Rashi Bereishis 2:5
כי לא המטיר. וּמַ"טַ לֹא הִמְטִיר? לְפִי שֶׁאָדָם אַיִן לַעֲבֹד אֶת הָאֲדָמָה, וְאֵין מַכִּיר בְּטוֹבָתָם שֶׁל גְּשָׁמִים, וּכְשֶׁבָּא אָדָם וְיָדַע שֶׁהֵם צֹרֶךְ לָעוֹלָם, הִתְפַּלֵּל עֲלֵיהֶם וְיָרְדוּ וְצָמְחוּ הָאִילָנוֹת וְהַדְּשָׁאִים:
בראשית רבה כב ח
אמר רבי יוחנן: הבל היה גבור מקין, שאין ת"ל ויקם, אלא מלמד שהיה נתון תחתיו. אמר לו: שנינו בעולם, מה את הולך ואומר לאבא?! נתמלא עליו רחמים. מיד עמד עליו והרגו. מן תמן אינון אמרין: טב לביש לא תעביד, וביש לא ימטי לך.
from the Torah Forum.
שאלתי פעם לאחד מגדו"י סתירה מזה למבואר בתומר דבורה לידבק בדרכיו ולתת טובה גם למי שמשתמש באותה טובה כנגד המיטיב, שכך בו"ע נוהג עמנו ברחמיו וברוב חסדיו.
(תומר דבורה
מִי אֵל כָּמוֹךָ
מוֹרֶה עַל הֱיוֹת הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא מֶלֶךְ נֶעֱלַב, סוֹבֵל עֶלְבּוֹן מַה שֶׁלֹּא יְכִילֵהוּ רַעְיוֹן. הֲרֵי אֵין דָּבָר נִסְתָּר מֵהַשְׁגָּחָתוֹ בְּלִי סָפֵק, וְעוֹד אֵין רֶגַע שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיֶה הָאָדָם נִזּוֹן וּמִתְקַיֵּם מִכֹּחַ עֶלְיוֹן הַשּׁוֹפֵעַ עָלָיו, וַהֲרֵי תִּמְצָא שֶׁמֵּעוֹלָם לֹא חָטָא אָדָם נֶגְדּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיֶה הוּא בְּאוֹתוֹ הָרֶגַע מַמָּשׁ שׁוֹפֵעַ שֶׁפַע קִיּוּמוֹ וּתְנוּעַת אֵבָרָיו, עִם הֱיוֹת שֶׁהָאָדָם חֹטֵא בַכֹּחַ הַהוּא לֹא מְנָעוֹ מִמֶּנּוּ כְּלָל אֶלָּא סוֹבֵל הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא עֶלְבּוֹן כָּזֶה לִהְיוֹת מַשְׁפִּיעַ בּוֹ כֹּחַ תְּנוּעוֹת אֵבָרָיו, וְהוּא מוֹצִיא אוֹתוֹ כֹּחַ בְּאוֹתוֹ רֶגַע בְּחֵטְא וְעָוֹן וּמַכְעִיס וְהַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא סוֹבֵל. וְלֹא תֹאמַר שֶׁאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִמְנוֹעַ מִמֶּנּוּ הַטּוֹב הַהוּא ח"ו שֶׁהֲרֵי בְכֹחוֹ בְּרֶגַע כְּמֵימְרָא לְיַבֵּשׁ יָדָיו וְרַגְלָיו כְּעֵין שֶׁעָשָׂה לְיָרָבְעָם, וְעִם כָּל זֹאת שֶׁהַכֹּחַ בְּיָדוֹ לְהַחְזִיר הַכֹּחַ הַנִּשְׁפָּע הַהוּא וְהָיָה לוֹ לוֹמַר כֵּיוָן שֶׁאַתָּה חֹטֵא נֶגְדִּי תֶּחֱטָא בְּשֶׁלְּךָ לֹא בְשֶׁלִּי, לֹא מִפְּנֵי זֶה מָנַע טוּבוֹ מִן הָאָדָם אֶלָּא סָבַל עֶלְבּוֹן, וְהִשְׁפִּיעַ הַכֹּחַ וְהֵטִיב לְאָדָם טוּבוֹ. הֲרֵי זֶה עֶלְבּוֹן וְסַבְלָנוּת מַה שֶׁלֹּא יְסֻפָּר וְעַל זֶה קוֹרְאִים מַלְאֲכֵי הַשָּׁרֵת לְהַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא מֶלֶךְ עָלוּב וְהַיְנוּ אוֹמְרוֹ מִי אֵל כָּמוֹךָ, אַתָּה אֵל בַּעַל חֶסֶד הַמֵּטִיב, אֵל בַּעַל כֹּחַ לִנְקֹם וְלֶאֱסֹף אֶת שֶׁלְּךָ, וְעִם כָּל זֹאת אַתָּה סוֹבֵל וְנֶעֱלָב עַד יָשׁוּב בִּתְשׁוּבָה. הֲרֵי זוֹ מִדָּה שֶׁצָּרִיךְ הָאָדָם לְהִתְנַהֵג בָּהּ רְצוֹנִי הַסַּבְלָנוּת וְכֵן הֱיוֹתוֹ נֶעֱלַב אֲפִלּוּ לְמַדְרֵגָה זוֹ וְעִם כָּל זֹאת לֹא יֶאֱסֹף טוֹבָתוֹ מִן הַמְּקַבֵּל:)
ואמר לי שסיבת ה"איסור" המבואר במהר"ל היא מצד "השחתה" שמשליך לריק את השפע שאצלו למקום שאינו "כלי" לאותה טובה. (כי הכרה בטובה היא הכלי קיבול של הטובה). וזהו בדרגה הרגילה. אך כאשר הוא בדרגה גבוהה שרוצה לידבק בדרכיו באותו עניין הרי הוא "מתקן" אצל עצמו שכוונתו לאותה דביקות והליכה בדרכיו, אם כן אין כאן השחתה.
ואציין כי אותו גדול עולם מפורסם הוא בדורינו כאמון הוא על תורת המהר"ל.
פחד יצחק - שבת
דיעויין מהר"ל בספר גור אריה פרשת בראשית שכתב דאסור לעשות טובה למי שאינו מכיר בטובה. וחוזינן דאף על גב דעשיית טובה להזולת היא מצוה מוטלת עלינו מצד חובת ההליכה בדרכיו של מקום, ורואים אנו כי גם הכופרים בטובתו של מקום מקבלים הם רוב טובה, ואם כן הלא אין טעם להפקעת חובת החסד למי שאינו מכיר בטובה הנעשית לו, ועל כרחנו לומר כי מכוון דישנם שני סוגי הנהגה, הנהגה של צדיק וטוב לו רשע ורע לו, והנהגה של צדיק ורע לו רשע וטוב לו, הנה לא נאמרה לנו חובת ההליכה בדרכיו יתברך אלא בנוגע לדרכי ההנהגה של צדיק וטוב לו רשע ורע לו, אבל בנוגע לההנהגה השניה של צדיק ורע לו רשע וטוב לו, לא תתכן לגמרי ההליכה בדרכיה. (ועיין פרק קמא דברכות דעתו של ר' מאיר בדבר אחד שלא ניתן למשה.) וזה הוא לשון הכתוב הנסתרות להשם אלקינו והנגלות לנו ולבנינו. דהיינו שיש הנהגה שאנחנו מחוייבים להתדמות לדרכיה, והנהגה זו היא ההנהגה הנגלית לנו במשפט התורה של שכר לצדיק ועונש לרשע; ויש הנהגה שאינה שייכת לנו ומופקעת היא לגמרי מגדר דימוי אליה. והנהגה זו היא
ברכת פרץ
עוד לפרשת בשלח
בפסוק זה א׳ ואנוהו אמרו חז״ל בשבת דף קל״ג הוי דומה לו מה הוא חנון
ורחום אף אתה, והרמב״ם ז״ל פ״א מה׳ דעות ה״ו כתב דרשה זו מקרא דוהלכת
בדרכיו מה הוא רחום וכו׳ וכ״כ רבינו יונה ז״ל ומקור לזה כתבו שהוא מספרי
עקב, וכנראה מדברי הרמב״ם ז״ל שזהו מ״ע מדאורייתא.
ובגמרא סנהדרין
צ״ב אמרינן כל אדם שאין בו דעת אסור לרחם עליו שנאמר כי לא עם
בינות הוא ע״כ לא ירחמנו עושהו וכו׳ ואר״א כל הנותן פתו למי שאין בו
דעה יסורין באין עליו שנאמר וכו׳, והדברים צריכים ביאור גדול שהרי אפילו
על בהמה ושאר בע״ח מצוה לרחם וכדאמרי׳ בב״מ דפ״ה א׳ שא״ל רבי לאמתי׳
שבקי׳ ורחמיו על כל מעשיו כתיב וכש״כ על אדם שאין לו דעת כגון תינוק
שבודאי מצוה לרחם עליו לעזרו ולמלטו מכל צרה וצוקה [בזמן שאין לו מי שיפקח עליו].
ונראה בזה בעה״י שני גדרים אמיתיים, הא׳ דלא נקרא רחמנות אלא במה
שלא חייבתו תורה ליתן וכגון אם הוא עני הרי חייבה תורה לכל ישראל להחזיק
בידו ולתת לו די מחסורו וכן השבת אבדתו ופריקה וטעינה וכל כיו״ב אין
העושה נקרא מרחם אלא עושה מה שחייב לעשות וזה ודאי חייבים לעשות לכל
אדם ואפילו למי שאין בו דעה ואפילו אם הוא אדם בעל מדות קשות
ורעות שכל זמן שהוא בכלל אחיך חייבים לעשות לו כמו לשאר עניים בישראל
אבל ענין רחמנות המדובר כאן הוא לענין לתת לו לפנים משורת הדין דהיינו יותר
ממה שחייבה תורה וזהו מצד הרחמנות בלבד ועל זה אמרו שלמי שאין בו
דעת אסור לרחם עליו והטעם הוא כמשי״ת בעה״י.
נראה עוד גדר בזה דודאי מי שאין בו דעת כלל לא לטובה ולא לרעה וכגון
ילד וכיו״ב מצוה גדולה להטיב עמו ולרחם עליו בכל מה שהוא צריך, אבל הגמרא מדברת כאן במי שאין בו דעת
ורגש להכיר טובה למטיבים עמו ולהכניע מפניהם, אבל יודע לבעוט בגאוה ובוז על המרחמים עליו ומביט עליהם
כעל נחות דרגא הנכנעים לפני מעלתו, ותחת להכיר ביקרת לבבם של
המרחמים עליו ובמעלת נדיבותם, הוא חושב בדמיונו שכ״ז הוא חולשה מצד מרחמיו
שהם כמוכרחים להטיב עמו וכי לכבוד הוא להם להיות בתומכיו [ובדמיונו מצוייר כאילו זה מגיע לו באמת וכמעט שקובע בלבו שהוא עושה טובה
עמהן במה שהוא נאות לקבל מהן] והוא מתברך בלבבו לאמר הנה נסל לידו בר גש שאפשר
למצוץ ממנו, וכבר הוא אצלו בהרשימה של משועבדיו
והתוצאות מהרחמנות על שכזה המה רעות רבות. א׳] שמחזקים את גאותו של זה
ובפרט שיתגאה בלבו על מטיביו, ב] שהלה אינו מכיר טובה כלל וזהו מדה רעה מאד וכמשי״ת בעה״י, הג׳] שבכדי להראות שהוא
איננו נכנש כלל להכיר טובה, הוא אדרבא משלם רעה תחת טובה ימעמיד פנים כאילו הוא נפגע
מהם, וכאילו הדריכו את מנוחתו, וכידוע ליודעים. וזהו מדה מנוולת מאד. והד׳]
שבהתנהגות כזו, הרי הוא מעורר קפידה גדולה אצל מטיביו, ונמצאו באים לידי שנאה תחת
אהבה שהיתה ראוי׳ לבא ע״י מדת ההטבה. והה׳] שכפי
הרגיל האדם הלזה מוסיף ודורש
בתוקף שיחזרו ויתנו לו ורוצה שיתנו לו דוקא
כאשר בתחילה, וכפי הרגיל גם
בפעם השני מרחמים עליו קצת אבל לא כאשר בתחילה והלזה מתקצף כאילו גזלוהו כו׳, וסוף סוף שדורש וחוזר ודורש עד שמסתלקין
ממנו לגמרי וִהלזה נעשה שונא גמור למטיביו, וכ״ז בא ע״י שרחמו על
מי שאין בו דעה להכיר טובה, ולכן אחז״ל שאסור לרחם על כיו״ב כי תוצאותיו
הם צרות רבות ורעות וכשנ״ת. ואפשר דזהו נמי מה שאמרו דיסורין
באין עליו [על המרחם למי שאין בו דעה] דהיינו יסורין של שילום רעה תחת טובה,
ושל קטטות ושנאה כבושה וכנ״ל. ועיין עוד חולין דף קל״ג ע״א בגליון. ומניעת הכרת הטובה הוא מדה רעה ומרה
מאוד ועיקר הדרך לאהבת השי״ת ביארו החסיד בחו״ה על יסוד הכרת הטובה. והנני מעתיק מש״כ בברייתא משנת ר״א
פ״ז וז״ל אין לך קשה לפני הקב״ה יותר מכפיית טובה וכו׳ לא נטרד אדה״ר
מג״ע אלא על כפיית הטובה כו׳ אף אבותינו במדבר לא כעס עליהן
הקב״ה אלא על כפיית הטובה כו׳ וכשהיו אבותינו בארץ לא היו רוב
חטאותיהן אלא כפיית טובה כו׳ מפני מה ענש הכתוב ביותר לכפויי הטובה מפני שהוא כעין
כפירה בעיקר כו׳ האדם הזה הוא כופה טובתו של חברו למחר הוא כופה טובתו
של קונו כו׳ שכפיית הטובה הוקשה לכפירה בעיקר כו׳, הזהרו שלא
תכפו טובה שכפוי טובה אינו יכול לקבל מלכות שמים, וע״ש.
ספר חסידים סימן תתרכ״ו
אל ירחם אדם על אכזריים ואל ירחם על מי שאינו מרחם על עצמו ואל ירחם על מי שהוא כפוי טובה. כגון מי שמרמה את חבירו וגונב וגוזל ומסית ומדיח ורכיל ואל ירחם על מי שאינו מרחם על עצמו. כגון מפזר מעות שלא לצורך ואינו נשמע כשיועצים אותו אל תוציא המעות בהבלים. ואל ירחם על מי שהוא משחק ואומר תרחם עלי שלא יביישני ולא יכלימני פלו' שהרויח עלי זהוב טוב שיתבייש המשחק ועוד שלא יהא מסייע לעוברי עבירה ועל כפויי טוב' כגון שנתן לו אחד והוא אומר לאחרים מה שלכלבים הי' משליך הוא נותן לי ומשקר כשעושים לו טובה מכריעו לכף חובה ולאותו אדם כל זמן שנהנה ממנו שלא יאמרו לו וכשלא יהנהו יהפך לשנוא לו. ויש כשיעשו לו טובות הרבה ואם פעם אחת יעשה לו דבר מועט שאין מקובל לו ישכח כל הטובות בשביל דבר מועט ולא יחזיק לו טובה וכל מי שאינו מחזיק טובה לכל מי שיעשה לו טובה כגון שלא בפניו לא יברך את ה' שזימן לו מה שזה נותן:
להבדיל אלף אלפי הבדלות
I am posting the following only because I think it is interesting how this sheigitz oved avoda zara sonei Yisroel expressed some of the ideas found above, as an example of חכמה בגוים. Obviously, there is a lot here that is deeply offensive to the Jewish mind and heart.
Quam multi indigni luce sunt! Tamen dies oritur.
My translation- There are many who are unworthy of light. And yet, the sun rises.
De Beneficiis (On Benefits / On Kindness), Book I, Chapter 1, Section 12.
BOOK IV.
I.
Of all the matters which we have discussed, Aebutius Liberalis, there is none more essential, or which, as Sallust says, ought to be stated with more care than that which is now before us: whether the bestowal of benefits and the return of gratitude for them are desirable objects in themselves. Some men are found who act honourably from commercial motives, and who do not care for unrewarded virtue, though it can confer no glory if it brings any profit. What can be more base than for a man to consider what it costs him to be a good man, when virtue neither allures by gain nor deters by loss, and is so far from bribing any one with hopes and promises, that on the other hand she bids them spend money upon herself, and often consists in voluntary gifts? We must go to her, trampling what is merely useful under our feet: whithersoever she may call us or send us we must go, without any regard for our private fortunes, sometimes without sparing even our own blood, nor must we ever refuse to obey any of her commands. "What shall I gain," says my opponent, "if I do this bravely and gratefully?" You will gain the doing of it—the deed itself is your gain. Nothing beyond this is promised. If any advantage chances to accrue to you, count it as something extra. The reward of honourable dealings lies in themselves. If honour is to be sought after for itself, since a benefit is honourable, it follows that because both of these are of the same nature, their conditions must also be the same. Now it has frequently and satisfactorily been proved, that honour ought to be sought after for itself alone.
II. In this part of the subject we oppose the Epicureans, an effeminate and dreamy sect who philosophize in their own paradise, amongst whom virtue is the handmaid of pleasures, obeys them, is subject to them, and regards them as superior to itself. You say, "there is no pleasure without virtue." But wherefore is it superior to virtue? Do you imagine that the matter in dispute between them is merely one of precedence? Nay, it is virtue itself and its powers which are in question. It cannot be virtue if it can follow; the place of virtue is first, she ought to lead, to command, to stand in the highest rank; you bid her look for a cue to follow. "What," asks our opponent, "does that matter to you? I also declare that happiness is impossible without virtue. Without virtue I disapprove of and condemn the very pleasures which I pursue, and to which I have surrendered myself. The only matter in dispute is this, whether virtue be the cause of the highest good, or whether it be itself the highest good." Do you suppose, though this be the only point in question, that it is a mere matter of precedence? It is a confusion and obvious blindness to prefer the last to the first. I am not angry at virtue being placed below pleasure, but at her being mixed up at all with pleasure, which she despises, whose enemy she is, and from which she separates herself as far as possible, being more at home with labour and sorrow, which are manly troubles, than with your womanish good things.
III. It was necessary to insert this argument, my Liberalis, because it is the part of virtue to bestow those benefits which we are now discussing, and it is most disgraceful to bestow benefits for any other purpose than that they should be free gifts. If we give with the hope of receiving a return, we should give to the richest men, not to the most deserving: whereas we prefer a virtuous poor man to an unmannerly rich one. That is not a benefit, which takes into consideration the fortune of the receiver. Moreover, if our only motive for benefiting others was our own advantage, those who could most easily distribute benefits, such as rich and powerful men, or kings, and persons who do not stand in need of the help of others, ought never to do so at all; the gods would not bestow upon us the countless blessings which they pour upon us unceasingly by night and by day, for their own nature suffices them in all respects, and renders them complete, safe, and beyond the reach of harm; they will, therefore, never bestow a benefit upon any one, if self and self interest be the only cause for the bestowal of benefits. To take thought, not where your benefit will be best bestowed, but where it may be most profitably placed at interest, from whence you will most easily get it back, is not bestowal of benefits, but usury. Now the gods have nothing to do with usury; it follows, therefore, that they cannot be liberal; for if the only reason for giving is the advantage of the giver, since God cannot hope to receive any advantages from us, there is no cause why God should give anything.
IV. I know what answer may be made to this. "True; therefore God does not bestow benefits, but, free from care and unmindful of us, He turns away from our world and either does something else, or else does nothing, which Epicurus thought the greatest possible happiness, and He is not affected either by benefits or by injuries." The man who says this cannot surely hear the voices of worshippers, and of those who all around him are raising their hands to heaven and praying for the success both of their private affairs and those of the state; which certainly would not be the case, all men would not agree in this madness of appealing to deaf and helpless gods, unless we knew that their benefits are sometimes bestowed upon us unasked, sometimes in answer to our prayers, and that they give us both great and seasonable gifts, which shield us from the most terrible dangers. Who is there so poor, so uncared for, born to sorrow by so unkind a fate, as never to have felt the vast generosity of the Gods? Look even at those who complain and are discontented with their lot; you will find that they are not altogether without a share in the bounty of heaven, that there is no one upon whom something has not been shed from that most gracious fount. Is the gift which is bestowed upon all alike, at their birth, not enough? However unequally the blessings of after life may be dealt out to us, did nature give us too little when she gave us herself?
V. It is said, "God does not bestow benefits." Whence, then, comes all that you possess, that you give or refuse to give, that you hoard or steal? whence come these innumerable delights of our eyes, our ears, and our minds? whence the plenty which provides us even with luxury—for it is not our bare necessities alone against which provision is made; we are loved so much as actually to be pampered—whence so many trees bearing various fruits, so many wholesome herbs, so many different sorts of food distributed throughout the year, so that even the slothful may find sustenance in the chance produce of the earth? Then, too, whence come the living creatures of all kinds, some inhabiting the dry land, others the waters, others alighting from the sky, that every part of nature may pay us some tribute; the rivers which encircle our meadows with most beauteous bends, the others which afford a passage to merchant fleets as they flow on, wide and navigable, some of which in summer time are subject to extraordinary overflowings in order that lands lying parched under a glowing sun may suddenly be watered by the rush of a midsummer torrent?
What of the fountains of medicinal waters? What of the bursting forth of warm waters upon the seashore itself? Shall I
"Tell of the seas round Italy that flow,
Which laves her shore above, and which below;
Or of her lakes, unrivalled Larius, thee,
Or thee, Benacus, roaring like a sea?"
VI. If any one gave you a few acres, you would say that you had received a benefit; can you deny that the boundless extent of the earth is a benefit? If any one gave you money, and filled your chest, since you think that so important, you would call that a benefit. God has buried countless mines in the earth, has poured out from the earth countless rivers, rolling sands of gold; He has concealed in every place huge masses of silver, copper and iron, and has bestowed upon you the means of discovering them, placing upon the surface of the earth signs of the treasures hidden below; and yet do you say that you have received no benefit? If a house were given you, bright with marble, its roof beautifully painted with colours and gilding, you would call it no small benefit. God has built for you a huge mansion that fears no fire or ruin, in which you see no flimsy veneers, thinner than the very saw with which they are cut, but vast blocks of most precious stone, all composed of those various and different substances whose paltriest fragments you admire so much; he has built a roof which glitters in one fashion by day, and in another by night; and yet do you say that you have received no benefit? When you so greatly prize what you possess, do you act the part of an ungrateful man, and think that there is no one to whom you are indebted for them? Whence comes the breath which you draw? the light by which you arrange and perform all the actions of your life? the blood by whose circulation your vital warmth is maintained? those meats which excite your palate by their delicate flavour after your hunger is appeased? those provocatives which rouse you when wearied with pleasure? that repose in which you are rotting and mouldering? Will you not, if you are grateful, say—
"'Tis to a god that this repose I owe,
For him I worship, as a god below.
Oft on his altar shall my firstlings bleed,
See, by his bounty here with rustic reed
I play the airs I love the livelong day,
The while my oxen round about me stray."
The true God is he who has placed, not a few oxen, but all the herds on their pastures throughout the world; who furnishes food to the flocks wherever they wander; who has ordained the alternation of summer and winter pasturage, and has taught us not merely to play upon a reed, and to reduce to some order a rustic and artless song, but who has invented so many arts and varieties of voice, so many notes to make music, some with our own breath, some with instruments. You cannot call our inventions our own any more than you call our growth our own, or the various bodily functions which correspond to each stage of our lives; at one time comes the loss of childhood's teeth, at another, when our age is advancing and growing into robuster manhood, puberty and the last wisdom-tooth marks the end of our youth. "We have implanted in us the seeds of all ages, of all arts, and God our master brings forth our intellects from obscurity."
VII. "Nature," says my opponent, "gives me all this." Do you not perceive when you say this that you merely speak of God under another name? for what is nature but God and divine reason, which pervades the universe and all its parts? You may address the author of our world by as many different titles as you please; you may rightly call him Jupiter, Best and Greatest, and the Thunderer, or the Stayer, so called, not because, as the historians tell us, he stayed the flight of the Roman army in answer to the prayer of Romulus, but because all things continue in their stay through his goodness. If you were to call this same personage Fate, you would not lie; for since fate is nothing more than a connected chain of causes, he is the first cause of all upon which all the rest depend. You will also be right in applying to him any names that you please which express supernatural strength and power: he may have as many titles as he has attributes.
VIII. Our school regards him as Father Liber, and Hercules, and Mercurius: he is Father Liber because he is the parent of all, who first discovered the power of seed, and our being led by pleasure to plant it; he is Hercules, because his might is unconquered, and when it is wearied after completing its labours, will retire into fire; he is Mercurius, because in him is reasoning, and numbers, and system, and knowledge. Whither-soever you turn yourself you will see him meeting you: nothing is void of him, he himself fills his own work. Therefore, most ungrateful of mortals, it is in vain that you declare yourself indebted, not to God, but to nature, because there can be no God without nature, nor any nature without God; they are both the same thing, differing only in their functions. If you were to say that you owe to Annaeus or to Lucius what you received from Seneca, you would not change your creditor, but only his name, because he remains the same man whether you use his first, second, or third name. So whether you speak of nature, fate, or fortune, these are all names of the same God, using his power in different ways. So likewise justice, honesty, discretion, courage, frugality, are all the good qualities of one and the same mind; if you are pleased with any one of these, you are pleased with that mind.
IX. However, not to drift aside into a distinct controversy, God bestows upon us very many and very great benefits without hope of receiving any return; since he does not require any offering from us, and we are not capable of bestowing anything upon him: wherefore, a benefit is desirable in itself. In it the advantage of the receiver is all that is taken into consideration: we study this without regarding our own interests. "Yet," argues our opponent, "you say that we ought to choose with care the persons upon whom we bestow benefits, because neither do husbandmen sow seed in the sand: now if this be true, we follow our own interest in bestowing benefits, just as much as in ploughing and sowing: for sowing is not desirable in itself. Besides this you inquire where and how you ought to bestow a benefit, which would not need to be done if the bestowal of a benefit was desirable in itself: because in whatever place and whatever manner it might be bestowed, it still would be a benefit." We seek to do honourable acts, solely because they are honourable; yet even though we need think of nothing else, we consider to whom we shall do them, and when, and how; for in these points the act has its being. In like manner, when I choose upon whom I shall bestow a benefit, and when I aim at making it a benefit; because if it were bestowed upon a base person, it could neither be a benefit nor an honourable action.
X. To restore what has been entrusted to one is desirable in itself; yet I shall not always restore it, nor shall I do so in any place or at any time you please. Sometimes it makes no difference whether I deny that I have received it, or return it openly. I shall consider the interests of the person to whom I am to return it, and shall deny that I have received a deposit, which would injure him if returned. I shall act in the same manner in bestowing a benefit: I shall consider when to give it, to whom, in what manner, and on what grounds. Nothing ought to be done without a reason: a benefit is not truly so, if it be bestowed without a reason, since reason accompanies all honorable action. How often do we hear men reproaching themselves for some thoughtless gift, and saying, "I had rather have thrown it away than have given it to him!" What is thoughtlessly given away is lost in the most discreditable manner, and it is much worse to have bestowed a benefit badly than to have received no return for it; that we receive no return is the fault of another; that we did not choose upon whom we should bestow it, is our own. In choosing a fit person, I shall not, as you expect, pay the least attention to whether I am likely to get any return from him, for I choose one who will be grateful, not one who will return my goodness, and it often happens that the man who makes no return is grateful, while he who returns a benefit is ungrateful for it. I value men by their hearts alone, and, therefore, I shall pass over a rich man if he be unworthy, and give to a good man though he be poor; for he will be grateful however destitute he may be, since whatever he may lose, his heart will still be left him.
XI. I do not fish for gain, for pleasure, or for credit, by bestowing benefits: satisfied in doing so with pleasing one man alone, I shall give in order to do my duty. Duty, however, leaves one some choice; do you ask me, how I am to choose? I shall choose an honest, plain, man, with a good memory, and grateful for kindness; one who keeps his hands off other men's goods, yet does not greedily hold to his own, and who is kind to others; when I have chosen such a man, I shall have acted to my mind, although fortune may have bestowed upon him no means of returning my kindness. If my own advantage and mean calculation made me liberal, if I did no one any service except in order that he might in turn do a service to me, I should never bestow a benefit upon one who was setting out for distant and foreign countries, never to return; I should not bestow a benefit upon one who was so ill as to be past hope of recovery, nor should I do so when I myself was failing, because I should not live long enough to receive any return. Yet, that you may know that to do good is desirable in itself, we afford help to strangers who put into our harbour only to leave it straightway; we give a ship and fit it out for a shipwrecked stranger to sail back in to his own country. He leaves us hardly knowing who it was who saved him, and, as he will never return to our presence, he hands over his debt of gratitude to the gods, and beseeches them to fulfil it for him: in the meanwhile we rejoice in the barren knowledge that we have done a good action. What? when we stand upon the extreme verge of life, and make our wills, do we not assign to others benefits from which we ourselves shall receive no advantage? How much time we waste, how long we consider in secret how much property we are to leave, and to whom! What then? does it make any difference to us to whom we leave our property, seeing that we cannot expect any return from any one? Yet we never give anything with more care, we never take such pains in deciding upon our verdict, as when, without any views of personal advantage, we think only of what is honourable, for we are bad judges of our duty as long as our view of it is distorted by hope and fear, and that most indolent of vices, pleasure: but when death has shut off all these, and brought us as incorrupt judges to pronounce sentence, we seek for the most worthy men to leave our property to, and we never take more scrupulous care than in deciding what is to be done with what does not concern us. Yet, by Hercules, then there steals over us a great satisfaction as we think, "I shall make this man richer, and by bestowing wealth upon that man I shall add lustre to his high position." Indeed, if we never give without expecting some return, we must all die without making our wills.
XII. It may be said, "You define a benefit as a loan which cannot be repaid: now a loan is not a desirable thing in itself." When we speak of a loan, we make use of a figure, or comparison, just as we speak of law as; the standard of right and wrong, although a standard is not a thing to be desired for its own sake. I have adopted this phrase in order to illustrate my subject: when I speak of a loan, I must be understood to mean something resembling a loan. Do you wish to know how it differs from one? I add the words "which cannot be repaid," whereas every loan both can and ought to be repaid. It is so far from being right to bestow a benefit for one's own advantage, that often, as I have explained, it is one's duty to bestow it when it involves one's own loss and risk: for instance, if I assist a man when beset by robbers, so that he gets away from them safely, or help some victim of power, and bring upon myself the party spite of a body of influential men, very, probably incurring myself the same disgrace from which I saved him, although I might have taken the other side, and looked on with safety at struggles with which I have nothing to do: if I were to give bail for one who has been condemned, and when my friend's goods were advertised for sale I were to give a bond to the effect that I would make restitution to the creditors, if, in order to save a proscribed person I myself run the risk of being proscribed. No one, when about to buy a villa at Tusculum or Tibur, for a summer retreat, because of the health of the locality, considers how many years' purchase he gives for it; this must be looked to by the man who makes a profit by it. The same is true with benefits; when you ask what return I get for them, I answer, the consciousness of a good action. "What return does one get for benefits?" Pray tell me what return one gets for righteousness, innocence, magnanimity, chastity, temperance? If you wish for anything beyond these virtues, you do not wish for the virtues themselves. For what does the order of the universe bring round the seasons? for what does the sun make the day now longer and now shorter? all these things are benefits, for they take place for our good. As it is the duty of the universe to maintain the round of the seasons, as it is the duty of the sun to vary the points of his rising and setting, and to do all these things by which we profit, without any reward, so is it the duty of man, amongst other things, to bestow benefits. Wherefore then does he give? He gives for fear that he should not give, lest he might lose an opportunity of doing a good action.
XIII. You Epicureans take pleasure in making a study of dull torpidity, in seeking for a repose which differs little from sound sleep, in lurking beneath the thickest shade, in amusing with the feeblest possible trains of thought that sluggish condition of your languid minds which you term tranquil contemplation, and in stuffing with food and drink, in the recesses of your gardens, your bodies which are pallid with want of exercise; we Stoics, on the other hand, take pleasure in bestowing benefits, even though they cost us labour, provided that they lighten the labours of others; though they lead us into danger, provided that they save others, though they straiten our means, if they alleviate the poverty and distresses of others. What difference does it make to me whether I receive benefits or not? even if I receive them, it is still my duty to bestow them. A benefit has in view the advantage of him upon whom we bestow it, not our own; otherwise we merely bestow it upon ourselves. Many things, therefore, which are of the greatest possible use to others lose all claim to gratitude by being paid for. Merchants are of use to cities, physicians to invalids, dealers to slaves; yet all these have no claim to the gratitude of those whom they benefit, because they seek their own advantage through that of others. That which is bestowed with a view to profit is not a benefit. "I will give this in order that I may get a return for it" is the language of a broker.
XIV. I should not call a woman modest, if she rebuffed her lover in order to increase his passion, or because she feared the law or her husband; as Ovid says:
"She that denies, because she does not dare
To yield, in spirit grants her lover's prayer."
Indeed, the woman who owes her chastity, not to her own virtue, but to fear, may rightly be classed as a sinner. In the same manner, he who merely gave in order that he might receive, cannot be said to have given. Pray, do we bestow benefits upon animals when we feed them for our use or for our table? do we bestow benefits upon trees when we tend them that they may not suffer from drought or from hardness of ground? No one is moved by righteousness and goodness of heart to cultivate an estate, or to do any act in which the reward is something apart from the act itself; but he is moved to bestow benefits, not by low and grasping motives, but by a kind and generous mind, which even after it has given is willing to give again, to renew its former bounties by fresh ones, which thinks only of how much good it can do the man to whom it gives; whereas to do any one a service because it is our interest to do so is a mean action, which deserves no praise, no credit. What grandeur is there in loving oneself, sparing oneself, gaining profit for oneself? The true love of giving calls us away from all this, forcibly leads us to put up with loss, and foregoes its own interest, deriving its greatest pleasure from the mere act of doing good.
XV. Can we doubt that the converse of a benefit is an injury? As the infliction of injuries is a thing to be avoided, so is the bestowal of benefits to be desired for its own sake. In the former, the disgrace of crime outweighs all the advantages which incite us to commit it; while we are urged to the latter course by the appearance of honour, in itself a powerful incentive to action, which attends it.
I should not lie if I were to affirm that every one takes pleasure in the benefits which he has bestowed, that everyone loves best to see the man whom he has most largely benefited. Who does not thinks that to have bestowed one benefit is a reason for bestowing a second? and would this be so, if the act of giving did not itself give us pleasure? How often you may hear a man say, "I cannot bear to desert one whose life I have preserved, whom I have saved from danger. True, he asks me to plead his cause against men of great influence. I do not wish to do so, yet what am I to do? I have already helped him once, nay twice." Do you not perceive how very powerful this instinct must be, if it leads us to bestow benefits first because it is right to do so, and afterwards because we have already bestowed somewhat? Though at the outset a man may have had no claim upon us, we yet continue to give to him because we have already given to him. So untrue is it that we are urged to bestow benefits by our own interest, that even when our benefits prove failures we continue to nurse them and encourage them out of sheer love of benefiting, which has a natural weakness even for what has been ill-bestowed, like that which we feel for our vicious children.
XVI. These same adversaries of ours admit that they are grateful, yet not because it is honourable, but because it is profitable to be so. This can be proved to be untrue all the more easily, because it can be established by the same arguments by which we have established that to bestow a benefit is desirable for its own sake. All our arguments start from this settled point, that honour is pursued for no reason except because it is honour. Now, who will venture to raise the question whether it be honourable to be grateful? who does not loathe the ungrateful man, useless as he is even to himself? How do you feel when any one is spoken of as being ungrateful for great benefits conferred upon him by a friend? Is it as though he had done something base, or had merely neglected to do something useful and likely to be profitable to himself? I imagine that you think him a bad man, and one who deserves punishment, not one who needs a guardian; and this would not be the case, unless gratitude were desirable in itself and honourable. Other qualities, it may be, manifest their importance less clearly, and require an explanation to prove whether they be honourable or no; this is openly proved to be so in the sight of all, and is too beautiful for anything to obscure or dim its glory. What is more praiseworthy, upon what are all men more universally agreed, than to return gratitude for good offices?
XVII. Pray tell me, what is it that urges us to do so? Is it profit? Why, unless a man despises profit, he is not grateful. Is it ambition? why, what is there to boast of in having paid what you owe? Is it fear? The ungrateful man feels none, for against this one crime we have provided no law, as though nature had taken sufficient precautions against it. Just as there is no law which bids parents love and indulge their children, seeing that it is superfluous to force us into the path which we naturally take, just as no one needs to be urged to love himself, since self-love begins to act upon him as soon as he is born, so there is no law bidding us to seek that which is honourable in itself; for such things please us by their very nature, and so attractive is virtue that the disposition even of bad men leads them to approve of good rather than of evil. Who is there who does not wish to appear beneficent, who does not even when steeped in crime and wrong-doing strive after the appearance of goodness, does not put some show of justice upon even his most intemperate acts, and endeavour to seem to have conferred a benefit even upon those whom he has injured? Consequently, men allow themselves to be thanked by those whom they have ruined, and pretend to be good and generous, because they cannot prove themselves so; and this they never would do were it not that a love of honour for its own sake forces them to seek a reputation quite at variance with their real character, and to conceal their baseness, a quality whose fruits we covet, though we regard it itself with dislike and shame. No one has ever so far rebelled against the laws of nature and put off human feeling as to act basely for mere amusement. Ask any of those who live by robbery whether he would not rather obtain what he steals and plunders by honest means; the man whose trade is highway robbery and the murder of travellers would rather find his booty than take it by force; you will find no one who would not prefer to enjoy the fruits of wickedness without acting wickedly. Nature bestows upon us all this immense advantage, that the light of virtue shines into the minds of all alike; even those who do not follow her, behold her.
