The Cost of Rejecting a Ger. Timna.

The original version of this was posted in '06.  After extensive alterations and additions this needed to be posted anew.

In Sanhedrin 99b the Gemara explains that Timna went to Avraham, Yitzchak, and Ya’akov and asked that they accept her as a convert to Judaism, and they all refused her. So she went and became a concubine to Esav's son Eliphaz just to be close to the family of Avraham Avinu, even though being a concubine was a shocking debasement for the daughter of a king. The Gemara says that we were punished for this, in that Amalek, our eternal enemy, was the product of her union with Eliphaz. With this the Gemara illustrates that what may seem to be a passuk with no special significance is actually very meaningful. But it is important to realize that this Gemara opens the window on a very significant issue.

The Alter from Slobodkeh (in his sefer Ohr Hatzafun) says that we know that Avraham's life work was to spread the knowledge of Hashem and that he was a great seeker of geirim.  If he refused her, he must have seen terrible character traits in her.

If so, we can say that they refused her because they correctly discerned in her the midos that ultimately expressed themselves in her descendant, Amalek, and they didn’t want those personality traits grafted onto Klal Yisroel.

Even though this rejection resulted in the birth of Amaleik, it is better to allow the creation of an eternal existential threat rather than jeopardize our defining Jewish traits. Better to create an Amoleik than to bring middos ra’os into Klal Yisrael.

Similarly, we find the issur of accepting Amoni and Mo’avi, apparently for their bad middos. But maybe that is only after their nation had expressed the bad midda in a maaseh which deserved punishment--shelo kidmu. Here, her middos ra’os had not yet expressed themselves. Even so, the Torah shows us that he and the other avos should have helped her. Their refusal shows how serious a refusal to do a chesed is--our terrible nemesis Amalek came from her.

And this is the same taineh on Ya’akov for hiding Dinah from Eisav, and of course he was punished for that as well, when Dinah was taken by Shchem.

Perhaps (see Yalkut Lekach Tov at the end of Vayishlach) the taineh was not that they didn't do differently, but that they didn’t feel any sympathy for her when they decided that they couldn’t help her. But the fact is the Gemara uses the expression Lamos (in Iyov, from the shoresh “nameis”, meaning melt, here meaning a person who shrinks from doing chesed for his neighbor) mei’rei’aihu chesed regarding Ya’akov, which sounds like a tainah for not doing differently.

Also remember what R’ Chaim Shmeulevitz says about “ohr vechoshech mishtamshim be’irbuvia” on the Makkas Choshech. Perhaps the problem in this marriage was not only the choshech alone, but the fact that it was combined with an ohr that both Eliphaz and Timna had. In other words, Timna was honestly motivated to become a giyores, but along with that ohr there was a choshech that they were unable to eliminate, which, in combination with their ohr, was capable of generating a terrible force.

(The plain meaning of the Gemara is a criticism of the Avos. The language of the gemara in Sanhedrin 99b is

נפק מינה עמלק דצערינהו לישראל מאי טעמא דלא איבעי להו לרחקה

Amalek came from her, who pained Israel. Why? Because they shouldn't have distanced her.
I am following Gedolei Hamefarshim that understand the Gemara differently.)

But there might be a theme about refusing geirim, because not only do we have the Gemara in Sanhedrin about Timna, there’s also the Gemara in Sottah 42b about Orpa, which says that both Golyas and Yishbi (who almost killed David in a later battle) were among the four sons of Orpa. The Gemara there says that amar Hakadosh Baruch Hu yavo’u b’nei haneshukah v’yiplu b’yad bnei hadvukah, so you can’t really tell whether there’s any taineh on Na’omi for discouraging Orpa, or the only point of the Gemara is that Orpa was unfit to become a Jew, as shown by the sons she ultimately had. So, although there is a clear similarity between the cases of Timna and Orpa– both being turned away, both giving birth to children who threatened our existence– and there’s also the Gemara about Yaakov refusing to give Dinah as a wife to Eisav, and the story of Shchem that followed, there’s no clear evidence as to how the three fit together, whether there is a general theme or mussar haskeil, or that you have to judge them on a case by case basis.

Also note that the Gemara in Yevamos (79a) says that the reason Hashem agreed to the demand of the Giv’onim to have the children of Sha’ul killed, was in order to make a Kiddush Hashem so that other potential Gerim would see the concern that the Jews have for the well-being of Gerim, and the Giv’onim lost their livelihood with the destruction of Nov. Now, Chazal also say that Yishbi’s ability to almost kill David was because the aveiraa of Nov had as of then not been forgiven (that’s why he’s called Yishbi B’nov). So you have the son of a refused geir becoming the instrument of nekomoh for an injury to geirim– not good geirim, Giv’onim, but geirim nonetheless. So you see once again that Chazal stress the importance of sympathy with, and the risks of indifference to, the geir.

R’ Chaim Ehrman attended R Schwab’s chumash shiur for four years, and in 1961 he heard the following from him:

When nations wage war, one nation generally covets the resources or the land of the other nation. Amalek went to the desert to wage war against Yisrael. Did they want the desert? There are miles and miles of desert available to any nation. There is no need to wage war to claim the desert. Amalek had a goal in mind. He wanted to show that the Am Hashem, the nation that Hashem chose to be His people are vulnerable and can be attacked like any other nation. Amalek deliberately waged war against the Will of Hashem. He wanted to show that Hashem’s nation is made up of mere humans and can lose a war (which happened when Moshe lowered his hands) like any other nation. What is the source of this hatred?
Rav Schwab answers this question based on the Gemara in Sanhedrin 99b. Amalek’s hatred came from his mother, Timna. She was a princess from the land of Canaan. She could have lead a life of luxury and royalty. She decided to become a giyores and marry into the descendants of Avraham Avinu. She approached Yaakov Avinu, but he replied, saying “you are from Canaan, and we may have nothing to do with Canaanites.” She went to Eisav, who told her that he had three wives and could not take another wife. She approached the children of Eisav and again she was rejected. Finally, Elifaz, the son of Eisav, took her as a concubine, not as a regular wife.
Timna felt totally rejected. She stooped from being a princess to a mere concubine, not even receiving a kesuba, a dowry. She realized that Hashem is the true G-d, but became very bitter because of her treatment and the respect she should have received. (Notice the warm reception Boaz gave Ruth, a princess of Moav who gave up her religion to become a giyores.) Amalek, her son, picked up the bitterness and unhappiness of Timna. He, then, decided to avenge his mother’s sadness and rejection. The mussar haskell (moral lesson to be learned) is that we must try to be mekarev (bring close) everyone, to the best of our ability, and avoid rejecting any person from Avodas Hashem.(End Ehrman. He says that he is in middle of putting a together a sefer of the shiurim he heard from R Schwab, which will include this.)

So, you have a pretty clear difference of opinion between the Alter and R Schwab. One said that we pushed her away because she had middos m’gunos, the other says she had middos m’gunos because we pushed her away, which seems closer to what the Gemara in Sanhedrin says. Unless pshat is that we shouldn’t have pushed her away (at all, so brusquely, so completely) despite her middos m’gunos.

If I were around when Chazal talked about discouraging potential geirim, I would have asked, but look what happened when we did that to Timnoh and to Orpoh. What would they have answered? That the richuk there was too strong? That the richuk is only a test for sincerity, but once you find sincerity you should encourage them? That we were m’racheik them because of their bad middos, and better a bad goy than a bad Jew? That instead of rejecting them completely, we should have worked with them and helped them eliminate the middos ro’os and then taken them as geirim? That even if you are m’racheik, you should be close to them socially and try to do chesed for them?

At a conference in Eretz Yisroel in July 2006 about standards in Geirus, Harav Reuven Feinstein said a new pshat in Koshim Geirim L’Yisroel K’sapachas: he said that this is also referring to the punishment for being m’racheik a geir tzedek, or in making him wait five years before his geirus, because it says “m’kablim osso miyad.”

Rav Bergman in his Shaarei Ora II on this parsha has a beautiful discussion of this sugya.  His focus is on the concept of Kiruv, which spans a range from baalei teshuva to geirim.  He goes with the Alter's approach.  He adds that it was davka because Timna was such a great person that her middos ra'os could not be corrected.  
A normal geir will be mevatel themselves to Klal Yisrael, and overcome their natural techunos hanefesh.  But she was a great woman.  She had such a hakara that she would do anything just to get close to the family of the great Avraham Avinu.  Ironically, davka because she was so great she couldn't be mevatel herself to our hashkafos and middos, and her terrible middos would remain part of her.  But, he says, no matter what the reason is, rejecting a person who wants to become a ger has a terrible price.  The consequences are inevitable even if the decision was fully justified.  He says that we see what Avraham Avinu was willing to forego, kabalas pnei haShechina, for all the years Lot was with him, so he could be mekareiv him.  He adds something I also once said: why is גדולה הכנסת אורחים מקבלת פני השכינה?  Because receiving guests, chesed and kiruv, is being domeh to Hashem, mah hu.... and becoming a Godly person is far greater than standing in the presence of God.  In any case, the idea is that kiruv is so precious and valuable that even in those cases where kiruv is not good, where it is dangerous, rejecting it causes tremendous damage.  We find it by Timna and we find it by Dina/Eisav, and I would add that this may have also been the shitta of Shammai HaZaken.

The way I visualize the concept that there are negative consequences even when the act is entirely justified is that Kiruv is so critical to the briya that it is close to teva.  There are times that picking up a piece of steel that is glowing red is necessary.  Your act might be necessary to protect someone you love from a horrible fate.  But you're going to get burned.

Visualizing it is not the same as understanding it.


UPDATE 2018.
Just something that came up in current events - another rejected Gerus novitiate who became a Nazi.
Jerusalem Post
Times of Israel

"Adam Thomas, who had studied in Israel and tried to convert to Judaism, and Claudia Patatas found guilty of membership in outlawed far-right group"

“While Avi, or Adam I guess, was extremely intelligent, he had an extreme approach to Judaism,” Simpkins said. “He was very insecure (bordering on paranoia), constantly emotional, and intense. He was quick to anger when agitated, but I never saw anything remotely resembling violent tendencies.”
Simpkins said Thomas spoke of having a terrible childhood in the UK and grew up with family who were far-right extremists.
“He started learning about Judaism to discover why he was supposed to hate them,” Simpkins said. “Then he decided he really wanted to become an Orthodox Jew himself.” But at the yeshiva in Jerusalem – one which is popular with converts as well as Jews who grow up secular – Thomas struggled.
“The rabbis decided that Adam needed to deal with his childhood professionally and return to convert with a clear head,” Simpkins said. “He was making the common mistake many who desire conversion make, which is to replace one psychological extreme with another... Adam was given two weeks to leave the yeshiva when the rabbis decided he needed psychological help before proceeding.”

Shlach. When the Opposite of Reb Zeira's Rule Applies

I'm putting this up because I thought it too interesting to fall between the cracks. Also, Rav Simcha Soloveitchik says it's brilliant, so even discounting for גוזמה and חנופה, it must be ok. Please forgive the peculiarities - I don't have time to make it pretty.

Reb Zeira's famous rule (for example in Menochos 13b) is that כל הראוי לבילה אין בילה מעכבת בו וכל שאינו ראוי לבילה בילה מעכבת בו.  Something the Torah says is part of a Mitzva is sometimes essential and sometimes not. Where the Torah does not make it fundamentally essential, the rule tells us that although you can do without, that is only where under the circumstances you could have done the act. IF, however, the circumstances are such as to make it impossible to do the act, then you can not fulfill the Mitzvah. 

The first application is by a Korban Mincha: Most Menachos are meant to be mixed with oil. Failure to mix the oil into the flour would not render the Mincha unfit: you simply will have missed the opportunity to do the mitzva of "mixing the flour with oil." But this is true only where you could have mixed it. Where you could not mix it, then failure to mix renders the Mincha unfit.
Other applications:
Nedorim 73a, that even though a man can be meifir without hearing the neder, a cheresh cannot be meifir.
Yevomos 104b, that even though reading is not me'akeiv, a mute man or woman cannot do chalitza.
BB 81b, you need ro'ui to read by Bikurim.
Taz in OC 689 that a deaf person is not chayav Birkas Hamozon, Megilla, Krias Shema based on kol horo'ui. See also Shagas Aryeh 6 - 7.
Kiddushin 25 on Ro'ui le'biyas mayim regarding beis hastorim.

In fact, the Sdei Chemed in Klal Choph 37 brings the Mas'as Binyomin who says the rule doesn't apply by derbabonons, proving that from the fact that if you're during shmoneh esrei shomei'a k'oneh works, even though you're not allowed to talk. Many argue, and he brings many that say that indeed there is no s'k when you're not allowed to talk.

It doesn't bother me that there are exceptions to this rule. For example: leaning on a Korban is not essential. Shouldn't we say, according to Reb Zeira, that at least you have to be ABLE to lean on it? No. As Tosfos says in Gittin 28b, there are pesukim that indicate that even where Smicha is impossible, the Korban is still Kosher. But what does bother me is that sometimes exactly the opposite of Reb Zeira's rule is true- that where you can do it, you must do it, but where you can't, it doesn't matter. 

With that in mind, I wonder why they make Reb Zeira's rule the universal one, and the contrary cases all just exceptions to the rule. ESPECIALLY when the basis of Reb Zeira's rule is vague (Tosfos Menochos 18b "Svoro b'Alma; Rashbam  BB 81b, that it's not called a Mincha unless the circumstances are such where the mitzvos could be fulfilled - שצוה הקב"ה להביא מנחה שיכול לקיים בהן מצות בלילה; another Rishon I can't remember who says because it's a לא שינה הכתוב לעכב.) Yes, there are droshos for each exception, there's always a reason for the opposite to be applied, but opposites they are. You have some drasha to say like Reb Zeira, you have drashos to say the opposite, and I just can't believe that Reb Zeira's rule is so self evident that we should prefer it. Extrapolating Reb Zeira all over the place is just not right.

1. The Korbon of Geirus, which is in this week's parsha - 15:14, even if you hold that a me'ukov korbon cannot marry a bas yisroel, or at least - see Netziv here in Sifrei - a Bas Yisroel from a choshuveh yichus, whatever that means.  See page 21, where he says

והרשב"א כתב בזה"ל והא דאמרינן אינו גר עד שימול ויטבול אבל הרצאת דמים לא מעכבא אע"ג דהוי באבותינו מדכתיב וכי יגור וגו' וכדאי' בכריתות פרק ד' מחו"כ ולכאורה כוונת הרשב"א משום שאינו מעכב בזמן הזה לא פסיקא ליה למתני אבל יותר נראה דאפילו בזמן הבית אינו מעכבו מלהיות גר כמילה וטבילה אלא כיון שמל וטבל קידושיו קידושין וה"ה כישראל לכל דבר ואינו יכול לחזור בו אלא שאינו כישראל כשר להשיא לו אשה מיוחסת וכשרה ואסור באכילת קדשים וכיו"ב כתב הרמב"ן והביאו הרשב"א ד' מ"ה לדעת הרי"ף בגר שקבל בפני ג' ומל או טבל בפני עצמו דגר הוא ולא פסלינן לזרעיה אלא דלא מנסבינן לי' בת ישראל לכתחילה ולענין שחרור עבדים יש הרבה פרטים כיוב"ז והכי מדויק לשון הגמ' דכריתות שם גר כי מייתי קרבן לאכשורי נפשיה למיעל בקהל ולא קאמר למהוי גר וכן מדויק מש"כ הרמב"ם ריש ה' מחו"כ שקרבנו עכבו להיות גר גמור ולהיות ככל כשרי ישראל כו' משמע דגר מיהא הוי ובהל' א"ב שם כתב דלדורות כשירצה עכו"ם להכנם לברית צריך ג' דברים אלו מילה וטבילה והרצאת קרבן ובה"ו כתב שאינו גר עד שימול ויטבול ולא זכר הרצאת דמים אלא כמש"כ דאינו מעכב עיקר הגירות וע"ע להלן ראיה מתוספתא וכי תימא מנלן לחלק בין מילה וטבילה להרצאות דמים ע"ז כתב הרשב"א מדכתיב לדורותיכם ואי היה מעכב בדיעבד האיך היה מהני בזמן הזה אלא לכתחילה מעכב להשיאו אשה והשתא הכל בדיעבד

which explains that ein hochi nami, the fact that it's good without korbon now proves that it was never that important. 

Getting back to business - the fact is that when there was a Mizbei'ach, then the korbon was essential. But when there's no bayis, he doesn't need it at all. See Krisus 8 and 9 and Eirchin in the beginning of perek arba mechusrei kapara.

2. The Korbon Ho'Omer, when there's no bayis, he'ir yom is mattir, but when there is, Chodosh remains assur until you are actually makriv the korbon. Menochos 68a

3. When there's a Mizbei'ach, then you don't have complete kaporo until you're makriv the appropriate korbon. But when there isn't a Mizbei'ach, teshuva brings complete kaporo. This is implicit in the Rambam in the beginning of Teshuva. 

The Mabit in Beis Elokim mentions this and explains it by saying that a sin in the time of the Mikdosh has an extra layer of damage that can only be repaired by a korbon.

מבי"ט בית אלקים שער התשובה פרק ב

וענין הקרבנות שיהיה החוטא מעוכב כפרה עד אשר יקריב חטאתו או אשמו גם שחזר בתשובה לפני האל יתברך, הוא דבר צריך ביאור, כי כיון שהתשובה מכפרת על החטאים ונקרא צדיק בהרהור תשובה בלבו מה לי בזמן שבית המקדש קיים מה לי בזמן שאין בית המקדש קיים, ואם הוא צריך לקרבן והוא מעוכב כפרה בזמן הבית, א"כ בזמן שאין בית המקדש קיים לא תהיה לו כפרה בתשובה עד אשר יבנה בית המקדש, והדבר ידוע כי התשובה מכפרת בכל זמן:

ולכן אני אומר כי התשובה לעולם היא מקובלת אם גמר בלבו שלא לשוב עוד וניחם על מה שעשה, כי היא מצות הגוף ואינה תלויה בארץ ולא בזמן בית המקדש, כי היא מהדברים שקדמו לעולם ולא היה קיום לעולם זולתה, אלא שיש הפרש מה בקבלת התשובה בין שני הזמנים, והזא, כי בזמן שאין בית המקדש קיים התשובה מתקבלת על כל עונות קלים וחמורים עם קבלת העונש כמו שנתבאר למעלה, בין שחטא במזיד בין שחטא בשוגג, כי כיון שהיא מכפרת על המזיד כל שכן על השוגג, ואופן התשובה על השוגג הוא בשיתן אל לבו שאם היה ירא וחרד מעבור על דברי האל יתברך לא היה חטא בא על ידו, והיה ראוי שידע באמת בכל פועל שרוצה לעשותו קודם שיעשנו שהוא פועל היתר ואינו מכעיס בו את יוצרו, ולכן ינחם על מה שעשה בשוגג וישוב לעתיד שיהיה זהיר וזריז במעשיו שלא יאונה לו כל און, כי הצדיקים אין הקב"ה מביא תקלה על ידם, ובזמן שבית המקדש היה קיים אין תשובה זו מספקת על השוגג עד שיביא את קרבנו, וגם על קצת עונות שאמרו חכמים שמביאין קרבן עליהם על המזיד כשוגג:

וטעם זה, כי בזמן שבית המקדש ושכינה שרויה למטה במקום המיוחד היא מכינה את האנשים לחכמה ויראת חטא יותר מזמן שאין מקום מיוחד לשכינה אלא שהולכת אתנו בגלות בעונותינו ואינה נראית אלא היא נסתרת בינינו וכאמרו (דברים ל"א) ואנכי הסתר אסתיר פני ביום ההוא וגו', כי לא יקרא הענין נסתר כי אם בהיותו במציאות במקום ידוע אלא שאינו נראה ונגלה, וכן הוא הסתרת השכינה שהיא אתנו אלא שהיא מסותרת בעונותינו, ולכן בזמן שהיא נגלית היא מועילה לאנשים להשפיע עליהם רוח דעת ויראת ה', וכמו שראינו כי מיום שנסתרה השכינה פסקה הנבואה, כי אפילו בבית שני חסרו חמשה דברים (יומא כ"א), וכמו שאמר הכתוב (חגי ב') וארצה בו ואכבד חסר ה':

וכשהאדם חוטא בזמן שבית המקדש קיים עונו חמור וגדול יותר משני פנים, האחד מצד היותו מושפע מהשכינה לקדש עצמו ולהיותו מוכן לעבודתו עבודת הקודש, והוא בבחירתו הרעה ויצרו הרע מקשה עצמו לדעת ללכת אחרי יצרו הרע. השני מצד היותו כמעיז פנים נגד השכינה בהיותה גלויה ומפורסמת במקום המיוחד והוא עובר על מצות התורה ואינו חושש ואינו מתבייש ממנה, דמיון העבד העובר על דברי האדון בפניו כי אין ספק שענשו גדול, מה שאין כן כשהוא עובר שלא בפניו, או בהיותו במסתר פנים ממנו, והוא בזמן הגלות שאין האדם מוכן כל כך לעבודת השם ויראתו מצד הסתר השכינה, וגם נקל בעיניו לחטוא להיות השכינה נסתרת ממנו, ועל זה חייבה תורה מלקות ומיתת בית דין, כפי החטאים לעוברים שהעיזו פניהם בעדים והתראה בזמן הבית והיות השכינה גלויה, או בהיות בית דין הגדול עומד ליסר הפושעים והחטאים ולהמיתם כפי עונם ולא חשש ולא נתבייש מהם בהיות השכינה נצבת עליהם, כמו שכתוב (תהלים פ"ג) אלהים נצב בעדת אל:

ולכן בזמן שאין בית המקדש קיים ואין ב"ד וסנהדרין, היסורין הבאים על החוטא מספיקים למרק את עונו כמו המיתה בזמן הבית, מצד שאין העון נחשב כל כך חמור בזמן הזה משני הפנים הנזכרים למעלה, כי יש מהיסורין הנחשבים ומצערין את האדם כמו המיתה וכאמרם ז"ל (נדרים ס"ד) ד' חשובים כמתים וכו', וכן החטאים שהם בשוגג אינם נחשבים כל כך חמורים כמו בזמן הבית, ולכך בזמן הבית היה צריך להביא קרבן כפרה על עונו, ובזמן הזה עם התשובה וקצת יסורין שבאים עליו אם החטא הוא חמור יתכפר עונו, כי אפילו בזמן הבית היו באים יסורין על מי שחטא בשוגג אם היה משהה כפרתו, וכמו שמצינו כשנסתפק לו אם חטא בשוגג או לא חטא שמביא אשם תלוי כדי להגין עליו מן היסורין, וכמו שאמרו (בכתובות ל') מיום שחרב בית המקדש אע"פ שבטלו ד' מיתות ב"ד, דין ד' מיתות לא בטלו, מי שנתחייב סקילה או נופל מן הגג או חיה דורסתו וכו', וזהו כשלא עשה תשובה, שאם עשה תשובה היסורין יעבירו מיתתו וכמו שכתבתי. והתוס' הקשו על זה המאמר, דחזינן כמה פושעים ועובדי עבודת אלילים שמתים על מטתם, ותירצו דע"י תשובה הקב"ה מיקל ולפעמים מוחל לגמרי או זכות תולה לו ואינו נפרע ממנו בחייו ע"כ:

R Nissen Kaplan's remarks in his Shelmei Nissen

ומשמע מדברי המבי"ט שמי שחטא בזמן הזה ועושה תשובה מתכפר לו אף בלא קרבן וכן משמע קצת בלשון הרמב"ם פ"א מהלכות תשובה ה"ג וכן כתב הרמב"ן בשער הגמול וז"ל אע"פ כן אין השוגג ראוי להיענש על שגגתו בגיהנם ובאר שחת אלא שהוא מירוק מאותו עוון ולהתקדש ולהיטהר ממנו כדי שיהא ראוי למעלה ההוגנת למעשיו הטובים בעולם הבא לפיכך חס הקב"ה על עמו ועל חסידיו ונתן להם הקרבנות להתכפר בהם השגגות וכשאין בית המקדש קיים ומשלם עליהם יסורין למרק מהן אותן השגגות ולהתכפר ביסורין כדי להיותם נקיים לעולם הבא

 ולפי"ז לכאורה היה אפשר לומר דלדברי הראשונים מי שחטא בזמן הזה ועושה תשובה ולרמב"ן עם יסורים שוב אינו צריך להביא קרבן אף אם יבנה בית המקדש דכיון דנתכפר לו שוב אין צריך קרבן ולמבי"ט הוי דוקא בעבירות שחטא לאחר החורבן ולרמב"ן אף בעבירות שחטא בזמן שבית המקדש היה קיים 

אלא דלכאורה צ"ע דבגמ' בשבת ויומא דמבואר דאיכא חיוב כתיבה בפינקס אף בזמן הזה ומשמע דשייך חיוב קרבן אף בזמן הזה וצריך לכתוב על פינקסו כדי שיזכור ויוכל להביא קרבן כשיבנה בית המקדש ומצאתי במנחת חינוך מצוה קכ"ט אות ז' שכתב בתוך הדברים בשם הכפתור ופרח דאיכא חיוב קרבן אף בזמן הזה והביא המנח"ח ראיה על זה משבת י"ב ע"ב שכתב על פינקסו שיבנה בית המקדש אביא חטאת שמינה ומיומא דף פ' דהאוכל חלב בזמן הזה צריך לכתוב שיעור 

והיה אפשר לומר דבאמת היינו טעמא דאין אנו כותבין על הפינקס דכיון דמעיקר הדין נתכפר לו בתשובה שוב אינו צריך לכתוב על פנקס שיביא קרבן דכשיבנה בית המקדש אינו מחויב בקרבן שכבר נתכפר לו אלא ראם ירצה יהיה רשאי להביא קרבן אף על חטא שחטא בזמן שלא היה בית המקדש ואינו כחולין בעזרה ובפרט לדרכו של הרמב"ן בשער הגמול ולכן רבי ישמעאל בן אלישע החמיר על עצמו וכתב על פינקסו שכשיבנה בית המקדש אביא חטאת שמינה ולפי"ז נצטרך לפרש כוונת הגמ' ביומא האוכל חלב בזמן הזה צריך לכתוב שיעור הכוונה דאם רוצה להביא קרבן לעתיד לבא צריך לכתוב השיעור דבלא"ה לא יוכל להביא דשמא ב"ד של אחריהם יאמרו שהשיעור יותר גדול ונמצא דאינו מחויב קרבן כלל והוי חולין בעזרה ומ"מ ההו"א שם בגמ' עדיין צ"ע יעויי"ש וכן נצטרך לדחוק בלשון התוס' בשבועות שכתבו דלא יצטרך לכתוב על פינקסו שיביא חטאת דכוונתם לומר שאין לומר שאמר לו שלבך אנסך לגבי שאין לו מה לכתוב על פינקסו כיון שהוא פטור מקרבן אבל לא נתכוונו לומר שאם חייב קרבן היה צריך לכתוב על פנקסו ומ"מ הלשון דחוק דמשמע יותר דסברי התוס' דצריך לכתוב על פנקסו

אמנם היה נראה דאפשר לומר עוד בזה דאולי בזמן הזה אם אנו עושין תשובה ומתכפר לנו שוב אין אנו צריכין לכתוב על פנקס ראין אנו חייבים עוד בקרבן ואף אם לא הספיק לעשות תשובה עד שנבנה הבית מ"מ לדעת המבי"ט יהיה סגי שיעשה תשובה כיון דבשעת החטא היה שלא בפני הבית ולא היה חטאו גדול כל כך ורק לרמב"ן בכה"ג יצטרך להביא קרבן ומ"מ רבי ישמעאל בן אלישע כיון דהיה בפני הבית כמבואר בגמ' בברכות דף ו' אע"ג דכשחטא בשוגג היה כבר שלא בפני הבית מ"מ כיון שהיה חי בפני הבית צריך כפרה כמו בפני הבית ואף במעשה דרב כהנא ורב אסי בשבועות שמא י"ל דכיון דהוו אמוראים תשיבי בני מעלה וכבפני הבית דמו וצריכים עדיין להביא קרבן חטאת על חטאם אף שחטאו שלא בפני הבית ושמא עד"ז יש לפרש הגמ' ביומא ועדיין צ"ב

ומצינו כעין חילוק זה ברמב"ן עה"ח בפרשת ויקרא פ"ד פסוק ב' וז"ל ולא הזכיר בכהן המשיח וכפר עליו ונסלח לו כאשר הזכיר בשאר החוטאים בקהל ובנשיא ובהדיוט אולי לרוב מעלתו לא יתכפר לו לגמרי עד שיתפלל ויתחנן לאלוקיו כי מלאך השם צבקות הוא וצריך להיות נקי וטהר ידים כו' עכ"ל ועל דרך זה יש לבאר החילוק דמצינו דגבי נשיא כתוב אשר נשיא יחטא ודרשו חז"ל בתורת כהנים אשרי הדור שהנשיא מביא כפרה על שגגתו וראיתי מי שהקשה אמאי לא הזכיר לשון אשר גבי כהן משיח אמנם להנ"ל י"ל דכיון דאין מתכפר להכהן המשיח לגמרי אפילו ע"י הקרבן עד שירבה בתפילה ותשובה וכו' לא נופל על קרבנו לשון אשר מלשון אשרי הדור שהכהן המשיח מביא כפרה על שגגתו

I'm sure there are plenty more "exceptions to the rule." I'd appreciate hearing about any you think of.

Be'haaloscha, Bamidbar 11:10, Bocheh L'Mishpechosav. Geirus

Synopsis:
The Jewish People underwent Geirus at Har Sinai.
There is a rule that גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי , conversion erases all previous familial relationships and renders relatives unrelated and able to marry each other.
It appears that this rule did not apply to the Jews at Har Sinai.
Why?
Answer: Because at Sinai, two things happened, but the Geirus only had one step.
One: the actual Geirus- we were granted a quantitative (613) and qualitative (servants of Hashem) increase of mitzvos and kedusha, and
Two: this endowment was declared to be exclusive to members of Klal Yisrael.
At every Geirus after Sinai, two things happen, but they are different, because they are both parts of the Geirus. (Neither of these two elements can exist independently, but they are conceptually and effectively distinct.)   
One: the person erases his past and joins Am Yisrael, and
Two: he accepts the kedusha of Avdus to Hashem and Taryag Mitzvos.
It is element One, the negation of his prior identity, that results in the annulment of familial relationships.
Element One was not present at Mattan Torah, nor was there any need for it, nor would it make any sense at all.
Therefore, at Sinai there was no negation of their prior relationships.

However, there is an contrary opinion that holds that the rule of K'katan did apply at Sinai.
I explain the basis of the two opinions.
I discuss problems with this minority opinion.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Our passuk, 11:10,  says וַיִּשְׁמַע מֹשֶׁה אֶת הָעָם בֹּכֶה לְמִשְׁפְּחֹתָיו אִישׁ לְפֶתַח אָהֳלוֹ.  Chazal (Shabbos 130a) explain that the people were upset about the Arayos restrictions they were taught at Mattan Torah.  As the Gemara says, כל מצוה שקבלו עליהם בקטטה כגון עריות דכתיב וישמע משה את העם בוכה למשפחותיו על עסקי משפחותיו עדיין עושין אותה בקטטה דליכא כתובה דלא רמו בה תיגרא.    Mitzvos they accepted with contentiousness, they are still fussing about.  (I don't know if this is a siman or a sibba.  Both make perfect sense.)  For example, it says they cried about marital relations, and this initial resentment still echoes among us, as we see that wedding negotiations always involve some argument. 

What so upset us that we came to tears?  Rashi there in Shabbos says שנאסר להם קרובות, that certain relatives that are allowed to a Ben Noach are prohibited to Jews, and they were crying for the loss of those relatives.  But there is an important disagreement between the Maharal and Reb Meir Simcha as to exactly what the problem was.

The Maharal (and Rabboseinu Ba'alei Hatosfos on our passuk) understands the Gemara to mean that many married couples realized that they would have to separate, because under the new rules their marriage was illegal. 

Reb Meir Simcha (Devarim 5:26) understands that the marriages of the people that received the Torah at Sinai were not affected: with the giving of the Torah, we all became Geirim (Yevamos 46a), and converts are viewed as newly born.  גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי.  (Yevamos 97b)  The familial history of all the people living then, who were all geirim, was erased.  All their relatives from their past life were no longer legally related to them.  Therefore, there could be no problem with marriages among those people, and so Hashem told them to go home, no matter to whom they were married, שׁוּבוּ לָכֶם לְאָהֳלֵיכֶם, which means to their marital relations (Moed Kattan 7b).  The reason they cried here in Be'ha'aloscha was because they were thinking about the future, when the children they would have in the future would not be allowed to marry the childrens' relatives.

The Maharal (Breishis 46:10 and in Yisro) says that the rule of גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי did not apply to that generation, because it was a forced conversion; Hashem had them over a barrel, so to speak.  They couldn't refuse the conversion.  A forced conversion does not yield the result of גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי.  So, many married couples were forced to separate.  (Side note- The Shmaitsa in the Hakdama says that it wasn't a literal case of duress.  Instead, the fact that the world could not exist without Torah was so obvious to the Jews at that point, that in a manner of speaking, they had no choice.  Similarly, the Prashas Drachim I discuss in a different post says that even then, there was a din of the Rambam's Kofin making Ratzon.)

Ironically, the Chasam Sofer in his pirush to Avodah Zara 63b says that he never could find a convincing source for Chazal's rule of Geir Shenisgayer K'Katan Shenolad Dami.  Reb Meir Simcha says that the passuk in Devarim 5 שׁוּבוּ לָכֶם לְאָהֳלֵיכֶם that allowed them to go home to their spouses is the source for the rule- that they could go back to their spouse even if the spouse was a relative, because any potential problem was solved by the chidush of גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי.   The Maharal looks at the same event and says that on the contrary, the couples that were related to each other were  prohibited to go home, and that's why they cried.  According to Reb Meir Simcha, it is the source for the rule.  According to the Maharal, it is the one and only exception to the rule.

Most Achronim assume the Maharal's pshat, that they were crying for the spouses they lost.  However, they offer several alternatives to the Maharal's explanation for this anomalous absence of the general rule that a Ger is no longer related to his erstwhile relatives.  As we said, the Maharal's explanation is that Mattan Torah was to some extent a forced conversion, and a forced conversion is not called a rebirth.  The explanations offered by other Achronim are as follows:

Many achronim (including Rav Shternbuch in his Moadim Uzmanim on Shvuos #238) say that Geir Shnisgayer is only Ke'Kattan when he is coming from a different nation.  But we already were descendants of the Avos, we already were Klal Yisrael.  For example, the Ramban at the end of Emor says that after Avraham's Bris Milah, his children acquired the yichus of "Zera Avraham," and the Brisker Rov in Parshas Bo says that the din of Kol ben neichar by Korban Pesach proves that there was already a legal distinction between Zera Avraham and a Ben Neichar in Mitzrayim.  So the Geirus at Mattan Torah was simply geirus to add kedusha.  Such a Geirus is not ke'katan she'nolad.

Reb Yosef Ber (YU) as brought by Rabbi Shurkin in his Harrerei Kedem brings the Rambam that Geirus requires three things, Milah, Tevilah, and Ritzui of the Dahm of a Korban.  From the words the Rambam uses (13 Issurei Bi'ah 1 and 3, and see similar in 1 Teshuva 2), it appears that he sees the Korban at Mattan Torah as essentially distinct from the normal korban of a geir: it was a korban tzibbur.  Therefore, he says, the geirus too was a geirus of a tzibbur.  We only say Ke'kattan when an individual becomes a geir, because he leaves behind all his relatives.  But where a group all becomes geirim together, their relationships survive the geirus.  I'm sure Reb YB said it slightly differently, because the way it's written it's very speculative.  What I think he said was that there is a difference between the geirus of a yachid and the geirus of a tzibbur.  Even if a bunch of geirim are misgayeir at once, they are still not related, because the nature of their geirus was Geirus Yachid.  But here, it wasn't geirus of a yachid.  It was Geirus of a Tzibbur.  A Geirus tzibbur brings along its members' relationships.


I am not a Googelamden, who just digs up a bunch of pshatim and adds nothing.  I don't write unless I can offer something new.


What I have to offer is this: 
When Rus insisted on becoming a Giyores, she told Na'ami  עמך עמי, ואלקיך אלקי.  Your nation is my nation, and your G-d is my G-d.  Geirus involves two elements, two dinim: joining Klal Yisrael and kabbalas Mitzvos Hashem.  What is this Ameich Ami business?  Why does the Ger need to join Klal Yisrael?  Apparently, it's only shayach to be chayav in Mitzvos when you're a member of Klal Yisrael: that special yachas to the Ribono shel Olam requires being a member of Am Yisrael.  Now, these two elements have different characteristics.  Establishing the special relationship through the mitzvos is a a matter of acquiring something totally new.  Before, you weren't chayav in mitzvos, and now you are.  Joining Klal Yisrael is more than a matter of entering, it requires leaving as well.  One can be a Amoni, or a Ashuri, or whatever, and that's fine, but in order to become a Yisrael, you have to abandon your earlier national identity.  Kedusha- a positive act, be'poeil.  Klal Yisrael- both a negative and a positive, shlilis and be'poeil. You have to erase your past in order to enter your future.  (Maybe this is a part of the Geirus, maybe it's only a machshir for kabbalas mitzvos.  That's a question for another day.)  This is the basis of Geir Shenisgayer: not the addition of kedusha, but rather the abandonment of the previous identity that was necessary in order to become a Yisrael.

So nowהסכת ושמע :

What is the source of this dual requirement, of joining Klal Yisrael plus kabalas mitzvos?  Why isn't Kabalas Mitzvos alone good enough?  Because at Mattan Torah, at the the bris of Chorev, two events occurred:

• One, that we were endowed with and we accepted the Chiyuv mitzvos, the special relationship with the Ribono shel Olam.  
• Two, that the Ribono shel Olam was meyacheid this chalos davka to Klal Yisrael.  

This was a geirus, certainly, but at that time the actual Geirus only had one element- chalos mitzvos and avdus to Hashem.  It so happens that there was also a special yichud of this chalos to members of Klal Yisrael.  Why was this higher kedusha made exclusive to Klal Yisrael?  I don't know.  Maybe because of Avraham's being the first to recognize with tifkeit what the Ribono shel Olam wants and to fulfill it, maybe because of the perfection of Yaakov, maybe because of the gevura of Yitzchak.  I don't know, and it doesn't matter to me.  The fact remains that this special yachas through an endowment of kedusha is specific and exclusive to members of Klal Yisrael, and this exclusivity was established at the time of Mattan Torah.  And while we were the kallah, we were also the Chosen.

After Mattan Torah, only after the limitation of chiyuv mitzvos to Klal Yisrael, the process of Geirus itself required two steps. The two steps now are:

• First that the Geir becomes a member of Klal Yisrael and 
• Second that he accepts the kedusha of mitzvos and avdus to Hashem.  

So the kashe of the Maharal disappears, poof.  Geirus is only ke'katan shenolad when the process involves two elements, identity change and kedusha.  This is true after the Bris with Klal Yisrael at Sinai, when the Ribono shel Olam was meyacheid His name and kedusha upon us.  But at Sinai, no identity change was necessary.

I think this pshat is gold, and makes everything else unnecessary.  True, Reb Meir Simcha holds that Geir shenisgayeir is ke'katan because of a Gzeiras Hakasuv and it applied to the Geirus of Sinai.  But for all the rishonim and achronim that say not like Reb Meir Simcha, what I'm saying could be, as my father zatza'l used to say, karov l'emes. 

I ask, too, that you realize that this goes FAR, FAR, BEYOND the teretz from the achronim that Rav Shternbuch brings.  What they say is dry as dust, with no explanation, no lomdus, a take it or leave it teretz.  What I'm saying brings a completely different perspective that breathes life into the teretz.

One more thing:
Let's talk for a moment about the basic machlokes whether Geirus Sinai had a din of K'katan she'nolad or not.  What's the yesod of the machlokes?

We already explained that the shita that Sinai did not cause כקטן שנולד holds that nolad comes from the change of identity, from Nochri to Yisrael.  What does the other shitta, Reb Meir Simcha, hold?  Reb Meir Simcha holds that כקטן שנולד comes from the Chalos din of becoming an Eved Hashem.  This applied 100% at Har Sinai, so there was a din of כקטן שנולד there too.

In fact, if  you want to say this with a little smile, you might say pshat in the machlokes about what causes the din of katan she'nolad - is it the שינוי השם  from Nochri to Yisrael or the שינוי רשות from owning himself (or, perhaps,  הפקרות,) to being a kinyan of the Ribono shel Olam, an Eved Hashem.



Please note that even if you don't accept the essential difference between Mattan Torah and later Geirus, the idea that Geirus involves two elements still is very useful, as follows:

Would this din apply where they were already members of Klal Yisrael?  Of course not.  They weren't abandoning their past. 
Would this din apply where it was the geirus of a tzibbur?  No it would not.  Since Hashem allowed the tzibur to convert as a whole, it appears that their din tzibbur was allowed to remain.  If not, then they couldn't have a GEIRUS TZIBUR.  If they remained a tzibur, then there was not din of katan shenolad.
And finally; would this din apply if the geirus was forced?  No, it would not. A chalos can be chall ba'al korcho.  But a bittul chalos cannot be chall ba'al korchos.  You can be mechayeiv someone in more mitzvos against his will, you can impose kedusha on him, but a person's identity is inherently personal- you can't make a person not be what he is.  That can only happen if the person changes himself.


UPDATE:
Tal Benschar wrote a comment noting that it is clear in Chazal that the generation of Sinai did inherit from their parents.  The Gemara in Bava Kamma 109a says that under certain circumstances, repayment of theft may be made to the heir of the victim.  That person is called the Go'eil.  The Torah says there may be a victim who has no heir.  The Gemara asks, but every Jew is related to every other Jew!  The Gemara says that the only person without an heir is a Ger who had no children after the conversion.  According to Reb Meir Simcha, the entire generation of Sinai were considered reborn without relatives, so why would every Jew be related to every other Jew?  There were 600,000 unrelated individuals created on that day.
I attempted to defend Reb Meir Simcha by saying that the din of Go'eil may survive the Geirus of Sinai, though the din of yerusha did not, just as Amoni or Mitzri does.  I supported this with the opinion of Reb Yochanan, that a convert (whose children later convert, according to the Rambam's reading of Reb Yochanan) is considered to have fulfilled the mitzvah of Piryah ve'Rivya.  I deflected the fact that rishonim seem to equate Go'eil with Yoresh by arguing that the laws of yerusha might be a siman of who is the go'eil, not the sibah, and would therefore apply even through geirus.

I later admitted that this argument was untenable, because there is not a shred of support for this concept in the Braisos or Gemaros or Rishonim.  

It was also noted that it is impossible to contend that there was no din yerusha in the midbar, because the way the Gemara in Bava Basra understands the story of the Bnos Tzlafchad assumes all the dinim of yerusha were in full force.

The only defense of Reb Meir Simcha I could think of is that although they were K'katan regarding Arayos, they were not K'katan  regarding Yerusha.  The problem with this is that Reb Meir Simcha says that the entire source for the rule of K'katan  is Sinai, and if it didn't apply to yerusha, on what basis does it apply in cases of later geirus?

One might respond that it is obvious to Chazal that if kurva regarding Arayos is annulled, then  kurva regarding yerusha must be annulled as well.  If so, one must deal with the contradiction evident between Tzlafchad and Shuvu L'ahaleichem.  One can say that the retention of yerusha was a singular exception to the rule which was necessitated by the overriding need to bequeath Israel to the descendants of Avraham, either to fulfill the vow to Avraham, or because we, as individuals, were not worthy of Eretz Yisrael.  Our only claim was through Avraham Avinu.  This is why Geirus did not annul kurva regarding Geirus Sinai.   But for all subsequent Geirus, just as kurva regarding Arayos is annulled, kurva regarding yerusha is annulled too.

In any case, I noted that with or without a defense of Reb Meir Simcha, we can assume that he had a way to resolve the questions, and so his opinion that K'Katan applied to Sinai remains on the roster of Shittos.

Vayishlach, 36:12, 36:22--Achos Lohton Timna. Why didn’t the Ovos accept Timna’s geirus?

See Sanhedrin 99b, where the Gemara explains that Timna went to Avrohom, Yitzchok, and Ya’akov to become a giyores, to convert to Judaism, and they refused her. So she went and became Eliphaz’s concubine just to be close to the family of Avrohom Avinu, even though it was shocking for a daughter of a king to become a concubine. The Gemora then says that we were punished for this, in that Amolek descended from her union with Eliphaz. With this the gemora illustrates that what may seem to be a posuk with no special significance is actually very meaningful. But it is important to realize that this Gemora opens the window on a very significant issue.

The Alter from Slobodkeh (in his sefer Ohr Hatzafun) says that we know that Avrohom was a great seeker of geirim, and if he refused her, he must have seen terrible character traits in her.

If so, we can say that they refused her because they correctly discerned in her the midos that ultimately expressed themselves in her descendant, Amalek, and they didn’t want those personality traits grafted onto Klal Yisroel.

Even though this rejection resulted in the birth of Amoleik, it is better to allow the creation of an eternal existential threat rather than jeopardize our defining Jewish traits. Better an external threat than an dilution of our defining traits. Better to create an Amoleik than to bring middos ro’os into Klal Yisroeil.

(I wonder where those people who stick those pakeshvillen all over Yerusholayim come from. They certainly don’t exhibit the rachmonim bayshonim v’gomlei chasodim traits we are supposed to all have inherited. Of course, they are doing it l’sheim shomayim, and even rishonim use strong expressions against other rishonim they disagree with on psak and hashkofoh. But one difference is that the rishonim knew kol hatoroh kulloh, and could confidently say their shittos were daas Torah, whereas these people are using religious impetuosity to vent their achzorius. Another difference is that the pakeshvillen are often profane, arrogant, and ignorant.)

Similarly, we find the issur of accepting Amoni and Mo’avi, apparently for their bad middos. But maybe that is only after their nation had expressed the bad middoh in a mayseh which deserved punishment--shelo kidmu. Here, her middos ro’os had not yet expressed themselves.) Even so, the Torah shows us that he and the other avos should have helped her. Their refusal shows how serious a refusal to do a chesed is--our terrible nemesis Amalek came from her.

And this is the same taineh on Ya’akov for hiding Dinah from Eisav, and of course he was punished for that as well, when Dinah was taken by Shchem.

Perhaps (see Yalkut Lekach Tov at the end of Vayishlach) the taineh was not that they didn’t do differently, but that he didn’t feel any sympathy for her when they decided that they couldn’t help her. But the fact is the gemora uses the expression Lamos (in Iyov, from the shoresh “nomeis”, meaning melt, here meaning a person who shrinks from doing chesed for his neighbor) mei’rei’aihu chesed regarding Ya’akov, which sounds like a tainah for not doing differently.

Also remember what R’ Chaim Shmeulevitz says about “ohr vechoshech mishtamshim be’irbuvia” on the Makkas Choshech. Perhaps the problem in this marriage was not only the choshech alone, but the fact that it was combined with an ohr that both Eliphaz and Timna had. In other words, Timnoh was honestly motivated to become a giyores, but along with that ohr there was a choshech that they were unable to eliminate, which, in combination with their ohr, was capable of generating a terrible force.

But there might be a theme about refusing geirim, because not only do we have the Gemora in Sanhedrin about Timno, there’s also the Gemora in Sottah 42b about Orpoh, which says that both Golyas and Yishbi (who almost killed Dovid in a later battle) were among the four sons of Orpoh. The Gemora there says that omar Hakodosh Boruch Hu yovo’u b’nei haneshukoh v’yiplu b’yad bnei hadvukoh, so you can’t really tell whether there’s any taineh on No’omi for discouraging Orpoh, or the only point of the Gemora is that Orpoh was unfit to become a Jew, as shown by the sons she ultimately had. So, although there is a clear similarity between the cases of Timnoh and Orpoh– both being turned away, both giving birth to children who threatened our existence– and there’s also the Gemora about Yaakov refusing to give Dinah as a wife to Eisov, and the story of Shchem that followed, there’s no clear evidence as to how the three fit together, whether there is a general theme or mussor haskeil, or that you have to judge them on a case by case basis.

Also note that the Gemora in Yevomos (79a) says that the reason Hashem agreed to the demand of the Giv’onim to have the children of Sho’ul killed, was in order to make a Kiddush Hashem so that other potential Gerim would see the concern that the Jews have for the well-being of Gerim, and the Giv’onim lost their livelihood with the destruction of Nov. Now, Chazal also say that Yishbi’s ability to almost kill Dovid was because the aveiroh of Nov had as of then not been forgiven (that’s why he’s called Yishbi B’nov). So you have the son of a refused geir becoming the instrument of nekomoh for an injury to geirim– not good geirim, Giv’onim, but geirim nonetheless. So you see once again that Chazal stress the importance of sympathy with, and the risks of indifference to, the geir.

R’ Chaim Ehrman attended R Schwab’s chumosh shiur for four years, and in 1961 he heard the following from him:
When nations wage war, one nation generally covets the resources or the land of the other nation. Amalek went to the desert to wage war against Yisrael. Did they want the desert? There are miles and miles of desert available to any nation. There is no need to wage war to claim the desert. Amalek had a goal in mind. He wanted to show that the Am Hashem, the nation that Hashem chose to be His people are vulnerable and can be attacked like any other nation. Amalek deliberately waged war against the Will of Hashem. He wanted to show that Hashem’s nation is made up of mere humans and can lose a war (which happened when Moshe lowered his hands) like any other nation. What is the source of this hatred?

Rav Schwab answers this question based on the Gemora in Sanhedrin 99b. Amalek’s hatred came from his mother, Timna. She was a princess from the land of Canaan. She could have lead a life of luxury and royalty. She decided to become a giyores and marry into the descendants of Avraham Avinu. She approached Yaakov Avinu, but he replied, saying “you are from Canaan, and we may have nothing to do with Canaanites.” She went to Eisav, who told her that he had three wives and could not take another wife. She approached the children of Eisav and again she was rejected. Finally, Elifaz, the son of Eisav, took her as a concubine, not as a regular wife.

Timna felt totally rejected. She stooped from being a princess to a mere concubine, not even receiving a kesuba, a dowry. She realized that Hashem is the true G-d, but became very bitter because of her treatment and the respect she should have received. (Notice the warm reception Boaz gave Ruth, a princess of Moav who gave up her religion to become a giyores.) Amalek, her son, picked up the bitterness and unhappiness of Timna. He, then, decided to avenge his mother’s sadness and rejection. The mussar haskell (moral lesson to be learned) is that we must try to be mekarev (bring close) everyone, to the best of our ability, and avoid rejecting any person from Avodas Hashem.
(End Ehrman. He says that he is in middle of putting a together a sefer of the shiurim he heard from R Schwab, which will include this.)

So, you have a pretty clear difference of opinion between the Alter and R Schwab. One said that we pushed her away because she had middos m’gunos, the other says she had middos m’gunos because we pushed her away, which seems closer to what the Gemora in Sanhedrin says. Unless pshat is that we shouldn’t have pushed her away (at all, so brusquely, so completely) despite her middos m’gunos.

If I were around when Chazal talked about discouraging potential geirim, I would have asked, but look what happened when we did that to Timnoh and to Orpoh. What would they have answered? That the richuk there was too strong? That the richuk is only a test for sincerity, but once you find sincerity you should encourage them? That we were m’racheik them because of their bad middos, and better a bad goy than a bad Jew? That instead of rejecting them completely, we should have worked with them and helped them eliminate the middos ro’os and then taken them as geirim? That even if you are m’racheik, you should be close to them socially and try to do chesed for them?

At a conference in Eretz Yisroel in July 2006 about standards in Geirus, Harav Reuven Feinstein said a new pshat in Koshim Geirim L’Yisroel K’sapachas: he said that this is also referring to the punishment for being m’racheik a geir tzedek, or in making him wait five years before his geirus, because it says “m’kablim osso miyad.”

UPDATE DECEMBER 2014
I just saw Rav Bergman in his Shaarei Ora II on this parsha, and his discussion of this sugya is beautiful.  He goes with the Alter's approach.  He adds that it was davka because she was such a great person that her middos ra'os were indelible.  A normal geir will be mevatel themselves to Klal Yisrael, and overcome their natural techunos hanefesh.  But she was so great that she couldn't be mevatel herself to our hashkafos and middos, and her terrible middos would remain part of her.  But, he says, no matter what the reason is, rejecting a person who wants to become a ger has a terrible price.  He says that we see what Avraham Avinu was willing to forego, kabalas pnei haShechina, for all the years Lot was with him, so he could be mekareiv him.  He adds something I also once said: why is גדולה הכנסת אורחים מקבלת פני השכינה?  Because receiving guests is being domeh to Hashem, mah hu.... and become Godly is far greater than being in the presence of Godliness.  In any case, the idea is that kiruv is so precious and valuable that even in those cases where kiruv is not good, where it is dangerous, rejecting it causes tremendous damage.