Vayakhel, Shemos 35:30, 31. Betzalel ben Uri ben Chur l’matei Yehudah....Chochmoh, tvunoh, vodaas.

Originally published in 2007. It's very good, so I'm putting it in the front of the line.

Reb Meir Simchah here (Meshech Chochmoh) asks, why does the possuk list Betzalel’s yichus selectively, noting specifically his ancestors Chur and Yehudah.

He answers that one is faced with the possibility of the ultimate sacrifice, of martyrdom, close and meticulous rational analysis is untimely. When Nachshon and Shevet Yehudah were faced with the test of whether they would jump into the Red Sea, and when Chur was faced with a mob of hysterics demanding an Eigel, if Nachshon and Chur had indulged in careful critical analysis and deep consideration of the alternatives and ramifications, they never would have moved: they would have suffered from “the paralysis of analysis.” But they had the deeper wisdom and strength to do what needed to be done without hesitation, and what they did echoes throughout all time. He brings an epigram from the Chosid Yaavetz– "analysis saps the strength of the will."   דהחקירה תעכב [ברצון הפנימי] מלמסור נפשו על קדוש השם יתברך

So, middoh k’neged middoh, Hashem filled Betzalel with wisdom. When the time came, and there was a need for careful and prudent wisdom, Hashem granted that as a gift to the descendant of these two people who had shown they knew the limits of chochmoh.

Reb Meir Simcha 35:30

ראו קרא ד' כשם כצלאל כו' כן חור למטה יהודה כו' הענין דמסירת נפש צריך להיות שלא בחקירה והתחכמות יתירה ויהודה מסר עצמו בים במסירת נפש כמו דאיתא בתוספתא דסוטה וכן חור מסר עצמו בעגל דהחקירה תעכב [ברצון פנימי] מלמסור נפשו על קדוש השי"ת כעדות יעב"ץ החסיד לכן אמר שבעבור זה שלא חקרו ולא נתחכמו יותר מדאי לכן וימלא אותו בחכמה ובדעת כו' והבן 

Reb Meir Simcha ends his discussion with with “vehovein.” He clearly means to say that his pshat is not just his usual standard of a brilliant and deep vort, or a new iteration of a truism. And the reason is because at first glance, he seems to be advocating imprudence and foolhardiness! This, obviously, is not what he wants us to come away with. We are all too familiar with the delusional extremists whose acts of 'martyrdom' fill the newspapers. What, then, does he mean?

The answer is this: Reb Meir Simcha is not saying that there is an alternative to prudent wisdom. He is saying that along with chochmas hatorah, you have to develop another kind of chochmoh, and that is the chochmoh of mussor and hashkofoh. This is what the Torah means by "chochmo, tevuna, voda'as. Only when you combine Chochmas Hatorah with the Binoh of mussor and hashkofo do you come to Da'as, the knowledge of what needs to be done right now. If you only have the wisdom of havonas hatorah, you are lacking a crucial part of what a ben Torah must develop. People talk about ‘the fifth shulchon oruch.’ Everyone has their own opinion of what comprises this part of shulchon oruch, and it is usually cited in support of some unsupportable and foolish opinion that contradicts daas torah. In fact, however, this part of Shulchon Oruch is not an alternative to the first four parts. The fifth shulchon oruch is the mussor and hashkofoh that cannot be written on paper. Only if a person knows and understands kol hatorah kuloh, and he also is a godol in hashkofoh and mussor, only then can he trust that his kol demomoh dakoh comes from an inculcated sense of what the right thing to do is.

My father (Shlitah) Hareini Kapparas Mishkavo, liked to say that if someone would open a store that sold common sense, it would go bankrupt, because everyone thinks he has plenty of common sense. In fact, though, common sense is a rare and precious commodity. The same is true regarding the Tevunoh VoDa'as the Torah mentions here.

In Parshas Titzaveh, 30:7, it says B’heitivo es haneiros yaktirenu. The ketores is brought in middle of the hatovas haneiros. While this is a well known halachah which many of us say before pesukei de'zimra every day, did you ever wonder why this is so? Why must we interrupt the preparation of the menorah in order to burn the ketores? Where do we find a Gzeiras Hakasuv that requires that Oseik Bemitzvah should davka stop in middle to do a different mitzvah? Reb Moshe in the original Dorash Moshe says that a talmid chochom (the menorah) needs to have a sense of smell (the ketores) – to be able to discern that something is wrong even when nothing apparent is evident, to be able to sense when people are using the Torah to trick others into following false philosophies. He brings Sanhedrin 93b about the Melech Hamoshiach who is “morach v’do’in.” He explains that this is not a din of nevu’ah, it is simply a sense that every yorei shomayim develops to some degree.

This is what Reb Meir Simcha is talking about. A talmid chochom that does not develop this extra sense, and who relies on just his wisdom, is incomplete, and he should remember that the ketores is an essential part of the hatovas hamenorah.

Here is what bothers me. Why was this quality necessary, or relevant, to davka Betzalel? Of course you need kavana, and chachma, and daas, to fabricate the keilim and invest them with kedusha. As we have said elsewhere, the degree and quality of kavana is an essential part of the keilim and the begadim, no less than in writing a Sefer Torah. But why this particular techunas hanefesh? There was no mesiras nefesh involved here.

My nephew, Harav Yitzchak Buchalter, suggested the following. We know the story said about the Ramak, who said in a drasha that total bitachon will mean the Ribono shel Olam will take care of you 100%. A simple Jew listened, and sold his horse and wagon, we all know the story. The lesson is that the talmidim of Reb Moshe Cordevero were each and every one a gadol in Chochma and Mussar and Kabbala. But they were not simple Jews, they were great thinkers. As such, they had the problem the Chosid Yaavetz described. When Betzalel made the keilim, he had to have the deep wisdom of the heart, which entails dakusdikkeh kavanos that are entirely outside of a normal person's comprehension. To make the keilim with these kavanos required a faith in siyata dishmaya that the kavanos were exactly as they needed to be, with no sfeikos at all. 

  A young medical school student I met, Reb Jacobowitz from Baltimore, said the following, and I think it's superb. Chazal tell us again and again that Betzalel and Ahaliav and indeed all the craftsmen were איש אשר נשאו לבו וכל אשר נדבה רוחו אותו, which means they didn't apprentice, they didn't practice, they were inspired with divine wisdom and skill which expressed itself in their sublime work.  As the Ramban says in 35:21,

כי לא היה בהם שלמד את המלאכות האלה ממלמד, או מי שאימן בהן ידיו כלל, אבל מצא בטבעו שידע לעשות כן, ויגבה לבו בדרכי ה' (דה''ב יז ו) לבא לפני משה לאמר לו אני אעשה כל אשר אדני דובר 

 If so, the type of chochma needed here is beyond learned chochma. It is the tevunas haleiv that was exemplified by Nachshon and Chur, a direct connection to kedusha and truth. 

Was the Mishkan Weighted or Staked? Installment Three

Reb Moshe in the Darash derives important יסודות from the יתדות, a lesson from these alternative methods of keeping the יריעות, the fabric and leather panels that covered the Mishkan, in place.

וכל יסדות החצר נחשת (כז יט) 

רש"י מסתפק ביתדות אם כובדן עושה שלא יגביהם הרוח או תקועין בארץ, ונראה דילפינן מזה שצריך כל אדם להשתדל שבכח עצמו מצד ידיעתו והבנתו לא יגביהנו הרוח בכל מקום שיהיה. אבל מתחלה יהיה זה ע"י אחרים היינו ע"י התמדתו בישיבה בין מורים וחברים שישפיעו עליו להתחזק בדרך ה', עד שמזה יבא שיהיה חזק בעצמו שלא יגביהו אותו ויטלטלוהו הרוחות הרעות והכפירה אף כשיהיה לבדו.

In other words, when you create your own Mishkan, your wellspring of Kedusha and shelter from pernicious forces, you have to make sure that the wind will not blow it away, and that that its lines will remain straight, that it will neither sway nor slump. This requires that you do two things. One is that you you need to be anchored, thoroughly grounded in a community, amidst a cohort of good and wise עובדי השם, who by instruction and example help you to grow intellectually and spiritually.  The other is that you, through your personal work on ידיעת התורה and מדות תרומיות and זיכוי הרבים, achieve a personal gravitas that will give you the wisdom and strength to stand steadfast.   

To build a בית נאמן בישראל, you have to be both weighted and staked.

Yasher koach to Rabbi Avrohom Bukspan.

Was the Mishkan Weighted or Staked? Installment Two

 We brought Rashi's alternative explanations of what kept the Mishkan covers from being blown about by the wind and from sagging into the Mishkan. Either there were weights on the hanging edges, or ropes that attached them to stakes driven into the ground.

The Gemara in Shabbos 27b-28a

וכל היוצא מן העץ אינו מטמא טומאת אהלים, אלא פשתן

Rashi

אינו מטמא טומאת אוהלים - אם עשה מהן אהל והמת תחתיו הוי כשאר בית וא"צ להטביל האהל עצמו דלא קבל טומאה אלא כלים שתחתיו:

אלא פשתן - שאף אהל טמא כדכתיב והזה על האהל ובגמ' יליף דבפשתן משתעי קרא:

(It is not only Pishtan, it is anything that is called "ohel" by the Mishkan, including wool and leather.)

Tosfos holds that this susceptibility to tuma is even if the Ohel is actually attached to the ground.  Proof that Tosfos holds like that is because he asks, how can it be that the Ohel is tamei, but we have a rule that something that is mekabel tuma is not a barrier to Tuma, and the Mishna in Ohelos says that an ohel made of "sadinim" are a barrier to Tuma! They shouldn't be, if they are tamei themselves. Tosfos answers that the Mishna is talking about silk, not linen, sadinim that are attached to the ground.

וקשה לר"י דתנן באהלות (פ"ח מ"א) אלו מביאין וחוצצין השידה והתיבה כו' והסדינים שהם עשוים אהלים ואיך חוצצין סדינין של פשתן בפני הטומאה והא כל דבר המקבל טומאה אינו חוצץ בפני הטומאה וי"ל דמיירי בסדינין של משי וקבועין שאינן מטמאים ורשב"א פירש במשניות בע"א:

Obviously, Tosfos holds that everything, even non-linen, is mekabel Tuma if it is merely draped over a frame to function as a shelter, because it would not lose its din keli. What distinguishes linen is that it is mekabel Tuma even if is fully attached to the earth, and it loses its din keli, but it is mekabel tuma as an ohel of pishtan. This opinion is shared by the Ramban, Tos Rid, and the Raavad Tu'M 5:12.

Other Rishonim hold that the din tuma of ohel pishtan is only if it is draped over a frame, but NOT if it is attached to the earth. This is the Tosfos HaRosh, and the Rosh in Keilim 27:1 and the Smag.  (and possibly the Rambam in Tu'M 5:12.) The Rashba goes even farther. The Rosh holds that the exclusion of tents from Tumah is only if they were originally manufactured to serve only as tents. The Rashba holds that even pishtan, if it was originally a regular garment or keli, draping it over a frame to serve as a tent would remove its susceptibility to Tumah - even תלוש ואחר כך חיברו. In any case, this group of Rishonim holds that if it is literally attached to the ground, it is never tamei, not even pishtan.

(The Rashba that Tosfos brings just says that the rule of כל המקבל טומאה אינו חוצץ בפני הטומאה does not apply to an ohel.)

It seems clear that this whole machlokes depends on whether the Mishkan itself was weighted or staked. Tosfos ודעמיה hold that the Mishkan was staked, mechubar mamash, and and the gzeira shava that teaches tuma by all such ohalim is that even mechubar mamash of pishtan is mekabel tumah.  The Rosh ודעמיה hold that the Mishkan was just weighted. The limud teaches that tents that were made of other materials, even if not attached to the ground, are not mekabeil tumah - they lose their din keli. But pishtan is still mekabel tumah even if it serves as a tent. This does not teach anything about mechubar mamash, and  mechubar mamash is never mekabel tumah.

I should have realized this would happen, but I found that the Cousin Rav Yechiel Michel Feinstein says this nekuda also.  I guess that even if I'm not the first to realize this, it's nice that the first was the Torah giant Reb Yechiel Michel.

In his Sefer on Chumash, end of Teruma:

 ובפירש"י ואיני יודע אם תחובין בארץ או קשורין וכובדן מכביד שיפולי היריעות שלא ינועו ברוח וכו' ונראה דבזה תליא פלוגתת הראשונים בדין טומאת אהלים דמבואר במשנה שבת דף כ"ז ב' דכל היוצא מן העץ אינו מטמא טומאת אהלים אלא פשתן ובגמ' שם דף כ"ח א' ילפינן לה ממשכן דקרוי אהל ונחלקו הראשונים אי מטמאין גם כשהן מחוברין וכן הוא דעת התום שם והראב"ד פ"ה מהלכ' טומאת מת הי"ב אכן דעת הרמב"ם שם נראה דס"ל דאין מטמאין מחוברין אלא דווקא כשעשויין אהלים עי"ש וי"ל דהרמב"ם ס"ל דבמשכן היו היתידות תלושין ולא מחוברין בארץ ומש"ה דווקא אהל שאינו מחובר מיטמא כמו משכן אבל הראב"ד והתוס' ס"ל דהיתידות היו תחובין בארץ ומש"ה איכא טומאת אהלים גם במחובר והארכתי בזה במקום אחר. 

Was the Mishkan Weighted or Staked? Installment One.

 What kept the roof of the Mishkan, the יריעות, from sagging in middle, or flapping in the desert wind? Fabric or leather of that great an unsupported span would not remain horizontal.  True, the material of the Yerios was quite heavy, but it was as heavy in middle as it was on the sides. Specifically, the middle was ten amos wide, and over the Kerashim and hanging down the sides were a total of eight or nine.  If you've ever had a sukkah cover that doesn't rest on the schach, you know that it's going to sag in middle, even without rain. The answer is, the Yerios had copper bars, or pegs, or stakes - יתדות - to keep them in place.

We are not talking about the קלעי החצר. Everyone knows that the curtains around the Chatzer had מיסרים ויסדות, ropes and stakes. We are talking about the יריעות המשכן.

 

Teruma, Shemos 27:19

לכל כלי המשכן בכל עבודתו וכל יתדותיו וכל יתדות החצר נחושת

Rashi in Teruma says he is not certain whether the copper pegs, or stakes, were attached directly to the ends of the material to weigh the Yerios down, or  were attached with rope to the יריעות and hammered into the ground, but he leans towards the latter.

. כְּמִין נִגְרֵי נְחֹשֶׁת עֲשׂוּיִין לִירִיעוֹת הָאֹהֶל וּלְקַלְעֵי הֶחָצֵר, קְשׁוּרִים בְּמֵיתָרִים סָבִיב סָבִיב בְּשִׁפּוּלֵיהֶן, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תְהֵא הָרוּחַ מַגְבִּיהָתָן, וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ אִם תְּחוּבִין בָּאָרֶץ אוֹ קְשׁוּרִין וּתְלוּיִין וְכָבְדָּן מַכְבִּיד שִׁפּוּלֵי הַיְרִיעוֹת שֶׁלֹּא יָנוּעוּ בָרוּחַ, וְאוֹמֵר אֲנִי שֶׁשְּׁמָן מוֹכִיחַ עֲלֵיהֶם שֶׁהֵם תְּקוּעִים בָּאָרֶץ, לְכָךְ נִקְרְאוּ יְתֵדוֹת, וּמִקְרָא זֶה מְסַיְּעֵנִי אֹהֶל בַּל יִצְעָן בַּל יִסַּע יְתֵדֹתָיו לָנֶצַח (ישעיהו ל"ג):

Indeed, in Vayakhel Rashi says only that pshat.

Vayakhel, Shemos 35:18

את יתדת המשכן ואת יתדת החצר ואת מיתריהם

Rashi there

יתדת. לִתְקֹעַ וְלִקְשׁוֹר בָּהֶם סוֹפֵי הַיְרִיעוֹת בָּאָרֶץ, שֶׁלֹּא יָנוּעוּ בָּרוּחַ:

(Rashi in Naso, Bamidbar 4:32 possibly could be read either way, but he equates the Yerios and the Kla'im, which again implies that he assumes the latter pshat.

וִיתֵדוֹת וּמֵיתָרִים הָיוּ לַיְרִיעוֹת וְלַקְּלָעִים מִלְּמַטָּה, שֶׁלֹּא תַגְבִּיהֵם הָרוּחַ)

I do not know know if these putative ropes and stakes pulled the Yerios directly downward and held the sides vertical, or tented outward, and I don't think it matters much. It seems to me that the Gemara in Shabbos 98b implies they were vertical  (לרבי יהודה מיגליא אמה דאדנים, לרבי נחמיה מיגליא אמה דקרשים.), while the Chizkuni implies they were pulled to form an angle (ומושכין בכח המיתרים ונועצין היתדות בארץ והיריעות נמתחות יפה כדי שלא תהיינה שחות ונופלות בתוך המשכן מתוך כבדן וממעטת חללו).

What I do know is that that the character of these stakes explains a whole bunch of interesting machloksim of  Rishonim on several different topics, and I seem to be the first to point this out.  (לעניות דעתי)  (not really.)

When Nadav and Avihu died, why didn't their bodies cause the entire Mishkan and its contents to become Tamei? The Gemara in Shabbos learns from והזה על האהל in Chukas that a meis causes tumah to the ohel itself, if it is made of the materials used in the Mishkan. But we do not find anywhere that they had to take the whole Mishkan apart, and do טבילה והזאת מי חטאת on it.

This question was asked by the Rishonim, who, for some reason, primarily focus on the ohel itself and not on the keilim in the Mishkan. 

Rebbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva in Toras Kohanim argue whether they died outside the Mishkan, or in the Heichal mamash.

The Daas Zkeinim Shemini 10:2 asks, 

וימותו לפני ה'. פלוגתא איכא בתורת כהני' רא"א שמתו בחוץ במקום שהלוים מותרים ליכנס שנא' ויקרבו וישאום בכתנות' וא"כ מאי לפני ה' שנגפן המלאך והוציאן לחוץ רע"א לא מתו אלא בפנים שנא' לפני ה' ומאי ויקרבו וישאום בכתנות' מלמד שנתנו חכה של ברזל לתוך פיהם וגררום והוציאום לחוץ. ותימה לדברי ר' עקיבא א"כ נטמא המשכן דאיקרי אוהל מטומאת מת וצריך הזאה שלישי ושביעי ולא מצינו שפסקו מעבודתם כלל וכן כתוב בפירוש ומפתח אהל מועד לא תצאו דבשלמא לר"א א"ל שדחפן המלאך לחוץ קודם יציאת נשמה אלא לר' עקיבא קשיא וצ"ע:

The Baal HaTurim 10:4 there answers

קרבו. בתורת כהנים פליגי איכא מאן דאמר בחוץ מתו כיון שהלוים נכנסו לשם ומה דכתיב וימותו לפני ד' נגפם המלאך והוציאן לחוץ ואיכא מאן דאמר בפנים מדכתיב לפני ד' ומה דכתיב ויקרבו וישאום שהטילו בהם חנית וגררום והוציאם לחוץ ואע"פ שאין חלוק בין כהן ללוי בשלא צורך עבודה אפי' כהנים אינם נכנסים ולצורך כגון לפנות טומאה אפי' לוים נכנסים אם אין כהן והכא לא הי' כהן שלא היו רשאים לטמאות מ"מ כיון דאפשר לגוררם בחנית לא חשיב לצורך ואסור ליכנס. והשתא למ"ד בפנים מתו א"כ נטמא המשכן טומאת מת והיה צריך טבילה והזאת שלישי ושביעי שהרי אהל של פשתן מקבל טומאה ולא מצינו שנתפרק המשכן אחר כך שהרי לא פסקו מעבודתן. וי"ל כיון דכתיב בי' על פי ה' יחנו ועל פיו יסעו חשיב קבוע ולא מקבל טומאה:

The Minchas Chinuch in Kometz HaMincha 264 asks, what do you mean it was not mekabel tuma because it was mechubar? But the Gemara in Shabbos learns from the Mishkan that an ohel itself is mekabel Tumah even if it is mechubar!

מצוה רס"ד מבואר שם דלדברי המדרש מתו נדב ואביהו בהיכל. וראיתי בטור על התורה פ' שמיני הק' שהרי המשכן היה של פשתן ונטמא בטומאת מת וצריך הזאה וטבילה ולא מצינו שנתפרק המשכן. ותירץ כיון דכתיב על פי ה' יחנו וגו' חשוב קבוע ולא מקבל טומאה. וצ"ע היטב במס' שבת דף כ"ח ובתוס' ובהר"מ בפ"ה מה' טומאת מת במנ"ל שם ובהראב"ד דעיקר הלמוד שפשתן מטמא באוהל הוא רק בקבוע וצריך עיון גדול. ולא ראיתי לדעתי מקום לקושיא של הטור ולא תי' כלום וצ"ע רחב בדינים אלו:

It is my opinion that if the stakes were actually hammered into the ground, then it was mechubar mamash. If it was mechubar mamash, then the Gemara in Shabbos is saying that Mechubar Mamash is mekabel Tumah, and it doesn't make sense to say that כיון דכתיב בי' על פי ה' יחנו ועל פיו יסעו חשיב קבוע. Sure, al pi Hashem makes it super mechubar. But it's not more mechubar that mechubar mamash.

The Baal HaTurim must hold that the Yerios were not really mechubar. That's why they would be susceptible to Tumah if not for the unique status of מחובר מחמת דין "על פי השם"  The Gemara in Shabbos is assuming they were just weighted at the edges, and such an ohel is mekabel Tumah. It so happens, according to the Baal HaTurim, that this particular ohel was not mekabel tumah, but any such type of ohel would be mekabel tumah, so the drasha in Shabbos is valid. If the Baal HaTurim held that the Yerios were hammered into the ground, his teretz would not make sense.  Mechubar is mechubar.

The Minchas Chinuch assumed that they were hammered into the ground, and if the Gemara in Shabbos says that an ohel like the Mishkan is mekabel Tumah, then the Mishkan itself must have been mekabel Tumah despite being mechubar.  Apparently, the idea that they became Tamei does not bother the Minchas Chinuch.

As I said, this seemingly trivial issue actually is pivotal in several other machloksim among the Rishonim. I'm planning on at least three more installments, but each should be independently understandable.

Vayakhel and Pekudei Parsha Questions

1. The brass altar in the courtyard is described as being "five amos long and five amos wide, square." The golden altar in the Heichal is "one ama long and one ama wide, square." The description "square" appears to be unnecessary. If all sides are equal, it's a square. What would we think if it wasn't described as being square? This pertains to practical halacha, because we have an oral tradition from Sinai that our Tefillin must be square, similar to the altars.
"Square" teaches geometric perfection of 90 degree corners and straight lines, so if it is a rhombus, or or there is a nick on the edge, it would be passul. The Meshech Chochma and Netziv in Ki Sisa 27:1 say additional answers regarding where the ribu'a has to begin and the application to the Mizbei'ach in the Mikdash which had different dimensions.

2.  If something has been used personally, can it be donated and used in the Mishkan?
From the Mar'os HaTzovos and the jewelry, yes, but only if it undergoes a significant physical change. See Magen Avraham OC 147 sk 5, אם שינה צורתן. But see Rav Hirsch here regarding the Kiyor.

3. What words in our parsha indicate that a mental resolution to give charity cannot be retracted and creates a legal obligation, and why do you think this applies uniquely to hekdesh/tzedakah.

Nediv Lev.  יו”ד סימן רנח, סעיף יג. Why? You’re on your own.

4. On the basis of a close similarity of its name, some scholars believe that one of the ingredients of the Anointing Oil was Cannabis. Which ingredient do you think that was?
Kenei Bosem. I'm not making this up. There are convincing reasons to believe this is the case.

5. If one only has enough for one candle, the Shabbos candle takes precedence over any other, including Chanuka. This is because of the vital importance of Shalom Bayis. On other days of the week, Chanuka takes precedence over Shalom Bayis. Apparently, avoiding friction on Shabbos is of greater importance than at any other time of the week. What passuk indicates that this is so.לא תבערו אש בכל מושבותיכם ביום השבת
See Gittin 52b about the Sattan instigating fights between a married couple every erev Shabbos and Reb Meir's intevention. 
See Shla'h Shabbos Ner Mitzva 32, where he says

 ועל כן עבירה כפולה היא מי שמראה כעס בשבת וכבר נתנו סימנים לא תבערו אש בכל מושבותיכם ביום השבת והוא אש המחלוקת וחימום הכעס 

and Chasam Sofer there in Gittin and Shaarei Ora I Ki Sisa.

6.  Moshe and Betzalel were required to give a precise accounting. For every penny they were given, they had to say "This is what I used it for." This was a public accounting given to Klal Yisrael, and it was presented in a fashion that the Jews all said "Well done. You used it all just as it ought to have been used."  After 120 years, when you come to the Olam Ha'Emes, you're going to undergo a Din v'Cheshbon. This Din v'Cheshbon will be like the cheshbon of Moshe and Betzalel in Parshas Pekudei. You are going to be asked, "You were given the ability to walk, to talk, to see, to feel, to think, to influence others, you were given intellectual and emotional gifts above others. What did you do with these precious gifts? You are now going to tell us exactly how you used your gifts, how you spent your time and money." It's not enough to convince yourself that you did the right thing. You're going to have to show the court that you did the right thing, Rochel Bitcha Haketana. Each one of us was given a Tafkid, and the tafkid involves בין אדם למקום, and בין אדם לחבירו, and בין אדם לעצמו. How do you think you're going to do when you leyn your personal Parshas Pekudei?
Inspired by Kol Rom I beginning of Pekudei.

The Four Crowns in the Mishkan

In Teruma and Tetzaveh, Rashi points out that three keilim had gold crowns: the Shulchan, the Golden Mizbei'ach, and the Aron haKodesh.  Rashi says that these three zeirim/crowns correspond to the three crowns mentioned by Rav Shimon in Avos 4:13 the crowns of Royalty, of Kehunah, and of Torah. (Aron, see Rashi 25:11; Shulchan, 25:24; Mizbei'ach, 30:3.)

שמות רבה לד ב

 א"ר שמעון בן יוחאי: ג' כתרים הם, כתר מלכות וכתר כהונה וכתר תורה. כתר מלכות זה השלחן דכתיב בו "זר זהב סביב". כתר כהונה זה המזבח דכתיב בו "זר זהב סביב". וכתר תורה זה הארון דכתיב בו "זר זהב". 

and

במדבר רבה ד סוף סימנים יג יד 

רבי שמעון אומר שלשה כתרים הם כתר תורה וכתר כהונה וכתר מלכות וכתר  שם טוב עולה על גביהן. מעשה הארון כנגד בעלי תורה ... מעשה השולחן כנגד מלכות בית דוד ... מזבח הזהב כנגד כתר כהונה ... מעשה מנורה כנגד בעלי שם טוב , שנאמר: טוב שם משמן טוב, ולכך היו כל כליה עמה בבגד תכלת שכתר שם טוב על גביהם

 אבות פרק ד משנה יג 

רבי שמעון אומר: שלשה כתרים הם: כתר תורה וכתר כהונה וכתר מלכות. וכתר שם טוב עולה על גביהן.   

(Reb Shimon=Reb Shimon bar Yochai.)

Yoma 72b

אמר רבי יוחנן שלשה זירים הן, של מזבח, ושל ארון ושל שולחן

Rashi says in Yoma there,

שלשה זירין נעשו בכלי הקודש. של מזבח סימן לכתר כהונה ושל ארון סימן לכתר תורה ושל שולחן סימן לכתר מלכות, שהשולחן הוא סימן לעושר מלכים

Many mefarshim ask, where is the fourth crown?  If, as the Mishna in Avos says, the greatest crown is that of Shem Tov, why is that crown not found in the Mishkan?  And now that the Medrash in Bamidbar says that the Menora represents that crown, why did the Menorah not have any crown? If the symbolic crown appeared on the Shulchan, the Mizbei'ach, and the Aron, why did the Menorah have no crown at all?

There are many teirutzim to this question, beginning with the Maharal in Derech Chaim in Avos.  But the ellipsis is obvious and clearly intentional, and so I think it deserves a simple and satisfying answer. (H. L. Mencken once wrote that "For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong."  Unlike most such answers, I think this one is good.)

A כתר-זיר-crown is a symbol of greatness.  By placing a crown on top of a person or a thing, you express its glory. But it is only a symbol.  What a crown expresses is splendor, a shine.  In fact, the idea of a crown is most fundamentally expressed in Iyov 29:2-3, 

מי יתנני כירחי קדם כימי אלוה ישמרני.  בהלו נרו עלי ראשי לאורו אלך חשך

There, we see the crown as a halo, a ring of light.  That is a true crown, symbolically expressed by placing a gold crown on one's head.  In fact, the words   זהב  and זיב , gold and shine, are basically the same.  We use gold to represent and produce a zohar/ziv.  In the same way, the words זר  and  זוהר are essentially the same- a crown, and a shine.  The purpose of the זר is to represent and embody a זוהר.

But the Menorah did not need a symbolic crown.  The purpose of the Menorah was to cast light, and that light is an inherent crown.  The Menorah, which represented the Keser Shem Tov, did not need a golden crown.  It did not need  זהב, because it had  זיב , and it did not need a זר because it had a  זוהר , and it did not need a קרן של זהב because it had  קרני אור.  It did not need a crown, because it had a Corona. When you have a halo, it doesn't make any sense to wear a crown.

After Mattan Torah, the members of Klal Yisrael had עדיים, crowns of glory, which they had to give back after the Eigel.  But Moshe, as far as I know, did not have any עדי.  He had Karnei Ohr, and he didn't need any עדיים.

One last thing. An answer as simple as this will often evoke the reaction that it is so obvious that everyone knows it without being told.  If,you feel that way, why don't you ask someone the question.  "If" they don't give this answer immediately, tell them to think about it for a while and come back to you with an answer.  Then you'll see how obvious it is.  The only criticism I accept on this answer is that it doesn't offer anything meaningful from a hashkafa or chochma standpoint.  It's just a simple fact.

But one question does remain.  Assuming that the light of the menora is the crown that corresponds to the Keser Shem Tov, why is the menorah and its light the best metaphor for that Keser?  The shulchan, the mizbei'ach, the Aron, are obviously appropriate.  But what is it about the Menorah that corresponds davka with Keser Shem Tov?

My initial response is that without the light of the Menorah/Shem Tov, the other kesarim remain in the dark and lose their significance. What good is a Talmid Chacham without Da'as? Or a Kohen that is unpleasant and unsympathetic? Or a King that walls himself off in his Versailles?  Only when they have a shem tov can their other qualities become an additional crown.

I'm open to suggestions.

Vayakhel, Shemos 35:3. Do Not Tell This To Your Children

Many years ago, on a Yomtov, I had finally cornered one of my sons and he was about to get the punishment he had earned. He said to me, Daddy, you can't patch me today, it's Yomtov!

Whether it was the cleverness, or the coolness in the face of doom, he got away with it. This week, I discovered that he was probably right.

One difficult passuk in our parsha has elicited some very different explanations.  In Shemos 35:3, it says לא תבערו אש בכל מושבותיכם ביום השבת.  The problem is that lighting fires is one of the 39 melachos, so why does the Torah single it out.  The Gemara Shabbas 70a and Yevamos 6b brings a machlokes Tanaim as to what the passuk teaches.  הבערה ללאו יצאת דברי רבי יוסי ר' נתן אומר לחלק יצאת.  Reb Yosi says that unlike other melachos on Shabbos that are capital crimes, lighting fires is a lesser aveira and only gets Malkos.  Reb Nassan says that if not for this passuk we would have thought that the punishment for Chillul Shabbos only applies when one does all 39 melachos.  This singling out of one the melachos shows us that each and every melacha is independent of the others both for punishment and for korbanos. This machlokes Tanaim appears and is used numerous times in Shas.

The Gemara in Yevamos 6b addresses the end of the passuk (בכל מושבותיכם) and uses it for an additional drasha.  You might think that a person awaiting capital punishment might be executed on Shabbos (because of a kal vahomer from the avodah,) so this passuk tells us that Beis Din is not allowed to execute a criminal on Shabbos.

 דתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל לא תבערו אש בכל מושבותיכם מה ת"ל מה ת"ל אי לרבי יוסי ללאו אי לר' נתן לחלק דתניא הבערה ללאו יצתה דברי ר' יוסי רבי נתן אומר לחלק ואמר רבא תנא מושבות קא קשיא ליה מושבות מה ת"ל מכדי שבת חובת הגוף היא וחובת הגוף נוהגת בין בארץ בין בח"ל מושבות דכתב רחמנא בשבת למה לי משום רבי ישמעאל אמר תלמיד אחד לפי שנאמר וכי יהיה באיש חטא משפט מות והומת שומע אני בין בחול בין בשבת ומה אני מקיים מחלליה מות יומת בשאר מלאכות חוץ ממיתת ב"ד או אינו אלא אפילו מיתת ב"ד ומה אני מקיים והומת בחול ולא בשבת או אינו אלא אפילו בשבת ת"ל לא תבערו אש בכל מושבותיכם ולהלן הוא אומר והיו אלה לכם לחוקת משפט לדורותיכם בכל מושבותיכם מה מושבות האמורים להלן בב"ד אף מושבות האמורים כאן בב"ד ואמר רחמנא לא תבערו 

The Rambam (Lavin 322) enumerates this as an independent issur lav that counts towards the taryag mitzvos.  In the Yad, Shabbos 24:7, he says that it even prohibits Malkos. Similarly, the Chinuch in 113 counts it as a separate mitzvah.

The Minchas Chinuch asks that just because the Torah prohibited capital punishment on Shabbos does not make it a separate lav.  All that does is remove the hetter we might have applied based on the Kal Vachomer.  Now that you have the passuk, all you know is that the general issur of Shabbos applies here.  How does that make it a new lav?  And he brings another question from the Magen Avraham in 339 sk3, who asks on the Rambam, what issur of chillul Shabbos is transgressed when you give malkos?  The Magen Avraham suggests that Malkos causes bruising, which is chillul Shabbos.

But I saw that Reb Berel Povarsky (Bahd Kodesh here) answers both questions, and it's hard to disagree with him.  He notes that the Chinuch ends by saying that

משרשי המצוה. שרצה השם יתברך לכבד היום הזה שימצאו בו מנוחה הכל, גם החוטאים והחיבים.

The "root" of the Mitzva is that Hashem wants to honor this day, that the guilty and the sinners too will find rest.  The point is that it is a new issur, the issur for Beis Din to punish on Shabbos.  Basically, the Magen Avraham's question answers the Minchas Chinuch's question.  It's not merely a removal of a kal vachomer based hetter, it creates a new issur.  That issur has nothing to do with whether some melacha is being transgressed.  It's a new issur of punishing on Shabbos.

(I should point out that the Magen Avraham himself suggests this as a second teretz-

כתב הרמב"ם פכ"ד אין עונשין בשבת שאע"פ שהעונש מ"ע אין דוחה שבת כיצד הרי שנתחייב מיתה או מלקות אין מלקין שנאמר לא תבערו אש וה"ה לשאר עונשין וכתב המ"מ שמנאה הרמב"ם במנין המצות ע"כ ובאמת במנין המצות סי' שכ"ב משמע דוקא בדבר שיש בו חילול שבת אסור מדאורייתא וכ"מ בגמ' שבת דף ק"ו גבי הבערה ע"ש ואפשר דבמלקות נמי איכא חילול שבת כגון שעושה חבורה וצ"ע ואפשר דמרבוי דקרא דבכל מושבותיכם נפקא לן שאין דנין כלל וצ"ע בסנה' דף ל"ה משמע דוקא בדבר שיש בו חילול שבת וכ"מ בתו' שם ודיני ממונות אין דנין גזירה שמא יכתוב:)

The problem with this pshat, and the obvious reason the Minchas Chinuch and the Magen Avraham did not assume it, is that it is strongly implied in the Gemara that the reason Beis Din is not ma'anish is because of the chillul Shabbos aspect, as the Magen Avraham points out.  To improve Rav Povarsky's pshat, I would add that the Chinuch and the Rambam learned that the limud is not that we should ignore the kal vachomer and reinstate the general rule of issur chillul shabbos.  The limud is that the kal vachomer that would be mattir is really true, and Retzicha would be docheh Shabbos BUT ONLY IF THERE WOULD BE A DIN OF BEING MA'ANISH ON SHABBOS.  The chiddush of the drasha is that THERE IS NO DIN OF BEIS DIN BEIN MA'ANISH on Shabbos, and mimeila there is no kal vachomer, and that's why it's not docheh. Now that this is the case, of course it's a new mitzvah.

If anyone sees R Povarsky, please let him know that I dramatically improved his vort.

(Or the Rambam is going with the Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:6 that makes a general statement of "ein danin."

מה אם עבודה שדוחה שבת רציחת מצוה דוחה אותה שנאמר מעם מזבחי תקחנו למות שבת שהעבודה דוחה אותה אין דין שתהא רציחת מצוה דוחה אותה.  ר' לא בשם ר' ינאי מיכן לבתי דינין שלא יהו דנין בשבת מאי טעמא נאמר כאן בכל מושבותיכם ונאמר להלן והיו אלה לכם לחוקת משפט לדורותיכם בכל מושבותיכם מה להלן בבית דין הכתוב מדבר אף כאן בב"ד הכתוב מדבר)

I said this over at the Kiddush this morning, and Rav Yitzchak Resnick said (implied) that I should be ashamed of myself if I think this is a chiddush.  After all, the Ramah in OC 291:2 says, (based on many Medrashim and the Zohar that the fires of Gehenom do not burn on Shabbos,)  (The Rama says something very similar in 295 regarding Maariv motzei Shabbos.)

יש אומרים דאסור לשתות מים בין מנחה למעריב בשבת דאז חוזרות הנשמות לגיהנם ועל כן אין לאכול סעודה שלישית בין מנחה למעריב אלא יאכל אותה קודם מנחה (תוספות והרא"ש ומרדכי פרק ערבי פסחים)

If the fires of Gehinom themselves don't burn on Shabbos, is it not obvious that the din menucha on Shabbos mandates that even resha'im are not punished?

I have to admit that R' Yitzchak is probably right.  And so was my son, so many years ago. The truth is, it's pashut that he was right on Yomtov, because there's a din of simcha, and by punishing him I would be over on a bitul asei.  But there is no din of simcha on Shabbos.  (see note)  Now, as it turns out, he was right both for Yomtov and for Shabbos.  If Beis Din cannot give Malkos, when the Malkos is a din deoraysa, and was earned according to the psak of Beis Din, Kal Vachomer a parent can't give a child a patch on Shabbos.


UPDATE: Not only is R Yitzchak right, but I a friend sent me a video in which the speaker quotes a Chidah that uses our passuk to refer to the fire of Gehinom, but he says it doesn't stop burning unless the person himself was shomer Shabbos, and that the Baal HaTurim also makes the connection.  Not at all my style, much too earnest.  But you might like it.  https://youtu.be/Ho-RhOHACTA

Note: R Abbie Jakubovic is giving me a hard time in the comments about my statement that there is no din of simcha on Shabbos.  He has excavated a number of mekoros that seem to say that there is. I say that they are all mezuyaf or ta'us sofrim. Or that when they say "simcha" they don't really mean simcha, which even AJ admits is likely, nay, undeniable.

R Avi Lencz strengthens R Abbie's suggestion that while there might be a din simcha on Shabbos, it is not the same as the din of simcha that we find on Yomtov.  He directs us to a discussion on this topic from R Wahrman in the Oros HaShabbos.  He uses it to show a difference between the simcha of Yomtov and the simcha of Purim, but the idea applies just as well to Shabbos- that the kind of simcha on Shabbos is just another way of describing Oneg, which is very unlike the simcha of Yomtov. R Avi's take on it is 

אולי י"ל דשמחה דחג ויו"ט הוא דין בהיו"ט עצמו, דצריך לשמוח בעיקר היות היום יו"ט. משא"כ שבת הוי שמחה במה שהוא יום של הארת מלכותו ית', וכלשון "ישמחו במלכותך."

R Abbie just sent me the Sifri in Behaaloscha and the Netziv there.  Yasher Koach.

The Sifri says 

וביום שמחתכם ובמועדיכם. אלו שבתות.

The Netziv there (next page middle of column) says very something that fits in here very nicely:

 ועי׳ שבועות ד׳ ט״ו כ׳, וביום הקימו כר דייק ג״כ מיתור דוביום. להכי דריש אלו שבתות דיש בו שירה כדתנן בסוכה פ״ה ובמוספין היו מוסיפין עוד תשע ותני שם ד נ״ה יכול כשם שתוקעין על שבת בפ״ע כו', ומשתמע מביום שמחתכם דאע״ג שאין בו מצות שמחה אלא עונג, מכ״מ יש בו שמחת הנפש. וע״ז סמכו לתקן בתפלה ישמחו במלכותך. עי׳ ב״י או״ח סי׳ רפ״א בשם רב כהן צדק. והוא עשה״כ נכון כסאך מאז וגו', דאע״ג שכבר מלך כשני כדאי׳ ברה״ש ל״א, ובששי מלך על כל בריותיו ע״ש, מ״מ לא הי׳ כסאו שלם עד שנגמר מלאכת שמים וארץ. וזהו ביום השביעי התעלה וישב על כ״כ. וע״ע ירוש׳ מגילה פ״א והובא כר״ן שם, ויעשו אותם בשבת, א״ל לעשות אותם ימי משתה ושמחה, את ששמחתו תלוי בב״ד, יצא זה ששמחתו תלוי בי״ש, היינו שמחת מלכות שמים.

Update March 2021

I realized that if the din of simchas yomtov makes it assur to get married because of ein mearvin, then kvbbshkv that it's assur to be mevateil beyadayim. 

Building the Mizbei'ach on Shabbos and Yomtov

According to the Magen Avraham, even if you have the minhag to cover knives during Birkas Hamazon, one doesn't have to cover ceramic knives. The celebrated Rabbi Asher Weiss writes the following:

נוהגים לסלק את הסכין מעל השולחן, או לכסותו, בשעת ברכת המזון (שו"ע או"ח קפ ה, לבוש קפ ה). בטעם המנהג כתבו הראשונים שמצינו בדברי חכמים שהשולחן נקרא מזבח, ומכפר על האדם כמזבח [רבי יוחנן ורבי אלעזר בברכות נה א ובמנחות צז א. ורבי יוחנן וריש לקיש בחגיגה כז א. בטעם שהשולחן מכפר, ראה רש"י ותוס' שם, ומהרש"א בחדושי אגדות בבא בתרא ס ב ד"ה התקוששו [באמצע הדיבור], ומנחות מז א ד"ה המזבח], והמאריך לשבת על שולחנו כדי שיבואו אורחים עניים ויאכיל אותם, מאריכים לו ימיו ושנותיו [רב יהודה בברכות נד ב – נה א], ומשום כך כשם שאסרה התורה לבנות את המזבח המאריך חיים באבן שסותתה בכלי ברזל או שנגע בה ברזל המקצר חיים, [מדות פ"ג מ"ד; רבי שמעון בן אלעזר במכילתא מס' דבחדש פרשה יא; תורת כהנים קדושים פרשה י אות ט; תנחומא פרשת יתרו סי' יז; פסיקתא זוטרתא שמות פרק כ פסוק כב; רש"י תמיד כו ב ד"ה אמר. ראה כעי"ז: תוספתא ב"ק פ"ז ה"ב; מכילתא דרשב"י פרק כ פסוק כב; מס' שמחות פ"ח הט"ז. וראה טעמי המצוה]. כך אין ראוי שעל השולחן המכפר ומאריך חיים כמזבח, יהיה מונח סכין שמביא פורענות ומקצר חיים. (ספר חסידים סימן קב; הרוקח סי' שלב; שבלי הלקט סדר ברכות סימן קנה;  שולחן של ארבע לרבינו בחיי שער ראשון; דרשות ר"י אבן שועיב פרשת ויקחו לי תרומה ד"ה וטעם איסור; ארחות חיים מלוניל הל' ברהמ"ז אות ח; אבודרהם הל' ברכת המזון ד"ה ונהגו העולם).

אף שלכאורה מהטעם שהזכרנו, היה מקום להסיר או לכסות את הסכין אף בשעת האכילה, נהגו להשאירו גלוי עד שעת ברכת המזון, אחרי גמר השימוש בו, כדי שלא להטריחו להסירו ולהחזירו כל פעם לצורך שימוש בו (ביאור הלכה סימן קנא סעיף ו ד"ה בסכין ארוך; משנה ברורה סי' קפ ס"ק יא. ראה כף החיים קסז מא  שחולק וסובר שיותר טוב להסיר את הסכין במשך כל הסעודה ולהחזירו רק לצורך שימוש בו). ויש שכתב שהקפידו לסלק את הסכין או לכסותו דווקא בשעת ברכת המזון, שבה שעובדין את שם יתברך ומברכים אותו [לבוש סי' קפ סעיף ה], שהיא מעין העבודה היותר חשובה הנעשית ע"ג המזבח. שהאכילה  נחשבת כשחיטת הקרבן, השתיה היא כעין קבלת דם הקרבן, אמירת דברי התורה על השלחן היא כהולכת הדם למזבח, וברכת המזון היא מעין זריקת הדם על גבי המזבח, שהיא העבודה החשובה יותר, המסיימת את עבודות הקרבן, וכמו שאמרו "הדם הוא המתיר". (שו"ת באר עשק סי' כז, הובא בבאר היטב סי' קפ ס"ק ה. ראה זבחים מג א ורמב"ם מעה"ק פ"ה הי"ח. עוד ראה תורה תמימה פרשת יתרו פרק כ אות קלב).

לדעות האוסרות להשתמש לבנית המזבח באבנים שנגעה בהם מתכת אחרת מלבד ברזל, יש להסיר מן השלחן אף סכין העשויה משאר המתכות כגון כסף או זהב (ראה שולחן של ארבע לרבינו בחיי שער ראשון, ומג"א סי' קפ סק"ד ופמ"ג שם). יש מקפידים מהטעם הזה להסיר מעל השולחן בשעת ברכת המזון את כל כלי הברזל כגון מזלגות וכפיות (בן איש חי שנה ראשונה חוקת אות ו. ראה טהרת השולחן על השו"ע סי' קפ סעיף ה).

טעם נוסף משום "מעשה שהיה", וההבדלים ההלכתיים בין הטעמים

הראשונים הביאו טעם נוסף למנהג הסרת הסכין, משום מעשה שהיה באחד שבירך ברכת המזון וכשהגיע לבונה ירושלים נזכר בחורבן בית המקדש ולקח את הסכין ותקעו בלבו (שבלי הלקט שם בשם רבינו שמחה; ארחות חיים שם. ראה בב"י סי' קפ). ויש שכתבו שלטעם הזה צריך לכסות את הסכין רק קודם ברכת בונה ירושלים ולא בכל ברכת המזון. ויש להסיר את הסכין או לסלקו אף בשעת ברכת מעין שלוש, שמוזכר בה בנין ירושלים (טהרת השולחן על השו"ע סי' קפ סעיף ה). ויש סוברים שאף לטעם הזה, כיון שהמעשה היה בברכת המזון אין להחמיר בברכה מעין שלוש (שו"ת שלמת חיים סי' קפז. ראה אורח נאמן סי' קפ ס"ק טז).

לדעה זו יש להסיר מן השולחן כל סכין שאדם יכול להרוג בו את עצמו, ואף כשאינו עשוי ממתכת אלא מחומר אחר כגון עץ או פלסטיק (שו"ת בית אבי ח"ג סי' קמב אות ד, הובאו דבריו בשו"ת רבבות אפרים ח"ג סי' קלב).

So, if you cover your knives on Shabbos, you would have to cover ceramic knives during the week.  (I don't mention plastic knives, because I think it would be very laborious to kill yourself with a plastic knife, especially when there are so many less tiresome instrumentalities, and, I think, suicidal people don't really have a lot of energy.)  If you don't cover your knives on Shabbos, as the Mechaber says in the end of OC 180, because the reason for covering them is because metal cannot be used in the construction of the Mibei'ach, and you can't build the Mizbei'ach on Shabbos, then you would never have to cover ceramic knives.

I want to repeat the Magen Avraham.  The Mechaber quotes the Roke'ach's minhag to cover knives during bentching
דמכסין הסכין בברכת המזון ע״ש לא תניף עליהם ברזל, במכילתין אינו דין שיניף חמקצר על המאריך ושלחן כמזבח
 בשלהי חגיגה
The Mechaber adds that nahagu" not to cover knives at bentching on Shabbos and Yomtov.  The Magen Avraham says
משום דשלחן דומה למזבח ובמזבת כתיב לא תניף עליהם ברזל, ובשבת אין בונין מזבח וליכא רמז למזבח

(Before getting into the main topic, do you realize what a chiddush the Magen Avraham is saying?  We all know the Gemara about a man's table being like his mizbei'ach.  But the Magen Avraham says that the Shulchan is not a mizbei'ach.  What you do at your table is like building a mizbei'ach.  True, on Shabbos and YT the mizbei'ach is busy with Korbanos.  But you can't build a mizbei'ach on S/YT.  Since on Shabbos/YT you can't build a mizbei'ach, your actions at the table don't have to conform with the rules of the mizbei'ach.

The explanation, of course, is that the Magen Avraham is not going with the Rambam that holds that the mitzva of binyan of the Mikdash and the Keilim was all one mitzva whose purpose was to be able to do Avodah, which is why he lists only one mitzva- to build the bayis, and not a separate mitzva for each kli.  He is going with the Ramban that the mitzva of building the Mikdash structure is to provide a מדור בתחתונים for hashra'as hashechina, but building each kli is its own mitzvah.)

Back to the main topic.  This is all based on the assumption that one cannot build the Mizbei'ach on Shabbos or Yomtov.  This is a reasonable assumption, because the Gemara in Shavuos 15b says explicitly that building the Beis Hamikdash is suspended on Yomtov, and it goes without saying on Shabbos.  

Gemara Shavuos:  נבנייה ביום טוב ונקדשיה ביום טוב אין בנין מקדש דוחה יום טוב 

Rambam 1 Beis HaBechira 12:   ואין בנין ב"ה דוחה יום טוב.

If building the Mikdash is not docheh, there is no reason to think that building the Mizbeia'ch would be docheh.

Except that there is.

The Gemara in Shabbos 88a says

רבי יוסי אומר בשני עלה משה וירד בשלישי עלה וירד בד' ירד ושוב לא עלה ומאחר שלא עלה מהיכן ירד אלא ברביעי עלה וירד בחמישי בנה מזבח והקריב עליו קרבן 

that Moshe built a Mizbei'ach on the fifth of Sivan.  As the Minchas Chinuch in Mitzva 309 points out, that was Shavuos.  The MC brings from the Turei Even that this is a problem.  If Binyan Mikdash is not docheh, then Binyan Mizbei'ach shouldn't be docheh; What was Moshe Rabbeinu doing building a Mizbei'ach on Shavuos?  One would naturally answer that it was before Mattan Torah, and before Mattan Torah there wasn't any holiday called Shavuos.  But assuming that the Avos kept the Torah, as Avraham Avinu did with Pesach, Moshe Rabbeinu should have been observing Shavuos even before Mattan Torah.

The Minchas Yitzchak offers two answers.

ששת ימים תעשה מלאכה. פירש״י הקדים אזהרת שבת למלאכת המשס, לומד שאינו דוהה שבת ע״כ,והיא מדברי המכילתא, ושם איתא עוד בזה״ל, כגון שנטל קרנו של מזבח וכוי, שומע אני יתקנם בשבת ת״ל ויקהל משה וכו׳ בחול ולא בשבת עיי״ש, וראיתי מכבר שהעידו בטו״א (הגיגה ד״ט), ובמנ״ח (מצוה ש״ט), בהא דאמרינן (בשבת דפ״ז) דבה׳ בשבת יצאו ממצרים, ובשבת נתנה תורד״ והי׳ לפי״ז אז בשבת נ״א לספירה כמ״ש המג״א (סי׳ תצ״ד), ויו״ט הו׳ ביום ר (ה׳ בסיון^ בנ׳ לספידד״ א״כ היא!־ הי׳ בנין המזבח בה׳ בסיון שהי׳ יו״ט אז, ואין בנין ביהמ״ק דוחה יו״ט, ואף שלא ניחנה תורה עוד, מ״מ מדאי קיים משה כל התורה נולה עד שלא ניתנה עכת״ד.

וי״ל בפשוט, עפי״מ דאיתא בירושלמי (שבת פ״ז ה״ב ופי׳׳ב ד,״א), מה בנין הי׳ במשכן, שהיו נותנין קרשים ע״ג אדנים, ולא לשעה היתה? אמד ר׳ יוסי מכיון שהיו הונים ונוסעים עפ״י הדבור, כמי שהוא לעולם, ועי׳ מ ה בקה״ע ופ״מ שם, ובתשו׳ עטרת תכמים (או״ה סי׳ הי), וכ״ז שייך בבניית המשכן, אבל בנין המזבח של קודם מ״ת, שהי׳ רק לשעה אז, י״ל דאין בזה משום בנין

 ועי״ל דאפשר ע״י שנים, דשנים שעשאוהו פטורין, ואף דהוי זה א״י וזה א״י, לפי מה שכתב והאחרונים. דגם אם אינו יכול מחמת איסור שבת הוי אינו יכול, אבל י׳׳ל כיון דהא דאינו דוחה יויט, הוי משום אין עשה דוחה ל״ת ועשה ולשיטת הריב״א (סוף חולין) בדיעבד יצא ידי חובת המצוה כפי מה שביאר דבריו הנוב"י (בתשו' שבסוף הספר ח"א), י״ל דהוי כזה יכול וז״י והבן.

ובהא דדייק במנילתא שם, כגון שנטל קרנו של מזבח, או שנפגמה הסכץ וכו׳ עיי״ש, י׳׳ל דבא להסיר קושי׳ הידועה דלמה לי קרא דלא דחי שבת, הרי בלא״ה אץ עשה דוהה ל״ת ועשר״ י״ל דבא לאסור הבנין ע״י נשים, דל״ש אין עדל״ת ועשר״ דבהו לינא עשד״ ונמ״ש התום׳ (בקידושץ דל״ד), אך בנשים י״ל דפטורות מבנץ ביהמ״ק, משום דל״ה בלילה נדאיתא (בשבועות די״ד), והו״ל מ״ע שהז״ג, אבל לפי מה שכתב, בתשו׳ בי״צ (או״ה סי׳ ג׳ אות הי). בשם גדול אחד, ליישם קושי׳ התום׳ (סונה דמ״א), על מה דמשני דאיבני בלילד״ והלא אין בנין ביהמ״ק בלילה, ח״ ל דבבין מזבח, דל״ה דק נלי מקדש, וכדאיתא (מבוזים דף סי), ולא מקדש, י״ל דהוי בלילה עיי״ש, וממילא ל״ה הזמן גרמא, ושייר גם בנשים, ובזה מיישב הבי״צ, הא תשים טוו הנוצה של עזים עיי״ש, ובזה ח י ק המכילתא ״מזבח וסכץ״ דל״ה רק נלים, ומצוה גם בנשים, והי׳ הו״א דעדל״ת, וצרץ קרא לאסור בשבת וא״ש.

His two answers are that Moshe Rabbeinu's mizbei'ach was temporary, or that it was done by two people at once, which removes the issur de'oraysa.  (The first answer is fine.  But the second answer- I don't think he thought it through.  If Shnayim she'asu was an eitza, they would have built the whole BHM on Shabbos. The answer is, of course, that Shnayim she'asu is still a maaseh issur.)  Wonderful answers both, but one might be excused for looking for others.

The Aruch Laner in Sukka 41 (and Chaim B. was mechavein) points out that according to Rebbi Eliezer that making cheese is an issur deoraysa of Boneh, it would be muttar on Yomtov on the basis of Mitoch for a mitzva.  This is based on Tosfos in Shabbos 95a:

תימה לר"י כיון דמותר לגבן בי"ט מן התורה אפילו באפשר אפילו לא יהא מותר מדרבנן אלא בדלא אפשר אם כן נפל ביתו בי"ט יהא מותר לבנותו בי"ט דמתוך שהותר בנין לצורך דמגבן הוי משום בונה כדאמר בסמוך הותר נמי שלא לצורך ובלבד שיהא צורך היום לאכול בתוכו שלא יכנו שרב ושמש וי"ל דאסור מדרבנן דהוי עובדא דחול כי היכי דאסורין טחינה והרקדה ביו"ט :

So it turns out that according to Rebbi Eliezer, at least, it was muttar for Moshe Rabbeinu to build the Mizbei'ach on Shavuos, and the Gemara in Shavu'os is not going according to Rebbi Eliezer.  But being meysheiv according to Rebbi Eliezer is not going to do us any good, first of all, because we never needed an answer according to Rebbi Eliezer who is mattir machshirim, and also because the whole world doesn't hold like Rebbi Eliezer.

Additionally: we have to realize that the Mizbei'ach is unique among the keilim/parts of the mikdash.  See the Rogotchover in Yisro 20:21, where he says that

מזבח צריך לבא מתחילה לשם כמבואר במכילתא פ׳ יתרו, ולא כמו כל בנין דבונין בחול ואח״כ מקדישים במעילה יד, א וכ״מ, אבל זה מתחילה לשם, ולכך יש בה הך לאו דלא תבנה, עמ״ש התוס׳ סוכה דף מ״ט ע״א,  וזה ר״ל הך דאמרינן ביבמות דך ז׳ ע״ב לא ממקדש כו', ר״ל דזה רק הכשר לא עצם, דהרי בונין בחול, משא״כ מזבח. וזה ר״ל מה דאמר בסוכה

דף מ ״ה, יופי לך מזבח כו', דאינו מובן כלל, ור״ל דמתחילה נבנה לשם כמו דאמר במכילתא

Therefore, there is good reason to say that the building of the mizbei'ach is also an avodah, just like bringing a korban on a mizbei'ach is for us.  We do find that the Avos built mizbechos as an avodah.  So it could be that the Mizbei'ach that Moshe Rabbeinu built before Mattan Torah had a din of Avodah, an avodas tzibbur that was kavua lo zman, so of course it was docheh.

And here's a clear raya from the Rogotchover that my svara makes sense: in Vayakhel 35:10, he says that building the Mishkan is different than building the Mikdash, because by the Mikdash, the building is a din hechsher, while by the Mishkan, every pratt is a mitzva on its own, not as a hechsher for avodah.
והנה כבר כתבתי דמשכן הוה המצוה הבנין וכל פרט ופרט מהמשכן הוה מצוה לא מחמת דבר לצורך דבר רק לעצם [הגה: ונ״מ די״ל דמשכן דוחה שב ת דזה לא הוה הכשר מצוה

On that basis, he says that there is a good svara to say that building the Mishkan ought to be docheh Shabbos.  Now even though in fact there is a passuk that tells us the din that building the Mishkan was not docheh, the Rogotchover says that if not for that limud, it would be docheh.  If so, there is no reason the building of the Mizbei'ach by Sinai would not be docheh.  There was no limud to asser that binyan of a Mizbei'ach, which was, like all binyan mizbechos, a mitzva be'etzem, not just a hechsher.

UPDATED A New Discussion about Computers and Shabbos

I found some interesting sources during the week of Parshas Beshalach in ayin gimmel, and I posted the information there, but I'm putting it here at the end of the post as well.


Last week, in Parshas Vayakhel, in passuk 35:33, the words מלאכת מחשבת, Me'leches Machashaves appeared.  These words are understood by Chazal as the fundamental definition of what sort of work is prohibited on Shabbos.  Mesorah's translation is "craft of design."  Most often, the way Chazal interpret this phrase is to limit the legal definition of 'work,' in Hilchos Shabbos, to cases of specific intent.

The next section is divided into two parts.  Option One is for people without experience in Hilchos Shabbos.  Option Two is for people who prefer straight yeshivishe talk.

Option One
In tort law, Specific Intent is defined as follows:

The mental purpose, aim, or design to accomplish a specific harm or result by acting in a manner prohibited by law.  Specific intent requires that the defendant intended to achieve some result additional to the criminal act in order to prove all the elements needed to be found guilty of the crime. It differs from general intent, which only requires proof that the defendant intended to do the prohibited act. For example, the crime of larceny requires not only the general intent to take property, but also the specific intent to permanently deprive another of the property.

Thus, in Hilchos Shabbos,  מלאכת מחשבת means that two elements must be present for a finding of  transgression of Shabbos: intention to do the specific prohibited act, and intention for a particular result.  If a person intended to do one prohibited melacha but did another, he didn't have intention to do that act, and it's not מלאכת מחשבת.  If a person intended to do a prohibited act, but was doing it for a purpose other than the usual purpose of the melacha, then he lacks the intent to achieve the prohibited result, and it's not מלאכת מחשבת. In both cases, מלאכת מחשבת teaches us that this person is not legally culpable for the what he did.

Option Two
In Yeshivish, we would say that Chillul Shabbos requires two things:
כוונה for a  מעשה  and   כוונה  for a תוצאה :  intent to do a specific act, and intent to generate a specific result.  The תוצאה has to be the purpose for which the Melacha was done in the building of the Mishkan.  Classic application: if a person digs a hole, he can be said to be creating a pit, or building a pit.  If he is digging because he wants sand, then even if he digs a perfect hole, it is not Meleches Machsheves.  He is lacking the specific intent required for a melacha of building.


Generally, מלאכת מחשבת narrows the cases that are called Melacha of chillul Shabbos.  But מלאכת מחשבת can also be used to include cases that would otherwise be excluded.  For example: If a person throws wheat and chaff up into the air, and the wind blows away the chaff and allows the wheat to fall to the ground, it is considered his act, because he is intentionally using existing forces to complete the act that he began and he intended (Aruch Hashulchan 242:24.  I don't know why the Aruch Hashulachan says it as if it were a chidush. It is an open Rashi in Bava Kamma 60a. and the Rosh there and the Rach in Shabbos 120b argue and say the svara is because that is the classic definition of the melacha, so the concept is limited to Zoreh.  Similarly, the Gemara says that nursing a child is technically a melacha, but of course it is muttar.  But why is it a melacha?  The woman is just putting the child to her breast, and the child nurses!  The child is doing the melacha, not the woman.  The answer is that because children naturally nurse, if you put a child to a breast with the intention that the child nurse, then the result is called your מלאכת מחשבת.  The same ought to be true by putting a leech on someone's skin, and just like Zoreh is a machlokes Rashi and the Rosh/Rach, this too is a machlokes between the Magen Avraham, who holds it's a grama even when you put grain into an active mill and certainly when you put a leech on skin, against the Even Ha'Ozer who holds it's a perfect melacha gmura, at the end of 328. Another example of this is in Tosfos Shabbos 73b.  For further discussion, see Totzos Chaim 8:3)

So now, here is a new question.

There is a nascent technology called BCI, Brain Computer Interface.  This enables a person to control a computer via his thoughts, or, more correctly, it trains a person to generate brain activity that controls a computer.  The computer doesn't read your mind.  As with Voice Recognition software, the computer and the person work together to create a lexicon of commands.  Brain activity A (visualize Netanyahu) means that the cursor moves the right, Brain activity B (visualize Shulamit Aloni) means left, and Brain activity C (think of smelling a bowl of hot cholent) means stop, and so forth.  See, for example, here.  (This is not what Stephen Hawking uses.  His devices respond to small muscle movements.)

At the moment, this infant technology is barely crawling.  It will soon become enormously efficient and popular.  One can easily imagine an earphone that functions as an inductive coil- or a yarmulkeh with a sensor- sensitive enough to distinguish between various brain activities, which could be used to control a computer.  One could do anything, from turning on a light to starting a war, by means of his brain activity.   All it will take is an Israeli with some spare time and a soldering gun.

Would this be called melacha on Shabbos?  You are not lifting a finger.  You are not moving or even talking.   You are not "doing" any act at all.

My opinion is that the centrality of kavana in the din of מלאכת מחשבת would make this a melacha de'oraysa.  Both the melacha and the result are intended.  The result is proximate and definite and immediate.  This is a melacha gemura.

It goes without saying that Reb Moshe, who prohibited the use of Shabbos clocks for anything but heat and light, would prohibit this at least on a Derabanan level.  But I'm not talking about Derabanans and Kavod Shabbos here, I'm talking about a De'oraysa.

Clarification:
This is not at all related to issues of voice controlled computers or microphones or hearing aids.  In all of those cases, the problem is the sound wave you generated impinging upon the receiver.  And please do not confuse this with infrared motion detectors, or computer controlled motion detectors.  In those cases, your action results in melacha being done, no less than if there were a string attached to you that pulled a switch when you moved.  You are basically pulling the switch.  In our case, you are doing absolutely no physical act.
This is not at all related to issues of whether the use of electrical mechanisms is assur or why it is assur.  I'm talking about a one hundred percent melacha de'oraysa- igniting a fire that cooks a pot of meat- that was done by sending a signal via my brain activity to a computer to do it.

UPDATE I
Over the last two days, I spoke about this to several Talmidei Chachamim.

• One said that it is not a melacha at all and muttar mid'oraysa.  Melacha requires a physical act on my part.  This person is a highly respected posek.  He also holds that Rav Elyashiv's issur to walk where motion activated cameras will turn on is completely wrong, as does Rav Wosner.
• One said that it is melacha gemura and assur mid'oraysa.  Interesting svara offered by the second person:  He said, a melacha was done.  The question is, to whom to be meyacheis the melacha.  So, if a person tells a goy to do a melacha, the melacha is mis'yacheis to the goy.  But if I make the computer do the melacha, it's mis'yacheis to me.  great unknown says that this svara is contradicted by Reb Akiva Eiger in the Teshuvos #8 where he argues on the Nesivos regarding mis'asek.
• Another talmid chacham said that it is no different than the brain telling the hand to light a fire.  The hand's action is my action.  The computer here becomes my hand, and the melacha is a ma'aseh be'yadayim.

UPDATE II

An excellent and helpful comment posted by the antipodean bar nash pc directs us to the Gemara in Sanhedrin 101a.  The Gemara says that it is muttar to 'paralyze' an animal via a lechisha/incantation, even though it essentially traps the animal, and trapping is an Av Melacha.  He said that the reason for this hetter is the absence of an act of Tzeidah.  This is highly debatable, as will soon discuss.  But Reb Chaim Kanievsky assumes that is the pshat in Rashi in the following paragraph.  (And the tzushtell is notable for another reason, as well- he wants to be machria the issue of whether מלאכת מחשב is called מלאכת מחשבת from a case of מלאכת מכשף.)
(I do not have a copy of the sefer.  I copied this from an online citation, and made several minor changes. It  is not complete, as indicated by the ellipses, and I cannot vouch for its accuracy.)

בספר דרך אמונה על הלכות שמיטה ויובל להגאון ר"ח קנייבסקי שליט'א, הקשה: “ויל"ע דבסנהדרין ק"א א' אמרי

לוחשין לחישת נחשים ועקרבים בשבת ואין בכך משום צידה [...] אע"ג דע"י הלחש אינו יכול לזוז ממקומו

עד שנוכל לתופסו מ"מ...מותר דאין זה צידה טבעית ויל"ע מ"ש גבי שביעית דאסור גם פעולה שאינה

טבעית ומ"ש שבת דמותר" (דרך אמונה, שמיטה ויובל, פרק א, הלכה ז, ביאור הלכה ד"ה סוקרין). לאחר

מכן הוא מביא שני תירוצים, בתירוצו הראשון הוא עומד על ההבחנה המהותית שבין שביתת הארץ מעבר

לשביתת האדם ממלאכה, ובין שבת שבו רק האדם שובת, משכך, היות ולחישה אינה פוגעת בשביתת

האדם מותר ללחוש בשבת, אולם בשביעית “האיסור הוא שהארץ לא תיעבד ולכן גם ע"י סגולה הרי הארץ

נעבדה על ידו" (שם). עוד תירץ הרב קנייבסקי, על פי ההבחנה שבין דיבור ומעשה: “דבאמת אין חילוק

בין שבת לשביעית רק החילוק הוא אם עושה איזה מעשה או שאין עושה כלום רק לוחש דכשעושה מעשה

באמת גם בשבת יהיה אסור אבל בלחישה בעלמא גם בשביעית יהיה מותר".

According to his first teretz, there is a difference between the concept of the issurim of Shabbos and the issurim of the rest of the Torah.  He says that Shabbos prohibits the human act, while other dinim prohibit causing a result.  On Shabbos, we don't care that fires are set, as long as you didn't do the act of setting them.  Magical incantations are not included in the legal definition of Melacha, simply because they are supernatural.  Therefore, no melacha has been done and no issur transgressed.  During the year of Shvi'is, we care very much that the land should not be worked, irrespective of who works it, so even a supernatural method that causes land to be worked would be assur on Shvi'is.  According to this, Rashi is dealing with an entirely different issue, that of  " אין זה צידה טבעית" , and this has nothing to do with BCI. 

According to his second teretz, Shabbos and the whole Torah are the same, and l'chisha would be muttar in all cases because it does not involve a human action.  The Torah only prohibits a human action, not thoughts that result in action.  If so, a BCI ma'aseh would be muttar in kol hatorah kulah.

Let me point out that Reb Chaim Kanievsky's point that speech is neither action nor legally actionable is not contrary to the generally accepted issur on talking into a microphone or using voice recognition software to write or control a computer on Shabbos.  The difference is as follows:

In talking into a microphone, the issur is the impingement of the voice/pressure wave/air movement upon the microphone, because that impact directly causes electrical changes, and directly generating electrical changes on Shabbos is assur.  Here, by the Lechisha, there's no issur on Lechisha on Shabbos.  The issur is the trapping.  The man is not trapping, he is talking.  His voice is not doing a melacha; the effect of his voice is causing a melacha to happen.

UPDATE III

Tosfos in Gittin 31a DH B'machshava says that a melacha that is done with intent alone (Tosfos is talking about being mafrish Truma with machshava and the issur of mesakein) is assur on Shabbos.  The Chida in his Pnei David on Beshalach 16:23 brings a raya from Tosfos to the Maharsh Primo who said that since the Mahn that fell in the Midbar could be changed into whatever form you desired by intent alone- you could make it into baked, or cooked, or broiled simply by desiring that it be so- it was assur to make this change on Shabbos.  The Teshuvos Har Tzvi (OC I 174) says that this really is clear in the passuk אֵת אֲשֶׁר תֹּאפוּ אֵפוּ וְאֵת אֲשֶׁר תְּבַשְּׁלוּ בַּשֵּׁלוּ , because the Mechilta says it means that the Mahn actually cooked/baked/broiled itself according to the owner's intent, and it's clear in the passuk that this change had to be done before Shabbos began. (It's not clear to me, though, because according to Reb Akiva Eiger's pshat in the Rambam 9 Shabbos 3 onהמבשל על האור ... דבר שאינו צריך בישול כלל פטורbishul of the Mahn could not be de'oraysa.  It's a great kashe on the Rambam, but irrelevant to the halacha.)

However, the Chida, in his sefer Yosef Ometz (92:2) brings that Tosfos in Menachos 55 says the opposite, that if the hafrasha is done with thought alone, it is muttar on Shabbos.  The Chida's resolution of this stira, and a discussion on the topic as a whole, can be found in the Sefer Sdei Tzofim on Menachos, page 402 (page 408 on Hebrewbooks.org , or if that doesn't work, then go here and then go to page 408).

I know that some people are going to point out Reb Akiva Eiger's Teshuva in 159 about making a kinyan before Shabbos that will be chall on Shabbos.  I say it's irrelevant. I'm too lazy to discuss it, and just wrote this so nobody should say "Ha!  You forgot Reb Akiva Eiger's teshuva!"  I didn't.

Lastly, let me point out that the Rashi in Sanhedrin 101 is not at all clear as to why it is muttar, as indicated in Reb Chaim's two teirutzim.  Concordant with Reb Chaim's first pshat, the Levush and the Mishna Berura (328 SK 143) learn that Rashi was mattir either because it's not the normal derech or because it's supernatural.  According to both the Levush and the MB, we have no proof that Rashi would be mattir machshava.  In fact, it is very likely that if Rashi held that machshava is bichlal not a ma'aseh melacha, he (or the people who read into him) wouldn't have to come up with other hetteirim like shinui or not derech hateva.  Since he (they) did, it proves that machshava can be considered melacha.  Therefore, according to these pshatim in Rashi, our case, which is natural and will soon be common, might be assur gamur:

According to the Rambam who holds that the lachash is a meaningless superstition, the Gemara is no raya at all, since he holds it’s muttar because the lachash doesn't work.

FINAL UPDATE

What we end up having is the following:

• A stirah in Tosfos, Gittin 31 (Assur) and Menachos 55 (Muttar).  UPDATE:  This is not correct.  Both are mattir.
• An ambiguous Rashi (that Rav Kanievsky in his second pshat reads to mean Muttar for sure on Shabbos, and possibly in all isurim; but according to his first pshat, and according to the Levush (OC 328) that Rashi was mattir because it's not the normal derech of Tzeidah, and the Mishna Berura in 328 SK 143 that Rashi was mattir because it's not derech hateva, we have no proof that Rashi would be mattir machshava, and most likely a proof that Rashi would asser. 
• The shittos of the Maharash Primo and Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Assur). 
• The Magen Avraham that holds that putting wheat into a mill that is already turning is called a grama, despite the intent and immediate result.  It’s possible that according to the Magen Avraham, machshava cannot make something that is not called your ma’aseh into your ma’aseh.

Bottom line:

• Assur: Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank.
• Muttar: Rav Kanievsky in his second pshat in Rashi. 
• Most likely Assur in Rashi and L'halacha: Levush, Mishna Berurah, and Reb Chaim Kanievsky in his first pshat in Rashi.
• Probably Muttar: the Magen Avraham.

So the surprising result is that for chillul Shabbos, the preponderance of shittos is that no physical act is necessary.  Chillul Shabbos can be the result of pure machshava IF the machshava causes the melacha directly and immediately and definitely, and it is commonly done in this way.  And it goes without saying that every normal posseik would agree that it would be a zilzul Shabbos to do melacha with machshava.

It could be that Shabbos is unique, that Meleches Machseves results in a chumra that makes it assur, as the Aruch Hashulchan (quoted above) says.  In fact, while not very much like the mleches hamishkan, this would be a nice match with the type of melacha involved in the creation of the world.  What the halacha would be in other issurim besides Shabbos remains unanswered, outside of the universal hetter of Reb Chaim Kanievsky's second pshat in Rashi, which, we have seen, is contrary to the Levush and the Mishna Berura.


UPDATE:
I posted on this again in 2013, in Parshas Beshalach, here.  I'm also pasting the newer post here.  I normally would just erase both and make a new one, but I hate to eliminate the comments, and I don't have the time to put them into the post.


A double portion of the Mahn came down on Friday, because people would not be allowed to carry it to their houses on Shabbos.  This way, they had their Shabbos food in their houses before Shabbos.  They were also told be sure to cook or bake the Mahn before Shabbos began.  

את אשר תאפו אפו ואת אשר תבשלו בשלו

There is a discussion in the Mechilta here about exactly how the Mahn was prepared.  Rebbi Yehoshua holds that the mere thought of baking would miraculously transform the Mahn into a baked preparation, and the thought of cooking would render the Mahn cooked.  Rebbi Elazar HaModa'i says that it would taste as if it were prepared the way you wanted, but there was no physical change.  (I suppose this is what underlies the machlokes Reb Ami and Reb Asi in Yoma 74b whether the tribulation of the Mahn was not having food in the pantry or not seeing the food you're tasting.)

יאמר אליהם הוא אשר דבר ה', אמרו לו אימתי אמר להם מחר: את אשר תאפו אפו, ר' יהושע אומר מי שהוא רוצה אפוי היה מתאפה לו והרוצה מבושל היה מתבשל לו. ר' אלעזר המודעי אומר הרוצה לאכול דבר אפוי היה טועם בו כל אפויים שבעולם והרוצה לאכול דבר מבושל היה טועם בו כל בשולים שבעולם ר' אליעזר אומר על אפוי אפו ועל מבושל בשלו הא כיצד יום טוב שחל להיות ערב שבת מנין שאין רשאין לא לאפות ולא לבשל אלא אם כן עירבו ת"ל את אשר תאפו אפו אפו על אפוי ובשלו על מבושל:

Two years ago, I posted a discussion about BCI technology, with which a person can control a computer via thought patterns.  Absolutely no movement is involved; sensors detect and analyze variations in brain wave activity and the program responds to this variation.  Once you can move and click a cursor with brain activity, you can do every single one of the thirty nine melachos of Shabbos without lifting a finger.  

BCI stands for brain–computer interface (BCI).  Other terms used are mind-machine interface (MMI), and direct neural interface, and brain–machine interface (BMI),  For the latest on BCI, go here.

Having seen this Mechilta, and some other sources, it is time for an update.  Some of this material was briefly mentioned in the original post, but most of it is new, like the Mechilta.

Harav Tzvi Pesach Frank, in his pirush on Chumash here and in a teshuva, and the Mirkeves Hamishna and the Netziv in their peirushim on the Mechilta, note that our Mechilta shows that according to Rebbi Yehoshua, this form of melacha is assur on Shabbos; that it needed to be done before Shabbos, even though the cooking and baking would be effected by thought alone.

(Please note that this Mechilta is completely incomprehensible- to me- if we're going to read it literally from a halachic standpoint.  Even if thought would make it cooked, the thought did not cook it.  I'm not talking about the Bishul b'chama/Bishul b'eish issue, I'm talking about no bishul at all happening.  It turned it into a food that was identical with something that had been cooked.  It was נתהפך to become a thing that is Mevushal, but there is no event of בישול taking place.  What we have here is like a thought that takes an object that was in a Reshus Hayachid and makes it re-appear in a Reshus Harabbim.  There was no akira, there was no ha'avara, there was no hanacha.  Before it was there, now it's here.  We have the shiur of a melacha, and we have the effect of a melacha, but the melacha wasn't done.  There's a consequence without a sequence.  Bishlema by netilas neshama, causing death is the melacha, and however you do it it's assur.  Here, it's the act of bishul that is assur and the fact that the food gets cooked is for the chiyuv on a shiur of the melacha.  It's like Zorei'ah, planting: the issur is the planting, and the fact that the seed sprouts is just a test of whether your act of planting was a melacha.  Here, it's impossible that such a thing would be bishul.  Maybe it would be makeh b'patish, but that doesn't make sense either, since it was perfectly good even without the machshava.  But I don't care that this is shver.  The Achronim see the Mechilta as a raya to this question, so I'm going with that.  I guess the problem is not bishul, but Mesaken Manna, like the next source says.)

The Moshav Zkeinim in Bamidbar (11:8) says the following:

 אמרינן בסיפרי ועשו אותו עוגות וכוי, ותימה הא כתיב (שמות ט״ז כ״ג) את אשר תאפו אפו ואת אשר תבשלו בשלו ואת כל העודף אלמא היה נאפה ומתבשל ואין לומר לאו דווקא אפו אלא תחשבו עליו, ולדבר[יו] (ה)מתבשל למה היה אסור בשבת לחשוב עליו שיש בו טעם תבשיל, וי״ל [דכיון] דלא היה מתהפך אלא על פי דבורו לתבשיל חשוב תקון דהא אפילו הפרת נדרים לצורך שבת איבעיא לן בנדרים (ע״ז אי) ובסוף שבת (קנ׳׳ז אי) אי שרי בשבת, ואע״ג דהתם שרי הכא חשיב תקון

which means that he holds it is assur, although he says דבורו.

On the other hand, Tosfos in several places indicates that it would be muttar; Fact 1.Designating Truma on Shabbos is assur under Mesaken Manna, a toldah of Makkeh Be'Patish.  Fact 2. Although lechatchila one should not designate Truma with thought alone, if one does so it is effective.  Combining Fact 1 and 2, Tosfos in Gittin 31a DH Bemachshava, and in Chulin 7a DH Vedilma and Bechoros 59a DH Bemachshava says that to do so on Shabbos with thought alone would be muttar.  Also, the Shittah in Beitza 34b says this.  (It's easy to mis-read Tosfos, but what he's saying is that even though machshava would be effective and muttar as far as hilchos Shabbos are concerned, the possibility of doing it with machshava is not sufficient to be mattir a physical hafrasha.)

The Achiezer in 2:49:4 talks about our Tosfos, and mentions that he has several problems with Tosfos' Shittah which he does not answer.  But he says that even according to Tosfos, that it's muttar to be mafrish on Shabbos with thought alone, that's only because Tevel has inherent Truma potential, so you're only designating which part is Truma.  But by Hekdesh, where you're creating an entirely new status, and this status causes a transfer of ownership, such a machshava is like a maaseh and would be assur on Shabbos.  But he says that this is only because ownership transfers generate a concern that you might write, and so are assur miderabanan.  The implication is that a real melacha, if done with Machshava, would be muttar.

Along the same lines, see Reb Akiva Eiger brought in the Shaar Tziyun in 633 sk 14, regarding a too-tall sukkah that has a pile of dirt in middle, and before yomtov you weren't mevateil the dirt, that he is not sure if if it is muttar to be mentally mevateil the dirt to the ground, because it would make the Sukka kasher and therefore be mesaken manna/makeh b'patish.  I cannot find this RAE anywhere except this Shaar Tziyun.  Anyway, from this RAE is appears that he's mesupak regarding the issue of mesaken manna with machshava.

And the best part- Reb Meir Don Plotzki (Kli Chemda) in Beshalach proposes that there is a difference between Shabbos and Yomtov.  On Shabbos, which is an eternal and immutable commemoration of Hashem's Shvisa creating the world through His Machshava, the issur includes melacha that is done with machshava.  But Yomtov, whose kedusha is created by Beis Din, by humans, the issur is only on melacha that is done with an act, the human sort of melacha.  Wouldn't that be interesting, to be mattir BCI melacha on Yomtov but not on Shabbos?

I found a nice article on this topic.  He cites most, if not all, of my references, here.  Here's his summation:

סקירת השיטות שראינו, מהן ניתן להפיק שיטה הלכתית בנוגע ל-BCI:

א.    הגרשז"א – המחשבה כמעשה (בהלכות מסוימות) לענין שבת.

ב.    הרב רוזן – בדיקת התוצאות הסופיות של תהליכים (גם פנימיים) וקישורם למקורם.

ג.    עמדת ה'חומרא' של הכלי-חמדה – כשעשיית המלאכה נעשית כרגיל על ידי המחשבה, אזי זו איננה מנגנון של כ'לאחר-יד' גרידא.

ד.    עמדת ה'קולא' של הכלי-חמדה – פעולה המתבצעת על ידי מחשבה אינה מלאכה גמורה בגידרה, אלא 'רק' איסורא.

ה.    הקהילות יעקב – מעמד של 'עדיף מכלאחר-יד' לפעולה סגולית בהלכות שבת, שלא כדרכה.

ו.     הקהילות יעקב – דרכה של פעולה כזו היא תמיד ה'לא טבעית', לא גזרו חכמים בה.

ז.     הרב זאב לב (והגרשז"א) – החילוק בין החפצא לגברא באדם ובפעולותיו בעולם. זהו היחס המפורש ביותר לנושא, ובשילוב עם חילוק החפצא/גברא זהו פיתוח של מערך מחשבתי עם השלכות הלכתיות קונקרטיות.