Nitzavim, Devarim 29:17. The Pen is Mightier than the Sword

Almost all yamim tovim have two days because of safek, but the days of Rosh Hashanna are not misafek, they’re called vadai and yomah arichta. Why is this so? There are, as always, two answers: a technically correct one, which is well known, and a deeper, perhaps truer, answer.

I believe that answer is as follows. What follows was inspired by the sefer Menachem Tzion (from Rav Menachem Sachs, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank's son in law, founder of the Associated Talmud Torah in Chicago, and father in law of Rabbi Jack D. Frank z'l of KJBS.)

Ba’alei mussar say that the reason ‘pen’ is repeated is that the yetzer hara has two strategies of attack.
One is to find a crack in one’s faith; if a person just takes his emunah for granted, and does not reflect on how Hashem runs the world and hashgacha pratis, there may be a weakness in his emunah that he is not even aware of. This is the ‘"פן יש בכם...אשר לבבו פונה"”--the ‘pen’, the doubt and weakness in bitachon that is within the person himself. The Gematria of Amalek and of Sofeik is 240.
The other strategy is if the person’s emunah is good, the Yetzer Hara looks for a chance to convince the person that what is actually an aveira is not so bad, not really assur, maybe even a big mitzvah to do--this is the "pen" of a person who does not stay aware of what is muttar and what is assur, he has a “pen” about what the halacha is. While he may start out doing things that are arguably only maaaaybe a safek, it is a שורש פורה רוש ולענה of maizid gamur, it is a root that produces poisonous fruit. It's an easy ride from “eh, it’s probably muttar.” "not only is it muttar, it’s probably a mitzvah." This is the ‘Pen’ of “shoresh poreh rosh vela’ana.”

As an instrument of spiritual destruction, the ‘pen’ is mightier than the sword. It's easier to withstand an external threat to our lives for our faith than to withstand internal doubt hiding in unexamined faith, and a negligent lack of clarity in halacha.

We see now that this series of psukim lists the five most dangerous factors that lead to a life of aveiros. They are:
1. Vatir’u es shikutzeihem- ותראו את שקוציהם
2. Pen #1,
3. Pen #2,
4. Vehisbareich bil’vavo- והתברך בלבבו , and
5. leimor shalom yi’hiyeh li- לאמר שלום יהיה לי.

Vatir’u is exposure to anti-Torah immorality, especially when that bad behavior is celebrated in society, what I call “ha’ro’eh sotah be’hiddurah. Pen #1 is weakness in faith. Pen #2 is not caring enough to know for sure what the halacha is. Vehisbareich is intellectual arrogance, the attitude that whatever I do is fine, and nobody can tell me that I am wrong. Shalom yiheyeh li means that I don’t care how my behavior influences orther people because I don’t care what happens to other people, as long as sholom yiheyeh li, as long as I’m going to be alright.

1. Exposure to immoral behavior.
2. Uncertainty of faith.
3. Ignorance of halachah.
4. Intellectual arrogance.
5. Indifference to the well-being of the community.
If a person sees any of these characteristics or attributes in himself, it’s a good sign that needs to re-examine his lifestyle.


We cannot come into Rosh Hashanna with a ‘pen', with sfeikos. There are no "sfeikos" on Rosh Hashanna. You have to deal with your doubts before the day comes, because if you walk into shul unprepared on Rosh Hashanna, you have lost a tremendous opportunity. You have to prepare for the Yomim Noraim by examining where you stand, who you are, what you are proud of, what you are ashamed of, and then you can benefit from Rosh Hashanna. Chazal absolutely did not want a person to come and say, well, it’s a sfeika diyoma, maybe it’s not today, I still have tomorrow....chazal want us to know that this is not the case. Today is the day, and there is no tomorrow. The time to prepare for Rosh Hashanna is not when you walk into shul on Rosh Hashanna, it’s when we begin the slichos.

And here's a mashal about the great enemy of teshuva- procrastination.
In Europe, the chimney sweeps, the Koimenkerrers, were looked down upon. Their work left them filthy and covered with tar and soot, and besides the dirty layer of ash, their skin was stained and they smelled like wet ash and the residue of all the food that had been cooked in the fireplace. There was a man who needed to marry off his daughter, but he was a koimen kerrer, and nobody would look at his daughter. The Shadchan decided that he would try his luck in a neighboring town, where the father's trade was not known, and he was successful. As soon as the daughter became engaged, the father decided that he would do no chimney sweeping for a month before the wedding. A month would be enough time to scrape all the ash and tar off, and it would be enough time for the stains in his skin to go away, and he could come to the wedding as clean as anyone else, and cause no embarrasment to his daughter and to his family.

Sure enough, a few days into the month, he realized that he had to pay for the wedding, and money was tight, so he decided that two weeks of enforced vacation would be enough, and he could try to do a couple of jobs in order to get some money together. After the two weeks went by, of course, a friend came over and said, please, my chimney is blocked and really needs to be cleaned, could you please just do this one job? Well, for a friend...and anyway, two weeks is plenty of time. One week before the wedding, a long time customer came over and said, look, you've been doing my work for years, and I don't want to give the work to someone else, but I need the job done, and if you can't do it, I'll have to go to the competition. Sure enough, he decided that under the circumstances, he had to do the work, which took almost the entire week. But, he thought, I'll really scrub myself on the day of the wedding. The stains won't come off, and I might still smell a little, but a little scented soap will do the job, and I'll still look decent. Comes the morning of the wedding, and he is absolutely determined that the morning will be spent in the shvitz with a bar of fels naptha, and he'll be fine. On the way to the bath, there's an emergency. Someone comes over and says that if his chimney is not swept, his wife will leave him, he will be made to look like a fool, he'll die of shame, and he is willing to pay ten times the going rate for the job, but please, please, it's just two hours of work. Well, ten times the rate! And I'll be finished by noon, plenty of time to clean up enough for the wedding. So it's off to work. But this is a difficult job, and it's an old chimney, and as he's finishing up, ma'aseh sattan! He gets stuck in the chimney. It takes three men and two ropes, but after two hours, he is dragged out of the chimney, he's never been so filthy and smelly and tarred, and if he doesn't leave RIGHT NOW he'll miss the chupah, so he runs off to the wedding covered from head to foot in tar and wet ash and rancid grease, his clothing ripped, you can barely tell he's human. (From the sefer Kerem Tzvi, from Reb Tzvi Hirsh Farber of London in the 1930s.)

The story is only funny until you realize that it's really about how you yourself have spent the entire month of Ellul and what you're likely to look like on Rosh Hashannah.

(An earlier version of this post was published in 2007.)

Adopting Chumros During the Aseres Yemei Teshuva

The daf yomi is learning Nazir now, and it's worth putting the analysis of the laws of Nezirus on hold for a moment to think about the fundamental concept of Nezirus.

We sometimes do things because our Yetzer Hara, our desire, pushes us to act without seriously and honestly considering the consequences.   The Torah tells us that it is good to create a bubble in time, a period during which you remind yourself that you do have will-power and you can resist your desires.  Wine and grapes are very enjoyable, but you will not touch them for thirty days.  Certainly, when you drink wine your inhibitions are diminished, and it is important to be vigilant for those thirty days.  You are trying to strengthen your ability to withstand desires, and drinking wine is the worst thing you can do.

Another enemy of spiritual growth is vanity. Physical vanity focuses one's attention on himself to the detriment of others, and it inflames all physical desires. Also, a person who is conscious of his beauty might not put as much single minded effort into the study of Torah and Mussar.  Vanity can impede growth in Torah, in middos, and in chesed.  So the Torah says, grow your hair for thirty days, and perhaps you will look unkempt during that time, or, if you are lucky enough to have beautiful hair, by the end of thirty days you will have brightly shining curls- then go and cut them off and burn them in the Beis HaMikdash.  Unlike Savonarola's foolish exhibition, this is a true bonfire of the vanities.

Perhaps the greatest enemy of spiritual and Torah growth is despair.  So many people have given up on themselves!  They don't always say it in so many words, but you see them all the time.  They are bitter and unsympathetic, they sit there with the slichos and just stare off into the distance.  They have decided that nothing they've tried has worked, they are failures in Ruchniyus and Gashmiyus, they are just losers.  All they can do is go through the motions, because they are never going to get any better than they are.  In the Slichos for Tzom Gedaliah it says 

טכסת מקדם אלו ימים עשרה, יחיד בם לשוב ולמצוא כפרה, כל השנה כולה לרבים מסורה, לשוע ולענות בכל עת צוקה וצרה, מהר היחיד ושב בינתיים מוחלין לו, נואש ולא שב אין תקנה לעוולו, סדר וערך כל אילי נביות להועילו, עותר וצועק ואין שומע לו

Despair is a terrible problem.  We feel bad for a person that despairs, but from the Pizmon we see that sometimes it's just an excuse- it's the way a person avoids doing what he really knows he can do.  Sometimes, it practically paralyzes a person's initiative and saps his energy. Whatever it is, it is a terrible weapon of the yetzer hara.  Seeing the dead causes greater despair- that person can't do anything any more, oh, what's the point in trying!  But the truth is that as long as you're alive, you can grow, you can change, you can make a difference.  All that you need is life and a decision to try, even if only to try something small.  The only person that cannot do teshuva is the בן סורר ומורה, and a בן סורר ומורה never existed and never will exist. To help deal with the self-destructive trait of despair, the Nazir is told to spend a period of time focused on life.  You are alive- you have been given the gift of life.  Do something with the time you have!  It's not too late for you.

תאוה, גאוה, ויאוש

Nezirus addresses the problems of תאוה  and  גאוה  and  יאוש.  The Torah tells a person to carve out a period of time during which he reminds himself of what is possible and what is worthy. Thirty days really is not long enough to permanently change who you are, but it is a good way to remind yourself of what is important, and what you are capable of doing.  

Every year, people come over to me and say that this whole business of acting different during Ellul, of the Aseres Yemei Teshuva, it's just hypocritical.  We accept chumros (OC 603,) we avoid Pas Palter or we're makpid on Chalav Yisrael, we don't talk in shul or speak lashon hara.  But come the eleventh of Tishrei, all the chumros go out the window.  What's the point?  To them I say, look at the parsha of Nazir.  Obviously, the idea of Nazir is not to say, OK, I'm on the wagon for thirty days, but on day thirty one I'll be flat on my back in the cemetery with a bottle of Thunderbird.  The idea is to create a bubble of time during which you make a conscious attempt to remind yourself of what is important, of what is worthy, of what you are capable of doing.  You probably won't see enormous changes, but the Parsha of Nazir tells us that something is likely to remain, and you will come out a better person.  

Why Teshuva is so Important

In the last post, I brought down something Reb Itzaleh Peterberger said about the consequences of delaying Teshuva.

 גופא מה שהאדם אינו עושה תשובה הוא חטא גדול וכמש״כ במדרש רבה הרי החתירה לפניך כו׳ והנה ביבמות (פ״ח ע״ב) מבואר מפני מה גרים בזה״ז מעונין ויסורין באין עליהן מפני ששהו להכנס תחת כנפי השכינה, והלא הדברים קו"ח ומה גרים שאין עליהם חיוב כלל להתגייר ואינם מחוייבים במצוות ובכ״ז אם נתגיירו הם מעוניו ומדוכין ביסורין בשביל ששהו עצמם להכנס תחת כנפי השכינה, א״כ ישראל שהוא מחויב בכל התורה ואם הוא חוטא א״כ אף אם עשה תשובה הלא יש עליו עוד תביעה מה ששהה להכנס תחת כנפי השכינה, ועל אחת כו״כ אם לא עשה תשובה כלל, הדבר נורא מאד. אשרי האיש הממהר לעשות תשובה

There are two things I'd like to add.

1.  The Gemara in Zevachim 7b about a korban without teshuva- זבח רשעים תועבה.  It appears from that Gemara that the given the simple fact that the person knows about the aveira, he knows he needs kapara, and he has not done teshuva, Chazal label him a  רשע.  

ואמר רבא עולה דורון היא היכי דמי אי דליכא תשובה זבח רשעים תועבה ואי דאיכא תשובה התניא עבר על מצות עשה ושב לא זז משם עד שמוחלים לו אלא ש"מ דורון הוא

2.  (Also from Reb Itzaleh) The Gemara in Yoma 87a about the butcher that said "I have nothing to talk to you about,"

רב הוה ליה מילתא בהדי ההוא טבחא לא אתא לקמיה במעלי יומא דכפורי אמר איהו איזיל אנא לפיוסי ליה פגע ביה רב הונא אמר ליה להיכא קא אזיל מר אמר ליה לפיוסי לפלניא אמר אזיל אבא למיקטל נפשא אזל וקם עילויה הוה יתיב וקא פלי רישא דלי עיניה וחזייה אמר ליה אבא את זיל לית לי מילתא בהדך בהדי דקא פלי רישא אישתמיט גרמא ומחייה בקועיה וקטליה

You have to ask yourself, where did Rav learn that one should present himself to the one that wronged him, instead of waiting for him to come by himself to ask to be forgiven?  And why did Rav Huna say "Abba is going to kill a man"?  Why was it so pashut to Rav Huna that if Rav would present himself to the butcher, and the butcher would not ask mechila, he would die?  And why, indeed, did the butcher die?  Was his sin against Rav so severe?  And if the offense against Rav was indeed so severe, why did he die davka after Rav presented himself?  After asking these questions, think about what the Yaaros Devash (right in the beginning) says about this time of the year: וזהו ״דרשו ה׳ בהמצאו״ שהוא ממציא עצמו לנו טרם קראנו אליו.  Whatever the pshat in the Gemara is, one thing is clear:  when the Ribono shel Olam is ממציא עצמו לנו, ignoring the opportunity of the Aseres Yemei Teshuva and Yom Kippur is being like the taboch that said זיל, לית לי מילתא בהדך.

Are You Relying on the Middas HaRachamim?

Are you relying on the Middas HaRachamim?  Not so simple.  Chesed and Rachamim have to be earned.

Reb Yisrael Salanter, brought in Reb Yitzchak Blazer's Kochvei Ohr, says that the concept of Rachamim, the idea of the 13 middos, only applies in this world, where ראה שאין העולם יכול להתקיים  במידת הדין שיתף עמו מידת הרחמים.   That does not apply to Olam HaEmes.  So after 120, when we go to the בית דין של מעלה, we will cry "Rachamim, Chesed!" and the Malach will say "No רחמים, no חסד.  Here, כולו דין."

Reb Elyah Lopian also brings this in his לב אליהו, at the end of Mattos/Massei, on the last page of Sefer Bamidbar.  The way Reb Elya says it over from Reb Itzaleh, we will come to the Olam Ha'Emes and we will not recognize Hakadosh Baruch Hu.  We're used to being mispallel to אבינו האב הרחמן, we're used to seeing ארך אפים ורב חסד, but there, it is all דין.

I also saw it in the Arvei Nachal, but I can't remember where.

This is a problem.  The Chafetz Chaim says that you can come to the בית דין של מעלה with millions of zechusim, like the sand on the shore, and if they're examined with דין, some will be written off because they weren't done with Ahava, some without Simcha, some without kavana.  Almost all of the zechusim will be gone.  Maybe you'll be left with one or two perfect zechusim.  Faced with דין, with almost no zechusim and no appeal to רחמים.... think about what Reb Akiva and Nachum Ish Gamzu and Chutzpis HaMeturgeman and Yoshiyahu and Iyov and countless others went through; and what they went through was with Rachamim, in order to avoid punishment in the Olam HaEmes, and you'll get an idea of what Middas HaDin means.

So there's no hope.  It's a terrible thing to hear.  In davening, we ask for חן וחסד ורחמים, we say אבינו האב הרחמן המרחם רחם עלינו and it's only for the duration of our lives?  It's only to give us a reprieve, probation, but as soon as our life is over, all that Rachamim and Chein and Chesed is gone and does nothing for us?After 120, the Ribono shel Olam is not האב הרחמן המרחם any more?  According to these baalei hashkafa, "No."

There are three things that lessen the horror of this message.

One is that if you do teshuva in this world, then even though teshuva is based on רחמים, it erases the sin, and ממילא (consequently) the sin won't come before the בית דין של מעלה.  By the way, this is also the explanation for why we say אל מלא רחמים for neshamos.  It's not that we're asking for רחמים stam.  Pshat is that we're being mispallel and doing mitzvos so that the concept of רחמים should come from our world, where it's operative, to theirs.  It is also possible that when we ask for רחמים in this world- for ourselves or for the neshamos of the dead- and it is granted, perhaps the רחמים remains operative in Olam HaBa.
But whatever the pshat is, we ought to be able to ask for Rachamim now for ourselves after we are niftar, which they say doesn't work.  ועדיין צע"ג לענ"ד.

Two is that Reb Yitzchak Blazer, when he came to his life-long friend Reb Chaim Berlin in  a dream, said that the human mind cannot conceive of the severity of the דין in בית דין של מעלה, but a Talmid Chacham has many many defenders.  So learn as much as you can.
This is from the Toldos Chayav intro to the Kochvei Ohr, page 31-2.

שאלתי ממנו מה נעשה בדינו בעולם ההוא. ואמר לי שדין של מעלה חמור מאד שאי אפשר לשום אדם בעולם הזה לשער כלל, וביחוד מקפידים מאד על דברים האסורים שנדברו שלא כהוגן.  אמנם על תלמיד חכם יש הרבה מליצי יושר

ושאלתי עוד, איך עלה בדינו, והשיבני, שכל ימות החול לא הניחוהו לבוא אלי בחלום ולתת לי יישר כח עד יום השבת, שנתנו לו מנוחה והניחוהו להראות אלי בחלום

Third, the Chafetz Chaim says that it's a mistake to think there's only one book called Middas HaDin.  There are millions.  According to how you acted toward others in this world, that is the volume of דין that is applied to you.  במידה שאדם מודד בה מודדין לו means that the מידת הדין will be determined by your behavior.  If someone offends you, or hurts you and you are dan lekaf zechus, then a מידת הדין book of דן לכף זכות will be used in your case.  It's not רחמים- it's a different set of rules of דין.
This idea is also developed in Reb Chaim Shmuelevitz in his Sichos.
The problem is, how can you be dan lekaf zechus, when usually, the better you know someone, the less you respect them.  The answer is, as Reb Chaim Shmuelevitz says regarding the Tzeduki in the Kodesh Kodoshim in Yoma 16, and Reb Yochanan ben Zakai before he died, a person can sincerely believe something his whole life and be dead wrong.  The point is that many people that are bad are tinokos shenishbu, to some extent.  That too is a limud zechus.
When we say you should be דן לכף זכות, that doesn't mean smile and go on with your life.  It means that now that you were  דן  that he is רעך, you will actively apply the pessukim  ואהבת לרעך כמוך and וחי אחיך עמך.

Reb Itzel Blazer on Din:

מורי זצוק"ל אמר כי כביכול בעולם האמת לא מכירין כו' כי בעוה״ז אם יקרא איש לה׳ יענהו. שערי רחמים פתוחים, אבל שם אין רחמים ואין חסד, ע״כ ימהר האדם בעוד ששערי רחמים פתו­חים וישוב מחטאיו וירוחם

(Also in his כוכבי אור p 134 on the bottom.)

Reb Yitzchak Blazer there on delaying Teshuva:

ד. גופא מה שהאדם אינו עושה תשובה הוא חטא גדול וכמש״כ במדרש רבה הרי החתירה לפניך כו׳ והנה ביבמות (פ״ח ע״ב) מבואר מפני מה גרים בזה״ז מעונין ויסירין באין עליהן מפני ששהו להכנס תחת כנפי השכינה, והלא הדברים קו"ח ומה גרים שאין עליהם חיוב כלל להתגייר ואינם מחיייבים במצוות ובכ״ז אם נתגיירו הם מעוניו ומדוכין ביסורין בשביל ששהו עצמם להכנס תחת כנפי השכינה, א״כ ישראל שהוא מחויב בכל התורה ואם הוא חוטא א״כ אף אם עשה תשובה הלא יש עליו עוד תביעה מה ששהה להכנס תחת כנפי השכינה, ועל אחת כו״כ אם לא עשה תשובה כלל, הדבר נורא מאד. אשרי האיש הממהר לעשות תשובה­

I don't think you can do teshuva for delaying doing teshuva.  It's too hard for me to think about.  Maybe someone out there can help.

From the Lev Eliahu:

והטעם בזה והסבר הדברים- כבר אמרנו למעלה, כי לגבי כל העולם ודאי אין העולם יכול להתקיים במדת הדין לפיכך שיתף הקב"ה מדת הרחמים למדת הדין. אבל עם הצדיקים הגדולים היחידים הללו- מתנהג הקב"ה אתם במדת הדין לבד וכו' כמשנ"ל

ומדוייק בזה מה שאמרו "ראה הקב"ה שאין העולם מתקיים במדת הדין- ושיתף עמו מדת הרחמים", ללמדנו שלעולם היה צריך להעמיד את העולם במדת הדין לבד דוקא, אלא שאי אפשר, אבל עם הצדיקים- שאפשר להנהיגם במדת הדין לבד- נוהג הקב"ה אתם כן כפי שראוי להעות בעולם וכמש"נ

ושמא תאמר 'עכ"פ לקתה מדת הדין והאמת - שאין כאן מדה שוה!  שהצדיקים לוקים- ואותם שאינם צדיקים פוטרים אותם לשלום!'... לא מחכמה שאלת זאת!   אדרא, דע כי הצדיקים מנקים אותם מכל עון וחטא בעוה"ז- כדי שיזכו ויכנסו למחיצתם בגן עדן לעוה"ב, משא"כ מי שהוא נצרך לשתף לו מדת הרחמים בדינו - זה רק בעוה"ז, אבל בעוה"ב- שם אין שיתוף של רחמים במדת הדין, כי לקבל עוה"ב אי אפשר אלא בדין גמור.

וזהו מה שאמרו בגמרא (ל"ה ע"ב) "ג' באים לדין, עני עשיר ורשע וכו,"- והיינו לדין ממש! וכן במשנה אבות (פ"ג מ"א) "ולפני מי אתה עתיד ליתן דין וחשבון", וכן תמצא ברבה מקומות, וכבר אמר הגרי"צ בלזר זצוק"ל מליצה, שבעולם האמת לא מכירים את הקב"ה ... כי כאן - הוא ארך אפים ורב חסד. אבל שם - אין רחמים בדין!ד

From the Chofetz Chaim

והנה מה מאוד צריך האדם להתחזק את עצמו במידה זו , לדון את כל אדם לכף -זכות ,כי על -ידי מידה זו דכף זכות, וכן להפך חס ושלום ,נקל להאדם להעלות על עצמו שם צדיק או רשע לעולם ,כי ידוע הוא דחובתו של האדם וזכותו תלוי לפי רוב המצוות והעונות שיש בידו , כמה שאמרו חז"ל בכמה מקומות {רמב"םהל' תשובה }, ריש פ"ג} :אם רב מצוות הוא בגדר צדיק , ואם רוב עונות ,הוא בגדר רשע , ואמרו חכמינו ז"ל בראש -השנה ,דף טז ,עמוד ב : שלושה ספרים נפתחין ליום -הדין {והיינו יום -הדין הגדול בעת התחיה ,כפרוש רש"י שם }: צדיקים גמורין -נכתבין ונחתמין לאלתר לחיי עולם ,רשעים גמורים {היינו רוב עוונות ,כפרוש רש"י שם } נכתבין ונחתמים לאלתר לגיהנום ,שנאמר וגו' , ובינונים וכו' , והנה ידוע הוא ,דבענין הזכיות שיש ביד האדם ,אף אם {הוא} כחול ירבון - אם הקדוש -ברוך -הוא יתנהג עמו במידת הדין הגמורה ,לא ישאר בידו כי אם מעט מזער ,כי כמה וכמה מהן לא השלים לעשות אותן בכל פרטיהן ואפניהן הנאותין לאותה מצווה , ואפילו אותן שהשלימן כדין ,לא היה באהבה וביראה ובשמחה הראוי לעשית המצווה , כללו של דבר : אם ידקדק הקדוש -ברוך -הוא , חס ושלום , אחר עשית מצותיו ,ימצאו רבן בעלי מומין ,והמצוות שישארו לו יהיה מעוטא דמעוטא נגד העוונות שיש לו ויקרא על האדם הזה עבור זה שם רשע לעולם

אבל אם הקב״ה יתנהג עמו במדח הרחמים ויחפש עליו זכות בכל עניניו ישארו זכיותיו על מכונן • ויותר מזה שאפילו אם נמנו מעשיו ונמצא שיש לו רוב עונות אם הקב״ה יתנהג עמו במדת הרחמים הגמורה יתמעטו מנינן כי בודאי ימצא כמה וכמה מהעונות שיש לחפות עליו שעשה אותן בשגגה או בסבה אחרת • כללו של דבר אם ירצה הקדוש ב״ה לחפש זכות על האדם לא יבצר ממנו • וממילא אם יתמעט מקצת עונותיו יכריע הכף זכות ויקרא עליו שם צדיק לעולם

והנה כל זה תלוי לפי ההנהגה שהנהיג את עצמו בימי חייו עם הבריות : אם דרכו היה לדון אותם לכף זכות, דנין אותו גם כן לזכות ,כדאיתא בשבת קכז : ואם דרכו היה ללמד חובה על הבריות ולדבר עליהם רע - גם המלאכי -השרת מדברים עליו רע למעלה , כדאיתא במדרש משלי {יא ,ה} ,על -כן צריך שידע האדם בנפשו בעודו בחיים , כי בעת שהוא דן את חברו , בין לטב בין למוטב , אז בדבוריו ממש הוא מסדר דין לעצמו

The Ramchal in Derech HaShem also says this (4:8:4).  My son Shlomo Sheyichyeh said this over at the Seuda HaMafsekes at Rav Tzvi Kaplan's yeshiva, and one of the yungeleit came over and showed this to him.

 אך ענין השופר בר"ה הוא, כי הנה ביום זה הקב״ה דן את בל העולם בלו, ומחדש כל המציאות בבחינת הסיבוב החדש, דהיינו השנה החדשה. והנה נסדרים הסנהדראות, ונערך הדין על כל היצור, כפי סדרי הדין העליון, וכט״ש בח׳׳ב. והקטיגור מזדמן לקטרג כפי עוונותיהם של בני האדם. והנח ציונו הקב״ה לתקוע בשופר, והבינה בו. להמשיך ההגהגה ברחמים ולא

 בתוקף הדין, ולערבב הקטיגור שלא יקטרנ  והנה כבר ביארנו, שכמו שאין מדת הדין נותנת שיגיע טוב לבני אדם אם לא יזכו לו, כן מחוק המשפט עצמו, במעשים מן המעשים שיעשו בני האדם, בהגמלם הגמול הראוי להם לפי ענינם, שינוהג עמהם בכלל דינם ברחמים ובחמלה, ולא ידוקדק עליהם בדין גמור. וכענין מה שאמרו חז"ל, כל המעביר על מדותיו מעבירין לו על כל פשעיו, כמו שהוא מוותר כך יוותרו לו, ונמצא שמתנהגים עמו ברחמים, וזה עצמו מדת משפט. ואמנם לא המעשה הזה לבד יגמל על דרך זה, אבל כל מעשה שתגזור החכמה העליונה עליו שראוי להגמל כך יגמלך כך, ומכלל זה מצוה של תקיעת שופר שנצטוו בה ישראל להיות ממשיכים עליהם ההנהגה ברחמים, וכשישמרו אותה כראוי זה יהיה הפרי שילקטו ממנה  ואמנם פרט הענין, היחס אשר לתקיעת שופר עם המשכת הרחמים תלוי בשרשי ההנהגה ויסודותיה, והכוונה בזה באמת לעורר אבות העולם להתחזק בזכותם, לעורר את הרחמים ולפייס מדת הדין, ולהגביר הטוב על הרע, וליטול הכח מהמקטרגים, ולהתכוון שישתמש האדון ברוך הוא מרוממותו, להנהיג בשליטת יחודו ולעבור על פשע. וכל זה על ידי מצוה זאת, כשתתחבר עמה תשובתם של ישראל כראוי.  ופרטי כל ענין זה כפי פרטי התיקון בדרכיו

I don't understand this well enough to know whether these contradict the above.
Rabbeinu Bachay Shemos 15:2.

זה א-לי - ועל דרך הקבלה היא השכינה שנקראת זה וזאת, כי השכינה עמהם בכל הגלויות, ולכן הזכיר כאן שם י-ה, שהוא מדת הדין, כמו שכתב בתהלים קל"ג "אם עוונות תשמר י-ה", ובמדרש, בעולם הזה מקלסין בב' אותיות, ולעולם הבא בו' אותיות, שנאמר בי-ה ה' צור עולמים. רוצה לומר שם בן ב' אותיות מדת הדין שבה נברא עולם הזה, ועולם הבא נברא ברחמים, כי מדת הדין תתעלה ברחמים ואינה נוהגת עוד, שאין יצר הרע ומיתה 

Ramban Beshalach 13:21.

 וה' הולך לפניהם יומם. כבר אמרו (ב''ר נא ב) שכל מקום שנאמר וה' הוא ובית דינו, הקב''ה עמהם ביום ובית דינו בלילה. אם כן פירוש הכתוב שהשם שוכן בתוך הענן והולך הוא לפניהם ביום בעמוד ענן, ובלילה בית דינו שוכן בעמוד האש להאיר להם, כטעם אשר עין בעין נראה אתה ה' ועננך עומד עליהם ובעמוד ענן אתה הולך לפניהם יומם ובעמוד אש לילה (במדבר יד יד): 

וראיתי באלה שמות רבה (יט ו) כי לא בחפזון תצאו ובמנוסה לא תלכון כי הולך לפניכם ה' (ישעיה נב יב), לשעבר אני ובית דיני הייתי מהלך לפניכם, שנאמר וה' הלך לפניהם יומם, אבל לעתיד לבא אני לבדי, שנאמר (ישעיה נב יב) כי הולך לפניכם ה' ומאספכם אלהי ישראל. וסוד המדרש הזה כאשר הזכרתי, כי בגאולה הראשונה היה הקב''ה עמהם ביום ובית דינו עמהם בלילה, אבל לעתיד לבא תתעלה מדת בית דינו ברחמים, וה' הולך לפניהם, השם המיוחד, כי אלהי ישראל מאספם עמו, ולילה כיום יאיר כחשכה כאורה (תהלים קלט יב), כי הכל במדת רחמים מיוחדת

Trojan Horse Chumros During Aseres Yemei Teshuva

Many people are not machmir on Chadash.  Their mesora is to follow the opinion that Chadash is muttar outside of Eretz Yisrael.  Although many people adopt stringencies in halacha during the Aseres Yemei Teshuva, those who eat Chadash the whole year have to be careful to not avoid it during the Aseres Yemei Teshuva.  To be clear:  If you eat Chadash all year, you can not be machmir to avoid it during Aseres Yemei Teshuva.  Why?  Because if a person chooses to be machmir on Chadash during Aseres Yemei Teshuva, he will be forever obligated to be machmir- not just during the Aseres Yemei Teshuva, even the rest of the year, forever.  He won't even be able to be mattir neder.  Aruch Hashulchan 603:2 - after discussing that a person ought to be machmir on things during Aseres Yemei Teshuva:

ונראה לעניות דעתי דזה אינו אלא בדברים שאין בהם איסור מן הדין, דבזה אינו אלא הידור בעלמא, ונכון להדר זה בימים אלו. אבל דברים שיש פוסקים לאיסור מן הדין, אלא שנוהגים על דעת דעת המתירין, כמו חדש בחוץ לארץ, או בשר בלא סירכה, וכיוצא בזה – אי אפשר לנהוג כן בעשרת ימי תשובה. דכיון שאין אוכלין בימים אלו – הרי זה כקבלו עליהם דיעות האוסרים. ואם כן איך יאכלו אחר כך?ה

According to the Aruch Hashulchan, the only Chumros one should take on are cases where there is no issue about the halacha- it is definitely muttar- but it is good to be machmir, such as Gentile bakery bread, which is definitely muttar, but it's nice to avoid it since Chazal would like us to.  Other examples would be Tevillas Ezra, or Vasikin.  Rabbeinu Tam tefillin would be fine, too, since almost all of our Rabbeinu Tam tefillin are passul according to Rabbeinu Tam.

There is a Chayei Adam from the Pri Chadash (127:10) that is similar to the Aruch Hashulchan.  He's talking about the need to be mattir neder for a minhag tov.

וכל זה בדבר שקבלו מעצמם. אבל דברים שיש בו מחלוקת בין הפוסקים ובמקום א' נהגו כדברי האוסר, אם כן לא קבלו עליהם איסור חדש שיהיה נראה לנדר, אלא שקבלו עליהם שדבר זה אסור באיסור תורה או מדרבנן, לא מהני בזה שום התרה, שאין בדורותינו מי שיכול להכריע נגד אותו חכם שאוסר, כי אם אפשר לחד בדרא (פ"ח שם סי' ב'). ולפי זה אותן אנשים שנוהגים שלא לשתות ולאכול חדש, היינו על פי דעת כל הפוסקים הראשונים, ומחמת חולשתם או שאינם בריאים רוצים להתיר נדרם, נראה לי דאם קיבל עליו מחמת שחשש שידע שכל הראשונים אוסרים, ואם כן כבר קיבל עליו באיסור תורה ולא מחמת נדר, ודינו ככל איסורי תורה שאסור, רק לחולי שיש בו סכנה לא מהני התרה. אבל אם לאו בר הכי הוא רק שסבר שהוא חסידות, אם כן דינו כמקבל משום פרישות בסי' ח'. ונראה לי דדוקא בזה. אבל במי שנהג תמיד להמתין בין אכילת בשר לחלב ו' שעות, ועכשיו מפני חולשתו רצה לנהוג כהמקילין להמתין רק איזה שעות, כיון דלכל הדיעות, אין האיסור רק מחמת סייג וגדר, ואם כן מהני לזה התרה להמקילין בסי' ט'

Unlike the Aruch Hashulchan, he says that if you did if knowingly as a chasidus, you can be mattir.  Like the Aruch HaShulchan, he says that if a person felt that he really ought to be machmir in Chadash, and he acted on it, it is not just a neder; Chadash becomes 100% and irreversibly assur to him.

What is the mechanism of this issur?  Why can't you change your mind?  It would be nice to think they are working with שוויה אנפשיה חתיכה דאיסורא.  But in שוויה אנפשיה חתיכה דאיסורא itself you have the machlokes Mahari ben Leiv (1:19), that it's from a din of neder, and the Noda Beyehuda (II EH 23), that it's a din of ne'emanus.  And this "ne'emanus," according to the Ketzos (34:4) is a din of hoda'as baal din, which doesn't make sense here unless you say that hoda'as baal din works not as eidus but as hischayvus, and this kind of hischayvus applies to issur v'hetter, which is very speculative.  So I'm not sure of the mechanism of this problem.

The ramifications of this unsettling psak halacha are endless.    This is not only relevant to Aseres Yemeir Teshuva.  Any time you decide you decide to be machmir because of the machlokes haposkim, even without a kabala for the future, the same would apply.

• There's an eiruv in town. You rely on it all year.  But some people in town don't approve of it- because they are chosheish for the Rambam, or they hold the city is shishim ribo, or whatever.  Here in Chicago, for example, several Shuls (Brisk, Aguda Peterson Park,) have announced that they do not want anyone who is carrying something in his pocket to daven there on Shabbos.  You want to be machmir during Aseres Yemei Teshuva and not rely on the Eiruv.
• All year you do like the Gaon, and you calculate Tzeis on the basis of the regular Shkiah.  Come Aseres Yemei Teshuva, you decide to be machmir for a week like Rabbeinu Tam.
• You usually rely on the Shach regarding bedikos for an ein lah vest.  Now you are libo nokfo, and you want to be machmir; or better, you want to be machmir like the Sefardim do, like the Rambam, even by Yeish lah Vest.

That's it.  You're stuck forever.  You can't even be mattir neder.  And this is not just one posek.  This is the Chayei Adam and the Aruch HaShulchan.


UPDATE
My son Moshe sheyichyeh just sent me a teshuva from Reb Moshe (OC 2:83) that says not like the Aruch HaShulchan and not like the Chayei Adam, which Reb Moshe mentions.

באחד שנהג כהרמב״ם שאין מועיל צוה״פ ליותר מעשר אם יש לו התרה

 ואחד שנהג כהרמב״ם שצורת הפתח לא יועיל לפרצה יותד מעשר אם מועיל התרה, הנה הטעם שאיו מועיל התרה הוא משום דכיוו שנהג כשיטה זו ואיו בדורותינו מי שיכול להכריע שלא כשיטה זו נעשה אצלו כמו שנפסק הלכה כשיטה ההיא עיין בח״א. ולכן לא שייך זה אלא במנהג מקום שאפשר שהנהיגו להורות בזה כשיטה ההיא ומי יכריע שלא כמותם, אבל כשאחד רוצה לחוש להחמיר הרי לא עלתה כלל במחשבתו שהוא מורה בזה כשיטה ההיא דלאו בר הכי הוא, וגם הרי אומר שלא משום שמורה כשיטה ההיא נהג כן אלא משום שרצה להחמיר אף שהוא שלא כדין, לכן מסתבר שהוא רק כדין נהג ג״פ שיכול להתיר.

Rav Elyashiv, (I am told there is a similar psak from Rav Ovadiah Yosef on a similar chumra) also encouraged people to be machmir in Chadash during Aseres Yemei Teshuva, like Reb Moshe, and not like the Aruch HaShulchan.

The sefer Tal Imrasi from R. Tal Doar brings a great number of achronim on this issue.  (The link will open the relevant pages from the sefer as a pdf, or you can view the images below.)

OTHER POSTS ON THIS TOPIC, WITH MORE INFORMATION, HAVE BEEN POSTED.  

November 2013
March 2016

Helping Your Friends Do Teshuva. כפייה דתית

Two parts:  Part two is is Divrei Torah. 

PART I

There's a tendency to favor simplicity, the easy-to-understand half-truths that free us from trying to comprehend a complex whole.  Still, sometimes these bromides can yield some insight.  For example: the distinction between Humans and other creatures, that "only a Human is capable of intentionally killing himself" is true, but it's not the only difference.  Still, it does focus our attention on one aspect of what being human means.

Almost all religions are exclusivist.  They teach that their truth is the only truth, and that other religions are false and, by omission or commission, passively or actively, evil.  But to what extent do they require that their adherents impose their beliefs on others?  That great intellectual achievement of Western society, that religion is a matter of personal conscience and outside the ambit of the state or of other individuals, is a purely political concept, and tells us nothing about theoretical religious doctrine.   Of course there is a wide gulf between theoretical religion and practical religion, and the practicalities of living among others in a heterogeneous civil society mandates some degree of tolerance.  But there are definitely differences between religions in this matter; what does a religion's theological doctrine on tolerance of or respect for other religions tell us about that religion?  I'm not claiming that this discussion will tell us everything about a religion.  But it does focus our attention on one aspect of what it means to be faithful to that religion.

There are really several aspects to this question.  We find differences in applying this concept to members of the same religion who have sinned, to minority non-co-religionists who live in a state that defines itself as being "of religion X," and to non-co-religionists who live outside the borders of the religious state.

Another question: among those religions that hold that their beliefs should be imposed on others, what is the motive for that imposition?  There are four distinct possibilities: 

• 1. As charity, for the spiritual benefit of the other (to save him from burning in Hell, to save a lost soul, etc.).  
• 2. As service to god.  Just as sins are offensive to god, so too are sinners; unbelievers are by definition sinners and should therefore be eliminated.  (You could also call this punishment, or Ubi'arta Hara Mikirbecha, but I think the way I put it is sharper.)  
• 3. Shared liability.  Any sin that we could prevent, but don't prevent, has been committed because of our inaction.  It is our fault that it occurred, and to some extent it is as if we did the sin.
• 4. To protect the true religion, because the existence of non-believers can engender doubt in the minds of the servants of the true god.  (Before we got married, my wife met a very sincere woman who told her she should light candles for Shabbos even before she gets married.  My wife said that in her family, they don't light until they get married.  The other person said "But the Rebbe says you should."  My wife answered, "My rebbe, Reb Moshe Feinstein, said I shouldn't."  The other, with a perplexed look of utter confusion, said, "There's another Rebbe?????")

I don't mean the items in this list to be mutually exclusive.  One, or two, or all of the reasons might apply.

David Rohde, in an article he wrote for the New York Times (October 19 of 2009), described his seven month`s as a captive of the Taliban.  He wrote

Citing the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam, he said it was every Muslim’s duty to try to stop others from sinning. If one person in a village commits a sin, those who witness it and do not stop him will also be punished by God.

Pressing me to convert, one commander ordered me to read a passage of the Koran each day and discuss it with him at night. He dismissed my arguments that a forced conversion was not legitimate. He and the guards politely said they felt sorry for me. If I failed to convert, they said, I would suffer excruciating pain in the fires of hell.

At one point, a visiting fighter demanded to know why I would not obey. He said that if it were up to him, he would take me outside and offer me a final chance to convert. If I refused, he would shoot me. 

That is pretty forthright, but you can't really prove anything from an ignorant man-child with a gun who is emulating a morally stunted illiterate.

The Christians have changed their overt behavior over time, generally from proselytization by force to earnest evangelism.  Even in the earliest years, there were some moments of tolerance: In the year 633, The fourth council of Toledo declared that

“men ought not be compelled to believe (or rather pretend to believe) because God will have mercy on those on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth.  Man fell by his own free will in listening to the tempter, and suffering himself to be misled by the wiles of the serpent, and so he could only be converted by his free acceptance of the Christian faith.”

And there is a very poignant record of the Jewish community's attempts to convince the Visigothic King Sisebut of Hispania (565-612) to leave them alone and not force them to convert to Christianity here.

Hindus and Buddhists really don't care a fig for what others do or don't believe; The pluralism they espouse, I think, bespeaks a theological blurriness, and they're kind of embarrassed about the whole thing.  Islam has gone through various stages, from the formative stage of violent forced conversion, to a long and wonderful period of tolerance, and back to nuts again.

What do we Jews believe?  Can we do the Torquemada thing, too?  Certainly, we have a mitzva of rebuking and educating people who are not being mekayeim mitzvos.  But intimidation is much more effective.  As a certain mobster once said, "You can get a lot more done with a kind word and a gun than you can with a kind word alone."  More seriously, it's obvious that if we did go along this path, we could never replicate what the Spanish did during the Inquisition.  We don't have that kind of bloodiness in our national makeup.  But I want to talk about both theory and practice.

This has a lot to do with the Aseres Yemei Teshuva.  It's so very hard to modify our behavior!  Breaking habits to the extent that we can be confident we will never revert is practically quixotic.  Judging from those poor people who have their stomachs banded, and who manage to regain all their weight, succeeding at permanent behavioral change is vanishingly rare.  On the other hand, it's easy to force other people to do the right thing.  We've all seen the morbidly obese person hectoring a diabetic to undertake a spartan lifestyle, and we've all seen smokers curling their lip in disdain at the sight of a person like them lighting up in public.  If we've despaired of doing teshuva ourselves, can we at least make our friends and neighbors do teshuva?   Not only is it easy to make other people do the right thing, it is also very enjoyable.  It provides a sense of superiority and rectitude at no personal cost.

And this is not such an abhorrent notion.  Would you not agree that a father or mother could impose their beliefs on their children?  What about a grandfather, or an uncle, or a cousin?  Where does the familial right of enforced indoctrination end?  And what about the regulation of psychoactive drugs and alcohol and tobacco? Are we not interfering in personal matters of choice?  And what about traffic safety laws that require the use of seat belts and penalize failure to use them?  Or do we have a right to protect society from the costs of irresponsibility, and even protect individuals against their own bad choices?  Is כפייה דתית, religious coercion, different? 

PART II

The Gemara in Sanhedrin 16 brings the first passuk in Shoftim, Devarim 16:18, to show that we are required to establish a system of justice that is empowered to enforce all religious law, including matters of public morality, transgressions of prohibitions, and refusal to fulfill religious obligations.  This empowerment is absolute, and the means of enforcement is left to the judges' discretion.  This rule primarily pertains only to the official court system operating within Israel or other areas of Jewish autonomy.  Can individuals take the law into their own hand?  What obligation do we have regarding non-Jews?  What obligations do we have regarding Jews outside Israel,, or outside areas of self-government?

The Rosh in Bava Kamma 27-28, brought by the Rema CM 421:13, says that one is permitted to strike another Jew in order to prevent him from transgressing an Isur. Therefore, if one sees a Jew chasing another Jew to hit him, he may use physical force in order to stop the perpetrator.  This, however, involves the defense of a victim, not simple religious enforcement.

The Rema in EH 154:3 also brings, as a Yeish Omrim, the Trumas Hadeshen  (#414) permits a person to hit his or her spouse in order to prevent the spouse from cursing his or her parents.  This case, too, can be seen as a legitimate response to verbal assault, and not at all a matter of enforcing religious law.

However: The Sheiltos (#27)  indicates that not only may one use physical force to prevent another from doing any aveira now, but he can also do so to prevent him from doing aveiros in the future.  But the Trumas Hadeshen limits his halacha to cases where the one is responsible for the other, such as a parent or a master, or a spouse, depending on how society views a spouse.

The Maharshal (YSS Bava Kamma 3:9) limits this to a Muchzak b’kashrus.  (By the way, I'm not convinced that he's making this distinction on the basis of the Mishna in Sanhedrin about Kana'im, which would limit it's relevance to muchzakim b'kashrus, like Pinchas.  I think he says this because if we allowed the shabavnikim to do it, Judaism would descend to utter anarchy and chaos.  Like in Mei'ach She'arim.)  He explains that the Rosh we quoted in the beginning, who seems to grant a blanket hetter for everyone to do so, is only talking about a sin that hurts other people, and the Rosh that allows intervention only allows it in order to save the victim, just as we find by a rodeif achar arayos or retzicha, but not by a rodef after avoda zara.

On the other hand, the Gemara in Ksuvos 86a that states that if a person refuses to build a sukka or take a lulav, “they beat him….” until he changes his mind.  This obviously is not talking about a sin that affects anyone else.  Even so, the Nesivos in CM 3:1 says that the din of Makin oso is not limited to Beis Din.  You and I can take the law into our own hands as well, even using physical coercion to force a person do his personal mitzva, like lulav or sukka, and certainly to stop him from doing aveiros now or in the future.  (The Nesivos in his Chavos Da’as in YD 161:6 seems to contradict this.)  The Ketzos in his Meshoveiv Nesivos there says, like the Maharshal, that the hetter for an individual to use physical force only applies where he is preventing an imminent aveira, not to prevent a future aveira, and he limits the Gemara in Ksuvos to Beis Din.


(By the way, although the Nesivos would allow you to hit someone who was talking during davenning, you are not allowed to embarrass him in public, to be malbin panav.  So take him outside and then smack him.)

The Netziv in Haamek She’lah 27:6 and the Shaar Hatziyun in OC 608:8 say that the Rambam, and therefore the halacha, only frees the vigilante from civil liability, but not that it is muttar to do so.  This is clear in both the Rambam in 3 Avadim 5 and 6 Dei’os 5, as cited by the Shaar Hatziyun.

In any case, everyone agrees that if a person has the ability to rebuke a sinner, that person is obligated to do so under the din of Arvus, under the din of “Hochei’ach Tochi’ach” and (Ramban there) because of “Arur asher lo yakim as divrei hatorah hazos.”

 So, as it turns out, it's only the She'iltos and the Nesivos in CM (self-contradicted by the Nesivos in his Chavos Daas in YD) that give a blanket hetter for individual vigilantism for aveiros.  The Maharshal limits it to individuals who are Muchzak B'kashrus.  Everyone agrees that Beis Din can impose and enforce religious requirements.

Going back to the beginning of this post, the question remains:  Does this concept, that we, either as individuals or as a society, impose our beliefs upon others by force, apply only to fellow Jews, or even to non-Jews??  I say that this would depend on whether you learn this halacha from, on the one hand, hochei'ach, which is specific to Amisecha, or Areivus, which is only lanu ulvaneinu- for Jews, or, on the other hand, from Arur.  I also pointed out that there were three possible motives for proselytization: charity, destruction of evil, and elimination of bad examples from the public forum.  These three possibilities are also implied respectively by the dinim of hochei'ach, arvus, and arur.


In practical terms, Judaism never ever was interested in imposing its beliefs outside of its home grounds.   While we certainly believe that it would be in the gentiles' best interest to adopt our theology, we never, ever, took a step to force this doctrine on others, even when we were a dominant power.  Maybe that says something about the calm confidence of Judaism.  We have nothing to prove to ourselves or to others.  If you want to join us in our Avodas Hashem, you're welcome.  If not, have a good life.

Eli, in the comments, quotes Avishag Hashunamis, who said (Sanhedrin 22a) חסריה לגנבא נפשיה לשלמא נקיט, that a certain person's profession of piety was merely a way of hiding his impotence.

Still and all, I maintain that there are real and true and fundamental distinctions between the behavior of the Jews and that of other nations, such as our excess of mercy, despite historical figures like Leizer Kaganovich.  Our behavior towards people of other religions, I believe, is another example of our unique character, even if it was not always strictly observed.

And here's an interesting yedi'ah.  The Rambam in 8 Melachim 10 says that Moshe Rabbeinu received a commandment from Hashem to impose the Seven Noachide Mitzvos on all mankind.  However,there's a fascinating discussion from R Dovid Pardo in his pirush on the Sifrei, in Ki Seitzei, on passuk 21:14, where he states that the Ramban there holds that the requirement of imposing the seven mitzvos on gentiles only applies to those gentiles that choose to live among us in Eretz Yisrael.  We have no obligation or interest in going outside of our borders and imposing our beliefs on the gentiles.  He brings that the Ra'avad also holds like that, and that despite the literal meaning of the Rambam, it could be that the Rambam agrees with this.

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On another note:  I recently came across something from the Breslevers, and since they are just now coming back from Uman, I found it to be an interesting window into what they're all about.  I'm just putting the link here, and you'll have to translate it yourself.

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The Chumros of the Aseres Yemei Teshuva

Chazal say (sotah 2a) that it is as 'difficult', so to speak, for the Ribono shel Olam, to successfully match a chasan and a kallah as it was to split the Red Sea at the time of Yetzias Mitzrayim. Similarly, there is a Gemara (Pesachim 118) that says that it is as 'hard' for Hashem to provide a parnassa for a man as it was to split the Red Sea. How are we to understand these puzzling Gemaros?

It's hard to know what constitutes "difficulty" for the Ribono shel Olam. But Chazal do tell us that a conflict arose as Klal Yisrael left Mitzrayim. When Hashem told the sea to split, the sea, or the malach that represented the sea, refused, because Halalu ovdei avoda zara, vehalalu ovdei avoda zara-- this group worships idols and that group worships idols. In other words, the sea protested and said "Yes, when I was created, I was created on the condition that when this time will come, I will suspend natural law and allow the fleeing Jews to cross me, and then inundate the pursuing Egyptians. But where are the Jews? I see no difference between the two groups. Both look like idolaters. Why should I save the lives of one group and drown the other, when they are basically indistinguishable? They all look like Mitzrim to me." But Hashem said that while the difference might be only incipient and vestigial, nonetheless, there was a difference, and Hashem insisted that the Red Sea split.

When a young couple goes out, they are on their best behavior; they dress, eat, and talk with a constant awareness that they have to make a good impression, that they cannot disappoint the person who has committed their lives to them. A few years later, the perspective has entirely shifted. The spouse is taken for granted, children and profession are the foremost if not the only concerns, and so forth. This is not the Chasan and Kallah of a few years ago. That the relationship built on entirely different personnae survives is a miracle- a miracle akin to the splitting of the sea.

When we daven on Yom Kippur, we stand there in our kittels, we don't eat, we don't engage in unnecessary talk, we spend twenty four hours like pure angels, and we ask Hashem to please, please, give us a tranquil life and financial success so we can do chesed, and so we can learn and support those who learn. So Hashem looks down and sees us behaving in the holy manner that we were born to achieve, and Hashem brings the malach of bracha and parnasa and hatzlacha and says "Look, see this beautiful, holy man? I want you to bring him all the blessings he is asking for." A few weeks later, the malach is summoned to do his work, and he comes down to the world, and he looks at the man, and the malach says to himself, "Who is this guy? This isn't the person Hashem showed me on Yom Kippur, the tzadik with an angelic countenance whose pure tefillos and desire to serve Hashem brought tears to my eyes! This guy I see in front of me blew off his chavrusa because he got araingetohn into fantasy football on his stupid computer. There is no way this is the same person." And the malach goes home.

The Mechaber in OC 603 says that during the Aseres Ye'mei Teshuva, everyone should try to avoid Pas Palter, and should be machmir on things that he normally would not be. This is certainly a meritorious thing, and any builder will tell you that when you lay the foundation, you have to be hyper-meticulous, because the most trivial, initially invisible deviation will set in place a trajectory that, after you build ten stories, will cause a disasterous collapse. The Aseres Ye'mei Teshuva are the year's foundation, and nothing is 'inconsequential": we need to set the foundation of the year into place without even the most minor flaw.

But let's try to remember that after Yom Kippur, when the real world reasserts itself, when petty concerns seem momentous, when Sukkos duties demand our attention, that we need to retain enough of the Aseres Ye'mei Teshuva so that when the malach comes down with the bracha, at least he'll find some resemblance to the person Hashem pointed out to him on Yom Kippur.