Titzaveh: 28:30. Leiv Aharon and Psak Halacha

Harav Shimon Kalman Goldstein told us of an interesting shailah and and interesting and revealing discussion he had with a poseik. As it turns out, it has a direct connection to our parsha.

Some years ago, we posted the following.  Here is the part that is relevant, with a few minor changes, such as "Zatzal" for my father.

28:30:

 ונתת אל חשן המשפט  את האורים ואת התמים  והיו על לב אהרן בבאו לפני ה' ונשא אהרן את משפט בני ישראל על לבו לפני ה' תמיד

 The Urim Vetumim were on the heart of Aharon. This phrase, “ahl leiv Aharon,” does not merely describe the placement of the Urim Vetumim. As we will explain, it describes the condition necessary for the Urim Vetumim to function.
The Yalkut here: R’ Shimon Ben Yochai says, the heart that rejoiced when Moshe was elevated to greatness will wear the Urim Vetumim. Rav Chaim Shmuelevitz here in the ma’amar “Sheves Achim Gam Yochad” says that this means that a heart that feels such empathy for others is fit to wear the Urim Vetumim. To understand the messages that come through it, one has to have complete sensitivity and sympathy for Klal Yisroel. 
The Choshen only serves to amplify and augment that intrinsic empathy, which enables the wearer to correctly understand its messages. He connects this to the story in Brochos 31b with Eli Hakohen. When Eli told Chana that she was a drunk— shikora— she answered “no, Master...” And the Gemora there explains

ותען חנה ותאמר לא אדני אמר עולא ואיתימא רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמרה ליה לא אדון אתה בדבר זה ולא רוח הקודש שורה עליך שאתה חושדני בדבר זה איכא דאמרי הכי אמרה ליה לא אדון אתה לאו איכא שכינה ורוח הקודש גבך שדנתני לכף חובה ולא דנתני לכף זכות מי לא ידעת דאשה קשת רוח אנכי ויין ושכר לא שתיתי 

You are not a master in this matter, you have revealed that the divine spirit is not resting on you, for then you would know that I am not drunk, but rather I am overwhelmed with emotion and I am praying with total concentration. The pshat is that if Eli did not have the necessary sympathy to discern that she acted as she did because she was davening with great kavono because of her emotional desolation, he could not correctly interpret the message of the Urim Vetumim. He thought it said "shikora," drunk, when it actually said "kesarah," like Sarah, who also prayed to have a child.

The lesson is that you need the “leiv Aharon” in order for the Urim V’tumim to work. I once heard a nice story about empathy from my father Zatzal. The Baal Shem Tov once said that he learned ahavas Yisroel from a drunken peasant. Two drunken peasants were staggering through the street, holding on to each other, saying "John, you are my best friend!" "Ivan, you are my best friend!" Suddently, John pushes Ivan away and kicks him. Ivan, shocked, said, "John, why did you kick me? I am your best friend!" And John said, "I was sick last week, why didn’t you visit me!" Ivan answered, "But John, my best friend, how was I supposed to know you were sick? I didn’t know you were sick, I don’t see you every day!" John yelled at him, "You call yourself my friend? Why didn’t it hurt you when I was sick?" 

The question that came up was as follows: Babysitting is in high demand in Lakewood. Often, a babysitter agrees to do a job, and turns down other offers, and an hour before gets a call that they are cancelling - "My husband is too tired to go out," "We forgot," and so forth. Do they have to pay the babysitter? The posek immediately answered the obvious answer, which is that in CM 333:2 it says that if the employee turned down other work and cannot get a replacement job, the baalhabayis has to pay him or her like a poeil battel. In this case, poel battel would probably be the same as the going rate for babysitters. In fact, this is common knowledge in Lakewood. For example, if you agree to send your child to a playgroup, and later back out, and they can't find a replacement child, you have to pay the full 100% fee for the playgroup. Pashut.

So Rabbi Goldstein asked, why is this simple halacha not done by anyone in Lakewood when it comes to babysitters? He answered that in his family, the girls really don't want to babysit, but they do it because of social pressure, and they try to push it off on each other. When someone cancels, they're relieved! So that's why people don't pay for cancellation.

The problem is that this may be his experience with his own daughters, but there are plenty of girls that use every penny they earn to pay for seminary, to pay for their expenses after they get married, to pay for their education, and every penny matters to them.

The bigger problem is that a posek cannot try to justify an avlah because of his prejudice, because of his experience in his own family. Instead of rationalizing a bad hanhaga based on is private circumstances, he should ask about the expectations of this particular babysitter.

If the rule in 333 were based on "common practice" and "expectations," one could say that unless the babysitter had made it clear that she was relying on the job offer, the baalhabayis could say that he had no obligation to assume that the babysitter was one of those for whom it mattered, that she was makpid.  But the obligation is not based on "common practice." It is based on the din of Mazik. It is a mazik under Dinah d'Garmi. Just because others say "kra ksusi v'hipater" does not mean that you can go around being a mazik and relying on the kra ksusi people. You're a mazik, and you're chayav, unless you have demonstrable proof that you were told that you would not have to pay.

This is another example of the importance of the Leiv Aharon in psak. You can have the Choshen, and the Urim v'Tumim, you can be the biggest lamdan in the world. If you are missing the Leiv Aharon, you won't have the siyata dishmaya of asukei shmaita aliba d'hilchesa.