Behaaloscha, Bamidbar 11:16. Shivim Ish. How Many Judges in Sanhedrin?

ויאמר ה' אל משה אספה לי שבעים איש מזקני ישראל אשר ידעת כי הם זקני העם ושטריו ולקחת אתם אל אהל מועד והתיצבו שם עמך וירדתי ודברתי עמך שם ואצלתי מן הרוח אשר עליך ושמתי עליהם ונשאו אתך במשא העם ולא תשא אתה לבדך 

The Rabanan in the Mishna in Sanhedrin 2a learn from our pesukim that Sanhedrin has 71 members- the seventy Moshe Rabbeinu was told to gather, plus Moshe himself. Avi Mori Zatzal asked, but Moshe Rabbeinu's judicial status was such that he, as an individual, was considered equal to the entire Sanhedrin, he had the judicial power of an entire Sanhedrin.   משה במקום שבעים וחד קאי (Sanhedrin 13b, 16a-b.)  So how do you learn from here that Sanhedrin must have seventy one members?  If Moshe was equal to an entire Sanhedrin, then that first Sanhedrin, which included Moshe, was the equivalent of 140 people, and a Sanhedrin without a Moshe should need 140 people! Also, he asked, how is it possible for Moshe to pasken alone? Only God Himself is called a “dan yechidi,” the One Who judges alone? Furthermore, there is a rule in capital cases that kulo chayov, pattur- that if all the members of the court find the defendant guilty, he is automatically declared innocent, because unanimity in a capital case is evidence of prejudice, a failure of serious legal dialogue, and also because "והצילו העדה" requires that the judges be capable of considering exculpatory factors until the moment of execution, and this mutually reinforcing court will be incapable of reconsidering their decision. So how could Moshe be dan by himself? There could not have been any give and take, any discussion, and so whatever decision he made would have been procedurally flawed!

My father said that the answer to both questions can be seen in the parsha of the Slav, the quail, that immediately precedes our passuk.

When the people complained that they had nothing to satisfy their desire for meat, Moshe said to Hashem, it is impossible to satisfy these people, "mei'ayin li bassar?" As Moshe said later, there isn’t enough meat in the world!  If I gave them all the fish in the sea, it wouldn’t be enough, where will I get it from, האנכי הריתי את כל העם הזה אם אנכי ילדתיהו כי תאמר אלי שאהו בחיקך כאשר ישא האמן את הינק?  Did I conceive this nation? Did I give birth to them? What did he mean to add with this last phrase? Even if he had “harisi” and “yeliditihu," what's impossible is impossible!

From Moshe’s words we see that "impossible" presenting an insurmountable barrier depends on your relationship with the person in need. When a child needs something, a father's reaction is that he will do whatever he can, no matter how difficult, no matter if what they need is "impossible", he will try to do the "impossible." As my father put it, "פאר א טאטע איז דאס ניט קיין תרץ." For a father, that is not an answer.  He used Basya bas Pharaoh as an example: when she saw the child in the water, she stretched out her hand, although her hand could not possibly have reached him. No matter! You do what you can, and you don't even weigh the possibility of success. So first, Moshe Rabbeinu said "what they want simply does not exist." The whole world is not enough to satisfy their desires and needs. Then he said, if they are asking for the impossible, how do they expect me to do it? Am I their father? 

So Hashem told him, "Until now, you were like a father to the people. When you judged them, you didn’t judge as a dayan, you judged as a father judges his children. A father doesn’t need hagadas eidus, he doesn’t need drisha ve'chakira, your whole-hearted and selfless empathy and boundless love for your people allowed you to judge them by yourself. But if you say that you are not their father, from now on you are only the gadol hador, and you can judge them as a dayan, as one of the seventy one.

With this we understand another thing. The instruction to Moshe to convene a Sanhedrin is placed in middle of the story of the People's complaint about not having meat to eat. There seems to be no reason for this apparently irrelevant interruption. Why does the Torah place the parsha of Sanhedrin here? The answer is that the way Moshe reacted and expressed himself in his response to the people's complaint was the reason he was told to gather a Sanhedrin and to join the Sanhedrin as one judge among the others. Until that point, he was dan not as a dayan but as a father. Moshe had gathered the Bnai Yisroel in Mitzrayim, he gave them courage and hope and identity, he brought them out, he split the Red Sea, he gave them the Torah. In National identity terms, we would call him the father of the nation. And more than that– he was a charismatic leader– the people see themselves as part of him, and he sees himself as part of them. Their individual existence is meaningless, as they exist only as reflections of each other; the state is a reflection of the personality of the leader. But when he said "they are asking for the impossible! Am I their father? Am I their mother?" he lost that status, and could only be dan as a dayan.

After I said this in a drasha, someone showed me that the Brisker Rov asks the kashe on the Gemara in Sanhedrin (if Moshe was equal to the other 70, then we should say that a Sanhedrin without Moshe should comprise 140 members, not only 71.) The Brisker Rov answers that we see that Moshe Rabbeinu's din changed from being a shakul as soon as Hashem told him to gather the 70 people. 

But– and this is very important– the Brisker Rov does not even hint at any explanation for this change. He simply states this as a fact: his analysis of the pesukim leaves no alternative but to say that Moshe Rabbeinu's status changed at precisely this point.  After stating this tremendous and perplexing chiddush, he does not even begin to discuss why this might be true.  Ovi Mori’s pshat improves the vort tremendously. The fact that people told him it is a Brisker vort is just because people have a yetzer hora to say “yeah, I saw that someone else says that already,” when in fact the other person just says a little nothing from the vort.


(The idea that a father, one who loves someone with all his soul, will do what he can even when solving the problem is impossible, is found in several places.  First, as my father said, from Bas Pharaoh.  I've heard this in the name of Reb Itzel Ponovezher as well.  In our parsha, we have the people who were tamei, and they came to Moshe and complained that they can't take it, they need to be able to be makriv the Korban Pesach- even though they knew very well that their taineh was futile.  Finally, we see that Iyov was punished for his silence at the Egyptian Wannsee Conference.  There was nothing he could have done.  Running away, like Yisro, would solve nothing.  But at least cry out! A man who suffers, screams, even though it doesn't help him a ki hu zeh.  Reb Chaim B showed me that this is said over in the name of the Sfas Emes- see his comment, and I saw it in the Lekach Tov quoted from "the gedolei Baalei Mussar.")


When I told this to HaRav Yitzchok Grodzinsky, a Rosh Kollel in Bnei Brak, the son of my father's Mashgiach in Slabodkeh-Lithuania, I remarked that what my father said was certainly not a pshat that a Brisker would say.  Harav Grodzinsky added that it was, in fact, davkeh a Slabodker mehalach, emblematic of the foundational mussar spirit of the Slabodkeh Yeshiva.

The original version of this post was written in 2008, during the year of aveilus for my father Zatzal.

Note:

Yehuda O, in the comments, said an interesting svara.  He said that even though Moshe Rabbeinu was shakul to the seventy of Sanhedrin, he wouldn't have a din Beis Din of three without two other people.  Another commenter directed us to the Shai LaTorah III:133, where he brings this in a shakla ve'taria from the Brisker Rov, his brother Reb Moshe, and his son Reb Dovid.  Yasher koach to both of you!

ויאמר ה' אל משה אספה לי שבﬠים איש מזקני ישראל אשר ידﬠת כי הם זקני הﬠם ושטריו ולקחת אתם אל אהל מוﬠר והתיצבו שם ﬠמך 

מרן הגרי׳׳ז זצ"ל הסתפק בהא דמשה במקום ﬠ"א, אם דין זה נאמר רק עד שנאמרה הך פרשה ד"אספה לי שבﬠים איש", שבזה נתמנו ﬠ' זקנים לסנהדרין או דגם אחרי פרשה זו ׳׳משה במקום שבﬠים ואחד

והביא ראיה מדברי הרמב"ם בהלכות מלכים פ"א הל"ג וז"ל אין מﬠמידין מלך בתחילה אלא ﬠ"פ בית דין של ע' זקנים. וﬠל פי נביא כיהושﬠ שמינהו משה ובית דינו וכו', עכ"ל. ומדכתב הרמב׳׳ם "משה ובית דינו" מוכרח מזה דאחרי שהוקם סנהדרין גדולה, לא היה משה במקום ﬠ"א, וזהו שהיה צריך לבית דינו כדי למנות את יהושﬠ ﬠכ"ד

והנה מרן זצ"ל אמר בשם אחיו הגר"מ זצ"ל להסתפק, אם הא דמשה במקום ﬠ"א, שייכא רק לבית דין של ﬠ"א, או דהיה לו גם דיך בית דין של שלשה. והביא ראיה מהא דאיתא בגמ' ראש השנה כ"ה ﬠ"ב "ואימא הכא נמי (דקידוש החודש יהא

ביחיד) אין לך מומחה לרבים בישראל יותר ממשה רבינו, וקאמר ליה הקב"ה עד דאיכא אהרן בהדך" יעוי"ש. הרי דלקידוש החודש דבﬠינן ג' לא מהני משה רבינו לבדו, ובﬠל כרחך דלא היה אלא במקום ﬠ"א, אבל לא במקום בית דין של ג'

ואין לומר דכשנאמרה פרשת קידוש החודש ﬠדיין לא היה משה במקום ﬠ"א דהנה כתב הרמב"ם בהלכות קידוש החודש פ"ה ה׳׳א "כל מה שאמרנו מקביﬠת ר"ח וכו, אין ,עושין אותו אלא סנהדרין וכו׳. שכך נאמר למשה ולאהרן החדש הזה לכם ראש חדשים שכך הוא פירוש הדבר ﬠדות זו תהיה מסורה לכם וכל הﬠומד אחריכם במקומבם׳׳ ﬠכ"ל. ומבואר מזה דמ"החודש הזה לכם" ילפינן דקידוש החודש מסור לסנהדרין, ובﬠ׳׳כ דכבר אז היה משה במקום ﬠ"א

והנה בזה דמשה במקום ﬠ"א, ודין בית דין של ג' לא היה לו נראה בטעמא דמילתא, דהוא משום דב"ד של ﬠ"א, הוי מﬠלות, ולכן שייך ﬠ"ז הא דמשה במקום ﬠ"א קאי. אולם דין בית דין של ג' הוא הלכה בהחפצא של הבית דין דבﬠינן שיהיה בשלשה דיינין, ולכן לא שייך ﬠ"ז הא דמשה במקום ﬠ"א, דבﬠינן ג' דיינין בדוקא

ולפי"ז י"ל דנהי דבית דין של ﬠ"א הוי "מﬠלות", אבל הרי בﬠינן גם שיהיה בית דין", וא"כ אף דמשה במקום ﬠ"א, אבל בﬠינן שיהיו שנים ﬠמו, כדי שיהיו" שלושה ויחול ﬠ"ז תורת "בית דין" וצ"ﬠ בזה

ואם כנים הם הדברים, א"כ יש לדחות ראית מרן זצ"ל, ממש׳׳כ הרמב׳׳ם "משה ובית דינו ﬠמו", דמש"כ הרמב"ם "ובית דינו׳׳ הכונה לﬠוד שנים ﬠמו. אכן הדין דמשה במקום ﬠ"א לא פקﬠ באמת גם אח"כ

אולם מלשון הרמבײם לא משמﬠ כן, ד'בית דינו" לכאורה הוא סנהדרין וֹכמש"כ הרמב"ם אח"כ

הגרמ"ד הלוי סאלאװײציק שליטייא

Enough.

Dr. Ezekiel Emanuel recently printed an essay titled "Why I Hope to Die at 75"  Emanuel is a highly intelligent man, and his essay cannot fairly be compressed, but the gist of it is that living past the age of 75 invites morbid incapacity and pain which burden the individual, his family, and his friends. Life is a process, and it is finite; by 75, one has achieved all he possibly can, and one's existence becomes an illustrated process of dying.  Emanuel actively opposes legalizing euthanasia and suicide, but he will refuse tests, treatments, and therapies whose only purpose is to extend his life past the age of 75.

It would seem obvious that an Orthodox Jew could not possibly agree with him.  Every moment of life is a precious opportunity to serve God and to serve our fellow man.  The emulation of God through study and acts of kindness, and the purification of body and soul through prayer and study, are enhanced with age and experience.  Ours is a religion that venerates זקנה- age and wisdom.  Even suffering has its place in our life experience.  Presuming that one's personal preference trumps God's gift of life seems audaciously pagan.  Whether we desire לישב בשלוה or למות בשלוה, we recognize that our wishes and desires should be subservient to God's will.  

(On a more esoteric level, the existence of elders improves society.  The opportunity and responsibility to express selfless hakaras hatov, and the calming influence of the aged, contribute to a better world.  This is obviously not demonstrable, and so it is irrelevant to anyone that doesn't realize it himself- it's "faith based.")

But we cannot dismiss his essay out of hand.  There are numerous statements in Chazal that one might interpret as being congruent with his thesis. While we recognize that secularism is not an absolute barrier to the apprehension of truths, we begin with one essential axiom- that only the Torah can guide us to the comprehension of the truth, particularly in such important matters.  

(Forgive the inappropriate interjection.  While Emanuel's article is non-senescencical, it is not nonsensical.)

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There are three aspects of human effectuation of change:  desire, prayer, and act. Action to cause death is almost never allowed.  In Parshas No'ach, the passuk says (Breishis 9:6) Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God He made man.  שפך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך כי בצלם אלהים עשה את האדם.  Given the emphatic and fundamental prohibition of homicide, is it theologically abhorrent to hope for death?  As an introductory postulate, we assume that if hoping for death is theologically defensible, then prayer for death is equally legitimate.  So we would state the question as follows:
Where one may not cause death by action, is it theologically defensible to desire or pray for death, his own or that of others.

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To approach the question methodically, one must ask the following questions.

1.  Let's start with diametrically opposed possibilities.  Is prayer for death absolutely allowed without any restriction or special circumstances, or is it absolutely prohibited no matter how terrible the suffering is.

        A.  Always allowed:  

Prayer is nothing more than asking God to do something.  If God decides to do it, it is His will, He has decided it is the right thing.  Prayer for death is not an interference with or a denial of God's will any more than prayer for healing or wealth or success.  You present your petition, God decides whether to answer it.  

                  B. Never allowed:

i.  God grants life, and it is a precious gift that enables us to fulfill our great destiny of serving Him and doing His will.  Every moment of our lives there is a purpose for our existence, and every moment of our lives is a glorious opportunity.  To disdain that gift is both the ultimate kefiyas tov and a dereliction of duty to our Master.  If a person, at his penultimate moment, realizes that he needs to do teshuva, he can acquire his world to come in that one moment- and what a tragedy it would be if he died before that moment of supreme and eternal importance.

ii.   Indirect causation of death is included in the prohibition against homicide.  (Rambam 2 Rotzei'ach USh'N 2.) If a prayer to end a person's life is answered, the prayer is an indirect causation.  The fact that God answered the prayer doesn't prove that you are not liable.  God enabled man to choose to do good or to do bad, and one can do so physically or metaphysically.  Perhaps prayer is just another means of doing things.  Additionally, if I pray that a person's sins should be scrutinized by the heavenly court, and as a result he dies, then I caused his death.

(I believe that while the "diametric" is not correct, the lomdus is useful in analyzing the opinions among the poskim brought below.)

2.  Neither of the diametrically opposed alternatives is correct, and prayer for death is only allowed under extreme circumstances.  If so,

A. What degree of suffering makes such prayers appropriate?      
B.  Does it matter whether the suffering is physical or mental?      
C.  Does it matter if the person might or might not recover?
D.  Does it matter if the person will recover, but will suffer terribly until he does recover?  And what does "recovery" mean in this context?  Restoration to normal health, or a short extension of life (חיי שעה)?

3.  If prayer is allowed to alleviate suffering, what if the suffering of Person A is caused by Person B, and the only way to alleviate the suffering is if Person B dies- can one pray for the death of Person B?

       A.  Would this be allowed where Person B is wicked and through malice or indifference is causing the suffering of Person A?  (This is not limited to rotzchim.  If you have babies, and share an apartment wall with someone that blasts punk rock every night at three a.m., and laughs at you when you beg him to lower the volume, you know what I mean.)
       B.  Would this be allowed even if Person B is innocent, but is the unwilling or unwitting cause of the suffering of Person A, which cannot be alleviated unless Person B dies?

***********************

Here are the places where Chazal seem to allow prayer or other types of metaphysical intervention that are intended to result in one's death.  Each case involves emotional or physical distress; one must bear in mind that the circumstances and the degree and type of distress in these cases varies very widely, as outlined above.

• Sotah 46b, on the residents of Luz, who were miraculously immortal so long as they stayed within the walls of their city.  When one would become disgusted with his endless life, he would walk outside of the city and die. 

היא לוז שצובעין בה תכלת, היא לוז שבא סנחריב ולא בלבלה, נבוכדנצר ולא החריבה, ואף מלאך המות אין לו רשות לעבור בה, אלא זקנים שבה, בזמן שדעתן קצה עליהן יוצאין חוץ לחומה והן מתים...

• Bava Metzia 84a, R’ Yochanan lost his mind in his grief over Reish Lakish’s death, the Chachamim asked Hashem for mercy (which, as Rav Waldenberg points out, does not necessarily mean they asked that he die- perhaps they asked that his suffering end.  However, the Maharsha says they prayed that he die.) and he died:

נח נפשיה דר' שמעון בן לקיש והוה קא מצטער ר' יוחנן בתריה טובא אמרו רבנן מאן ליזיל ליתביה לדעתיה ניזיל רבי אלעזר בן פדת דמחדדין שמעתתיה אזל יתיב קמיה כל מילתא דהוה אמר רבי יוחנן אמר ליה תניא דמסייעא לך אמר את כבר לקישא בר לקישא כי הוה אמינא מילתא הוה מקשי לי עשרין וארבע קושייתא ומפריקנא ליה עשרין וארבעה פרוקי וממילא רווחא שמעתא ואת אמרת תניא דמסייע לך אטו לא ידענא דשפיר קאמינא הוה קא אזיל וקרע מאניה וקא בכי ואמר היכא את בר לקישא היכא את בר לקישא והוה קא צוח עד דשף דעתיה [מיניה] בעו רבנן רחמי עליה ונח נפשיה

• Taanis 23a, regarding Choni HaMe'agel.  When he woke in a later generation and found nobody that recognized him or understood his teaching, he became distraught, asked for Hashem's mercy, and died.

.לא הימנוהו ולא עבדי ליה יקרא כדמבעי ליה, חלש דעתיה, בעי רחמי ומית

• The story of the prayer of Rebbi's housekeeper in Kesuvos 104a:.

ההוא יומא דנח נפשיה דרבי גזרו רבנן תעניתא ובעו רחמי ואמרי כל מאן דאמר נח נפשיה דר' ידקר בחרב סליקא אמתיה דרבי לאיגרא אמרה עליוני' מבקשין את רבי והתחתוני' מבקשין את רבי יהי רצון שיכופו תחתונים את העליונים כיון דחזאי כמה זימני דעייל לבית הכסא וחלץ תפילין ומנח להו וקמצטער אמרה יהי רצון שיכופו עליונים את התחתונים ולא הוו שתקי רבנן מלמיבעי רחמי שקלה כוזא שדייא מאיגרא [לארעא] אישתיקו מרחמי ונח נפשיה דרבי

The Gemara says that Rebbi's housekeeper, seeing him suffering, prayed that the Heavenly Court's wish that Rebbi should join them in Heaven should outweigh the prayers of the earthly court that wanted Rebbi to continue to live here on Earth.  It seems, at first, to be a poor citation, because how do we know that "Rebbi's housekeeper" did the right thing?  Is this any kind of citation to authority?  But if you look at the Rosh in Moed Kattan 3:11, you will see that this woman was known for her wisdom and fear of God, to the extent that none of her contemporaries, which includes the members of Rebbi's family, were willing to presume they were superior to her:

והשפחה היתה בה חכמה יתירה ויראת חטא ולא רצו לשקול עצמם כנגדה.

 Furthermore, the most cited Rishon on this topic is the Ran in Nedarim, and the Ran brings that story of Rebbi's housekeeper as proof that such prayer can be the right thing.

• The Ran in Nedarim 40a.

The Gemara there says:  One who does not visit the ill is not entitled to pray for him, not that he live and not that he die.

כל שאין מבקר חולה אין מבקש עליו רחמים לא שיחיה ולא שימות

Ran- sometimes, one should pray for mercy that a person die and be relieved from great pain, when he cannot possibly survive.  We see this is true from the story (Kesuvos 104) of Rebbi's housekeeper, a great woman (see Rosh on Moed Kattan 17 about how respected she was by the Tannaim,) who, seeing Rebbi's suffering, prayed that he die.

אין מבקש עליו רחמים לא שיחיה ולא שימות. נראה בעיני דה"ק פעמים שצריך לבקש רחמים על החולה שימות כגון שמצטער החולה בחליו הרבה ואי אפשר לו שיחיה כדאמרינן בפרק הנושא (כתובות קד.) דכיון דחזאי אמתיה דרבי דעל כמה זימנין לבית הכסא ואנח תפילין וקא מצטער אמרה יהי רצון שיכופו העליונים את התחתונים כלומר דלימות רבי ומש"ה קאמר דהמבקר חולה מועילו בתפלתו אפי' לחיות מפני שהיא תפלה יותר מועלת ומי שאינו מבקרו אין צריך לומר שאינו מועילו לחיות אלא אפי' היכא דאיכא ליה הנאה במיתה אפי' אותה זוטרתי אינו מהנהו:

• Rav Reuven Margalios in his Nefesh Chaya OC 292 directs us to the Yalkut in Mishlei 8:34, #943, about an aged woman that was tired of living.  Rav Yosi ben Chalafta advised her to stop coming to shul every morning and evening, in which merit she apparently was living.  She stopped doing it, and three days later she died.

אשרי אדם שומע לי. א"ר יהושע בן לוי לבניו אקדימו עולו אקדימו וחשיכו עולו לבי כנישתא כי היכי דתוריכו חיי ולמודייכו תתקיים בידייכו, א"ר חמא בר חנינא מאי קראה אשרי אדם שומע לי לשקוד על דלתותי יום יום וגו'. 

אמר רב חסדא לעולם יכנס אדם שני פתחים לבית הכנסת ויתפלל שנאמר לשמור מזוזות פתחי, שני פתחים סלקא דעתך, אלא אימא שעור שני פתחים. 

מעשה באשה אחת שהזקינה הרבה, באת לפני ר"י (הגלילי) בן חלפתא אמרה לו רבי זקנתי יותר מדאי ומעכשיו חיים של נוול הם שאיני טועמת לא מאכל ולא משתה ואני מבקשת ליפטר מן העולם, אמר לה במה הארכת כל כך ימים, אמרה לו למודה אני אפילו יש לי דבר חביב אני מנחת אותו ומשכמת לבית הכנסת בכל יום, אמר לה מנעי עצמך מבית הכנסת שלשה ימים זה אחר זה, הלכה ועשתה כן וביום השלישי חלתה ומתה, לכך אמר שלמה אשרי אדם שומע לי וגו', מה כתיב אחריו כי מוצאי מצא חיים

• It's not really germane, but there's a story in Sefer Chasidim (301) about a man who felt exactly like the women in the Yalkut Mishlei.  He was sick of living, so he decided to stop doing Shnayim Mikra because the Gemara in Brachos says the reward for Shnayim Mikra is long life (Brachos 8a.)  He was told that the Torah is not a vending machine, and he has to do mitzvos whether he wants the schar or not.

יהודי אחד לא היה קורא שנים מקרא ואחד תרגום שמאריכין לו ימיו ושנותיו, כי אמר אני קץ בחיי למה אקרא. א"ל החכם לא אמרו זה רק כנגד האוהבי חיים, אלא מעתה מה שכתוב אריכות ימים בכיבוד אב ואם ובמשקלות וכי בעבור זה יפטרו עמלים ומרי נפש שקצים בחייהם, אלא לא דברה תורה התוכחות שמי שאינו חושש בהם יעשה מה שלבו חפץ, ולא נאמרו הברכות על מי שאינו חושש בהם להיות פטור, שאין זה דומה לשכיר יום שאדם יכול לומר אם תעבדני בטוב אני אוסיף על שכרך, והשכיר יכול לומר איני חפץ לעבוד לך ואיני חפץ בשכירותיך, אלא לעבד קנין כספו דומה שאין העבד עושה תנאי לרבו, ועוד דומה לשורו וחמורו... לפי שנתן רשות לעשות טוב ורע וחפץ שיעשו רצונו על מנת שלא לקבל פרס, אלא כנגד האוהבים הנאות העולם והיראים מפני הפורעניות אמר הקב"ה עשו רצוני כדי שייטב לכם ולבניכם לעולם, ודברי תוכחות אם לא תעשו רצוני. אבל כנגד העושים מאהבה לא אמר שכרם כי אין קץ לשכרם. לכך יקרא אדם שנים מקרא ואחד תרגום לשם מי שאמר (שמות י"ג) "למען תהיה תורת ה' בפיך"... ומכל מקום הקב"ה יאריך ימיו ושנותיו, ואל יסמוך על תנאי... וכתיב (דברים י"ח) "תמים תהיה עם ה' אלקיך"

• It seems to me that we find something very similar in Parshas Be'haaloscha, Bamidbar 11:15, where Moshe Rabbeinu says to Hashem

ואם ככה את עשה לי הרגני נא הרג אם מצאתי חן בעיניך ואל אראה ברעתי.

Daas Zkeinim- 

כי טוב לי למות מיד ולא להיות מתנונה והולך.

It is better that I die immediately, and not slowly waste away.

Netziv-

הרגני נא הרוג. בהיותי בעצם בריאותי כעין הרג שאינו מחמת חולי. וזה מה שאמצא חן בעיניך. שלא יהי' לי כאב לב ויגון

Kill me now when I am whole and healthy, like "hereg," which is not a result of illness.  This will be a sign of Your favor, so that I don't undergo heartache and suffering.

Tur Ha'Aruch-

הרגני נא הרוג. שתשלח אלי הורגים בחרב, כי טוב מותי, אפילו בחרב אדם, מחיי צער. אי נמי הרגני נא, המיתני, כמו ואנשיהם יהיו הרוגי מות (ירמיה יח, כא):  ואל אראה ברעתי. כפשטה, טוב מותי ממה שאראה עצמי ברעה גדולה כזאת שאני בה

Better that I die, even by the sword. rather than a life of suffering....better that I die than to see myself in this terrible situation.

The Medrash Rabba in Devarim (9:9) has a similar story, but the circumstances of that story limit its relevance.  There, Moshe was accepting the gezeira, not invoking it.

קְרָא אֶת יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אמר לפניו רבש"ע יטול יהושע ארכי שלי ואהא חי אמר הקדוש ב"ה עשה לו כדרך שהוא עושה לך מיד השכים משה והלך לביתו של יהושע נתיירא יהושע ואמר משה ר' בוא אצלי יצאו להלוך הלך משה לשמאלו של יהושע נכנסו לאהל מועד ירד עמוד הענן והפסיק ביניהם משנסתלק עמוד הענן הלך משה אצל יהושע ואמר מה אמר לך הדיבור א"ל יהושע כשהיה הדיבור נגלה עליך יודע הייתי מה מדבר עמך. אותה שעה צעק משה ואמר מאה מיתות ולא קנאה אחת ושלמה מפרשה (שיר ח, ו): "כי עזה כמות אהבה קשה כשאול קנאה". אהבה שאהב משה ליהושע ומה שקינא משה ביהושע כיון שקיבל עליו למות התחיל הקדוש ברוך הוא מפייסו אמר ליה חייך בעולם הזה הנהגת את בני אף לעתיד לבא על ידיך אני מנהיג אותן מנין שנאמר (ישעיה סג, יא): ויזכור ימי עולם משה עמו

• On the other end of this type of Tefillah, there is the famous story of Reb Meir in Brachos 10a,

הנהו בריוני דהוו בשבבותיה דר"מ והוו קא מצערו ליה טובא הוה קא בעי ר' מאיר רחמי עלויהו כי היכי דלימותו

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Based on these mekoros, there are poskim that apply this le'halacha.

• Tiferes Yisrael (Boaz) Yoma 8:7, based on the Ran:

והכי קי״ל בכל חולה דמותר להתפלל שימות היכא דמצטער טובא 

• And the Aruch HaShulchan YD 335:3

ואמרו חכמינו ז"ל: כל המבקר את החולה ניצול מדינה של גהינם. ומה שכרו בעולם הזה? ה' ישמרהו מיצר הרע, ויחייהו מן היסורין, ויאושר בארץ שיהו הכל מתכבדים בו..., עיין שם. וכל המבקר את החולה גורם לו שיחיה, שמתפלל עליו שיחיה. וכל שאינו מבקר אין מבקש עליו רחמים, לא שיחיה ולא שימות. דלפעמים יש לבקש רחמים שימות, כגון שיש לו יסורים הרבה בחליו ואי אפשר לו שיחיה, כמעשה דרבי פרק "הנושא" (ר"ן שם

• Rav Chaim Falagi in his Chikekei Lev (YD I:50) says that while the sick person may ask for his own death, nobody else may do so.  This is not a halacha concern, but he's afraid that such a prayer by others might be tainted by a hidden desire to free themselves from the physical and emotional exhaustion of dealing with the situation, or a desire to inherit his wealth.

On the other hand, most of our greatest contemporary poskim drastically limit the applicability of this approach.  

• Reb Moshe in CM II:74 says that this is only allowed in a case where people who know their prayers are always accepted have already prayed for life and their prayers were not answered.  He says while he does not know of anyone in our time that is on that madreiga, they may exist, but the halacha is only relevant to them.
• Rav Wosner in his Sheivet HaLeivi 10:293 also says that this is not for the common man; only the greatest of the great can use this Ran, because who can know when there is no hope, when the end is inevitable.  He says this in 10:26 as well.  I believe that this idea underlies Reb Moshe's psak as well.
• Rav Waldenberg in Tzitz Eliezer 5:Ramat Rachel and 9:47 says flat out that it's never muttar:  He says that nobody paskens like the Ran, and all the rayos from the other Gemaros can be distinguished.  After all is said and done, his psak is based on two things; that none of the great poskim bring it le'halacha, and that it is contrary to basic hashkafa as he understands it.
• Reb Shlomo Zalman in his Minchas Shelomo (1:91) does mention the Ran as a halacha, but only in passing, and not as the main focus of the teshuva.   (ועוד יותר מזה נלענ"ד שאפילו אם החולה מצטער הרבה באופן כזה שמצד ההלכה מצוה לבקש עליו שימות, וכמו"ש הר"ן בנדרים דף מ' ע"א והובא גם בפוסקים...., מ"מ)  Still, Reb Shlomo Zalman's dicta carry weight.  Also, it is interesting that he cites the Ran le'halacha to the extent that it is not just a רשות but מצוה לבקש עליו שימות.  (Similarly, see שערים המצויינים בהלכה סי' קצד סק"ב.  Regarding the Gemara in Brachos 10a that  אפילו חרב חדה מונחת על צווארו של אדם אל ימנע עצמו מן הרחמים, see  ועלהו לא יבול, ח"ב עמ' קלב where Reb Shlomo Zalman is quoted as saying that once the knife is cutting, yiush makes sense.)  In Shulchan Shlomo Tefilla 8 he is quoted as saying that even if one can say that statistics do not apply to Yidden (based on Reb Yonasan Eibeschitz's idea that the bracha of Rofei.. amo Yisrael hints at a special standard,) it is better not to be mispallel b'rabbim, because the most likely result is loss of faith in tefilla.

(I am familiar with other Rabbanim that have printed their opinions on these matters.  Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but I choose not to cite them, just as I would not cite the opinion of the local chaplain when discussing the shittos of the Gaon and Reb Akiva Eiger.  For the same reason, I will refrain from stating my opinion.  This is very serious and emotionally fraught, and one should seek a safe harbor in such matters.)

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Surprisingly, almost nobody brings a Maharsha that seems to be very relevant.  The Gemara in Brachos 47a says that המאריך באמן יותר מדאי אינו אלא טועה, one that unduly elongates his "Amens" is making a mistake.  The use of the word טועה is very unusual- we would expect the Gemara to say it's good or bad, kasher or passul.  He explains that this builds on the previous Gemara that said that slowly enunciating Amen lengthen one's life; while one should hope for a good and full life, one must realize that an unduly long life is not a good thing.  If he thinks that life is worth extending beyond a certain point, אינו אלא טועה, he is just making a mistake.

שהוא סבר שעל ידי שיאריך באמן יאריך ימים ושנים כדאמרי׳ בסמוך כל המאריך באמן מאריכין לו ימיו ושניתיו  והוא טועה, דאריכות ימים ושנים יותר מדאי נמי אינן טובים כמ״ש והגיעו שנים אשר תאמר אין לי בהם חפץ 

At the very least, you see that the Maharsha does not believe that life is so precious that it is worth preserving at any cost and under any circumstances.  (Someone suggested to me that there is a difference between seeking excessively long life, which is not wise, and desiring that it end when it does occur.  I see no distinction.)

This Maharsha is particularly interesting in that he apparently rejects the postulate I stated toward the beginning of this discussion.  I said that "if hoping for death is legitimate (al pi hashkafa yeshara,) then prayer for death is equally legitimate."  The Maharsha contradicts that postulate.  In Nedarim 40, the Maharsha strongly disagrees with the Ran there, and says that the idea of prayer for death is unacceptable- דודאי מאן דסני ליה חדי בליבי' אבל שיבקש רחמי שימות הא פשיטא שגם השונא אינו עושה כן.  But even though the Maharsha in Nedarim rejects the idea of prayer for death, in Brachos he says that it is natural and right for a person to hope that he die before suffering a wretched senescence.   I imagine that this is why the Maharsha is not brought as a source in the question of prayer for death- the poskim hold that even if one may hope that his life should end, this does not prove that he may pray for his death.

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Dr. Emanuel absolutely opposes euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide.  The distinction between not wanting or making any effort to live, and suicide, is both prudent and reasonable.  This concept is certainly present in Halacha.  None of those we cited as allowing prayer for death would ever allow taking physical action to end a life, no matter how painful or miserable that life may be.

On that note, see Rav Carlbach's חבצלת השרון, פרשת וירא, page 190, where he brings several of our sources.  At the end of the piece, he quotes someone he knows (ר"א פרישמן) as having suggested that this hangs on a machlokes between Reb Moshe and the Chazon Ish.  The Chazon Ish (brought here below) in the last piece on Orach Chaim says that what we accomplish through tefilla is considered our act, a human act. Reb Moshe (OC 4:40:13,) on the other hand, says that Hashem's answers to a man's tefillos are not considered to have been done by that man.  Applying this to our discussion, he says that according to the Chazon Ish that tefilla is considered to be a form of human action, it would be assur to pray for death, just as human action to hasten death is assur.  According to Reb Moshe, that the result of tefilla is not considered human action, it would not be assur to pray for death.

With all due respect, and although I did mention this possibility in the initial formal presentation of the issues, I disagree with the way he presents this linkage, as clever as it is.  The Chazon Ish and Reb Moshe are only arguing about whether the "bidei adam" of the one who prays takes away the problem of הכל ביד"ש חוץ מיראת שמים and satisfies the need that Yiras Shamayim be a product of בחירה.    Second, the writer overstates his case- the Chazon Ish does not mean that the result of tefilla is considered to have been "done" by the person who was mispallel.  This is not גירי דיליה, it's not גרמי, and it's even far from a גרמא.  When you ask a third party for a favor, and he grants the favor, it is he that is doing it, not you, and the same is true when Hashem answers a tefilla. (Even if you hold that under certain circumstances יש שליח לדבר עברה באיסור רציחה, see Kiddushin 43a from Chaggai HaNavi and פרשת דרכים דרך האתרים דרוש ב, the Ribono shel Olam is not your Shaliach.)  The way he says his pshat in the Chazon Ish, tefilla for death would be tantamount to Retzicha, and it would be hard to say that none of the Tanaim that we mentioned are mattir under some circumstances.  While I agree that the tefilla might create guilt on your part, the result of the tefilla is certainly not your act.  At most, it creates a moral liability, and Reb Moshe certainly could agree with that.  

Chazon Ish:

 'דברים ה׳ כ״ו מי יתן וגו', המקום ב״ה מניח את הבחירה ביד האדם, אבל האדם רשאי להכריח את רעהו לעבודתו ית

 בין בכפי׳ בין בפיתוי ולא הוי ביטול הבחירה כיון דהמעשה עושה בבחירה וכל ישראל כאיש אחד והיינו מי יתן שיהי׳ בין צדיקי הדור משתדלים לקרה לה כל העם לעבודתו ית׳, אבל המקום ב״ה אינו נותן בלבם את הקירוב דא״כ לא יתיחס הדבר לברואיו, אמנם אם יש מתפלל לפניו ית׳ על הקירוב ותפלתו נשמעת, מתיחס הקירוב שעושה הקב״ה לברואיו, כיון שנעשה ע״י תפלת נברא, והיינו דאמרו ע״ז ה׳ א׳ היה להם לומר אתה תן ור״ל שעי״ז היה אפשר לו להקב״ה לעשות הקירוב כיון שהוא ע״פ תפלתם.

Reb Moshe:

בתפלת ברוריה שישובו הרשעים בתשובה

ומה שתירץ כתר"ה על תפלת ברוריא על הרשעים שישובו בתשובה שהקשה מהרש"א בברכות דף ח בח"א הא הכל ביד"ש חוץ מיראת שמים דאולי ע"י תפלת האדם אין זה נקרא ביד"ש, הנה הוא דוחק גדול ולא מסתבר זה כלל דהא התפללה שהשי"ת יעשה שישובו בתשובה וזה הא  תמוה מאחר דהוא בידי אדם, אבל צריך לומר שהתפלה היתה שלא יהא להם נסיונות וממילא ישובו שלא היו חוטאים אלא מחוסר פרנסה וכדומה, וגם שייך להתפלל שהשה'ת יזמין להם שישמעו

דברי מוסר מאנשים צדיקים וישובו עי"ז בתשובה וזה יותר נכון.

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.....די לחכי

All the above should be understood in light of the Gemara in Pesachim 49b that begins with the words מותר לנוחרו.   

Be'haaloscha, Bamidbar 19:35. Bris Milah and Learning Torah

Bris Milah is an essential prerequisite for proper understanding of Torah.

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Reb Akiva Eiger, in his Tshuvos (42) discusses the right of a grandfather to make the Bracha over a bris when the father is not there.  He says the following:

1. The Bracha of "Le'hachniso" is not only on the Mitzva of Milah itself, but an expression of gratitude for the other mitzvos that follow the Bris, such as...to teach him Torah and to find him a spouse, and the grandfather also has the mitzva to see to it that these things are done.
2. The Gemara in Nedarim says that the words "אם לא בריתי יומם ולילה חוקות שמים וארץ לא שמתי", if not for my Bris, I would not have emplaced the laws of Heaven and Earth, seem to refer equally to Torah and to Bris Milah. 
3.  We find in the עוללות אפרים (written by the author of the Kli Yakar, but not very popular because it's not written with the clarity he developed for the Kli Yakar) that the external Milah is the cause for the spiritual Milah of the heart, which opens the heart and enables it to absorb and understand the wisdom of the Torah.  (and again, since the grandfather has a personal obligation to see to it that the child learn torah, this means that he has a personal obligation to ensure that he gets a bris milah, so he has the right to the bracha.)

הלבוש (סימן רס"ה)כתב דיש מתמיהים למה יברך האב להכניסו, הא המוהל הוא שלוחו, ושלוחו של אדם כמותו, וכיון שהמוהל מברך על המילה מה צורך לאב לברך להכניסו, הרי המילה היא בריתו של אברהם אבינו, ויש מפרשים דברכת להכניסו אינה על המילה רק האב משבח ומברך לד' שמיום ההוא והלאה מוטל עליו עוד מצות אחרות הנגררות אחר המילה,  והם שמצוה לפדותו אם הוא בכור וללמדו תורה ולהשיאו אשה, עין שם... מצינו במתניתין סוף פרק ג' דנדרים גדולה מילה שאלמלא היא לא ברא הקב"ה עולמו, שנאמר אם לא בריתי יומם ולילה חוקות שמים וארץ לא שמתי. ואמרינן שם (דף ל"ב) גדולה תורה שאלמלא תורה לא נתקיימו שמים וארץ שנאמר אם לא בריתי, משמע דאם לא בריתי קאי אתרוויהו על מילה ועל התורה... ויותר נראה דבאמת מילה ותורה שייכים להדדי, וכמ"ש בעוללות אפרים (מאמר שצ"ב) שמילה חיצונית היא סיבה למילה פנימית מערלת לב, כשימול ערלת לבבו אז יהיו חדרי לבו פתוחים להבין ולהשכיל 

So I always wondered, are there any other proofs of the association of Bris Milah and Limud Hatorah?  Of course, there's Birkas Hamazon, where it says "על בריתך שחתמת בבשרנו ועל תורתך שלמדתנו", but that does not prove any causal relationship. But I do have several good, strong ra'ayos, as follows.

(Before the rayos, I want to point out that the Gemara Reb Akiva Eiger brings from Nedarim 32 that says that the world stands on Bris and Torah is mentioned in the Baal HaTurim in the the first word in the Torah, Bereishis.  He says that the outer letters are Bris, and the inner letters are Eish, and Eish is Torah.  So in that structure, the Bris is meigin on the Torah.  But this is not a proof of any kind, just a nice tzushtell.)

 1.  The Tanchuma in Mishpatim (5), which goes like this. 

ואלה המשפטים. זה שאמר הכתוב, מגיד דבריו ליעקב וגו', לא עשה כן וגו'. אונקלוס) הגר בן אחותו של אדריאנוס, היה מבקש להתגייר והיה מתירא מן אדריאנוס דודו. אמר לו, אני מבקש לעשות סחורה. אמר לו, שמא אתה חסר כסף וזהב, הרי אוצרותי לפניך. אמר לו, אני מבקש לעשות סחורה לצאת לחוץ לידע דעת הבריות, ואני מבקש לימלך בך היאך לעשות. אמר לו, כל פרקמטיא שאתה רואה שפלה ונתונה בארץ, לך עסוק בה, שסופה להתעלות ואת משתכר. בא לו לארץ ישראל ולמד תורה. לאחר זמן מצאוהו רבי אליעזר ורבי יהושע, ראוהו פניו משתנות. אמרו זה לזה, עקילס לומד תורה. כיון שבא אצלם, התחיל לשאול להם שאלות הרבה, והן משיבין אותו. עלה אצל אדריאנוס דודו. אמר לו, ולמה פניך משתנות. סבור אני שהפסידה פרקמטיא שלך או שמא הצר לך אדם. אמר לו, לאו. אמר לו, אתה קרוב לי ואדם מצר לי. אמר לו, ולמה פניך משתנות. אמר לו, שלמדתי תורה, ולא עוד אלא שמלתי את עצמי. אמר לו, ומי אמר לך כך. אמר לו, בך נמלכתי. אמר לו, אימתי. אמר לו, בשעה שאמרתי לך מבקש אני לעשות סחורה, ואמרת לי, כל פרקמטיא שאתה רואה שפלה ונתונה בארץ, לך ועסוק בה, שסופה להתעלות. חזרתי על כל האומות ולא ראיתי אומה שפלה נתונה בארץ כישראל, וסופה להתעלות. שכן אמר ישעיה, כה אמר ה' גואל ישראל קדושו, לבזה נפש למתעב גוי לעבד מושלים מלכים יראו וקמו שרים וישתחוו למען ה' אשר נאמן קדוש ישראל ויבחרך. אמר ליה סקנדרוס שלו, עתידין אלו שאמרת, שיהו מלכים עומדים מפניהם, שנאמר, מלכים יראו וקמו. הכהו אנדריאנוס על לחיו, אמר ליה, יש נותנין רטיה אלא על גב המכה. עכשיו אם רואין גילורר אחד אין עומדין מלפניו, שהיית אומר שהמלכים רואין אותם ועומדין בפניהם. אמר ליה סקנדרוס, אם כן מה תעשה, טמנהו, הואיל ונתגייר הרגהו. אמר ליה, עקילס בן אחותי עד שהוא במעי אמו היה ראוי להתגייר. מה עשה סקנדרוס שלו. עלה לגג ונפל ומת, ורוח הקודש צווחת, כן יאבדו כל אויביך ה'. אמר ליה אנדריאנוס, הרי מת סקנדרוס, אין אתה אומר לי על מה עשית הדבר הזה. אמר ליה, שבקשתי ללמוד תורה. אמר לו, היה לך ללמוד תורה ולא לימול. אמר לו עקילס, נתת לאסטרטלירוס אנונה אלא אם כן נטל זינו שלו. כך, לעולם אם אין אדם נימול, אינו יכול ללמוד תורה, שנאמר, מגיד דבריו ליעקב (תהל' קמז יט), למי שהוא מל כיעקב. לא עשה כן לכל גוי, משום שהם ערלים. חקיו, זו תורה. 

Akilas' uncle, Hadrian, was shocked that he had been circumcised.  Akilas told him that he did so because he wanted to learn Torah.  His uncle said, you could have learned without making a bris. Akilas answered that it is impossible to learn Torah without having a Bris Milah.  (I believe the Gaon says that Akilas=Onkelos.)

2.  The connection to this week's parsha is that our parsha contains וַיְהִי בִּנְסֹעַ הָאָרֹן .  The Gemara in Shabbos 116 says that this little piece, separated as it is with the two upside-down nunns, is viewed as a separate book of the Torah.  We derive from this (OC 334:12 and Mishna Berura SK 36) that in certain cases of fire on Shabbos, one may save a sefer Torah if it has 85 letters that are intact, even if they are scattered in many words.  The source for the number 85 is that the smallest "book" of Torah, Vayhi Binso'ah, is 85 letters.  The gematria of the word Milah is, of course, 85.  This is another excellent flag that highlights the association of Bris Milah and Limud Hatorah.  The kedusha of Bris Milah is a Machshir that enables a child to become a Sefer Torah.   I'm sure I am not the first to note this association, but I am not aware of who else has said this, because I'm not a gematria man.  Minor point:  if you are a gematria person, then you can be associated with the idea of Metzitza b'peh.  Peh, פה, the locus of limud hatorah, connected with the bris milah.  Not my department, and as far as I'm concerned we can do away with Metzitza b'peh, but for those of you that like this sort of thing, there it is.  

3.  The Yerushalmi in Sotah about Elisha ben Avuya.  The Yerushalmi says that the great Talmidei Chachamim of Yerushalayim had gathered for Avuya's son's bris, and as they talked in learning, it appeared that a great fire burned around them.  Avuya was frightened and asked, have you come to burn down my house? They answered no, we were just talking Divrei Torah, and the words were happy as at the time they were given at Har Sinai, and so the fire of Mattan Torah appeared.  Nothing to be afraid of, it's just limud hatorah the way it should be.  Avuya was so amazed that he determined to dedicate his son to Torah scholarship.  This was, apparently, an inappropriate reason to learn Torah, and  this self interest expressed itself as a flaw in the child's learning, and since he was such a great and powerful intellect, what might otherwise have been a minor blemish became monstrous and resulted in Elisha ben Avuya becoming an Apikorus.  

The point of the Yerushalmi is that the time of the Bris Milah is the moment that the parameters of the child's potential growth in Torah, the potential of his trajectory, are set.  In the case of Acheir's great potential, this self-interest at the so very important moment of the Bris Milah הבאיש הביע את שמן הרוקח, and he became an apikorus. 

4.  The Targum Yonasan, as explained by Rav Schwab in his Sefer on Chumash.  The Targum Yonasan says that they used to say ישימך אלוקים כאפרים וכמנשה, Yesimcha, at a bris.  Rav Schwab explained that the word Milah is related to mahul, blended.  Bris Milah alludes to the idea that Ruchnius and Gashmiyus are not inherently and utterly incompatible. On the contrary, kedusha and chulin can work together in a synergistic, mutually beneficial relationship.  

The connection to Efraim and Menashe is that Efraim was able become a gadol batorah because he received monetary support from Menashe; the work that Menashe did with the kavana of supporting Efraim was as spiritual as Efraim's Torah.  One might associate this idea with something the Lubavitcher Rebbe constantly says from the Baal Hatnya: that the great chiddush of Mattan Torah was that previously, kedusha and gashsmiyus were incompatible and antagonistic.  With Mattan Torah, gashmiyus itself could become infused with kedusha through limud hatorah and kiyum mitzvos.  If so, we might say that the Bris Milah, the Bris that allows Mehila/mixing, is what enables our limud hatorah to affect our physical being.  To be a true talmid chacham, you have to be mahul- a man that combines the spiritual and the secular, you serve the Ribono shel Olam with the yetzer hatov and with what we call the yetzer hara.

Note, too, the Gemara (Psachim 68b) that 

א"ר אלעזר הכל מודים בעצרת דבעינן נמי לכם מ"ט יום שניתנה בו תורה הוא

and all the achronim ask, if for commemorations of gashmiusdikeh things like sukkos and mitzrayim Reb Eliezer holds you can do kulo lashem, kal vachomer the commemoration of mattan torah!  They answer that the Torah was given to mankind davka because we have the yetzer hara, because we're not malachim, and we can be mekadeish gashmiyus.  If so, the idea of Milah/mahul repeats the idea of Mattan Torah requiring davka that we not entirely divorce ourselves from gashmiyus, but that we find a way to make gashmiyus holy.

If you think about it for half a second, you'll realize that this "allusion" only might seem novel because it's so obvious that we don't even notice it any more.  It is the most obvious symbolism of the Bris Millah.  The location of the bris teaches precisely this idea, that what seems to be tumah and arayos can become kedusha and tahara.  

And of course, this is directly related to the excellent vort we said in the Chasam Sofer about the child needing to experience both Kiddush and Havdala before his bris.

Beha'aloscha, Bamidbar 11:6. Tired of Mahn: Orienting, Habituation, Sensory-Specific Satiety, Ruchnius and Gashmius.

Most people will find this post boring.  I find the question fascinating, possibly a key to the nature of human motivation, but that's just my opinion.

How would you like to eat the same food for forty years?  Let's say that the food could have different flavors, even different textures, but it always looked the same, and only changed when thought about some other specific food while you were eating it.  But when you ate it without the hineni muchan, without imagination, it would always taste and feel the same, kind of like shortbread cookies.  Would you enjoy it much?  

The fact is that we experience a decline in appetite when that appetite is satisfied repeatedly in the same manner.  We're all familiar with this phenomenon.  Although some people, particularly children with food obsessions, can eat and will only eat one or two foods for years- with one of my children, it was Cheerios and macaroni and cheese, and by the end of Pesach he lost lost ten percent of his body weight- for most people, repeatedly eating one food results in not only diminished enjoyment, but even disgust.

This is not specific to eating.  It applies just as well to sexual relations and to music.  Passionate affairs inevitably cool, and listening to the same music over and over has been used by the military as a form of torture.  There are so many words to describe it- bored, jaded, world-weary, ennui..... (Recently, I heard this referred to as "The Hedonic Treadmill.")

Why is this so?  The food tastes the same as it did before, you're the same person, so why don't you enjoy it as much as you did in the beginning?  The pate de foie gras is still exactly the same as when you tasted it and swooned from pleasure.  Your taste buds are the same.  The ambiance is the same.  What's the problem?  The spouse is the same, why are you bored, why are you looking at another person whose only distinction is that she is not the one to whom you've been married for seven years?  What does boredom have to do with physical enjoyment?  

And given that this is a reality, we need to kler a Chkira: 
However it works, what is the underlying logic?  Is novelty a necessary component of enjoyment?  Or does repetitiveness work against pleasure?  

There are two mechanisms that psychologists have studied that bear upon this question.  (I) is Orienting/Habituation and the other (II) is Sensory-Specific Satiety.  Following brief discussions, we will talk about (III) why the Ribono shel Olam was angered by the complaints about the Mahn.

I
Orienting responses are heightened sensitivity experienced by an organism when exposed to a new or changing stimulus. Orienting responses can result in overt, observable behaviors as well as psychophysiological responses such as EEG activity and undergo habituation with repeated presentation of the eliciting stimulus.

The importance of mind over stomach was demonstrated in 1998 in a striking experiment with two men whose mental functions were normal except for a severe form of amnesia. They were unable to remember an event for more than a minute. Their eating habits were studied on several days by researchers, led by Paul Rozin at the University of Pennsylvania, who created a rather extended lunch period.

After each man ate his lunch, the food was cleared. In a few minutes, a researcher appeared with an identical meal and announced, “Here’s lunch.” The men always ate up without any complaint about feeling full. Then, after the food was cleared and another few minutes passed, a third lunch was served, and the men always dug into it, too.In fact, one of them stood up after his third lunch of the day and announced that he would “go for a walk and get a good meal.” Asked what he planned to eat, he replied, “Veal parmigiana” — the same food he had just had for lunch. When the researchers tried the same experiment on a control group with normal memories, the people all refused a second lunch. They, unlike the men with amnesia, consistently felt less hungry after eating, but the sensation apparently wasn’t just coming from their stomachs, as the researchers concluded.
“Nonphysiological factors seem to be of major importance in the onset and cessation of normal eating,” Dr. Rozin and his colleagues wrote in  Psychological Science. “The results suggest that one of the principal nonphysiological factors is memory for what has recently been eaten.”

I would put it this way.  It seems that after eating a particular food, the memory of satiety is imprinted more strongly than the memory of the appetite.  With repeated experiences of the satiety brought about by eating this food, the sense of not being hungry becomes a conditioned reflex.  A nafka minah would be that according to this model, habituation would not occur unless the person ate to full satisfaction.  A person who every day eats a particular food but not to satisfaction will never tire of eating it.

II
The other is Sensory-Specific Satiety- that eating will decrease appetite selectively- a person will be satiated for one food but not for others: For item A, I have no appetite.  For item B, I'm hungry.  There is an aphorism for this in many languages, such as (Eiruvin 82b)  רווחא לבסימא שכיח.  In English, the expression is, as Dr. Rolls says,  New meat begets a new appetite.

The following is an excerpt from a paper by Dr. Barbara Rolls, "Sensory-specific Satiety" NUTRITION REVIEWS VOL. 44, NO. 3/MARCH 1986, in which she discusses a concept in which her peers (e.g., Dr. Paul Rozin, who was kind enough to send me the information) consider her pre-eminent.  Dr. Rolls is the author of a series of popular weight management books titled "Volumetrics."

Monotony in the Diet 
Up to this point we  have been considering hedonic responses to foods during a meal and for  several  hours  after  a  meal.  Let  us look beyond  daily consumption and consider changes in food preference that can develop over longer periods. People tire  of  particular foods and this, of course, means that they stop eating them. There is  little understanding of why  the  preference for particular foods  declines over time, but one obvious possibility is that eating a food too often can affect acceptance. 

Studies of the effects of consumption of monotonous army rations indicate that  repeated presentation of some foods can lead to a very persistent decrease in the pleasantness of  these foods.  For  example,  with  repeated consumption canned meats became very un- palatable and continued to be disliked for 3 to 6 months after the study. Canned meats were not rated as very palatable at the start of the study, and the effects of repeated consumption appear  to be  different  for  staple foods and foods of initial high palatability. For example, in the army studies repeated consumption did not change  the  palatability  of  desserts, sweets, canned fruits, cereal, or staples such as dairy products, bread, or coffee.  We also found no decline in the rating of pleasantness of the taste, appearance, texture, or smell or either a confectionery or a savory corn snack after they had been eaten every day for 3 weeks. 

Moskowitz has described time preference curves for different food types. These indicate that foods not consumed for about 3 months are highly desired,  but those eaten the  day before may not be desired at all. Foods such as meat and shellfish, foods with a heavy fat content, or foods that carry the meal such as the entree have steep curves and are greatly desired if  not eaten for  a very long period, but recent consumption eliminates the desire for such foods. Items that do not carry the meal and do not have a high fat or  protein content such as bread, salad, potatoes, and some desserts have a much flatter function and can be eaten every day with no loss of preference. (emphasis mine.)

A recent study of food preference of Ethiopian refugees illustrates the importance of understanding the effects of  monotony on food intake. The refugees reported that the taste of the three foods that they had been eating for approximately  6 months  was  less pleasant than  that  of  three new foods. Refugees who had been eating the usual diet for only 2 days found its taste as pleasant as that of the new foods. The monotonous diet affected the refugees in that they would often trade the staple diet for small quantities of less nutritious foods, and they  would stop preparing the  monotonous foods adequately. This effect could possibly have been overcome by the simple expedient of adding spices to vary the flavor, as is the practice when people subsist on diets consisting primarily of one food such as rice. It appears that decreases in palatability can extend beyond a meal to affect general acceptability of  some foods. It seems unlikely, however, that  this  is the same phenomenon as sensory-specific satiety. Sensory-specific satiety occurs rapidly after eating, and tends to be fairly short-term. 

The food industry refers to decreases in acceptance of  foods in the long term as “wear-out.’’ It seems likely that wear- out is partly due to cognitive satiety. That is, a person knows a lot of a particular food has been  consumed and  desires a change.  It is possible that eating too much  of  a food  or being forced to  eat  a food  can contribute to cognitive satiety. Supporting this cognitive hypothesis is the finding that, in a study of factors affecting food monotony, self-selection of  the items to be included in a repetitive diet reduced dissatisfaction with the diet. Thus overall satisfaction with a 3-day, self-planned menu cycle was the same as with a 6-day cycle chosen by someone else. Making people eat foods that they  have  not selected themselves can decrease the preference for those foods. (emphasis mine)  This is supported  by  studies  of  young children,  in which foods they were  forced to  eat to  gain rewards  decreased  in  preference. Clearly, much more work is needed to understand what makes foods change in desirability. Variety, Monotony, and Body Weight Body  weight maintenance may  depend to some extent on the availability of a varied and palatable diet. 

In studies of the effects of consumption of  a monotonous liquid diet, it was found that both obese and normal-weight individuals voluntarily  restricted intake and  lost  weight. There is also some evidence that if freely available diets are varied and palatable there may be excessive weight gain. In studies of  caloric regulation  in  obese  and  normal- weight subjects confined  to  the hospital, a plentiful and varied supply of food led to over- eating and weight gain over 3- to 6-day period . It is difficult to conduct long-term controlled studies of the effects of variety and palatability on human body weight.  It  is therefore worth considering the literature on animals. 

In recent years there have been several reports of obesity in rats given free access to  a variety of  palatable, high-energy  food.  In most  of  these studies the obesity could have been due to the high palatability and high energy content of the foods as well as their varied sensory properties. However, in one study the effect of  variety per se was examined by using foods of similar energy  density which were eaten  in  similar amounts in pilot studies (ie, they appeared to be of similar palatabilities). Rats were offered either laboratory chow alone, chow plus one palatable food, or chow plus three palatable foods (cookies, crackers, chocolate)  in  succession (changed every  12 hours), or  simultaneously, for 7 weeks. All rats offered the palatable foods ate more than the chow-fed controls. Rats given the simultaneous but not the successive variety ate more than the other palatable food groups and had significantly greater body weight gains and more body fat at the end of  the 7 weeks. Thus the effect of  variety on food intake can extend beyond a single meal and can contribute to the development of  obesity. 

It seems likely that, in affluent societies where there is continual appetite stimulation by both successive and simultaneous variety within and between meals, there will be little opportunity to compensate for overeating due to variety without conscious limitation of intake. Mechanisms of Sensory-specific Satiety Is the  decrease in the palatability of  foods that accompanies consumption simply  because of sensory adaptation or habituation? In other words,  does the perceived intensity of foods decrease with consumption? In a study conducted by Mower et al on the effect of  a meal  on  olfactory stimuli, decreases  were found in the pleasantness of  the  odors, but there were no changes in the perceived intensity  of  the stimuli. In another study  it was found that the decrease in the pleasantness of the taste  of  particular foods  was  associated with only minor changes in the intensity of the taste of those  It would not be adaptive to have food consumption lead to a decreased ability to taste foods. Indeed, we all know that we  can still taste and smell foods after they have  been consumed.  It  is  more  likely that sensory-specific satiety involves a change in a mechanism concerned particularly with the reward or hedonic value of food. 

Electrophysiological studies of brain cells in monkeys are  clarifying  the mechanisms  of sensory-specific satiety. The electrical activity of  single cells has been recorded while mon- keys ate particular foods  to  satiety.  When recordings were  made  in  areas of  the  brain concerned with the sensory analysis off  taste stimuli (the nucleus tractus solitarius and the opercular cortex) or visual stimuli (the inferior visual temporal cortex and the amygdala), satiety  had no  effect  on  the responses of  the This finding is in marked contrast to the effects of  consumption on cells in the lateral hypothalamus, an  area  of  the  brain involved in the control of  motivational state and reward. It  was  found that  when  a  monkey was hungry, cells in the lateral hypothalamus responded to the sight or taste of food, but as it consumed a food the neurons became less responsive to it and acceptance for that food gradually decreased. However, if the monkey was then offered another food, the neuron responded and the monkey then accepted this food. Thus, sensory-specific satiety does not appear to be  related to  changes in  sensory processing of  responses to foods, but it is related to brain areas controlling motivation and the reward value of foods. 

To further define the neuronal basis of   sensory-specific satiety, Rolls and colleagues followed taste processing from the primary (opercular) taste cortex into a secondary gustatory area in the caudolateral orbitofrontal cortex, which  in turn  has  connections to  the  lateral hypothalamus.  Sensory-specific satiety  is paralleled by the responses of single neurons in this caudolateral orbitofrontal cortex taste area. A neurophysiological basis for  this,  in terms of altering responsiveness of specifically tuned neurons in this area of gustatory cortex as a food is eaten, has been proposed.  It is likely that cognitions contribute to sensory-specific satiety. People seem to learn how much of  a  particular food they  can eat  in a meal.  It  may  be that when this  limit is exceeded, food  becomes unpleasant. Learning about the  caloric value  of  foods and appropriate amounts for  consumption depends on the sensory properties of the foods. Since cognitions about foods depend on sensory properties  of  foods,  it will  be difficult to  determine whether sensory-specific satiety and cognitive satiety are distinct phenomena. 

Conclusion 
During consumption of  a food the pleasantness of  its taste, appearance, smell, and texture  decrease.  The  pleasantness  of  other foods not consumed decreases much less or remains unchanged. Such responses to foods occur  very  rapidly, within  2  minutes after a meal, and appear to depend more on the sensory properties of  foods than the caloric content, hence the term “sensory-specific satiety.” Sensory-specific satiety helps to  ensure the consumption of  a varied, and therefore  balanced, diet. Thus, when a variety of  foods is available, there will  be a tendency to switch from one food to another because of  the decrease in palatability in any one food after consumption. Sensory-specific satiety can also affect the amount of  food consumed in a meal, so that the more varied a meal, the greater the intake will be. Since sensory-specific satiety is one of many factors controlling food intake and selection, its influence depends on the  context in which eating takes place. An understanding of factors  that affect the hedonic response to foods is important, for this response potentially influences both appetite and the acceptability of foods.

III
Considering these realities, it is not surprising that we found the Mahn unappetizing after a while.  The reaction was natural and expectable, perhaps inevitable.  In fact, in Devarim (8:16) it says   המאכלך מן במדבר אשר לא ידעון אבתיך למען ענתך ולמען נסתך להיטבך באחריתך  , He fed you the Mahn in the desert...so that you would suffer and to test you so that you would benefit in the end.     The Gemara (Yoma 74b) says 
המאכילך מן במדבר למען ענותך רבי אמי ורבי אסי חד אמר אינו דומה מי שיש לו פת בסלו למי שאין לו פת בסלו וחד אמר אינו דומה מי שרואה ואוכל למי שאינו רואה ואוכל אמר רב יוסף מכאן רמז לסומין שאוכלין ואין שבעין אמר אביי הלכך מאן דאית ליה סעודתא לא ליכלה אלא ביממא that the people did not enjoy the Mahn as they would regular food, either because it didn't look like food, and appearance is an important part of gustatory satisfaction, or because they never had tomorrow's food in the pantry.  I would say that equally problematic was the sameness of the Mahn, the constant repetition.  Even if it did taste different, it was the same old thing every day.  It was missing the sizzle, the excitement of newness.  Just like a blind person is not as satisfied as a sighted person, because he is missing the visual aspect, so too the sameness of appearance caused boredom and ultimately disgust.  So what was the Ribono shel Olam's kpeida?  Why was He angered? 

I'd like to think about the fact of our abhorrence of sameness, how boredom subverts pleasure and drives us to seek new experiences, even if they are absolutely not better than what we've had before.  Irrespective of Darwinian necessities (ensuring a varied diet, fathering children with many women,) or physiological mechanisms (altering responsiveness of specifically tuned neurons), let's assume there's an intentional spiritual component in this phenomenon.  In the section I emphasized above, Moskowitz's observation, we note that the problem only occurs in foods "with a heavy fat content or foods that carry the meal".  But there does not seem to be any such phenomenon in foods that "do not carry the meal or do not have a heavy fat or protein content."  Similarly, see Rolls' reference to the difference between self-planned repetitive menus and menus planned by someone else.  These strongly imply a predominant mental component in this phenomenon.  Let's further assume that the disgust with the Mahn bespoke an extreme spiritual flaw on the part of Klal Yisrael.  The question then becomes, what, exactly, was that flaw?

to be continued

I don't have time to finish this, so here's what I'm thinking.
This problem is intensified where the foods have a high fat content, or carry the meal, or are imposed externally.  The common denominator is the attitude of eating to satisfy the nefesh ha'be'hamis- self-indulgence.  In other words, a kind of eating that satisfies the appetite, not hunger, desire, not need.  Hashem created us with a hatred for stagnation, and this emotion should serve a desire to grow in ruchnius, to never be satisfied, to feel impatience and disdain for what we've already achieved, because of a burning desire to accomplish more.  For the Dor Hamidbar to allow infantile impulse for self-indulgence to redirect this spiritual drive toward a desire for new food meant that they didn't appreciate what it meant to eat the Mahn, which was the food of Malachim and enabled them to grow in havanas hatorah.  It was, basically, Me'ilah.