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Showing posts with label Nepotism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nepotism. Show all posts

Monday, July 9, 2018

Pinchas. Moshe Rabbeinu's request that his sons succeed him. Two Dinim in Malchus.

Bamidbar 27:16-18.

וידבר משה אל ה' לאמר
יפקד ה' אלהי הרוחת לכל בשר איש על העדה
אשר יצא לפניהם ואשר יבא לפניהם ואשר יוציאם ואשר יביאם ולא תהיה עדת ה' כצאן אשר אין להם רעה
ויאמר ה' אל משה קח לך את יהושע בן נון איש אשר רוח בו וסמכת את ידך עליו

Rashi
"יפקד ה'" - כיון ששמע משה שא"ל המקום תן נחלת צלפחד לבנותיו (במ"ר) אמר הגיע שעה שאתבע צרכי שיירשו בני את גדולתי א"ל הקב"ה לא כך עלתה במחשבה לפני כדאי הוא יהושוע ליטול שכר שמושו שלא מש מתוך האהל וזהו שאמר שלמה (משלי כז) נוצר תאנה יאכל פריה

When Moshe Rabbeinu was told that the daughters of Tzelaphchad were fully entitled to inherit their father's rights because he had no sons, he asked that his own sons inherit his title and authority as the king of Klal Yisrael. (Moshe had the legal status of king - Zevachim 102.) Hashem declined to grant this request and said that Yehoshua will succeed him as king.  The Medrash Rashi quotes is famously hard to understand. It appears completely out of character for Moshe to make this request. Here are some of the many obvious difficulties, each asked by innumerable mefarshim. Each question has answers. I find none of them convincing, and I don't like ten different answers if one answer will be enough for all the questions at once.

1. When Moshe was told that he would lead the Jews, he argued and pleaded that Hashem not make him take the responsibility, that Hashem give the position to someone else, as long as he did not have to do it. Why would he want his sons to be given that responsibility?

2.  How could Moshe have thought that his sons were worthy to succeed him? They experienced nothing of the shibud Mitzrayim or Yetzias Mitrayim, and, according to many rishonim, they and their mother were the only living Jews that were not present at Mattan Torah. How were they qualified to lead Klal Yisrael? Nothing they did was recorded in the Torah. Everyone knew that Moshe's successor would be Nadav or Avihu, or Pinchas, or Yehoshua, or Kaleiv, or Nemuel, or whoever, but nobody had a hava amina that Moshe's children were in the parsha of taking their father's place.

3. I understand that Moshe had an obligation to his sons. But it is absurd to think that he was more concerned that his sons be kings than that Klal Yisrael have a great leader.  He was a shepherd of Klal Yisrael and the father of Klal Yisrael davka because his concern for their well being was paramount, more important than anything else in the world and certainly more than his self interest.

4.  שאתבע צרכי?   Or  גדולתי? He wanted his gedula to go to his sons? Was it his? He was an eved Hashem with no existence as a self interested Human Being. And now he has "needs?" He wants "My gedula" to go to his sons?

The answer:
The first king to rise to power has to earn the position. In a natural society a king gains the throne by Fear, or Civil Benefit, or Protection. Fear is his ability and the will to crush any citizens that oppose him.  Civil Benefit means that he has the ability to benefit the citizens of the state, either economically through the use of his wealth, or socially by maintaining the social order for the benefit of the dominant class. Protection means that he has the power to defend them from enemies, internal or external.   The distinction is not absolute. Every king needs the power to defend his throne through fear, and a king that can crush opposition will only be secure if he somehow provides some benefit to the ruling class or society as a whole.  (h/t Niccolo M.) But Moshe Rabbeinu acquired the throne not because he could impose his will, not because he could provide economic benefit or maintain the social structure, not because he could protect the people from enemies, but because of his personal character.

Moshe Rabbeinu was made king by Divine appointment. Why was he chosen?  He was not a terrorist or a Rothschild or an Eisenhower. The reason Moshe Rabbeinu was chosen was that he was a Godly man - it was only through him that the Ribono shel Olam could speak directly to Klal Yisrael.  It was through him that the Torah could be given, and through him that the nation could be formed.  He embodied what the Ribono shel Olam wanted Klal Yisrael to be. He was the paragon, the role model of human perfection. (Of course, it was essential that he be a protector and leader and benefactor as well, but there is a difference between central and essential.)

The great annav, Moshe Rabbeinu, was opposed to being singled out as the perfect human being, and he did not want that crown. The Ribono shel Olam insisted, and he became king.

Only a first king needs to earn the throne. Once he's earned it, it belongs to him and to his family as part of his yerusha.  Just as a man's possessions naturally go to the person that stands in his place, Moshe Rabbeinu's crown would naturally be his children's.  The identification of a child with his parents is self evident, both to the father and to the children. A king's children acquire their power because they speak for their father, they are, in a sense, their father. (Of course, the predictability and tranquility of inheritance is far better than a civil war with every succession.)

Besides the din yerusha, the din that the crown belonged to Moshe Rabbeinu and therefore to his family, there was another reason that Moshe desired that his children succeed him. Chazal say that a man that leaves a child that stands in his place is said to still be alive, to not have died. Moshe Rabbeinu felt that if he were fated to die, at least he could leave a son in his place, a successor, through whom he could be said to be alive.
(BB 116a -
מפני מה בדוד נאמרה בו שכיבה וביואב נאמרה בו מיתה? דוד שהניח בן נאמרה בו שכיבה. יואב שלא הניח בן נאמרה בו מיתה. ויואב לא הניח בן? והכתיב (עזרא ח, ט) מבני יואב עובדיה בן יחיאל!  אלא דוד שהניח בן כמותו נאמרה בו שכיבה. יואב שלא הניח בן כמותו נאמרה בו מיתה.)

This is what Chazal mean when Moshe said אתבע צרכי שיירשו בני את גדולתי.  Moshe was asking that he stay alive, and he would stay alive if his son inherited his position, if his son would continue what he lived for. Although Moshe resisted the responsibility, he only resisted the title "perfect human," "role model of what it means to be an eved Hashem." But that requirement only applied to a first king. Once the king was given the throne, his son did not need to be that paragon who earned the throne because he was perfect. His son would inherit simply because of the din of yerusha.

So why the Hashem say no? I believe that Hashem was telling Moshe that Klal Yisrael, entering Eretz Yisrael, needed another king that would rule on the basis of his spiritual perfection, another role model of what Klal Yisrael aspires to - they needed another First King. Moshe's malchus was in a completely different world, and the first king in Eretz Yisrael would have to establish a completely new state. That is why Yehoshua was chosen, and not Moshe Rabbeinu's son.

(It's tempting to say that Yehoshua was more of a son than his natural sons, as we see in BB 116a - כל שאינו מניח בן ליורשו הקדוש ברוך הוא מלא עליו עברה,  and then רבי יוחנן ורבי יהושע בן לוי חד אמר כל שאינו מניח בן וחד אמר כל שאינו מניח תלמיד , but that's not what Chazal say here. They say that Yehoshua deserved it more.)

In brief:
There are two dinim in Moshe Rabbeinu's malchus. The second din is an automatic result of the first din. The first din was that he was was a paragon, a role model of what a Jew should be, and therefore a fitting interlocutor for the Ribono shel Olam and Kabbalas HaTorah. The other was the authority invested in him, the position of leadership. The first only is necessary in the first king in a line. Once the malchus was granted, the second din was automatically chal. Moshe Rabbeinu knew that his sons were not qualified for the title of Toras Moshe.  But the second din is an essential definition of kings and an automatic chalos for any king. Moshe resisted becoming king because he would be the first, and therefore needed to embody the first din. Once he had the din melech, then only the second din applies, and that certainly can and should go to his son. Moshe thought that once you established the character of a king, the succeeding generations did not need to do anything but be secular authorities, the second din. But Hashem said that Klal Yisrael, in that their lives would be totally different upon settling in Eretz Yisrael, still needed a king of the first din, and for that, only Yehoshua, to whom Moshe was "moser" the Torah, was fit.

Monday, April 27, 2009

Achrei Mos, Vayikra 16:32. Lecha’hein tachas aviv. Hereditary Entitlement and Meritocracy in Torah Judaism.

(This is a re-post. It has been expanded, and is now one of two articles on nepotism/hereditary entitlement. The other post deals with Moshe Rabbeinu's prayer that his kingship be inherited by his son/s, and Hashem's not granting that request.)

Here, and in Titzaveh, Shemos 29:30, the passuk teaches us that the position of Kehunah Gedolah is inherited from one's father. Obviously, all Kohanim descend from Aharon. But among the Kohanim, the son of the Kohein Gadol inherits his father’s position. Rav Shternbuch, in his Taam Vodaas in Shemos 29, tells the following story. (The italicized portion is from Oizer Alport’s ParshaPotpourri.)

A controversy once broke out when the Rav of a small town in Europe passed away. The leaders of the community wanted to appoint an outsider to take his place, while one of the Rav’s sons argued that he was suited for the position and deserved precedence as the inheritor of his deceased father. The two sides agreed to bring the dispute to the Chofetz Chaim for resolution.


The Chofetz Chaim began by agreeing that Jewish law recognizes that all religious positions, including Rabbinical appointments, are subject to be inherited by the offspring of the deceased. However, the Gemora in Yoma (72b) distinguishes between the son of the Kohen Gadol, who may inherit his father’s purely religious position, and the son of the Kohen Mashuach Milchama (the Kohen who leads the Jews to battle), who may not. Because the latter position is uniquely intended for a man of war and is not purely a religious function, the fact that somebody was suited for the role is irrelevant to his son’s capacity to inherit and fill the position.


The Chofetz Chaim explained that it was once true that the function of the Rav of a community was purely religious in nature – to render legal rulings and to teach the people – and his children were legally entitled to be offered the position before other candidates were considered.

However, he continued, this has unfortunately changed due to the assault of various anti-religious movements on traditional standards and values. As a result, the role of the Rav has been transformed into that of a general leading his troops into a fierce battle, regarding which the Gemora rules that the children are not entitled to automatic precedence in inheriting and filling the position of the deceased!

A thoughtful reading of this story does raise some questions. If the Chofetz Chaim would have said that inherited position is the standard law of the Torah, we could understand that. But it is hard to see the difference between rabbinic religious positions and pastoral positions. Does he mean that religious functions are sinecures, that we don’t care if the man is capable? Doesn’t kehunah gedola, or any religious position, require certain talents or at least aptitude? Why should the Mashu’ach Milchama position be more important in the sense that we really have to get the best suited candidate, that it is a merit-based appointment, while kehunah gedolah is transferred on the basis of familial privilege, of chazakah?(The rule of inherited authority applies to the crown as well. If an heir is qualified, albeit minimally, the crown is his, despite the abundance of far more talented alternatives. Please don't tell me that hereditary succession is peaceful and orderly: I am still looking for a royal succession in Tanach that didn't involve bloodshed, often the killing of the closest relatives in order to gain the position, a minhag that we, the upholders of tradition, have proudly continued in recent years.
Metaphor


On the other hand, it is possible that the rigid and perhaps irrational rule of inherited succession, messy as it turned out to be, is better than a free for all beauty contest, which would be impossible to win decisively and would guarantee a bloody, endless civil war every time a king died. I think that the "best form of government" may be one of the ineluctable, immutable, distinctions among the three Noahide families; we Semites don't do well with Democracy.)

In any case, back to the question on the Chafetz Chaim. Why does inherited rule make more sense in a religious capacity than for the Mashu'ach Milchama? The answer is this:

When the kohen gadol does the avodah, it is not he alone that is standing there doing the avodah. It is him, and his father, and his father’s father, lo, unto the earliest times.

(When I first said this, at the Shabbas table, my wife, Ms. Bor Sid She'einah Me'abeid Tipah, intoned the whole pre-battle speech from a certain re-imagining of Beowulf which she had seen:
"Lo, there do I see my father. Lo, there do I see my mother, and my sisters, and my brothers. Lo, there do I see the line of my people, stretching back to the beginning. They call to me; they bid me to take my place among them, in Valhalla, where the brave may live...forever."  I mention this because it is an excellent portrayal of the strength that might be accessible to one who sees himself as a link in an ancient chain.)

click here

In spiritual matters, when you stand before Hashem, you stand at the center of a great cloud of the past and the future. So of course, we want a man whose ancestors and descendants are all kohanim gedolim.

By the Mashu’ach Milchama, on the other hand, while of course we need an individual who is a tzadik, more importantly we need a man that can inspire the soldiers to courage and bravery. We don’t give a hoot about his father. (So my wife’s sonorous declamation was, in a sense, inapposite: there, he was summoning up and embracing his brave heritage and fate, while my whole point here is that zechus avos is more important in a religious function than it is in a mashuach milchomo. But it’s a great way to communicate an emotional understanding of the idea that the Kohen Gadol doesn’t go in alone.)

In the interest of scholarship not being eclipsed by showmanship, there are several things that need to be added.

We cited a Chofetz Chaim above regarding Rabbonus being hereditary. In fact, this is a very contested issue. Just as an indicator of how difficult the practical halacha is, in the Kol Kisvei Chafetz Chaim there is a letter from him about a din torah he was involved in: after Reb Naftoli Trop died, his position as Magid Shiur was given to the CC's son in law, and the Trops were not happy. In settlement, the yeshiva gave one position to a Trop, and a monetary settlement to a Trop son in law.

The various medroshim and the Rambam, (such as the Sifra in Shmini on the sons of Aharon, and the Sifra in Tzaz, Vayikra 6, and the Sifri in Devorim 17:20, who all say that Kehuna Gedola and Malchus and Srarah are inherited, and the Medrash in Koheles that says that while Kehuna and Malchus are inherited, Rabbonus is not, since the Keser Torah is available freely to anyone and is not restricted in any way by rights of inheritance, and the Rambam in Klei Hamikdash that says that Malchus, Kehuna Gedolah, and other minuyim are inherited, but only if the heir is worthy of the position "either in Chachma or in Yir'as Shamayim,",) are not nearly as interesting as the more recent poskim.

The more recent poskim that discuss this all basically 'agree' that Malchus and Kehuna Gedola are inherited. They all agree that 'Purely Torah' positions, like saying the Beis Medrash shiur, are not. The issue seems mostly to be which category does Rabbanus or being a Rosh Yeshiva go into-- malchus/serara, or Torah. If Malchus, then they are inherited. If Torah, they are not.

So, the Rama in YD 245 says there is yerusha in Rabbanus. (The Magen Avraham in OC 53 brings the Teshuvos Harashba that the position of Chazzan is inherited. I know an otherwise sane man, whose father was a Chazan, and who thinks he has a beautiful voice, and who, when he davens for the amud, is memareik a lot of aveiros in his listening audience, not through dveikus, but through yesurim.)

But: the Aruch Hashulchan there in YD 245 says there is absolutely no preference given to the son of a Rov. And the Chasam Sofer says the same thing in Teshuvos OC 12.

On the other hand, the Chasam Sofer in the very next teshuva seems to qualify the strong statements in the above cited teshuva. And (no kidding) the Chasidishe perspective, even the Avnei Nezer and the Maharsham, is that Rabbonus is primarily Malchus and is inherited.

An interesting and very fiercely litigated issue arises where the position comprises both Torah and Serara. Torah is not subject to Yerusha; but along with the Torah position comes Serara- power and money. Arguments will arise as to which is the primary function, the Torah or the Serara. This would be less of an issue with Roshei Yeshiva than it is with Rebbes. But lets assume that the two functions are or could be independent. Does the latter follow the former? Or perhaps an argument could be made that upon the death of the holder of the position, the two aspects should be divided, with the Serara going to a heir and the Torah position going to the person with the greatest aptitude. And, of course, there is the usual fight about where the position is definitely inheritable, and the holder of the position didn't write a Tzava'a, but clearly expressed his preference for someone who is not first in line in the law of yerusha. Do we apply the strict law of yerusha, where we don't care about unwritten wishes, or do we say that in communal matters, where theoretically the needs of the community should have given some weight, the statements should be given the force of law?