Achrei Mos. The Se'ir Azazel

The term "Scapegoat" expresses an error on the part of non-Jewish readers of the Torah. They believed that the Azazel goat was allowed to escape. Our tradition teaches that it was not allowed to escape, it was thrown off a cliff to its death.

Here is the etymology of Scapegoat.

scapegoat (n.)

1530, "goat sent into the wilderness on the Day of Atonement as a symbolic bearer of the sins of the people," coined by Tyndale from scape, a shortening of escape (see scape (v.)) + goat; the whole word translating Latin caper emissarius, itself a translation in Vulgate of Hebrew 'azazel (Leviticus xvi.8, 10, 26), which was read as 'ez ozel "goat that departs," but which others hold to be the proper name of a devil or demon in Jewish mythology

 Indeed, the words of the Torah do not state explicitly that the goat is killed.  But in all honesty, the idea that all the sacrifices are slaughtered, including the Parah Adumah and the Egla Arufa, and davka the goat that symbolically carries the nation's sins would just be set free to wander in the desert, is untenable, even without Torah she'baal peh.  One suspects that they chose to disregard the most likely explanation only because doing so would lend credence to our mesorah. 

Rabbi Dr. Scheiber argues that from taharas metzora (Vayikra 14 4-7) you see that sometimes, an animal used for kapara/exoneration is set free.  Additionally, he points out that just a few perakim separate the paired animals in last week's Parshas Metzora and the paired animals in this week's Parshas Achrei Mos. In the case of Metzora, it is clear that the un-slaughtered bird is set free. On what basis can we be so confident that by Yom Kippur the unslaughtered goat is killed? At least it remains ambiguous, and it would be reasonable to resolve the ambiguity of the shiluach of the sa'ir from the explicit din of the shiluach of the tzipor.

I responded that one must note the differing terminology of the two parshiyos:

וצוה הכהן ולקח למטהר שתי־צפרים חיות טהרות ועץ ארז ושני תולעת ואזב

וצוה הכהן ושחט את־הצפור האחת אל־כלי־חרש על־מים חיים

את־הצפר החיה יקח אתה ואת־עץ הארז ואת־שני התולעת ואת־האזב וטבל אותם ואת הצפר החיה בדם הצפר השחטה על המים החיים

והזה על המטהר מן־הצרעת שבע פעמים וטהרו ושלח את־הצפר החיה על־פני השדה

Five times in four pesukim is the term chaya used. In the last passuk, it says that  ושלח את הצפר החיה על־פני השדה, once again calling it Chaya when he sets it free. But by the seir Azazel, in the last reference, it does not call it the Chay. It says  ושלח את השעיר במדבר.

So yes, we do find a case of shiluach to freedom of the second of paired animals where the first was killed. But both from the sair's job of "carrying sin," and from the fact that Chaya is dropped in the last passuk, I think it is clear that it is not meant to remain alive. This change in the description of the tzipor removes the ambiguity from the Sa'ir.

Rabbi Schreiber responded

All you have proven is that the bird is alive.

The question at hand is :

Is the Torah contrasting the treatment of the bird to that of the goat or is it a saying the goat is to be treated LIKE the other paired animal

However 

I could make this distinction:

The birds are brought after the tzaraas has resolved -presumably the person has done teshuva and learned their lesson.

In contrast the saier works לשבין בין לשאינם שבין.

So the Torah is saying the metzora has redeemed themselves while Klal Yisroel has not yet demonstrated their worthiness for כפרה.

Rashi mentions this as well. 

On passuk 16:10,

והשעיר אשר עלה עליו הגורל לעזאזל יעמד חי לפני יהוה לכפר עליו לשלח אתו לעזאזל המדברה:

Oneklos says

וּצְפִירָא דִּי סְלִיק עֲלוֹהִי עַדְבָא לַעֲזָאזֵל יִתָּקַם כַּד חַי קֳדָם יְיָ לְכַפָּרָא עֲלוֹהִי לְשַׁלַּח יָתֵיהּ לַעֲזָאזֵל לְמַדְבְּרָא:

Rashi explains,

יעמד חי. כְּמוֹ יֻעֲמַד חַי — עַל יְדֵי אֲחֵרִים, וְתַרְגּוּמוֹ יִתָּקַם כַּד חַי; מַה תַּ"ל? לְפִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר לְשַׁלֵּחַ אֹתוֹ לַעֲזָאזֵל וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שִׁלּוּחוֹ אִם לְמִיתָה אִם לְחַיִּים, לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר יָעֳמַד חַי, עֲמִידָתוֹ חַי עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ, מִכָּאן שֶׁשִּׁלּוּחוֹ לְמִיתָה (ספרא):

Why does he translate יעמד חי  as  יִתָּקַם כַּד חַי?   The words כַּד חַי mean "while it is alive," and the "while it is" is not in the words of the passuk. Elsewhere, Onkelos translates חי simply as חי. He explains that this is because the verses below do not state explicitly that the goat is sent to its death, but only that it is "sent off in the wilderness."   Psukim 21-22 - 

וסמך אהרן את־שתי ידו [ידיו] על ראש השעיר החי והתודה עליו את כל עונת בני ישראל ואת כל פשעיהם לכל חטאתם ונתן אתם על־ראש השעיר ושלח ביד איש עתי המדברה

ונשא השעיר עליו את כל עונתם אל־ארץ גזרה ושלח את השעיר במדבר

This is why the Targum needs to explain that חי only means that while the other goat of the pair was just slaughtered as a chatas, this one remains alive for the moment. But it, too, will later be killed.  Psukim 9-10 - 

והקריב אהרן את־השעיר אשר עלה עליו הגורל ליהוה ועשהו חטאת

והשעיר אשר עלה עליו הגורל לעזאזל יעמד חי לפני יהוה לכפר עליו לשלח אתו לעזאזל המדברה

Achrei Mos. Mitzvos D'oraysa that are Harchakos

It is reasonable to assume that the issurim in the Torah are intrinsic issurim, and it is Chazal's job to make transgression less likely by expanding the issur to acts that might lead to those primary prohibitions. For example, the issur of the Torah is only meat cooked with milk, to the extent that many rishonim hold that broiling is not included in the issur, and midoraysa, cheeseburgers are kosher. But it was clear to Chazal that if one could eat meat and milk that are merely mixed together, people would inevitably forget the issur to cook them together. So they prohibited broiling them together, and even eating meat and milk together, and even chicken and milk together, and they even prohibited eating milk until the next meal after one has eaten meat or chicken. Chazal's tremendous expansion of the issur makes it clear that the issur of Basar b'chalav really needs harchakos and gedarim - but the Torah left that to the Chachmei Yisrael. It would appear that Siyag and Geder are the purview of Chazal.

This is not necessarily true. There are Torah prohibitions that can be understood as motivated by a need to prevent other things from happening. They are not inherently wrong, they are prohibited because of the need to prevent what they might lead to.

One might think that such prohibitions would be less strict, and might be more easily waived where some immediate need would be served, where some good might result, which would be prevented by enforcement of the prohibition. 

This is also not the case. The application and severity of these "Geder Issurim" or "Siyagim"  is indistinguishable from that of the primary issurim. Once the Torah assered, we do not have the right or ability to limit the application of the issur. Just because in our Torah it is given as a siyag does not mean that it does not have innumerable and unknowable rationales.  Additionally, we do find that secondary issurim can have a stringency similar to the primary, such as in the case of אביזרייהו of Arayos and Avoda Zara. (Famously, the Ramban, perhaps even to the extent of Harchakos Derabanan-  שלש עבירות הללו לא שנא בעבירה גופא ולא שנא באבקה של עבירה אין מתרפאין בהם כלל)

King of the examples is Rabbeinu Yonah in Shaarei Teshuva 3:80.

איש איש אל כל שאר בשרו לא תקרבו (ויקרא יח). כל קירוב בשר אסור כגון הנגיעה בידי אשת איש. ופירושו - לגלות ערוה. כי הקריבה מביאה לידי ערוה. וכי תאמר בלבבך איפה נמצא בכתוב כי גדרה התורה גדר כי תאמר אשר אסרה מגע יד ליד להיות גדר לעבירה. נשיבך דבר. הנה במצות הנזיר אשר עיקר נזירותו פן ישתה וישכח מחוקק או יתעהו רוח זנונים. אוסרתו התורה מכל אשר יעשה מגפן היין. וכל זה לגדר הרחקה ממשתה היין. 

I assume that Rabbeinu Yonah is only in concordance with the Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvos about negi'yah and yichud, and fundamentally contrary to the Ramban there.
Rambam Mitzvos LS 353

שחבק ונשק דרך תאוה ונהנה בקרוב בשר הרי זה לוקה מן התורה, שנאמר לבלתי עשות מחקות התועבות וגו' ונאמר לא תקרבו לגלות ערוה, כלומר לא תקרבו לדברים המביאין לידי גילוי ערוה

The Ramban holds that this is all miderabanan (which is what forced him to say that derabanans are yeihareig, because that is what he has to see in Sanhedrin 75a ימות ואל תעמוד לפניו ערומה.)

UPDATE:

From R Amiel Naiman on February 17 2023:

The Torah doesn’t say “Don’t lie”.    It says to “distance yourself from lying”.     מִדְּבַר־שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק

Very similar to Rabbeinu Yona! Yasher koach.

Also, (R D Gary Schreiber's ha'ara) Shemos 19:12, the mitzva of Hagbala of Har Sinai, where Rashi says

והגבלת - קבע להם תחומין לסימן שלא יקרבו מן הגבול והלאה. לאמר - הגבול אומר להם השמרו מעלות מכאן ולהלאה, ואתה הזהירם על כך

Additionally, the Ohr Hachaim there says that the three day hagbala was in order for the Jews to get used to not pushing their way past the line, one of our incorrigible national traits, so that come Mattan Torah, they would be used to it.

והגבלת - נראה שאין מצות הגבלה זו אלא ליום ג', ואף על פי כן הקדימה מעתה, כדי שינהגו בו כבוד מעכשיו, גם ירגילו עצמם להתרחק ממנו בג' ימים, ורחוק שיתקדש ההר מיד ויתחייבו עליו קודם רדת שכינתו יתברך

See, too, the Chinuch in 416, who explains the issur of desiring another's personal property as a Siyag to prevent unlawful taking. The Chinuch attributes this to the Rambam as well.

שלא להתאוות ממון חברו - שנמנענו לקבע במחשבתנו להתאוות מה שביד אחד מאחינו בני ישראל, לפי שקביעות המחשבה בתאוה על אותו דבר יהיה סבה לעשות תחבולה לקחת אותו ממנו, ואף על פי שאין רצונו למכרו, או על ידי מקח או חליפין או בחזקה, אם לא נוכל בענין אחר. ועל זה נאמר (דברים ה יח) ולא תתאוה בית רעך וגו'. וכתב הרמב''ם זכרונו לברכה (ספר המצוות ל''ת רסו) שאין שני הלאוין שהן לא תחמד שבסדר וישמע יתרו, ולא תתאוה שבסדר זה לאוין כפולין בענין אחד, אבל הם שני ענינים שלאו דלא תחמד ימנענו מלקחת בשום צד, בין בדמים בין שלא בדמים מה שקנו זולתנו אם איננו חפץ למכר אותו דבר, ולאו זה דלא תתאוה ימנענו אפילו התאוה בו בתוך לבנו, כי עם התאוה, יבוא להתחנן לו ולהכביד עליו למכרו או להחליפו לו בכלי אחר על כל פנים. ואף על פי שהאחד מאלו הלאוין מושך את חבירו שנים יחשבו מכל מקום, והרי אתה רואה החלוק שביניהם.

Then you have the explicit ones, such as (Devarim 17:17)  ולא ירבה לו נשים ולא יסור לבבו.

Above, we offered the issur of meat and milk as the classical example of an issur that cries out for harchakos, but the Torah left those Harchakos to the discretion of Chazal. I believe that this halacha itself does includes a Harchaka decreed by the Torah. The Rambam (Mishnayos Krisus 3:4, the נקודה נפלאה,) says that the Torah made cooked meat and milk assur b'hana'ah only secondarily to the issur of eating it. If for any reason the issur of eating it is not invoked, even if only because a pre-existing issur interfered with the invocation of the new issur, no issur hana'ah can exist. To me, this implies that the issur hana'ah only exists as a siyag to prevent transgression of the issur achila.

ויש במה שנשאנו ונתננו עכשיו נקודה נפלאה אנו מייעדין עליה לפי שהיא מפתח לעניינים אחרים ומוסף על מה שיש בה מדקדוק העיון וזה שידוע הוא שבשר בחלב אסור בהנאה והחלב דרך (משל) [בישול] מותר בהנאה לכשיבושל החלב עם החלב למה אינו חל איסור בשר בחלב על איסור חלב והוא ההיקש בנבילה שהוא איסור מוסיף כמו שאמרנו כאן בחלב הקדשים ונתחייב על אכילתו מעילה לפי שניתוסף בו איסור הנאה?

והתשובה על זה שבשר בחלב נאסר בהנאה מפני שאסרו הכתוב לאכילה כמו שהקדמנו שכל איסור האכילה אסור בהנאה עד שיפרט לך הכתוב ואין שם כתוב שאוסר אכילתו וכתב איסור הנאתו רק שני העניינים יחד הם איסור בשר בחלב ולפיכך כשאנו אומרים אין איסור חל על איסור לא יחול איסור בשר בחלב על איסור נבילה ולא יהיה אסור בהנאה אבל הוא מותר בהנאה והאוכל ממנו לוקה משום נבילה ואין שם איסור בשר בחלב כל עיקר לפי שלא חל ולא תהיה הקושיא במקומה עומדת ויהיה כמו חלב קדשים בשוה אלא אם אמרנו עליו שהוא אסור בהנאה כמו שאנו אומרים בקדשים והאוכל ממנו אינו חייב משום בשר בחלב אז היה ראוי להקשות ואין הדבר כן אלא אנו אומרים שבשר זה בחלב לא נאסר בהנאה אלא תראה המשנה אמרה בפירוש שבשר בהמה טמאה מותר לבשל בחלב ומותר בהנאה וכבר נתבאר זה במקומו וזכור הענין מפני שהוא מטעה הכל ותקיש עליו בכל הדומה לו:

In a coincidence, the Likut Shallal Rav in the beginning of Achrei Mos brings something on this line from Reb Moshe Mordechai. Having read a good deal of Reb Moshe Mordechai's Torah, I venture to say that either this piece is badly written or it wasn't meant seriously, because something is not right. Still, it's on topic, and it's quoted from Reb Moshe Mordechai, who never said a krum thing in his life, so here it is. The idea is that the issur of ביאה ריקנית is a Harchakah to prevent bringing Eish Zarah.

תמה הגאון בעל ”לבוש מרדכי", מה מקום יש להזהיר את אהרן שלא יבא בכל עת אל הקודש, וימות כדרך שמתו בניך', הלא נדב ואביהו לא משום ביאתם אל הקודש נענשו ומתו, אלא משום שהקריבו אש זרה במזבח.

ברם, מצינו אצל נזיר שכל עיקר איסורו הוא בשתיית יין, ובאה התורה ועשתה גדר וסייג לאיסורו ואסרה עליו גם מחרצנים ועד זג. וכיון שכך נאסר הסייג ממש כעיקר האיסור, וחרצנים נאסרים ממש כשם שהיין עצמו אסור. 

כמו כן כאן, כיון שנדב ואביהו בבואם אל הקודש פנימה הגיעו לידי כך שהקריבו אש זרה, ממילא נתעורר שבעתיים הצורך לעשות סייג וגדר, על ידי איסור מוחלט של ביאה ריקנית אל הקודש. ואף שלא חטאו בדבר זה עצמו, שהרי טרם נאסר עליהם, אבל כיון שאם היו נשמרים ונזהרים ממנו לא היו באים לידי חחטא החמור, מחייב הדבר לאסרו. וכיון שכך הרי לענין האזהרה, נחשב הדבר כאילו משום איסור זה עצמו מתו. 

מפי רבי משה מרדכי אפשטיין

רשימות הרה״צ  שמואל זילברמן ז״ל

So we have these examples:
1. Harchaka by Arayos and Harchaka by Sheker
2. Grapes for a Nazir
3. Hagbala by Sinai
4. Lo Sachmod
5. Issur Hana'ah by Basar b'Chalav
6. Biah Reikanis



After writing this, we received a comment from Rabbi Reuven Chaim Klein, a scholarly and prolific author, who referred us to an article he wrote on this topic. It is far, far, better researched than this post, and includes almost everything we've brought down, with the exception of the din Hagbala by Sinai and the Rambam's Nekuda Nifla'ah, (the relevance of which we understand that reasonable people might contest,) and Lo Tis'aveh.  Reb Chaim's article can be found here, and his bio here. He mentions that Reb Yosef Engel wrote on this as well in his לקח טוב כלל ח׳.
What I found most interesting was the Mizrachi Reb Chaim brings - 

ומדסתם הרמב״ם את דבריו ולא הדגיש באיסור בניית אכסדראות של עץ במקדש שלוקין עליו דייק המגיד משנה (ע״ז פ״ו ה״ט-ה״י) דבאמת אין לוקין על לאו זה משום דמדרבנן הוא דמיתסר וקרא אסמכתא בעלמא היא. וכן דייק ר״א מזרחי(דברים טז:כא) מהא דכתב הרמב״ם שנאסר כל בנין של עץ אע״פ שאינו עץ נטוע מהרחקה יתירה שהוא איסור מדרבנן דאילו מדאורייתא לא מצינו שאסרה דבר משום הרחקה 

By the way, Reb Chaim brings from Reb Dovid Goldberg's peirush "Meshivas Nafesh" on the Shaarei Teshuva that now that the Torah assered, albeit as a siyag, it acquires self standing status, as I pointed out earlier in this post. Reb Chaim points out that the Tzitz Eliezer says the contrary. I just want to add that the Chinuch in 416 which I quoted above also points out that despite being a siyag, the issur becomes self-standing in application.  Here is what Reb Chaim says.

ג הרי דמסברא חיצונה לא הוי אמרינן שאסרה תורה דבר משום סיג' דדבר זה נמסר לרבנן כמש"נ עשו משמרת למשמרתי' ולזה טרח רבינו להביא ראיה שגם מדאורייתא לפעמים יש איסור שהוא רק משום סיג כענין יין בנזיר שמצד איסור יין לנזיר לא הוי אסרינן אכילת ענבים אבל התורה אסרה אכילת ענבים משום סיג שלא יבא לשתות יין אבל מ"מ צריך להוסיף דאף שכוונת התורה באיסור זה הוי משום סיג אבל עכשיו שנאסר הרי זה איסור בעצם ואפילו שחוף דאינו יכול לבעול למ"ד משמש מת בעריות פטור ג"כ אסור בלאו דלא תקרבו כמו לענין אכילת ענבים דפשוט הוא דעכשיו יש איסור בעצם בהם אפילו שלא בתורת סיג ודבר זה מפורש בדברי המסלת ישרים פרק י"א וז"ל ואם לחשך אדם לומר שמה שאמרו על נבול פה אינו אלא כדי לאיים ולהרחיק אדם מן העבירה ובמי שדמו רותח אמורים שמדי דברו בא לידי תאוה אבל במי שאמרו דרך שחוק בעלמא לאו מילתא היא ואין לחוש עליו וכו' אלא האמת הוא כדברי ח"ל שניבול פה הוא ערותו של הדיבור ממש ומשום זנות הוא שנאסר ככל שאר עניני הזנות חוץ מגופו של מעשה שאע"פ שאין בהם כרת או מיתת ב"ד אסורים הם איסור עצמם מלבד היותם ג"כ גורמים ומביאים אל האיסור הראשון עצמו וכענין הנזיר וכו' עיי"ש 

Here's the Chinuch, again-ואף על פי שהאחד מאלו הלאוין מושך את חבירו שנים יחשבו מכל מקום.




Finally: 
Reb Yosef Engel, Lekach Tov, Klal Ches, and in the Hosafos there, found nineteen dinim in the Torah that are משום סייג.

Acharei Mos, Vayikra 16:2. Fear is an Ingredient of the Avodah on Yom Kippur.

Parshas Achrei Mos begins with a description of the Sacrificial Service of Yom Kippur.  The first thing Moshe was told to tell Aharon is a negative: that if Aharon were to come into the Kodesh Kadashim outside of a specific time and without specific korbanos it might cause his death.

דבר אל אהרן אחיך ואל יבא בכל עת אל הקדש מבית לפרכת אל פני הכפרת אשר על הארן ולא ימות כי בענן אראה על הכפרת

Only then does the Torah go on to say that the only way to avoid the fatal consequences of entering the Kodesh Kadashim is to enter it on Yom Kippur while doing the sacrificial service of Yom Kippur which is then described. 

Reb Moshe, in his second English Darash, says that it seems that the first thing in the instructions for Avodas Yom HaKippurim should be a positive- "Do X Y and Z."  It is unusual that the first statement in the instructions is "If you don't do it correctly, walking into the Kodesh Kadashim can be deadly."

Reb Moshe explains that this is a misunderstanding.  If you read the passuk correctly, you would realize that this fact is indeed the first ingredient in the Yom Kippur service.  Awareness of the danger of entry under any other circumstances is a prerequisite for the acceptability of the Yom Kippur service.  Only if the Kohen Gadol consciously focuses on the supreme holiness and danger of the Kodesh Kadashim, only if he is fully aware that its holiness is such that that no one may enter other than to perform the Yom Kippur service, will he do the day's avodah in a befittingly elevated state and thereby bring forgiveness.

Reb Moshe then adds that even if the Kohen Gadol knows how serious it is to enter the Kodesh Kadashim, and even if he brings all the sacrifices, he cannot come in on any day other than Yom Kippur.  Reb Moshe says 

"Perhaps, despite his elevated spiritual level, the concept of "hokar raglecha" applied to him."

The term "hokar raglecha" is from Mishlei 25:17.   הוקר רגלך מבית ריעך פן ישבעך ושנאך.  Visit your neighbor sparingly (literally, "Cool your feet" from your friend's house)  lest he become sated with you and hate you.  When I translated Reb Moshe's book for Artscroll, I tried to find the source for using the term hokar raglecha as a limit on excessive appearance before Hashem, and for years I could not find it.  The best I could do was the Gemara (Chagiga 7a) that uses this passuk to discourage people from bringing korbanos that are not necessary, but not in regard to Tefilla:

כדרבי לוי דרבי לוי רמי כתיב הוקר רגלך מבית רעך וכתיב אבא ביתך בעולות לא קשיא כאן בחטאות ואשמות כאן בעולות ושלמים תניא נמי הכי (משלי כה) הוקר רגלך מבית רעך בחטאות ואשמות הכתוב מדבר אתה אומר בחטאות ואשמות או אינו אלא בעולות ושלמים כשהוא אומר (תהילים סו) אבוא ביתך בעולות אשלם לך נדרי הרי עולות ושלמים אמור הא מה אני מקיים הוקר רגלך מבית רעך בחטאות ואשמות הכתוב מדבר.

I finally found it in the Gaon on Mishlei there, where he says that it is assur to daven more than three hours at a time. 

ועוד הקר רגלך מבית רעך אלו בתי הכנסת והיינו שאל ירבה אדם בתפילה יותר מג' שעות

The Gaon in his Chidushim in Brachos 32b also says 

כי אסור לשהות יותר מג' שעות בתפילה,כמו שכתב בבהיר, והטעם ידוע.

The Sefer HaBahir 138 says 

אסור לו לאדם לשהות שלש שעות כפיו פרוסות לשמים

If you know someone that davens shmoneh esrei on Rosh Hashanna or Yom Kippur for more than three hours, you should let them know there is a problem.  (I think that this issur only applies to Shmoneh Esrei proper, the part that is called עומד לפני המלך, standing before the king.  I'm not sure if עומד לפני המלך applies to the vidui section on Yom Kippur,.  But when it says הטעם ידוע and the taam is not yadua to me, I really should not be offering my opinions.)

Another source is Kapach's Moreh, 3:47.  The Rambam says that the purpose of having a Beis Hamikdash was so that people seeing it would be awed and inspired, and would be filled with fear of God.  If a person would find himself there on a regular basis it would diminish the awe and inspiration, and he brings the passuk in Mishlei..

כבר ביארנו כי כל המטרה הייתה במקדש  להביא את הפונה אליו להתפעלות, ושייראוהו וירהוהו, כמו שאמר ומקדשי תיראו . וכל דבר מרומם, כשיתמיד האדם להמצא בו, ימעט מה שיש בנפש ממנו, ותמעט ההתפעלות שהייתה באה על ידו. וכבר העירו חכמים ז"ל על עניין זה ואמרו, שאין רצוי להכנס למקדש בכל עת, והסמיכו את זה לאמרו 'הוקר רגלך מבית רעך פן ישבעך ושנאך' .

Then the Rambam says that this is the reason that a person that is tamei is prohibited from entering the Har Habayis- there are so many tumah restrictions that most of the time, a person would not be allowed to enter, and only after a period of vigilant watchfulness would a person be able to enter the area.

וכיון שזו הייתה המטרה, הזהיר יתעלה את הטמאים מלהכנס למקדש, עם ריבוי מיני הטומאות, עד שכמעט לא תמצא אדם טהור כי אם מעטים:

כי אם ניצול ממגע נבלה, לא ניצול ממגע אחד משמונה שרצים שנופלים הרבה בבתים ובמאכלים ובמשקים ורבות נתקל בהם האדם,

ואם ניצול מאלה, לא ינצל ממגע נדה או זבה או זב או מצורע או משכבן ,

ואם ניצול מאלה, לא ינצל משכיבת אשתו או מקרי,

ואף כאשר טהר מכל הטומאות הללו, אינו מותר לו להכנס למקדש עד שיעריב שימשו,

ואסור להכנס למקדש בלילה  כמו שנתבאר במידות ותמיד ,

ובאותו הלילה אפשר שישמש מיטתו על הרוב, או יארע לו אחד מגורמי הטומאה, וישכים למחרתו כמצבו אתמול, ויהיה כל זה סיבה להתרחק מן המקדש ושלא ירגיל שם בכל עת.

Rav Bergman also touches on this idea in his Shaarei Orah II on Achrei Mos.  He shtells tzu the Rambam in 7 Beis Habechira 1-2 that there is a mitzva to fear the Mikdash, and because of that a person may not enter even the Har Habayis unless he has a mitzva he needs to do there.

מצות עשה ליראה מן המקדש שנאמר ומקדשי תיראו. ולא מן המקדש אתה ירא אלא ממי שצוה על יראתו

ואי זו היא יראתו לא יכנס אדם להר הבית במקלו או במנעל שברגליו או באפונדתו או באבק שעל רגליו או במעות הצרורין לו בסדינו ואין צ"ל שאסור לרוק בכל הר הבית אלא אם נזדמן לו רוק מבליעו בכסותו. ולא יעשה הר הבית דרך שיכנס מפתח זו ויצא מפתח שכנגדה כדי לקצר הדרך אלא יקיפו מבחוץ. ולא יכנס לו אלא לדבר מצוה:

He also brings the Gemara in Sanhedrin 52a-b that familiarity breeds contempt.

אמר רבי (אליעזר) למה תלמיד חכם דומה לפני עם הארץ בתחלה דומה לקיתון של זהב סיפר הימנו דומה לקיתון של כסף נהנה ממנו דומה לקיתון של חרש כיון שנשבר שוב אין לו תקנה

Rebbi Eliezer says, a talmid chacham appears, to the common man, like a golden flask.  Once they engage in conversation, he appears like a silver flask.  If the talmid chacham needs help from the other person, he becomes an earthenware vessel, which once broken is utterly useless.

Rav Bergman ties this idea to the death of Nadav and Avihu.  He says that what ultimately destroyed them was the fact that after repeated contact with Moshe and Aharon, and even with Gilui Shechina, they lost a degree of awe, of hispaalus, and this diminished hispaalus led to their fatal errors (Shemos 24:11, ויחזו את האלקים ויאכלו וישתו, and the Gemara in Sanhedrin that immediately precedes the one we just quoted about familiarity: אמר לו נדב לאביהוא אימתי ימותו שני זקנים הללו ואני ואתה ננהיג את הדור).

Achrei Mos, Vayikra 17:3. The Hunter's Diet אשר יצוד ציד חיה

The Gemara (Chulin 84a) says that this passuk teaches that one should eat meat as a hunter would.

תנו רבנן, אשר יצוד, אין לי אלא אשר יצוד, נצודין ועומדין מאליהן מנין, כגון אווזין ותרנגולים, ת"ל ציד מ"מ, אם כן מה ת"ל אשר יצוד, למדה תורה דרך ארץ, שלא יאכל אדם בשר אלא בהזמנה הזאת 

Translation: Asher Yatzud: perhaps we can eat only after trapping.  What if they're readily available and at hand?  The Torah says Tzeid, meaning it doesn't matter how you get them.  Why then use the expression "ya'Tzud (indicating hunting or trapping)?  The Torah is teaching the correct way to behave- that one should eat meat only בהזמנה הזאת- in this manner of preparation.

The expression  בהזמנה הזאת is unusual and idiomatic and, for us, unclear.  

Rashi, with many sources, (for example, the Sh'iltos,) says that the Gemara's advice is that one should not get used to eating meat often, because doing so creates an appetite that will demand satisfaction, and meat is expensive.  אלא בהזמנה הזאת - כאילו הוא צד שאינה מזומנת לו כלומר לא יאכל בשר תדיר שלא יעני:

There are, however, two other interpretations that I find interesting, the Kli Chemda and the Rambam.

The Kli Chemda (Breishis 27:3) says the following:

טעמו של דבר, שלא יהא האדם מורגל באכילת בשר כמ"ש (דברים יב כ-כב) בכל אות נפשך תאכל בשר, אך כאשר יאכל את הצבי ואת האיל כן תאכלנו, ורצה בזה, שתאכל סתם בשר באקראי, לא אכילת קבע כמו הצבי והאיל שאין נמצאים בבית כי חיות הנה, ועיקר מדורם אינם עם האדם כי אם במדברות ויערות, על כן אין אוכלים מהם כ"א מעט, כי לאו בכל יומא מתרחיש ניסא להנצל מגדודי חיות בשעת הצידה, על כן מסתמא אין האדם אוכל מהם כי אם לפרקים, כך לא תרגיל את עצמך לאכול סתם בשר, לפי שהוא מוליד אכזריות ותכונות רעות בגוף האדם כי כל העופות הדורסים אוכלים בשר, וכן האריה דורס ואוכל, לכך נאמר לעתיד (ישעיה יא ז) ואריה כבקר יאכל תבן. כי יהיה שלום בעולם בין כל הבעלי חיים. ע"כ אמר יצחק וצודה לי צידה, כי לא רצה לאכול בשר כי אם בהזמנה זו. 

Approximate translation: ... a person should not have the habit of eating meat, as the passuk says, "When you desire it, eat meat, but as one eats a deer or antelope, so you should eat it."  Meaning, eat meat only occasionally, not as a regular habit.  Deer and antelope represent meats that are not readily available, they are wild, they inhabit deserts and forests far from human dwellings.  Not everyone is able to survive the privations and dangers of a hunting trip, so most of us only eat them occasionally.  So, too, do not eat meat habitually, because doing so breeds cruelty and bad traits in people; vicious birds of prey eat meat, and lions rip apart their prey and eat.  Therefore it says about the future "the lion, like cattle, will eat straw,"  because in the time to come there will be peace in the world among all living things.  This is why Yitzchak said "hunt me some game," because he only wanted to eat meat בהזמנה זו (note that the Kli Yakar chose this phrase to echoe the Gemara in Chulin), on exceptional occasions. 

So the Kli Yakar uses our Gemara to present a theoretical basis for a sort of almost-vegetarianism, or at least to suggest that eating meat, while certainly not prohibited, is a a symptom of the degenerated spiritual condition of our world, and one should avoid eating meat too often because doing so stimulates cruelty and coarseness.  This idea is also found in Rav Kook's writings, for example, where he says that (based on Sanhedrin 59) it was only after the mabul that No'ach was permitted to slaughter and eat animals, and even that was only as a concession to the base character and desires of mankind.  Had man not fallen so low, Hashem would have maintained the pre-existing prohibition.  Eating meat is an unfortunate but necessary outlet for animalistic urges that need some sort of outlet.  (Please don't mail me any more simple-minded questions about this: Yes, Hashem knew we have these urges; but had mankind as a whole been more disciplined and deliberate, we would have developed a culture that controlled and sublimated these drives.  We, as a whole, did not.  Under the circumstances, to continue the prohibition would create a tension that would yield more negative than positive results.)

I believe the Rambam uses our Gemara differently than Rashi or the Kli Yakar.  The Rambam says that one should engage in challenging physical activities and get sweaty before eating, and only then is it healthy to eat.  Even some foods that would otherwise be mildly unhealthy are good for you if, and only if, you exercised before eating.  We don't know exactly where the Rambam got this idea.  It doesn't have to be a Gemara, of course.  It wouldn't be the only time the Rambam was applying worldly wisdom from sources other than Chazal.  He might have gotten it from Gittin 67b, where it says that after someone gave Rav Amram Chasida bad food, Yalta had him work out and sweat, and this cured him:

שמעה ילתא ומעיילה ליה לבי מסותא ומוקמי ליה במיא דבי מסותא עד דמהפכי מיא דבי מסותא והוו דמא וקאי בישריה פשיטי פשיט רב יוסף איעסק בריחיא רב ששת איעסק בכשורי אמר גדולה מלאכה שמחממת את בעליה

But is is possible that he is using our Gemara in Chulin as a source- one should eat meat as a hunter would, in other words, after vigorous effort in the catching and preparing the food, and only when  you're hungry; Don't just buy it packaged in the market and plunk it into the pot and roll over to the table.  Work up a sweat, come to the table with vigor and appetite, and then you may eat meat.  I remember hearing about an old recipe book that begins "After you catch a chicken and behead it, let it hang to bleed out.  When preparing bear, double check to make sure it is dead before you begin to skin it."

Rambam 4 Deios 1:

הואיל והיות הגוף בריא ושלם מדרכי השם הוא. שהרי אי אפשר שיבין או ידע דבר מידיעת הבורא והוא חולה. לפיכך צריך להרחיק אדם עצמו מדברים המאבדין את הגוף. ולהנהיג עצמו בדברים המברין והמחלימים. ואלו הן. לעולם לא יאכל אדם אלא כשהוא רעב. ולא ישתה אלא כשהוא צמא. ואל ישהא נקביו אפילו רגע אחד. אלא כל זמן שצריך להשתין או להסך את רגליו יעמוד מיד:

Rambam 4 Deios 2:

לא יאכל אדם עד שתתמלא כריסו אלא יפחות כמו רביע משבעתו. ולא ישתה מים בתוך המזון אלא מעט ומזוג ביין. וכשיתחיל המזון להתעכל במעיו שותה מה שהוא צריך לשתות. ולא ירבה לשתות מים ואפילו כשיתעכל המזון. ולא יאכל עד שיבדוק עצמו יפה יפה שמא יהיה צריך לנקביו. לא יאכל אדם עד שילך קודם אכילה עד שיתחיל גופו לחום. או יעשה מלאכה או יתיגע ביגע אחר. כללו של דבר יענה גופו וייגע כל יום בבקר עד שיתחיל גופו לחום וישקוט מעט עד שתתישב נפשו ואוכל. ואם רחץ בחמין אחר שיגע הרי זה טוב ואחר כך שוהה מעט ואוכל:

Rambam 4 Deios 14:

ועוד כלל אחר אמרו בבריאות הגוף. כל זמן שאדם מתעמל ויגע הרבה ואינו שבע ומעיו רפין אין חולי בא עליו וכחו מתחזק. ואפילו אוכל מאכלות הרעים:

I saw that Rav Meir Bergman in Vol II also suggests that the Gemara in Chulin might be the Rambam's source.  I was glad to see it, because when I said this, I couldn't quite convince myself it was true, since the Gemara refers specifically to meat and the Rambam is advising this as a general matter for all foods.  But if Rav Bergman says it too, it's good enough to post.

A choshuveh correspondent directs me to the Eretz Chemda (see the following page as well) (from the Malbim), who discusses and brings mekoros for the Rambam.  Thank  you.

Yom Kippur: On Behalf of His Wife: וכפר בעדו ובעד ביתו- ביתו זו אשתו

Yesterday, I attended the joyous Lechaim for the engagement of my youngest son, who became a Chassan just before Shabbos.  The Chassan was prepared to say Divrei Torah and Divrei Bracha, but with all the excitement and comings and goings and reunions with old friends and meeting new friends (including the Divrei Chaim!), there really wasn't a moment to organize the crowd into a speech schema.

The Chassan is learning Maseches Yoma, and of course, the Aseres Yemei Teshuva is about to begin (see note #1), and the speech he prepared, I think, hit the trifecta, and deserves dissemination.

The Mishna in the beginning of Yoma says that the Kohen Gadol must be married when he does the avoda of Yom Kippur.  This is based on (Vayikra 16:6) וכפר בעדו ובעד ביתו, he shall achieve forgiveness for himself and his household etc.  Chazal darshen that ביתו זו אשתו, the word "household" means his wife.  Since the formal vidui mentions his wife, he must have a wife in order to do the Avoda. Why?  What is the logic of requiring that the Kohen Gadol be married while he does the Avoda?  How does having a wife make any difference in his Avoda?

We find another instance where a public figure needs to have a family.  That is the Gemara in Sanhedrin (36b) that is brought by the Rambam in 2 Sanhedrin 3:  אין מעמידין בכל סנהדרין לא זקן מופלג בשנים ולא סריס, מפני שיש בהן אכזרייות, ולא מי שאין לו בנים, כדי שיהיה רחמן.  One may not appoint to the Sanhedrin one who is very old...nor one who has no children, because they will not have properly developed traits of mercy.  But if this is the logic behind the בעד ביתו of the Kohen Gadol, why a wife?  Why not a son?

We would like to suggest three possible answers.
(Update November 2014: Four.)

I
The Kohen Gadol must say Vidui for Klal Yisrael.  That he can do so is surprising, because vidui is a prime example of something one must do on his own, something one cannot ask someone else to do on his behalf.  (See Minchas Chinuch brought in note #2)  How can a Kohen Gadol say vidui for Klal Yisrael?  The answer is that only once the Kohen Gadol experiences the absolute empathy of ishto ke'gufo can he escape the prison of egotism, and only then can he move from the specific to the general, from the personal to the national, and come to level of ערבות that allows him to say vidui for Klal Yisrael as if he were intimately connected with each and every one of them, as if they were all כגופו.   Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach once went to the doctor with his wife, and told the doctor "עס טוט אונז וויי די פוס," our foot is hurting.  The Kohen Gadol can say the same regarding all of Klal Yisrael- but to come to that madreiga requires the first step of having a ריעך כמוך.

(See notes #3 and #4.)


II
The Kohen Gadol comes before Hashem and says, Ribono shel Olam, you described Klal Yisrael as יונתי תמתי, Your perfect dove (Shir Hashirim 5:2).  I, too, have a perfect dove, my own wife, and she is without any flaw or blemish or imperfection.  ועל כל פשעים תכסה אהבה  (Mishlei 19:12)  You, too, Hashem, look at יונתך תמתך and say כולך יפה רעייתי ומום אין בך.

When a person gets married, his shidduch is a matanah from the Ribono shel Olam, it is the zivug that was fated and intended for him from the moment he was created, and it is the perfect zivug for him.  There is nobody else, only יונתי תמתי, and he must thank the Ribono shel Olam for giving him this unique and perfect gift.
(See note #5)


III
The Gevuras Ari asks why do Chazal assume that Beiso means only his wife, when elsewhere the term might include his sons as well.  I would suggest that we find a particular characteristic that is essential to Kehuna Gedola, and that is Tznius.  Kimchis, as related in Yoma 47a, had seven sons that were Kohanim Gedolim, and she attributed this amazing accomplishment to her extraordinary Tznius.  It is clear that a mother's tznius is a condition precedent for the kedusha of Kehuna Gedola.  It is possible (See note #6) that it is also an element in the kedusha itself.  If so, it is logical to assume that the word Beiso refers to Kol kevuda bas melech pnima, the tznius of the wife of the Kohen Gadol.   Kohanim Gedolim knew that they could only marry a woman that exemplified and embodied the midda of Tznius, and only a Kohen Gadol that has a wife who embodies the midda of tznius can do the avoda.

Along these lines:
The Sforno points out in Parshas Vezos Habracha that the Tribe of Asher was the most successful of the Shvatim and its members were very wealthy, and although most people resent wealth in other people, everyone loved Shevet Asher.  This is what is meant by "Retzui Echav."  The Sforno does not explain why this was so, he just says that it is an anomaly.  But perhaps we can explain it on the basis of the Rashi (Devarim 33:24) that says that Kohanim Gedolim married girls from Shevet Asher- שהיו בנותיו נשואות לכהנים גדולים הנמשחים בשמן זית- and this must be because they were tremendous Tznu'im, as we discussed above.  Properly evolved Tznius is not only a matter of modesty in dress, it includes placidity and silence; it certainly means that one avoids flashiness and arrogance and tumul.  This kind of tznius, concomitant with good yichus, is a tzniyus of עדינות ואצילות.  If Asher was so developed in the midda of Tznius, we can understand why everyone loved them and nobody was jealous of them- because of their tznius.


IV
(November '14)
I saw in the Vayoel Moshe on Parshas Chayei Sara that he brings the Mizrachi's question, if Yitzchak waited to marry Rivka till she was three and ra'ui l'bi'ah, why not wait till she was capable of bearing children?  The R'em says he wanted to be married in order to avoid improper thoughts, like the Gemara with Rav.  The Satmarer is not happy with that answer, obviously.  So he brings the Zohar that says that the reason a Kohen Gadol has to be married is that without a wife, he is a "Plag Gufa," half a body, and he is a ba'al mum.  In order to do the avoda of Yom Kippur, even that kind of mum passels the avoda.  So he shtells tzu to Yitzchak and says that Yitzchak's avoda, whatever it was, also required that he not be a ba'al mum, so he needed to be married.  (The Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur needs to be married, not just Kiddushin, as the Gemara says on 13a.  Here, too, although Eliezer was mekadeish her immediately, we're talking about nisu'in.)




The Chassan getting ready to propose.

Notes.

1.  I think Aseres Yemei Teshuva is singular and so I wrote "is about to begin" and not "are about to begin."  Aseres is not the same as Asara.  Aseres is a unit comprising ten items.  Like "a dozen eggs weighs around a pound."

2.  Regarding Vidui through a Shliach, see the Minchas Chinuch here.

3.  One might ask, how do I know that the din of בעד ביתו is specific to the Vidui?  First, because the passuk that says וכפר בעדו ובעד ביתו is talking about the Vidui.  Furthermore, the Gevuras Ari is mashma that the requirement is specific to the Vidui.  It's not b'frierush in the Gevuras Ari, but evident from the fact that he says that he holds that as long as the Kohen Gadol is married during avodas Hapar, it doesn't matter if he's married during avodas ha'se'irim, which makes zero sense if he's talking about avodas hadam, because the avodas hadam of the Par and of the Se'irim is done together.  It only makes sense if he's talking only about the Viduyim, which are, of course, separate.  It is on that basis I say that the din of בעד ביתו is a din in the Vidui.  The relevant section of the Gevuras Ari: 

יש לעיין בהא דביתו, אי קפיד רחמנא בשעת כפרת פרו דוקא שיהיה לו בית, אבל בשעת

כפרת שתי שעירים לית לן בה אם אין לו בית, דהא  האי ביתו לא כתיב אלא גבי כפרת פרו, ואפילו לרי

 יהודה דס״ל ברפ״ק דשבועות (ב׳ ע״ב) דבשאר עבירות אחד כהנים ואחד ישראלים מתכפרים בשעיר המשתלח מ״מ אפשר לומר דלא קפיד קרא אביתו אלא בכפרתו שלו דהיינו פרו המיוחד לו, או דלימא אכולה מילתא

 קפיד אביתו, שכל עבודת יוה״כ צריך להיות בכ״ג נשוי ואפי׳ לר״ש נמי אע״פ שכל כפרתו בפרו ווידויו

See also the Gevuras Ari here in DH  מ״ מ אכתי.  

4.  It could be argued that Chazal understand the בעד ביתו later in the parsha as including all Kohanim, so it seems that it does not exclusively refer to his wife.  This is not a kashe.  The primary meaning of Beiso is his wife.  Secondarily, but only on the basis of apparent redundancy, it is understood to also refer to his brother Kohanim,  The fact that his brother Kohanim need special kaparah is not surprising, because the kapara here primarily involves Tumas Mikdash Ve'Kadashav.  The surprising halacha, which we are addressing, is that his wife needs to be included, and that if he does not have a wife, he cannot do the avodah.

5.  This is not how the Chassan was going to say it.  It would be inappropriate for someone that has just gotten engaged, or just gotten married.  It's more appropriate for someone that has been married for twenty years.  He was just going to say that his Kallah is a gift from the Ribono shel Olam and perfect for him, without all the mawkish יונתי תמתי business.

6.  Some readers wrote in saying that this is a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.  Please read the paragraph again.  What I said is that a mother's Tznius is a necessary factor in having children that become Kohanim Gedolim.  There are two ways to understand that:  either that Tznius avoids things that would ruin the children, or that Tznius lends an enhancement to the children.  That either Tznius is just a way of preventing a psul, or that Tznius is a way of investing a maalah.  I suggested that Tznius is not merely a shlilus of pritzus, it is a be'poeil of kedusha, and it is a necessary ingredient of being a Kohen Gadol, both in one's mother and in one's wife.

 As far as a shiduch being bashert, there is a nice Yalkut in Chayei Sara as follows:

ויען לבן ובתואל ויאמרו מה' יצא הדבר לא נוכל דבר אליך רע או טוב מן התורה ומן הנביאים ומן הכתובים שאין זווגו של אדם אלא מאת הקב"ה. מן התורה ויאמרו מה' יצא הדבר. מן הנביאים ואביו ואמו לא ידעו כי מה' היא ומן הכתובים בית והון נחלת אבות ומה' אשה משכלת:

Achrei Mos, Vayikra 16:6. Outsourcing Teshuva

Our parsha describes the Korbanos brought on Yom Kippur and tells us that the Kohen Gadol says vidui as he does the avoda of these korbanos.

16:6.  וְכִפֶּר בַּעֲדוֹ וּבְעַד בֵּיתוֹ  he will atone for himself and for his household. 

Rashi- וכפר בעדו ובעד ביתו: מתודה עליו עונותיו ועונות ביתו:  He confesses his sins and those of his household.

16:10.   לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו לְשַׁלַּח אֹתוֹ לַעֲזָאזֵל  for forgiveness, to send it to Azazel

Rashi- לכפר עליו: שיתודה עליו, כדכתיב (פסוק כא) והתודה עליו ו  He confesses (the sins of the Bnei Yisrael) upon it.

Mitzvah 364 in the Chinuch is the mitzva of Vidui, as derived from the passuk in Naso (Bamidbar 5:7.)  The Chinuch (from the Mechilta) explains that because the previous iterations of Vidui (such as our parsha) were associated with Korbanos, one might think that there is no mitzva of vidui without a korban, therefore the Torah says Bnei Yisrael... Ve'hisvadu.  This teaches that Vidui is a stand-alone mitzva, with or without a korban.

The Minchas Chinuch notes that certain rules of Vidui (e.g., that it requires that the person mention his specific aveira, and not make a generic admission)  are derived from Moshe Rabbeinu's vidui in Ki Sisa after the sin of the Eigel (Shemos 32:31.)  The Minchas Chinuch says that if we derive rules from Moshe Rabbeinu's vidui, then we can also derive a rule that one can do vidui through a shaliach, confess by proxy: Moshe had not sinned, he was saying the vidui on behalf of Klal Yisrael.  He supports this by citing the Rambam, who says that in the Avodah of the Kohen Gadol in our parsha, since it is to attain forgiveness for all the Jewish people, the Kohen Gadol says vidui on their behalf.  We see, the Minchas Chinuch says, that although obviously remorse cannot be done by proxy, because remorse is "be'lev," it describes a feeling, and it's not a feeling unless you feel it, but once the sinner regrets the aveira, he can do the Vidui through a Shaliach.

Almost everyone who has written about the Minchas Chinuch disagrees with him.  The idea of attaining forgiveness by having someone else say vidui seems bizarre.  However, I myself don't think there is a problem.  You just have to adjust the Minchas Chinuch a little bit.


It could be that there are two dinim in Vidui: It could be that Vidui is a din in Teshuva, and Vidui is a din in Kapara.  Or, in Yeshivish, Vidui is a din in Teshuva and Vidui is also a din in Kappara; Teshuva foders vidui, and kapara foders vidui.  Normally, when a person does teshuva with his own actions, that itself is all that is necessary to attain kapara as well, so he says vidui.  But sometimes, the person cannot achieve kapara with his actions alone, and someone else needs to step in and do something on his behalf.  When there is another person who is the mechapeir, the mechapeir needs to say vidui because the kapara needs vidui.   So, here, the Kohen Gadol is doing an avodas korban to attain kapara.  The Kohen Gadol is doing the avoda because nobody else can do the Avoda.  Since there cannot be a kapparas korban without vidui, a part of the avoda is saying vidui.  Moshe Rabbeinu also was doing something Klal Yisrael couldn't do.  Their sin was beyond help, and it was only because of Moshe's special closeness to Hashem that he could gain Kapara for us.  Since Kapara needs Vidui, he needed to, and was able to, say vidui for us.  Only the Mechapeir can say vidui. 

Technically, this would mean that a  person would not have to say vidui when he brings a Chatas, because he can't get the kapara through his own actions.  But, in fact, that's not true.  He does Smicha.  Since he does smicha, he can and must say vidui himself.  But on Yom Kippur, only the Kohen Gadol does the avoda.  Only the avoda brings Kapara.  Kapara requires that the mechapeir should say vidui.  That's why the Kohen Gadol can say Vidui.

So the point is that unlike the Minchas Chinuch, I am saying that there is a vidui that cannot be done with a shliach, and there is a vidui that can be done with a shliach.  The vidui that is a chelek of teshuva must be done by the shav.  The vidui that is a chelek of the chalos of the kapara can be done by a shliach where there is a reason that the shav cannot do the avodas hakapara himself.

Another application:

The Abudraham (here) says that the reason Chazal instituted Modim Derabanan is because you can't make a shliach to say thank you.  However, he did not mean that the shliach tzibur can't be motzi.  Of course, where there is a minyan, he can be motzi.  But it is better to say Thank You yourself.

Life lesson:

There are some things you have to do in person.  You can't get someone else to say that you're sorry or that you're grateful.  I can't tell you how many times someone has said to me "Oh, you're going to be seeing so and so?  Tell him thank you for me."  My response is always the same:  "You can't make a shliach to say thank you."  But if you don't have entree to the person you need to thank, or to whom you need to apologize, and you have to send an interlocutor, then the interlocutor can speak on your behalf.  This is an application of כל מלתא דאיהו לא מצי עביד שליח לא מצי עביד except exactly backwards.  Only where you can not do it yourself, and the mechapeir is someone else, on there can the other do it for you.


Examples of people who have trouble with the Minchas Chinuch:


  page 202

  page 215

  page 52

  page 569

and someone else that holds that bichlal it's not shayach shlichus or shomei'a K'oneh by vidui:
the Mishnas Yaavetz.

I recently saw that Rav Bergman in Shaarei Orah II on Yom Kippur says there are two kinds of teshuva on Yom Kippur. One is that of individuals, and the other is Klal Yisrael as a whole. The public vidui we do expresses the teshuva of the Klal. If so, we can say that the Kohen Gadol's vidui is also specific to the teshuva of the klal, and has zero shaychus to the vidui of individual teshuva.

Achrei Mos, Vayikra 18:5. וָחַי בָּהֶם, Vachai Bahem: The Obligation to Preserve Life Countermands Other Religious Obligations

וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֶת חֻקֹּתַי וְאֶת מִשְׁפָּטַי אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשֶׂה אֹתָם הָאָדָם וָחַי בָּהֶם  אֲנִי ה
Observe my ordinances and laws, that man shall do them and live; I am Hashem.

The Gemara in Yoma 85 says that the words "vachai bahem" in this passuk teach that the obligation to preserve human life overrides the obligation to observe other Mitzvos.  If the only way to preserve life is to transgress a religious prohibition, the preservation of life is dominant.

This is true for almost all the aveiros in the Torah.  A man who is starving should eat treif food; a man whose life is endangered should be mechallel Shabbos to protect himself.  But there are three exceptions (Pesachim 25 and Sanhedrin 74a):  Avodah Zarah, Gilui Arayos, and Shfichas Damim.  If a person is given a choice- worship this idol or we will kill you; engage in an illicit sexual relationship or we will kill you; kill that other man or we will kill you, one must submit to martyrdom rather than do the prohibited act. 

The Chasam Sofer points out an odd thing.  The source for the rule that life outweighs other religious considerations is our passuk, Vachai Bahem.  This passuk introduces the parsha of Arayos, of forbidden sexual relationships.  Why is it that this almost-universal rule of Vechai Bahem, the rule of Ya'avor ve'ahl yei'hareig, is taught in the introduction to the parsha of Arayos, when Arayos is one of the three rare exceptions to the rule?  Ve'chai Bahem could have been stated in 98% of the Torah in a context where it applies.  Why was it incongruously stated here, where it does not?

The Chasam Sofer does not answer his question: he says "mitzvah le'yasheiv," it would be a mitzvah to explain it.

It's mitzvah time!

First of all, I want to point out that Tosfos, I think, noticed this oddity.  Tosfos in Sanhedrin 60a, d'h חקתי דהשתא, says that despite the contiguity to the parsha of Arayos, the words וָחַי בָּהֶם in this passuk are not talking about Arayos but rather about the 613 Mitzvos of the Torah.  Tosfos does not say what it is about those words that made  him say that, so it's not absolutely clear that Tosfos means what the Chasam Sofer means.  It is possible that Tosfos might just be saying that the idea of vechai bahem is so broad a concept, that it must be referring equally to all the taryag because all the taryag bring life, and it has not specific association with any one parsha.  But it is more probable that Tosfos means the din of pikuach nefesh, that the fact that din of pikuach nefesh that is learned from וָחַי בָּהֶם does not apply to Arayos is proof that this passuk is talking about the whole Torah and not about Arayos. 

Reb Meir Simcha here in his Meshech Chochma talks about this passuk and the Tosfos, and he says that Tosfos means the din of Pikuach Nefesh, the Chasam Sofer's point.  This is no taina on the Chasam Sofer, for two reasons.  1. He probably learned Tosfos not like Reb Meir Simcha, but instead like the first pshat I said above, and 2. as I said before, even when we accept that the passuk is not talking about Arayos, it's odd that it's in the introduction to Arayos. 

In any case, Reb Meir Simcha initially suggests that the din of vechai bahem / yaavor ve'ahl yeihareig does apply to Arayos in cases of lo sikrevu legalos erva, i.e., Clintonesque contact without znus mamash, where it's only a lahv.  However, Reb Meir Simcha points out, this is not true according to the Rambam, who holds that even abizraihu of AZ GA and ShD is yeihareig, even tiny issurim of arayos are yeihareig ve'al yaavor, as stated in the Gaon in YD 157 (and, if I remember correctly, as discussed at length in the intro to Sefer Hamitzvos).   But then he says that according to Reb Meir, in Sanhedrin 59a, that even a Goy that is osek batorah is like a kohen gadol, and Reb Meir bases it on our passuk- Ha'adam vechai bahem- not Yisrael, but any Adam- then we can say that since Goyim are not chayav in Kiddush Hashem (Sanhedrin 74b), if they would have a case of oneis by arayos, their halacha would be ya'avor.  I'm not sure why he says this only in Reb Meir.  The din that pikuach nefesh is doche the seven mitzvos Bnei Noach, I assume, is agreed to by everyone, so it's not only Reb Meir that holds that vechai bahem also goes on Goyim. 

So: Reb Meir Simcha's teretz on the Chasam Sofer's question is: only for Jews, who have a mitzvas Kiddush Hashem, do we limit Vechai Bahem from applying to arayos.  For Goyim, who do not have a mitzvas kiddush Hashem, the general petur of Vechai Bahem applies even in cases of Arayos (and Avodah Zara, but not Retzicha, as Reb Meir Simcha says in the Ohr Sameiach, 5 Yesodei Hatorah 6.)  So we can say that the passuk is in the parsha of Arayos because Goyim are also metzuva on Arayos, and for Goyim, Vechai Bahem is docheh even issur Arayos.

So we have Reb Meir Simcha's answer, two tentative approaches of my own, Chaim B's teretz, and a drush teretz:

1. Reb Meir Simcha in the Meshech Chochma: These words apply to non-Jews as well as Jews, and although we, Jews, cannot apply them to the three chamuros because of our Mitzva of Kiddush Hashem, Goyim do not have a mitzva of Kiddush Hashem, and so for Goyim, the וָחַי בָּהֶם dispensation does apply to Arayos and Avoda Zara.

2. My first tentative teretz: That Vechai Bahem does apply to Arayos.  If one would be weak and would choose to do the aveira and save his life, he would not be chayav missa, as almost all the rishonim (Tosfos, Ran, Ramban, Rambam in Yesodei Hatorah) say in the sugya of Abaya and Rava on mei'ahava umei'yira.  Why would he not be chayav missa?  Because Vechai Bahem removes the chiyuv missa, even if it remains assur.

3.  My second tentative teretz:  The Mishna Sanhedrin 73a says that if we see a man running after a person to kill him or running after an erva for an illicit sexual act, we kill the pursuer, the rodef.  The Rif at the very end of Eilu Ovrim in Pesachim says that you can kill a rodef even on Yom Kippur or Shabbos, although wounding, to say nothing of killing, any living thing is an issur de'oraysa.  The Mishneh Lemelech at the very end of Hilchos Shabbos, 24:7 brings this Rif; he says that while the Rif makes it clear that you can kill a murder rodef on Shabbos, what about killing an arayos rodef on Shabbos?  He doesn't state a final opinion.  I would say that we would be mattir chillul shabbos to kill an arayos rodef on the basis of vechai bahem.  This would explain what it's doing in this parsha.  (But I don't get the Mishneh Lemelech.  If you can kill a murder rodef on Shabbos, that's because of the din of pikuach nefesh.  Why would arayos rodef be different?  What happened to "kaasher yakum ish ahl rei'eihu urtzacho nefesh kein hadavar hazeh?)

4.  See the comments; Chaim B shtells tzu Reb Elchanan's pshat in Tosfos in Kovetz He'aros #48.  He pulled the rug out from under me on this.  I should have thought of what he said, but that's the breaks.  Here's what Chaim wrote:
R' Elchanan explains that Tosfos holds that pikuach nefesh is not nidche because of the big 3. Pikuach nefesh (or v'chai bahem) still applies, but it clashes with the chiyuv to be moseir nefesh. Net result is shev v'al ta'aseh.

 5.  I copied this from HaRav Yissachar Frand, because he writes better than I do.
A cursory examination of this pasuk would seem to indicate that the Torah is telling us that human life is more precious than keeping the mitzvos. Therefore, if you have a choice between observing Shabbos or staying alive, your life is more valuable than the mitzva. We would conclude that there is a general rule: life is more important than the mitzvos, with just three exceptions.
 Rav Moshe Feinstein Zt"l, in his sefer "Igros Moshe," writes  that this common understanding of the pasuk is incorrect. That is not what the pasuk is saying. The true explanation is as basic as a Targum Onkelos.
The Targum Onkelos translates this pasuk as: "and you should live through them in the World to Come." In other words, the pasuk is not telling us to stay alive and neglect the mitzvos, because life is more precious than mitzvos. The pasuk is telling us that the most precious thing in life is keeping mitzvos, because they bring us to olam haba, the World to Come.
Therefore, if I have a choice between observing the Shabbos or being murdered, the Torah says, "live!" Why? Not because life, for its own sake, is more precious than G-d's Commandments. Rather, life is precious because you can do those Commandments! Therefore, perform work on this Shabbos so you can keep so many more Shabbasos in the future. Eat chometz on Pesach. Why? So you can go on and do more mitzvos, and be worthy of life in the world to come.
This is an entirely different perspective. Life is not valuable just for the sake of life itself, without a purpose. Life is not valuable simply in order for a person to work, do errands and go to ball games. That is not what makes life worth living! What does make life worth living? "V'chai bahem" - "l'chayei alma" [in the world to come]. Life that leads to this goal is worth living. The Torah is instructing us to violate the Shabbos and to eat chometz [leaven] on Pesach. Why? The reason is because a human life is valuable because it can do so many more mitzvos in this world. Therefore, violate the Shabbos once so that you can observe Shabbos many more times. (end quote)

Based on this approach, the answer to the question is that Vachai Bahem is in fact universal.  The application of Vachai Bahem, however, varies.  In most cases, the application of vachai bahem results in overturning the issur in order to live.  In some cases, though, the application of vachai bahem results in giving up one's physical life, because doing the issur would cause terrible damage to the eternal life of the soul.

The Torah davka put the din of vechai bahem here to teach us that sometimes, vechai bahem means that we have to give up our lives.

Achrei Mos, Vayikra 16:32. Lecha’hein tachas aviv. Hereditary Entitlement and Meritocracy in Torah Judaism.

(This is a re-post. It has been expanded, and is now one of two articles on nepotism/hereditary entitlement. The other post deals with Moshe Rabbeinu's prayer that his kingship be inherited by his son/s, and Hashem's not granting that request.)

Here, and in Titzaveh, Shemos 29:30, the passuk teaches us that the position of Kehunah Gedolah is inherited from one's father. Obviously, all Kohanim descend from Aharon. But among the Kohanim, the son of the Kohein Gadol inherits his father’s position. Rav Shternbuch, in his Taam Vodaas in Shemos 29, tells the following story. (The italicized portion is from Oizer Alport’s ParshaPotpourri.)

A controversy once broke out when the Rav of a small town in Europe passed away. The leaders of the community wanted to appoint an outsider to take his place, while one of the Rav’s sons argued that he was suited for the position and deserved precedence as the inheritor of his deceased father. The two sides agreed to bring the dispute to the Chofetz Chaim for resolution.


The Chofetz Chaim began by agreeing that Jewish law recognizes that all religious positions, including Rabbinical appointments, are subject to be inherited by the offspring of the deceased. However, the Gemora in Yoma (72b) distinguishes between the son of the Kohen Gadol, who may inherit his father’s purely religious position, and the son of the Kohen Mashuach Milchama (the Kohen who leads the Jews to battle), who may not. Because the latter position is uniquely intended for a man of war and is not purely a religious function, the fact that somebody was suited for the role is irrelevant to his son’s capacity to inherit and fill the position.

The Chofetz Chaim explained that it was once true that the function of the Rav of a community was purely religious in nature – to render legal rulings and to teach the people – and his children were legally entitled to be offered the position before other candidates were considered.

However, he continued, this has unfortunately changed due to the assault of various anti-religious movements on traditional standards and values. As a result, the role of the Rav has been transformed into that of a general leading his troops into a fierce battle, regarding which the Gemora rules that the children are not entitled to automatic precedence in inheriting and filling the position of the deceased!

A thoughtful reading of this story does raise some questions. If the Chofetz Chaim would have said that inherited position is the standard law of the Torah, we could understand that. But it is hard to see the difference between rabbinic religious positions and pastoral positions. Does he mean that religious functions are sinecures, that we don’t care if the man is capable? Doesn’t kehunah gedola, or any religious position, require certain talents or at least aptitude? Why should the Mashu’ach Milchama position be more important in the sense that we really have to get the best suited candidate, that it is a merit-based appointment, while kehunah gedolah is transferred on the basis of familial privilege, of chazakah?(The rule of inherited authority applies to the crown as well. If an heir is qualified, albeit minimally, the crown is his, despite the abundance of far more talented alternatives. Please don't tell me that hereditary succession is peaceful and orderly: I am still looking for a royal succession in Tanach that didn't involve bloodshed, often the killing of the closest relatives in order to gain the position, a minhag that we, the upholders of tradition, have proudly continued in recent years.
Metaphor


On the other hand, it is possible that the rigid and perhaps irrational rule of inherited succession, messy as it turned out to be, is better than a free for all beauty contest, which would be impossible to win decisively and would guarantee a bloody, endless civil war every time a king died. I think that the "best form of government" may be one of the ineluctable, immutable, distinctions among the three Noahide families; we Semites don't do well with Democracy.)

In any case, back to the question on the Chafetz Chaim. Why does inherited rule make more sense in a religious capacity than for the Mashu'ach Milchama? The answer is this:

When the kohen gadol does the avodah, it is not he alone that is standing there doing the avodah. It is him, and his father, and his father’s father, lo, unto the earliest times.

(When I first said this, at the Shabbas table, my wife, Ms. Bor Sid She'einah Me'abeid Tipah, intoned the whole pre-battle speech from a certain re-imagining of Beowulf which she had seen:
"Lo, there do I see my father. Lo, there do I see my mother, and my sisters, and my brothers. Lo, there do I see the line of my people, stretching back to the beginning. They call to me; they bid me to take my place among them, in Valhalla, where the brave may live...forever."  I mention this because it is an excellent portrayal of the strength that might be accessible to one who sees himself as a link in an ancient chain.)

click here

In spiritual matters, when you stand before Hashem, you stand at the center of a great cloud of the past and the future. So of course, we want a man whose ancestors and descendants are all kohanim gedolim.

By the Mashu’ach Milchama, on the other hand, while of course we need an individual who is a tzadik, more importantly we need a man that can inspire the soldiers to courage and bravery. We don’t give a hoot about his father. (So my wife’s sonorous declamation was, in a sense, inapposite: there, he was summoning up and embracing his brave heritage and fate, while my whole point here is that zechus avos is more important in a religious function than it is in a mashuach milchomo. But it’s a great way to communicate an emotional understanding of the idea that the Kohen Gadol doesn’t go in alone.)

In the interest of scholarship not being eclipsed by showmanship, there are several things that need to be added.

We cited a Chofetz Chaim above regarding Rabbonus being hereditary. In fact, this is a very contested issue. Just as an indicator of how difficult the practical halacha is, in the Kol Kisvei Chafetz Chaim there is a letter from him about a din torah he was involved in: after Reb Naftoli Trop died, his position as Magid Shiur was given to the CC's son in law, and the Trops were not happy. In settlement, the yeshiva gave one position to a Trop, and a monetary settlement to a Trop son in law.

The various medroshim and the Rambam, (such as the Sifra in Shmini on the sons of Aharon, and the Sifra in Tzaz, Vayikra 6, and the Sifri in Devorim 17:20, who all say that Kehuna Gedola and Malchus and Srarah are inherited, and the Medrash in Koheles that says that while Kehuna and Malchus are inherited, Rabbonus is not, since the Keser Torah is available freely to anyone and is not restricted in any way by rights of inheritance, and the Rambam in Klei Hamikdash that says that Malchus, Kehuna Gedolah, and other minuyim are inherited, but only if the heir is worthy of the position "either in Chachma or in Yir'as Shamayim,",) are not nearly as interesting as the more recent poskim.

The more recent poskim that discuss this all basically 'agree' that Malchus and Kehuna Gedola are inherited. They all agree that 'Purely Torah' positions, like saying the Beis Medrash shiur, are not. The issue seems mostly to be which category does Rabbanus or being a Rosh Yeshiva go into-- malchus/serara, or Torah. If Malchus, then they are inherited. If Torah, they are not.

So, the Rama in YD 245 says there is yerusha in Rabbanus. (The Magen Avraham in OC 53 brings the Teshuvos Harashba that the position of Chazzan is inherited. I know an otherwise sane man, whose father was a Chazan, and who thinks he has a beautiful voice, and who, when he davens for the amud, is memareik a lot of aveiros in his listening audience, not through dveikus, but through yesurim.)

But: the Aruch Hashulchan there in YD 245 says there is absolutely no preference given to the son of a Rov. And the Chasam Sofer says the same thing in Teshuvos OC 12.

On the other hand, the Chasam Sofer in the very next teshuva seems to qualify the strong statements in the above cited teshuva. And (no kidding) the Chasidishe perspective, even the Avnei Nezer and the Maharsham, is that Rabbonus is primarily Malchus and is inherited.

An interesting and very fiercely litigated issue arises where the position comprises both Torah and Serara. Torah is not subject to Yerusha; but along with the Torah position comes Serara- power and money. Arguments will arise as to which is the primary function, the Torah or the Serara. This would be less of an issue with Roshei Yeshiva than it is with Rebbes. But lets assume that the two functions are or could be independent. Does the latter follow the former? Or perhaps an argument could be made that upon the death of the holder of the position, the two aspects should be divided, with the Serara going to a heir and the Torah position going to the person with the greatest aptitude. And, of course, there is the usual fight about where the position is definitely inheritable, and the holder of the position didn't write a Tzava'a, but clearly expressed his preference for someone who is not first in line in the law of yerusha. Do we apply the strict law of yerusha, where we don't care about unwritten wishes, or do we say that in communal matters, where theoretically the needs of the community should have given some weight, the statements should be given the force of law?