Questioning your hashkafos because of apparent reality.

I remember reading that Reb Yosef Ber retracted his strong initial opposition to German post-war reparations to Israel. When he  saw how much it contributed to growth and development, how much it improved the lives of Israelis, he decided that it must have been the right thing.

You don't often see Gedolei Torah changing their hashkafos, or piskei halacha that stem from their hashkafos, on the basis of the flow of history. The Satmarer did not drop "דער שיטה"  because Eretz Yisrael became such a phenomenal wellspring of Torah. As Rav Schwab famously pointed out, a purely historical analysis of the Neis Chanuka might lead to trivializing the victory. It was essentially reversed within a hundred years with the fratricidal wars of Hyrcanus and Aristobolus and finally by Hordus, and perhaps we were worse off than before. The Ramban says this was a punishment for the Chashmonai usurpation of the throne. But despite the disastrous post-Chanuka events, we  do not say that in retrospect, it renders the original miracle meaningless.

One might say that this disregard for apparent fact is the secret of Jewish tenacity. If we thought that this endless cycle of suffering and misery was evidence of having made a mistake somewhere along the lines, we would have all long ago dropped Judaism in favor of some religion that has had a placid history. We would have all become Lutherans or Hindus.  But those of us that remain have learned to refuse to accept history as evidence. Our certainty and our faith overcomes everything. We know the truth, and we are not going to believe our lying eyes.

This came to mind because of the diametrically differing perspectives I saw in Rav Chaim Zaichyk's Ohr Chadash and in Rav Ahron's Mishnas Reb Aharon.

(What the Shevatim regretted is a well-known question with varying answers. Examples: Contrast the Seforno and the Kli Yakar. What I found interesting was how Kletzk and Novarodok used it so forcefully to support such disparate hashkafos. "Look at this! From here you see a tremendous Yesod about life as a Ye'rei Shamayim!")

Reb Aharon:

ויאמרו איש אל אחיו אבל אשמים אנחנו על אחינו אשר ראינו צרת נפשו בהתחננו אלינו ולא שמענו על כן באה אלינו הצרה הזאת     ויען ראובן אתם לאמר הלוא אמרתי אליכם לאמר אל תחטאו בילד ולא שמעתם וגם דמו הנה נדרש

כלומר: גם כשראו האחים שיש ﬠליהם תביﬠה מן השמים ־ לא שינו את דעתם לגבי עצם הדין שדנו אותו, אלא שחשבו בדﬠתם שיש ﬠליהם תביﬠה ﬠל  חסרון הרחמים  "אשר ראינו צרת נפשו בהתחננו אלינו ולא שמענו." ורק ראובן טען שעצם הדבר היה חטא. אבל הם עדיין הוסיפו להחזיק בדעתם כי כל מה שעשו בדין עשו, כי חשבוהו לרודף, ..... וגם מניעת הרחמים היתה אצלם על פי דין, שהיו סבורים על פי עומק דעתם בדין זה שאינם רשאים לרחם, ואחרי שראו עונש בהשגחה, הרהרו בתשובע ע"ד מניעת הרחמים אבל לא על עצם הדין, כל כך היה הדין ודאי אצלם.

and here is how Rav Zaichyk sees it.  Page 245.

ויפתח האחד את שקו וגו' וירא את כספו וגו' ויחרדו איש אל אחיו לאמר, מה זאת ﬠשה אלקים לנו"

כפי המבואר במדרשים ובמפרשי התורה, היו הם תקיפים בדﬠתם ובטוחים בﬠצמם כל הזמן, כי מכירת יוסף אחיהם בצדק היתה ומבוססת על ההלכה, כיון שהם חשבו את יוסף לרודף שכל הקודם להרגו זכה, כשאין דרך אחרת להציל את הנרדף. הם גם דנו אותו למוציא דינם ומוסר הראוי לﬠונש מיתה בדיני אדם. הם היו כה בטוחים בצידקתם ﬠד כי ישבו לאכול לחם, בﬠיניהם לא היתה זו תקלה ﬠד כי תמנﬠ אותם מלקבוﬠ את סﬠודתם, ﬠל שחשבו כי מן השמים מסכימים לפﬠולתם.

אולם אחר כך, כאשר ראו כי מן השמים מרמזים להם כי לא כמחשבתם מחשבת הקב"ה ודﬠתו, והם טﬠו בהלכה, אז נחﬠוררו להרהר אולי טﬠו. הם ראו את אצבﬠ אלקים מרמזת להם באמצﬠות המאורﬠות והפגﬠים שבאו ﬠליהם, כי דנו שלא בצדק, מהנהגת הּשׂי'ת נפקחו עיניהם ונחרדו מן הרמז הנרמז להם משמים, כי כל תלאותיהם וצרותיהם באו ﬠל אשר דנו דיך מוטﬠה ובלתי נכון.

I don't think I am an imbecile, so I am not equating anyone with anyone else here. I am only pointing out the striking difference between Harav Zaichyk, the great Novarodoker Rosh Yeshiva and lifelong exponent of the Navorodoker mesorah, and Reb Aharon.

One tiny he'ara. Why does Reb Ahron hold that the Shvatim accepted they had made a mistake as far as feeling rachmanus, but not as far as the din as a whole? Reb Aharon describes them both as halachic decisions. So if you take your later experiences to be evidence of error in one, why not the other? Maybe pshat is that they held they were right, of course. Their hard experience clearly showed the RBSO was angry about something they had done as a group. As long as they could be toleh on the lesser matter of  מצוה לרחם\אסור לרחם they had no reason to re-think the major psak about Yosef being a Rodef and a mechallel shem shamayim by delaying the creation of a Klal Yisrael.  But the question still bothers me.

Thank you , Reb Micha, for that great zug from RYB! Assuming, as he obviously does, that there is a difference between halacha and hashkafa, it answers my question. Hashem does not pasken Halacha. But through history, He does pasken on Hashkafa. Perhaps אסור לרחם\מצוה לרחם falls under the latter.  Based on Reb Micha's heara, I should really change the title of this piece. It really should be "Changing a psak halacha...." but everyone knows that לא בשמים היא, as implicit in RYB's words, so that's a problem. It's probably a problem for Rav Zaichyk, too. Unless, as I said, that rule does not apply when you are dealing with a halacha that stems from a hashkafic determination. Additionally, לא בשמים היא does not, I think, preclude the RBSO from paskening on the world on the basis of what He holds lehalacha, irrespective of what Reb Yehoshua paskened. But even if world events show that the RBSO holds different than the Beis din shel mattah, they wouldn't have the right to change their psak, any more than Rebbi Eliezer did.  I don't like to stick my nose into this kind of machshava.

Mikeitz: The Amsonis and the word Es

42:18, Yosef's words to the brothers,

ויאמר אלהם יוסף ביום השלישי זאת עשו וחיו את־האלהים אני ירא

The holy Talmid Chacham Harav Shain has a sefer Birkas Ish.   He brings Shimon and/or Nechemiah Haamsoni from Psachim 22b, pireish.  Asks, the pireish passuk is in Voeschanan.  What about this pasuk, that says basically the same thing?  And in Shmos, Vatirenah hameyaldos es, and in Beshalach Vayiru ha'am es, and on and on.  Certainly, he knew of these pesukim, but for some reason he didn't darshen them.  He shows that the answer is clear in Onkelos.  

Almost all the time, Onkelos translates Es to mean ית.

In the beginning of vayeishev את אחיו is מן, also in that passuk את בני בלהה.

אִלֵּין תּוּלְדַת יַעֲקֹב יוֹסֵף בַּר שְׁבַע עַסְרֵי שְׁנִין (כַּד) הֲוָה רָעֵי עִם אֲחוֹהִי בַּעֲנָא וְהוּא מְרַבֵּי עִם בְּנֵי בִלְהָה וְעִם בְּנֵי זִלְפָּה נְשֵׁי אֲבוּהִי וְאַיְתִי יוֹסֵף יָת דִּבְּהוֹן בִּישָׁא לְוַת אֲבוּהוֹן:

End of Voeira בצאתי את העיר it means min.

Every one of them has meaning and must be there for clarity.

But every את השם he translates מן קדם, until the one in voeschanan. There he says ית.

את יהוה אלהיך תירא אתו תעבד ובו תדבק ובשמו תשבע

יָת יְיָ אֱלָהָךְ תִּדְחַל וּקֳדָמוֹהִי תִפְלָח וּלְדַחַלְתֵּיהּ תִּקְרַב וּבִשְׁמֵיהּ תְּקַיַּם:

Some esses are im, and some are min.  Those aren't particles, they aren't extra at all.  But other esses can be yas, and some min kadam.  These arguably, serve no apparent purpose, and should be darshened.  All the esses with Hashem he translates min kadam until the one in Voeschanan.  He points out that the Amsonis were before Onkelos.  So it's very very likely that the Amsonis always held that the Voeschanan es was also min kadam, but they later realized (I don't know what it is that made this so,) that it has to be Yas, and they said that if so, they had to retract all they had said before.  Rabbi Shain doesn't have a clear pshat either. He speculates that the three pesukim of yira before voeschanan might refer to the three dargos of yira mentioned in the Rambam yesodei hatorah 2:1 and the mesillas yesh 24. But he says it's up to us to figure it out.

On the topic: The Maharal in Nesivos Olam asks why they weren't bothered by ואהבת. He answers that ahava is dveikus, and dveikus to Hashem is compatible with dveikus with other things. But Yira is pirud, awareness of the gulf between creator and created, between cause and effect, and it is essentially exclusive to the Ribono shel Olam.

יש שואלין בזה למה לא הקשה לו מן ואהבת את ה׳ אלהיך גם כן כמו את ה׳ אלהיך תירא.

ותירוץ שאלה זאת כי המורא שייך דוקא אל אלהות, שבזה מורה שהוא אלוה ומושל והוא הענין האלהות שהוא נבדל מן האדם ואינו משותף עמו וירא מפניו, ולפיכך לא היה קשה לו מה שכתיב ואהבת את ה׳ אלהיך אם בא לרבות שיהיה אוהב חכמים או הבריות או מה שיהיה, בשביל זה לא יהיה כאן שתוף לאלהות, אבל יראת השם יתברך אין לשתף שום דבר כלל עד שבא רבי עקיבא ולימד את ה׳ אלהיך תירא לרבות ת״ח. ורצה בזה כי יש לשתף יראת חכמים עם יראת שמים כי יראת חכמים השלמה ליראת שמים ואין כאן חס ושלום שום שיתוף. וזה כי יראת השם יתברך הוא מצד שהוא יתברך נבדל מן הכל לכך שייך בו היראה, ואין שייך היראה מצד החבור רק מצד שהוא נבדל מהכל ואין לו שתוף עם זולתו, ותלמידי חכמים שהם נבדלים מן שאר אדם גם כן מצד השכל שיש בתלמיד חכם חכם כמו שהוא יתברך נבדל מהכל, מפני כך התלמיד חכם שיש לו דביקות עם השם יתברך בערך שאר אדם והשם יתברך נבדל מהכל והתלמיד חכם נבדל משאר אדם, ולפיכך אם אין לאדם יראה מן תלמיד חכם ומשותף עם תלמיד חכם לגמרי מבלי יראה מן התלמיד חכם בזה עצמו כאלו יש לו שתוף עם השם יתברך. כי לפי ערך שאר בני אדם התלמיד חכם יש לו דביקות עם השם יתברך והוא נבדל משאר אדם.

We have discussed this issue elsewhere, with a very different approach.

Mikeitz. If you have the podium, Use It!

 After interpreting Pharaoh's dreams, Yosef forthrightly advised him exactly what needed to be done.  

The Or Hachaim points out that Yosef seemed to be speaking out of place. He had not been asked for advice, he was asked to interpret the dreams. He explains that this was part of the interpretation, in the sense the Yosef had to explain to Pharaoh that Hashem had shown him the interpretation in order to save the Egyptian people.

ועתה ירא וגו'. טעם יוסף שנעשה יועץ למלך והוא לא בקש ממנו אלא פתרון החלום, כי בא לתת לו טעם אשר הראהו ה' את אשר הוא עושה כי הוא כדי שיפקד פקידים וגו'. עוד להיות שהראוהו בחלום שבלעו הפרות הרקות לפרות הבריאות זה יגיד כי יתפרנסו שני רעב משני שבע, ולזה אמר ירא פרעה וגו':

The Ramban is more practical - Yosef wanted the job.

 ואמר יוסף כל זה בעבור שיבחרו אותו כי החכם עיניו בראשו:

Harav Galinski, in his colorful והגדת, points out this behavior of Yosef, and says that it is a big mussar haskeil for each and every one of us.

אמת, לא נדרש ליעץ למלך. אבל רצה שיבחרו בו, ו"המיקרופון" בידו, הכל מאזינים לו, נצל ההזדמנות והשמיע דבריו, ובתוך שעה היה משנה למלך מצרים.

ההורים, המיקרופון בידם.

המחנכים, המיקרופון בידם.

הרבנים, המיקרופון בידם.

רשות הדיבור נתונה, מאזינים לדבריהם, ינצלו את הבמה באפן מושכל להעביר רעיונותיהם, להדריך ולהשפיע!

A very Novarodoker perspective. It may look like עזות פנים, but it is really not. Don't allow fear of how you will look hinder you from doing what needs to be done. No hispailus. You have a job, you have an opportunity, take advantage of the moment and get it done. What people may think of you is not a factor at all.

I was reminded of this when reading a new post by Marc Shapiro on the Seforim Blog, in which he discusses what the mysterious letters שב are doing in some machzorim after each set of Tekiyos. He brings down a pshat from Reb Bunim from Pashischa, which some might view as profound, and other less evolved minds might view as bizarre. Be that as it may, it is similar to what Rav Galinsky said. I remember hearing a very similar thought in Yiddish, something to do with ווען דו שטייסט ביים ברעטל, but in Latin, it's Carpe Diem.

For the other quiz question, I asked about the letters שב that are found after the first and second set of shofar blasts. What is this about?

I was going to discuss this matter and present various sources. However, Moshe Babad alerted me to the existence of a comprehensive article that recently appeared on this very topic, and thus there is no need for me to go into any detail. The article is by R. Yehudah Aryeh Markson and appears in the journal Etz Hayyim 30 (Elul 5778), pp. 408-437 (it is not yet on Otzar haChochma). The title of the article is

שב בני שב – לגלגוליו של מנהג קדמון שנשתכח

R. Markson begins by noting that he, like everyone else, simply paid no mind to the word שב that appears together with tekiat ha-shofar. It was only after he was asked what the meaning of שב is that he investigated the matter. This led him to uncovering the story of what used to be a widespread minhag that for some reason simply disappeared and was almost entirely forgotten from Jewish communal memory (with the exception of a few “pure” German minyanim, such as KAJ in Washington Heights).

R. Markson mentions various explanations that have been offered for שב including the incorrect suggestion that it is one of the holy names that you need to have in mind before shofar blowing. Another incorrect explanation was offered by R. Simhah Bunim of Peshischa that שב is an abbreviation for שוטה בלאז – “Idiot, blow.” In other words, blow the shofar without any special kavvanot and just have in mind to fulfill the mitzvah. (I am sure that R. Simhah Bunim didn’t really think that this is the meaning of שב but was only offering a “midrashic” understanding. This is probably also the case with those who explain the letters to mean שוואנץ בלאז.) A third incorrect explanation is that שב is related to תשובה and is directed to the people to urge them to do teshuvah. A fourth incorrect explanation mentioned by R. Markson is that שב should be read שֵב, as in שב ועל תעשה, and the meaning is that the person who blows the shofar should cease his blowing and wait a bit before resuming the next set of shofar blasts. According to this explanation, the reason for waiting is to give him time for silent prayer or to separate the different groups of shofar blasts. R. Markson records other incorrect explanations as well.

The fourth explanation mentioned in the previous paragraph is closest to the truth, which, as R. Markson shows, has its origin in medieval Ashkenazic minhag where it is first mentioned by Maharil. The word שב should indeed be read שֵב, and it means “sit”. The one calling out the shofar sounds was telling the blower to sit down between the series of blasts. R. Markson, p. 426 n. 71, refers to Maharil as ‘אבי ומייסד מנהג אמירת ה’שב. However, I don’t know on what basis one can say this, as opposed to assuming that Maharil is simply recording a minhag that was already practiced in his day. After all, as R. Markson notes, R. Meir of Rothenburg records the practice of the shofar blower to sit between the series of blasts, though there is no mention of the shofar blower being told שב.

Why is the person blowing the shofar told to sit? R. Markson presents a variety of explanations such as to show that the three groups of shofar blasts are separate from each other, to show that these blasts are the tekiot di-meyushav, to give the shofar blower a chance to focus on teshuvah or just to rest, or to confuse the Satan.

In the comments that follow that post, there was this nice explanation:

 פרשיסחא says:

December 16, 2020 at 1:23 pm

The story of the Rebbe Reb Bunim is told that שוטה בלאז was his response to someone who claimed he prepared all the kavanos besides that one of שב.

Mikeitz, Bereishis 41:16. The Nexus of Spiritual and Physical

This is from Reb Yaakov, with my son R' Mordechai's hesber.
Emes L'Yaakov here:

מ"א ט"ז בלעדי אלקים יענה את שלום פרעה 

הנה לכשנתבונן בב' מיני נרות שנצטוינו להדליק נר שבת ויו"ט ונר חנוכה הא' ניתן להשתמש בו ואדרבה בלא תשמיש א"צ להדליק והב' אסור בתשמיש ואפי' לעסוק כנגדו בד"ת אר בדבר מצוה נאסר הא' משום שלום בית והשני מפני שהוא כנגד אור המקדש עדות היא לישראל שהשכינה שרויה בישראל והלא גדול השלום שמדחה לנר חנוכה ואף שכאן ישנו פירסומא ניסא אבל שלום ביתו עדיף וצריך טעם הלוא פרסום הנס מאשר ההשגחה הפרטית ויכולת ד' וכל הדברים הנגררים מצד הנס אבל מצד אחר עונג השבת התאחדות הגשמיות והרוחניות על ידי סעודת השבת זהו ענין המאחד כל העולמות זה בזה והרי אכילת שבת מעין עולם הכא ואיך יתכן שאכילה ושתיה יהיו מעין עולם של רוחניות ליום שכולו שבת ומנוחה וע"כ מפני שהעולמות אחוזים זה בזה וזוהי דרכן של אבותינו שבכל הויות העולם שתפו שם שמים בכל עניניהם והדברים הגיעו כל כך עד שיוסף הצדיק בדברו שיחת חולין לכאורה עם פרעה מלך מצרים תיכף בשמעו שמלך מצרים אומר שמעתי עליך תשמע חלום לפתור אותו מוחה בכל תוקף ואומר בלעדי אלקים יענה את שלום פרעה ואח"כ בתוך דבריו את אשר האלקים עושה הראה את פרעה וכן להלן ועל השנות החלום גו' כי ממהר אלקים לעשותו וכן היתה שיחתו כל כך עד שפרעה הכופר שאמר לי יאורי ואני עשיתיני יחזקאל כ"ט פ"ג הוכרח להודות בפני שריו ועבדיו הנמצא כזה איש אשר רוח אלקים בו הרי שכן הבין גם פרעה וזהו השלוב של גשם ורוח ועיין מה שכתבתי בביאור ענין זה להלן בפרשת וארא שמות ז' פכ"ב 

Reb Yaakov points out that we have two mitzvos to light candles, one for Shabbos and Yomtov and one for Chanuka. The first requires that we enjoy and benefit from it, but benefiting in any way from the second is assur, even to use it to learn Torah. If only one can be done, the Shabbos candle has priority, despite the lesson of Chanuka that miracles can happen, that the spiritual is the true power in the world. The reason, he says, and as my son explained, is that Kodoshim, certainly the Menorah, involve taking the physical and converting it to purely spiritual. But the experience of Shabbos means to bring the physical and the spiritual together, to harmonize them by connecting them to each other. That is a far greater mitzva than the light of Chanuka.

Vayeishev, Miketz: Why Yosef Remained in Prison Two Extra Years

At the end of Vayeishev, Yosef asked the Sar HaMashkim to remember him to Pharaoh, to ask that he be released because he was innocent. The Sar HaMashkim forgot Yosef until Pharaoh had the inscrutable dream that begins our Parsha. Rashi says that Yosef was forgotten, and remained imprisoned for two extra years, for his lack of faith. He should have trusted in divine providence and should not have made any attempt to hasten the process. Parshas Mikeitz begins with that word because it indicates the end of a discrete period- in this case, the two additional years of incarceration that Yosef was required to experience.

Rashi 40:23

But the chief cupbearer did not remember: on that day

ולא זכר שר המשקים: בו ביום:.

and he forgot him: afterwards. Because Joseph relied on him to remember him, he was compelled to be confined for two years, as it is said:“Praiseworthy is the man who made the Lord his trust and did not turn to the haughty (רְהָבִים)” (Ps. 40:5). He did not turn to the Egyptians, who are called רַהַב, haughty. [From Gen. Rabbah 89:3]

וישכחהו: לאחר מכן. מפני שתלה בו יוסף בטחונו לזכרו, הוזקק להיות אסור עוד שתי שנים, שנאמר (תהלים מ ה) אשרי הגבר אשר שם ה' מבטחו ולא פנה אל רהבים, ולא בטח על מצרים הקרוים (ישעיה ל ז) רהב:

Reb Moshe finds this incredible. Despite our faith that Hashem's will ultimately being effected, we are expected and required to make an effort to accomplish things on our own. We know that our success or failure will be because Hashem made it so, but we must make the effort. This is elementary. Reb Moshe rejects the idea that Tzadikim Gemurim, like Yosef, should make no effort at all. So Reb Moshe says two things;

1. Yosef's experience in going to Egypt and his life there involved constant miracles. From the moment he was sold by the brothers, his life should have ended five times, and the fact that he survived and flourished was obvious divine intervention. In addition, his terrible circumstances, his unjust imprisonment, also indicated clear hashgacha pratis. So while others are expected to make personal efforts, in Yosef's case, where it was clear as day that a preordained story was unfolding moment by moment, his personal efforts were inappropriate.

But, Reb Moshe says, this only explains one year of imprisonment. Even Resha'im don't suffer in Gehinnom for more than one year, so why did Yosef remain confined for two years?  So he says

2. Rashi describes the Mitzrim, and specifically the Sar HaMashkim, as רהבים. Rahav means haughty. Yosef should have realized that you never should ask for a favor from a haughty person, from a baal ga'avah, because for the ba'al gaivah, nobody matters, nobody really exists, but himself. He will not lift a finger for another unless he directly benefits. So although Yosef was already punished for his misunderstanding of the Hashgacha Pratis, he was punished again for doing something that, for Yosef, was foolish. Nothing to do with religion, it was a punishment for doing something foolish. Like when you slap a child for running into the street- it's not a religion thing,  it's just teaching somebody to have more seichel and to think before he jumps.


I want to emphasize this second answer. You might ask, if Yosef was punished for failing to see or trust the Yad Hashem, what difference does it make if his request was foolish? Again, the answer is that it doesn't matter that he shouldn't have made any effort in the first place. It's true, he shouldn't have made any effort at all, and he was punished for making it. But as an entirely separate matter, whatever a man does must be done with seichel, and doing something without full focus deserves a patch.

I usually post only things of my own, but I was so enamored of the seichel hayashar in this piece that I had to put it up. When Yosef talks to Pharaoh in the beginning of Mikeitz, of course his interpretation was divinely inspired. But his brilliant suggestions to Pharaoh were not, as far as I know, part of his nevu'ah. That was what he thought of on his own, and it took a lot of courage and fast thinking to make those audacious suggestions. If Pharaoh were in a bad mood, he could have thanked Yosef for his interpretation and have him killed or thrown back into the pit. He had plenty of skilled tax-masters and bureaucrats that could have done the job. It was Yosef's presentation and words that awed Pharaoh and convinced him on the spot to take this foreign slave and make him the viceroy of Egypt. That was all Yosef's doing.
 
Here are Reb Moshe's words; it is written in several places, but this is what he wrote in the Darash Moshe.

וישכחהו 

שם פרש"י מפני שתלה בו יוסף בטחונו לזכרו הוזקק להיות אסור שתי שנים וכו' מה 

שנענש יוסף בשנתים ימים אף שיב"ח הרי הוא שיעור העונש כעדיות ספ"ב נראה דהוא על שני דברים 

א על שהי"ל לידע שרק בשבילו עשה השי"ת שישימו את שר המשקים והאופים בבית הסוהר שהוא נמצא שם ושיחלמו חלומות והוא יפתור אותם וממילא לא הי"ל לבקשו אף שודאי צריך כל אדם להשתדל במה שביכלתו ואין בזה שום חסרון בבטחון וגם יעקב עשה כל העצות אף שבטח רק בהשי"ת אבל כן הוא רצון השי"ת שהאדם ישתדל והוא יעזרהו ולא שיסמוך על נסים אבל הכא הי"ל להבין שהוא רק מעשה השי"ת להצלתו 

ב שהי"ל לידע שמצרים שנקראו רהב משום שהם בעלי גאוה ובעלי הגאוה שמתגאים על לא דבר ולא שום מעלה לא שייך שיעשו איזה טובה לשום אדם שזהו מחסרון בעלי הגאוה שכל אדם שפל בעיניהם ואין כדאי להם לעשות לו טובה וצריך האדם לידע זה ולכן נענש בשתי שנים 

I also want to add something from the Gemara in Bava Metziah 75b. The Gemara lists three whose prayers are ignored. The third is a person who is not successful in one city and lacks the sense and courage to move to another city and start over again. He should know that galus is mechaper, or that he's too deep into a bad circumstance to help himself, and it's time to move. If he doesn't move, then it's his own fault, and when you bring your bad fate upon yourself and are unwilling to make the effort that can resolve your problem, your tefillos will be ignored. 

תנו רבנן שלשה צועקין ואינן נענין ואלו הן מי שיש לו מעות ומלוה אותן שלא בעדים והקונה אדון לעצמו ומי שאשתו מושלת עליו קונה אדון לעצמו מאי היא איכא דאמרי תולה נכסיו בנכרי איכא דאמרי הכותב נכסיו לבניו בחייו איכא דאמרי דביש ליה בהא מתא ולא אזיל למתא אחריתא:

Rashi there-

שהרי הם גרמו לעצמן

I spoke about this idea elsewhere- that we were placed in this world not only to do Torah and Mitzvos but also to become the best human beings we are capable of becoming- and that involves every thing that expresses our humanity and seichel that we are capable of doing. You are put here not just to become a malach, but also to become a mentsch. I don't want to hide behind ambiguity here, so I'll make it clear. The Ribono shel Olam requires not only that we follow halacha and develop good middos, but also that we develop our intellectual abilities to their greatest extent. A person that is meticulous about religious law and middos but acts without seichel or lazily in worldly matters transgresses Hashem's will. It is a sin to be a na'ar. Being a na'ar is not just what Rashi says in 37:2 about Yosef being excessively interested in his appearance- 

"והוא נער" - שהיה עושה מעשה נערות מתקן בשערו ממשמש בעיניו כדי שיהיה נראה יפה- 

it involves anything done without intelligence and maturity.

Mikeitz, Bereishis 42:37. Reuven's Guarantee and the Relationship with Grandchildren.

Shimon was imprisoned in Mitzrayim, and the brothers told Yaakov that they had been warned not to return to Egypt without Binyamin.  When they found their money in their sacks, Yaakov was distraught, convinced that if he sent Binyamin he would never see him again, and that Shimon was finished.  Reuven told Yaakov that he guaranteed the return of Binyamin; he said  את שני בני תמית אם לא אביאנו אליך תנה אתו על ידי ואני אשיבנו אליך, he was so sure that he could bring Binyamin back that he told Yaakov that he could kill his two sons if he didn't bring Binyamin back.  Rashi brings the Medrash that לא קבל דבריו של ראובן. אמר בכור שוטה הוא זה, הוא אומר להמית בניו, וכי בניו הם ולא בני.  Yaakov rejected Reuven's words.  He said "This is a deranged firstborn.  Are they his children and not mine?"

The Maharitz Chiyos in his Toras Hanevi'im (in the note there) wonders how Reuven could seriously make such an offer.  Is one's child's life a commodity?  He suggests that perhaps Reuven's ability to make such an offer was pursuant to his status as leader of his brothers and presumptive king of the nascent Klal Yisrael.

The Chasam Sofer in his last teshuva in Orach Chaim, written to the Maharitz Chiyos, disagrees, and says that this was just Reuven's way of saying that he would give up his din bechor, his claim to a double inheritance.  "שני בני" means his bechor status, which gave him a claim as if he were two heirs.  He explains that the expression "תמית" is just another way of saying that he would give up his claim to land in Eretz Yisrael.  The Gemara in Bava Basra 118b says that owning land in Eretz Yisrael is referred to as חיות, life:

 מרגלים יהושע וכלב נטלו חלקם.  מנהני מילי? אמר עולא דאמר קרא (במדבר יד) ויהושע בן נון וכלב בן יפנה חיו מן האנשים ההם; 

and the Gemara says מאי חיו שחיו בחלקם, so you see that חיות can be a metonym for ownership of land in Eretz Yisrael.  Reuven was saying, if I fail, you can take away my bechora-rights, which would mean cutting his share in Eretz Yisrael in half.  The Chasam Sofer adds that according to his pshat, the Medrash should not be read as if Yaakov was ridiculing Reuven's attitude that his sons were his and not Yaakovs, but rather that Yaakov was saying that he had already taken away the bechora from Reuven- "Do you think your family is entitled to a double portion as if your two sons were my two sons?  They're not.  I've already decided to strip you of your bechora.  They're your sons, not mine, and you're entitled to no more than a regular heir."

Rav Baruch Epstein says this pshat also, and he makes it clear that his way of putting it is superior to the Chasam Sofer's.  

אפשר לפרש הענין [ע״ד הדרש] על פי מ״ד בב״ב , ויהושע וכלב חיו מן האנשיס  התרים מן הארץ, ופריך בגמרא , מאי חיו, אילימא  חיו ממש והכתיב קרא אחרינא (פ׳ פינחס) ולא נותר  מהם איש כי אם כלב בן יפונה ויהושע בן נון, אלא מאי חיו — שחיו מחלקם, כלומר שנטלו חלקם של  מרגלים בחלוקת הארץ [ע״ד מה שאמרו זכה — נוטל  חלקו וחלק חבירו], ויהי׳ לפי״ז באור הלשון חיו  כלפי שאמרו עני חשוב כמת נקרא העשיר חי   ולפי״ז כשנרצה לומר פלוני נתעשר מפלוני אומרים  פלוני נחיה מפלוני, ומבואר לפי״ז דכמו שהנוטל  חלק בנחלה נקרא חי,  כן המאבד חלקו נקרא מת וע"ד זה אפשר לפרש כוונת דרשת חז"ל עה"פ דפרשת משפטים וגם בעליו יומת דקאי על עונש ממון, כנודע.  והנה ידוע דיעקב הנחיל לבניו ולבני בניו את ארץ כנען, כמבואר בפ' ויחי בברכתו לאפרים ומנשה  ובמדרשים ואגדות, ועל זה אמר ראובן, אשר אם  לא ימלא משלחתו בבנימין להשיבו אז ירשה לו שיאבד  בצואתו זכות נחלת שני בניו בארץ כנען, והוציא ענין זה בלשון תמית ע״ד המליצה כלפי אלה הנוחלים  שנקראו חיים כמו שבארנו, וע'ע בפרשה הסמוכה  בפסוק ע׳ מש״כ שס. [לאחר שנים רבות שכתבתי  זה הייתי בע״מ וויען  והגיד לי שם אחד מחכמי עיר  פרעסבורג כי הגאון חת״ס בכתביו נגע ברעיון זה]++ זה.

If Harav Epstein had picked up the Teshuvos, he would have seen that the Chasam Sofer was indeed נוגע ברעיון זה, and that his version is not substantively superior.  One can, however, enhance the Chasam Sofer by reference to the Brisker Rov in Vayechi (48:16) as follows.

In Parshas Vayechi, Yaakov gives a bracha to the sons of Yosef.  In 48:4, it says ונתתי את הארץ הזאת לזרעך אחריך אחזת עולם.  Then, in 48:5 it says שני בניך הנולדים לך בארץ מצרים עד באי אליך מצרימה לי הם אפרים ומנשה כראובן ושמעון יהיו לי.   Finally, in 48:16 it says ויקרא בהם שמי.  We immediately realize that these two sons of Yosef have thus supplanted the sons of Reuven- they were counted as separate shevatim, thus granting a double portion to Yosef.  Now, the Rov brings from the Rashbam and the Ramban that ויקרא בהם שמי means שיחיה זרעם וזרע זרעם, or שיעמוד זרעם ושמם.  He explains that passuk 4 shows that the essence of the Bracha was inheritance of the land; 5 shows that this bracha gave Yosef's sons the status of being Yaakov's sons and thereby independent Shevatim, who are therefore entitled to individual portions, thus yielding for Yosef a double portion.  The Gemara in Bava Basra 115b states אמר אביי גמירי דלא כלה שבטא, we have a kabbala that no Shevet will be entirely wiped out.  Also, he brings that the Toras Kohanim Bechukosai 8 says ברית כרותה לשבטים, and the Raavad there says ברא הקב"ה ברית שלא יכלה זרעם.  According to this, we can see how meduyak the Chasam Sofer's idea is in the words of Reuven and Yaakov:  If Reuven's sons would have the status of Shevatim, this would yield two results: double portion of land, and a guarantee that they and their names would survive forever.  By waiving his claim to the Bechorah, Reuven exposed his children to the possibility of death.  We don't need the Chasam Sofer's connection of the word חיו to ownership of land.  The חיות at issue was real חיות, the guarantee of survival, and that is why Reuven said את שני בני תמית.

The Aruch LaNer, in his Binyan Tziyon, says he doesn't like the Chasam Sofer's pshat, (although I don't think his complaints are very strong,) and suggests a different pshat.  He says that Reuven was making an oath that he would bring Binyamin back.  The Gemara (e.g., Shabbos 32b,) says that transgression of an oath can cause the death of minor children.  At that time, two of Reuven's four children were minors, so he was telling Yaakov that he was willing to make a Shvu'ah that he would bring Binyamin back, even knowing that failure to fulfill the oath would be fatal to his two minor sons.   With a little imagination, the Aruch LaNer's pshat can be read into the Targum Yonasan, who says ית תרין בניי תקטול בשמתא אין לא איתיניה לוותך.

What I find most interesting here is the apparent difference between the perspectives of Reuven and Yaakov about the relationship between a person and his grandchildren.  Reuven held that the connection of Yaakov to Reuven's children is contingent on Reuven.  If Reuven's relationship with Yaakov would be destroyed, then his children would no longer have anything to do with Yaakov.  Yaakov held that Bnei Banim K'Banim, that the relationship to a grandchild stands independent of the relationship to the child.  Obviously it stems from that first connection, but it acquires independent significance.  Even if a child were disinherited and estranged, the relationship to the grandchildren would not necessarily be affected.  It could be that this is the Shakla v'Tarya of the Gemara in Yevamos 62b, where it's pashut that בני בנים הרי הן כבנים as far as the son of a son, but it's a chidush that it applies to the son of a daughter.  It also comes up in the din of yerusha b'kever in Yeish Nochlin in Bava Basra 116b, as follows:

בעי רמי בר חמא אבי האב ואחיו כגון אברהם ויעקב בנכסי עשו איזה מהן קודם אמר רבא תא שמע האב קודם לכל יוצאי יריכו ורמי בר חמא יוצאי יריכו שלו ולא יוצאי יריכו של בנו ה"נ מסתברא דקתני זה הכלל כל הקודם בנחלה יוצאי יריכו קודמין ואילו איתיה ליצחק יצחק קודם השתא נמי דליתיה יצחק יעקב קודם שמע מינה:

Rashbam there:

אבי האב. של מת והאחין של מת דהיינו זקנו ואחין איזה מהן קודם מי לימא כיון דיצחק קודם ליעקב לירש את עשו דהאב קודם לאח הרי הוא כאילו ירשו יצחק לעשו והלכך יבוא יעקב ויירש את יצחק אביו אבל אברהם לא יירשנו שהבן של מת קודם לאבי המת או דלמא בני בנים הרי הן כבנים ונמצא עשו בן אברהם וקודם אברהם ליעקב בנכסי עשו דהאב קודם לאחין: 

So it turns out that this question is at the bottom of Rami bar Chama's iboya.  

The question also arises in matters of family law- in many, if not all states, grandparents have an independent right of visitation with their grandchildren, except where the exercise of such rights infringes on the superior rights of the parents.  This should be tolui on the machlokes between Yaakov and Reuven, the Gemara in Yevamos, and the iboya of Rami bar Chama in Bava Basra.

Miketz, Breishis 43:14. The First Acheir: וְשִׁלַּח לָכֶם אֶת אֲחִיכֶם אַחֵר וְאֶת בִּנְיָמִין Also, Chanuka.

Three parts: Part one, Chanuka. Part Two, Parshas Mikeitz.  Part Three, a complaint about abysmally bad taste.

Part I

In honor of Chanuka, I want to link to an older piece that I wrote about Tumah Hutra Betzibur, טומאה הותרה בציבור.  It is a high quality piece, but of interest only to a limited audience.   

Part II

And now, on to Parshas Mikeitz.

וְ*ל שַׁ*י יִתֵּן לָכֶם רַחֲמִים לִפְנֵי הָאִישׁ וְשִׁלַּח לָכֶם אֶת אֲחִיכֶם אַחֵר וְאֶת בִּנְיָמִין וַאֲנִי כַּאֲשֶׁר שָׁכֹלְתִּי שָׁכָלְתִּי 

Yaakov says to his sons, if you must go back to Mitzrayim, and you must take Binyamin, then there's nothing I can do but pray that Hashem give you favor in the eyes of the man who threatened you, and may you bring back your other brother and Binyamin.  

The Ramban here, (also brought in the Shai Latorah I,) says that obviously the "other brother," אֲחִיכֶם אַחֵר, is Shimon.  The Ramban asks why Yaakov refers to Shimon as Achichem acheir, not Shimon beni, my poor son Shimon who has been imprisoned in Mitzrayim.  He answers that Yaakov was still angry about what Shimon did to the people of Shechem, and he wouldn’t even mention Shimon’s name; and Yaakov would have left Shimon in Mitzrayim if not for the fact that they didn’t have any bread in the house.

The Shai Latorah brings that Reb Simcha Zissel Broide/Chevron points out how amazing this is, how makpid Yaakov was on Shimon.  Here it was twenty years later, and according to the Ramban the complaint against Shimon  was not the action Shimon had taken against Shechem, but instead Shimon and Levi’s not having asked Yaakov’s advice/permission.  And still, he was unwilling to take a risk to save Shimon, and when circumstances forced his hand, he only referred to him as "the other one," Acheir.  We see, he says, the degree of seriousness Yaakov attached to family discipline, that it was such an unforgivable breach that he would have left Shimon there in prison, and when the opportunity to get him back arose, he referred to him as his "Acheir," like Elisha ben Avuyah.

            The truth is, the Ramban does say this, but there’s an essential point that was left out in the sefarim that quote it.  We have to ask ourselves, did Shimon ask for mechilah? Did he demonstrate a change of heart?  Did he make an effort to address the problem?  Are we not justified in saying pshat in the Ramban that Shimon was recalcitrant, and would have done the same again?  (These are rhetorical questions.  Answers: No. No. No. Yes.)  If so, Yaakov’s attitude was far more understandable. 

Once again, we have an example of Shimon’s position in the shvatim.  Nowhere in Tanach is anything nice said about him.  I have seen stained glass windows in shuls that had the twelve tribes with a passuk from Tanach about each, and the window for Shimon has a generic passuk that is totally irrelevant to Shimon, because the people who made the windows couldn't find one nice thing in Tanach about that Sheivet.  Shimon was not only a kannai, he was stubborn, and never accepted constructive criticism that he should learn to channel and redirect his anger.  A blind zealotry that rejects the need for discipline and nuance is deadly and even self-destructive.  Levi, on the other hand, apparently channeled their aggressiveness into avodas Hashem and became the great teachers of Klal Yisrael.
(Note: Acheir is the epithet by which Elisha ben Avuya, who lived at the time of the Tana'im, is known.  While his scholarship is not contested, his rejection of orthodox theology resulted in his expulsion from the his peer group (Chulin, Shiluach Hakein) and his eternal disgrace of being referred to as Acheir, the Other.  Reb Meir, the great Tanna, studied with him.  When Reb Meir's attempt (end of Horyos) to depose Rabban Gamliel failed, Rabban Gamliel declared  that henceforth Reb Meir would be quoted  as Acheirim, a dual insult: that his name is not mentioned, and although Reb Meir felt he could study the Torah with Elisha ben Avuya without being influenced by his heretical theology, Rabban Gamliel was here asserting that Reb Meir was influenced by Elisha, and deserved to be called Acheirim just as his teacher was called Acheir.)

Part III

On a completely different topic:

A few years ago, I wrote about the minhag of inscribing the name of the donor or other honorees on sanctified objects.  I wrote the following:

Benefactors donate items to Shuls and Batei Medrash, which are intended to beautify and glorify our places of Tefillah and Torah. For example, people donate Sifrei Torah, or the Paroches on the Aron Kodesh. And, to our bemusement, in middle of that beautiful thing, is a lengthy description of who donated it and why they donated it. We learn that they gave it for their birthday, or in honor of their anniversary, or whatever private motivation that they choose to record in shining letters. It often strikes us as incongruous that while the ostensible motive of the donor is to glorify Hashem, it seems that they are equally motivated by their desire to show off their munificence and perpetuate their own glory. As usual, this attitude does conclusively prove one thing, and that is Daas Baal Habayis Hepech Daas Torah, that where we think we are standing up for the honor of the Torah, in fact we are just venting ignorant feelings of prejudice and jealousy. The Rashba addresses this issue in his Responsa.

The Tshuvos HaRashba in 981 brings a proof from the story of Yosef that when a person does a mitzvah, it is proper to publicize that he did it and why he did it. The Torah sees fit to interrupt the narrative of the sale of Yosef to note that Reuven was purely motivated and that he intended to save Yosef. As cited by the Torah Temimah here, the Rashba then says, and the Rama in YD 249:13 paskens, that one who dedicates an object to tzedakah may write his name on it, and the community cannot interfere with this prerogative. So, all those parochos and things that have a gantzeh megillah about who donated it and why, might look like they aggrandize the donor at the expense of the beauty of the donated object, but the Rashba and the Rama say it’s fine. The truth is, these inscriptions can also be seen as beautiful in themselves, since they give voice to and demonstrate the donor’s love and respect for the davar shebikdusha and his desire to be associated with them.  As  Lkwdguy put it, " while some choose to mark anniversaries with eternity bands, these donors chose to mark theirs with something truly eternal."  Beautifully said.  Lkwdguy must work on Madison Avenue.

 This question came to mind recently.  For a guest's simcha, a family sefer Torah was brought to shul.  It was a sefer torah from Europe, purchased from the gentiles who had saved it from being burned when all the Jews of the town were herded into the shul and burned alive.  The rav of the town was the great great grandfather of the young man who was celebrating a simcha.  On the Mantle of the sefer was a Jewish Star, the yellow star with 'Jude' inside that the Nazis forced Jews to wear.  It was not an authentic relic, it was a new embroidered patch.

So, what do you think about that?  Poignant symbolism, or shameful abuse of a Sefer Torah? Profundity or ignorance?  I vote for ignorance and shameful.  These symbols were used to dehumanize us, to identify us as targets for torture and horrible deaths.  We should never forget our sufferings and martyrdom; but the Sefer Torah is not the proper place to put that reminder.  The Sefer Torah is our glory and our connection to the Ribono shel Olam, it is the precious heart of Klal Yisrael, it is the word and will of Hashem.  You don't put symbols of our degradation and suffering on it.  When we start engraving wedding bands with Arbeit Macht Frei, we can put Jewish stars on Sifrei Torah.  Either it makes the Sefer beautiful or it doesn't belong there. 

Mikeitz, Breishis 43:14. The First "Acheir"

Yaakov consents to his childrens’ request that he allow them to return to Egypt, despite the danger to Binyamin. He says "may Hashem grant you success, that you will come back safely and bring back my other son, (Shimon, who had been incarcerated in Egypt,) and my son Binyamin.

The Ramban here, and it is also brought in the Shai Latorah I, asks why Yaakov refers to Shimon as so coldly as Achichem acheir, 'your other brother', not Shimon beni, 'my son'. Yaakov does refer to Binyamin, on the other hand, as 'my son.' Why the obvious and clearly intentional use of a cold and dispassionate description of Shimon?

The Ramban answers that Yaakov was still angry about Shchem, and he wouldn’t even mention Shimon’s name. He would have left him in Mitzrayim if not for the fact that they didn’t have any bread in the house. The Shai Latorah brings from Reb Simcha Zissel Broide/Chevron that this is amazing, how makpid Yaakov was on Shimon; it was twenty years after the event, and according to the Ramban himself the complaint against Shimon and Levi was not the action against Shchem, but instead Shimon and Levi’s not having asked Yaakov’s advice/permission. We see, he says, the degree of seriousness Yaakov attached to family and personal discipline, that it was an unforgivable breach to the extent that he would have left Shimon to rot in Egypt, and he called him his Acheir, like Elisha ben Avuyah.

The truth is that yes, the Ramban does say this, but there’s an extremely important point that was left out. We have to ask ourselves, did Shimon ask for mechilah? Did he demonstrate a change of heart? Are we not justified in saying pshat in the Ramban that Shimon was adamant and recalcitrant, and would have done the same again? If so, Yaakov’s attitude was far more understandable, and it's just loshon hora to say that the Ramban attributed to Yaakov Avinu such an adamant anger toward Shimon, that he never forgave him for a twenty year old sin, to the extent that he referred to him as 'the other one,' like Elisha ben Avuya, and would have left him enslaved in Egypt. The Ramban says no such extreme thing.

Once again, by the way, we have an example of Shimon’s position in the shvatim– nowhere in Tanach is anything nice said about him. The members of Shevet of Levi, on the other hand, who was Shimon's equal partner in the destruction of Shchem, apparently channeled their aggressiveness into avodas Hashem.