Netzavim and Vayeilech. Guest Post and New Video

The first part is from Rabbi Avraham Bukspan, author of several excellent Parsha works, whose Frand-like style begins with likkut but ultimately creates something special and uniquely his.

This is followed by a video by Rabbi Sendy Shulman. Rabbi Shulman is one of the new Musmachim at my son's kollel, KHA, Kollel Horaah of America, in Marlboro New Jersey. They just successfully concluded a fund-raising campaign, and in his well-crafted speech Rabbi Shulman used an insight from Harav Shmuel Brudny to express the feelings of the Yungeleit.

A moment's thought will reveal that the two divrei Torah are contradictory. Rabbi Bukspan says that a Rebbi has to consciously abandon his focus on personal growth in favor of his Talmidim, while Rabbi Shulman says that the path to one's greatest growth in Gadlus BaTorah comes from dedicating your life to your talmidim!

Of course, it is not a stirah at all. 

מתלמידי יותר מכולם!!!!

After the bechina, my son told the musmachim that the Rabbi Heinemann they saw is not the same as the Rabbi Heinemann of fifty years ago. His dedication to the tzibur has resulted in growth in gadlus far greater than focus on himself. As Reb Chiya said to Reb Chanina (BM 85b), his dedication to his talmidim resulted in his Torah being greater and truer than Reb Chanina's, who was far more talented than him.   בהדי דידי קא מינצית?

כי הוו מינצו ר' חנינא ור' חייא אמר ליה ר' חנינא לר' חייא בהדי דידי קא מינצית ח"ו אי משתכחא תורה מישראל מהדרנא לה מפילפולי אמר ליה ר' חייא לר' חנינא בהדי דידי קא מינצית דעבדי לתורה דלא תשתכח מישראל מאי עבידנא אזלינא ושדינא כיתנא וגדילנא נישבי וציידנא טבי ומאכילנא בשרייהו ליתמי ואריכנא מגילתא וכתבנא חמשה חומשי וסליקנא למתא ומקרינא חמשה ינוקי בחמשה חומשי ומתנינא שיתא ינוקי שיתא סדרי ואמרנא להו עד דהדרנא ואתינא אקרו אהדדי ואתנו אהדדי ועבדי לה לתורה דלא תשתכח מישראל היינו דאמר רבי כמה גדולים מעשי חייא

Vayeilech 1 — Standing or Walking?

 ועתה כתבו לכם את השירה הזאת ולמדה את בני ישראל שימה בפיהם למען תהיה לי השירה הזאת לעד בבני ישראל 

So now, write this song for yourselves, and teach it to the Children of Israel, place it in their mouth, so that this song shall be for Me a witness against the Children of Israel (Devarim 31:19).

               From the phrase, “Ve’simah be’fihem — Place it in their mouth,” the Gemara (Eruvin 54b) concludes that a rebbi must present his lessons to his students: “ad she’tehei sedurah be’fihem — until it is organized in their mouth.”  Torah must be taught in a clear manner, allowing for the talmid to absorb and internalize the information properly, without any confusion. 

           In HaKsav VeHaKabbalah, Rav Yaakov Mecklenburg says that the Gemara learns this from the Torah’s use of the root ש.י.מ.  for putting or placing, as opposed to the verb נ.ת.נ.. While נ.ת.נ. denotes any kind of placement, ש.י.מ. refers to a careful, deliberate, and methodical arrangement. 

            We see this from the mitzvah for the Kohen to take the ashes from the korbanos that are on top of the Mizbe’ach and place them alongside it: “Ve’samo eitzel haMizbe’ach” (Vayikra 6:3). In Toras Kohanim (Tzav 2:4), Chazal define the word “ve’samo” as calmly placing, in a way that the ashes do not scatter. Thus, the shoresh of ש.י.מ.  implies placement in an unhurried and careful manner.

            HaKsav VeHaKabbalah uses this definition to explain “Ve’simah be’fihem.”  Torah needs to be taught in an organized and calculated fashion, guaranteeing that the information is not scattered in the students’ minds, but is neatly arranged.  At times, a rebbi may need to give his talmidim large amounts of information. But if the material is transmitted in a disorganized or  an unsystematic way, the students become overwhelmed and find it difficult to integrate the lesson in their minds, to understand how the various pieces of information fit together.  By use of the word “simah,” which implies a more measured and purposeful method, Chazal associate the preferred procedure of teaching Torah to the careful placement of the ash in a neatly arranged and organized pile. All teachers are thereby urged to put forth their best effort at presenting the material in a slow, patient, and organized manner. This way, all the critical information can be properly and precisely understood and put into its proper context.

Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky discusses the ideal rebbi described by our Chazal. In Malachi (2:7), we are taught: “Ki sifsei Kohen yishmeru daas ve’Sorah yevakshu mi’pihu ki malach Hashem Tzevakos hu — For the lips of the Kohen should safeguard knowledge, and people should seek Torah from his mouth; for he is a malach of Hashem, Master of Legions.” Based on this verse, the Gemara (Chagigah 15b) tells us that if a rebbi is “domeh le’malach Hashem,” similar to an angel of G-d, we should learn Torah from him. If not, we should not.

            What exactly does a malach look like? How can we recognize the rebbi we are looking for? Rav Yaakov explains that a malach is an omeid, a stationary being. It does not grow or evolve, but always stays the same. A human, however, is a mehalech, with the capacity to move, to grow and evolve (see Zecharyahu 3:7); he is, hopefully, in a constant state of forward progress. (See Tetzaveh, Staying Alive, on this subject.) A rebbi, though, explains Rav Yaakov, must be like a malach, where he is not concerned about his own growth and development, but the growth and development of his students.

            A true rebbi is only focused on the proper presentation of the appropriate material, and when needed, presents it in a simplified fashion. His role is to see that his students are the ones going places; they are the ones who need to grow as they learn, digest, and retain the material. Such a rebbi is like a malach, for his only ambition is to see his talmidim progress.

             “Nitzavim or Vayeilech?” Standing or going? From a play on words on these two parashiyos, we have a question every person must ask himself. Am I standing still or am I going and growing?

            Every rebbi must ask the same question in a slightly modified form: “Nitzavim or Vayeilech?” Am I willing to stand still, putting aside an aspect of my personal growth, so that my talmidim can move forward and develop as they should?

Ahd kahn divrei Rabbi Bukspan. 

And now Rabbi Shulman's speech.

Aseres Yemei Teshuva and Parshas Vayelech. Sometimes, the Ribono shel Olam taps you on the shoulder.

Around a year ago, my wife and I began learning Tanach together. We have gone through Yehoshua, Shoftim, and Melachim, all with Rashi. My wife was not looking forward to beginning Yeshaya, because the Hebrew is idiomatic, and because it is so depressing. Nonetheless, we began. We found Rashi to be much lengthier than elsewhere, and that added to the challenge, so we cut down our usual twenty or so pesukim a night to five. We discussed changing our way of learning, because the length of Rashi made it so much harder, so maybe we would find another peirush for our seder, maybe the Radak.

Come Friday night, she says that it probably is not appropriate for her to learn Yeshaya on Shabbos, because it makes her teary eyed, as do all the stories of tragedies and missed opportunities. I say that we should try anyway. So we sit down to learn, including Rashi.  

Here are the Pesukim we learn Friday night.

לָמָּה־לִּ֤י רֹב־זִבְחֵיכֶם֙ יֹאמַ֣ר יְהוָ֔ה שָׂבַ֛עְתִּי עֹל֥וֹת אֵילִ֖ים וְחֵ֣לֶב מְרִיאִ֑ים וְדַ֨ם פָּרִ֧ים וּכְבָשִׂ֛ים וְעַתּוּדִ֖ים לֹ֥א חָפָֽצְתִּי׃

כִּ֣י תָבֹ֔אוּ לֵרָא֖וֹת פָּנָ֑י מִי־בִקֵּ֥שׁ זֹ֛את מִיֶּדְכֶ֖ם רְמֹ֥ס חֲצֵרָֽי׃

לֹ֣א תוֹסִ֗יפוּ הָבִיא֙ מִנְחַת־שָׁ֔וְא קְטֹ֧רֶת תּוֹעֵבָ֛ה הִ֖יא לִ֑י חֹ֤דֶשׁ וְשַׁבָּת֙ קְרֹ֣א מִקְרָ֔א לֹא־אוּכַ֥ל אָ֖וֶן וַעֲצָרָֽה׃

חָדְשֵׁיכֶ֤ם וּמוֹעֲדֵיכֶם֙ שָׂנְאָ֣ה נַפְשִׁ֔י הָי֥וּ עָלַ֖י לָטֹ֑רַח נִלְאֵ֖יתִי נְשֹֽׂא׃

וּבְפָרִשְׂכֶ֣ם כַּפֵּיכֶ֗ם אַעְלִ֤ים עֵינַי֙ מִכֶּ֔ם גַּ֛ם כִּֽי־תַרְבּ֥וּ תְפִלָּ֖ה אֵינֶ֣נִּי שֹׁמֵ֑עַ יְדֵיכֶ֖ם דָּמִ֥ים מָלֵֽאוּ׃

רַחֲצוּ֙ הִזַּכּ֔וּ הָסִ֛ירוּ רֹ֥עַ מַעַלְלֵיכֶ֖ם מִנֶּ֣גֶד עֵינָ֑י חִדְל֖וּ הָרֵֽעַ׃

לִמְד֥וּ הֵיטֵ֛ב דִּרְשׁ֥וּ מִשְׁפָּ֖ט אַשְּׁר֣וּ חָמ֑וֹץ שִׁפְט֣וּ יָת֔וֹם רִ֖יבוּ אַלְמָנָֽה׃

לְכוּ־נָ֛א וְנִוָּֽכְחָ֖ה יֹאמַ֣ר יְהוָ֑ה אִם־יִֽהְי֨וּ חֲטָאֵיכֶ֤ם כַּשָּׁנִים֙ כַּשֶּׁ֣לֶג יַלְבִּ֔ינוּ אִם־יַאְדִּ֥ימוּ כַתּוֹלָ֖ע כַּצֶּ֥מֶר יִהְיֽוּ׃

אִם־תֹּאב֖וּ וּשְׁמַעְתֶּ֑ם ט֥וּב הָאָ֖רֶץ תֹּאכֵֽלוּ׃

וְאִם־תְּמָאֲנ֖וּ וּמְרִיתֶ֑ם חֶ֣רֶב תְּאֻכְּל֔וּ כִּ֛י פִּ֥י יְהוָ֖ה דִּבֵּֽר׃ 

Rashi on passuk 16:

רחצו הזכו. (פתח הוא) ל' צווי לפי שהוא מגזרת רחץ, אבל רחצו קמץ לשון עבר שהוא מגזרת רחץ

 רחצו. הזכו. הסירו. חדלו. למדו. דרשו. אשרו. שפטו. ריבו. לכו.

י' אזהרות של ל' תשובה יש כאן כנגד עשרת ימי תשובה וכנגד עשרה מלכיות זכרונות ושופרות:

".... Wash, purify, remove, cease, learn, seek, uphold, judge, fight, come: ten mandates of repentance, corresponding to the Ten Days of Repentance [from Rosh Hashana to Yom Kippur] and corresponding to the ten verses of Kingship, Remembrance, and Shofar."


The ten imperatives in Pesukim 16, 17, and 18, correspond to the עשרת ימי תשובה. I never would have known this. How often are the עשרת ימי תשובה referred to in Tanach? So far, only one other place, where Naval died ten days after he insulted Dovid HaMelech, those were the עשרת ימי תשובה (RH 18a.) To have learned Tanach a whole year, to get to Yeshaya, to wonder whether yes Rashi or no Rashi, to decide to do it anyway, and to do it now, and to learn davka the pesukim that are meramez to the עשרת ימי תשובה, that is not just general information. 


Even more: This week is Parshas Vayelech. In 31:18, the Torah warns us that Klal Yisrael will face Hester Panim.

ואנכי הסתר אסתיר פני ביום ההוא על כל הרעה אשר עשה כי פנה אל אלהים אחרים

Rashi in Yeshaya 8:17 brings a Yerushalmi (San 10:32) that discusses the "Hester Panim" mentioned in our Parsha. The Yerushalmi says that there was no worse moment of Nevu'ah than that moment when the Ribono shel Olam said through Moshe Rabbeinu that there would be הסתר פנים.

וחכיתי לה' המסתיר פניו וגו'. אין לך נבואה קשה כאותה שעה שאמר משה (דברים ל״א:י״ח) ואנכי הסתר אסתיר פני ביום ההוא

We are used to thinking of הסתר פנים like the story of Megillas Esther, that Hashem hides from us, that His Hashgacha Pratis is hidden behind Teva. But in our pesukim, the Navi Yeshayahu tells us that there is an aspect of Hester Panim that is much, much, worse than that. This is the aspect kind of Hester Panim that the Gemara in Chagiga (4b) uses our pesukim in Yeshaya 1:12 to explain.

רב הונא כי מטי להאי קרא יראה יראה בכי אמר עבד שרבו מצפה לו לראותו יתרחק ממנו דכתיב כי תבואו לראות פני מי בקש זאת מידכם רמוס חצרי.

This is an aspect of Hester Panim where Hashem doesn't want your mitzvos. 

The Navi Yeshaya applies this to the Avoda of the Beis HaMikdash - I have no interest in your korbanos. Who asked you to make Aliyah LeRegel? Your Yomtov gatherings make me tired. But the Rambam and Rabbeinu Yonah explain that this הסתר פנים is not limited to the things the Navi Yeshaya described, it is total. All the mitzvos you do are rejected by the Ribono shel Olam. This is not an issue of עבירה מכבה. This is an iron curtain created by failure to do Teshuva.

The Rambam (Teshuva 7:7) says that when a person has not done Teshuva, the RBSO does not want a person's mitzvos. Not just Aliya l'regel - all mitzvos.

כַּמָּה מְעֻלָּה מַעֲלַת הַתְּשׁוּבָה. אֶמֶשׁ הָיָה זֶה מֻבְדָּל מֵה' אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ישעיה נט ב) "עֲוֹנוֹתֵיכֶם הָיוּ מַבְדִּלִים בֵּינֵכֶם לְבֵין אֱלֹהֵיכֶם". צוֹעֵק וְאֵינוֹ נַעֲנֶה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ישעיה א טו) "כִּי תַרְבּוּ תְפִלָּה" וְגוֹ'. וְעוֹשֶׂה מִצְוֹת וְטוֹרְפִין אוֹתָן בְּפָנָיו שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ישעיה א יב) "מִי בִקֵּשׁ זֹאת מִיֶּדְכֶם רְמֹס חֲצֵרָי", (מלאכי א י) "מִי גַם בָּכֶם וְיִסְגֹּר דְּלָתַיִם" וְגוֹ'. וְהַיּוֹם הוּא מֻדְבָּק בַּשְּׁכִינָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים ד ד) "וְאַתֶּם הַדְּבֵקִים בַּה' אֱלֹהֵיכֶם". צוֹעֵק וְנַעֲנֶה מִיָּד שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ישעיה סה כד) "וְהָיָה טֶרֶם יִקְרָאוּ וַאֲנִי אֶעֱנֶה". וְעוֹשֶׂה מִצְוֹת וּמְקַבְּלִין אוֹתָן בְּנַחַת וְשִׂמְחָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (קהלת ט ז) "כִּי כְבָר רָצָה הָאֱלֹהִים אֶת מַעֲשֶׂיךָ". וְלֹא עוֹד אֶלָּא שֶׁמִּתְאַוִּים לָהֶם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (מלאכי ג ד) "וְעָרְבָה לַה' מִנְחַת יְהוּדָה וִירוּשָׁלםִ כִּימֵי עוֹלָם וּכְשָׁנִים קַדְמֹנִיּוֹת":

Rabbeinu Yona says this in Shaarei Teshuva (א' מ"א) as well. 

העיקר הט"ז התפלה. יתפלל אל השם ויבקש רחמים לכפר את כל עונותיו. שנאמר (הושע יד) קחו עמכם דברים ושובו אל ה' אמרו אליו כל תשא עון וקח טוב ונשלמה פרים שפתינו. זה ענין הוידוי. אמרו אליו כל תשא עון וקח טוב. זה ענין התפלה. ופירושו - וקח טוב מעשה הטוב שעשינו. כי אמרו ז"ל עבירה מכבה מצוה. ובעת התשובה יתכפרו העונות ותתעורר זכות המצוה ויאיר נרה. אחרי אשר לא הגיה אורו לפני התשובה. וכן כתיב (איוב ח) אם זך וישר אתה כי עתה יעיר עליך ושלם נות צדקך. אמרו רבותינו זכרונם לברכה אם זך וישר היית לא נאמר. אלא אם זך וישר אתה. שעשית תשובה. כי עתה יעיר עליך. עתה אחרי התשובה שעשית. יעיר עליך כל הצדקות שעשית מלפנים ואשר היה ביתך פתוח לרוחה. ונטעת אשל אכסניא. כמ"ש (שם לא) דלתי לאורח אפתח וקודם התשובה לא היו צדקותיך מגינות עליך. ואחרי שובך וסר עונך. יעיר זכותך ושלם נות צדקך.

All the mitzvos, and maasim tovim, and Torah, that you did, Hashem tears them up in front of you; Only after Teshuva they are changed into zechusim. 

Reb Ahron (Mishnas Rebbi Ahron/Torah/Vayeilech, p 368)

ובאמת זהו עיקר גדר קלקול העוון, ההבדלה והריחוק בין האדם לבוראו, וכדכתיב (ישעיהו נ"ט ב') "כי אם עוונותיכם היו מבדילים ביניכם ובין אלקיכם" ומגיע הריחוק עד כדי כך שאין רוצים במצוותיו, וכמש"כ הרמב"ם בהל' תשובה פרק ז' ה"ז שעושה מצוות וטורפין אותן בפניו שנאמר מי בקש זאת מידכם רמוס חצרי וגם תורתו אינה רצויה וכדכתיב תהלים ג' ט"ז ולרשע אמר אלוקים מה לך לספר חקי ותשא בריתי עלי פיך והגדר הוא שאין למצוותיו ותורתו מבוא וכניסה לפנים ובגדר מה דתנו יזנה כ"ח ב' משל לעבד שבא למזוג כוס לרבו ושפך לו קיתון על פניו וזהו מה שאמרו סוטה כ"א א' עבירה מכבה מצוה ואפילו בעסק התורה שבה אמרו שם אין עבירה מכבה תורה אבל מ"מ יש שהאדם מגיע לדרגה כזו שגם תורתו אינה רצויה עד שאומרים לו מה לך לספר חקי ואף שברור ופשוט הוא שגם אז מחוייב הוא בתורה ומצוות אך מ"מ אינם לרצון וכמו שנאמר בקרבנות שמות יח יח לרצרן להם וכן הוא בכל מעשי המצוות שכולם נקראים ריצוי ובזה שעוונותיו מבדילין בינו לבין קונו ומרחיקין אותו ממנו ית' אינו במצב של רצוי 

ובאמת שחשיבות תורתו ומצוותיו של האדם הוא כפי התקרבותו אל ה' וכמש"כ בממ"י פ' ט"ו כשם שאינו עולה על המזבח אלא סולת מנופה וכו' כן אינו עולה על רצון מזבחו העליון וכו' אלא המובחר שבמעשים הטהור וכות ונמצא דמשקל התורה והמצוות הוא לפי מדרגתו בכלל אף שהמצוה עצמה נעשית בתכסיס שוה 

That means that when a person does not do Teshuva, then his heartfelt davening is not a davening, his mehuderdikkeh tefillin is not tefillin, his hasmada in Torah is not Torah. Only with Teshuva do these things turn to your eternal benefit.

Learning this on Friday night of Shabbos Shuva felt like a Navi knocked at my door with a telegram from the Ribono shel Olam. "The Ribono shel Olam wants you to know this: It is the עשרת ימי תשובה, and you had better take this very, very, seriously."

We don't have neviim, we don't even have a bas kol. But we apparently do have something. That "something" arranged that after almost a year of learning Tanach, during Aseres Yemei Teshuva, the night before we read in Parshas Vayeilech about Hester Panim, we read a Rashi that told me that until a person does Teshuva, all his Mitzvos and Maasim Tovim just make the Ribono shel Olam tired. They bring no Ritzui. The person is in a self imposed condition of Hester Panim, a Hester Panim that means not only that Hashem is hidden from him, but far worse, that Hashem does not want to see him or his pathetic mitzvos and Torah.  In order to escape from that miserable condition, the Navi told us we have Aseres Yemei Teshuva. These Aseres Yemei Teshuva are not just a matter of time passing. They represent the ten steps a person must take to climb out of his pit of Hester Panim. They are  

 רחצו. הזכו. הסירו. חדלו. למדו. דרשו. אשרו. שפטו. ריבו. לכו.

The Gaon in his Peirush on Nach (MHK) says
טז רחצו וגו' חשב כאן תשעה דברים ואחר כך אמר לכו נא ונוכחה והמה כנגד עשרת ימי תשובה והעשירי יום הכפורים ואמר בפסוק הראשון ד' דברים רחצו הזכו הסירו חדלו שהם ד' דרכי התשובה היינו חרטה וידוי עזיבת החטא ולחדול מכל הדברים שהביאו לחטוא והם כנגד ארבעה פעולות שבאדם במחשבה בדיבור במעשה והמעשה נחלק לשתים עשה ולא תעשה יז למדו היטב הרגילו את עצמכם להיטיב דרשו לדרוש יפה אשרו לשון הדרכה כמ"ש רש"י ורצה לומר הגזול תמיד שלא היה יכול לילך בדרך מפני העושקים ורצחנים וז"ש בחולם לשון מקור שהיה תמיד עשוק וגזול תדריכוהו שפטו בשביל היתום כמו שפטני אלהים וריבו הוא יותר כי שפיטה מדת השופט וריב הוא מדת בעל דין ואצל אלמנה שהיא מעונה יותר מהיתום וגם כל כבודה פנימה אמר ריבו שתהיה בעל דין בשבילה 

The notes from R Meir Yehoshua Katzenellenbogen there:

 ביאור פסוק זה בכת"י וז"ל 

"רחצו הזכו הסירו כו' חדלו אמר כאן כב' פסוקים יו"ד דברים נגד יו"ד ימי תשובה. ובפסוק הראשון הוא דברים נגד ד' דרכי תשובה והם חרטה וידוי ועזיבת החטא. דהיינו אם גזל ישיב את הגזילה' וכן כל דבר יקבל על עצמו שלא לעשות עוד' והם נגד מחשבה דיבור ומעשה. ומעשה הוא ב' דברים עשה ולא תעשה, והיינו חרטה בלב נגד מחשבה, וידוי הוא בפה נגד דיבור, עזיבת החטא נגד מעשה שהוא משיב הגזילה וכדומה, ומה שקיבל על עצמו שלא לעשות עוד נגד לא תעשה, וז"ש (דברים ל יד) בפיך ובלבבך לעשותו. וז"ש: רחצו היינו חרטה, הזכו הוא וידוי, הסירו כו' כמשמעו עזיבת החטא. 

[בליקוטים: להסיר כל העבירות מה שגזל יחזיר לבעליו וכן בכל העבירות יראה לתקנם] חדלו הרע שיקבל על עצמו שלא לעשות עוד." [בליקוטים: נמצא יש בארבעה אלו שתיים לעבר ושתים להבא, רחצו הזכו לעבר, הסירו חדלו להבא. וע"ש עוד] 

Reb Tzadok Pri Tzadik Devarim 11:

והנה אמר בתוכחה זו עשרה לשונות של תשובה, רחצו, הזכו וגו' עד לכו נא ונוכחה וגו' כפירוש רש"י ז"ל, והיינו הטהרה והזדככות מצד האדם כסדר להיות מקודם סור מרע במחשבה ובמעשה, ואחר כך להיות ועשה טוב גם כן במחשבה ובמעשה, כי הד' ראשונים המה בסור מרע, רחצו הזכו הוא במחשבה בלב, הסירו חדלו הוא במעשה, ואחר זה ד' בחינות כנ"ל בועשה טוב, ולמדו היטב הוא הכנה לזה ללמד את עצמו אופן העשה טוב, ודרשו ואשרו חמוץ הוא במחשבה, ושפטו יתום ריבו אלמנה הוא עשה טוב בפועל. ואחר כל אלה לכו נא ונוכחה שיהיה מעתה בכח להיות נקרא מהלך, כמו שנאמר "אשרי תמימי דרך ההולכים בתורת ה'", כי כל עוד שלא נטהר מחלאת הנפש הוא נסבך בסבכי חטאים עד שאין בו כח לזוז את עצמו ולהלוך. ומעתה אם יהיו חטאיכם כשנים היינו דבר הנפעל ונצבע לעצמו, כשלג ילבינו, שיוכל להתהפך לתכלית הלבנונית להיות עזה כשלג, כי כבר בא על ידי מעשיו לתשובה עלאה שזדונות נעשים כזכיות. וגם תיבת רחצו הוא בחינת תשובה תתאה בהרהור במחשבה בלבד, שאמרו על זה שזדונות נעשים כשגגות... וגם אם יאדימו כתולע, שהוא לשון מפעיל כתולעת שצובע את אחרים, היינו גם מי שהחטיא את אחרים יש בכח להתהפך כצמר על כל פנים שהוא במדרגה למטה משלג, כידוע משאת כצמר לבן, כי גם אלישע אחר ששמע מאחורי הפרגוד שובו בנים שובבים חוץ מאחר (חגיגה ט"ו), והיה זה מפני שאין מספיקין בידו, ועם כל זה היה בזה התעוררות לדחוק את עצמו והיה מועיל תשובתו גם כן כדאיתא בשל"ה הקדש, וגם לירבעם שחטא והחטיא תפסו הקב"ה בבגדו שישוב... (שם דברים יא)

Rabbi Krasner speaks about this at length in his amazing Nachalas Shimon on Yeshaya 1, numbers 31 and 41, and brings from the Noda Biyehuda a long discussion of how the Rambam could say what he says and his makor. Among other things, the idea is that וְעוֹשֶׂה מִצְוֹת וְטוֹרְפִין אוֹתָן בְּפָנָיו  doesn't mean that he doesn't get schar. It means that his schar goes to where his ikker roots/yenika are/is, so if he is a ben olam hazeh, all the schar goes to olam hazeh. If he does teshuva, and becomes a ben olam haba, then his schar goes to the olam haruchni, to olam haba.

Vayeilech, Devarim 31:3-13. The Schenirer-Scherman Unintended Consequence Rule

In the Mitzva of Hakhel, we are told to gather all of Klal Yisrael during Sukkos of the year that follows Shemittah to hear the reading of a large part of Sefer Devarim.  The Torah specifies that men and women and converts and children attend.   הקהל את העם האנשים והנשים והטף וגרך אשר בשעריך למען ישמעו ולמען ילמדו ויראו את יהוה אלהיכם ושמרו לעשות את כל דברי התורה הזאת The purpose of the gathering is so that all that attend will hear and learn and so that they will fear Hashem and do His mitzvos. 

I'm not going to discuss the issue of women learning Gemara, but it's obvious that the women had to be there to hear the Torah, both at Hakhel and at Mattan Torah.  The raya that they were essential to Kabbalas Hatorah is that the three day delay was in order that the women should be in a state of ritual purity, such that they would be receptive to hearing the words of Torah.

It's also obvious that Chazal were not sanguine about women learning Gemara in the same way as men.  Witness Rav Nachman's statement in Megillah 14b regarding Chulda and Devorah, and, of course, Rebbi Eliezer's words in Sotah 20a.  I realize that both can be interpreted differently, but if you're not seeing the subtext of those Chazals, then we're not sharing a lexicon and we're not really having a conversation.  Also, if you think that Chazal did disapprove of women learning Gemara, but they were not enlightened, there is a gap between us I'm not interested in bridging.   I don't need an audience of or a conversation with kofrim b'divrei Chazal and azei panim.

Finally, it's also obvious that the times, they are a-changin'.  The current Yoatzot and Rabbaniot have worked hard to attain what they've achieved, and while no doubt equal to their cohort, they are not worthy of comparison to the poskim that learned in traditional yeshivos.  But there might come a time when some female outlier will publish halachic opinions that stand up to criticism and which will be shown to be of a caliber equal or superior to accepted male poskim.   The Yeshiva world will never accept this: we have plenty of examples of geonim in Torah and Yir'ah who were rejected by the right wing because of some theological or political problem.  But this will not matter to the Modern wing of Orthodoxy.  On the contrary, they will celebrate and embrace this phenomenon.  At that point, Modern Orthodox Judaism will experience an irreversible change of trajectory.  

This beginning of this sea change is all around us, and the movement is inexorable.  Most of us know a woman who is learning the daf, or giving a shiur on Gemara, or writing articles on Halacha.  The extent and degree of this phenomenon is totally unprecedented.  For all I know, it will lead to improvement.  I can't say that men have done such an excellent job, but certainly the female perspective will not be the same.  As I said before, Chazal's words are not encouraging.

Whose fault is it?  Rebbetzin Sarah Schenirer and Rabbi Nosson Scherman, that's whose fault it is, Beis Yaakov and Artscroll.  It's not really a "fault."  What they did was no different than what Rabbeinu Hakadosh did, and it saved tens of thousands of Jews for Yiddishkeit.  But there are unintended consequences, and this is a big one, and it's gonna shake your windows and rattle your walls.

Note:
From the comments, it has become clear to me that I need to explain what I perceive to be the problem.  To me, the biggest problem is the feminization of Torah.  Torah, as it exists now, is the product of a male approach.  We learn by arguing, we fight each other over every word, and we build complex structures that define our view of Torah as a gestalt.  I believe that a woman's perspective would be very different, and that after a few generations, the Torah that stems from a gender neutral learning would be unrecognizable to us.  This would have two terrible results: The Chareidi world (such as Lakewood, Telz, Mir, and their offshoots) would utterly reject the legitimacy of those groups that exhibit these characteristics, to the extent of refusing to join them on rabbinical action committees; and, concomitantly, this would generate an unbridgeable gap that would start out based on theological differences but would ultimately express itself in enormous halachic differences and would be as wide as today exists between the Orthodox and the Conservative.

The immediate response of the modern crowd is, "do you have any empirical data that support your assertion."  No, I don't.  So consider yourself to have won this argument, and have a good day.

Vayeilech, Devarim 31:12. The False Dichotomy of Tzibur/Yachid

The Mitzva of Hakhel is stated thus:
הקהל את העם האנשים והנשים והטף וגרך אשר בשעריך למען ישמעו 
Gather the nation, men and women and children and converts that live among you so that they will hear....

To whom was Moshe speaking?  Who was commanded to fulfill the mitzva of Hakhel?  The answer to this question is not clear to me.  In pesukim 1 through 6, Moshe is speaking to all of Klal Yisrael.  In pesukim 7 and 8, he is speaking to Yehoshua.  In passuk 9, he is dealing with the members of his shevet and Sanhedrin.  So when passuk 10 begins, and it says ויצו משה אותם לאמר מקץ שבע שנים במעד שנת השמטה בחג הסכות.  בבוא כל ישראל לראות את פני יהוה אלהיך במקום אשר יבחר תקרא את התורה הזאת נגד כל ישראל באזניהם. הקהל את העם, when it says ויצו משה אותם, who is the the  אותם?  Who is he instructing?  If  אותם is Klal Yisrael, then it shouldn't say בבוא כל ישראל, when Klal Yisrael will come.  It should say בבואכם, when you will come.  If, on the other hand, it is directed to Yehoshua and the Zkainim and Shevet Levi, then the pesukim flow more naturally.

Anyway, I can't see in the words הקהל את העם any commandment to individuals.  It seems like a mitzva that the people should be gathered, not a mitzva for the individuals to gather.  By Aliya Laregel, on the other hand, the words are שלוש פעמים בשנה יראה כל זכורך.  The various terms used in that context are יראה, תחוג, and ושמחת.  These are not at all like הקהל את העם.  

In fact, the Rambam's words (3 Chagiga 1) are מצות עשה להקהיל כל ישראל.  In the next halacha, he says כל הפטור מן הראייה פטור ממצות הקהל, which might be read to mean that there is an individual obligation, but I don't believe that's true.  It just defines who is to be gathered.

The Malbim here says הצווי על הב"ד שבידם להקהיל כולם, so there clearly is a mitzva on Beis Din.  But his next words are ועל כל איש מישראל על מה שבידו לבא בעצמו ולזרז הנשים ולהביא את הטף, that there is also a mitzva on each individual.

Where do we get the mitzva for individuals out of this passuk?  The אותם in ויצו משה אותם can only have one meaning; either it means Beis Din or it means each individual.  How can we say it means both? 

The assumption of my question is that the tzibur is not the yachid and the yachid is not the tzibur.  I think that the dichotomy between the individual and the tzibur is false.  Our perception of ourselves as individuals is illusory.  The isolation of consciousness is an artifact that bespeaks a limitation of perception, not a reality.  For all I know, white blood cells might have some kind of awareness, like that of an amoeba, and act as if they're independent.  But they're not; they're component units in an organism which have no significance as individuals.  I think the same is true of Klal Yisrael.

Even if one were to postulate some kind of collective moral sensorium, that our experiences and actions influence others without our or their realizing it (as Reb Yisrael Salanter said- "If someone says Lashon Hara in the Beis Medrash in Vilna, there will be more chillul Shabbos in Paris", or as the Ibn Ezra says by Egla Arufa in Devarim 21,) that would only make sense for contemporaries.  Avraham Avinu's words resulted in the suffering of Shibud Mitzrayim, and his merits benefit his descendants through zechus avos, even though we are not responsible for what he did and not control him.  The Tzibur affects the yachid and the behavior of a yachid has an effect on the tzibbur, as Rav Freidlander discusses in his Sifsei Chaim in the section Ein Mazal LeYisrael, as does Rav Meir Berman in his Sifsei Daas II on Haazinu.  (Rabbi Dovid Gottlieb, writing as Dale Gottlieb, wrote an article on this question many years ago in Tradition.  I found the article stimulating but far from comprehensive.  If you want to pay for it, it is available here, but you're not allowed to share it.)  Famously, the Rambam in Teshuva says that one individual's behavior can tip the balance of the entire world and create consequences for all the members of the tzibur.  Even if the mitzva is to Beis Din, that only means that it 's a mitzva on the tzibur.  Tzibur and individual are identical.  The covenants, and the renewal of covenant, was with כולכם- the people as a whole- Mattan Torah, Nitzavim, and Hakhel.  The deeper truth is only the כולכם.  I also believe that the כולכם usually applies only to Klal Yisrael, but might to some extent apply to mankind as a whole.

I realize that this extreme postulate would mean that there is no schar or onesh for individuals.  That is absurd, but I don't know where to draw the line.  If individuals suffer for the behavior of the tzibur as a whole, and vice versa, then the idea of pure personal self-determination is not correct.  Maybe individualism and national organicism, or holistic collectivism, are not mutually exclusive; maybe each reality is fully functional, but I can't figure out how that would work.  It seems to me that the former contradicts the latter.

Vayeilech, Devarim 31:12. The Mitzvah of Hakhel and the Mitzva of Chinuch

Chagiga 3a: Reb Yehoshua (ben Chananiah, the stam Reb Yehoshua in Shas) asked the talmidim who visited him what was new in the Bais Medrash (ein bais medrash belo chiddush). They told him that they came to hear his Torah, not to talk, but he insisted that they say something. (When I try this in my house, I just get a sour look.) So they told him what they heard about the Mitzvah of Hakheil, the law that every seven years, on the first Sukkos that follows the Shmita year, there was a mitzvah for all of Klal Yisrael, men, women, and children, even infants, to gather and hear the King read the Torah in the Beis Hamikdash. But, they said, "Bishlema the men came to learn (to analyze the deep meaning and vast permutations of Torah) and the women came to hear (to learn the many halachos that were relevant to them). But why did the children come?" The answer they heard was‘litein schar limaiviahen,’ to reward those that brought them. Reb Yehoshua said, "Such a precious pearl of an idea, and you wanted ‘le’abda mimeni’, to make me miss it!

The Gemora cannot mean that it is a mitzva that has no meaning other than to reward the doer. As the brother of the Maharal, Reb Chaim Ben Betzalel of Vurtzberg, in his "Sefer Hachaim", (Cheilek 2, perek 2, page 24) says (after bringing those that explain the Gemora in Chagiga as meaning that there is no benefit to the children), "we don’t find that moving stones from one place to another, with no benefit to anyone, is a form of service of Hashem." And as the Nesivos in Nachlas Yakov says "it is hard to understand that there is a mitzvah that has no benefit other than receiving reward." And, most certainly, Reb Yehoshua would not have been so excited to hear it.

So, the Nesivos says that the pshat is, of course there is meaning to the mitzva, like any other mitzva in the Torah, and Chazal are not questioning the reason for a mitzva, as they don’t by so many others that have no obvious reason. We don't all hold like Reb Shimon. The question was, since all the Jews over 12 or 13 would have to be in Yerushalayim they couldn’t possibly leave the infants at home. They’re going to leave the infants with the Poilishe Shikses? So, if they had to bring the children anyway, why did Hashem have to tell them to bring the children? Under the circumstances, they had no alternative but to bring the children even if they were not told to do so. The answer is that ‘ein Hakadosh Baruch Hu mekapei’ach schar kol briah’, and so, since (for whatever reason,) it is the retzon Hashem (and therefore a purposeful and meritorious act) that the children be there, Hashem wanted us to do it lesheim mitzva, so we should do it with kavana and as metzuvim ve’osim, understanding that we are bringing them because Hashem wants us to bring them.

But the problem is that the Gemora says that "Bishlema the men came to learn, and the women came to hear. But why did the children come." This lashon shows that the Gemara is asking what the reason for bringing the children is! According to the Nesivos, the Gemara should have asked "Why is there a tzivui to bring the children?", not "Why do the children come?" And, the Gemara does seems to be saying that the only reason is litein schar lemaivi’aihen, which is mashma that that is the only reason the Gemora could come up with. Really, the Nesivos seems to be offering a novel alternative to the perplexing literal meaning of the Gemara. So, if we do want to take the Gemara at face value, we have to continue looking.

Reb Moshe, in his Teshuvos, Yoreh Deah 2:104, towards the end, offers a pshat in the Gemara. Many times, parents evaluate their children, and if they think the child is not going to be a gadol, they will not work hard to teach him Torah, and if they think he is completely untalented, they will do only the most perfunctory effort to teach him. Now, let us look at the Gemara. The Gemora's question is based on the assumption that the din of Hakhel is a din of Chinuch. If so, asks the Gemara, what is the purpose of bringing the children? If the chiyuv is the general mitzvah of chinuch, what kind of benefit are the little children getting from going? So the Gemara answers, you are wrong. The parent’s chiyuv of chinuch is absolute. Chinuch is a maiseh that the Torah was mechayev the parents under all circumstances, at all ages, for all children, whether they see the benefit or not. It is none of their business to calculate what benefit their children will get from the chinuch, just as they don’t do a cost/benefit analysis when they buy a lulav and esrog. Teach them to the best of your ability, even if it seems that they don't understand a word. But in truth, just as by other mitzvos, there is a benefit, whether we know it or not, there is a chinuch benefit even for babies to go to Hakhel.

I always was bothered, though, by the lashon of the Gemara, that says "litein schar limeivi’eihen", because according to this, the Gemara should say "so that the little children will benefit", or "because this, too, is chinuch". But I found that the Akeidas Yitzchok, the Akeida, provides an interesting insight into what Reb Moshe's pshat. He explains that bringing the children is not really chinuch as the term is generally understood, because the little children understand nothing. But it prepares the child for chinuch. It prepares the ground, it makes it softer and more receptive to the seeds that will be planted later. It makes the child a better beis kibul. This explains the loshon of the Gemara— bringing the children to Hakhel brings schar to those that bring them, because when they later begin their childrens’ chinuch, the children will be more receptive and more in tune with what they learn. That is the schar lemeivi’eihen-- it enhances the parents later chinuch. It is, in a sense, like the Ibud Lishma that is a necessary precursor for writing a sefer torah that has kedusha. This idea becomes even more beautiful with Reb Meir Simcha’s vort, as follows.

Reb Meir Simcha here says that the reason Reb Yehoshua was so happy with the vort is because the Yerushalmi in Yevomos (first perek, mishna 6, 8b in our print) says that when Rav Dosa ben Harkinus was visited by Reb Yehoshua, Reb Akiva, and Reb Eliezer, he gazed upon them and said an insight about each of them. About Reb Yehoshua he said "Es mi yoreh dai’ah, es mi yovin shmu’a, gemulai meicholov, atikei mishodoyim. Zochur ani shehoyso imo moleches arisaso lebais hakneses bishvil sheyisdabku oznov bedivrei Torah," I remember that his mother used to bring his cradle to the Beis Medrash so that the words of Torah would attach themselves to his ears." Reb Yehoshua was so happy because he saw that what his mother realized intuitively was da’as Hashem as expressed in the din of Hakhel. He knew that the reason the Torah was mechayev chinuch even for babies is because there absolutely is a benefit, as he had learned from his own life story. The chinuch of children begins before they are born, and every experience the child has leaves a roshem. This is the Torah equivalent to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozart_effect

R’ Elchonon at the end of Kovetz He’oros #3 discusses the Gemara in Bava Basra 9, that talks about the zechus of having your tzedakah go to the deserving poor, and not to frauds, or slackers or worse. (From Yirmiahu 18, involving his problem with the people from his hometown, the Anshei Anosos, who maliciously spread the deadly rumor that he was having an affair with a married woman, so he cursed them that their tzedakah money should go to unworthy recipients.) He asks, but they want to give to deserving poor, their intentions are good, and Hashem is "maaleh alav ke’ilu asa’o," Hashem elevates good intentions to be as if they were carried out! So what’s the difference who gets it? He answers with a Ramchal who says that every mitzvah has two aspects; the tikkun of the briah and kiyum r’tzon Hashem. "Ma'aleh alav" only goes to retzon Hashem, but not the tikkun of the briah, and the powerful merit of tzedakah that is such a tremendous meigin (protection from suffering) is only generated by the tikkun habriah aspect. We can explain the Gemara in Chagigah by saying that the mitzvah of Hakheil is only the second and not the first aspect. Or, that the talmidim thought it was only for the second aspect, but Reb Yehoshua, from the perspective of his unique experience, realized that it was for the first as well.

Parshas Nitzavim and the Mitzvah of Teshuva

Reb Meir Simchah in this week’s parsha, Parshas Netzavim, says an interesting thing. He says that now that there is an option of doing teshuva, to not do tshuvoh is not just a bitul asei, but rather it is an aggravating factor in the punishment of the underlying aveira. In other words, the punishment for not doing teshuva is worse than the punishment for the aveira you should have done teshuva for. (Devarim 30:11.)

So, why is it so hard for us to seriously focus on the Mitzvah of Teshuva? Here are some of the usual suspects. I don't want you to think that they are self-evident, dreary platitudes. Simple is not the same as simplistic. As the Mesilas Yesharim illustrates, simplicity sometimes hides profound truth. And, as the Mesilas Yesharim definitely doesn't say, it's taken a long and dissolute life to come up with this list.

A. Lust. I am not ready to give up my pleasures. Self-denial is both out of style and not good for your mental health.

B. Pride. I’m as good as anyone else, I’m at least as good as those rabbis, those professional Jews, and I don’t need to apologize for my lifestyle. And I’m certainly not going to admit they are any better than me by changing to be more like them.

C. Sloth. I know I ought to do tshuvoh, but it’s just too much effort, both mentally and physically, for me.

D. Fear of Peer Group Reaction, fear of what other people will think of you. Your friends will think you've gone frum, or your family will be angry at you for not going with the flow of their comfortable lives and assumptions. In some circles, doing teshuva is very anti-social. I know a young couple that was ostracized by their erstwhile friends, and suffered a great deal of emotional pain, and eventually moved out of the neighborhood, because the young woman decided to wear a sheitel. Way to go, friends!!!

E. Despair. I’m no good, I'm beyond redemption. Or, I’ve tried it before, and it didn’t work, and I would just be lying to myself to think it’s going to work now. This is usually just a rationalization for A, "Lust" and C, "Sloth."

F. Denial. You believe that changing your lifestyle would be so terribly traumatic, (see A, "Lust" and D, Fear of Peer Reaction,) that you create a delusional reality that supports your refusal to undertake it. Sometimes the tool of denial is convincing yourself that you are not capable of doing tshuvoh (see E, "Despair,") and sometimes B, "Pride," that you don't need to.

You might recognize some of these factors from the last time you thought about going on a diet, because it's really the same issue of will power and admitting failure and the need to change. This is what keeps the people in the women's magazine business prosperous. When you fast on Tzom Gedaliah, though, keep in mind that the same conscious decisiveness that keeps us from eating on that day demonstrates that we can indeed do teshuva and eliminate other bad behavior.

A few years ago, I read a story in the paper about the arrest of a suspect in a crime (by Stefan Esposito). The article said that the suspect "allegedly" shot someone several times in a parking lot, but the victim survived and was able to identify him. Also, a security camera in the lot filmed the crime, and every time the suspect fired the gun the flash very clearly illuminated his face. Also, an off duty policeman witnessed the crime, pursued the suspect, chased him and arrested him two blocks away, at which time he was found to be in possession of the weapon used in the crime.

The article ended by stating that

"the suspect faces an uphill legal battle."

In the beis din shel maaloh, they can build a good case against ovrei aveirah as well. Our lives are recorded and played over during our trial, and malachim who witnessed the events testify about what occurred, and worse yet, the suspect has signed a document stating exactly what aveiros he did. We face an uphill legal battle.

But despite what might seem to be pretty bad odds, there is a great deal we can do to ameliorate the consequences of our aveiros.

Remember the Minchas Chinuch. He says if not for the passuk that passels a Sukkah Gezulah, the fact that you’re not mekayeim the mitzvah because of Mitzva Haba’ah be’aveira wouldn’t be that much of a problem, because even if you haven’t been mekayeim the mitzvah by eating there, at least you weren’t mevateil the assei by eating outside of a Sukkah: you did eat in a Sukkah, just you weren’t mekayeim the mitzvah. Same thing with teshuva: even if you can’t be mekayeim the mitzvah of teshuva, at least don’t be mevateil the assei.

Many people don’t realize how broad the concept of tshuvah is. It runs from the Gemara in Kiddushin where "shema hirheir tshuvah b’libo" makes him a safeik tzadik gamur, to extremes like tshuvas hamishkal and galus. Simply accepting that what you have done is wrong, and being ashamed of what you have done, is a great mitzvah. You may not be ready for the extreme end of the scale, but anyone can be m’kayeim the great mitzvah of tshuvah by recognizing the need to do it, and knowing how easily accessible the beginning of the range of options is.

We see this in the Mishna in Yoma. Reb Akiva says Ashreichem Yisrael, how lucky you are, Yisrael, that you have the option of Teshuva, and he brings two pesukim: Vezarakti aleichem Mayim Tehorim, and Mikvei Yisrael Hashem; teshuva is like the sprinkling of the ashes of the Parah Adumah, and it is like immersing in a Mikva. Rav Pam Zatzal explained that Reb Akiva is illustrating the broad range of the Mitzva of Teshuva: If one immerses himself in a mikva, as does a geir who re-creates himself, this is the greatest mitzva. But being sprinkled with the ashes of the Para Aduma, which seems to be a far lesser personal investment in tahara--it is a mere sprinkling on a person that does not even remove his clothes, his begadim tzo'im, also brings tahara and purification. Reb Akiva is telling us Ashreichem Yisrael-- Teshuva at any level is a magnificent, wonderful gift to Klal Yisrael.

In Parshas Vayeilech, the Ramban on 31:17-18 says that "Ki ein Elokai bekirbi" is not a real vidui, and it is certainly not a teshuva shleima. But it is recognition of the sin, it is some degree of regret. And in the next passuk, 31:18, the Ramban explains that this tiny little incomplete teshuva results in a tremendous lessening of the tochecha; it ends the Tzaros Ra'os ve'Rabbos, but it doesn't end the galus entirely. Klal Yisrael has to do a better teshuva to end the galus. But it is a powerful and effective step which bears fruit immediately.

Similarly, the Ramban on Devarim 30:14, Mah Hashem sho'eil mei'imach, and Ki karov eilecha hadavar me'od, says that the Davar is Teshuva. The minimum requirements are few and within reach. See, also, Kiddushin 49b: if a wicked man proposes to a woman, and the woman's acceptance is conditional on his being a holy man, a tzadik gamur, and the man is known to be a lowlife scoundrel, we still have to consider her possibly married, because "shema hirheir teshuva be'libo," maybe he had thoughts of repentance in the moments prior to his proposal. Evidently, this would classify him as a tzadik gamur!
I wish you, in this Eish Shechora ahl gabei Eish Levana, a Kesiva Vechasima Tova Le'alter le'chayim tovim. Thank you for your valuable insights, mar'ei mekomos, and mussar.

Vayeileich, Devorim 31:2. The End of Moshe Rabbeinu’s Days.

Please note: This discussion is more about strange hashkafos than about enlightenment. It is very possible that careful thought would show that there is less here than meets the eye.

The Gemora in Yevamos 50a records the three questions King Menashe confronted the Navi Yeshaiyohu (his grandfather) with: Moshe Rabbeinu said lo yir’ani odom vochoi, but Yeshaya said ve’er’eh es Hashem; Moshe said bechol kor’einu, and you said behimotzo; Moshe said (here) that his days had ended, and you said that Hashem added 15 years to Chizkiyahu’s life. The Gemora answers the questions: Moshe, who saw be’aspaklaria hame’ira knew that what he saw was not really Hashem; behimotzo is for a yochid, and bechol is for a tzibur; and whether a person can exceed his apportioned years is a machlokes Reb Akiva (there’s a maximum) and the Chachomim (years can be added.) The Mahrsho asks that in the first perek of Kiddushin and Sotah the Gemora says on this passuk that if not for Mei Meriva, Moshe would have entered Eretz Yisroel, so it is shver on Reb Akiva, and the Mahrsho says that this is not like Reb Akiva.

There happens to be a machlokes about whether a person can kill another person before Hashem intended for him to die, i.e., that Hashem allows it to happen but was not gozer that it should happen.
The Alshich (Breishis 37:21 and Doniel 3:15), the Ohr Hachaim, and the Zohar (p. 185), and the Netziv in Harcheiv Dovor (Brieshis 37:15, unless the person is thoroughly good,) say that a person can be murdered by a ba’al b’chiroh outside the retzon Hashem.

Rav Schwab and Rav Dovid Kronglas have said that this is outrageous. But an outrageous Alshich remains an Alshich.

I suppose you could call this the Slaughterhouse Five / Bridge of San Luis Rey or the Vonnegut/Wilder machlokes.

See also Reb Yehuda Halevi's shitah, as stated in the Kuzari, Ma'amar 5 ch. 20 [page numbers are from the Devir/Even Shoshan edition]. On p. 225, he quotes the passuk in Shmuel 1 26:10 and explains that the passuk is talking about three types of death -- Divine death, natural death, and death through mikreh. This, of course, implies that hashgachah is not absolute because one can die through mikreh. He defines mikreh on p. 222 and adds that it is dependent on/related to Divine, natural, and bechirah actions. This might imply that mikreh is really an interplay of hashgachah and bechirah. On p. 227 he adds that spiritual preparation, i.e. knowledge and understanding of the secrets of the Torah causes good and repels bad. In the next paragraph he says that someone who does hishtadlus and has bitochon will see good and will not lose. However, one who enters a dangerous situation violates the prohibition against testing Hashem (Devorim 6:16).

The Rashbatz in his Mogen Ovos (5:25 d’h Ben shmonim ligvuroh) quotes this Kuzari on the three types of deaths. His son, the Rashbash, in a teshuvah (195) explains it this way. Everyone has a set lifespan which can be lengthened due to zechuyos and shortened due to aveiros. On Rosh Hashonnoh, someone who is judged to have his lifespan lengthened or shortened is written in the Sefer Hachayim or the opposite. However, someone who is not having his lifespan lengthened or shortened is not written in any book and is subject to mikreh.

Harav Shimon Krasner has a thorough discussion of the various shittos in his sefer (Nachalas Shimon) Shmuel II 16:10 where Dovid Hamelech says about Shimi ben Geiro that “Hashem omar lo kalleil es Dovid.”