Many, many, meforshim emphasize that we do mitzvos sichliyos not because of our seichel. We do them because the RBSO commanded us to do them.
Examples, and I'm going to add more as time goes on:
The Netziv asks why it says על האדמה by Kibbud Av in the Aseres Hadibros. He answers that we all know that the ikker of mitzvos is in Eretz Yisrael. But we might think that this only applies to mitzvos that we only do because of Hashem's tzivui. But sichliyos would apply no less in chutz la'aretz. So Hashem says that this is not correct. Even Kibbud Av, the paradigm of sichliyos, is done because of Hashem's tzivui, because it is commanded among the Taryag. As such, it is more meaningful in Eretz Yisrael than it is in chutz la'aretz. You do it because of Hashem's tzivuy.
Reb Micha Berger mentioned a very clear example of this shittah, as follows:
See Arukh haShulchan OC 1:14:
On the other hand, Reb Moshe, for example, says, why does it say אם כסף תלוה את עמי העני והגר..... it's not an "if," it's a chiyuv. He explains that Hashem wants us to be rachamanim, to the point that even if there was no tzvuy we would do it on our own initiative. This seems to be farkehrt from the others.
Darash Moshe, Yisro.
Even the Netziv seems to say farkert in his hakdama to Breishis about Sefer Yesharim.
I've been wondering about this for decades. I've been arguing about this with Rav Dovid Zucker for at least thirty years. The idea that we should supress our human kindness and focus exclusively on the fact that it's a mitzva in the Torah makes it cold and bloodless. Imagine doing Kibbud Av, and saying to yourself, "I really don't care if he's hungry. But vibalt the RBSO was metzaveh on Kibbud, I'll get him something to eat." Pretty horrible, I think.
Last Friday, erev Chukas, my son Rav Mordechai said an excellent answer. It is one of those that, like the Gaon, is impossible to think of, and once told, everyone says "Well, that's obvious." It's not obvious at all. The problem is that people think they understand the answer when they do not.
To understand the answer, we need to begin with what will appear to be an impossible yesod:
- If a person does chesed only because he has a soft heart, he is a loving altruist, then he is not doing the mitzva properly.
- If a person does chesed only because the RBSO commanded it, he is not doing the mitzva properly.
- If a person does chesed for both reasons, because he is a loving humanist and because the RBSO commanded it, he is not doing the mitzva properly.
That seems to leave us thinking that no possiblities are left, and nobody can do the mitzva properly. But that is not the case.
We do chesed because the RBSO told us not only to do chesed, but that we should develop our souls to be baalei chesed. We do Chesed because the RBSO told us that the middah of chesed is a wonderful thing, and that He wants us to be BAALEI chesed, and for that we need to be baalei chesed in our hearts.
Hashem told us to kill all that live in an ir hanidachas, but that does not mean that we should be people that enjoy killing children. Hashem told us to do chesed, but that does mean that we should be people that enjoy doing chesed.
Not only should we enjoy doing chesed, but we should do it so many times, and work on ourselves so much, that we would do it even if Hashem would not command us to do it.
This is really an application of והלכת בדרכיו. Hashem does chesed not because it is imposed upon Him externally. Hashem does chesed because that is what Hashem does inherently. If you want to be מה הוא רחום, then you have to be an inherent Rachum, not a Rachum because someone is making do rachamim.
Reb Mordechai added that this is why the Gemara in Kiddushin relates the Parah by Dama with his Kibbud Av. For him, Kibbud was a sichlis. For us, they're both chukim. But Kibbud is a chok that is supposed to change us so that it becomes so natural that not doing it would be unthinkable. This is not the case with Parah, or kashrus, or korbanos. It's only by mitzvos of Chesed.
Rav Dr NJ Stone responded to the above sentence "so that it becomes so natural that not doing it would be unthinkable. This is not the case with Parah, or kashrus, or korbanos. It's only by mitzvos of Chesed." with an email titled "Why? Says Who?", and he continued and said
"why not the others ? maybe tahara should become second nature? kodshim ?"
All I can say is, I have no idea. Maybe he's right. Maybe the dinim of kedusha and kashrus are meant to teach us to develop spiritual sensitivity to whatever enhances or contradicts them. But I know that in the mah hu/af atta list of "vehalachta bidrachav" it doesn't say anything about kashrus.
Examples, and I'm going to add more as time goes on:
The Netziv asks why it says על האדמה by Kibbud Av in the Aseres Hadibros. He answers that we all know that the ikker of mitzvos is in Eretz Yisrael. But we might think that this only applies to mitzvos that we only do because of Hashem's tzivui. But sichliyos would apply no less in chutz la'aretz. So Hashem says that this is not correct. Even Kibbud Av, the paradigm of sichliyos, is done because of Hashem's tzivui, because it is commanded among the Taryag. As such, it is more meaningful in Eretz Yisrael than it is in chutz la'aretz. You do it because of Hashem's tzivuy.
Reb Micha Berger mentioned a very clear example of this shittah, as follows:
See Arukh haShulchan OC 1:14:
... וכן מיסודי הדת לעשות כל המצות לא מפני שהשכל מחייב כן, כגון במצות שבין אדם לחברו, אלא מפני שהקדוש ברוך הוא צוה אותנו לעשות כן. ולכן נאמר בדברות האחרונות בשבת ובכיבוד אב: כאשר צוך ה' אלהיך". משום דזה מוסכם בכל אום ולשון שהאדם צריך לנוח יום אחד בשבוע כדי לחזק כחותיו, וכן ההסכמה בכל אום ולשון לכבד הוריו. ולזה אמרה תורה: "שמור את יום השבת לקדשו כאשר צוך ה' אלהיך", "כבד את אביך ואת אמך כאשר צוך ה' אלהיך". כלומר: ולא מפני שהשכל מחייב כן. ובדברות הראשונות קודם חטא העגל לא הוצרכו לאזהרה זו, לפי שהיו כולם במדרגת מלאכים, כדכתיב: "אני אמרתי אלהים אתם, ובני עליון כולכם"....
Darash Moshe, Yisro.
ואם מזבח אבנים (כ כב)
בג' מקומות נאמר אם והוא חובה, אם מזבח אבנים, והוא חובה, אם כסף תלוה [להלן כב כד], והוא חובה, ואם תקריב מנחת בכורים [ויקרא ב יד], והוא חובה. עיין ברש"י. וצריך להבין הטעם. ונראה שאף שאמרו [תו"כ קדושים] אל יאמר א"א בבשר חזיר אלא אפשי ומה אעשה ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי כך, מ"מ יש דברים שהתורה מקפדת שגם ירצה זה ברצון נפש ממש, והוא שיכין עצמו וטבעו לרצות לעשות דברים טובים. שמה שנדמה לבני אדם שהוא קרבן יהיה אצלו דבר קביעות, וכחלק מטבעו. וזה הוא כוונת מזבח אבנים, שהוא דבר קבוע ולא נפסד לעולם. וכשיעשה רק מחמת שהוא כפוי מהקב"ה ליחן צדקה ולשמור שבת וכדומה, עלול שלא יהיה זה דבר קבוע. וגם הקביעות שייך שיהיה רק ע"י אמונה גדולה ובטחון בהשי"ת עם הידיעה שרק מידו הכל, שאז לא יהיה שום נסיון. ולכן נאמר אם, שאף שהוא חובה, רוצה השי"ת שיהיה זה בדרך רצון שהוא בלשון אם. וכן מצות הלואה וצדקה רצון התורה שירצה בלב שלם לא רק מצד כפיה ממצות התורה אלא שישנה טבעו שירצה בעצם לעשות טובות שרק בזה יהיה קיום העולם. וכן מנחת ביכורים ליתן הראשית להשי"ת ישנה טבעו שירצה ברצון גמור ולכן נכתב בהו אם שהוא לשון רצון
Even the Netziv seems to say farkert in his hakdama to Breishis about Sefer Yesharim.
I've been wondering about this for decades. I've been arguing about this with Rav Dovid Zucker for at least thirty years. The idea that we should supress our human kindness and focus exclusively on the fact that it's a mitzva in the Torah makes it cold and bloodless. Imagine doing Kibbud Av, and saying to yourself, "I really don't care if he's hungry. But vibalt the RBSO was metzaveh on Kibbud, I'll get him something to eat." Pretty horrible, I think.
Last Friday, erev Chukas, my son Rav Mordechai said an excellent answer. It is one of those that, like the Gaon, is impossible to think of, and once told, everyone says "Well, that's obvious." It's not obvious at all. The problem is that people think they understand the answer when they do not.
To understand the answer, we need to begin with what will appear to be an impossible yesod:
- If a person does chesed only because he has a soft heart, he is a loving altruist, then he is not doing the mitzva properly.
- If a person does chesed only because the RBSO commanded it, he is not doing the mitzva properly.
- If a person does chesed for both reasons, because he is a loving humanist and because the RBSO commanded it, he is not doing the mitzva properly.
That seems to leave us thinking that no possiblities are left, and nobody can do the mitzva properly. But that is not the case.
We do chesed because the RBSO told us not only to do chesed, but that we should develop our souls to be baalei chesed. We do Chesed because the RBSO told us that the middah of chesed is a wonderful thing, and that He wants us to be BAALEI chesed, and for that we need to be baalei chesed in our hearts.
Hashem told us to kill all that live in an ir hanidachas, but that does not mean that we should be people that enjoy killing children. Hashem told us to do chesed, but that does mean that we should be people that enjoy doing chesed.
Not only should we enjoy doing chesed, but we should do it so many times, and work on ourselves so much, that we would do it even if Hashem would not command us to do it.
This is really an application of והלכת בדרכיו. Hashem does chesed not because it is imposed upon Him externally. Hashem does chesed because that is what Hashem does inherently. If you want to be מה הוא רחום, then you have to be an inherent Rachum, not a Rachum because someone is making do rachamim.
Reb Mordechai added that this is why the Gemara in Kiddushin relates the Parah by Dama with his Kibbud Av. For him, Kibbud was a sichlis. For us, they're both chukim. But Kibbud is a chok that is supposed to change us so that it becomes so natural that not doing it would be unthinkable. This is not the case with Parah, or kashrus, or korbanos. It's only by mitzvos of Chesed.
Rav Dr NJ Stone responded to the above sentence "so that it becomes so natural that not doing it would be unthinkable. This is not the case with Parah, or kashrus, or korbanos. It's only by mitzvos of Chesed." with an email titled "Why? Says Who?", and he continued and said
"why not the others ? maybe tahara should become second nature? kodshim ?"
All I can say is, I have no idea. Maybe he's right. Maybe the dinim of kedusha and kashrus are meant to teach us to develop spiritual sensitivity to whatever enhances or contradicts them. But I know that in the mah hu/af atta list of "vehalachta bidrachav" it doesn't say anything about kashrus.
Your opening sentence is Rashi's position, but the Rambam and Ramban disagree. This is an involved machloqes. I should write it up. Here's a different discussion by R Assaf Bednarsh of the Gush, which I don't fully agree with (I think he goes too extreme on Rashi) from the VBM:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-27-ta%E2%80%99amei-ha-mitzvot
and part 2:
https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-28-ta%E2%80%99amei-ha-mitzvot-2
I'm looking forward to seeing what you have to say about this!
DeleteR' Wolbe, (Alei Shur vol II pg 152, in his essay that comes out against "Frumkeit"), quotes the Alter of Slabodka:
Delete“ואהבת לרעך כמוך — You should love your peer the way you love yourself. You do not love yourself because it is a mitzvah, rather, a simple love. And that is how you should love your peer.“
The Rambam famously makes a division between mitzvos sikhlios, which we should learn to internalize their values, and mitzvos shim'iyos, where we should say, "Takeh I think I would love pork, but what can I do, pork is assur!"
Now, what does that mean for mitzvos sikhlios, mishpatim, that are bein adam laMaqom?
And for that matter, how would the pure "אנא עבדא דקב"ה" model even start to deal with chovos ha'eivarim?
The Chinukh, with his repeated "האדם נפעל לפי פעולותיו"... Would he say this even by chuqim? Could be... we could say that chuqim are also there to refine us, even if we cannot understand how.
And I have a start of a write-up, that would be built atop to address where I would read R Bednarsh's sources differently than he did, at http://www.aishdas.org/asp/divine-command-theory
As for my teaser about Rashi... RAB understands Rashi as backing Divine Command Theory -- "morality" means "that which Hashem commanded". I understand him as saying that our motive should be "that which Hashem commanded", but that doesn't rule out His commanding it for our benefit (either as individuals or as a collective, perhaps depending on the mitzvah). I think he conflates motive with cause in his interpretation of a few of his sources. But I need to sit down and think it out more before writing.
Did I just say "motive with cause"? Maybe I should have said "I think he conflates our ideal motive for doing mitzvos with HQBH's Motive for commanding them." Better than calling it a cause, since that steps into the Euthyphro Dilemma.
DeleteOk, Reb Micha, time to put out "Hashkafa for Dummies." Euthypro???
DeleteEuthyphro is a book by Plato. (So much for your self-deprecating "for Dummies".) The title character is a young student of Socrates, and Socrates is leading him down the primrose path to realizing he doesn't know what piety is.
DeleteThe original question was: IS something pious beceause the gods ask it of humans, or do the gods ask it of humans because it's pious?
The modern version: Is something moral because Hashem commanded it? Or did Hashem command it because it's moral?
The problem: If you take the first route, then morality is arbitrary. Hashem could equally have chosen "Thou shalt kill." So why would following it make you "good"? But if you go the second route, then you're saying morality is so primary that even G-d Himself is subject to it -- by Hashem isn't subject to anything!
(My own resolution is that morality is that which has us furthering the goal for which we were made. A good person is like a good pen -- we're effective at what we were made for. Thus, Hashem chose what is moral because He chose how the universe would run and how souls operate. It's His choice, not something Hashem had to conform to. But morality is also not arbitrary relative to creation.)
So, if I have understood you correctly, the conclusion is that mitzvos of chesed should be done not because that is what we desire/are inclined naturally to do, but specifically because that is what the RBSO commands. And, at the same time, part of what the RBSO commands is that we should develop our own middos of chesed, so that we should naturally desire/be inclined to do acts of chesed, even had we not been commanded to do so. Is that an accurate description of R' Mordechai's explanation?
ReplyDeleteThat is exactly what he is saying.
DeleteSo, you ask, what about a person that is naturally inclined to do chesed? Should he pave over his natural altruism, and then start over again? I don't think so. I think this is like a person that is Nolad Mahul. An areil needs a bris. A nolad mahul does not have the pegam in the first place. Here, too. A natural altruist, perhaps as a yerusha from the Avos, is born with a ruchniyusdikkeh advantage. BUT, he needs to realize that his natural middah is a gift that enables him to be ve'holachta bidrochov, that it enables him to emulate the middah of the RBSO who is kulo tov.
Perhaps the person who is naturally inclined to do chesed should do a little introspection to identify the outer limits of this natural inclination, and then strive (as an eved Hashem) to overcome these limits, based on his submission to the RBSO's ratzon. In this manner, the extra amount of chesed that he does over and above the extent of his natural inclination will demonstrate that all of his chesed deeds were performed because the RBSO thus commanded, and not only because he was following his own natural proclivities.
DeleteI don't think that there is such a thing as "nolad mahul" in the realm of character, at least not to the extent that there would be NO need at all for him to work on submitting to the RBSO's ratzon with קבלת עול. After all, the RBSO made us as human beings, not malachim.
That is certainly true, and many of the people to whom I've told this idea to initially think that's what I'm saying, that inevitably, even a mitzva that is sichlis or a middah tova will have an application or circumstance where halacha says to behave in a manner inconsistent with natural chesed. I understand how you're using that idea in connection with a natural baal chesed - that of course his chesed is a maalah. But it is vital that he keep in mind that his chesed has to comport with the dinim in the Torah, not how he feels in his heart. His heart should follow the Torah. And that can't come naturally.
DeleteSee Arukh haShulchan OC 1:14:
ReplyDelete... וכן מיסודי הדת לעשות כל המצות לא מפני שהשכל מחייב כן, כגון במצות שבין אדם לחברו, אלא מפני שהקדוש ברוך הוא צוה אותנו לעשות כן. ולכן נאמר בדברות האחרונות בשבת ובכיבוד אב: כאשר צוך ה' אלהיך". משום דזה מוסכם בכל אום ולשון שהאדם צריך לנוח יום אחד בשבוע כדי לחזק כחותיו, וכן ההסכמה בכל אום ולשון לכבד הוריו. ולזה אמרה תורה: "שמור את יום השבת לקדשו כאשר צוך ה' אלהיך", "כבד את אביך ואת אמך כאשר צוך ה' אלהיך". כלומר: ולא מפני שהשכל מחייב כן. ובדברות הראשונות קודם חטא העגל לא הוצרכו לאזהרה זו, לפי שהיו כולם במדרגת מלאכים, כדכתיב: "אני אמרתי אלהים אתם, ובני עליון כולכם"....
How do we translate "לא מפני שהשכל מחייב כן, כגון במצות שבין אדם לחברו"?
Notice here RYME writes "la'asos kol hamitzvos" -- not whether or not mitzvos have reasons, but that our understanding that reason (or an aspect of the reason) shouldn't be our motive for observance. "Miyesodei hadas", no less! Would he consider the quote from the Alter I posted two days ago to be kefirah?
PERFECT MAMESH
Deletemah hu / af atta is surely a function of dveikut / halachta b'drachav
ReplyDeletebut i would think all the mitzvot are designed to create the instinctive sensitivity to/for/of torah values/ virtues
I think your first sentence inadvertently takes sides in the Litvish - Chassidish battles of the 19th cent. We can phrase the fork in the hashkafic road between them as how we define derekh Hashem. Is it the path TO Hashem, and thus about deveiqus. Or is it as in "vehalakhata bidrakhav"m the path Hashem Himself "walks", and thus about middos.
DeleteThe notion that the ultimate deveiqus is defines more by the person's being shaped by Hashem's Values than by an ecstatic experience of closeness to G-d is very very Litvish.
And if we phrase that in terms of
(1) middos as what it is we are shaping according to the Torah, and
(2) how Hashem is meitiv others, so mah-Hu-af-attah and the ideal we are trying to refine our middos toward is bein Adam lachaveiro
you have Mussar.
I discuss the fork in the hashkafic road in the introduction of my book. In the body of my book and the introduction to Shaarei Yosher, Rav Shimon Shkop actually defines qedushah in interpersonal terms, to the extent that bein adam laMaqom and learning Torah are defined as being qadosh because they are part of the self-maintenance necessary for being better at benefitting others.
For more info about my sefer, see
Widen Your Tent http://www.aishdas.org/asp/widen-your-tent
Amazing observation!
Deletehttps://youtu.be/LzHmunZxJeM
This morning I was reading one of Rav Bergmann's sefarim. He quotes his father in law as explaining
Deleteגדול הכנסת אורחים מקבלת פני השכינה
by saying that the latter brings you close to the Shechina, but the former is והלכת בדרכיו, which makes you more like the Shechina.
The Aruch Hashulchan and Reb Moshe are not in conflict: the AHS is discussing ACTS and Reb Moshe is discussing MIDDOS.
ReplyDeleteA high level of doing mitzvos is doing them to change our personality. More like Rav Yoshe Ber Soloveitchik that nihugei aveilus are to make us feel the sadness inside us (not like Rav Ahron Soloveichik that nihugei aveilus are external manifestations of inner feelings)
I don't understand. In all humility, my mehalach is flawless. Why look for anything else????
Delete