Parshas Bamidbar and Shavuos - מנו ועצרו, but It Is Not the Numbers

When Chazal instituted the reading of the Torah on Shabbos, the order of Parshiyos was not fixed. Nonetheless, there were certain requirements. The Gemara (Megilla 31b) says that the tochecha in Bechukosai must be done before Shavuos, and that of Netzavim before Rosh Hashannah.

תניא ר' שמעון בן אלעזר אומר עזרא תיקן להן לישראל שיהו קורין קללות שבתורת כהנים קודם עצרת ושבמשנה תורה קודם ר"ה מאי טעמא אמר אביי ואיתימא ריש לקיש כדי שתכלה השנה וקללותיה בשלמא שבמשנה תורה איכא כדי שתכלה שנה וקללותיה אלא שבתורת כהנים אטו עצרת ראש השנה היא אין עצרת נמי ראש השנה היא דתנן ובעצרת על פירות האילן 

Tosfos there in Megilla has a slightly different perspective - that we do not want any vestige of klala to be read immediately after these two beginnings, so we get them out of the way.

שאנו רוצים להפסיק ולקרות שבת אחת קודם ר"ה בפרשה שלא תהא מדברת בקללות כלל שלא להסמיך הקללות לר"ה ומטעם זה אנו קורין במדבר סיני קודם עצרת כדי שלא להסמיך הקללות שבבחוקותי לעצרת

The Maharit in a Teshuva adds that not only do we not want to read the klalos after these dates, we want to davka have a parsha in between, to be mafsik.

וכתבו התוס' שנהגו העולם להפסיק בפרש' אחת בין קללות לעצרת והוא פ' במדבר סיני וכשם שאמרו שלא לאחר כך אמרו שלא להקדים שיהיו קורין אותם שתי שבתות שלפני עצרת דלא מינכרא מילתא שכלו קללותיה אא"כ נקראים בסמוך לאחרית השנה

The implication is that in setting the order of Parshiyos it was more important to avoid a negative, to see to it that these two parshiyos of Tochacha for the sins of the past are not hanging over our heads at our new beginnings, on Shavuos and on Rosh Hashannah. Shavuos is the Rosh Hashanna for tree crops, and the first of Tishrei is the Rosh Hashanna for mankind.

Over time, simanim were developed to help us remember what to read. As the Mechaber says in OC 428:4,

 וסימן לפשוטה יפקדו ופסחו ולמעוברת סגרו ופסחו מנו ועצרו צומו וצלו קומו ותקעו:

So the siman for Shavuos is מנו ועצרו, Me'nu-count, atzru-Shavuos. On leap years, Bamidbar is two weeks before and Naso is immediately before Shavuos.

As is often the case, the reasons given by our Chachamim for their takanos are not the whole story. I don't know why, but sometimes the real reasons are hidden and left for discovery by individuals that pay more attention. Perhaps Chazal wanted us to experience the pleasure of discovery. With that in mind, I'd like to say something I heard from Harav Shimon Kalman Goldstein. The vort is his; he is not responsible for my presentation or my hosafos.

Medrash Rabba Parshas Vayeitzei, where Yaakov meets Rachel by the well, 70:9. Some see in it a foreshadowing of Mattan Torah.

ר' יוחנן פתר לה: בסיני,

וירא והנה באר, זה סיני.

והנה שם שלושה, כהנים לוים וישראלים.

כי מן הבאר ההיא, שמשם שמעו עשרת הדברות.

והאבן גדולה, זו שכינה.

ונאספו שמה כל העדרים

ר' שמעון בן יהודה איש כפר עכו אמר, משום ר' שמואל: שאילו היו ישראל חסרים עוד אחד, לא היו מקבלים את התורה.

וגללו את האבן, שמשם היו שומעים את הקול ושמעו עשרת הדברות.

והשיבו את האבן, (שמות כ): אתם ראיתם כי מן השמים דברתי וגו':

To emphasize the relevant part of the Medrash -

ונאספו שמה כל העדרים

ר' שמעון בן יהודה איש כפר עכו אמר, משום ר' שמואל: שאילו היו ישראל חסרים עוד אחד, לא היו מקבלים את התורה.

The Y'dei Moshe there explains

לפי דאיתא שאותיות התורה הם ס' רבוא נגד ס' רבוא נשמות ישראל על כן היו צריכים להיות דוקא במילואם ששים רבוא והרי מצינו מנחות ל א' בספר תורה שאם חסר אות אחת פסולה

Every single Jew at Mattan Torah was essential to Kabbalas HaTorah. If even one was missing, the Torah could not be given. Every letter corresponds to one Jew; you can't have a marriage with only one party; a Torah letter without a Jew whose Neshama resonates to that particular frequency is a dead and non-functional letter, and the Torah would be passul.  This can be seen in the Siman of Krias HaTorah - מנו ועצרו. Counting Klal Yisrael, as spoken about in Parshas Bamidbar, is essential to Kabbalas HaTorah. 

Let me make this clearer. Certainly, we see from here that every individual has a chelek in Torah, and that Torah is incomplete if anyone is not zocheh to his cheilek. But to me, there is a bigger chiddush here. Why were the shishim ribo necessary? It is certainly possible that this is a stratum of kedusha. You have a mezuman, an eidah/minyan, 22,000, and certainly 600,000, you have a step up in the darga of kedusha. One might say that this is why the shishim ribo were needed at Sinai, it was a critical mass, a quorum. . Or, like the Ramban says, because it includes all the permutations of human thought, Chacham HaRazim. The chidush here is that it was not so, it was not a matter of critical mass, or חכם הרזים. It simply is that every letter corresponded to an individual. Without that marriage, the letter was defective. We don't just passively receive the Torah - it is a dynamic relationship comprising two parts, the written Torah and the neshamos of Klal Yisrael.

It's not a matter of quantity, it's interrelationship, it's parallelism.

When Na'ami tried to discourage Rus from becoming a giyores, she told her that we have 613 mitzvos, and Rus answered עמך עמי. How were Rus's words responsive? Perhaps we can say that the Torah and the Mitzvos are not given to individuals, it was given to Klal Yisrael. Only Klal Yisrael as a whole can fulfill the entirety of the taryag, and only Klal Yisrael is fit for Kabbalas HaTorah- in this world, Klal Yisrael and the Torah are a unity.

It was not only the men that experienced this at Mattan Torah. The Ribono shel Olam gave us the din of prisha to ensure that the women were worthy of Kabalas HaTorah, no differently than the men. Whether the shishim ribo somehow includes the women, or that a man and a woman form a single unit, or, as the Pnei Yehoshua (Kiddushin 30a) suggests, we count על דרך מזה ומזה הם כתובים, I don't know. As the Chasam Sofer קובץ תשובות סימן נב says

"נשאלתי אם יש אתי לפרש הנמצא בספרי חצונים לרז"ל כי יש ששים רבוא אותיות לתורה, ואמרו כי ישראל ר"ת כן הוא, ועמדו למנין כל התנ"ך ואין בו כמו אלו.

תשובה. דברים הללו לא נמצאו בש"ס כי אם בספרי המקובלים, ואין לנו עסק בנסתרות ולא אתנו יודע עד מה, ואיך נעמוד למנין אותיות התורה. וכבר העידו חז"ל [קידושין ל' ע"א] שאין אנו בקיאין בחסרות ויתירות. 

And this vital and essential connection is not of merely historical interest, something that happened long ago in Midbar Sinai. The relationship of the Torah and Klal Yisrael is renewed every year, as if we are actually experiencing  a new Mattan Torah. This is true to the extent that there is a minhag to not do any surgical procedures before Shavuos, because the malachim were being mekatreig in order to prevent the gift of the Torah to the Jews, and that Kitrug happens every single year when the vows are renewed (see OC 468:9, Rema - ונהגו שלא להקיז דם בשום ערב יום טוב ואין לשנות, and MB sk38, (לח) שלא להקיז - דבערב שבועות יצא שד דשמו טבוח ואלו לא קיבלו ישראל את התורה הוי טבח להי לבשרייהו ולדמייהו וגזרו רבנן על כל עיו"ט משום ערב שבועות ושרעפי"ן שקורין באנקע"ס או קעפ זעצי"ן יש מתירין מלבד הו"ר שהוא יום הדין ועכ"פ בערב שבועות יש להחמיר.)  Every single Jew has a cheilek of Torah, and without his cheilek, the Torah is diminished.


I want to end with something the Maharsham says in his third introduction to his Teshuvos, something he heard in the name of the Nesivos.

שמעתי בשם הגאון מליסא ז"ל לפרש מש"כ כי לא דבר ריק הוא מכם כי הנה בתורה יש מקומות הכתובים ובזוה"ק ומדרשים דתיבת ישראל ר"ת יש ששים רבוא אותיות לתורה ועי׳ פני יהושע קידושין לי ובחידושי חת"ס סוף חולין מש"כ בזה ויש גם מקומות פנוים וריקנים בתורה כמו בין חומש לחומש ובין פרשה לפרשה ודומיהם אבל באמת לא ריק הוא כי גם שם מלא אותיות נסתרים וגניזים שאינם נראים לעין והענין כי יש נשמות ישראל הראויים להדבק באותיות התורה ויש מהם שאינם ראוים להדבק בהאותיות ומ"מ נמשך חיותם ממקום הריק שבתורה 

The spaces have kedusha too. Some are zocheh to correspond to a letter, others to a space. The spaces serve a vital purpose and give meaning to the written letters.

My son Shlomo added that if you see the story with Yaakov and Rachel as a remez to Mattan Torah, you should also see there that even with everything in place, you need mesiras nefesh and ahavas hatorah in order to bring the Torah from potential to actual. You need a יחד לב of מסירת נפש.
Breishis 29:10

ויהי כאשר ראה יעקב את־רחל בת־לבן אחי אמו ואת־צאן לבן אחי אמו ויגש יעקב ויגל את־האבן מעל פי הבאר וישק את־צאן לבן אחי אמו

I have to add something I saw at Reb Chaim Brown's website that adds beautifully to this idea.  This is what he says:

....this amazing Koznitzer Magid (at the end of Avodas Yisrael) should make your Yom Tov.  In the last perek of Avos R' Yehoshua ben Levi tells us that a bas kol echoes from Sinai every day bemoaning those who ignore Torah.  The Mishna describes these people using the pasuk, "Nezem zahav b'af chazir...," it is like a golden ring in the snout of a pig.  M'mah nafshacha, asks the Koznitzer, how does this analogy make sense?  If people are learning, then they are not dragging the gold ring through the mud; if they are not learning, then they don't have the gold ring to begin with!  They have nothing, no connection -- where's the gold ring?
The answer must be, says the Koznitzer Magid, that every Jew, from the day he/she is born, has a connection to Torah built into his/her DNA.  We're not born with a silver spoon in our mouths -- we are born with a gold ring, a nezem zahav, the beauty of Torah.  The Mishna is telling us that it's up to us to make the most of that innate connection.  We can either seize the opportunity and hear the call from Sinai, or we can end up dragging that gold ring through the mud.  

 That's exactly what I'm saying. Like it or not, every Jewish Neshama is related to a letter in the Torah, its own kinyan. If the person becomes a tzadik, wonderful! If he becomes a rasha, the yachas to Torah is still there, but nebach, he's dragging it through filth.

Bamidbar 3:1-2. Parents are Parents, Whether by Birth or Through Adoption כאילו ילדו and other "כאילו"s

This was originally posted in 2010.  It is one of the collaborative pieces that I enjoy so much, including contributions from great Unknown, Micha, Chaim B., Nosson Gertner, and Eli..  I've added a paragraph and made some modifications. Yesterday, I re-posted it under its original title, but Reb Micha, in a few wise and poignant comments, explained to me why the original title was not what I wanted or needed to say. Because I'm deleting the more recent posting, I'm reproducing Micha's recent comments at the end of this post.  I also added a few words from R Asher Weiss.

The passuk begins by saying "These are the generations of Moshe and Aharon," and then lists only Aharon's children, Nadav and Avihu.  Rashi says that from here we learn that one who teaches another's child Torah "Ke'ilu/כאילו" it is as if he fathered him.

We find a similar expression in Sanhedrin 19b (from Michal bas Shaul) and Megilla 13a (from Basya bas Pharaoh) where it says

כל המגדל יתום ויתומה בתוך ביתו מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו ילדו 

that one who raises an orphan in his  home "it is as if he fathered him."  The concept is the same, but Chazal derive the two ideas from different pesukim.

One has to wonder, what does "כאילו/as if" mean?  Is this homiletics or is it a statement of halacha?  Is it meant to be taken at face value?  Do Chazal really mean that if you raise an orphan, or teach a child Torah, that he is your child?

Reb Shlomo Kluger, in his first comment in Even HaEzer, says that this depends on a machlokes between the Taz and the Drisha in Yoreh Dei'ah 242 regarding the concept of מורא רבך כמורא שמיים.  The Drisha says that the Choph hadimyon, the "Ke'ilu," "as if," does not necessarily indicate real parity.  It just means that the one has certain aspects of the other.  The Taz, on the other hand, says that Ke'ilu must be understood to mean halachic parity. The Chochmas Shelomo says that the same machlokes will apply to Chazal's dictum המגדל יתום ויתומה בתוך ביתו מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו ילדו.  According to the Drisha, one who raises an orphan would not thereby fulfill the mitzva of Pru Urvu, the mitzvah to have children.   But according to the Taz, one who raises an orphan fulfills the mitzvah of Pru Urvu.  (He says more there; it's worth reading.)

--Avrohom said that he finds it hard to understand that megadel yasom could fulfil pirya verivya, because that  mitzva is generally related to increasing the number of people in the world.  I responded that raising a child means that you're keeping him alive, and just as bringing people into the world is a mitzva, so too keeping them in the world is the same mitzva- as indicated in the Tanchuma I bring below regarding the relationship between Moshe Rabbeinu and Yisro.


--great unknown, in the first comment below, pointed out an interesting thing- that Reb Shlomo Kluger himself was an orphan raised by the Dubner Magid (which is a nice story, see here.  He did learn by the Dubner- see here- but he was a talmid, and although he was an orphan at that point, he was not the Dubner's foster child.  Apparently, his uncle took him in, or arranged for him to learn by various rabbeim/yeshivos.).  Chaim B notes that Rav Amiel in his Middos Le'cheker Halacha vol. III has a lengthy disquisition on the permutations of "ke'ilu" and K' in Chazal.  (Good luck reading it.  Don't expect the same lucidity as Drashos el Ami.  To me it reads like a hybrid of Reb Shimon Shkop's lomdus and Rav Kook's prose.)

The Taz cannot be taken too far.  Obviously, there is no din erva/prohibition of incest midoraysa with an adopted child.  Ugly and depraved, yes, but incest, no. Incest depends on a biological relationship, and a virtual child is not a biological child.  The din of ke'ilu only applies to the relationship between these two individuals, not to external ramifications of that relationship.  Also, I doubt that Reb Shlomo Kluger would say the Taz holds that one who teaches a child Torah is mekayeim Pru Urvu.  But who knows?  After all, the original Taz said his shittah regarding the obligation to honor and fear a teacher, which he says follows from the Chazal that one who teaches is like a father.

On the other hand, Reb Shlomo Kluger's pshat in the Taz would certainly apply the dinim of Arrur Makleh Aviv and Missas Beis Din by Makeh and Mekalel to an adoptive parent if not for Ein onshin min hadin.  But at least there would be an arrur for Makleh.

Teenagers in the 90s had a sarcastic expression, "as if." The phrase conveys the absurdity of something that another person has alleged. So it turns out that "as if" is tolui in the machlokes between the Drisha and the Taz.

Practical relevance of this issue:

• Many poskim say that there is no issur of yichud with an adopted child because their emotional relationship is that of a parent and a child (Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igros EH 4:64:2, but only so long as the adoptive parent is married; and Rav Eliezer Waldenburg in Tzitz Eliezer 6:40:21, but only if the adoption took place before a girl was 3 and a boy 9 years old.  The osrim are the Chazon Ish, the Steipler, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, and Rav Vosner.  Ask your CLOR!) 
• Reb Aharon Soloveichik once said that as a young rav, he was asked who should walk the Chassan to the Chupah- the natural or the adoptive parent.  He said that the adoptive parent should walk him down.  He said that he took a lot of criticism for his advice, but he was steadfast. 
• Similarly, there are poskim that say that when getting an aliyah, or writing a shtar like a kesuva, the adopted child may write "ben [adoptive father's name]".  (Others disagree: see Choshen Mishpat 42 in the Gaon #42.  Reb Moshe in EH I:99 says you should write the biological truth, and if we do not know who his father is, you should write "ben a person whose name is not known, and raised by [adoptive parent's name], although when you read it under the chuppah, you can make concessions to avoid embarrassing the person.  Ask your LOR!)
• This really expands the previous point, but deserves a paragraph of its own.  Micha, in a comment to the original post, pointed out that calling a child "Ploni ben adoptive father" gets complicated where one is e.g., a Kohen and the other is not, and poskim that generally allow "Ploni ben adoptive father" change their position in such cases.  I don't know why, though.  Unfortunately, there are plenty of people whose fathers were kohanim and who themselves are not kohanim, due to having been the product of a marriage prohibited to a kohen.  Besides the frum ones, I know a fellow named Christopher Cohen, a lawyer.  His mother is not Jewish.
• ➜  I was at a wedding where the biological father had converted to Judaism after his daughter, the kallah, was born.  This is a classic example of a problem in the kesuva.  You can't write that the kallah is his daughter, because al pi din, they're not related.  On the other hand, he raised her, so you have those poskim that allow writing the foster father's name.  I was not the mesader, baruch Hashem, but I got a lot of grief for not making a tumul about the problematic kesuva.  Why didn't I?  For two reasons.  First, because if I had, the chassan would have said מה לי ולצרה הזאת and gone home with his kallah without any kesuva.  Second, because although as I said most poskim hold not to use the foster father's name, an interesting argument can be made to allow it in this case, where he's the biological father and he raised her too!
• By the way, Rav Sherira Gaon says that Abbaya of the Gemara was not really named Abbaya, but Nachmeini, after his grandfather. His father had died before Abbaye was born, and his mother died at child-birth, and he was raised by his uncle Rabbah bar Nachmeini. Rabbah did not want to call his nephew Nachmeini, which was the name of his father; he therefore called him "Abbaya," meaning, "my father." Others say that Abbaya stands for Asher Becha Yerucham Yasom.  Rashi, though, says that Abbaya was his real name, and his uncle called him Nachmeini.  According to Rashi, then, it could be said that Rabbah held that the adoptive parent has certain naming rights.
• But who needs to speculate about Abbaya?  Moshe Rabbeinu was raised by Bisya bas Pharaoh (see link above to Megilla 13a,) and it was she that gave him the name by which we know him.  Reb Chaim Shmuelevitz says that the Torah identifies him by his Egyptian name davka to teach us about Hakaras Hatov.  True, in that case she didn't only adopt him, she saved him from death, while most adoptions are not matters of life or death.  But once you start splitting hairs in the sugya of Hakaras Hatov, you are going down a dangerous path.  Even when you help a person in need, the Tanchuma in Shemos by Moshe and Yisro says

 ״בשעה שאמר לי׳ הקב״ה למשה, ועתה לך אשלחך אל פרעה, אמר לי׳

משה, אדון העולם, איני יכול מפני שקבלני יתרו ופתח לי את פתח ביתו

ואני עמו כבן, ומי שהוא פותח פתח לחבירו נפשו הוא חייב לו . . . ולא

עוד, אלא כל הפותח לחבירו חייב בכבודו יותר מאביו ומאמו״

When Hashem told Moshe to go down to Pharoah, Moshe said "Master of the world, I can't, because Yisro received me and opened his house to me and I am like a son to him, and if a person opens his house to his fellow, he owes him his life....and furthermore, any person who opens his house to his fellow, he is obligated to honor him more than his own mother and father.
It seems to me that an adoptive parent is a perfect example of this Medrash--

פתח לי את פתח ביתו ואני עמו כבן....נפשו הוא חייב לו

He opened the door of his house to me, and I am like a son.....he owes him his life.

Come to think of it, it turns out that Moshe Rabbeinu was twice taken in and protected like a child- by Basya bas Pharaoh and by Yisro.  

**********************

Moving to another case where Chazal said "Ke'ilu," the Gemara in Menachos 110a says that one who studies the parsha of a korban "it is as if he sacrificed the korban."  Would the Taz say that if a person became obligated to bring a chatas for some inadvertent sin, and then he read and learned the parsha of korban chatas, and then the Beis Hamikdash was rebuilt, that he would not have to bring the Chatas?  And what if you were lazy, and while the Beis Hamikdash was standing you decided to stay home and read the parsha.  Are you pattur?  I would say that this, too, depends on the shittos of the Drisha and the Taz.

The Yad David in Menachos says this question is the subject of the machlokes between Reish Lakish and Rava there.  According to Reish Lakish, learning Torah accomplishes a similar atonement to that of bringing a Korban only during a time when there is no Beis ha'Mikdash and one cannot bring a real Korban. According to Rava, even when the Beis ha'Mikdash is standing, learning Torah atones exactly as if one had brought a Korban.

The Gan Raveh in Parshas Tzav brings the Binyan Ariel who says that when Hashem told Moshe, "Tzav Es Aharon v'Es Banav Leimor Zos Toras ha'Olah" it means that the Kohanim should make sure that they teach the people the rule that whenever they learn the laws of the Korban, it is as if they have offered an Olah, even though telling this to the people will surely decrease the number of Korbanos brought to the Beis ha'Mikdash.  Despite the resulting monetary loss to the Kohanim (who receive the hides of the korban Olah and much of the flesh of other korbanos), the Kohanim were enjoined to let people know about this halacha.

See a nice discussion of the din amira for a korban in the first piece in the Har Tzvi. who addresses the Beis Yosef that says that amira is mechaper "ktzas," and Reb Yishmael ben Elisha in Shabbos 12b (I will bring a chattas shmeinah, mashma that amira wouldn't patter him.)  Also,  I once saw a svara (from Reb Refoel Hamburger, and a similar but slightly different slant from Reb Chaim Ozer's cousin from Omaha, Reb Tzvi Hirsch Grodzinsky in his sefer Likutei Tzvi, about whom Reb Aharon Soloveichick said that the Brisker Rov said that he was considered the bigger lamden of the two,)  that amira doesn't work where there are other aspects of the korban that cannot be fulfilled through amira, such as "Kohanim ochlim ubaalim miskaprim."  Your amira does not make a kohen's achila.  Kind of like the Beis Halevi on Kol Rom.  Also, great unknown pointed out in a private communication that it would not work for a nazir, because amira does duplicate or parallel the Matan Behonos.  Eli in the comments sends us a link to a beautiful piece from the Cheshek Shlomo that deals with this.

A slight digression:  I had this in my journal, but forgot about it until Chaim B reminded me.

The Magen Avraham in Siman 1 says that you should stand when you say the parshas korban, because avoda is be’amidah.  Reb Chaim Kanievsky brings a Yalkut Shimoni in Yirmiah that says that a min asked someone, how can you believe the nevi’im when the navi says that the Kohanim and Leviim will do avodah forever, but you can't deny the reality that the churban stopped the avodah, and he was answered that amiras parsha by Kohanim and Leviim is like hakrava.  The pirush there, which happens to be written by the Magen Avraham, indeed says that when kohanim and leviim say parshas korban it is as if they brought it, which is apparently different from what he himself says in Shulchan Aruch!
    The Chofetz Chaim in his hakdama to his son in law’s Avodas Hakorbonos brings the same medrash and is docheh the raiya that it only applies to kohanim, and says that it is mamash like hakrava no matter who says it.  The son in law brings the same medrash and skips the words kohanim and leviim!  How do you like that!
    But there are also problems with the Yalkut itself.  First of all, this can’t be accepted as our derech, because then only kohanim should be saying the parshas hakorban, which is something weird that nobody has ever said in print.
    Second, R’ Matisyahu Solomon brings from the Chazon Yechezkel that the pshat in “neshalmah parim sfaseinu” is that we bring to ourselves the zchus of the korbanos that were brought at the time of the Beis Hamikdosh.  R’ Solomon connects this to the din of “pokeid avon avos ahl banim...v’oseh chesed l’ohavai...” which teaches that zchus avos comes to descendants that are “ocheiz b’ma’asei avosam.”  Here too, our saying the parshoh of korbanos brings us the zchus of our ancestors’ korbanos.  If we take this mehalach at face value, it is not like the shittah brought by the Magen Avraham that you have to stand during amiras parshas korbanos, and also it is not like the Yalkut that says that the amiras haparsha is like hakrovoh only when a kohen says it.
    However, we can be meyasheiv all these kashes.  There are two dinim: the zchus of amiras haparsha- or the zchus avos we create by saying the parshah- can be either the zchus of the ma’aseh hakrava or the zchus of having a korban brought on your behalf, the rei’ach nicho’ach aspect of the korban.  If you say that the zchus avos is the zchus of their ma’aseh hakravah, that just as they were makriv, it is as if we were makriv, (and not the zchus of the korban,) so this only is legitimate and helpful if the person is a kohen whose avodah is kosher.  But there is also a din that saying the parshah brings the zchus of the rei’ach nicho’ach of the korban, i.e., that it is as if a korban was brought for us, then even a Yisroel will benefit.  And there is no reason to think that one din is more mistavra than the other, and both dinim are true, so a kohen’s amira is as if he was makriv, and a yisroel’s amirah is as if he brought a korban and it was nikrav on his behalf.  (This question might revolve around the Gemara in Nazir and Kiddushin about Shluchi de'Rachmana or Shluchi didan.)
    This is meyasheiv all three kashes: the kashe on the Chofetz Chaim’s son in law (because the Yalkut that limits it to kohanim is the response to the min that said that avodah is boteil, and the proper response is that through the amirah of kohanim the avodah is eternal), the kashe that nobody limits amiras korbonos to kohanim (because although kohanim may have the additional aspect of the zchus of avodah, everyone has the zchus of the kiyum hamitzvah of bringing the korban), and the kashe on the Chazon Yechezkel from the Magen Avraham (because R’ Abramsky is talking about the zchus of the rei’ach nicho’ach, not the zchus of the avodah).   

Another interesting ramification of this discussion: The mitzva of Birkas Kohanim, according to Reb Yaakov Emden, is only de'oraysa when recited after the hakrava of a korban tzibur.  Therefore, he says, the duchening we do today is derabanan.  The Mishna Berura argues, but doesn't address the pasuk that is mashma like RYE.  So Reb Yakov Karliner answers in his Mishkenos Yaakov OC 66 that this is why we say "'ve'se'erav alecha asiroseinu ke'olah u'chi'korban" before duchenning- because our duchening is based on the parity between tefilla and korbanos.  Only because ve'se'erav can we duchen.  (His brother, the Keren Ora, says the same teretz in Maseches Sota in the sugya of birkas kohanim.)

I know about the Baal Hatanya in #37, and I don't want to put it in here, because it is not my mesora.  So please don't send me comments about his pshat in the Gemara in Menachos, thank you.

Next ke'ilu:  Shomeia Ke'oneh.
Rashi  in Sukkah 38b says that one who is in the middle of Shmoneh Esrei when the tzibbur is saying Kaddish or Kedushah should stop and listen quietly, thus answering through Shomeia Ke'oneh. Rabbeinu Tam and the Ri in Tosfos Brachos 21b ask on Rashi that if shomeia is really ke'oneh, then it should have a din hefsek.  (They say that Rashi is wrong ahl pi svara, but "gadol haminhag," so go ahead and do like Rashi anyway.)  Here, too, we see a machlokes as to the extent of Ke'.  (There are many other ways to answer Tosfos' kashe without saying that Rashi holds like the Drisha, though.  Example: The Tzlach in Psachim 56a holds that a whisper is not a hefsek, like in Baruch Shem in Krias Shma.  So even if Rashi holds like the Taz, the ke'oneh would not be worse than a whisper.)


This is getting too long.  Unless you or I can think of a really interesting machlokes about another ke'ilu, that will be it.  Nathan- thanks for mentioning Ke'ilu hu yatza mimitzrayim, but it doesn't say "yotzei," it says "yatza."

But considering that Shavuos is around the corner, here's one good thing to end with.  Kiddushin 30a.

״אמר ריב״ל כל המלמד את בן בנו תורה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו קבלה מהר סיני שנאמר והודעתם לבניך ולבני בניך וסמיך ליה יום אשר עמדת לפני ה׳ אלהיך בחורב

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The following are the comments from the deleted version of this post, when it was titled "A Foster Parent is Like a Natural Parent."

Micha BergerMay 21, 2014 at 5:24 AM

Language quibble: Foster parenting is a short-time job, filling in for the parents while they or the family get help and is reunited. Adoption is a way to graft a child permanently into the family tree. Different things entirely.

As for my comment: lemaaseh my adopted children as well as those my wife gave birth to are simply "ben Mikhah Shemuel". (Foster children of course were not.) And that includes both Jews by birth and ones converted upon adoption. I also queue the gabbai to say "ve'es ishto ... ve'es kol benei veisam" rather than "kol yotzei chalatzeha".

WRT the latter, one step in conversion of a qatan is that the beis din appoints someone responsible for the child's education. So there is a place to acknowledge the adoption Jewishly during the conversion process, by having beis din formally appoint the parents at the child's beris. (Which we did not do; last time we adopted a non-Jewish child was 25 years ago. I hadn't thought of it yet.)

Eliezer EisenbergMay 21, 2014 at 6:08 AM

I should have realized that. I wish you had corrected me four years ago about foster/adoptive. The reason I chose foster was that it is shorter, and the term adoptive is an odd and distracting form of grammar. I'm going to have to change it and probably re-post it instead of just correcting it..

I just re-read your old comment, and again found it poignant that your adopted child's non-Jewish birth mother attended the bar mitzva.

You have married children. Did your mesader kiddushin know what to do with the kesuva?

Micha BergerMay 21, 2014 at 8:16 AM

None of the children I adopted are married. It's not that hard of an inyan that given the time between being asked to be mesader qiddushin and the night of the actual wedding they couldn't come to a pesaq. It's not like the question is going to come up last minute.

Side-note, nothing to do with your discussion: A foster parents needs to remember they are a "foster parent". Some of my saddest periods were when I built of dreams of eventually adopting a child who was then returned to his parents' custody. (E.g. Mitchel Steinberg / Travis Smigiel. Who would have pictured that a child whose sibling was beaten to death by their father wouldn't have been legally adopted and still had a mother with custody?)

Parents through adoption are just that -- parents. Thinking of oneself as an "adoptive parent", that the relationship is any more about chessed than any other parenting, or that adoption is more relevant than whether or not the child entered the family by c-section, isn't fair to the child. A child needs parents, not benefactors. And so, the really unwieldy but more accurate title would be "Parents are Parents, Whether by Birth Or Through Adoption".

***************************************

From R Usher Weiss:

שאלה:

האם בן מאומץ חייב בכבוד הוריו המאמצים

תשובה:

למרות שאין עליו חיוב ומצווה מדין "כיבוד אב ואם" שהרי אינם הוריו האמתיים, מ"מ חייב הוא לכבדם משום שהם גידלו אותו.

מקורות:

בחינוך מצוה ל"ו כתב משרשי המצוות כיבוד אב ואס הוא שיכיר ויגמול חסד עם מי שעשה אתו טובה ולא יהיה נקל ומתנכר וכפוי טובה שזו מדה רעה ומאוסה בתכלית לפני אלוקים ואנשים וכו' ולפי"ז אף בנדון המאומץ כיון מאמציו הטיבו עמו באמוצו הרי שיש לו לכבדם כהוגן.

ובשדה חמד מערכת אבילות סי' קנ"ו מביא מהמדרש (שמות רבה ד') בשעה שאמר הקב"ה למשה לכה ואשלחך אל פרעה אמר רבש"ע איני יכול מפני שקבלני יתרו ופתח לי ביתו ואני עמו כבן ולא עוד אלא שכל הפותח לחבירו חייב בכבודו יותר מאביו ומאמו. ושם מביא עוד ראיה מהנביא אלישע שאחר שנלקח אליהו לא הלך לביתו לאביו ולאמו להחיותם כמו שהחיה את בן האכסניא שלו לדעת השדי חמד אין סתירה בין מדרש זה לבין הגמ' סוטה כי אמנם מצות כיבוד אב ואם איננה מצות עשה המוטל על המתגדל ואולם מדרך אנושית חייב לכבד את המגדל שכן הוא דרך העולם להכיר ולהוקיר בהערכה מי שקיבל ממנו טובה.

וכתב בשו"ת אגרות משה יו"ד ח"ב סי' ק"ל דבכלל ענין מצות כיבוד אב שלא יהיה כפוי טובה להוריו שהביאוהו לעולם הזה ולפיה מש"כ הר"מ שהגר נוהג באביו מקצת כבוד הוא כדי שלא ייחשב בעיני הבריות לכפוי טובה ומסתבר שענין זה שייך אף בבן מאומץ שלא יהיה כפוי טובה להם שמגדלים אותו ועי' בשו"ת שאילת יעקב ח"א פ"א שכתב שעיקר הכיבוד הוא משום שגידלוהו ולא מצד שילדותו עי"ש.

UPDATE:

I realized a simple thing, so simple that it's embarrassing to have missed it until now.  Why would I need to prove that adoption is as real and deep as biological relations? Isn't every marriage chosen and not a product of a biological process? If you can understand the power of the relationship between husband and wife, it should be no harder to understand the power of the relationship between adoptive parents and children. 

Bamidbar 4:49. Pidyon Haben with a Shaliach

פדיון הבן על ידי שליח

Synopsis:
Argument among poskim whether the mitzva of Pidyon Haben can be done through an agent, or has to be done personally.
Our parsha seems to state that it could be done through a shaliach, in that Moshe brought it to Aharon on behalf of the Bechors.
Answers that distinguish our parsha from general pidyon:
Our parsha was a mere delivery of money, which everyone allows through a shliach as long as the father personally says the nusach of pidyon; or
Moshe had the status of a Kohen at that time, and he was the podeh; or
everyone would agree that a kohen can receive on behalf of another kohen; or
the pidyon of the Midbar was singular and had different rules than the pidyon we do now.

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The Rama (YD 305:10) brings a Rivash that one cannot do Pidyon Haben via an agent.  The Rivash is in the Teshuvos (131), but he does not say this explicitly.  He brings the Rambam that says that the form of Bracha when a father redeems his son is "Ahl pidyon" but when a person redeems himself it is "Lifdos".  The Rivash explains that as far as the father is concerned, the mitzva could be done by another person, namely the son himself when he grows up, and for a mitzva that could be done by another person the proper bracha is "ahl."  `When the father was not podeh the son, and the son grew up and is podeh himself, that pidyon can not be done by anyone else at all, and in such cases, the language of the bracha is "li..", not "ahl."   We see that the Rivash holds that Pidyon cannot be done by a third party, a shliach.

Everyone argues with the Rama/Rivash.  As the Aruch Hashulchan (sk 5) says, וכל גדולי עולם דחו דבריו and that all the poskim say that one does not have to be concerned about the Rama's shitta here at all. The Gaon there says that the whole thing is an error and that it's not even in the Rivash.  (I don't know why he says that.  Look at the link.  It looks like it's there.  Either he had a different Rivash or he holds that's not how to learn the Rivash.)

If  you know the Aruch Hashulchan, you know that with that kind of setup, he usually takes the side of the chiddush.  Indeed, the Aruch Hashulchan does say that there is a strong basis for saying that Pidyon cannot be done by a shliach, and that one should very much avoid doing so.

The Aruch Hashulchan also says that some people say pshat that even the Rama agrees that you can send the money via shliach, and he only meant that the father himself needs to say the nusach of pidyon.  "Some people" happens to be, among others, Reb Akiva Eiger there in Shulchan Aruch.  But the Aruch Hashulchan disagrees with that pshat in the Rama, and holds that the Rama prohibits using a Shliach even for the giving of the pidyon money to the Kohen. 

So just like the shittas haRosh (Chulin 6:8) about Bris Millah, we have a serious argument about shlichus by Pidyon.  The issue of what is called a mitzva she'b'gufo, starting with the Tosfos HaRid brought in the Ketzos in 382 and onward, is endless.  But what is interesting is that in the first case of Pidyon, in our parsha, did the people deliver the money to the kohanim themselves?  No.  They did not. Bamidbar 4:49-51

וַיִּקַּח מֹשֶׁה אֵת כֶּסֶף הַפִּדְיוֹם מֵאֵת הָעֹדְפִים עַל פְּדוּיֵי הַלְוִיִּם מֵאֵת בְּכוֹר בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לָקַח אֶת הַכָּסֶף חֲמִשָּׁה וְשִׁשִּׁים וּשְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת וָאֶלֶף בְּשֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ  וַיִּתֵּן מֹשֶׁה אֶת כֶּסֶף הַפְּדֻיִם לְאַהֲרֹן וּלְבָנָיו עַל פִּי ה' כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה' אֶת מֹשֶׁה.

 Moshe Rabbeinu took the money and gave it to Aharon and sons.  It seems clear from these psukim that Shlichus works by pidyon haben.  I found that the Baal HaHafla'ah in Kesuvos 74 and in his Panim Yafos on the Chumash points this out as well, as does the Malbim here.

Is this a kashe on the Rivash?  According to Reb Akiva Eiger that I mentioned above, and the Hafla'ah, it is not shver on the Rivash, because they hold that even the Rivash allows mere delivery of money via shliach, so long as the father says the nusach of pidyon.  But the Aruch Hashulchan has some explaining to do, because he holds that even the delivery of the money has to be done by the father and not a shliach.

We can defend the Aruch Hashulchan by using the pshat which the Hafla'ah proposes but immediately rejects: that Shlichus does not work, and Moshe Rabbeinu took the money not as a shliach, but rather in his position as Kohen Gadol (as he is described in Zevachim 101b.)  The Hafla'a rejected this because of the simple reading of the psukim in Chumash, which he understands to mean that Aharon's receipt was the pidyon, not Moshe's, and that Moshe served as a shliach, not as a podeh. 

But even if the Hafla'ah is right, and Moshe acted as a shliach, I would still say that there is no kashe on the Aruch Hashulchan from here.  Even if Shlichus doesn't work, that's only when it's not beyado, or in a case of  מיגו דזכי לנפשיה.  Since Moshe could have taken it, but instead chose to give it to Aharon and family, shlichus does work here.

(Note: migo and beyado, which I am using to explain why shlichus worked here although it doesn't usually work by pidyon, is debatable.  Our problem is not shlichus of the kohen to take the money, it is with shlichus of the father to give the money.  So one might argue that migo and beyado wouldn't help.  The only migo and beyado would be if someone was beyado to be the father, not to be the Kohen.  But I can live with this kashe.)

In fact, although the Hafla'ah rejects this option, others, including Reb Dovid Soloveichik (as brought in the Shai Latorah,) say that the pidyon was effected as soon as Moshe Rabbeinu took the money.  This would answer the kashe on the Aruch Hashulchan. 

But we have to examine this solution, that Moshe took the pidyon as Kohen Gadol.  I don't know whether the din of pidyon by giving money to a Kohen is a din in Aharon and sons, the family that took over the avodah, which would exclude Moshe Rabbeinu, or a din in Kehuna, in actual ability to do avodah, which would include him. This probably is related to the Macholkes Rishonim whether a woman Kohenes can take the five Selaim to be podeh a child.  (Rambam 1 Bikkurim 10- No, / Rashi Kiddushin 8a and Tosfos Pesachim 49b- Yes.)


Rabbi Dr. NJS, wrote to inform me that the Netziv in passuk 50 says that the fact that they gave all the money to Moshe and he gave it as a sum to the Kohanim, which eliminated tovas hana'a, shows that it was a hora'as sha'ah and so no proof can be derived ledoros.  Reb Nachum also expressed his consternation that the Aruch Hashulchan quoted neither his brother in law (the Netziv during his first marriage to Rabbi Epstein's sister) nor his son in law (the Netziv during his second marriage to Rabbi Epstein's daughter) on this matter.  But everything balances out in the end.  The Aruch Hashulchan's own son, the Torah Temimah, never quotes his father.

He then suggested that instead of  saying "hora'as sha'a," one might suggest an explanation for the difference between this and the regular pidyon.  It was a demographic exchange.  Yes, of course they had a lottery, and those who did not have a corresponding Levi had to take money out of  their pockets and pay, but this was still primarily a threshold event which exchanged one group for another, and not primarily an individual obligation, as it became afterwards.  Therefore, the money was davka given as a sum and it was given davka through a shliach.  I was not willing to take achrayus for his pshat, but he showed me that in the Ramban (Shemos 13:11), the fundamental difference between Pidyon Midbar and Pidyon Doros is inescapable, to wit:

ועל דרך הפשט קדש לי כל בכור, כל הנמצאים בישראל היום, כי בעבור שפדאם ממות בהכותו בארץ מצרים ציוה שיהיו קדושים לו לעבוד את עבודת ה' לכל אשר יצווה בהם, ולא ציוה להם עתה פדיון עד שהחליפם בלווים וציוה בפדיון העודפים (במדבר ג מו), אבל המצווה בנולדים לא נהגה במדבר, וציוה כי כאשר יבאו אל הארץ תנהג באדם ובבהמה ובפטר חמור וציוה בפדיונם לדורות:

It is clear that the Ramban holds that pidyon of those that were in Mitzrayim did not go into effect until the exchange for the Leviim, whereas the pidyon of those that were notT in Mitzrayim was slated to go into effect when they came to Eretz Yisrael, irrespective of the exchange for the Leviim.  There are no two ways to read it.

I found that the Ibn Ezra (3:45) also says like the Netziv, that the Pidyon in the Midbar was a singular event with halachos that are different than Pidyon Le'Doros.

Both the Netziv and the Ibn Ezra seem to be inconsistent with the Medrash Rabba here (only male Kohanim) and the Gemara in Menachos 37a-b (two-headed child), which use the Pidyon Midbar as a source for dinim of Pidyon Doros.

Briefly,

• Rivash- no shlichus on Pidyon Haben.
• Shver from Pidyon in Midbar via Moshe Rabbeinu.
• Some answer that this was mere delivery of money, which even Rivash allows, as long as father personally says nusach of Pidyon.
• Others say Rivash would not allow this either, so kashe remains.

Three possible answers:

•  That Moshe took pidyon not as shliach, but he was the Podeh as Kohen Gadol (which raises interesting lomdishe questions, and might be related to issue of a Bas Kohen taking pidyon money).
• That even if Moshe didn't take as Kohen Gadol, and Aharon was the Podeh, but since Moshe could have been the Podeh as Kohen Gadol, even the Rivash would agree he can be a shliach (which also raises interesting lomdishe questions about migo and b'yado).
• Or, that Pidyon Midbar was different than Pidyon leDoros (which is not like the pashtus of the Medrash and the Gemara in Menachos).

~

Bamidbar 3:1-2. A Foster Parent is Like a Natural Parent

The passuk begins by saying "These are the generations of Moshe and Aharon," and then lists only Aharon's children, Nadav and Avihu.  Rashi says that from here we learn that one who teaches another's child Torah "Ke'ilu" it is as if he fathered him.

We find a similar expression in Sanhedrin 19b, where it says that one who raises an orphan in his  home "it is as if he fathered him."  The concept is the same, but Chazal derive the two ideas from different pesukim.

One has to wonder, what does "as if" mean?  Is this a homiletic encomium, or is it a statement of halacha?  Is it meant to be taken at face value?  Do Chazal really mean that if you raise an orphan, or teach a child Torah, that he is your child?

Reb Shlomo Kluger, in his first comment in Even HaEzer, says that this depends on a machlokes between the Drisha and the Taz in Yoreh Dei'ah 242.  The Drisha says that "Ke'ilu," "as if," does not indicate real parity.  It just means that the one has certain aspects of the other.  Therefore, according to the Drisha, one who raises an orphan would not thereby fulfill the mitzva of Pru Urvu, the mitzvah to have children.  The Taz, on the other hand, says that Ke'ilu must be taken seriously, that it means actual halachic parity.  Therefore, says Reb Shlomo Kluger, according to the Taz, one who raises an orphan fulfills the mitzvah of Pru Urvu.  (He says more there; it's worth reading.)  

great unknown, in the first comment below, pointed out an interesting thing- that Reb Shlomo Kluger himself was an orphan raised by the Dubner Magid (which is a nice story, see here.  He did learn by the Dubner- see here- but he was a talmid, not a foster child).  Chaim B notes that Rav Amiel in his Middos Le'cheker Halacha vol. III has a very lengthy disquisition on the permutations of "ke'ilu" and K' in Chazal.  It's available on Hebrewbooks.org.  (Good luck reading it.  Don't expect the same style as Drashos el Ami.  To me it reads like a hybrid of Reb Shimon Shkop's lomdus written in Rav Kook's prose.)

The Taz cannot be taken too far.  Obviously, there is no din erva/prohibition of incest midoraysa with an adopted child.  Ugly and depraved, yes. Incest, no. Incest depends on a biological relationship, and a virtual child is not a biological child.  The din of ke'ilu only applies to the relationship between these two individuals, not to external ramifications of that relationship.  Also, I doubt that Reb Shlomo Kluger would say the Taz holds that one who teaches a child Torah is mekayeim Pru Urvu.  But who knows?  After all, the original Taz said his shittah regarding the obligation to honor and fear a teacher, which he says follows from the Chazal that one who teaches is like a father.

On the other hand, Reb Shlomo Kluger's Taz would certainly hold that the dinim of Arrur Makleh Aviv and Missas Beis Din by Makeh and Mekalel would apply to an adoptive parent if not for Ein onshin min hadin.  But at least there would be an arrur for Makleh.

Teenagers in the 90s had a sarcastic expression, "as if." The phrase conveys the absurdity of something that another person has alleged. As you see, "as if" is a machlokes between the Drisha and the Taz. 

Practical relevance of this issue:

• Many poskim say that there is no issur of yichud with an adopted child because their emotional relationship is that of a parent and a child (Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igros EH 4:64:2, but only so long as the adoptive parent is married; and Rav Eliezer Waldenburg in Tzitz Eliezer 6:40:21, but only if the adoption took place before a girl was 3 and a boy 9 years old.  The osrim are the Chazon Ish, the Steipler, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, and Rav Vosner.  Ask your LOR!) 
• Reb Aharon Soloveichik once said that as a young rav, he was asked who should walk the Chassan to the Chupah- the natural or the adoptive parent.  He said that the adoptive parent should walk him down.  He said that he took a lot of criticism for his advice, but he was steadfast. 
• Similarly, there are poskim that say that when getting an aliyah, or writing a shtar like a kesuva, the adopted child may write "ben [adoptive father's name]".  (Others disagree: see Choshen Mishpat 42 in the Gaon #42.  Reb Moshe in EH I:99 says you should write the biological truth, and if we do not know who his father is, you should write "ben a person whose name is not known, and raised by [adoptive parent's name], although when you read it under the chuppah, you can make concessions to avoid embarrassing the person.  Ask your LOR!)
• This really expands the previous point, but deserves a paragraph of its own.  Micha, in the second comment, points out that calling a child "Ploni ben adoptive father" gets complicated where one is e.g., a Kohen and the other is not, and poskim that generally allow "Ploni ben adoptive father" change their position in such cases.  I don't know why, though.  Unfortunately, there are plenty of people whose fathers were kohanim and who themselves are not kohanim, due to having been the product of a marriage prohibited to a kohen.  Besides the frum ones, I know a fellow named Christopher Cohen, a lawyer.  His mother is not Jewish.
• ➜  I was at a wedding where the biological father was a convert, and his conversion took place after his daughter, the kallah, was born.  This is a classic example of a problem in the kesuva.  You can't write that the kallah is his daughter, because al pi din, they're not related.  On the other hand, he raised her, so you have those poskim that allow writing the foster father's name.  Although as I said most poskim hold not like that, an interesting argument can be made to allow it in this case, where he's the biological father and he raised her.
• By the way, Rav Sherira Gaon says that Abbaya of the Gemara was not really named Abbaya, but Nachmeini, after his grandfather. His father had died before Abbaye was born, and his mother died at child-birth, and he was raised by his uncle Rabbah bar Nachmeini. Rabbah did not want to call his nephew Nachmeini, which was the name of his father; he therefore called him "Abbaya," meaning, "my father." Others say that Abbaya stands for Asher Becha Yerucham Yasom.  Rashi, though, says that Abbaya was his real name, and his uncle called him Nachmeini.  According to Rashi, then, it could be said that Rabbah held that the adoptive parent has certain naming rights.
• But who needs to speculate about Abbaya?  Moshe Rabbeinu was raised by Bisya bas Pharaoh, and it was she that gave him the name by which we know him.  Reb Chaim Shmuelevitz says that the Torah identifies him by his Egyptian name davka to teach us about Hakaras Hatov.  True, in that case she didn't only adopt him, she saved him from death, while most adoptions are not matters of life or death.  But once you start splitting hairs in the sugya of Hakaras Hatov, you are going down a dangerous path.  Even when you help a person in need, the Tanchuma in Shemos by Moshe and Yisro says

 ״בשעה שאמר לי׳ הקב״ה למשה, ועתה לך אשלחך אל פרעה, אמר לי׳

משה, אדון העולם, איני יכול מפני שקבלני יתרו ופתח לי את פתח ביתו

ואני עמו כבן, ומי שהוא פותח פתח לחבירו נפשו הוא חייב לו . . . ולא

עוד, אלא כל הפותח לחבירו חייב בכבודו יותר מאביו ומאמו״

 

When Hashem told Moshe to go down to Pharoah, Moshe said "Master of the world, I can't, because Yisro received me and opened his house to me and I am like a son to him, and if a person opens his house to his fellow, he owes him his life....and furthermore, any person who opens his house to his fellow, he is obligated to honor him more than his own mother and father.
It seems to me that an adoptive parent is a perfect example of this Medrash-- Pasach li es pesach beiso, Ve'ani imo ke'ben...nafsho hu chayav lo.


Moving to another case where Chazal said "Ke'ilu," the Gemara in Menachos 110a says that one who studies the parsha of a korban "it is as if he sacrificed the korban."  Would the Taz say that if a person became obligated to bring a chatas for some inadvertent sin, and then he read and learned the parsha of korban chatas, and then the Beis Hamikdash was rebuilt, that he would not have to bring the Chatas?  And what if you were lazy, and while the Beis Hamikdash was standing you decided to stay home and read the parsha.  Are you pattur?  I would say that this, too, depends on the shittos of the Drisha and the Taz.

The Yad David in Menachos says this question is the subject of the machlokes between Reish Lakish and Rava there.  According to Reish Lakish, learning Torah accomplishes a similar atonement to that of bringing a Korban only during a time when there is no Beis ha'Mikdash and one cannot bring a real Korban. According to Rava, even when the Beis ha'Mikdash is standing, learning Torah atones exactly as if one had brought a Korban.

The Gan Raveh in Parshas Tzav brings the Binyan Ariel who says that when Hashem told Moshe, "Tzav Es Aharon v'Es Banav Leimor Zos Toras ha'Olah" it means that the Kohanim should make sure that they teach the people the rule that whenever they learn the laws of the Korban, it is as if they have offered an Olah, even though telling this to the people will surely decrease the number of Korbanos brought to the Beis ha'Mikdash.  Despite the resulting monetary loss to the Kohanim (who receive the hides of the korban Olah and much of the flesh of other korbanos), the Kohanim were enjoined to let people know about this halacha.

See a nice discussion of the din amira for a korban in the first piece in the Har Tzvi. who addresses the Beis Yosef that says that amira is mechaper "ktzas," and Reb Yishmael ben Elisha in Shabbos 12b (I will bring a chattas shmeinah, mashma that amira wouldn't patter him.)  Also,  I once saw a svara (from Reb Refoel Hamburger, and a similar but slightly different slant from Reb Chaim Ozer's cousin from Omaha, Reb Tzvi Hirsch Grodzinsky in his sefer Likutei Tzvi, about whom Reb Aharon Soloveichick said that the Brisker Rov said that he was considered the bigger lamden of the two,)  that amira doesn't work where there are other aspects of the korban that cannot be fulfilled through amira, such as "Kohanim ochlim ubaalim miskaprim."  Your amira does not make a kohen's achila.  Kind of like the Beis Halevi on Kol Rom.  Also, great unknown pointed out in a private communication that it would not work for a nazir, because amira does duplicate or parallel the Matan Behonos.  Eli in the comments sends us a link to a beautiful piece from the Cheshek Shlomo that deals with this.

A slight digression:  I had this in my journal, but forgot about it until Chaim B reminded me.

The Magen Avraham in Siman 1 says that you should stand when you say the parshas korban, because avoda is be’amidah.  Reb Chaim Kanievsky brings a Yalkut Shimoni in Yirmiah that says that a min asked someone, how can you believe the nevi’im when the navi says that the Kohanim and Leviim will do avodah forever, but you can't deny the reality that the churban stopped the avodah, and he was answered that amiras parsha by Kohanim and Leviim is like hakrava.  The pirush there, which happens to be written by the Magen Avraham, indeed says that when kohanim and leviim say parshas korban it is as if they brought it, which is apparently different from what he himself says in Shulchan Aruch!
    The Chofetz Chaim in his hakdama to his son in law’s Avodas Hakorbonos brings the same medrash and is docheh the raiya that it only applies to kohanim, and says that it is mamash like hakrava no matter who says it.  The son in law brings the same medrash and skips the words kohanim and leviim!  How do you like that!
    But there are also problems with the Yalkut itself.  First of all, this can’t be accepted as our derech, because then only kohanim should be saying the parshas hakorban, which is something weird that nobody has ever said in print.
    Second, R’ Matisyahu Solomon brings from the Chazon Yechezkel that the pshat in “neshalmah parim sfaseinu” is that we bring to ourselves the zchus of the korbanos that were brought at the time of the Beis Hamikdosh.  R’ Solomon connects this to the din of “pokeid avon avos ahl banim...v’oseh chesed l’ohavai...” which teaches that zchus avos comes to descendants that are “ocheiz b’ma’asei avosam.”  Here too, our saying the parshoh of korbanos brings us the zchus of our ancestors’ korbanos.  If we take this mehalach at face value, it is not like the shittah brought by the Magen Avraham that you have to stand during amiras parshas korbanos, and also it is not like the Yalkut that says that the amiras haparsha is like hakrovoh only when a kohen says it.
    However, we can be meyasheiv all these kashes.  There are two dinim: the zchus of amiras haparsha- or the zchus avos we create by saying the parshah- can be either the zchus of the ma’aseh hakrava or the zchus of having a korban brought on your behalf, the rei’ach nicho’ach aspect of the korban.  If you say that the zchus avos is the zchus of their ma’aseh hakravah, that just as they were makriv, it is as if we were makriv, (and not the zchus of the korban,) so this only is legitimate and helpful if the person is a kohen whose avodah is kosher.  But there is also a din that saying the parshah brings the zchus of the rei’ach nicho’ach of the korban, i.e., that it is as if a korban was brought for us, then even a Yisroel will benefit.  And there is no reason to think that one din is more mistavra than the other, and both dinim are true, so a kohen’s amira is as if he was makriv, and a yisroel’s amirah is as if he brought a korban and it was nikrav on his behalf.  (This question might revolve around the Gemara in Nazir and Kiddushin about Shluchi de'Rachmana or Shluchi didan.)
    This is meyasheiv all three kashes: the kashe on the Chofetz Chaim’s son in law (because the Yalkut that limits it to kohanim is the response to the min that said that avodah is boteil, and the proper response is that through the amirah of kohanim the avodah is eternal), the kashe that nobody limits amiras korbonos to kohanim (because although kohanim may have the additional aspect of the zchus of avodah, everyone has the zchus of the kiyum hamitzvah of bringing the korban), and the kashe on the Chazon Yechezkel from the Magen Avraham (because R’ Abramsky is talking about the zchus of the rei’ach nicho’ach, not the zchus of the avodah).   

Another interesting ramification of this discussion: The mitzva of Birkas Kohanim, according to Reb Yaakov Emden, is only de'oraysa when recited after the hakrava of a korban tzibur.  Therefore, he says, the duchening we do today is derabanan.  The Mishna Berura argues, but doesn't address the pasuk that is mashma like RYE.  So Reb Yakov Karliner answers in his Mishkenos Yaakov OC 66 that this is why we say "'ve'se'erav alecha asiroseinu ke'olah u'chi'korban" before duchenning- because our duchening is based on the parity between tefilla and korbanos.  Only because ve'se'erav can we duchen.  (His brother, the Keren Ora, says the same teretz in Maseches Sota in the sugya of birkas kohanim.)

I know about the Baal Hatanya in #37, and I don't want to put it in here, because it is not my mesora.  So please don't send me comments about his pshat in the Gemara in Menachos, thank you.

Next ke'ilu:  Shomeia Ke'oneh.
Rashi  in Sukkah 38b says that one who is in the middle of Shmoneh Esrei when the tzibbur is saying Kaddish or Kedushah should stop and listen quietly, thus answering through Shomeia Ke'oneh. Rabbeinu Tam and the Ri in Tosfos Brachos 21b ask on Rashi that if shomeia is really ke'oneh, then it should have a din hefsek.  (They say that Rashi is wrong ahl pi svara, but "gadol haminhag," so go ahead and do like Rashi anyway.)  Here, too, we see a machlokes as to the extent of Ke'.  (There are many other ways to answer Tosfos' kashe without saying that Rashi holds like the Drisha, though.  Example: The Tzlach in Psachim 56a holds that a whisper is not a hefsek, like in Baruch Shem in Krias Shma.  So even if Rashi holds like the Taz, the ke'oneh would not be worse than a whisper.)


This is getting too long.  Unless you or I can think of a really interesting machlokes about another ke'ilu, that will be it.  Nathan- thanks for mentioning Ke'ilu hu yatza mimitzrayim, but it doesn't say "yotzei," it says "yatza."

But considering that Shavuos is around the corner, here's one good thing to end with.  Kiddushin 30a.

״אמר ריב״ל כל המלמד את בן בנו תורה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו קבלה מהר סיני שנאמר והודעתם לבניך ולבני בניך וסמיך ליה יום אשר עמדת לפני ה׳ אלהיך בחורב

~~~~~~~~

Bamidbar 3:12 and 3:46. The mitzva of Pidyon Haben.

On Shabbos erev Rosh Chodesh Sivon ‘66/May 27, 2006, Reb Yaakov Feigenbaum sponsored Shalesh Seudos in honor of his first personal making of a siyum. He has been coming to the Daf since Me’ilah, which is not the masechta I would advise starting at, but Pesachim was the first masechta he made the Siyum himself. He said that he was motivated to join the Daf because R’ Shteinman said he should be kovei’ah ittim, and mostly because his son, Josh the Brisker, asked him why he wasn’t taking part in the Daf. I said the following, which has to do with the mitzva of pidyon.

The last Gemora in Psachim brings that R Simla’i attended a pidyon haben and was asked who should make the She’hechiyonu. Should the Kohen make it because he gets the pidyon, or should the father since he gets the mitzvah.

The Rashash asks, Why does Reb Simla’I assume that it’s an either A or B bracha? Why shouldn’t both the father and the Kohen each make a bracha? The Rashash answers that since it is one ma’aseh mitzvah that is being done, it’s more proper for the individual who is the greater neheneh, the one who has the more pleasure, to make the brocha, and the other to respond with Amen.

The Tzlach asks, why should the Kohen make any she’hechiyonu at all? You don’t make a bracha when you make some profit on a business deal, so why would the Kohen make a bracha here? He answers that the Kohen is also participating in the mitzvah, so his profit is connected to a kiyum hamitzva, and that’s why there’s a hava amina.

The Rosh at the end of Bechoros says that there’s no reason on Earth for the Kohen to make a birchas hamitzva here, because he’s just getting the money, and he’s not doing any mitzva at all.

It seems that the Rosh is contrary to the Tzlach, and also contrary to the hava amina here.

The answer is that there’s a big difference between birchas mitzva and she’hechiyanu. Birchas hamitzva only applies where you are being m’kayeim a chiyuv, when you are fulfilling an obligation, because doing the mitzva as you were commanded is m’kadesh you. This does not apply to the Kohen. But She’heciyanu refers to the hana’ah that results from doing the mitzva. Of course the Kohen is ne’heneh from the mitzva, because he gets the pidyon.

But now, the question arises again. If both the father and the Kohen are being neheneh from the doing of the mitzva, it is obvious that the primary beneficiary of the mitzva is the kohen. The whole point of the mitzvoh is that the Kohen should get the money! So of course as far as the hana’as kiyum hamitzva, the primary beneficiary is the person for whom the whole mitzva was created! So why shouldn’t the Kohen make the she’hechiyanu?

The answer is that the question is based on a false premise. The tachlis hamitzva is not so that the Kohen should get money. Hashem has many methods of getting money to people that should have it. The tachlis hamitzva is so that we should give money to a kohein. The fact that the kohein is ne’heneh is tangential. The same is true wherever we are commanded to give money– to the poor, for machtzis hashekel– the purpose of the mitzva is that the person should give the money to the other. The purpose of every mitzva is that the person should be influenced and elevated by the mitzva, by the act of giving. The primary beneficiary is the benefactor.

Some people do mitzvos or learn in an indifferent manner, and walk out no different that they walked in. Baruch Hashem, we have an olam that allows their learning to change their perspective, who learn with interest and enthusiasm. I mentioned then, and time has borne out the observation, that Yaakov in particular is a seeker of growth in learning, and he, and others in the shiur, have, through their participation and the example they provide, reinvigorated the shiur so that it is like we are learning it for the first time.

Bamidbar 1:49 Contronyms: מילים שיש להם מובנים הפכיים

The National Census discussed in this week's Torah portion can be viewed in entirely different ways. Reb Yakov Kaminecki says that counting can be a purely secular matter, to assess military strength or to apportion resources, in which case it evidences a lack of trust in God's promise of victory. On the other hand, it could be motivated by a spiritual purpose, so that the Jewish nation could better emulate the Merkovo, the heavenly host that appeared at Har Sinai, or as Rashi says, "kedei l’hashros Shechinoso aleihem", in order to rest the heavenly presence upon them.

The hamon am, the unenlightened among the people, viewed it as military planning, a lack of faith which later expressed itself in the Chet Hameraglim, the sin of the spies, who said that a realistic comparison of the Jewish people's military strength and the Canaanite armies indicated that the Jews would be routed.
The Levites, on the other hand, understood the real purpose of the Census. The Jewish Nation did not base their decisions on ostensible military realities or on mundane considerations of resources and actuarial prognostication. They were the Nation of God, who, while inhabiting a natural world, were in God's hand and under God's protection, and therefore above the vagaries and caprice of chance or the dismal calculations of economics and strategy.

Reb Yaakov points out that the the Torah says, in 1:2, "Se’u es rosh kol adas b’nei Yisroel." Also, the word "Naso" is used in the beginning of the next Parshah. This expression can have contrary meanings: in the story of Yosef interpreting the dreams of the Sar haofim and the Sar hamashkim, he used the expression "yisa roshcha" for both the sar hamashkim and the sar ha’ofim, but in one case it meant yisa roshcha, he will be elevated and respected, and the in the other it meant yisa roshcha mei’alecha, his head will be separated from his body. One word; two diametrically opposed meanings.

When Christopher Wren completed his Cathedral in the late 1600s, King Charles II was brought to see that great architectural work, which he had commissioned. He said that he found it “awful, artificial, and amusing.” Christopher Wren felt highly honored. He had received a great compliment. At that time, awful meant awe-inspiring or awesome, artificial meant a work of art and craftsmanship, and amusing meant inspired by a muse, or a work of genius. Sometimes, one word can have two meanings that are very, very different. In fact, in a few odd cases, those two meanings are not only different, but actually opposite. This is not like ‘pitted,’ which can mean with pits or pits removed, or boreich, (as in “hamevareich es Hashem,” which means to curse the heavens,) which can be used euphemistically or ironically to have the opposite of the usual meaning. The words I refer to here really have two diametrically opposed definitions. For example, in English, we have the words cleave, which means to cling but also means to split; fast, meaning moving quickly but also immobile; bolt, which means to screw into place, but also to quickly run away; temper, which means quick to heated anger but also to quickly cool off; qualified, which means unquestionably fit, but also unsure and doubtful, and sanction. These words have been described as auto-antonyms, enantiosemic or Janus-words, or, Richard Lederer’s neologism, contronyms.

Freud, in a paper published in 1910 ("Uber den Gegensinn der Urworte", "The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words") refers to this phenomenon, and builds on the theories of a philologist named Abel in 1884. Freud claimed that this displacement expressed itself in dream symbolism, where instead of visualizing something disturbing, a person will dream about its opposite. As Lacan recently said, "the unconscious is structured like a language" I once had a brief correspondence with Professor Laurence Horn, author of A Natural History of Negation (Chicago, 1989), in which he suggested that not only was Freud’s philology utterly unscientific and erroneous, but that his theories were bizarre, and interesting primarily for the window they provided into Freud’s subconscious. In any case, we are not writing here about the history of negation, nor about Freud’s ideas on the subject. We are writing only from the Torah perspective. However, I do find it interesting and ironic that Freud missed a classic example of this theory as applied to dream symbolism-- that when Yosef interpreted the dreams of the butler and the baker, Yosef interpreted identical words and image in the two dreams as having opposite meaning– yisa roshcha either meaning (for the butler) lift your head by pardoning you, or (for the baker) lift your head by removing it from your shoulders, as Reb Yakov Kaminecki noted, quoted above. Let us then disregard Freud's theories about the gegensinn of urworte and focus on developed languages. In the case of such words in, for example, English, one assumes that these chimeras developed because two words that come from different languages coincidentally sounded the same and were joined in the English language, or the same root word was used differently by distantly separated groups. In Hebrew, a language that developed among and was used by a small and relatively homogenous group of people, one would think that such cases would not exist, or would be extremely rare. In fact, however, we find a vast array of such words in Hebrew.

The word Keles can mean praise and glory, but it can also mean shame and disgrace— la’ag vakeles, but le’alei ulikaleis. Atzura can mean attached, or separated. Yosof can mean to add, but it can mean absolutely finished. And the word ‘Chet’ can mean sin, but it can mean cleansing. Arum, from the story of creation in the beginning of Chumash, is another example. Applied to Adam and Chava, it means uncovered, or exposed. Applied to the Nochosh, it means covert, shrewd, or deceptive. And there is also ‘pokad,’ which means remember, as in “pokad es Soroh,” but also missing, as in “lo nifkad mimenu ish.” (A complete list of these words follows this discussion, below.) This duality is noted by the Rambam in his “Moreh Nevuchim.” His example is the word “ponim.” Ponim means face, the exterior, the exposed surface. On the other hand, ponim is very close to ‘Pnim,’ which means the interior, the hidden, and to ‘Lofonim,’ which means long ago, or hidden in the past. According to the Rambam, this phenomenon is not isolated. Instead, he says, the recurrence and centrality of this phenomenon teaches that one must always assume that a word implies something very different from what our initial presumption leads us to believe. Whenever a word is used in the Torah, there is the manifest meaning that is indicated by the context, but there is also a hint, a trace, of a meaning that is very different. In fact, we can use the Rambam’s example as the symbol of this concept— every word has a ponim, a face, a literal and self-evident meaning, but it also has a pnim, an interior in which a meaning that is very different is hiding.

In our tradition, words are very powerful things. They are not merely a tool to enable communication, but instead were created at the same time– and with the same creative power and significance as– the tangible world. Words reflect, in a manner of speaking, the soul of reality. When we realize that words in the Torah are written to have an inherent duality, we must understand that the Torah is teaching us that it is not only words that may contain opposite meanings. The duality of these words teaches us that there is a duality in life itself. Although things mean what they mean, they carry within themselves the potential to mean the opposite. Through the creation of one, the potential for the other is also created. Every thing has a ponim, but it also has a pnim. It has within it a little seed that can grow and produce the opposite of the ponim. A sin, chet, creates the need for cleansing, and remembering, pokad, means that something had previously been, and might in the future be, forgotten. We compose our ponim, our face, to hide what is bifnim, hidden in our hearts.

Chazal apply this philosophy to the greatest of all good things, the Torah itself. It says in Chumash, “vesahmtem es devorai eileh ahl levavchem.” The Gemora says that the Torah is a ‘sahm,’ like a medicine. If one merits, the Torah will be his medicine of life. If he does not merit, then the Torah can be his poison. If one merits, he will draw life from the well of Torah. But if one is not worthy, his behavior will cause that dangerous little seed to sprout and produce not life, but his own destruction.

This is closely related to the philosophical concept called “zeh le’umas zeh.” Hashem told Moshe that he must lead the Bnei Yisroel in a war against the Midyanim, and that after that war he, Moshe, would die. We have to wonder, why does the Torah associate Moshe’s death with the war against Midyan? Was it merely a calendric coincidence, that the war was scheduled first, and Moshe’s death second? There seems to be more to the connection than that. Chazal tell us that Bilaam, the great and evil prophet, died during that war. When Bilaam the Rosho died, Moshe Rabbeinu had to die. Similarly, when the magic of Avodah Zarah came to an end, true prophecy disappeared. The world has to remain in balance, there has to be a tension between good and bad. The divine gift of human free will cannot be disturbed. Not only do words contain contrary meanings, but the world as a whole must be balanced between clashing forces, to the extent that every moment of great holiness creates the potential for evil, and vice versa. And perhaps we can take this even further— every event that takes place, every thing that we experience, every action we take, can result in good things or bad. The expression “blinding sun” also evokes this concept. Light is necessary for vision, but too much light can inhibit, even destroy, vision. Yisro saw the hashgochas Hashem on Klal Yisroel, and he came to join us. Amalek was exposed to the same light, and was blinded by it. Of course, the expression “sagi nahor” is a euphemism, but it can be seen as meaning that the person cannot see just like a person that cannot see because he has too much light. In Yeshaya 55:13 it says, “Tachas hana’atzutz ya’aleh verosh vesachas hasirpod ya’aleh hadas.” This doesn’t only mean that the good berosh and hadas will replace the bad thorns. It means that the thorns themselves will become the source of beroshim and hadasim. And in the next perek it says (56:3-5) “let not the childless say, behold, I am a dry tree...I will give them in my house and in my walls a place and a name.” This, too, means that the suffering and sadness that people experience will enable them to reap blessings greater than they would have been capable of receiving if they had a calmer life.

There is a remarkable Chazal that talks about the power of teshuva. If one does teshuva properly, “zedonosov ne’esin lo kezachuyos.” This means, not only can teshuva erase the red ink in our account book, but it can transform a debit into a credit. Hashem views the sin as if it were a meritorious act. On the other hand, if a person does a mitzvah, and becomes a ba’al ga’avah, or uses his reputation for personal gain or to accomplish wicked things, or creates a chillul hashem, then his mitzvah becomes an aveirah. It is not merely that his merit is erased: his mitzvah, meritorious at the time it was done, is viewed in retrospect as if it were a wicked thing. As A member of my shiur, Lothar Kahn, says, “vehoseir sotton milifoneinu umili’achareinu—” first, the Yeitzer Hora stands in our way to stop us from doing mitzvos. If we overcome him, and do the mitzvah, right away he gives us a yasher koach and says “You are such a tzadik!” This, too, can generate excessive confidence and haughtiness, which ultimately leads to a downfall. Here is the list of words for the moment. If you are aware of any others, please write me at eliezere@aol.com.
Keles
Sotah 27a top of the daf Kodesh Yosof Bamidbar 11:26, and by Yehuda and Tomor, as Rashi mentions there..
Otzar
See Kedushin 6a Ozov can mean abandon/leave, can mean stay and help. See Shemos 23:5. (it’s interesting to note that in I Melochim 14:10, it says "otzur ve'ozuv b’Yisroel.” Rashi there explains ‘ozuv’ in that possuk differently than where he brings the possuk in Shmos. In any case, both words, ‘otzur’ and ‘ozuv’, are on this list.
Cheit
Nacheim
(console/acceptance/comfort, and remorse). But see Rashi in Chumash by No’ach, where he says that it just means change of heart, which could be regret or consolation. Orum Ponim Rambam in Moreh
Pakad
(Pakad es Sarah, lo nifkad mimenu ish. So ploni nifkad could mean remembered or lost.) Seichel/Sachal. (The difference between a Shin Smalis and a samach is insignificant to everyone except Rava in Sotah 4b. Come to think of it, Maseches Sotah is a funny place for Rava to make that point. I guess that in Rava's Gemara, Sotah and Kli Cheres were spelled with a Shin Smalis.)
Tzedek
(arguable, because it is not justice/mercy, but rather righteousness, or rectitude.)
Chalatz
(armed and ready to pioneer, and abdication/withdrawal) 

Tzofeh (see, and remove from sight/hide, as in tzafun) Malbim Yehoshua 2:4- 

הצפון הוא העומד במקום שאין העין רואהו (והוא ההיפוך מפעל צפה, כדרך השרשים המשמשים דבר והפוכו)

Mahul
(mixed/blended, and separated/cut off.) (Might be wrong, because one is Mol and the other is mohal.)
Raga: Yeshaya 51:4, it means "calm" and "placid."  Yeshaya 51:15, ten psukim later, it means "agitated" or "turbulent."
Ohn
Breishis 35:18, Rachel meant weakness/suffering, Yakov meant strength.  See Rashi there.  (Coincidentally, that parsha, Vayeishev, also contains the word Yasaf, where it says about Yehuda and Tamar that lo yasaf le'da'ata.)
Deshen. Ash and luxury/fat/fertility.
Aratz. In Yeshaya 2:19, it means "Shatter."

Tzofeh/Tzafun

Yehoshua 2:4, in the Malbim: Tzafun means off to the side, where nobody is looking. Tzofeh means seeing from a distance or piercing vision.

וּבָ֙אוּ֙ בִּמְעָר֣וֹת צֻרִ֔ים וּבִמְחִלּ֖וֹת עָפָ֑ר מִפְּנֵ֞י פַּ֤חַד יְהוָה֙ וּמֵהֲדַ֣ר גְּאוֹנ֔וֹ בְּקוּמ֖וֹ לַעֲרֹ֥ץ הָאָֽרֶץ׃

Elsewhere, it means praise, or praiseworthy, such as in Kedusha, נעריצך. (So when we say נעריצך ונקדישך, both words can mean their opposite.)  Also found as "tyrant" or "tyrannical" in

 ”לָכֵן, הִנְנִי מֵבִיא עָלֶיךָ זָרִים עָרִיצֵי גּוֹיִם...“ (יחזקל כח, פסוק ז)

” רָאִיתִי רָשָׁע עָרִיץ; וּמִתְעָרֶה כְּאֶזְרָח רַעֲנָן“ (תהילים לז, פסוק לה)

”וּמַלְּטוּנִי מִיַּד צָר; וּמִיַּד עָרִיצִים תִּפְדּוּנִי“ (איוב כו, פסוק ג)

but "mighty" in

 ”וַיהוָה אוֹתִי כְּגִבּוֹר עָרִיץ, עַל כֵּן רֹדְפַי יִכָּשְׁלוּ וְלֹא יֻכָלוּ...“ (ירמיהו כ, פסוק יא)

Interestingly, as the Navi Yeshaya is wont to do, he contrasts the two meanings in succeeding pesukim:
8:12

לֹא־תֹאמְרוּן קֶשֶׁר לְכֹל אֲשֶׁר־יֹאמַר הָעָם הַזֶּה קָשֶׁר וְאֶת־מוֹרָאוֹ לֹא־תִירְאוּ וְלֹא תַעֲרִיצוּ׃

8:13

אֶת־יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת אֹתוֹ תַקְדִּישׁוּ וְהוּא מוֹרַאֲכֶם וְהוּא מַעֲרִצְכֶם׃

 למשחה means ligdulah. משחתם בהם means degradation.

Note, also, that wherever these words occur, Rashi states that the two meaning stem from the same idea. He opposes the Rambam’s concept of true contradictory meaning co-existing in a word.  For example, Rashi says that the reason Keles means two opposite things is because Keles means 

"arousing talk about unusual character."  See Rashi Yechezkel 22:4. See also Rashi Kiddushin 6a DH Atzurasi.  Most important, see Rashi Sotah 27a DH Dumah.  For an excellent example of Rashi's opposition to this concept and the alternative he offers, see Rashi Yechezkel 23:17.

מילים שיש להם מובנים הפכיים

קלס

קודש

יסף

עצר

עזב

חטא

נחם

ערום

פנים

פקד

שכל

צדק

חלץ

צפה

מהל

רגע

און

 דשן

ערץ

משחה

UPDATE October 2, 2011, Three Tishrei Ayin Beis.

We just layned Parshas Haazinu, and I was with my mother shlitah in the hospital with a Gemara and a Chumash for two days, the second day of Rosh Hashanna and Shabbos.  I looked at Haazinu more carefully than previously, and I noticed that there is a machlokes brought by Rashi from the Sifrei between Reb Yehuda and Reb Nechemia on passuk 32:36. 

 כִּי יָדִין ה' עַמּוֹ וְעַל עֲבָדָיו יִתְנֶחָם

כִּי יִרְאֶה כִּי אָזְלַת יָד וְאֶפֶס עָצוּר וְעָזוּב

As it turns out, Reb Yehuda and Reb Nechemia learn almost every word in these psukim as meaning diametrically opposed things, with Azlas, Atzur, and Azuv having opposite meanings respectively. Remarkably, this string of dual meanings is introduced with the word Yisnecham.

UPDATE June 10, 2020, 18 Sivan Pei.
Someone identifying himself as  Desikan Jeyaram posed the following question on Quora:

Is the Hebrew word chesed (חָ֫סֶד) an auto-antonym?

The answer is yes. Rashi takes pains to deny it, but others would say that it is another contronym. The usual meaning is צדקה. רחמים, but it can also mean תועבה, חרפה.
I know Rashi talks about it, but I don't remember where. I do know the Ramban also says that it always means kindness and sympathy. The Ramban is in Vayikra 20:17 beginning with והנכון בעיני במלת "חסד" שהוא כמשמעו.