The confluence of Parshas Kedoshim and Springtime, the month of Nissan, highlights an interesting idea. Rashi in the beginning of the parsha says Kedoshim Tihyu– Perushim tihyu, holiness means abstinence from illicit pleasures. According to Rashi, Kedoshim Tihyu does not introduce any new obligation or prohibition; it only reinforces our standing obligation to observe the mitzvos of the Torah. The Ramban, on the other hand, sees it as a new admonition. According to him, it is a moral directive to abstain from physical pleasures. Kadeish Atzmecha Bemuttar Lecha: Some things, although not prohibited by the laws of the Torah, should be avoided; self indulgence, purposeless pleasure, runs contrary to Kedusha.
In the month of Aviv/Nissan, we make a bracha on blossoming fruit trees. (See video link at bottom.) In this bracha we praise Hashem for His gift of Beauty to mankind, for creating beautiful things in the world so that we will have pleasure from them. But is this not inconsistent with the Ramban? How does enjoying the trees of Spring enhance our holiness? And if it can't enhance our kedusha, are we not told to avoid it? Aren’t we instructed to aspire to an ascetic life of pure spirituality, in which worldly pleasures are no more than attractive nuisances?
And what about the Mishna in the Avos 3:9; hamafsik mimishnaso ve’omeir mah no’eh ilon zeh...ke’ilu mischayeiv benafsho. How is this consistent with the bracha on ilanos? Doesn’t this Mishna imply that indulgence in esthetic enjoyment is sinful, and inherently inconsistent with Torah? Is it a sin to have pleasure from the beauty of the trees, or is it a good thing?
And what about Shimon Hakapar's famous dictum that the Nazir is a chotei, a sinner, for inflicting suffering upon himself by voluntarily prohibiting the enjoyment of wine? That he is a sinner for rejecting the good that God has created in the world, that he is doing damage to his soul by being a Porush? How can this be? He is not a chotei! He is being mekayeim the mitzvah of Kedoshim Tihyu!
The Chasam Sofer shows us how to answer these questions.
The Chasam Sofer here says: Our idea of kedusha is not rejection of the beauty and pleasures of the world. We do not deny what the world has to offer; on the contrary. We appreciate all the world has to offer, even the things the Torah forbade. As Rashi brings from Reb Elozor ben Azariah on the passuk later (20:26) Va’avdil eschem min ha’amim lihyos li, we do not say that chazir is disgusting; it must be very tasty , but we abstain from it because of God’s command. We are prushim not because we despise gashmius, but instead because we want to be daveik to kedusha, and kedusha grows from prishus and mitzvos. But even in prishus, we must not withdraw from society; our prishus is be’hakheil, while fully involved with others, because intimate association with Klal Yisroel potentiates kedusha. And even in prishus, we do find ways to enjoy the world, as we see in the bracha of flowering trees. But we do so only in ways that enhance our pursuit of kedusha.
Prishus is not a tachlis. Prishus is a tool that reminds us of the danger of making hana’as olam hazeh into a tachlis. If you make it a tachlis, you will inevitably ruin yourself. But if you learn prishus, you will be able to train yourself to make a life of kedusha in which hana’os olam hazeh are not only "not a distraction," but which can even enhance your kedusha.
Same with Nezirus. The gemara calls him a chotei for being a porush. The Gemara on 2b says, how can a Nazir be called “na’eh,” beautiful, when being a Nazir is an Aveirah! What’s that supposed to mean? What happened to Kedoshim Tihyu? The answer is that Prishus is a mitzvah, and it is an aveirah, and it is worthless, and it is priceless. The good Prishus is not intended to denigrate olam hazeh. Prishus is necessary to remind us of our priorities. Sometimes, as the Rambam says in Dei’os, a person has to become a porush gomur for a while. As Tosfos says there in Nazir 2b, yes, prishus is a sin, but the mitzvah is greater than the sin; when there is no alternative, an asei is docheh a lo sa’aseh. But the real hope is that he will then be able to return to a temperate life that will fully engage the world and its beauty and pleasure– but only to that degree that it is not mafsik his mishneh.
A perfect example of this concept is our minhag of Yom Kippur. At Maariv after Kol Nidrei, when we are full from our pre-Yom Kippur Seudos, when we have eaten more then usual because of the Mitzva of eating on erev Yom Kippur, we say Baruch Sheim out loud, like Malachim. But after Ne'ilah, having spent twenty six hours fasting and praying, we say Baruch Sheim quietly. But aren't we so much more like angels after Ne'ilah? The answer is that being angelic has nothing to do with whether we have food in our stomachs or whether we are hungry. It depends on what dominates our minds, what how we plan to comport ourselves, it has to do with what is the dominant thought in our minds. Erev Yom Kippur, we are excited and nervous about spending the next day in focused avodas hashem. That is a Malach, even if his stomach is full. Motza'ei Yom Kipppur, we're thinking about where our car keys are and whether the rov and the shliach tzibbur, those anti-semites, are going to kvetch through krias shma and shmoneh esrei. That is not a Malach, even if his stomach is empty.
As I've remarked before, the position of asceticism in Jewish hashkafa is very complex; the Lubavitcher Rebbe's doctors have said that he would pour salt over his food so that he would derive no pleasure from it; the Satmerer Rov did not sleep in a bed, but napped in a chair, for most of his life. On the other hand, other gedolim lived a life that, while thoroughly examined and disciplined, did not eschew the simple pleasures of life. Prishus is not only very complex, but it is also a very personal choice, and is certainly not a lifestyle which the average person should embrace. The Gemara teaches us the remarkable lesson that Prishus, although it is a mitzvah, that it can help a person become a kadosh, it can also be sinful and even destructive. Anytime the same act can variously be meritorious and sinful, one must tread carefully. But I think that the Chasam Sofer's careful and nuanced approach is true le'chol hadei'os and for all people.
לא נהניתי אפילו באצבע קטנה. דאמרינן במדרש עד שאדם מתפלל שיכנס תורה לתוך גופו יתפלל שלא יכנסו מעדנים לתוך גופו ומייתי הא עובדא דרבי: Tosfos Ksuvos 104a
Here is an engaging video of two gentlemen making the Bracha on Blossoming Trees. I am not responsible for the contents, not for the F16 and particularly especially not the Kabbalah.
Birkas Ha'ilanos
UPDATE:
In Spring 2017 I wrote something new on this bracha -
The Bracha on the Beauty of Spring - Birkas Ha'Ilanos
Showing posts with label Asceticism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Asceticism. Show all posts
Thursday, May 1, 2008
Sunday, April 22, 2007
Kedoshim, Vayikra 19:2. Kedoshim Tihyu. Asceticism in Jewish Thought.
What is the place of Asceticism in Judaism? The reflexive answer most Jews would give is that Judaism does not approve of asceticism; we do not believe in celibacy, we celebrate holidays with feast and song, we begin Shabbos and YomTov with a toast over a glass of wine. Indeed, Rashi’s explanation of Kedoshim Tihyu is that we should stay away from arayos that the Torah prohibited, as enumerated in the end of the previous parshah, implying that Kedusha comprises avoidance of the enumerated issurim and no more. However, the Ramban seems to advocate a much broader and restrictive approach.
The Ramban here, in his famous “naval birshus hatorah” drasha, condemns the pursuit of physical pleasure. According to the Ramban, then, why does the Gemora say that a Nazir is a chotei? It would seem that according to the Ramban, a Nazir is the opposite of a chotei; he is to be commended for abandoning worldly pleasures! In fact, the Ramban answers this question. The Ramban says that the Nazir brings a korban upon finishing his nezirus NOT because he refrained from wine during the course of his nezirus. On the contrary: He brings the korban because by of the precipitous drop in his kedusha caused by ENDING his nezirus. The words of the Ramban in Bamidbar 6:14:
"the reason for the Korban Chatas brought by the Nazir upon completion of his term of Nezirus ... is for having completed his Nezirut, and this is the sin. He had reached a very high level of holiness and closeness to Hashem, and he then descended from that level. He should have remained a Nazir for the rest of his life, living out his days as a Nazir sanctified to serving Hashem... He must atone for having returned to the 'tumah' of worldly pleasures."
Indeed, the Gemora there does say that Shimon Hatzadik, while objurgating the usual motives for accepting nezirus, honored the “nazir min hadarom” whose nezirus seemed to be intended to break his physical desires and pleasures. And see Taanis 11b, machlokes Shmuel and Rebbi Elazar and Reish Lakish whether yosheiv b’taanis, one who habitually fasts, is nikra chotei or kadosh or chassid (although Rashi and Tosfos have opposite interpretations of Reish Lakish.) The conclusion of the Gemara there, certainly in Reb Elazar, and maybe the maskana l’halachah, is that if he is “matzi l’tzi’urei nafshei,” if he is “capable of standing the suffering,” he’s nikra kadosh, and if not, he’s a chotei. And it is obvious that Nezirus is a means of deveikus; after all, Shimshon and Shmuel (see Nazir 66a) were Nezirim. (Yes, Avshalom was also a Nazir. But sometimes the refusal of the option of great achievement generates horrible degradation.)
The Mesilas Yesharim Be'vei'ur Middas Haprishus apparently takes the approach of Rebbi Eliezer in Taanis, saying that good prishus is to eschew things that are excessive and unnecessary, and bad prishus is prishus from things that are necessary, so a yosheiv beta’anis is good if he can take it, and bad if he can’t. ( I believe that what he means by "able to take it and not able to take it" is that prishus is good if you can do it without anger and resentment, if you can do it with a sense of gratification. If you obsess over the thing you are missing, that means you are not ready.) However, a careful reading indicates that prishus is necessary only because satisfying physical desires leads to specific aveiros.
Is there any reason other than that to avoid these pleasures? That is, is prishus from taivos good because taivos are inherently bad (ein lecho ben chorin/nemo liber est qui corpore servit), or only because they are thresholds to other things. Difference would be in case of some craving that cannot lead to issurim. No bitul torah, no arayos, no gaiva. Like smoking if it didn’t cause health problems. R’ Rudderman in his Sichos, page 345, mentions that there is a tachlis of “lehagbir haseichel al haratzon,” but he brings no sources.
Reb Moshe in the teshuvos (YD 3:35) talks about smoking marijuana, and he prohibits it. Not only does he prohibit it, he also calls it an issur de'oraysa, on the basis of the malkos in the parsha of Ben Sorer U'Moreh (Sanhedrin 72b regarding the passuk in Ki Seitzei), and Tumah, and an Issur Chamur, since it only satisfies a tayva and has no benefit to one's function. He also says that using marijuana transgresses the Ramban's Kedoshim Tihyu. However, the teshuva is based on his assumption that smoking marijuana creates a powerful addiction that will, like Chazal say about Ben Sorer U'Moreh, lead to violent antisocial behavior to satisfy this urge. One might argue that while this certainly applies to drugs such as heroin, it may not apply to marijuana. Never having smoked pot, I can't say from my own experience, but there are many who say that pot is no more addictive than alcohol.
R’ Chaim Shmuelevitz in Parshas Noso, #72, brings the Rambam that says that good nezirus is a “nodeir lashem derech kedusha, and bad nezirus is “ha’omeir harieni nazir im e’eseh kach vakach o im lo e’eseh.” R’ Shmuelevitz understands this to mean that good nezirus is one that is “ne’esis lesheim milchama im hayeitzer.” In other words, it is meritorious to use asceticism as a weapon in the battle against the evil inclination, but it is wrong to say that if I do or don’t do a certain thing, I will punish myself through self abnegation.
R’ Yakov Kaminetzki here seems to learn that the purpose of prishus is so that mevakshri hashem should be distinct from the common man– not that it is an intrinsically good thing, but that it is a means of reminding the tzadik that he what he seeks is different than what the masses of unthinking people seek. The unenlightened seek physical gratification and see it as the greatest good, while we see it as trivial and merely a means to enable us to serve Hashem.
See also below in Bechukosai, Vayikra 26:5, on “V’achaltem lachm’chem lasova.” R’ Moshe there says that it is better to eat a little and have it misboreich b’mei’av rather than eating the usual amount, because an adam hashaleim avoids involvement with physical pleasure.
I want to suggest an approach that may be consistent with the underlying idea of most of the above concepts of Prishus. It is rather simple, maybe even banal. Simplicity is underrated. It does not really address the high perishus Chazal encourage for people who want to be zocheh to Kinyan Torah-- Pas Bamelech Tochal and "ellah be'mi she'meimis atzmo ale'ha. It addresses only the most basic aspect of Prishus that is necessary for every member of Klal Yisrael.
The gemara Menachos 87 brings that Rav Yochanan says “ke'sheim she’hakol yafeh liketores, kach hakol ra le’yayin.” “Just as the sound of talk is good for the manufacture of the Ketores, so it is deleterious to the manufacture of wine.” Literally, this means that while compounding the Ketores, one should talk rhythmically, and this will improve the final product, while one should be silent when working with wine, because talk might cause it to sour. However, the Be’er Yosef from R’ Yitzchak Salanter says that the reason for the association and contrast, instead of mere recitation of difference, is that wine represents ta’anugei olam hazeh, worldly pleasures, and besamim represents hana’os ruchni’os, spiritual pleasures. One should avoid talk, i.e., preoccupation or deep interest in the former, but the more one delves into the latter, the better it is for him. The pleasures of a voluptuary become his quiddity. Even if you enjoy certain mosros, unnecessary pleasures, don’t talk about them- you can enjoy eating or drinking, but don't talk too much, or become obsessed with them.
It’s interesting to think about the way we look down upon gourmets as hedonistic pleasure seekers but we don't think less of people who love smells and music. What characterizes certain pleasures as animalistic and not others? Why don’t dignified people want to eat in public, but don't mind being seen enjoying the besamim at havdalah? Why do the Roshei Yeshiva all put their forks down when the photographer comes by? It’s not because only rational creatures enjoy smell, because dogs and cats love certain scents, and roll around in them in ecstasy. Certain animals also enjoy music. So what is it that makes eating so base?
When I first brought this question up, I said, as a joke, that the other pleasures, like smell and music, can be enjoyed with your mouth closed. Harav Reuven Feinstein made a beautiful observation. He said that eating is fundamentally selfish, and what you eat cannot be shared. But the enjoyment of music and smell can be shared with others.
I later realized that there is a more fundamental difference: eating and sex satisfy a craving, a hunger. While one may desire to hear music or to smell a fragrance, that desire doesn’t create a craving, or a hunger. As Umberto Eco says in the introductory essay to his anthology On Ugliness, there are different types of beauty: there is "beauty" that primarily arouses a desire to possess and use the object, and there is "beauty" that primarily elicits an appreciation of the object. The former is a vulgar and crude beauty; the latter is an objective aesthetic judgment. It is, one might say, dispassionate.
Having said this, we can see what prishus means in Jewish thought. Sensual pleasure itself is not intrinsically a negative thing. But the drive, the craving and pursuit of pleasure, is both unworthy and dangerous. One must aspire to eliminate that craving. When Prishus is employed for this purpose, it is laudable. This worthy Prishus comprises many levels. The initial level is to develop the discipline that enables one to resist physical cravings. The next level is to eliminate the driving urge that they often generate. Ultimately, one comes to a level where his decision to indulge or refrain is completely uninfluenced by any physical desire. Even this level, though, does not mean that one does not enjoy the food when he eats it; it only means that he choice to indulge was not driven or even influenced by desire.
The lesson is, then, that Prishus, at the most basic level, means the ability to learn to control and modify carnal desire such that one enjoys them as one would enjoy fragrance or music.
A very strong proof: Reb Elazar Hakappar, who said that a Nazir is called sinful for having deprived himself from wine, is the same Reb Elazar Hakappar who said, in Pirkei Avos, "Hakin'ah veha'ta'ava vehakavod motzi'in es ha'adam min ha'olam."
I think that this concept of prishus underlies the multitude of variations discussed by the baalei hashkafa.
This said, the question remains: does asceticism advance this goal? In other words, does self abnegation train a person to not want the thing he forcefully denies himself, or does it generate resentment and greater desire and lust? We all know that people that fall off the wagon tend to fall harder and farther, and that the final result is worse than if no attempt had been made at all. On the other hand, the Gemara does say that sexual desire is diminished by chastity and inflamed by satisfying it-- "it hungers when it is satisfied and it is sated when it is hungered." The answer is that this is exactly what Shimon Hatzadik meant, and this is what the Gemara in Taanis means, and this is what the Mesilas Yeshorim means. If a person is not ready, then his asceticism will be self-destructive, and will only serve to inflame his desire. At best, he will gain nothing from his attempts, only suffering for nothing. Only a person who is mentally and physically ready, and disciplined enough, to use asceticism to tame his baser desires, is encouraged to do so.
The Asceticism that Chazal encourage, then, is a means toward the end of learning to control and modify desire, to modify the desire for eating and for sexual relations so that they resemble the more refined sensual pleasure we derive from fragrance and music.
I suppose you could say, though it would be misleading if you hadn't read this post, that Chazal were aesthetes, not ascetics.
Tosfos Ksuvos 104a
לא נהניתי אפילו באצבע קטנה. דאמרינן במדרש עד שאדם מתפלל שיכנס תורה לתוך גופו יתפלל שלא יכנסו מעדנים לתוך גופו ומייתי הא עובדא דרבי:
The Ramban here, in his famous “naval birshus hatorah” drasha, condemns the pursuit of physical pleasure. According to the Ramban, then, why does the Gemora say that a Nazir is a chotei? It would seem that according to the Ramban, a Nazir is the opposite of a chotei; he is to be commended for abandoning worldly pleasures! In fact, the Ramban answers this question. The Ramban says that the Nazir brings a korban upon finishing his nezirus NOT because he refrained from wine during the course of his nezirus. On the contrary: He brings the korban because by of the precipitous drop in his kedusha caused by ENDING his nezirus. The words of the Ramban in Bamidbar 6:14:
"the reason for the Korban Chatas brought by the Nazir upon completion of his term of Nezirus ... is for having completed his Nezirut, and this is the sin. He had reached a very high level of holiness and closeness to Hashem, and he then descended from that level. He should have remained a Nazir for the rest of his life, living out his days as a Nazir sanctified to serving Hashem... He must atone for having returned to the 'tumah' of worldly pleasures."
Indeed, the Gemora there does say that Shimon Hatzadik, while objurgating the usual motives for accepting nezirus, honored the “nazir min hadarom” whose nezirus seemed to be intended to break his physical desires and pleasures. And see Taanis 11b, machlokes Shmuel and Rebbi Elazar and Reish Lakish whether yosheiv b’taanis, one who habitually fasts, is nikra chotei or kadosh or chassid (although Rashi and Tosfos have opposite interpretations of Reish Lakish.) The conclusion of the Gemara there, certainly in Reb Elazar, and maybe the maskana l’halachah, is that if he is “matzi l’tzi’urei nafshei,” if he is “capable of standing the suffering,” he’s nikra kadosh, and if not, he’s a chotei. And it is obvious that Nezirus is a means of deveikus; after all, Shimshon and Shmuel (see Nazir 66a) were Nezirim. (Yes, Avshalom was also a Nazir. But sometimes the refusal of the option of great achievement generates horrible degradation.)
The Mesilas Yesharim Be'vei'ur Middas Haprishus apparently takes the approach of Rebbi Eliezer in Taanis, saying that good prishus is to eschew things that are excessive and unnecessary, and bad prishus is prishus from things that are necessary, so a yosheiv beta’anis is good if he can take it, and bad if he can’t. ( I believe that what he means by "able to take it and not able to take it" is that prishus is good if you can do it without anger and resentment, if you can do it with a sense of gratification. If you obsess over the thing you are missing, that means you are not ready.) However, a careful reading indicates that prishus is necessary only because satisfying physical desires leads to specific aveiros.
Is there any reason other than that to avoid these pleasures? That is, is prishus from taivos good because taivos are inherently bad (ein lecho ben chorin/nemo liber est qui corpore servit), or only because they are thresholds to other things. Difference would be in case of some craving that cannot lead to issurim. No bitul torah, no arayos, no gaiva. Like smoking if it didn’t cause health problems. R’ Rudderman in his Sichos, page 345, mentions that there is a tachlis of “lehagbir haseichel al haratzon,” but he brings no sources.
Reb Moshe in the teshuvos (YD 3:35) talks about smoking marijuana, and he prohibits it. Not only does he prohibit it, he also calls it an issur de'oraysa, on the basis of the malkos in the parsha of Ben Sorer U'Moreh (Sanhedrin 72b regarding the passuk in Ki Seitzei), and Tumah, and an Issur Chamur, since it only satisfies a tayva and has no benefit to one's function. He also says that using marijuana transgresses the Ramban's Kedoshim Tihyu. However, the teshuva is based on his assumption that smoking marijuana creates a powerful addiction that will, like Chazal say about Ben Sorer U'Moreh, lead to violent antisocial behavior to satisfy this urge. One might argue that while this certainly applies to drugs such as heroin, it may not apply to marijuana. Never having smoked pot, I can't say from my own experience, but there are many who say that pot is no more addictive than alcohol.
R’ Chaim Shmuelevitz in Parshas Noso, #72, brings the Rambam that says that good nezirus is a “nodeir lashem derech kedusha, and bad nezirus is “ha’omeir harieni nazir im e’eseh kach vakach o im lo e’eseh.” R’ Shmuelevitz understands this to mean that good nezirus is one that is “ne’esis lesheim milchama im hayeitzer.” In other words, it is meritorious to use asceticism as a weapon in the battle against the evil inclination, but it is wrong to say that if I do or don’t do a certain thing, I will punish myself through self abnegation.
R’ Yakov Kaminetzki here seems to learn that the purpose of prishus is so that mevakshri hashem should be distinct from the common man– not that it is an intrinsically good thing, but that it is a means of reminding the tzadik that he what he seeks is different than what the masses of unthinking people seek. The unenlightened seek physical gratification and see it as the greatest good, while we see it as trivial and merely a means to enable us to serve Hashem.
See also below in Bechukosai, Vayikra 26:5, on “V’achaltem lachm’chem lasova.” R’ Moshe there says that it is better to eat a little and have it misboreich b’mei’av rather than eating the usual amount, because an adam hashaleim avoids involvement with physical pleasure.
I want to suggest an approach that may be consistent with the underlying idea of most of the above concepts of Prishus. It is rather simple, maybe even banal. Simplicity is underrated. It does not really address the high perishus Chazal encourage for people who want to be zocheh to Kinyan Torah-- Pas Bamelech Tochal and "ellah be'mi she'meimis atzmo ale'ha. It addresses only the most basic aspect of Prishus that is necessary for every member of Klal Yisrael.
The gemara Menachos 87 brings that Rav Yochanan says “ke'sheim she’hakol yafeh liketores, kach hakol ra le’yayin.” “Just as the sound of talk is good for the manufacture of the Ketores, so it is deleterious to the manufacture of wine.” Literally, this means that while compounding the Ketores, one should talk rhythmically, and this will improve the final product, while one should be silent when working with wine, because talk might cause it to sour. However, the Be’er Yosef from R’ Yitzchak Salanter says that the reason for the association and contrast, instead of mere recitation of difference, is that wine represents ta’anugei olam hazeh, worldly pleasures, and besamim represents hana’os ruchni’os, spiritual pleasures. One should avoid talk, i.e., preoccupation or deep interest in the former, but the more one delves into the latter, the better it is for him. The pleasures of a voluptuary become his quiddity. Even if you enjoy certain mosros, unnecessary pleasures, don’t talk about them- you can enjoy eating or drinking, but don't talk too much, or become obsessed with them.
It’s interesting to think about the way we look down upon gourmets as hedonistic pleasure seekers but we don't think less of people who love smells and music. What characterizes certain pleasures as animalistic and not others? Why don’t dignified people want to eat in public, but don't mind being seen enjoying the besamim at havdalah? Why do the Roshei Yeshiva all put their forks down when the photographer comes by? It’s not because only rational creatures enjoy smell, because dogs and cats love certain scents, and roll around in them in ecstasy. Certain animals also enjoy music. So what is it that makes eating so base?
When I first brought this question up, I said, as a joke, that the other pleasures, like smell and music, can be enjoyed with your mouth closed. Harav Reuven Feinstein made a beautiful observation. He said that eating is fundamentally selfish, and what you eat cannot be shared. But the enjoyment of music and smell can be shared with others.
I later realized that there is a more fundamental difference: eating and sex satisfy a craving, a hunger. While one may desire to hear music or to smell a fragrance, that desire doesn’t create a craving, or a hunger. As Umberto Eco says in the introductory essay to his anthology On Ugliness, there are different types of beauty: there is "beauty" that primarily arouses a desire to possess and use the object, and there is "beauty" that primarily elicits an appreciation of the object. The former is a vulgar and crude beauty; the latter is an objective aesthetic judgment. It is, one might say, dispassionate.
Having said this, we can see what prishus means in Jewish thought. Sensual pleasure itself is not intrinsically a negative thing. But the drive, the craving and pursuit of pleasure, is both unworthy and dangerous. One must aspire to eliminate that craving. When Prishus is employed for this purpose, it is laudable. This worthy Prishus comprises many levels. The initial level is to develop the discipline that enables one to resist physical cravings. The next level is to eliminate the driving urge that they often generate. Ultimately, one comes to a level where his decision to indulge or refrain is completely uninfluenced by any physical desire. Even this level, though, does not mean that one does not enjoy the food when he eats it; it only means that he choice to indulge was not driven or even influenced by desire.
The lesson is, then, that Prishus, at the most basic level, means the ability to learn to control and modify carnal desire such that one enjoys them as one would enjoy fragrance or music.
A very strong proof: Reb Elazar Hakappar, who said that a Nazir is called sinful for having deprived himself from wine, is the same Reb Elazar Hakappar who said, in Pirkei Avos, "Hakin'ah veha'ta'ava vehakavod motzi'in es ha'adam min ha'olam."
I think that this concept of prishus underlies the multitude of variations discussed by the baalei hashkafa.
This said, the question remains: does asceticism advance this goal? In other words, does self abnegation train a person to not want the thing he forcefully denies himself, or does it generate resentment and greater desire and lust? We all know that people that fall off the wagon tend to fall harder and farther, and that the final result is worse than if no attempt had been made at all. On the other hand, the Gemara does say that sexual desire is diminished by chastity and inflamed by satisfying it-- "it hungers when it is satisfied and it is sated when it is hungered." The answer is that this is exactly what Shimon Hatzadik meant, and this is what the Gemara in Taanis means, and this is what the Mesilas Yeshorim means. If a person is not ready, then his asceticism will be self-destructive, and will only serve to inflame his desire. At best, he will gain nothing from his attempts, only suffering for nothing. Only a person who is mentally and physically ready, and disciplined enough, to use asceticism to tame his baser desires, is encouraged to do so.
The Asceticism that Chazal encourage, then, is a means toward the end of learning to control and modify desire, to modify the desire for eating and for sexual relations so that they resemble the more refined sensual pleasure we derive from fragrance and music.
I suppose you could say, though it would be misleading if you hadn't read this post, that Chazal were aesthetes, not ascetics.
Tosfos Ksuvos 104a
לא נהניתי אפילו באצבע קטנה. דאמרינן במדרש עד שאדם מתפלל שיכנס תורה לתוך גופו יתפלל שלא יכנסו מעדנים לתוך גופו ומייתי הא עובדא דרבי:
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