Yalkut Shimoni at the End of Iyov and Sukkos

התמלא בשכות עורו. אמר רבה בר בר חנה עתיד הקב"ה לעשות סוכה לצדיקים לע"ל (כתוב בישעיה רמז תק"ג). אמר ר' לוי כל מי שמקיים מצות סוכה בעולם הזה אף הקב"ה מושיבו בסוכתו של לויתן לעתיד לבא שנאמר התמלא בשכות עורו וגו', את מוצא בשעה שבאו יסורין על איוב היה עומד וקורא תגר אחר מדת הדין שנאמר מי יתן ידעתי ואמצאהו אדעה מלים יענני, אמר לו הקב"ה איוב מה אתה עומד ואומר מי יתן ידעתי ואמצאהו הרי עורו של לויתן שאני עתיד לעשות לצדיקים לעתיד לבא אם חסר אני מטלית אחת ממנו יש לך למלאת שנאמר התמלא בשכות עורו, וא"ת עורו של לויתן אינו דבר משובח, א"ר פנחס הכהן בר חייא ור' ירמיה בש"ר שמואל בר רב יצחק פספסי הרוחות שלו מכהות גלגל חמה שנאמר האומר לחרס ולא יזרח. ירפד חרוץ עלי טיט, אין לך מזוהם של דג אלא מקום רפידתו, ומקום רפידתו של לויתן יפה של זהב לכך נאמר ירפד חרוץ עלי טיט. ד"א האומר לחרס ולא יזרח מקום רפידתו חרוץ הוא זהב שנאמר ירפד חרוץ עלי טיט.

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This is from the Yalkut Shimoni toward the end of Iyov. The reason I posted it is this: The fortieth perek of Iyov, where Hashem responds to Iyov's bewildered complaint, has a surprising number of (40:21-22, and 40:31) apparent references to Sukkos. Some mefarshim have translated these words to mean very different things, (e.g., 'Tzalzel' either meaning 'shade' or 'a fish-processing knife'). Thus, התמלא בשכות עורו can mean "Can you riddle his skin with barbs," meaning "Would you, Iyov, dare to lay a hand on the Leviathan?". But others read it as meaning "Will you complete the Sukkah with (the Leviathan's) hide?"

The Yalkut (40:31) takes the latter approach, and says that the pesukim allude to the following dialogue between Hashem and Iyov.

I'll try to translate.

"Will you finish the Sukkah with the Leviathan's hide?" Rabbah bar bar Channa said: in the future, Hashem will make Sukkos for the Tzadikim. Rav Levi said, whoever fulfills the mitzva of Sukka in this world, Hashem will settle him in a Sukka made of the hide of the Leviathan in the coming future, as it says "Will you finish the Sukkah with the Leviathan's hide."
You find that when suffering came upon Iyov, he complained about his strict punishment and said "If only I could know, if only I could find Him, I would like to know what words He could use to explain what is happening to me!" Hashem answered, "You say you want to know? Look: I will one day make a Sukka from the hide of the Leviathan; if it will be missing one side, will you complete it? If you say 'with the skin of the Leviathan,' is that not praiseworthy?
Rav Pinchas... and Rav Yirmiah... say, the corners of his sides dim the orbit of the Sun... there is no more foul part of a fish than its bottom; the bottom of the Levyasan is as beautiful as gold."

(end of Yalkut)

I can't tell you what this mysterious Yalkut means. But I do know the following:
1. It has something to do with Sukkos.
2. Hashem comforted the tragedy-beset Iyov by showing a connection between the suffering of the righteous in this world and the fact that a Sukka is kosher even when missing one entire wall.
3. It says that only Hashem can complete the fourth side of a sukka made from the hide of the Leviathan.

This may be one of the many medrashim that is so hopelessly obscure as to remain hefker to whatever pshat people want to impute to it. But I am hoping to get a clear and convincing pshat before yomtov is over. I know that Reb Aharon Soloveichik has a pshat in the Yalkut. I have to think about it before posting it.

Chaim B of DivreiChaim.blogspot.com referred me to Reb Tzadok, who says (see comments; it's on page 244 of the hebrewbooks.org volume I) that the idea of Sukkas Oro Shel Liviyasan means that tzadikim, having overcome the Yetzer Hara in this world, will be seated in a sukka made from an animal that represents untrammeled physicality and driving desire, (the Liviyasan being a combination of the Nachash and Dagim, which profligately engage in pirya verivya,) and that this animal was the source of Adam and Chava's "kosnos ohr." Thank you, Chaim. But Reb Tzadok's pshat does not address the connection to Iyov.

See further in the comments for a pshat from the Yismach Moshe that does specifically talk about this Medrash. I'm still hoping for more kipshuto.

Thanks to the wonders of the internet, I received a pshat from the author of the earlier post (on Meva'eit), who said the following:

Sukka is known to represent Hashem's protection and Hashgacha (e.g. Erchin 32b ואגין זכותא עלייהו כי סוכה, and the interchange of Shomer Amo Yisrael Laad <-> Hapores Sukkat Shalom).

Sukka tells us that it is just so that one could be in a place where the 4th wall is missing, the 3rd is only tephach, and the other two are some combination of God, Lavud & Dophen Akumma. Yet, it is a kosher Sukka.(Note: The writer is referring to the halacha that a sukka does not need four walls. A Sukka is halachically adequate if it has two 'whole' walls, a third wall that is a few inches long, and no fourth wall at all. Even the two 'whole' walls don't have to be whole: they can be perforated and short and afford no privacy or protection.)

We often look around and see holes in this protection shield. Iyyov feels he was left out there, no Mechitzos, no protection around. But, when he would see the full picture, the full Sukka, it should become clear that what looked like nothing around was in fact part of the bigger Sukkat Livyatan. Would he then dare to "fix" it?

And now I understand what I had heard in the name of Reb Aharon Soloveichik. I was missing some minor elements of what Reb Aharon said, but having seen this pshat, it is clear to me that this is precisely what Reb Aharon meant.

The Sukka represents Hashem's protection, the Hashgacha Pratis of Klal Yisrael. But the Sukka, ironically, is the merest scrap of a house-- not only is the roof barely functional, but the walls are merely ideas or symbols of walls, more absent than present. The mussar haskeil is that davka this Sukka teaches us that Hashem's inexorable hashgacha, the hashgacha that makes us indestructible, seems to be so fragile, it's barely there, but is no less real for that. As Reb Aharon said, the Mechitza that is there ahl pi din (tzuras hapesach, pi tikra, omeid meruba ahl haparutz, lavud, dofen akuma, Gud Asik, Pasei Bira'os, and all the dinim we use to create mechitzos, as Reb Eli mentioned) can be more real than a physical mechitza. Similarly, the deficiencies and deprivations we perceive in our life experience are often only epiphenomena; the deeper reality of the richness of a Torah life is truer than that which our limited perception can comprehend.

Yasher Kochachem to Rabbanim and Doctoirim Gary S, Chaim B, and Eli E!

I later saw that the Aruch Laner mentions this medrash too: 

Aruch Laner explains that by showing Iyov the halacha that a sukkah is composed of only three walls, of which the third may be only a tefach, Hashem demonstrated that this world's existence is temporary, as it serves as a portal of passage to the eternal world of the souls in the World-to-Come.  If a person 's lot is one of suffering, he need  not feel that he has been deprived of his deserved comfort and tranquility.  In fact, this state of difficulty should provide hope that his true reward will be eternal.   

A Remarkable Brisker Chumra on S'chach

I saw the strangest thing in the Brisker sefer (anonymous, printed taf shin nun gimmel) on the moadim. He brings that R Chaim was choshesh for the shitta of the Magen Avraham in OC 14 and 649 that l’chatchila only a bar chiyuva can make tzitzis or put s'chach on or even tie the lulav together.  Not only was Reb Chaim machmir like the Magen Avraham, but he was machmir more than the Magen Avraham:  The Magen Avraham says that the whole thing is just Lechatchila; and also, if the child is thirteen we are not chosheish that he is not a gadol.  Apparently, Reb Chaim was chosheish to such an extent that when he found out that a thirteen year old had put the s'chach on a sukkah, he refused to eat there, because he didn't want to rely on Chazaka d'Rabba for De'oraysas.  (Obviously, Reb Chaim wasn't machmir because the Magen Avraham says so, he was machmir because held like the Magen Avraham, but not just as a chashash lechatchila, but mei'ikar hadin.)

R Moshe talks about this chumrah in Igros OC 5 page 133. He disagrees with the Magen Avraham on two points.

First, he (and the Mishneh Brura) says that the Rema that says that yeish omrim that a woman should not tie tzitzis is not because of Rabbeinu Tam’s limud that the same way women cannot write tefillin because “uchsavtam/uk’shartam” which teaches that “kol she’yeshno b’kshira yeshno b’ksiva,” applies to all mitzvos, but rather the Maharam’s “dabeir el b’nei Yisrael v’assu lahem tzitzis,” which teaches “v’lo akum,” and which the Maharam says also excludes women.  The Maharam is specific to the mitzvoh of tzitzis and unrelated to other mitzvos.

Second, he says that even Rabbeinu Tam, whose shitta excluding a non-bar-chiyuva the Magen Avraham says would apply to tzitzis, agudas lulav, and putting up the s'chach, does not really hold like that. Rabbeinu Tam’s limud only applies to objects which have no meaning outside of the mitzva, like lulav agud and tzitzis. But where the object exists independent of the mitzva, like schach l’sheim tzeil, even Rabbeinu Tam would agree a woman can make the sukka.

Reb Moshe notes that Tosfos in Gittin 45a DH Kol says that RT said his din on tzitzis and igud lulav and asks that Rabbeinu Tam’s din should also apply to passel a women from putting on the s'chach, and this is shver from ganba’ch and Tosfos bleibs shver. R Moshe says that the answer to Tosfos’ kashe is that Rabbeinu Tam never meant to apply his din to Sukka.

Then R Moshe has an interesting discussion about the idea of Hiddur Mitzva. He says that the Machzor Vitri’s pshat in hiddur mitzvoh is that you should be machmir to do the mitzva fully with all chumros and things that contribute to the kiyum hamitzva, and has nothing to do with esthetic beauty. For example, putting on a gartel is a noi mitzva because it adds to Hikone. So it could be that Rabbeinu Tam holds like the Machzor Vitri, and holds that the din hiddur we find by igud lulav is because it contributes to holding the minim together, which is a to’eles in the kiyum hamitzva. If so, this explains Rabbeinu Tam’s reason for not having a women do the igud, because igud is not just hiddur, it is a part of the tzuras hamitzva. (See Parshas Lech Lecha, Breishis 12:1, where I bring from the Brisker Rov that the ambiguity of the identity of the land to which Avram was told to go was intended so that the halicha should be mitzva atzma and not just hachanoa.)

I am told that the Briskers hold that the Rambam holds like the Machzor Vitri.

This was originally posted in '06, and has been edited for stylistic consistency and clarity.  Mostly the former. 



However, you can’t go too far with this shittoh, because the Rambam in 7 Issurei Mizbei’ach says that from the possuk by Hevel, which says that Hevel brought beautiful korbonos and “vayisha Hashem el Hevel v’ehl minchoso” shows that whatever mitzvoh you do should be done in a beautiful way. The Rambam there says clearly that he is referring to esthetic beauty. But it is also interesting that he doesn’t prove it from the regular din of hiddur mitzvoh or from v’anveihu. Also, the Brisker Rov somewhere in his pirush on the gemora says that there is a special din by korbonos of ‘meichelveihem,’ which is not connected to ‘v’anveihu.’

So the bottom line is that R Moshe holds that even if you are machmir like Rabbeinu Tam, it would only apply to tzitzis and lulov, but not other mitzvos. But b’etzem he holds like the Maharam, which is limited to tzitzis, and would be mattir even lulov. He says he is surprised that the Bikkurei Yaakov paskened like RT, and he paskens instead like the Maharam. Imagine how surprised he would be at the story of R Chaim not sitting in the Sukkoh because a boy of thirteen put on the schach, and maybe he didn’t have shtei sa’aros.