Pinchas, Bamidbar 27:1. Saying Yimach Shemo- ימח שמו

Some person is found to have done a terrible thing, he is a rasha gamur, a horrible person, and someone says about him "Yimach Shemo Ve'Zichro," may his name and memory be erased.  A refined  person would certainly not express himself this way, but is there anything actually wrong with saying it?


My mother once told me a story about the Ponovezher Rov. (The Rov was a dear friend of our family, and used to stay at our house when he was in Chicago.  My mother and his daughter were close friends before the war;  my mother remembers that when the German bombardment began, she met her friend on the bridge in Kovna, and she asked her, Esther, vu geist du? because she was running back into town.  Esther responded "I'm going to my family."  That was the last time my mother saw her.  The Rov also learned with my mother's brother.)  Either the Ponovezher himself told the story to my mother, or his son, Reb Avraham Kahaneman told her the story.  Someone was talking to the Rov about Ben Gurion's  virulent enmity toward religion and the policies and laws he enacted against the Torah community.  This is certainly true- Ben Gurion did not love Orthodox Judaism.  Reb Chaim Ozer writes in his letters that Ben Gurion (at that time David Gruen)  had organized a demonstration in Warsaw, and the posters advertising the demonstration proclaimed that it would be מכת מוות לאורטודוקסיה, the "death blow to Orthodoxy."  A friend of organized religion he was not.  In any case, this person used the expression "ימח שמו" "may his name be erased," against Ben Gurion.  The Ponovezher Rov immediately and vehemently  responded, "One may never say such a thing on a Jew, no matter what he is!  (The Torah says that the widow of a married man that dies childless becomes a Yevama, so that her husband's brother might marry her and carry forward the name of the man that died.)  Are you paskening that Ben Gurion would not have a din Yibum?  The Torah says "lo yimacheh shemo," and that applies even to Ben Gurion!"

The problem is that there is an opinion among the Rishonim that a Mumar, one who has abandoned the Jewish religion, does not have a din Yibum.  If such person dies childless, his wife cannot marry his brother in order to perpetuate his name.  This is the opinion of the Mordechai in Yevamos.  And if Ben Gurion's not a mumar, then I'm Rabbeinu Hakadosh.  Now it's true that we don't pasken like the Mordchai (EH 157:5).  But why did the Ponovezher react so strongly?  Why can't we rely on the Mordchai at least to be mattir cursing that devil who gave the order to fire on the Altalena/kidnapper of innocent Teimani immigrants/Socialist/all around dvar hashem bazanik/meisis umadi'ach?

It so happens that there's a Chasam Sofer in the Teshuvos (Vol. 6 #56) that is relevant to this question.  


The Gemara in Bava Basra 119b says that Moshe Rabbeinu was teaching the laws of Yibum, and the daughters of Tzelafchad came in with a question:  אם כבן אנו חשובין תנה לנו נחלה כבן אם לאו תתיבם אמנו  If we daughters are like בנים, sons, in the lexicon of the dinim of the Torah, then we ought to inherit his share of the Land of Israel.  If we're not like בנים, then our mother ought to be a Yevama and marry our father's brother, because he died without בנים!


Someone asked the Chasam Sofer that if Tzelafchad was the Mekosheish Eitzim, then he publicly violated the Shabbos, and the rule is that a mechalel Shabbos in public is considered an absolute mumar.  According to the Mordechai that a Mumar doesn't cause Yibum, their claim was flawed.  Even if they, the daughters, are not like בנים, and so he is considered to have died without בנים, there would still be no din of yibum, because the father, being a mumar, was not entitled to yibum. 


The inquirer suggested two answers: 1. Only a person who repeatedly does the sin is categorized as a "mumar."  One time, although liable for punishment, does not make him a mumar.  2. Tzelafchad intended his act to be a test case that would demonstrate the seriousness of the violation of Shabbos, and so although he did violate Shabbos, he was motivated l'sheim Shamayim.  These answers are obviously weak, and the Chasam Sofer did not like either one.


The Chasam Sofer answers the question with a chiddush.  He says that the rule that "One who publicly violates Shabbos is an absolute Mumar for all halachos of the Torah," is limited:  it does not apply to Yibum even according to the Mordchai.  The Mordechai's rule that a mumar does not cause yibum only refers to a mumar who abandons Judaism, a mumar who becomes a meshumad and joins another religion.

  לא אמרו מרדכי אלא במי שהמיר ונדבק באומה משארי האומות ויצא מכלל יהדות לגמרי על זה אמרו שאינו בהקמת שם ואין מקושש ואפילו אחאב בכלל זה

Say what you will about Ben Gurion, he wasn't worse than Achav, and he was no less dedicated to his concept of the Jewish People.

So the mussar haskeil of this story is that a Jew might be a rasha, he might be a mena'eif, he might be a mumar le'chol hatorah kulla, or a murderer.  But if he is a Jew by any definition, if he hasn't rejected and abandoned his tie to Klal Yisrael, you can never say on such a person Yimach Shemo.  Even on the worst Jews, the Ribono shel Olam says veLo yimacheh shmo.

Note:
The internet is so marvelous.... I searched for the word yimacheh, because I remembered a phrase in Chazal that goes something like ימחה וימחה
and I came across an explanation in a forum on ivelt.com for why frummeh protesters are allowed to call the police Nazis.  Can you believe they have an actual discussion about this?  Morons.  Anyway, one of the commenters there wrote the following.  I don't know if it's assur to read on Tisha Ba'av because it makes you laugh, or muttar because it makes you cry.

וכאן המקום להעיר, וועגן זאגן ימח שמם, כידוע האט דער פאפער רב ז"ל געזאגט ביי די דעמאנסטראציע וועגן חיטוטי שיכבי געזאגט, ליגט אויף אינז דער חיוב צו זאגן ימח שמם וזכרם.

און דאס וואס מען זאגט איבער פון א גדול, ולא ימחה שמו מישראל, צו מען וואלט געדארפט מיבם זיין, קודם יש שיטת ר' יהודאי גאון מובא בטור, אף שלא פסקינן כן, אז א מומר דארף אחיו נישט מייבם זיין, ווייל ימחה וימחה, והגם למעשה פסקנט מען נישט אזוי, אבער בדיבור הי' נהוג בכל העולם בכל הדורות לומר ימ"ש. הלא אם יש"ו נוצרי שר"ת שלו הוא ימח שמו וזכרו, הי' מת בלי בנים, לא הי' אשתו מותרת בלי יבום, וכן שבתי צבי ימ"ש שכתבו עליו כן כל גדולי הדור, והד"ח כידוע כתב כן אף על בנש"ק בעת המחלוקת אשר אין לדבר מזה בזמנינו, אבל יכולים ללמוד, כי על שגץ מותר לומר ולכתוב ימח שמו

Here's a free translation, though I can't perfectly communicate the stupidity that cries out from every line.

"This is the place to remark about saying yimach shmam, it is known that the Popper Rov Z'L said by the demonstrations about the excavation of bodies that we are obligated to say yimach shemam ve'zichram.  

And that which is said in the name of a gadol "lo yimacheh shemo," where we would have to do yibum, first of all, there is the opinion of Rav Yehuda'i Gaon brought in the Tur that you don't do yibum when a mumar dies, because his name certainly ought to be erased.  Even though we don't pasken like that, but in speech the minhag is in all places and all times to say YM'SH.  If Yeshu the Nazarene, whose initials are Yimach Shemo Vezichro, would die without children, would his wife not be muttar without yibum?...and Shabtai Tzvi.....  We can learn from this that on a Sheigitz it is muttar to say and to write Yimach Shemo."

That has to be one of the great treasures of the internet:
  נהוג בכל העולם בכל הדורות לומר ימ"ש
Now is that not a minhag to be proud of?  Fine, fine people.

PInchas, Drasha for Sheva Brachos (#5)

The Medrash (בראשית רבה פרשה ס"ח:ג-ד, ויקרא רבה פרשה ח:א, במדבר רבה פרשה ג:ו)  tells the following story.

רבי יהודה בר סימון פתח (תהלים ס"ח) 'אלהים מושיב יחידים ביתה'. מטרונה שאלה את ר' יוסי בר חלפתא אמרה לו לכמה ימים ברא הקב"ה את עולמו, אמר לה לששת ימים, כדכתיב (שמות כ') 'כי ששת ימים עשה ה' את השמים ואת הארץ'. אמרה לו מה הוא עושה מאותה שעה ועד עכשיו, אמר לה הקב"ה יושב ומזווג זיווגים, בתו של פלוני לפלוני, אשתו של פלוני לפלוני, ממונו של פלוני לפלוני.

Someone asked Rav Yosi ben Chalafta, if it took Hashem six days to create the world, how does He spend his time since then?  He answered that Hashem spends His time making shidduchim.

I wonder, given that shidduchim are important, are they so important that the Ribono shel Olam needs to spend time working on them?  And what would be so bad if they were just left to chance, like the rest of the world does it?

And the Gemara (Moed Kattan 18b) reiterates this lesson; whatever you think about hashgacha pratis, shidduchim are in the hands of the Ribono shel Olam, and only the most serious and concerted effort of tefilla (see Rashi there DH או איהו) can circumvent that will.

אמר רב משום רבי ראובן בן אצטרובילי מן התורה ומן הנביאים ומן הכתובים מה' אשה לאיש.   מן התורה- דכתיב (בראשית כד) ויען לבן ובתואל ויאמרו מה' יצא הדבר. מן הנביאים- דכתיב (שופטים יד) ואביו ואמו לא ידעו כי מה' היא. מן הכתובים דכתיב (משלי יט) בית והון נחלת אבות ומה' אשה משכלת

In fact, the Medrash immediately before the one I quoted above says the same as the Gemara:

ר' אבהו פתח (משלי י"ט) 'בית והון נחלת אבות ומה' אשה משכלת'. רבי פנחס בשם ר' אבהו מצינו בתורה בנביאים ובכתובים שאין זיווגו של איש אלא מן הקב"ה. בתורה מנין (בראשית כ"ד) 'ויען לבן ובתואל ויאמרו מה' יצא הדבר'. בנביאים (שופטים י"ד) 'ואביו ואמו לא ידעו כי מה' הוא'. בכתובים היינו דכתיב (משלי י"ט) 'ומה' אשה משכלת'. יש שהוא הולך אצל זיווגו ויש שזיווגו בא אצלו. יצחק זיווגו בא אצלו, 'וירא והנה גמלים באים'. יעקב הלך אצל זיווגו, דכתיב 'ויצא יעקב'.

So what's so important about this?  Why, of all events in life, does the Gemara describe zivug as so vital, so essential, that the Ribono shel Olam can be said to spend all His time after Brias Ha"olam in organizing Shidduchim?

Chazal (Shavuos 30b, regarding Rav Huna's wife appearing in court before Reb Nachman) tell us that אשת חבר הרי היא כחבר, the wife of a Talmid Chacham must be shown the same respect as her husband.  Why is this true?  Simply, one might say that it is similar to honoring one's older brother, or a step mother, where the honor shown to them enures to the father.  I believe there is more to it than that.

מעשה בר"ש בן חלפתא שבא ערב שבת ולא היה לו מאן להתפרנס יצא לו חוץ מן העיר והתפלל לפני האלהים וניתן לו אבן טובה מן השמים נתנה לשולחני ופרנס אותה שבת אמרה אשתו מהיכן אלו אמר לה ממה שפרנס הקב"ה אמרה אם אין אתה אומר לי מהיכן הן איני טועמת כלום התחיל מספר לה אמר לה כך נתפללתי לפני האלהים וניתן לי מן השמים אמרה לו איני טועמת כלום עד שתאמר לי שתחזירה מוצאי שבת אמר לה למה אמרה לו אתה רוצה שיהא שולחנך חסר ושולחן חבירך מלא והלך ר' שמעון והודיע מעשה לרבי אמר לו לך אמור לה אם שולחנך חסר אני אמלאנו משלי הלך ואמר לה אמרה לו לך עמי למי שלמדך תורה אמרה לו ר' וכי רואה אדם לחבירו לעוה"ב לא כל צדיק וצדיק הוה ליה עולם בעצמו שנאמר (קהלת יב) כי הולך האדם אל בית עולמו וסבבו בשוק הסופדים עולמים אין כתיב אלא עולמו כיון ששמע כן הלך והחזיר

(Shmos Rabba 52:3)

Reb Shimon ben Chalafta needed money for shabbos, got a gem from shamayim, pawned it for money and bought food,  he brought it home and his wife asked him where'd you get the money for this stuff.  He told her what happened, and she said I won't eat a bite of  the food until you promise me you'll return the precious stone Motzei Shabbos.

This was the only time this happened; he always had money to buy shabbos, but this happened to be a bad week, and he thought he could use the miracle with nobody knowing.  His wife sniffed out the secret.  Not only did she sniff out his secret, she told him that she refused to benefit from a neis.  She said, everyone else will have full tables, and we'll have a hole in middle? Reb Shimon went to Rebbi, and Rebbi said, tell her I'll give you from my table in Olam Haba.  She said, I'm going to Rebbi with you, and we'll see.  She said to Rebbi, since when can a person get anything from another in OhB?  Everyone has his own world, no more and no less!  You can't go next door and borrow a cup of sugar in Shamayim!  When he heard this, he agreed to give it back.  (There is a similar story in Taanis 25a involving Reb Chanina ben Dosa and his wife.)

Do you realize who we're talking about here?   The greatest gedolim of the generation that wrote the Mishnayos, people who would have been nevi'im if their generation merited it.  They were geniuses and tzadikim that spent every waking moment in the Beis Medrash learning with all their strength from the gedolei hador, arguing, discussing, thinking, memorizing, with siyata dishmaya, and Mrs. Chalafta and Mrs. Dosa were at home changing diapers and sewing and doing the laundry.  And when it came to this very important matter of hashkafa, of what is right and what is wrong, of what a person ought to be doing and working towards in life, these women blew them all away and made it crystal clear to them that they were wrong.  They out-thought them and out-haskafa'ed them.  

This reminds me of the story with the Brisker Rov.  His Rebbitzen was over cleaning for Pesach, and he told her that she didn't need to do half of what she was doing.  She answered "If I would listen to you, we would have been eating Chametz at the Seder for a long time."

That is what the Netziv (Harchev Davar Breishis 2:18, and see Haamek Davar Breishis 4:19) calls an eizer k'negdo.  The netziv says, eizer k'negdo means that when you go off the track, your wife will help you by pointing out what you are doing wrong.  She will praise her husband when he should be praised, but also offer him insights that he would otherwise not have.  The latter, showing him his mistake when necessary, is the greater service.

The binah yeseirah that a woman has can grow without limit.  The only limit to its growth is the husband's madreigah.  In a properly constituted home, in a home where the husband and wife share ideas of avodas Hashem and mussar, the husband and wife will grow together.  The wife will grow from what she learns from the husband, and the husband will grow from what he learns from his wife, and the two will create a shleimus and kedusha far greater than the sum of what they could have created individually.  No matter what the husband's madreiga, his wife will have rachamim and bina yeseirah to offer that he should heed.  No  matter what the wife's madreiga, the husband will have chochma and gevura that the she should heed.  Avraham Avinu would have been different without a Sara.  Sara without an Avraham would never have come to a madreiga of nevua of כל אשר תאמר לך.  One without the other simply would not be a Tzelem Elokim.  (See note 1.)

Each party contributes their share to the Hashra'as Hashechina of a Bayis Ne'eman, and each contribution is unique and essential.

In Parshas Pinchas, Hashem counts the Jewish People again.  The Kli Yakar here (26:10), on the passuk .  Le'Chanoch, mishpachas haChanochi, le'Chetzron, etc, points out that the family names have an extra hei and yud, "haPalu'i, haChetzroni."  These two letters form name of Hashem.  Why does it appear specifically here?  Because Klal Yisrael was never suspected of pritzus, even the sonei yisrael knew that the Jewish family is kodesh kadashim.  But after Bnos Midian, the nations said "They’re no different than the rest of us, their blood was mixed when they were slaves in Mitzrayim."  So Hashem said eidus that they were pure.  The eidus is evident in the name of Hashem, the yud and the hei, which is the shechina that is brought about by a holy family life, the Yud from ish and and the Hei from isha.  They were each born from parents whose marriage created a hashra’as hashechina in their home. 

So why is the hei first?  The yud is the man's and the hei is the woman's contribution!  He answers that the as far as the right to inherit Eretz Yisrael, the women were more entitled than the men.  Their entitlement was based on two things in which they outdid the men of that generation- Tzniyus and the Love of Eretz Yisrael.  In 26:64, he explains that this is one of the reasons that the parsha ends by saying “uv’eileh lo hoyoh ish.”  Rashi- No Ish who had been counted earlier survived to be counted again, but many nashim.  Although the gzeira of the midbar affected the men, which is why Hashem counted them again, but there were plenty of elderly women who did enter Eretz Yisrael.  Rashi says that the reason is because they were lovers of Eretz Yisrael; when the men looked for excuses not to enter Eretz Yisrael, the women never gave up hope that they would be zocheh to live in Eretz Yisrael, so they weren’t affected by the gzeiras meraglim.  Rashi reiterates this in the beginning of the parsha of bnos Tzelafchad as to why they were nisyacheis to Yosef.  Yosef was also mechaveiv Eretz Yisrael- he said Veha’alisem es atzmosai.  Bnos Tzelofchod, descendants of Yosef, embodied the mesora of chibas ha’aretz.  Also, Yosef was famously chaste, and it was these characteristics that shone forth in the women of that generation.

So we see that the kedusha that is created in a Jewish home, in a home of hashra'as hashechina, a home in which both the husband and the wife learn from each other, that kedusha is a gift from the Ribono shel Olam that can be gotten nowhere but the hand of Hashem.  It's a shleimus that can't be achieved by yourself.  Yes, a man should be a man, dedicated to עמלות בתורה  and gevura,  and a woman should be a woman, nurturing, a paragon of צניעות and  בטחון.  But most importantly, the man and the woman must talk to each other, discuss spiritual matters with each other, share their growth with each other.  The husband learns from the binah and middos of his wife and incorporates and remakes them in his own distinctive masculine persona, and the woman learns from the chochma and gevura of the husband and incorporates and reinvents that chochma in her distinctive feminine character.  And that is how the true Tzelem Elokim is created. 

I suggest that this is the pshat in the first bracha of the Sheva Brachos, Shehakol Bara Lichvodo.  Hakol means disparate parts combined.  It is only with Hakol that Hashem's shechina can truly be revealed in the world.  The Hakol is the bond of kedusha and love and mutual respect and intertwined pursuit of shleimus between a husband and wife, the Shleimus of the Bayis Ne'eman that creates the Hashra'as Hashechina.

 Notes:
1.  The Abudraham brings from the Gemara in Kiddushin that the reason there are two brachos in Sheva Brachos on the same topic- Yotzer Ha'adam and Yatzar es Ha'adam BeTzalmo is that one refers to the first stage of creation and the other to the second.  He explains that the "second stage of creation" means after Chava was created- and that only then can we truly refer to humankind as having the Tzelem Elokim.  Man alone is not the Tzelem Elokim, and woman alone is not the Tzelem Elokim.  Only man plus woman is the Tzelem Elokim.  He, of course, is talking about the middos of gevura and rachamim and bina and so forth, which is the point of this Dvar Torah.

2.  The Netziv actually says that some people used to marry two wives, one for beauty and silence, and one as a peer that would advise and criticize when necessary.  The same is certainly true now.  Some women are just pieces of fluff with no involvement in their husband's spiritual or intellectual or financial life, and some men are totally unaffected by the middos of their wives.  Their intersection is purely utilitarian and does not change them at all.  When this happens, it's the fault of both parties.  That's why I said that the optimum arrangement, where each grows and the other grows with them, is a matter of sharing and discussion and empathy and only happens in a well-constituted home.  It's not automatic.

3.  Daniel, in the comments, writes that he doesn't believe that all marriages are bashert.  There are rishonim that agree with him.  The Gemara in Sotah 2b and Sanhedrin 22a goes like this:

כי הוה פתח ריש לקיש בסוטה אמר הכי :

'אין מזווגין לו לאדם אשה אלא לפי מעשיו' שנאמר :"כי לא ינוח שבט הרשע על גורל הצדיקים"(תהילים קכה')

אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר ר' יוחנן וקשים לזווגן כקריעת ים סוף, שנאמר: "אלהים מושיב יחידים ביתה מוציא אסירים בכושרות"(תהילים סח').

 איני (האמנם)?

והא אמר רב יהודה אמר רב: ארבעים יום קודם יצירת הולד בת קול יוצאת ואומרת בת פלוני לפלוני בית פלוני לפלוני שדה פלוני לפלוני?

לא קשיא. הא בזוג ראשון הא בזוג שני:

The Gemara contrasts the usual statement of shidduchim being a matter of fate with Reish Lakish'es statement that  a shidduch is a result of one's behavior and merit.  The Gemara answers that one is in regard to zivug rishon, the first match, and the other in regard to zivug sheini, the second.  What rishon and sheini mean is argued among the rishonim.  Rashi, of course, learns it means chronologically.  However, others hold exactly the opposite.  The Akeida and others learn that it means alternative models, one the preferred, and one not preferred.  So Yes, Daniel is right.  But there are things that are worth believing even if they are not true.

4.    Yes, I know that the Medrash also says אשתו של פלוני לפלוני, ממונו של פלוני לפלוני.  It's a vort, not the yud gimmel ikrim.  The main point is that אשת חבר הרי היא כחבר is not just a din in being mechabed the talmid chacham.  It is based on the spiritual resonance that develops between husband and wife in the marriage envisioned in the Torah.

5.  It's possible that what I'm saying about אשת חבר הרי היא כחבר is based on the concept of גדול שימושה יותר מלימודה (Brachos 7b, and see Tosfos Kesuvos 17a DH Mevatlin).  That's not very different than what I'm saying.

6. Someone wrote that this Dvar Torah is mawkish.  MAWKISH!  It's a sheva brachos drasha, so deal with it.  But it's nice to be excoriated with style.

7. Since we're talking about  אשת חבר כחבר, I'll share an experience of this morning, 11/14/22. I attended a bris of the grandchild of Rabbi Olstein in Chicago. He is the Menahel Ruchani of the Blitstein Institute for Women, a frum women's college. When he lived in Israel, he was certified as a dayan in choshen mishpat, so he knows how to learn. He and my wife respect and like each other very much, stemming from their interactions at the Blitstein Institute. I was honored with bentching at the bris, much to my surprise, and he told me afterwards that for all that he respects me, the zechus was because of  אשת חבר כחבר. Bishlema if he said אשתו כגופו, nu, meila. But using  אשת חבר הרי היא כחבר was novel, that I got the kibbud because of my wife. I wonder if there are any other such cases in Tanach or in divrei Chazal.

Pinchas: From the Shvilei Pinchas: The Connection Between the Parsha and the Three Weeks

This is a translation done by a dear friend, Rav Dr. Baruch Fox.  Reb Baruch applies the same well-honed skillset to hashkafa and machshava as he does to clinical diagnosis and surgery, and his translations contain a good deal of his own perspective.

We Read About Pinchas Who Is Eliyahu During the Three Weeks To Persuade Him to Come and Herald the Redemption

This coming shabbos, we read parshas Pinchas. In a normal, non-leap year, parshas Pinchas always falls during the first of the “three weeks,” between the seventeenth of Tamuz and the ninth of Av. During these three weeks, it is incumbent upon all Jews to mourn and lament the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash and to daven for the final and complete redemption. Seeing as these things do not occur by mere coincidence, there is, obviously, an intimate connection between parshas Pinchas and the “three weeks.”


Concerning this fact, the holy, Opter Rav, zy”a, writes in “Ohev Yisroel” that since all of the moadim are mentioned in this parsha, it was instituted to read parshas Pinchas during the “three weeks.” By so doing, we reinforce our hopes that these days, too, will soon be transformed into days of rejoicing and happiness as predicted by the prophet (Zechariah 8,19): "כה אמר ה' צבאות צום הרביעי וצום החמישי וצום השביעי וצום העשירי יהיה לבית יהודה לששון ולשמחה ולמועדים טובים והאמת והשלום אהבו".

This connection between parshas Pinchas and the “three weeks” ties in beautifully with the opening verses of the parsha: "וידבר ה' אל משה לאמר, פינחס בן אלעזר בן אהרן הכהן השיב את חמתי מעל בני ישראל, בקנאו את קנאתי בתוכם ולא כליתי את בני ישראל בקנאתי, לכן אמור הנני נותן לו את בריתי שלום"—Pinchas’ zealous actions spared Yisroel from Hashem’s wrath; as a reward, Hashem gives him His covenant of peace.

The Targum Yonatan explains: "את בריתי שלום, האנא גזר ליה ית קימי שלם, ואעבדיניה מלאך קיים ויחי לעלמא, למבשרא גאולתא בסוף יומיא"—the covenant of peace took the form of Pinchas being made into an angel, living forever and announcing the redemption in the end of days. This matter is presented at greater length in the Midrash (Yalkut Shimoni here):

"לכן אמור הנני נותן לו את בריתי שלום - אמר רבי שמעון בן לקיש, פנחס הוא אליהו, אמר לו הקב"ה, אתה נתת שלום בין ישראל וביני בעולם הזה, אף לעתיד לבא אתה הוא שעתיד ליתן שלום ביני לבין בני, שנאמר (מלאכי ג כג) הנה אנכי שולח לכם את אליהו הנביא לפני בוא יום ה' וגו' והשיב לב אבות על בנים".

The yalkut adds an important detail for us—Pinchas and Eliyahu hanavi are one and the same; just as he facilitated shalom, peace, between the Almighty and Yisroel at that time, so, too, he will serve this function once again in the future.

The rationale for reading parshas Pinchas at the onset of the “three weeks” is now more evident. At a time of mourning over the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash and Yisroel’s extended golus, it provides tremendous chizuk to recall the merit of Pinchas, Eliyahu, who willingly put his life on the line for the honor of the Almighty and in order to protect Yisroel from annihilation. We also intend to persuade him to fulfill that which Hashem promised him: "הנני נותן לו את בריתי שלום"—that he will appear to herald the redemption, swiftly, in our days, Amen.

The Purpose of Creation Is that Man Should Dwell in Both Worlds

Now, that we have established that we wish to invoke the merit of Pinchas, who is Eliyahu, and to hasten the arrival of the final redemption, let us take a closer look at the promise Hashem made to Pinchas. We have introduced the commentary of the Targum Yonatan that this promise conveys the fact that Pinchas will live forever and that he will be the messenger announcing the future redemption. This requires further clarification. The possuk alludes to the fact that he will facilitate “shalom” between Yisroel and their Father in Heaven; however, where do we find an allusion to the fact that he will live forever without dying?

Let us proceed by presenting an important principle gleaned from the holy teachings of the Ohr HaChaim hakadosh (Bereishis 3,14) which he expands upon (beginning of Bechukotai) in one of his forty-two elucidations (#20) of the possuk (Vayikra 26,3): "אם בחוקותי תלכו". Here are his elegant words:

"כשברא ה' אדם הראשון בעולם הזה לא בראו לשבת בעולם הזה לעולמי עד כשלא יחטא, שאם כן אדרבה ירידה היא לו ושפלות היא, כי תכלית המקווה הוא בעולם העליון ששמה יקצור אשר זרע, אלא היתה הכוונה כי עלה יעלה לשמים ולאוצרות החיים בעת אשר יחפוץ, ויהיה כמי שדר בבית ועליה על גבה, וכשירצה לעלות ולהשתעשע יעלה, כמו שמצינו שעלה אליהו בסערה השמימה (מלכים ב ב יא), ועל ידי החטא הוצרך להפשיט עורו מעליו ויניח הגוף בעולם הזה".

Hashem did not create man to dwell solely down below in this world; that would have been demeaning and would have constituted a spiritual decline for man. Rather, the intent was that man could reap the benefits of both worlds; for, his ultimate purpose and rewards lie in the world above. The situation would have been analogous to a person whose house contains a ground level with a second story above it; he would have had the freedom to climb to the second level and enjoy its treasures at will. This was, indeed, the situation witnessed with Eliyahu, who ascended to heaven in a blaze of fire; however, due to man’s sin, he was forced to relinquish this ability and freedom, and remains confined to his earthly body.

It occurred to me to elaborate upon the tremendous benefit it would be for man to be able to dwell in both worlds, like one who lives in a two-story house. The Agra D’Kallah (parshas Behaalotcha) presents the words of the Maggid of Mezritsch, zy”a, on the possuk (Bamidbar 10,2): "עשה לך שתי חצוצרות כסף" - "עשה לך שתי חצאי צורות שיהיו נכספים זה לזה"—rather than “make for yourself two silver trumpets,” he interprets this as saying “ make for yourself two half-forms (a play on the Hebrew word for trumpets) that will long (a play on the Hebrew word for silver) for one another.”

The Agra D’Kalla explains the Maggid’s message as follows: "על כן תקרא הנשמה שתי חצאי צורות, חציה למעלה וחציה למטה... וזה עשה לך שתי חצוצרות, היינו השתי חצאי צורות, כסף שיהיו משתוקקים זה לזה, זה לקבל וזה להשפיע ויהיה מלכות שמים שלימה, והכל על ידי קיום המצוות". Our holy sources have taught us that the neshomeh came down from on high to clothe itself in a physical form; nevertheless, the essence of the neshomeh remains above in the heavens. So, the neshomeh encompasses two half-forms—one residing above, while the other resides below. The intent is that they long for one another and operate together to achieve the fulfillment of the sovereignty of Heaven—one receives while the other provides the spiritual influence and bounty.

The Two Parts of the Neshomeh Illuminate One Another

Upon closer examination, we find that each of these two partners, these two half-forms of the neshomeh, possess an advantage and a disadvantage. The heavenly half-form always remains pure and untainted by the sins of the body; however, it is unable to perform mitzvos, since it lacks the bodily limbs. On the other hand, the half-form of the neshomeh that is clothed by a physical body, possesses the luxury of being able to engage in Torah study and to perform mitzvos; yet, it suffers the blemishes and disgrace that result when the body sins.

This, then, is the meaning of the homiletic interpretation: “make for yourself two half-forms that long for one another.” If the bodily half-form serves Hashem honorably and enhances its spirituality and kedushah, the two half-forms will long to unite and illuminate one another. The lower form will illuminate the form above with the Torah and mitzvos acquired with its physical tools; while the heavenly form, will illuminate the earthbound form with the brilliance and splendor it is exposed to above. However, if the bodily neshomeh is tainted by sins, a barrier will develop between the two parts of the neshomeh. The essence of the neshomeh above longs to remain pure and unsullied by the sins of the body below; therefore, it will shun any relationship with its sullied partner below.

We now understand the potential benefits of being able to live in both worlds—like one who lives in a two-story house. The two halves of the neshomeh, living in their respective universes, would be free to interact at will and share in each other’s light. Unfortunately, the sin of the tree of knowledge created a fatal separation between these two entities. Although, they long to illuminate and unite with one another, their relationship has become a distant one. As things stand, the two half-forms of the neshomeh are only able to unite fully by means of death—when the earthbound neshomeh leaves its body and reunites with the essential neshomeh above.

Eliyahu Dwells in Both Worlds

Looking back now at the words of the Ohr HaChaim quoted above, we find, that in his view, Eliyahu hanavi merited this lofty ability—to dwell in both worlds like one who lives in a two-story house.

This understanding ties in wonderfully with the following Midrash: "אם יאמר לך אדם, [אפשר] שאלו לא חטא אדם הראשון ואכל מאותו העץ היה חי וקים לעולם, אמור לו אתה, כבר היה אליהו שלא חטא והוא חי וקים לעולם"—if someone says to you, had Adom harishon not sinned by eating from that tree, he would have been able to live forever; you should respond that, in fact, there was Eliyahu, who did not sin, and he does live on for all eternity. We learn from here, that Eliyahu hanavi is living testimony that had Adom harishon not partaken of the tree of knowledge, he would have lived forever. Based on what we have already established, Eliyahu does, indeed, dwell in both worlds and comes and goes as he pleases—akin to Adom harishon before the sin.

We can take this a step further, based on a teaching in the Zohar hakadosh (Vayakhel 197.) that Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai expounded on the possuk (Mishlei 30,4): "מי עלה שמים וירד"—who ascended to heaven and then came back down—is referring to Eliyahu. Nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai questions the logistics of Eliyahu’s coming and going, seeing as heaven does not tolerate even the tiniest amount of physicality.

RaShbY explains, therefore, that when Eliyahu goes up to heaven, he divests himself of his bodily clothing and leaves it in a designated place between heaven and earth; he then adorns himself in a spiritual attire so that he may ascend and comingle with the malachim. Conversely, when he returns to this world on a Heavenly mission, he divests himself of his spiritual attire, between heaven and earth, and he reclaims his pure, physical body so that he can comingle with human beings. This is the meaning of the statement: "מי עלה שמים וירד" - זה אליהו—no man other than Eliyahu has ascended to heaven in the form of an angel and then returned to earth in human form.

Once again, we have found clear evidence that Eliyahu dwells in both worlds and possesses both spiritual and physical attires which he dons as necessary and as is appropriate. This is truly akin to the state of Adom harishon before the sin who lived in both worlds—like someone living in a two-story house.

This, now, provides us with an answer to one of our original questions: where do we find in the Holy One’s promise to Pinchas—“Behold! I give him My covenant of peace”—an allusion to the fact that he will live on forever? The sin of the tree of knowledge created a separation and barrier between the two parts of the neshomeh; however, Pinchas, who is Eliyahu, merited to receive the covenant of peace from the Holy One, the unique ability to make peace and reunite the two half-forms of the neshomeh. By living in both worlds, able to go upstairs and downstairs at will like someone living in a two-story house, he is living in a state of Adom harishon before the sin; this is our clear proof that his existence is eternal.

He Shall Restore the Heart of Fathers to Children and the Heart of Children to Their Fathers

Continuing on this path, let us now try to understand how the promise: “Behold! I give him My covenant of peace,” also conveys the message that Pinchas, who is Eliyahu, will merit to herald the future redemption to Yisroel. We will begin by explaining what we have learned in the Mishnah (Ediyot 8,7):

"אמר רבי יהושע, מקובל אני מרבן יוחנן בן זכאי ששמע מרבו ורבו מרבו, הלכה למשה מסיני שאין אליהו בא לטמא ולטהר לרחק ולקרב, אלא לרחק המקורבין בזרוע ולקרב המרחקין בזרוע".

It was transmitted to Moshe at Sinai that Eliyahu will not come to clarify matters of tumah and taharah, impurity and purity, but, rather, to distance those that were not meant to come close and to reunite those that have become distant.

The Arizal teaches us an important principle (Sefer HaLikutim, Haazinu) concerning the future redemption; that redemption is dependent upon rectifying the sin of Adom harishon. This also explains why the decree of death will no longer be in effect, because the world will return to the state of Adom harishon before the sin.

It is easy to understand, now, why Hashem specifically chose Eliyahu hanavi to herald the future redemption to Yisroel, as it is written in the words of the prophet (Malachi 3,23): "הנה אנכי שולח לכם את אליהו הנביא לפני בוא יום ה' הגדול והנורא, והשיב לב אבות על בנים ולב בנים על אבותם"—“Behold, I send you Eliyahu hanavi, before the great and awesome day of Hashem; he shall restore the heart of fathers to children and the heart of children to their fathers.” Who better than Eliyahu hanavi—who merited to dwell in both worlds like someone living in a two-story house—to have the power and kedushah to positively influence Yisroel to also merit this two-world existence?!

We can now interpret the possuk as follows: the purpose of sending Eliyahu hanavi before the day of redemption is because “he shall restore the heart of fathers to children and the heart of children to their fathers”—“fathers” refers to the essential neshomehs that remained in heaven; whereas, the “children” represent the offshoots of the neshomehs that descended to this world in order to take on a bodily form. When Eliyahu arrives to announce the redemption: “he shall restore the heart of fathers to children”—by uniting the essential neshomehs, the fathers, with their offshoots, the children, who will provide the latter with their heavenly illumination—“and the heart of children to their fathers”—the offshoots of the neshomehs, the children, will illuminate the essential neshomehs, their fathers, with the light of their Torah and mitzvos.

We can now return to explain the Mishnah: It was transmitted to Moshe at Sinai that Eliyahu will not come to clarify matters of tumah and taharah, impurity and purity, but, rather, to distance those that were not meant to come close and to reunite those that have become distant. We can interpret this as reference to the sin of the tree of knowledge which was due in great part to the serpent becoming too close with Chava, i.e. those that were meant to remain at a distance came too close.

The Gemorah explains (Shabbos 146.): "שבשעה שבא נחש על חוה הטיל בה זוהמא"—this undesirable and inappropriate relationship between the serpent and Chava left a perverse stain that resulted in distancing those that were meant to remain close and in touch, i.e. the essential neshomeh above was forced to distance itself from its counterpart below, and Adom harishon was no longer able to dwell in both worlds like living in a two-story house.

The Mishnah teaches that Eliyahu will come and restore the proper order. In other words, he will reestablish the appropriate distance between the serpent and mankind—thus, rescinding the decree of death—and will help reunite the two parts of the neshomeh that became distant from one another due to the deceitful serpent. This was all part of Hashem’s promise to Pinchas: "הנני נותן לו את בריתי שלום"—Behold! I give him My covenant of peace—he will merit to bring peace to Yisroel and reunite the two parts of the neshomeh when he arrives to herald the future redemption. This will represent the fulfillment of the possuk: "והשיב לב אבות על בנים ולב בנים על אבותם"—“he shall restore the heart of the fathers to the children and the heart of the children to their fathers”—swiftly, in our days, Amen.

Pinchas, Bamidbar 25:11. The Hole's in My Cabin, So Mind Your Own Business

You know the story about a passenger on a boat that was drilling a hole in the floor of his cabin. His fellow passengers grabbed him and took his drill away. Angrily, he said, "You troublemakers, why are mixing into my affairs? It's my cabin!"

Yes, it's true that a breech threatens us all, not just the people who are doing the breaching. But the interdependence and mutual responsibility of the members of Klal Yisrael can sometimes seem to be a pain in the neck. I would guess that it actually benefits us all, as we see that even Moshe Rabbeinu's high madreiga of nevu'ah stemmed from his position as leader of Klal Yisrael, so it seems that we all are elevated by this arvus. But sometimes, our individual responsibility for others' behavior results in very unpleasant things such as the hafganot in Yerushalayim (assuming that they stem from real anger about chillul shabbos and are not just an assertion of political power and entitlement).

Anyway, this week's parsha relates to this topic in two ways.

25:11. Velo Chilisi. The Shai Latorah here brings rayos and quotes anonymous rishonim that an individual’s sin can provoke punishment upon the entire community. Examples: Zimri and the fact that if not for Pinchos, there might have been a ‘chilisi.’ Beshalach 16:19– there were warned to not leave Mahn overnight. Two people did, and Hashem said “Ahd ana mei’antem.” Yehoshua 7– Achan was the only man who took from the shallal, and because of his sin, thirty six people died at the next battle, and Hashem said it was because “vegam lakchu be’keileihem.” He asks, but why then, by Korah, did Moshe argue “ha’ish echad yecheta ve’ahl kol ha’eidah tiktzof?”? He brings from Reb Dovid Soloveichik that Korach had a din “nivdal,” as Moshe had told him and his people “hibadlu mitoch ha’eidah.”

It's a drash, not a lomdishe shiur, so I wouldn't expect him to bring contrary rayos, but there are plenty of mekoros that guilt is personal except in the case of widespread and openly notorious behavior. But anyway, the point is that Reb Dovid Soloveichik said it.

25:12. Brisi Sholom. Everybody and his uncle talk about the apparent conflict between the act and the reward; some ask that a medal for an act should reflect the act, others say that it has to stem from the act and it doesn’t here.
First: Rav Shamshon Refoel Hirsch on Parshas Pinchos says that peace - shalom - isn't quiet or appeasement, but rather the restoration of rights, human and divine, and the creation of harmony between Hashem and His creation. Once again, like the Chasam Sofer's observation that Verav Shalom is the gematria of Machlokes.
Second: Harav Avraham Lawrence told me that he once heard an interesting vort. Rashi here says “bedin hu she’yitol scharo.” But we hold schar mitzvah b’hai alma leka!
That answer is that even if we hold schar mitzvah b’hai alma leka, there is one schar that is guaranteed, and that is “mitzvah goreres mitzvah.” But here, Hashem did not want that to happen, because even if Pinchos’ kana’us was a wonderful thing and a great mitzvah, it would not be good if kana’us was ‘goreir’ more kana’us, and being a kana'i is like going for a ride on tiger; sometimes you come back on it, sometimes in it. So in order to avoid that, Hashem rescinded deferral of schar through the usual ‘goreres’ protocol, and went directly to schar. This is what “bedin hu she’yitol scharo” means.

So: the point of these two ideas in Parshas Pinchas is that sometimes, we have to mix into other peoples' business, if not out of altruism, then out of self-interest, or, as anthropologists like to say, out of selfish altruism. Second, necessary and ultimate good, maybe, but still ugly and dangerous.

Earlier posts on Pinchas:

Flexibility in Psak and Eilu Ve'eilu
http://havolim.blogspot.com/2008/07/mattos-bamidbar-2815-seir-izim-echad.html

A Kohen with Blood on His Hands
http://havolim.blogspot.com/2007/07/pinchos-bamidbor-2513-bris-kehunas-olam.html
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Achrei Mos, Vayikra 16:32. Lecha’hein tachas aviv. Hereditary Entitlement and Meritocracy in Torah Judaism.

(This is a re-post. It has been expanded, and is now one of two articles on nepotism/hereditary entitlement. The other post deals with Moshe Rabbeinu's prayer that his kingship be inherited by his son/s, and Hashem's not granting that request.)

Here, and in Titzaveh, Shemos 29:30, the passuk teaches us that the position of Kehunah Gedolah is inherited from one's father. Obviously, all Kohanim descend from Aharon. But among the Kohanim, the son of the Kohein Gadol inherits his father’s position. Rav Shternbuch, in his Taam Vodaas in Shemos 29, tells the following story. (The italicized portion is from Oizer Alport’s ParshaPotpourri.)

A controversy once broke out when the Rav of a small town in Europe passed away. The leaders of the community wanted to appoint an outsider to take his place, while one of the Rav’s sons argued that he was suited for the position and deserved precedence as the inheritor of his deceased father. The two sides agreed to bring the dispute to the Chofetz Chaim for resolution.


The Chofetz Chaim began by agreeing that Jewish law recognizes that all religious positions, including Rabbinical appointments, are subject to be inherited by the offspring of the deceased. However, the Gemora in Yoma (72b) distinguishes between the son of the Kohen Gadol, who may inherit his father’s purely religious position, and the son of the Kohen Mashuach Milchama (the Kohen who leads the Jews to battle), who may not. Because the latter position is uniquely intended for a man of war and is not purely a religious function, the fact that somebody was suited for the role is irrelevant to his son’s capacity to inherit and fill the position.

The Chofetz Chaim explained that it was once true that the function of the Rav of a community was purely religious in nature – to render legal rulings and to teach the people – and his children were legally entitled to be offered the position before other candidates were considered.

However, he continued, this has unfortunately changed due to the assault of various anti-religious movements on traditional standards and values. As a result, the role of the Rav has been transformed into that of a general leading his troops into a fierce battle, regarding which the Gemora rules that the children are not entitled to automatic precedence in inheriting and filling the position of the deceased!

A thoughtful reading of this story does raise some questions. If the Chofetz Chaim would have said that inherited position is the standard law of the Torah, we could understand that. But it is hard to see the difference between rabbinic religious positions and pastoral positions. Does he mean that religious functions are sinecures, that we don’t care if the man is capable? Doesn’t kehunah gedola, or any religious position, require certain talents or at least aptitude? Why should the Mashu’ach Milchama position be more important in the sense that we really have to get the best suited candidate, that it is a merit-based appointment, while kehunah gedolah is transferred on the basis of familial privilege, of chazakah?(The rule of inherited authority applies to the crown as well. If an heir is qualified, albeit minimally, the crown is his, despite the abundance of far more talented alternatives. Please don't tell me that hereditary succession is peaceful and orderly: I am still looking for a royal succession in Tanach that didn't involve bloodshed, often the killing of the closest relatives in order to gain the position, a minhag that we, the upholders of tradition, have proudly continued in recent years.
Metaphor


On the other hand, it is possible that the rigid and perhaps irrational rule of inherited succession, messy as it turned out to be, is better than a free for all beauty contest, which would be impossible to win decisively and would guarantee a bloody, endless civil war every time a king died. I think that the "best form of government" may be one of the ineluctable, immutable, distinctions among the three Noahide families; we Semites don't do well with Democracy.)

In any case, back to the question on the Chafetz Chaim. Why does inherited rule make more sense in a religious capacity than for the Mashu'ach Milchama? The answer is this:

When the kohen gadol does the avodah, it is not he alone that is standing there doing the avodah. It is him, and his father, and his father’s father, lo, unto the earliest times.

(When I first said this, at the Shabbas table, my wife, Ms. Bor Sid She'einah Me'abeid Tipah, intoned the whole pre-battle speech from a certain re-imagining of Beowulf which she had seen:
"Lo, there do I see my father. Lo, there do I see my mother, and my sisters, and my brothers. Lo, there do I see the line of my people, stretching back to the beginning. They call to me; they bid me to take my place among them, in Valhalla, where the brave may live...forever."  I mention this because it is an excellent portrayal of the strength that might be accessible to one who sees himself as a link in an ancient chain.)

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In spiritual matters, when you stand before Hashem, you stand at the center of a great cloud of the past and the future. So of course, we want a man whose ancestors and descendants are all kohanim gedolim.

By the Mashu’ach Milchama, on the other hand, while of course we need an individual who is a tzadik, more importantly we need a man that can inspire the soldiers to courage and bravery. We don’t give a hoot about his father. (So my wife’s sonorous declamation was, in a sense, inapposite: there, he was summoning up and embracing his brave heritage and fate, while my whole point here is that zechus avos is more important in a religious function than it is in a mashuach milchomo. But it’s a great way to communicate an emotional understanding of the idea that the Kohen Gadol doesn’t go in alone.)

In the interest of scholarship not being eclipsed by showmanship, there are several things that need to be added.

We cited a Chofetz Chaim above regarding Rabbonus being hereditary. In fact, this is a very contested issue. Just as an indicator of how difficult the practical halacha is, in the Kol Kisvei Chafetz Chaim there is a letter from him about a din torah he was involved in: after Reb Naftoli Trop died, his position as Magid Shiur was given to the CC's son in law, and the Trops were not happy. In settlement, the yeshiva gave one position to a Trop, and a monetary settlement to a Trop son in law.

The various medroshim and the Rambam, (such as the Sifra in Shmini on the sons of Aharon, and the Sifra in Tzaz, Vayikra 6, and the Sifri in Devorim 17:20, who all say that Kehuna Gedola and Malchus and Srarah are inherited, and the Medrash in Koheles that says that while Kehuna and Malchus are inherited, Rabbonus is not, since the Keser Torah is available freely to anyone and is not restricted in any way by rights of inheritance, and the Rambam in Klei Hamikdash that says that Malchus, Kehuna Gedolah, and other minuyim are inherited, but only if the heir is worthy of the position "either in Chachma or in Yir'as Shamayim,",) are not nearly as interesting as the more recent poskim.

The more recent poskim that discuss this all basically 'agree' that Malchus and Kehuna Gedola are inherited. They all agree that 'Purely Torah' positions, like saying the Beis Medrash shiur, are not. The issue seems mostly to be which category does Rabbanus or being a Rosh Yeshiva go into-- malchus/serara, or Torah. If Malchus, then they are inherited. If Torah, they are not.

So, the Rama in YD 245 says there is yerusha in Rabbanus. (The Magen Avraham in OC 53 brings the Teshuvos Harashba that the position of Chazzan is inherited. I know an otherwise sane man, whose father was a Chazan, and who thinks he has a beautiful voice, and who, when he davens for the amud, is memareik a lot of aveiros in his listening audience, not through dveikus, but through yesurim.)

But: the Aruch Hashulchan there in YD 245 says there is absolutely no preference given to the son of a Rov. And the Chasam Sofer says the same thing in Teshuvos OC 12.

On the other hand, the Chasam Sofer in the very next teshuva seems to qualify the strong statements in the above cited teshuva. And (no kidding) the Chasidishe perspective, even the Avnei Nezer and the Maharsham, is that Rabbonus is primarily Malchus and is inherited.

An interesting and very fiercely litigated issue arises where the position comprises both Torah and Serara. Torah is not subject to Yerusha; but along with the Torah position comes Serara- power and money. Arguments will arise as to which is the primary function, the Torah or the Serara. This would be less of an issue with Roshei Yeshiva than it is with Rebbes. But lets assume that the two functions are or could be independent. Does the latter follow the former? Or perhaps an argument could be made that upon the death of the holder of the position, the two aspects should be divided, with the Serara going to a heir and the Torah position going to the person with the greatest aptitude. And, of course, there is the usual fight about where the position is definitely inheritable, and the holder of the position didn't write a Tzava'a, but clearly expressed his preference for someone who is not first in line in the law of yerusha. Do we apply the strict law of yerusha, where we don't care about unwritten wishes, or do we say that in communal matters, where theoretically the needs of the community should have given some weight, the statements should be given the force of law?

Pinchas, Bamidbar 28:15. Se’ir izim echad le’chatas lashem. Flexibility in Psak and Eilu Ve'eilu

Rashi from Chulin 60– Hashem asks that we bring a korbon to be mechaper for Him for His having diminished the Moon during the Ma’aseh Breishis.

Reb Moshe in Kol Rom III and other places: this is a mussar haskeil that when deciding between two sides, a decision for one does not necessarily mean that the other is without merit and truth. There are times when a decision has to be made, and the decision accepts the primacy of one side over the other, but this does not invalidate the truth of the other. Dayanim have to remember this when presiding over a case involving a dispute either in civil law or halachah.

In the Teshuvos, EH IV 34, Reb Moshe he talks about hysterectomies. Of course, male castration is an issur de’oraysa, under the rule of Be’artzechem Lo Sa’asu. The question is what the halacha is in the case of hysterectomy. The Gaon, based on his understanding of a Sifri, holds that this, too, is an issur lahv de’orayso. The Gaon is a daas yochid. But in other teshuvos, he Reb Moshe writes that he paskens like the Gaon, and assers hysterectomies. But then in this teshuva, Reb Moshe brings that the Shach in YD 242, in Hanhagos Horo’oh, brings a Bach that even in an issur de’orayso, you can be someich on a daas yochid against a rabbim in cases of tzaar godol or hefsed meruboh. The Shach disagrees with the Bach, and holds that’s only true in cases of an issur de’rabbonon. However, the Taz holds like the Bach even in issurim de’orayso. Therefore, Reb Moshe is mattir hysterectomies in cases of Tza’ar Gadol where there is no alternative. (Obviously, one would need shimush talmidei chachamim to know what constitutes tza’ar gadol.)

I find this to be amazing. What does psak halochoh mean? Everyone that has given shiurim to not yeshivishe baalei batim knows that as soon as you tell them that there is a machlokes about something, you have someone saying "He holds like this, and he holds like that, you can do 'vat ever you want.' This, of course, is wrong. There is such a thing as a psak halacha: the poseik decides what the halacha is, and the majority of poskim decide what the halacha is, and precedent decides what the halacha is. But if you can be mattir when there is hefsed meruboh, what does it mean when you pasken issur under normal circumstances? How does tza’ar or hefsed affect the decision? If you’re paskening it’s assur, then it’s assur, isn’t it? Apparently not, according to the Bach and Taz. If there’s a daas yochid to be meikil, the fact that you generally pasken like the rabbim, or you generally pasken le’chumroh by de'oraysas, is a din in how to pasken when you have two shittos that are both emes on some level. But where there’s a hefsed meruboh or tzaar godol, then you can be someich on the daas yochid, because that is also true. Here's an example. The shittah of the Tosfos Rid in Kiddushin 14, and brought in the Avnei Milu'im, is that if a woman tells her husband "Put my Get over there on the fire hydrant that's twenty feet away from me," and he puts it there, she is divorced. Nobody except the Tosfos Rid holds like that. So, what if some guy says, I know nobody paskens like the Tosfos Rid; but I don’t care, I’m going to be meikil like the Tosfos Rid and be mattir a woman on the basis of tein get ahl gabei sela. Is she divorced or not? Would her next husband be oveir on an issur de’orayso? The children would be mamzeirim, of course, because that is a decision that we make, not him. But as for the issur questio, maybe he would not be oveir an issur de'oraysa. It seems that he was just oveir on the procedural rules of psak halacha. Or, it could be that there comes a point when a da'as yachid is totally delegitimized, like "Beis Shamai be'makom Beis Hillel eino mishnah."

Maybe the pshat is that the din of psak is to preserve the Torah. In other words, psak is not necessarily a guarantee of truth: when you seek a psak, or you study a question and pasken, your true obligation, your true quest, is to sincerely seek the answer to your question in the Torah, to develop a coherent approach that is based on a valid understanding of the Torah. What you come out with doesn’t really matter. The main thing is to seek to live your life ahl pi dinei Torah.

In fact, in the case of par he’elam dovor shel tzibbur, the Gemara in Horyos says that Beis Din brings the korban only when the psak was shown to be false, not where the balance of votes moved from heter to issur on a question of logic or precedent. If, however, there are individual dayanim on the court who maintain the previous psak, it would seem that, again, it is a procedural determination, not a finding of truth.

Balak, Bamidbar 25:6. V’heima bochim pesach ohel moed. The Spear of Pinchas

(The following is based on something said by the Gerrer Rebbe and Rav Gedaliah Schorr, and combines verious nuances in its presentation by Harav Avraham Chaim Levin, Chairman of Moetzes Gedolei Hatoah, and the Divrei Yehudah, of the Gerrer family. And, of course, Me.)

Targum Yonasan interprets ‘bochim’ as ‘kor’in k’rias shma.’ When Zimri challenged Moshe Rabbeinu and the entire Torah morality, the Eidah, the Sanhedrin, responded by going to the Ohel Moed and saying Kri’as Shema with great kavanah. Krias shma has 248 words, and represents complete dedication of the 248 limbs of the human body to Hashem. The Gematria of the 248 limbs is Ramach, the Ramach Eivarim. But while all the tzadikim were saying krias shma and demonstrating their absolute and total dedication to Hashem, "Vayar Pinchos ben Elozor ben Aharon Hakohen vayakam mitoch ho’eida vayikach romach beyado." Pinchas was in that eida that was saying krias shma, and he, too, dedicated his ramach eivorim to Hashem through his tefilla. But then he took the next step— Pinchos took the ‘romach be’yado’– and of course, romach is also gematria ramach— he not only dedicated himself to Hashem, but he took that dedication of his ramach eivarim ‘be’yado’, he acted on his convictions and didn’t just sit saying krias shma. They both dedicated ramach to Hashem, but he took it beyodo and did something with it, he acted on it.

There is a time for Titz’ak Eilai, and there is a time for Mah Titz’ak Eilai. In Devorim 15:18, it says Yevarechicho Hashem bechol asher ta’aseh, may Hashem bless you in all that you do. In the sefer Peh Kadosh, Reb Itzaleh Volozhiner (R’ Chaim Volozhiner’s son), says that he was at a rabbinical conference in 1843, where the gedolim discussed the pressing issues the community faced. One of the gedolim got up and said that there is no good solution; we have to place our trust in Hashem and see what happens. Reb Itzaleh said that he learned from that speech that when in says in the Mishneh, that in the time before Mashiach, people will say "ein lonu lehisho’ein elo al avinu shebashomayim," this is one of the klolos of ikvesa de’meshicha, not a sign of faith. There has to be a Bechol asher ta'aseh in order for Yevarechecha Hashem. We're not on Earth to stand and daven. We're here to make ourselves worthy to be a conduit for Retzon Hashem, and to execute that Ratzon through our actions.

This doesn’t have to be seen as a criticism of ivory-tower tefilla. You can say (and this is, in fact, the Divrei Yehuda’s perspective,) that Pinchas’s ko’ach to take the ‘romach’ stemmed from the ‘bochin pesach ho’ohel,’ from the yichud leiv of the ramach eivorim of the people who were saying krias shma. He needed the yichud ramach eivorim of the people, it contributed to, informed and enabled the concrete action of the doer. Pinchas had the wisdom and the strength to convert that potential into action; but his action was empowered and enabled by the tefila of the Eidah-- he was the answer to their prayers. The simple words of the passuk may be seen as supporting this approach, because it says that the ‘eidah’ was bochim, and that Pinchos arose ‘mitoch ho’eidoh.’ He didn’t just jump out of nowhere; he was a member of the Eidah, he was saying Kri’as Shema with them, and it was their yichud leiv that created the possibility, and it was his yichud leiv that was the catalyst for the heroic act.

When you close the tehillim, if you are not changed by it, then you didn’t say the tehillim the right way. And not only do you have to be changed, but you have to walk out of there aware that Hashem will provide you with an opportunity to do something for other people, for the community, for your family. Tehillim and Tefilla is not the ‘job’, it is the introduction to other jobs. And when opportunity presents itself, many people who see the opening say to themselves that they are "not worthy, who am I, what can I do..." And, deep inside, maybe the person tells himself that such a reaction is anivus. Well, you should know that it is not anivus you are feeling, it is atzlus. It’s the Ramach without the Romach. We all have to make a conscious decision to not leave the davenning in shul or the tehillim in the book, because the most important effect of yichud leiv is the empowerment of siyata dishmaya– finding out what needs doing, and getting the job done.

Pinchos, Bamidbor 25:13. Bris kehunas olam - A Kohen with Blood on His Hands

The Gemora in Brochos 32b says that “kohen she’horag es hanefesh lo yiso es kapov shene’emar ‘yedeichem domim molei’u.” A kohen that killed someone may not perform the priestly blessings. The question here is, how could it be that Pinchas was granted the status of Kehuna precisely because he killed Zimri and Kozbi? The act of killing, while it was praiseworthy and indeed stopped the plague that followed the event of Bnos Moav, would have prevented a Kohen from serving in the Kehuna, and certainly ought not be a reason to be made a Kohen.

Some meforshim take the legalistic approach, and say that indeed, it was because he was not a Kohen before that he could become a Kohen afterwards. If he had been a Kohen before, his killing of Zimri would passel him, as it says Orach Chaim 128. Only a current Kohen is deconsecrated through an act of killing. Since he was not a Kohen at the time of the killing, no legal result followed from the act.

See, e.g., Rav Gedalya Schorr’s sefer Ohr Gedalyahu, where he brings that the Gur Aryeh talks about why he wasn’t niskahein before, and that the Chiddushei HoRim asked why he wasn’t passeled, but instead was Zoche to kehuna through something that would normally passel him, and the Rim answers that since the retzicha was an act of chesed it didn’t passel. Reb Gedalya adds that if he already had been a kohen that lomdus wouldn’t have helped prevent a psul. He also brings that the Zohar says that he should have been passul but it was a matono of Hashem that he wasn’t passeled— sort of a horoas sho’o.

First of all, I don’t think this is correct lehalocho, because a killing that is a tzorech mitzva should not passel, like if a Kohen who is in a milchemes mitzvah kills someone, or in self defense. In fact, in Shulchan Aruch, it says that a Mohel who inadvertently kills a child is allowed to duchen.

Second— a he’ora— according to these meforshim, the psul of a kohen who killed is only if he was a kohen when he killed, i.e., if the act and his kehuna were contemporaneous; if he was not a kohen when he committed the act, it has no effect on him. The fact that this person had killed doesn’t passel him, it can only passel a contemporaneous status of kehuna. This is like the din of nir’eh venidcheh in Kodshim. I find it hard to believe that the idea is applicable here, where it is the blood on the hands that is the problem. It shouldn’t matter what status the person had when the act occurred; the legalism of a change in status cannot erase his history. A ger might be ke'koton shenolad, but a Kohen Sheniskahein certainly isn't.

Third, see Tosfos Yevomos 7a DH Shene’emar Mei’im Mizbechi. The gemora there talks about Retzicha doche avodah, and it says that if you have to execute a kohen, you take him away from doing the avodah even when there is nobody to replace him. Tosfos asks, maybe that’s because of the Gemora in Brochos 32b “kohen she’horag es hanefesh lo yiso es kapov shene’emar ‘yedeichem domim molei’u?” And Tosfos answers 1. Obviously he is not really nifsal, because the rule is me’im mizbechi velo mei’al mizbechi, so the rule of lo yisso must be a ‘chumro be’almo.’ 2. It’s only to duchen that he’s possul, because his hands that killed cannot invoke brocho and rachamim because ein kateigor. As the possuk brought in Brochos says “ube’porishchem kapeichem.” So we see from Tosfos that even in the case of a murderer, the psul is only a chumroh, or is limited to duchening.

Reb Moshe in the Igros says that it is Poshut and Borur that a kohen who kills because he was in a legally constituted army, or wherever his killing is just ahl pi halocho, he is not passeled from the Kehuna. Igros Yoreh Deiah II 158 (p. 270 column I).

Later still, I saw that the Mishulchon Govo’ah brings that he heard in the name of R Rudderman that it would have passeled him if he were a kohen.

If the quote from Rav Rudderman is reliable, it would be interesting to think about what the machlokes is– whether yedchem domim molei’u is a din in ein kateigor or more like the psul for use in the Mizbei’ach of a stone that was touched by iron, where intent and circumstances are irrelevant.