Netzavim and Vayeilech. Guest Post and New Video

The first part is from Rabbi Avraham Bukspan, author of several excellent Parsha works, whose Frand-like style begins with likkut but ultimately creates something special and uniquely his.

This is followed by a video by Rabbi Sendy Shulman. Rabbi Shulman is one of the new Musmachim at my son's kollel, KHA, Kollel Horaah of America, in Marlboro New Jersey. They just successfully concluded a fund-raising campaign, and in his well-crafted speech Rabbi Shulman used an insight from Harav Shmuel Brudny to express the feelings of the Yungeleit.

A moment's thought will reveal that the two divrei Torah are contradictory. Rabbi Bukspan says that a Rebbi has to consciously abandon his focus on personal growth in favor of his Talmidim, while Rabbi Shulman says that the path to one's greatest growth in Gadlus BaTorah comes from dedicating your life to your talmidim!

Of course, it is not a stirah at all. 

מתלמידי יותר מכולם!!!!

After the bechina, my son told the musmachim that the Rabbi Heinemann they saw is not the same as the Rabbi Heinemann of fifty years ago. His dedication to the tzibur has resulted in growth in gadlus far greater than focus on himself. As Reb Chiya said to Reb Chanina (BM 85b), his dedication to his talmidim resulted in his Torah being greater and truer than Reb Chanina's, who was far more talented than him.   בהדי דידי קא מינצית?

כי הוו מינצו ר' חנינא ור' חייא אמר ליה ר' חנינא לר' חייא בהדי דידי קא מינצית ח"ו אי משתכחא תורה מישראל מהדרנא לה מפילפולי אמר ליה ר' חייא לר' חנינא בהדי דידי קא מינצית דעבדי לתורה דלא תשתכח מישראל מאי עבידנא אזלינא ושדינא כיתנא וגדילנא נישבי וציידנא טבי ומאכילנא בשרייהו ליתמי ואריכנא מגילתא וכתבנא חמשה חומשי וסליקנא למתא ומקרינא חמשה ינוקי בחמשה חומשי ומתנינא שיתא ינוקי שיתא סדרי ואמרנא להו עד דהדרנא ואתינא אקרו אהדדי ואתנו אהדדי ועבדי לה לתורה דלא תשתכח מישראל היינו דאמר רבי כמה גדולים מעשי חייא

Vayeilech 1 — Standing or Walking?

 ועתה כתבו לכם את השירה הזאת ולמדה את בני ישראל שימה בפיהם למען תהיה לי השירה הזאת לעד בבני ישראל 

So now, write this song for yourselves, and teach it to the Children of Israel, place it in their mouth, so that this song shall be for Me a witness against the Children of Israel (Devarim 31:19).

               From the phrase, “Ve’simah be’fihem — Place it in their mouth,” the Gemara (Eruvin 54b) concludes that a rebbi must present his lessons to his students: “ad she’tehei sedurah be’fihem — until it is organized in their mouth.”  Torah must be taught in a clear manner, allowing for the talmid to absorb and internalize the information properly, without any confusion. 

           In HaKsav VeHaKabbalah, Rav Yaakov Mecklenburg says that the Gemara learns this from the Torah’s use of the root ש.י.מ.  for putting or placing, as opposed to the verb נ.ת.נ.. While נ.ת.נ. denotes any kind of placement, ש.י.מ. refers to a careful, deliberate, and methodical arrangement. 

            We see this from the mitzvah for the Kohen to take the ashes from the korbanos that are on top of the Mizbe’ach and place them alongside it: “Ve’samo eitzel haMizbe’ach” (Vayikra 6:3). In Toras Kohanim (Tzav 2:4), Chazal define the word “ve’samo” as calmly placing, in a way that the ashes do not scatter. Thus, the shoresh of ש.י.מ.  implies placement in an unhurried and careful manner.

            HaKsav VeHaKabbalah uses this definition to explain “Ve’simah be’fihem.”  Torah needs to be taught in an organized and calculated fashion, guaranteeing that the information is not scattered in the students’ minds, but is neatly arranged.  At times, a rebbi may need to give his talmidim large amounts of information. But if the material is transmitted in a disorganized or  an unsystematic way, the students become overwhelmed and find it difficult to integrate the lesson in their minds, to understand how the various pieces of information fit together.  By use of the word “simah,” which implies a more measured and purposeful method, Chazal associate the preferred procedure of teaching Torah to the careful placement of the ash in a neatly arranged and organized pile. All teachers are thereby urged to put forth their best effort at presenting the material in a slow, patient, and organized manner. This way, all the critical information can be properly and precisely understood and put into its proper context.

Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky discusses the ideal rebbi described by our Chazal. In Malachi (2:7), we are taught: “Ki sifsei Kohen yishmeru daas ve’Sorah yevakshu mi’pihu ki malach Hashem Tzevakos hu — For the lips of the Kohen should safeguard knowledge, and people should seek Torah from his mouth; for he is a malach of Hashem, Master of Legions.” Based on this verse, the Gemara (Chagigah 15b) tells us that if a rebbi is “domeh le’malach Hashem,” similar to an angel of G-d, we should learn Torah from him. If not, we should not.

            What exactly does a malach look like? How can we recognize the rebbi we are looking for? Rav Yaakov explains that a malach is an omeid, a stationary being. It does not grow or evolve, but always stays the same. A human, however, is a mehalech, with the capacity to move, to grow and evolve (see Zecharyahu 3:7); he is, hopefully, in a constant state of forward progress. (See Tetzaveh, Staying Alive, on this subject.) A rebbi, though, explains Rav Yaakov, must be like a malach, where he is not concerned about his own growth and development, but the growth and development of his students.

            A true rebbi is only focused on the proper presentation of the appropriate material, and when needed, presents it in a simplified fashion. His role is to see that his students are the ones going places; they are the ones who need to grow as they learn, digest, and retain the material. Such a rebbi is like a malach, for his only ambition is to see his talmidim progress.

             “Nitzavim or Vayeilech?” Standing or going? From a play on words on these two parashiyos, we have a question every person must ask himself. Am I standing still or am I going and growing?

            Every rebbi must ask the same question in a slightly modified form: “Nitzavim or Vayeilech?” Am I willing to stand still, putting aside an aspect of my personal growth, so that my talmidim can move forward and develop as they should?

Ahd kahn divrei Rabbi Bukspan. 

And now Rabbi Shulman's speech.

Nitzavim, Devarim 29:17. The Pen is Mightier than the Sword

Almost all yamim tovim have two days because of safek, but the days of Rosh Hashanna are not misafek, they’re called vadai and yomah arichta. Why is this so? There are, as always, two answers: a technically correct one, which is well known, and a deeper, perhaps truer, answer.

I believe that answer is as follows. What follows was inspired by the sefer Menachem Tzion (from Rav Menachem Sachs, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank's son in law, founder of the Associated Talmud Torah in Chicago, and father in law of Rabbi Jack D. Frank z'l of KJBS.)

Ba’alei mussar say that the reason ‘pen’ is repeated is that the yetzer hara has two strategies of attack.
One is to find a crack in one’s faith; if a person just takes his emunah for granted, and does not reflect on how Hashem runs the world and hashgacha pratis, there may be a weakness in his emunah that he is not even aware of. This is the ‘"פן יש בכם...אשר לבבו פונה"”--the ‘pen’, the doubt and weakness in bitachon that is within the person himself. The Gematria of Amalek and of Sofeik is 240.
The other strategy is if the person’s emunah is good, the Yetzer Hara looks for a chance to convince the person that what is actually an aveira is not so bad, not really assur, maybe even a big mitzvah to do--this is the "pen" of a person who does not stay aware of what is muttar and what is assur, he has a “pen” about what the halacha is. While he may start out doing things that are arguably only maaaaybe a safek, it is a שורש פורה רוש ולענה of maizid gamur, it is a root that produces poisonous fruit. It's an easy ride from “eh, it’s probably muttar.” "not only is it muttar, it’s probably a mitzvah." This is the ‘Pen’ of “shoresh poreh rosh vela’ana.”

As an instrument of spiritual destruction, the ‘pen’ is mightier than the sword. It's easier to withstand an external threat to our lives for our faith than to withstand internal doubt hiding in unexamined faith, and a negligent lack of clarity in halacha.

We see now that this series of psukim lists the five most dangerous factors that lead to a life of aveiros. They are:
1. Vatir’u es shikutzeihem- ותראו את שקוציהם
2. Pen #1,
3. Pen #2,
4. Vehisbareich bil’vavo- והתברך בלבבו , and
5. leimor shalom yi’hiyeh li- לאמר שלום יהיה לי.

Vatir’u is exposure to anti-Torah immorality, especially when that bad behavior is celebrated in society, what I call “ha’ro’eh sotah be’hiddurah. Pen #1 is weakness in faith. Pen #2 is not caring enough to know for sure what the halacha is. Vehisbareich is intellectual arrogance, the attitude that whatever I do is fine, and nobody can tell me that I am wrong. Shalom yiheyeh li means that I don’t care how my behavior influences orther people because I don’t care what happens to other people, as long as sholom yiheyeh li, as long as I’m going to be alright.

1. Exposure to immoral behavior.
2. Uncertainty of faith.
3. Ignorance of halachah.
4. Intellectual arrogance.
5. Indifference to the well-being of the community.
If a person sees any of these characteristics or attributes in himself, it’s a good sign that needs to re-examine his lifestyle.


We cannot come into Rosh Hashanna with a ‘pen', with sfeikos. There are no "sfeikos" on Rosh Hashanna. You have to deal with your doubts before the day comes, because if you walk into shul unprepared on Rosh Hashanna, you have lost a tremendous opportunity. You have to prepare for the Yomim Noraim by examining where you stand, who you are, what you are proud of, what you are ashamed of, and then you can benefit from Rosh Hashanna. Chazal absolutely did not want a person to come and say, well, it’s a sfeika diyoma, maybe it’s not today, I still have tomorrow....chazal want us to know that this is not the case. Today is the day, and there is no tomorrow. The time to prepare for Rosh Hashanna is not when you walk into shul on Rosh Hashanna, it’s when we begin the slichos.

And here's a mashal about the great enemy of teshuva- procrastination.
In Europe, the chimney sweeps, the Koimenkerrers, were looked down upon. Their work left them filthy and covered with tar and soot, and besides the dirty layer of ash, their skin was stained and they smelled like wet ash and the residue of all the food that had been cooked in the fireplace. There was a man who needed to marry off his daughter, but he was a koimen kerrer, and nobody would look at his daughter. The Shadchan decided that he would try his luck in a neighboring town, where the father's trade was not known, and he was successful. As soon as the daughter became engaged, the father decided that he would do no chimney sweeping for a month before the wedding. A month would be enough time to scrape all the ash and tar off, and it would be enough time for the stains in his skin to go away, and he could come to the wedding as clean as anyone else, and cause no embarrasment to his daughter and to his family.

Sure enough, a few days into the month, he realized that he had to pay for the wedding, and money was tight, so he decided that two weeks of enforced vacation would be enough, and he could try to do a couple of jobs in order to get some money together. After the two weeks went by, of course, a friend came over and said, please, my chimney is blocked and really needs to be cleaned, could you please just do this one job? Well, for a friend...and anyway, two weeks is plenty of time. One week before the wedding, a long time customer came over and said, look, you've been doing my work for years, and I don't want to give the work to someone else, but I need the job done, and if you can't do it, I'll have to go to the competition. Sure enough, he decided that under the circumstances, he had to do the work, which took almost the entire week. But, he thought, I'll really scrub myself on the day of the wedding. The stains won't come off, and I might still smell a little, but a little scented soap will do the job, and I'll still look decent. Comes the morning of the wedding, and he is absolutely determined that the morning will be spent in the shvitz with a bar of fels naptha, and he'll be fine. On the way to the bath, there's an emergency. Someone comes over and says that if his chimney is not swept, his wife will leave him, he will be made to look like a fool, he'll die of shame, and he is willing to pay ten times the going rate for the job, but please, please, it's just two hours of work. Well, ten times the rate! And I'll be finished by noon, plenty of time to clean up enough for the wedding. So it's off to work. But this is a difficult job, and it's an old chimney, and as he's finishing up, ma'aseh sattan! He gets stuck in the chimney. It takes three men and two ropes, but after two hours, he is dragged out of the chimney, he's never been so filthy and smelly and tarred, and if he doesn't leave RIGHT NOW he'll miss the chupah, so he runs off to the wedding covered from head to foot in tar and wet ash and rancid grease, his clothing ripped, you can barely tell he's human. (From the sefer Kerem Tzvi, from Reb Tzvi Hirsh Farber of London in the 1930s.)

The story is only funny until you realize that it's really about how you yourself have spent the entire month of Ellul and what you're likely to look like on Rosh Hashannah.

(An earlier version of this post was published in 2007.)

Nitzavim, Devarim 30:7. Doing Mitzvos Without Kavana

The writer of the Chayei Adam also wrote a kitzur and peirush of the Sefer Chareidim.  In Perek 1:10 he says that even if you hold that מצות אינן צריכות כונה, and so you do fulfill a mitzva when you do it without Kavana, at the same time you transgress an issur de'oraysa by failing to have kavana.  You're yotzei the mitzva you did, but you were mevateil a different asei, the asei that is stated in the pesukim: ואותו תעבד and ולעבדו בכל לבבכם.

I'll say it again.  The Chayei Adam says, if you do a mitzva without Kavana you transgress (by omission) the requirement that we serve God with all out hearts.  This is even if we pasken you're yotzei the mitzva without kavana. You fulfilled the mitzva- let's say, the mitzva of Tzitzis.  But you did it by rote; you didn't involve your heart or your mind.  You've failed to do what you were commanded in the separate asei of ואותו תעבד, because the עבודה that is required in ואותו תעבד is לעבדו בכל לבבכם.

 להרבה פוסקים מ״ע מה״ת להתפלל בכל יום בכונת הלב שנאמר ואותו תעבד וכתיב ולעבדו בכל לבבכם ואמרו חכמינו ז״ל איזה עבודה שהיא בלב זו תפלה והמתפלל בלא כונה ופשיטא שלא התפלל כלל ביטל עשה זו ועונשו חמור ולכן כתבנו בהלכות תפלה שראוי לכל איש שאחר תפלת שמנה עשרה יתפלל תפלה קצרה מה שהוא צריך ויהיה בלב שלם כדי לקיים מצוה זו
  נראה לי דלכולי עלמא על כל פנים העושה איזה מצוה מן המצות בלא כונה ביטל עשה זו שהרי לכולי עלמא נאמר מקרא זה על כל המצות ואף למאן דאמר מצות אינן צריכות כונה היינו שעכ״פ יוצא ידי המצוה ומ״מ עבר על עשה זו

This is not really from our parsha, but it is a little connected.  In our parsha it says (30:7)

ומל ה' אלוקיך את לבבך ואת לבב זרעך לאהבה את ה' אלוקיך בכל לבבך ובכל נפשך למען חייך

That's close enough.

In case you think he's just giving mussar and that he doesn't mean this le'halacha, here's someone that takes his words at face value: the Imrei Binah of R Meir Auerbach (OC 14.)

The Imrei Binah brings the Chayei Adam, and says that he has a problem with it: if it's true that according to the shitta that מצות אינן צריכות כונה, if you do a mitzva without kavana you're yotzei but you are over a bittul asei, then it should be a מצוה הבאה בעבירה;  if it's a MHB'A, then you won't be yotzei the Mitzva.  So he says that this gufa is the basis of the machlokes of whether mitzvos require kavana.  One holds that the asei of בכל לבבכם is global and becomes an element of every mitzva, and so מצות צריכות כונה.  The other holds that it is an independent mitzva that does not create an overlay requirement of kavana in other mitzvos, and so מצות אינן צריכות כונה, and you won't be over the lav when you do a mitzva without kavana.

So why take a chance?  Even for us Yeshivaleit, we ought to think about mitzvos as we do them.  We don't have to say hineni this and that, but we certainly ought to have kavana that we're putting on the tallis in order to fulfill the mitzva of tzitzis.

Rabbi Aron Leibtag, the rabbi of the shul where I say my shiur, pointed out that while the Chayei Adam sees in לעבדו בכל לבבכם the regular din of "Kavana to fulfill the mitzva," it seems that the passuk is teaching us to do mitzvos with more than that- a good description would be the Rambam at the end of Meila (8:8,) where he says that we need to do mitzvos with a full awareness and appreciation of the sublime and exalted source of each and every mitzva.  I would add that we ought to have a sense of what a privilege it is to be commanded and to do those mitzvos- we all know the story of the Gaon and tzitzis; let's learn to appreciate mitzvos while we live.  (For a lengthier discussion of this approach, see Meta-Mitzvos.)

ראוי לאדם להתבונן במשפטי התורה הקדושה ולידע סוף ענינם כפי כחו. ודבר שלא ימצא לו טעם ולא ידע לו עילה אל יהי קל בעיניו ולא יהרוס לעלות אל ה' פן יפרוץ בו. ולא תהא מחשבתו בו כמחשבתו בשאר דברי החול. בוא וראה כמה החמירה תורה במעילה. ומה אם עצים ואבנים ועפר ואפר כיון שנקרא שם אדון העולם עליהם בדברים בלבד נתקדשו וכל הנוהג בהן מנהג חול מעל בה ואפילו היה שוגג צריך כפרה. קל וחומר למצוה שחקק לנו הקב"ה שלא יבעט האדם בהן מפני שלא ידע טעמן. ולא יחפה דברים אשר לא כן על השם ולא יחשוב בהן מחשבתו כדברי החול. הרי נאמר בתורה ושמרתם את כל חקותי ואת כל משפטי ועשיתם אותם. אמרו חכמים ליתן שמירה ועשייה לחוקים כמשפטים. והעשייה ידועה והיא שיעשה החוקים. והשמירה שיזהר בהן ולא ידמה שהן פחותין מן המשפטים. והמשפטים הן המצות שטעמן גלוי וטובת עשייתן בעולם הזה ידועה כגון איסור גזל ושפיכות דמים וכיבוד אב ואם. והחוקים הן המצות שאין טעמן ידוע. אמרו חכמים חוקים חקתי לך ואין לך רשות להרהר בהן

Nitzavim, Devarim 29:10. Achievement Through Empowerment

I
There's a Chasam Sofer in this week's parsha that says two fascinating things.  I'm going to do an interpretive translation of what he says and we'll see where it leads.

1.

ואמר טפכם נשיכם אעפ״י שהנשים בכלל כל ישראל המצווים ומוזהרים חזר והזכירם עם טפכם כי אחז״ל הני נשי במאי זכיין באמתוני גברייהו מב״כ ובמקרי בנייהו לבי כנשתא ואחז״ל פ״ק דחגיגה ראב״ע דרש בפ׳ הקהל אם אנשים באים ללמוד נשים באים לשמוע טף למה באים ליתן שכר טוב למביאיהם כי נ״ל הא דשאיל נשי במאי זכיין ר״ל במאי זכיין יותר מאנשים דאמרינן גדולת הבטחה שהבטיח לנשים יותר מאנשים דכתיב נשים שאננות בנות בוטחות עפ״ק דברכות ובמאי זכו יותר ואמר בזכות שמחזיקים ידי בעליהם ומגדלים בניהם לתורה כי הבעלים בעצמם ומכש״כ הבנים אפשר שיקלקלו ויקופח שכרם אבל הנשים עשות שלהם להחזיק ידיהם  כאלו הם בטוחים בצדקתם ותורתם ע״כ אם יקלקלו הם ח׳יו מ״מ שכר האשה לא יקופח כאלו היא מגדלת בעל ובן צדיקים גמורים ע״כ גדול הנאמר בהם מבאנשים

If a woman sends her husband out to learn, if she encourages him to be kovei'a ittim, and he goes out to a seder, and he wastes his time, then the woman has the complete schar of talmud Torah, and the man has nothing but the punishment for bittul Torah.  It's not her fault that he didn't learn:  she did what she was obligated to do.  In Olam Haba, she will shine with the brilliance of Torah, and he will be....what?  An empty cup of coffee?  A list of fantasy football stats?  Nothing, nothing, nothing.  (Harav Moshe Kaufman, my cousin, showed me a similar Netziv in Brachos 17a.)

2.

ואחז״ל מיכל בת שאול הניחה תפילין עיין פ׳ המוצא תפילין ובתוס׳ שם נראה היא רפתה ידי בעלה מעבודה ה' ואמרה לדוד הגלות נגלוסת מלך ישראל כא׳ הריקים ונענשה ולא הי' לה ולד עד יום מותה כי גם בני׳ לא גידלה לתורה והיא סברה גדול הנאמר בנשים לא מטעם החזקת ידי בעל ובניהם אלא משום דמקיימת מ"ע שהז"נ אעפ"י שאינה מצווה וטעתה וחשבה כמאן דס"ל קדושין ל"א ע"א גדול שאינה מצווה ועושה יותר ממצווה ועושה ומשו"ה הניחה תפילין  והנה בפ' הקהל משמע קצת שהקפיד על הטף אעפ"י שאינם מצווים כלל בשום מצוה אלא להיות שהאשה אינה מצווה ועושה כיון דכתיב למען ילמדו ולמען ישמעו וקאי לימוד אנשים שמחוייבים בעקרי מצות התורה והשמיעה בעלמא קאי אהנשים שאינם מצווים כ"כ כן כ' המפרשים א"כ מוכח שאין נחת לפניו באינו מצוויים ועושים והטף באו למצות חינוך לא עליהם יעבור כוס הציווי כלל אלא ליתן שכר טוב לאבות המחנכים המביאים אותם לידי חיוב לכשיוגדלו והיינו אם אנשים באים ללמוד ונשים רק לשמוע ש"מ אינו מצווה אין חשוב א"כ טף למה באים שהרי אינם מצווים בשום מצוה ואמר ליתן שכר למביאיהם לידי כך והנה עי"ז יזדרזו הנשים לגדל בניהם לתורה כי לא יזכו ע"י אינו מצוה ועושה כטעותה של מיכל בת שאול אלא ע"י גידול בניהם ע"כ אמר שם אין הדור יתום שראב"ע שרוי בתוכה כי מעתה ישגיחו האמהות על הבנים להביאם לבית הספר 

Michal bas Shaul held like Reb Yosef's hava amina, that eino metzuva v'osseh is greater than metzuva v'oseh.  She wore tefillin, as everyone knows from the Gemara in Eiruvin, and that was emblematic of her attitude about women and Zman Grama mitzvos.  She didn't want to be bothered to encourage or enable her husband to grow in Torah, because she was busy learning and doing and growing on her own.  This is why she had no children till the day she died: her tafkid was to enable others to learn, and by declining to engage in her specific function; the siyata dishmaya for her consonant ability to bear children was impaired.

One thing the Chasam Sofer says is that אין נחת לפניו באינו מצוויים ועושים.  I found that to resonate with the Baal Ha'Itur and the Yereim brought by the Rosh in RH 4:7, which is surprising since we in Ashkenaz pasken like the Rav'yah (brought in the Rosh) and the Ra'avad (in the beginning of Toras Kohanim by Semicha), who hold that whatever a man does has full mitzva significance by a woman.  (For an basic outline of some of these opinions, see here.)  I have to admit, though, that the Shaagas Aryeh in 106 also goes with that mehalach where he assers carrying a shofar through reshus harabim for a woman that needs to hear tekiyos.  Still, I think the Chasam Sofer is going even farther than characterizing it as mere כדי לעשות נחת רוח לנשים (Chagiga 16b).

The Chasam Sofer ends by saying that

והנה עד"ז יזדרזו הנשים לגדל בניהם לתורה כי לא יזכו ע״י אינו מצוה ועושה כטעותה של מיכל בת שאול

 אלא ע״׳ גידול בניהם

II
In the comments, it was pointed out that this restrictive role assignment can be difficult to bear.  Many women resent what seems to be an assumption of unfitness for intellectual tasks and an inferior role in public prayer.  It is clear, however, that role assignment is common in the Torah, and we are very serious about working within those roles.


For example:  Some families of the Leviim were assigned to guard the gates, an Honor Guard in the Beis Hamikdash.  Other families of the Leviim were given the responsibility of singing and playing instruments in the Beis Hamikdash.  These familial guilds were absolute and unchangeable, to the extent that if a Levi of the latter were to perform the former, he would be guilty of a capital crime- Erchin 11b,

 אמר אביי נקיטינן משורר ששיער בשל חבירו במיתה שנאמר (במדבר ג) והחונים לפני המשכן קדמה לפני אהל מועד וגו' והזר הקרב יומת מאי זר אילימא זר ממש הכתיב חדא זימנא אלא לאו זר דאותה עבודה:

It goes without saying that if a non-kohen were to perform certain avodos that require Kehunah, he would also incur a commensurate punishment.  

Why is this true?  Is the offense against the Korbanos?  Is it because he was pogeim the avodah?  No.  I believe it is because of his transgression of the division and assignment of Kohanim and Yisraelim, just as the previous case must be because he had no right to cross the line out of his particular role.  It is a din of  Poretz Geder, of bittul Mechitzos, of Basadeh Triefa. 

III

Regarding the Chasam Sofer above in I. Someone once told me this idea, that if a woman encourages her husband to learn, and he wastes his time, in Olam Haba he will be an amaretz, and she will be the Rosh Yeshiva, because she did her job exactly as she should have. I scoffed. I said this is no different than Yechezkel's prayer that the men of Anasos should give their tzedaka to fakers, so they don't have the zechus of helping the poor. It's sad, but when you put your money down, and the horse is lame, you lose.  But, as I said, the Chasam Sofer says I am wrong. The women will be zocheh as if her husband was learning with hasmadah.

In December 2017/Teiveis '78, I saw something from Rav Chaim Kanievsky on Yessachar and Zevulun. 

בהזדמנות רבינו אמר חידוש בענין הסכם ׳ששכר וזבולון, שאכן איתא בזוהר שהזבולון ידע ללמוד כמו היששכר, אבל הוסיף, רבינו שצריך שיששכר יהיה לו התנאים להיות תלמיד חכם. אבל אם למשל יש לו מידות רעות, ואינו יכול להתקיים בו להיות תלמיד חכם, לא יתכן שהזבולון יהיה יותר טוב מהיששכר, ולכן ע״כ לא ידע ללמוד.

So he seems to contradict the Chasam Sofer. You pick the wrong person to support, you don't get any zechusim. 

When I said this over at my kiddush, a visitor, Andrew Herenstein, said that Reb Chaim has nothing to do with the Chasam Sofer, and I realized that he is right. By Yessachar/Zevulun, Zevulun is also chayav to learn Torah. But the din is mechadeish that he can fulfill his chiyuv by supporting someone that is learning. If it turns out he picked wrong, he gets nothing. Mah she'ein kein by the Chasam Sofer's case, the wife has no mitzva of Talmud Torah. Her fundamental mitzva is to encourage and enable the men in her family to learn. If she does that, then she has done exactly what her mitzva of Talmud Torah comprises, and of course she will have the full zechus of limud hatorah.

UPDATE FEBRUARY 2024, ADAR I PEI DALED

I just saw from the Chafetz Chaim in his Sheim Olam something that can be read to contradict the Chasam Sofer, but it's not necessarily meant to be analyzed that carefully. You decide. It is in a note on Shaar 11.

"ח"ח בס' שם עולם (שער החזקת התורה פי"א) 

שמעתי על גדול הדור אחד שהשיב לאשתו לפני מיתתו כשבקשה ממנו שיתן לה חלק בעוה"ב בתורתו ובמצוותיו, "מה לך לבקשני בענין חלק, כשיהיה לי גם לך יהיה, כיון שאת סייעתני לעבודת השם, וכמו בעולם הזה כשהבעל הוא עשיר גם אשתו עשירה, ואם ח"ו לא יהיה לי, גם לך לא יהיה, כי כשהבעל עני גם אשתו עניה".

Later, looking around online, I came across this, which brings others, a contemporary (the Maharit Algazi) and a predecessor (R Shmuel Primo, and I have no idea if his entanglements make him unquotable,) who say exactly (in the latter case, mamash step by step,) like the Chasam Sofer as follows:

עד"ז כתב המהרי"ט אלגאזי בספרו קדושת יו"ט )דף פג.( דפעמים יש שהאנשים מתבטלים מחמת יסורין שבאו עליהן ואין להם שכר באותה שעה אלא כפועל בטל, אך הנשים המעשות את בעליהן, אף בזמן שבעליהן בטלים יקחו חלק שלהם, דהלא השתדלו ועשו את כל המוטל עליהן לעשות, ולמה יגרע חלקן. ]ובאמת שכ"כ נמי המהר"ש פרימו )קושטא ת"ה, דרוש לפ' בהר כו, ג( לענין המחזיק ביד מי שאינו לומד לשמה, שמקבל המחזיק שכרו מושלם- גם אם הלומד לא למד לשמה, והביא לזה את דברי הגמ' הנ"ל דגדולה הבטחתן של הנשים וכו' וסיים: האיש פעמים עוסק שלא לשמה ואבד שכרו, ואם לא זכה נעשית לו סם המות, לא כן האשה לא אבדה שכרה, כיון שהיא כיוונה לשם שמים, ואם הוא עשה שלא כהוגן מה היה לעשות יותר. ועד"ז כתב נמי החת"ס )פרשת אמור עה"פ אשה זונה( וז"ל: והאמת כי טוב מאוד לעם הארץ המחזיק לומדי תורה, כי מלבד מה שנוטל חלק עמו, עוד יותר מזה, כי אע"פ שהתלמיד חכם ח"ו אינו מהשלמים, מ"מ המחזיק נוטל שכרו משלם, כי מה הוי ליה למעבד, ולמה יפסיד. וע"ע בשו"ת בית שלמה )יו"ד ח"ב סי' צד([. 

UPDATE OCTOBER 2024

Another discussion I found. Some is already above, and it is certainly useful to keep Andrew Herenstein's observation in mind.

האם שכרו של ה"זבולון" תלוי בכוונת הלומד תורה - אם היא לשמה?

 

דרש רבא, מאי דכתיב (ירמי' יח, כג) "יהיו מוכשלים לפניך בעת אפך עשה בהם", אמר ירמיה לפני הקב"ה, רבונו של עולם אפילו בשעה שעושין צדקה - הכשילם בבני אדם שאינן מהוגנים, כדי שלא יקבלו עליה שכר (טז ע"ב. הובא גם במס' בבא בתרא ט ע"ב).

ישנה מחלוקת קדומה בענין מחזיקי לומדי תורה - והלומד תורה לומד שלא לשמה, האם נגרע שכרם של המחזיקים או לא. מצד אחד, יש לומר שלא נגרע שכרו כלום, שהרי המחזיק לומד תורה עשה כדת וכדין, וקיים מצותו לשם שמים כראוי וכנכון, ולמה אם כן ייגרע שכרו אם הלומד לא למד כראוי וכנכון. מאידך גיסא, יש מקום לומר שיגרע שכרו של המחזיק, כי כל תכלית מצותו היא להחזיק את לומדי תורה, וכשתכלית זו לא נתמלאה כדבעי, לא מגיע לו שכר.

בספר 'אמרי שפר' למהר"ש פרימו זצ"ל (קושטא ת"ה, דרוש לפר' בהר כו, ג) מובא בשם ראשונים כדעה הראשונה, שהמחזיק מקבל שכרו משלם - גם אם הלומד לא למד לשמה, וביארו בזה הגמרא (ברכות יז.): "גדולה הבטחה שהבטיחן הקב"ה לנשים יותר מן האנשים, שנאמר (ישעי' לב, ט) 'נשים שאננות קמנה שמענה קולי בנות בטחות האזנה אמרתי', כי מעלת הנשים היא במה שמחזיקות את בעליהן ובניהן לתורה, כמו שאמרו (שם): "א"ל רב לרבי חייא, נשים במאי זכיין, באקרויי בנייהו לבי כנישתא, ובאתנויי גברייהו בי רבנן, ונטרין לגברייהו עד דאתו מבי רבנן", ואמנם "האיש פעמים עוסק שלא לשמה ואבד שכרו, ואם לא זכה נעשה לו סם המות, לא כן האשה לא אבדה שכרה, כיון שהיא כיוונה לשמים, ואם הוא עשה שלא כהוגן מה היה לעשות יותר".

לעומתם, ממשיך מהר"ש פרימו וכותב: "ולעניית דעתי, קשה טובה לזאת ההקדמה, מהא דאמרינן בצדקה 'הכשילם בבני אדם שאינם מהוגנים', ואם לפי דברי הראשונים, למה יאבד שכרו, כיון דאיהו מיהא למצוה איכוון". כלומר, לפי האמור אינו מובן מה שביקש ירמיה הנביא על אנשי ענתות: "רבונו של עולם אפילו בשעה שעושין צדקה - הכשילם בבני אדם שאינן מהוגנים, כדי שלא יקבלו עליה שכר", מדוע לא מגיע להם שכרם משלם, הלא הנותנים נתנו כהוגן, ומדוע יגרע שכרם כשהמקבלים אינם מתנהגים כהוגן.

ולכן מסיק: "נלענ"ד, דאם התורה הוא שלא לשמה - גם המחזיק בידו אין לו שכר, יען כי מכחו הוא בא לו, ואם המקור מושחת מאין תמצא מים במורד, ובודאי דיש לו מיהא שכר כמכוין לעשות מצוה ולא עשאה, אבל לא שכר גמור, כמי שעוסק בתורה ממש".

והנה, הגאון החיד"א הביא את דבריו בספרו 'ראש דוד' (פר' קדושים ובפר' זאת הברכה), ודן בהם ותלה ענין זה במחלוקת אמוראים, דהנה במסכת בבא בתרא (שם) הובא מאמר זה בתוספת דברים, כמו שאמרו: "אמר רבי יצחק, מאי דכתיב (משלי כא, כא) 'רודף צדקה וחסד ימצא חיים צדקה וכבוד', משום דרודף צדקה ימצא צדקה, אלא לומר לך, כל הרודף אחר צדקה הקב"ה ממציא לו מעות ועושה בהן צדקה, רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר הקב"ה ממציא לו בני אדם המהוגנים לעשות להן צדקה כדי לקבל עליהם שכרו, לאפוקי מאי, לאפוקי מדדרש רבה, דדרש רבה, מאי דכתיב 'ויהיו מוכשלים לפניך בעת אפך עשה בהם', אמר ירמיה לפני הקב"ה, רבש"ע אפילו בשעה שכופין את יצרן ומבקשין לעשות צדקה לפניך הכשילם בבני אדם שאינן מהוגנין כדי שלא יקבלו עליהן שכר". ע"כ. הרי שלפי דעת רבי יצחק נאמרה ההבטחה "ימצא חיים צדקה וכבוד" - על המצאת מעות לעשות צדקה, ולא על המצאת אנשים מהוגנים דווקא, ואילו לרב נחמן בן יצחק נאמרה ההבטחה גם על המצאת אנשים מהוגנים, כי אכן בענין זה נחלקו רבי יצחק ורנב"י, אם נגרע שכר הנותן - כשהמקבל הוא אדם שאינו הגון (וע"ע בס' 'קדושת יום טוב' להרי"ט אלגאזי, יום טוב דרבנן פב, ד).

ובעיקר ההערה יש להביא דברי ה'נמוקי יוסף' (ו, ב מדפי הרי"ף ד"ה הא) בשם הרמ"ה וז"ל: "הא ד'אינו מקבל שכר', היינו דווקא במי שיודע בו שאינו הגון, אבל אם אינו מכירו ואפשר שהוא הגון, שכר יש לו שהרי לשם מצוה מתכוין, ועוד אי לא תימא הכי, אתה נועל דלת בפני כמה מהוגנים במקום שאינם מכירים, ומעשה דרבי מסייע לן (ראה ב"ב ח.), דהדר אמר 'יכנסו הכל'". מפורש יוצא, שאם מצד המחזיקי תורה היתה הנתינה כהוגן, כשנתינתו היתה לשם מצוה, לא נגרע שכרו כלל, ומה שאמר ירמיה "הכשילם בבני אדם שאינן מהוגנים, כדי שלא יקבלו עליה שכר", כוונתו היתה, שידעו שהם נותנים לאנשים שאינם מהוגנים, ובאופן כזה בוודאי יגרע שכרם, כי אזי בוודאי לא היתה כוונתם לשמים (ראה 'גור אריה' על מכילתין, ליוורנו תרי"א).

ולגופו של ענין - לגבי המחזיק לומדי תורה והלומד אינו לומד לשמה, מצינו שיטה נוספת בזה, והיא מה שכתב הגרי"י אלגאזי זי"ע (בעמ"ח 'ארעא דרבנן') בספרו 'שארית יעקב', שהדבר תלוי באם מחזיק את הלומד על תנאי שיקבל מחצה שכר לימודו, באופן כזה נגרע חלקו כאשר הלימוד לא היה כהוגן, אכן, באם החזיק בסתם, מקבל שכרו משלם - גם כאשר לא היה לימודו על האופן הנכון.

עוד יש להביא דברי ה'חתם סופר' (פר' אמור בפסוק אשה זונה) בענין זה, וז"ל: "והאמת כי טוב מאוד לעם הארץ המחזיק לומדי תורה, כי מלבד מה שנוטל חלק עמו, עוד יותר מזה, כי אע"פ שהתלמיד חכם ח"ו אינו מהשלמים, מ"מ המחזיק נוטל שכרו משלם, כי מה הוי ליה למיעבד, ולמה יפסיד". וכן האריך בזה בשו"ת 'בית שלמה' (יו"ד ח"ב סי' צד), וכתב שגם כשהלומד - לומד לקנטר, שזו מדרגה של שלא לשמה שעליה אמרו חז"ל (ברכות יז.) "נוח שלא נברא", עכ"ז לא נגרע השכר של המחזיקו (ראה עוד 'שיחת חפץ חיים' סי' ז דף לט).

Nitzavim, Devarim 30:2. ושבת עד ה'.... בכל לבבך ובכל נפשך ושב ה' אלוקיך את שבותך וריחמך Teshuva on Aveiros and Teshuva on Mitzvos.

Our parsha mentions the concept of Teshuva.  Teshuva might be one of the Taryag Mitzvos (Ramban here), or it might be too fundamental to be called a mitzva (Minchas Chinuch 364 explaining the Rambam in the Yad).  In any case, our pesukim are talking about Teshuva, and they tell us that teshuva can be doubly effective, that it not only ends punishment, but that it can also bring us to a state of grace and love and blessing.

The Mesilas Yesharim (perek 4) says that Middas Hadin, the Divine Attribute of Strict Justice, would not allow for Teshuva.  Under Middas Hadin, the punishment for a sin would be immediate and devastating, and the sin would be irreparable.  It is only through Middas Harachamim that these consequences are ameliorated.  The sinner is given time to repent, the punishment is diminished, and Teshuva  uproots and erases the sin entirely.  This modification of Middas Hadin is only possible through the Chesed, the charity, of Middas Harachamim.  (I've included the Hebrew and English text of the Mesillas Yesharim at the end of the post.  It's Elul, it's time to look at the Mesillas Yesharim.)

Reb Elchanan Vasserman asks the following question from the Gemara in Kiddushin 40b (which is also brought in the Rambam 3 Teshuva 3).

ר"ש בן יוחי אומר אפילו צדיק גמור כל ימיו ומרד באחרונה איבד את הראשונות שנאמר (יחזקאל לג) צדקת הצדיק לא תצילנו ביום פשעו ואפילו רשע גמור כל ימיו ועשה תשובה באחרונה אין מזכירים לו שוב רשעו שנאמר (יחזקאל לג) ורשעת הרשע לא יכשל בה ביום שובו מרשעו וניהוי כמחצה עונות ומחצה זכיות אמר ריש לקיש בתוהא על הראשונות

Briefly:  A life-long perfect tzadik that rebels at the end of his life loses all that he has done in the past.  Reish Lakish explains that this is not true if he sins out of some momentary desire or weakness.  It is true only when he recants and regrets his good deeds-- he is toheh ahl harishonos.  

From this Gemara we see that natural law mandates that regretfulness for past mitzvos erases all the mitzvos.    Reb Elchanan (Kovetz Maamarim, Ahl Hateshuva, p 21) asked the Chafetz Chaim, How then can the Mesillas Yesharim say that the power of Teshuva to erase past sins is a gift arising from Middas Harachamim?  According to the Gemara, regret is a natural and universal solvent: if you regret good acts, the good is erased.  If that's the case where the result is suffering and punishment, then kal vachomer (Meruba middas tova mimidas puranus) the same would naturally be true in the opposite regard- that regret for sin will erase the sins and prevent punishment.  Why does the Mesillas Yesharim say that the ability of Teshuva to erase sin is a singular and unparalleled gift from Hashem?

(Some people answer that only after the gzeiras hakasuv that Teshuva erases sin did it follow that Toheh ahl Harishonos erases mitzvos.  With all due respect, I think that's just infantile, a reflexive ‘lomdus’ that doesn’t make any sense.  The latter does not follow the former at all.  The protocol of Din does not have to echo that of rachamim.  That's the whole point of saying that midda tova is meruba.)

The Chafetz Chaim  answered that while it is true that all regret erases past behavior, Teshuva is unparalleled in two ways.  1. Teshuva brought about by fear of punishment does not mean that the baal teshuva regrets his aveiros like the Toheh, the sinner in Kiddushin, regrets his mitzvos.  A man who is doing Teshuva out of fear only regrets the deadly consequence of his sins.  Despite his lack of true regret, Teshuva meiYira erases his sins.  2. And if the Teshuva was from love of Hashem, Teshuva meiAhava, it doesn't erase the sin- it reconstitutes the sin into a meritorious act, as if it were a mitzva.  This is  unparalleled in the case of one who regrets having done a mitzva, and is the unique result of Middas Harachamim.

Reb Elchanan points out that the Ramchal's words do not seem to accord with the Chafetz Chaim's pshat.  The Ramchal said that even the erasure of sin is only possible because of Middas Harachamim, while the Chafetz Chaim said that erasure of any past mitzva or aveira is the natural result of charata, of regret. Also, Charata is Charata. If it works by toheh, it should work by teshuva meiyirah.

Reb Elchonon himself distinguishes between aveiros that are tzivuyim and aveiros that a pogem your neshama. The former are no different than toheh. The chiddush of teshuva is that it works even by the latter. Or, as some say in Reb Elchonon, that changing your identity from Rasha to Tadik or vice versa is not a chiddush. The only chiddush of teshuva is that it changes the past. (That which the Gemara says that Toheh loses schar, that is because a rasha can not get schar for mitzvos that he did.)

Rav Yosef Gavriel Behchhoffer offers a fascinating suggestion to answer the question. Rashi there says 

בתוהא - מתחרט על כל הטובות שעשה. R YG wants to say that Toheh is only where he regrets EVERYTHING good that he has done. This naturally results in losing his schar and his status. The chiddush of teshuva is that it works even when he does teshuva on ONE AVEIRA. That aveira is nimchal and erased and, if mei'ahava, the past becomes mitzvos instead of aveiros.

https://youtu.be/e8_r_YB9AVc?si=rlUi3QVETpJHKrE7&t=616

I'd like to point out that my reading of the pesukim in Yechezkel, both the pasuk brought in Kiddushim from perek 33 and also the passuk in Yechezkel perek 18 brought in Yoma 86, indicates to me that just as Teshuva can change aveiros to mitzvos, exactly so can Toheh ahl Harishonos, regret for past mitzvos, change them into Aveiros.  And it's not only my reading.    The Arvei Nachal (by the author of the Levushei Srad and the Tiv Gittin) on Parshas Va'eschanan Drush II, says exactly that.  This, too, does not seem to accord with the words of the Chafetz Chaim.

Also, I wonder, what kind of Toheh is the Gemara in Kiddushin talking about?  Is it talking about a Toheh that matches the Teshuva we are told to do?  Is a man called a Toheh only if he deliberately and thoughtfully reexamines the mitzvos he did, is deeply ashamed of them, mournfully regrets doing them, and makes a firm conscious decision to never do mitzvos again?  Does he have to re-create himself, as the Rambam says of the Baal Teshuva?  I doubt it.  It means just what it says:   that he regrets having done the mitzvos.  If that's enough to erase mitzvos, why wouldn't similar regret be enough to completely erase aveiros?  Why does teshuva require the wrenching effort of בְּכָל לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל נַפְשֶׁךָ?

Unfortunately, this all seems to point toward something I've often quoted from a well known and highly respected Mashgiach that I've had business with.

 "Good Comes and Goes, but Bad is Forever."

He didn't put it in those exact words, but pretty close, and I think the aphorism sums up his philosophy, that a spiritual fall generates an indelible change that forever increases the risk of relapse. Spiritual advances, on the other hand, are fragile, easily lost, and effortlessly extirpated. They disappear easily, and when they do, they don't leave a trace.

Reb Yitzchak Hutner in his Pachad Yitzchok answered Reb Elchonon's question along the same lines (minus the cynicism.)  He said that going from life to death is part of the teva, the natural order of Hashem's universe.  Going from death to life is not.  Order requires constant energy, while disorder is the default state.  Anyone can be meimis a chai.  Not everyone can be mechayeh a meis.

Another way to put this: Middos Ra'os take root much more easily than middos tovos.  Uprooting them is much harder than uprooting good middos.  What is true for Middos is also true for the effect of mitzvos and aveiros.  That alone would serve to explain why Toheh is derech hateva, while Teshuva is lema'ala miderech hateva.  Besides being painfully obvious, the Beis Yosef in the beginning of Orach Chaim says this about Azus Panim. Bad behavior is dyo, an indelible dye, while good behavior is sikra, faint and superficial.  One would think that observing disgusting behavior is not likely to influence you to emulate that behavior.  But in our parsha, in 29:16, it says that if you observe the disgusting pagan rites, beware of the effect on you, and know that you might be influenced by it.  Similarly, the Gemara (beginning of Sotah, brought by Rashi in Ki Sisa) says "haro'eh sotah b'kilkula, yazir atzmo min hayayin."  If you see a Sotah ugly disheveled and publicly disgraced, be on guard!  You are in danger of following her example.  Avoid wine!  Thus, we see that the result of Toheh is natural, while Teshuva is practically a miracle.

But one can say another mehalach.  And do me a favor: after reading it, the teretz is obvious.  But it wasn't obvious before you read it, so don't give me a hard time.  Hakol b'chezkas sumin....

Toheh works like Kavana misnagedes in mitzvos (Rosh Hashanna 28).  Even if you hold Mitzvos einan tzrichos kavana, that is because (as Reb Moshe says in the Darash on Ushmartem es hamatzos, Shmos 12:17) stama lishma , or because if the person realized that he had done the mitzva he would be pleased, or because of the Rambam in the second perek of Hilchos Geirushin.  But certainly, the desire to do Hashem's will is fundamental to all mitzvos, and if you do the mitzva intending that it not be a mitzva, you have done nothing at all.  For aveiros, on the other hand, even if you do an aveira with kavana misnagedes, for example, you do the aveira because you enjoy it but have kavana davka not to transgress Hashem's will, it doesn't make a bit of a difference, you're still punished for the aveira.  And worse than that: when one does a mitzva and davka doesn't want to be mekayeim Hashem's will, the act of doing the mitzva is the biggest moreid bemalchus.  Of course his mitzvos turn into aveiros.

With these teirutzim we can answer a kashe on a Tosfos in Sanhedrin 37b.  The Gemara says that even though our courts are no longer empowered to administer capital punishment, Hashem makes sure that the appropriate punishment occurs.  Tosfos asks, but we see many people who deny the entire Torah who live and prosper?  Tosfos answers that perhaps their Bris Milah suspends their punishment and they are given the reward for that mitzva before they die.  The problem is that obviously these people are Toheh.  If so, then according to the Gemara in Kiddushin they should get nothing at all for their mitzvos!  But according to our teirutzim, there is no kashe.  Tosfos chose the mitzva of Millah very carefully, because Millah is different than all other mitzvos.  The din of Toheh only applies to mitzvos that a person does and whose effect derive from the intention to do Hashem's will, or whose effect is the positive result of the act.  But Millah is neither.  It is done on one person by another person, and its effects are absolute, no matter what the mahul wants or thinks, as David Hamelech pointed out.  That's why Avraham Avinu saves mehulim from Gehinom, but Moshe Rabbeinu doesn't do so for people who've done the other Taryab.  So while all other mitzvos can be erased through Toheh, davka Millah can not.  And now you see why Tosfos mentioned Millah davka.

I suppose I should write Reb Elchanan's teretz better, but that will have to wait.  Anyway, I like these teirutzim more, and they also answer the other kashes I mentioned above, about changing the mitzvos to aveiros and the ease of toheh compared to the difficulty of teshuva, and Tosfos in Chulin.

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Cited text of Mesillas Yesharim

, וזה, כי לפי שורת הדין ממש, היה ראוי שהחוטא יענש מיד תיכף לחטאו בלי המתנה כלל, וגם שהעונש עצמו יהיה בחרון אף, כראוי למי שממרה פי הבורא יתברך שמו, ושלא יהיה תיקון לחטא כלל, כי הנה באמת, איך יתקן האדם את אשר עיות והחטא כבר נעשה? הרי שרצח האדם את חברו, הרי שנאף, איך יוכל לתקן הדבר הזה? היוכל להסיר המעשה העשוי מן המציאות.

אמנם, מדת הרחמים היא הנותנת הפך השלשה דברים שזכרנו: דהינו, שיתן זמן לחוטא ולא יכחד מן הארץ מיד כשחטא, ושהעונש עצמו לא יהיה עד לכלה, ושהתשובה תנתן לחוטאים בחסד גמור, שתחשב עקירת הרצון כעקירת המעשה, דהיינו, שבהיות השב מכיר את חטאו ומודה בו ומתבונן על רעתו ושב ומתחרט עליו חרטה גמורה דמעיקרא כחרטת הנדר ממש שהוא מתנחם לגמרי והיה חפץ ומשתוקק שמעולם לא היה נעשה הדבר ההוא ומצטער בלבו צער חזק על שכבר נעשה הדבר ועוזב אותו להבא ובורח ממנו, הנה עקירת הדבר מרצונו, יחשב לו כעקירת הנדר ומתכפר לו. והוא מה שאמר הכתוב (ישעיה ו): וסר עונך וחטאתך תכפר, שהעון סר ממש מהמציאות ונעקר במה שעכשיו מצטער ומתנחם על מה שהיה למפרע.

וזה חסד ודאי שאינה משורת הדין, אך על כל פנים הנה הוא חסד שאינו מכחיש הדין לגמרי, שהרי יש צד לתלות בו, שתחת הרצון שנתרצה בחטא וההנאה שנהנה ממנו בא עתה הנחמה והצער. וכן אריכות הזמן איננו ויתרון על החטא, אלא סבלנות קצת לפתוח לו פתח תקון. וכן כל שאר דרכי חסד: כענין ברא מזכה אבא (סנהדרין קד), או מקצת נפש ככל הנפש (קהלת רבה ז כז), המוזכרים בדברי החכמים, דרכי חסד הם לקבל את המעט כמרובה, אך לא מתנגדים ומכחישים ממש מדת הדין, כי כבר יש בהם טעם הגון להחשיב אותם. אך שיותרו עבירות בלא כלום או שלא ישגיח עליהם, זה היה נגד הדין לגמרי, כי כבר לא היה משפט ודין אמיתי בדברים, על כן זה אי אפשר להמצא כלל. ואם אחד מן הדרכים שזכרנו לא ימצא לחוטא להמלט, ודאי שמדת הדין לא תשוב ריקם.

For on the basis of justice alone it would be dictated that the sinner be punished immediately upon sinning, without the least delay; that the punishment itself be a wrathful one, as befits one who rebels against the word of the Creator, blessed be His Name; and that there be no correction whatsoever for the sin. For in truth, how can a man straighten what has been made crooked after the commission of the sin? If a man killed his neighbor; if he committed adultery-how can he correct this? Can he remove the accomplished fact from actuality?


It is the attribute of mercy which causes the reverse of the three things we have mentioned. That is, it provides that the sinner be given time, and not be wiped out as soon as he sins; that the punishment itself not involve utter destruction; and that the gift of repentance be given to sinners with absolute lovingkindness, so that the rooting out of the will which prompted the deed be considered a rooting out of the deed itself. That is, when he who is repenting recognizes his sin, and admits it, and reflects upon his evil, and repents, and wishes that the sin had never been committed, as he would wish that a certain vow had never been made, in which case there is complete regret, and he desires and yearns that the deed had never been done, and suffers great anguish in his heart because of its already having been done, and departs from it for the future, and flees from it then the uprooting of the act from his will is accredited to him as the uprooting of a vow, and he gains atonement. As Scripture states (Isaiah 6:7), "Your wrong will depart, and your sin will be forgiven." The wrong actually departs from existence and is uprooted because of his suffering for and regretting now what had taken place in the past. 


This is certainly a function of lovingkindness and not of justice. In any event, however, it is a type of lovingkindness which does not entirely negate the attribute of justice. It can be seen as according with justice in that in place of the act of will from which the sin arose and the pleasure that it afforded, there is now regret and suffering. So, too, the time extension constitutes not a pardoning of the sin, but rather God's bearing with the sinner for a while to open the door of repentance to him. 

Nitzavim, Devarim 29:28. Communal Obligation of Mitzvos

Arvus, or more correctly Areivus, means that all Jews have an obligation to see to it that their fellow Jews live Torah lives. Areivus is often translated as meaning the same as Areiv, which is a loan guarantor. In other words, each of us is obligated to fulfill our duty to Hashem, and as guarantors, we also are responsible for our neighbors' duty.

Mishulchan Gavo’ah brings from Reb Baruch Ber (with some changes): we find that if c'v Klal Yisrael is punished for aveiros, because of the din of arvus the tzadikim can be punished. He brings that tzadikim and tashba”r suffer for the resha’im of the generation. Additionally, we find that when pur’anus chas veshalom occurs, it starts from the tzadikim. Reb Baruch Ber asks, the din of arvus as found by a guarantor on a loan is that ein nifra’im min ha’areiv until you make the claim from the actual debtor and he can’t pay the debt. You certainly cannot go to the areiv before going to the primary debtor! He answers that there are two types of arvus. The halacha mentioned is by an areiv stam. But an areiv kablan is a co-signer, not merely a guarantor, and he is equally chayov, he is a primary debtor even though he didn’t borrow the money.  (Technically, there are four kinds of arvus: stam, ahl me'nas she'ipara, kablan, and shlof dotz or nasa ve'nasan be'yad, or according to Rabbeinu Tam toward the end of BB around 174b, five.  However, the distinctions among the last three have no relevance here, since the last group are direct obligations on the areiv, while the first group is primarily on the borrower.  What he means is that there are two categories of arvus.)

He explains that the lomdus of the difference is that an areiv stam accepts responsibility for the result of the debtor’s behavior, that is, if the debtor’s behavior results in default, the areiv must pay. But an areiv kablon accepts the original obligation of the debtor. The latter is also true in the din of arvus of Klal Yisrael. The din of arvus is not just that we are liable for the result of, and therefore punished for, the behavior of others; instead, it is that our chiyuv mitzvos includes seeing to it that others do their mitzvos.

In both monetary Arvus and Mitzva Arvus, you suffer the consequences of the other person's failure to do his duty. But there is a difference: by a monetary debt, if you pay the deadbeat's outstanding loan, you're off the hook. But by mitzvos, it’s not enough for you to do the mitzvah. You can't even do the mitzva twice, once for yourself and once for him. You have to see to it that the other person does it.

I believe that according to this idea of Reb Baruch Ber, the din arvus is not a side-halacha that obligates us to bring Jews to the Torah. It is an additional dimension of every mitzva we are chayav to fulfil. As an areiv kablan, the chiyuv of others to hear the shofar is your chiyuv of Teki'as Shofar. That means that even if you have heard teki'as shofar with the greatest hiddur, if someone has not heard teki'as shofar, and you could have helped him, you were not mekayeim this aspect of the mitzva of tekias shofar.

(By the way, I think this pshat is implicit in what the Rishonim say that you can be motzi a person even on the bracha of a mitzva, even if you have already done the mitzva yourself. They ask, but how can you say "ve'tzivanu to do this mitzva"? You are no longer chayav to do the mitzva! I believe it's a Yerushalmi, but I know it's a Ritva, a Ran and a She'iltos, that the din of Arvus means that if the other person has not been mekayeim the mitzva, then the chiyuv to do this Mitzva still remains upon you. And the nusach habracha is not "vetzivanu to see to it that others do mitzvos", the nusach of the bracha is "vetzivanu to do this mitzva."
The Ritva is in Hilchos Brachos 5:2:

כל הברכות שהם חובה על האדם וחבירו שהוא גדול חייב באותה ברכה כמוהו מוציאו ידי חובתו אע״פ שכבר הוציא עצמו והטעם לפי שכל ישראל ערבין זה לזה וכשחבירו חייב הרי הוא כאילו הוא עצמו חייב ולפיכך יחיד מוציא לחבירו בברכות של ק״ש אע״פ שאין חובה

The Ran is in Rosh HaShanna 29a.

The She'iltos is 54 DH Bram:

ברם צריך אילו מאן דקדיש ונפיק ידי חובתיה מהו לאפוקי לאחרים ידי חובתיהון מי אמרינן כיון דהא איפטר ליה הוה ליה כקטן ואסיר ולא מפיק או דילמא דחיובא הוא מי איכא דבעי קדושי ומיזל לעלם וכל חד וחד מישראל מיחייב בערבותא דחבריה וכמאן דלא איפטר דמי ומפיק אחרים )

Notes:
1. For a similar discussion, see Birkas Shmuel, Kiddushin #27, the chkira he brings from his son in law, R' Reuven Grozovsky, although they're talking about chinuch of limud hatorah and we're talking about mitzvos in general. Others have confused the two sugyos, and assumed that what is true by one is true by the other, but that alleged correlation is purely speculative.
2. See comments, below, from Harav Dr. Eli, Tosfos Sotah 37b, as follows:

See Sotah 37b and Tosfot there D.H. Amar, that counts the number of Britot to be48 x 613 x 603550 (or the last number squared). That is, each one of us took upon itself one obligation to look after Yankel's Shofar and another for Yankel's Mekhashefa Lo Tehaye.

He is referring to the Gemara there

אמר רבי לדברי רבי שמעון בן יהודה איש כפר עכו שאמר משום רבי שמעון אין לך כל מצוה ומצוה שבתורה שלא נכרתו עליה ארבעים ושמנה בריתות של שש מאות אלף ושלשת אלפים וחמש מאות וחמשים נמצא לכל אחד ואחד מישראל שש מאות אלף ושלשת אלפים וחמש מאות וחמשים

and Tosfos there

מר רב משרשיא ערבא וערבא דערבא - כמדומה דהכי בעי למימר דלר"ש בן יהודה קבל עליו כל אחד מישראל לתרי"ג מצות קצ"ח ריבוא ריבואות וח' אלפים ריבואות ותי"ג ריבואות ושבע אלפים ומאתים בריתות לשש מאות אלף ושלשת אלפים וחמשים וחמש מאות בשביל ערבותן אם יעברו עליהן ולרבי אליבא דרבי שמעון ששים ריבוא פעמים ושלשת אלפים ותקנ"ה פעמים חשבון זה בריתות קיבלו עליהן: 

Parshas Nitzavim and the Mitzvah of Teshuva

Reb Meir Simchah in this week’s parsha, Parshas Netzavim, says an interesting thing. He says that now that there is an option of doing teshuva, to not do tshuvoh is not just a bitul asei, but rather it is an aggravating factor in the punishment of the underlying aveira. In other words, the punishment for not doing teshuva is worse than the punishment for the aveira you should have done teshuva for. (Devarim 30:11.)

So, why is it so hard for us to seriously focus on the Mitzvah of Teshuva? Here are some of the usual suspects. I don't want you to think that they are self-evident, dreary platitudes. Simple is not the same as simplistic. As the Mesilas Yesharim illustrates, simplicity sometimes hides profound truth. And, as the Mesilas Yesharim definitely doesn't say, it's taken a long and dissolute life to come up with this list.

A. Lust. I am not ready to give up my pleasures. Self-denial is both out of style and not good for your mental health.

B. Pride. I’m as good as anyone else, I’m at least as good as those rabbis, those professional Jews, and I don’t need to apologize for my lifestyle. And I’m certainly not going to admit they are any better than me by changing to be more like them.

C. Sloth. I know I ought to do tshuvoh, but it’s just too much effort, both mentally and physically, for me.

D. Fear of Peer Group Reaction, fear of what other people will think of you. Your friends will think you've gone frum, or your family will be angry at you for not going with the flow of their comfortable lives and assumptions. In some circles, doing teshuva is very anti-social. I know a young couple that was ostracized by their erstwhile friends, and suffered a great deal of emotional pain, and eventually moved out of the neighborhood, because the young woman decided to wear a sheitel. Way to go, friends!!!

E. Despair. I’m no good, I'm beyond redemption. Or, I’ve tried it before, and it didn’t work, and I would just be lying to myself to think it’s going to work now. This is usually just a rationalization for A, "Lust" and C, "Sloth."

F. Denial. You believe that changing your lifestyle would be so terribly traumatic, (see A, "Lust" and D, Fear of Peer Reaction,) that you create a delusional reality that supports your refusal to undertake it. Sometimes the tool of denial is convincing yourself that you are not capable of doing tshuvoh (see E, "Despair,") and sometimes B, "Pride," that you don't need to.

You might recognize some of these factors from the last time you thought about going on a diet, because it's really the same issue of will power and admitting failure and the need to change. This is what keeps the people in the women's magazine business prosperous. When you fast on Tzom Gedaliah, though, keep in mind that the same conscious decisiveness that keeps us from eating on that day demonstrates that we can indeed do teshuva and eliminate other bad behavior.

A few years ago, I read a story in the paper about the arrest of a suspect in a crime (by Stefan Esposito). The article said that the suspect "allegedly" shot someone several times in a parking lot, but the victim survived and was able to identify him. Also, a security camera in the lot filmed the crime, and every time the suspect fired the gun the flash very clearly illuminated his face. Also, an off duty policeman witnessed the crime, pursued the suspect, chased him and arrested him two blocks away, at which time he was found to be in possession of the weapon used in the crime.

The article ended by stating that

"the suspect faces an uphill legal battle."

In the beis din shel maaloh, they can build a good case against ovrei aveirah as well. Our lives are recorded and played over during our trial, and malachim who witnessed the events testify about what occurred, and worse yet, the suspect has signed a document stating exactly what aveiros he did. We face an uphill legal battle.

But despite what might seem to be pretty bad odds, there is a great deal we can do to ameliorate the consequences of our aveiros.

Remember the Minchas Chinuch. He says if not for the passuk that passels a Sukkah Gezulah, the fact that you’re not mekayeim the mitzvah because of Mitzva Haba’ah be’aveira wouldn’t be that much of a problem, because even if you haven’t been mekayeim the mitzvah by eating there, at least you weren’t mevateil the assei by eating outside of a Sukkah: you did eat in a Sukkah, just you weren’t mekayeim the mitzvah. Same thing with teshuva: even if you can’t be mekayeim the mitzvah of teshuva, at least don’t be mevateil the assei.

Many people don’t realize how broad the concept of tshuvah is. It runs from the Gemara in Kiddushin where "shema hirheir tshuvah b’libo" makes him a safeik tzadik gamur, to extremes like tshuvas hamishkal and galus. Simply accepting that what you have done is wrong, and being ashamed of what you have done, is a great mitzvah. You may not be ready for the extreme end of the scale, but anyone can be m’kayeim the great mitzvah of tshuvah by recognizing the need to do it, and knowing how easily accessible the beginning of the range of options is.

We see this in the Mishna in Yoma. Reb Akiva says Ashreichem Yisrael, how lucky you are, Yisrael, that you have the option of Teshuva, and he brings two pesukim: Vezarakti aleichem Mayim Tehorim, and Mikvei Yisrael Hashem; teshuva is like the sprinkling of the ashes of the Parah Adumah, and it is like immersing in a Mikva. Rav Pam Zatzal explained that Reb Akiva is illustrating the broad range of the Mitzva of Teshuva: If one immerses himself in a mikva, as does a geir who re-creates himself, this is the greatest mitzva. But being sprinkled with the ashes of the Para Aduma, which seems to be a far lesser personal investment in tahara--it is a mere sprinkling on a person that does not even remove his clothes, his begadim tzo'im, also brings tahara and purification. Reb Akiva is telling us Ashreichem Yisrael-- Teshuva at any level is a magnificent, wonderful gift to Klal Yisrael.

In Parshas Vayeilech, the Ramban on 31:17-18 says that "Ki ein Elokai bekirbi" is not a real vidui, and it is certainly not a teshuva shleima. But it is recognition of the sin, it is some degree of regret. And in the next passuk, 31:18, the Ramban explains that this tiny little incomplete teshuva results in a tremendous lessening of the tochecha; it ends the Tzaros Ra'os ve'Rabbos, but it doesn't end the galus entirely. Klal Yisrael has to do a better teshuva to end the galus. But it is a powerful and effective step which bears fruit immediately.

Similarly, the Ramban on Devarim 30:14, Mah Hashem sho'eil mei'imach, and Ki karov eilecha hadavar me'od, says that the Davar is Teshuva. The minimum requirements are few and within reach. See, also, Kiddushin 49b: if a wicked man proposes to a woman, and the woman's acceptance is conditional on his being a holy man, a tzadik gamur, and the man is known to be a lowlife scoundrel, we still have to consider her possibly married, because "shema hirheir teshuva be'libo," maybe he had thoughts of repentance in the moments prior to his proposal. Evidently, this would classify him as a tzadik gamur!
I wish you, in this Eish Shechora ahl gabei Eish Levana, a Kesiva Vechasima Tova Le'alter le'chayim tovim. Thank you for your valuable insights, mar'ei mekomos, and mussar.

Nitzavim, Devarim 29:18. Ve’hisbareich bilvavo leimor Shalom yihyeh li.

Parshas Nitzvaim continues the theme of Parshas Ki Savo, that being chosen by Hashem is a high-risk job that comes with tremendous responsibilities. As Hashem’s people and His emissaries, we are held to a very high standard, and just as we are given the potential to achieve stellar greatness, we are warned that our indifference to our obligations can bring the most horrible debasement and tragedy. Having been warned, we blanched; who can live a life balanced on the edge of a razor, where the slightest inattention brings such terrible punishment? So Moshe told us, Attem nitzavim, you stand here today; you know you are not perfect, but even so Hashem has brought you to the borders of Eretz Yisrael, and just as you will soon enter the promised land, so, too, I promise you that ultimately you will experience the ultimate redemption and love of Hashem.

Having said this, it is surprising that in 29:18 Moshe warns that there might be among us those who ignore this warning, saying everything will be fine, I will do what I want and nothing will happen to me. After all, Moshe had already frightened them with one hundred and forty eight curses, each more horrible than the other. What is he adding here? To whom is he speaking, who is it that heard the earlier warnings, and accepted them, but thinks he has a loophole, an angle, that will enable him to coast along, doing what he wants?

Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank answers that Moshe Rabbeinu was addressing a phenomenon that we all have witnessed. As he puts it, a person was found in his store on Shabbas, openly doing business. He was asked, how can you do this? You believe in Hashem, you come to shul, how can you be mechaleil Shabbas so blatantly? The man answered, wait, you will see, I will make it all better. After Shabbas, he came to the Rav and handed him a generous donation, and said, here, this will do a tremendous amount of good, all the projects that need funding, all the poor that need assistance, this donation is the answer to your prayers.

This is the person Moshe Rabbeinu was addressing; the one who decided on his own that he can decide when the ends justify the means. Asei docheh lo sa'aseh! Lo efshar velo komichavein! Vechai bahem!  He is performing a vital role in the community, he is one of the good guys, he builds mikvaos, he supports the needy, he is doing God’s work! This is not mere rationalization. He actually pats himself on the back, he is "misbareich bilvavo! What a fine person I am!

Moshe Rabbeinu says to this person, Lo yoveh Hashem selo’ach lo. Not only will Hashem be angry at him, Hashem will be jealous of him, so to speak. You think you know better than Me? You think that I can’t take care of my people without your aveiros? Who are you to think you can get away with this, that the mitzvos are only for the common man, that you are the prince who can decide what he will or won’t do? For that kind of azus, gaavah, and chutzpah, Hashem reserves a special anger.

Similarly, the Pardes Yosef (the Poilisher one) says that there is a reason for the nexting (my word; I hate the word juxtaposition), the smichus of Parshas Teruma to Parshas Mishpatim. The Torah wants us to know that when there is a Mitzvah to donate one's money to a Beis HaMikdash, the gabbaim need to be sure where that money is coming from.
The Torah wants us to know that in dinei momonus there are Mishpatim: There is a section dealing with theft and there is a section dealing with the prohibition of taking interest on a loan, and on returning collateral and on not pressing the borrower and on not causing injury and on paying for damage that you caused. The Torah wants us to make sure that the money we are donating comes from sources which are Kasher v'Yashar. The Torah is not interested in a person donating money that is not kasher.

This, says Pardes Yosef, is the reason that Parshas Mishpatim comes before Parshas Teruma. We need to know about gzeilah and ribbis and shomrim and nezikin. Only then can we talk about making a pledge to the Beis HaMikdash.

Just as Binyan Beis Hamikdas is not docheh Shabbas, so, too, Binyan Beis Hamikdash is not docheh dinei mamonos.

Along the same lines, the Maharsha (written around 400 years ago) in Kesuvos 67 criticizes those who steal and then give that money to charity: "Many in this generation gather their wealth through measures which are without faith in G-d and which involve Chillul HaShem like by stealing from ovdei kochavim. Afterwards, they donate this money to get annual honors for themselves so that they will be blessed by the community. This is nothing other than a mitzvah ha'ba’ah b'aveirah. Such money will not last."

In real life, this is an unworkable requirement; it’s not true in halachah or in practice. (See Tosfos Avoda Zara 17a DH Mahu, but Tosfos is not really a proof, because that's talking about a psul in the object even if it went through several hands; and anyway, the only mitzvah a mumar is pattur from is Korban Pesach, if that, and he is certainly not pattur from the mitzva of Tzedaka.) A mossad does not have to examine the kashrus of the money it’s taking, other than in exceptional circumstances that involve chillul or kiddush Hashem. But there is one thing we should remember; “One should not assist a person who is buying a clean conscience.” Davar beshem omro: credit to Dr. Jordan Hillman, retired professor of law at Northwestern University, with whom I used to share a weekly lunch and discussion of the differences and commonalities of Orthodox (mine) and Reform (his) philosophy. My beloved cousin is a prince of a man, an ehrliche and warm person. And he gets points in my book for having been a navigator on bombing flights over Germany in WWII. But as far as dogma and faith are concerned, there isn't very much common ground.