Sukkos: Shehakol Tomatoes, Greenhouse Esrogim and Moonroof Schach

Shehakol Tomatoes and Greenhouse Esrogim

The bracha on a tomato or a cucumber is Borei P'ri Ha'adama- Who created the fruit of the Earth- except when it is not a fruit of the Earth.  If a vegetable is grown in a container that is not open to the ground, and has no branches that overhang the ground, it is not halachically attached to the Earth, and you cannot make the regular bracha "borei pri ha'adama" on it.  In that case, the correct bracha is She'hakol.  Some, but not all, greenhouse produce falls into this category.  Although some greenhouses have benches that are perforated and stand above open ground, some grow produce that is completely separated from and unexposed to the earth.  During the winter, you should check your produce, because it is common for winter tomatoes and cucumbers to have been grown in greenhouses, often hydroponically, and therefore require the bracha she'hakol. When in doubt, one should make the bracha She'hakol.

While the issue of correct brachos is important, it is a din derabanan, and this question has relevance to dinim de'oraysa as well.  For example, can you use an esrog that was grown in an atzitz she'eino nakuv, a closed pot that separates the plant from the earth?  We can understand that the words "Pri Ha'adama" exclude something grown without contact with the Earth.  But the bracha "borei pri ha'etz"- Who created the fruit of the tree- doesn't mention the ground or the earth, so the bracha for greenhouse grown tree fruit should still be "ha'etz," and it should therefore satisfy the requirement in the Torah to use "Pri Eitz Hadar."  Similarly in the case of Hadasim, it says Anaf Eitz Avos, but nothing about the ground.  Certainly, the Aravos and Lulav should be fine, since it doesn't even say Pri or Eitz.  On the other hand, perhaps the word "eitz" connotes a tree that grows from the Earth, in which case a greenhouse esrog or hadas would not be kosher.

This is not a remote case.  As it happens, I have both an esrog and a hadas in pots which spend the summer outdoors and (because I live in Zone 5a/b) the winter in the house.  They are over twenty two years old, and have produced a great number of kosher esrogim and hadasim, though the esrog is long past its bearing years, and I trim the Hadas more as Bonsai than as a source of Hadasim.  I just realized that the esrog, the hadas, and I, are all superannuated.

Reb Moshe (OC 4:#124) indicates that they are kosher.   (Reb Reuven Feinstein argued that  his father was only mattir bedi'eved.  That may be true, but the cited teshuva shows that he was mattir lehalacha, and in the teshuva he does not say it is only bedieved.)  Reb Yaakov Kaminetsky is also mattir lechatchila.  His son in law used to raise esrogim in a greenhouse in Monsey.  However, the Chayei Adam in his Hilchos Sukka 152:3 (discussed extensively in his Nishmas Adam there) is not sure of the halacha in the case of all the four minim.  Although he believes they ought to be kosher, he has a problem with a Rambam in Hilchos Trumos (second perek) that indicates the opposite.  Reb Aharon Kotler was the biggest machmir on this issue.  He held that not only is such a fruit not kosher for Sukkos, but if the tree the fruit grew on was ever detached from the ground, that tree is forever passul for growing arba minim.  The Yam shel Shlomo and the Chazon Ish also discuss this, but I don't have access to my notes at the moment.

As far as Brachos, the Chayei Adam in his Hilchos Brachos (I don't remember the klal number but its easy to find) says that you make a she'hakol on this kind of vegetable, and mezonos on bread that is made from this kind of wheat (astronauts, pay attention.)  However, in line with his safek in Hilchos Sukka, he leaves unresolved the halacha regarding borei pri ha'etz.

(I think it's odd to say that and explicit element- Arvei Nachal, a brook willow- is not read as requiring that it actually grow near a brook, and you can use a willow that grew far from any brook, and to then say that an implicit requirement, that the eitz be grown in the ground, is integral.)

Moonroof Schach

As for Moonroof Schach, someone pointed out that if you want to go on a trip, you can throw a schach mat over your sun or moonroof, and have a kosher sukka.  Here's a picture of the car I drive, a Subaru Forester:

The sides of the car would have a halacha of Dofen Akuma, and you can't sit under the dofen akuma, so you would have to eat under the open part, not the closed roof.  There's also an issue of having the table in a non-kosher part of the Sukka (OC 634:4).  So make sure to eat off of your lap, or to use a lap table, not the dashboard.

This arrangement is better than the idea of opening two doors on one side of the car and putting the schach on between the tops of the doors, thus creating a three-sided sukka- the car and the two doors.  The car door sukka can involve a problem of having the walls of the sukka more than three tefachim above the floor of the sukka, which is passul (no gud asik because gediim bokim bo).  The Moonroof option, on the other hand, has the walls going down to the floor.

For the first commenter, who mentioned that his daughter wants a picture of a sukka on an elephant, here.

Sukkos and Chanuka

I like to think that the end of one Yomtov is the time to start looking forward to the next one. Now that Sukkos is over, and MarCheshvan is about to begin, there's a long, empty time until the next Yomtov. But at the Ne'ilas Hachag of Simchas Torah, I heard a very nice dvar Torah from a young man, Joey Nussbaum, and it bears repeating both because of the connection between Sukkos and Chanuka and because of the explanation it provides to a perplexing Gemara in Shabbos.

We all know the Beis Yosef's question about why we celebrate eight days, when the miraculous long-burning oil only lasted seven days more than it normally would. The Aruch Hashulchan addresses this question in OC 670:5. He brings from the Sefer Chashmona'i that in the year before Matisyahu's rebellion, Antiochus had prevented the korban celebration of Sukkos and Shemini Atzeres. Therefore, when the Jews were able to re-inaugurate the Beis Hamikdash, they intentionally celebrated for eight days, in order to show that they were making up for the lost days of Sukkos and Shemini Atzeres. The eight days of burning, then, were simply a heavenly ratification of their decision to establish this eight day holiday. (This is actually made clear in the Megillas Chashmona'im.)

With this we can finally understand what Shammai means by saying that we should start with eight candles and go down one every day just as was done with the bulls that are brought on Sukkos. Everyone reading the Gemara is puzzled by this association, because this reverse progression is unique to Sukkos, and why would Chanuka davka reflect the singular rules of Sukkos? But now we understand that Chanuka was viewed as a stand-in, as a commemoration, of the Sukkos holiday and korbanos that they had been prevented from bringing.

This also explains why we find dinim of hiddur on Chanuka that we generally don't find in other dinim. The reason is, again, because Chanuka is, to some extent, a quasi-Sukkos, and Sukkos is a holiday when hiddur on the esrog and all the minim is stressed to an unusual extent.

Micha Berger of http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2006/11/chayei-sarah-kibbush-and-chizuq.shtml commented that he heard this association from Rav Aharon Soloveichik in 1993, and expanded on it with something else he heard from him. What follows is from Micha's website, Aspaqlaria, at the above link.

R. Chaim Soloveitchik holds that there is a distinct difference between the sanctity of Eretz Yisroel that came with the first commonwealth and that of the second.

The first Temple did not create a permanent qedushah (holiness). The reason given is “that which was acquired through conquering is lost through conquering. The First Commonwealth built on land acquired in the wars of the days of Yehoshua and the Shoftim (Judges), was itself conquered.

The Second Commonwealth was “merely” an immigration of a group of Jews who decided to live in the land as Jews. It is predicated on the mitzvos done there, the education of children raised there. That kind of sanctity can not be undone. “Qidshah lisha’atah viqidshah le’asid lavo – it was sanctified for its time and sanctified for all time to come”. Even today, Har Habayis (the Temple Mount) has the sanctity of the Temple.

R. Aharon understands his grandfather’s words in the light of this distinction. The first commonwealth was founded on kibbush. It therefore had an inherently inferior qedushah. The second commonwealth was built by chazaqah. When Hashem tells Zecharia, “Not by force and not by might but by My spirit”, He is saying that the second Temple should be build on chazaqah, not kibbush, to lead to a permanent sanctification. “Neqeivah tesoveiv gever.”

Rav Aharon Soloveitchik notes Chanukah’s connection to Sukkos. According to Seifer haMakabiim, on the first Chanukah people who had just missed being oleh regel, going up to the beis hamiqdash, with their esrog and lulav, did so then at their first opportunity. Beis Shammai taught that one should light 8 lights the first night of Chanukah, 7 the second, learning from the 70 bulls offered for the mussaf on Sukkos, which also declined in number each day: 14 the first day, 13 the second, etc… Rav Yosi bar Avin or R’ Yosi bar Zevida explains that Beis Shammai are emphasizing the link between Chanukah and Sukkos. (We follow Beis Hillel, and teach that the ideal is to increase as the holiday progresses. They do not deny the connection; but rather Beis Hillel asserts an overriding halachic principle — that we increase in holiness over time.)

The concept of being a geir vetoshav is at the center of the similarity between the two holidays. Sukkos is a time when the toshav leaves his home to experience geirus in the Sukkah. Chanukah is also about the ger’s Chazaqah, the rededication of the second Beis haMiqdash. Not about winning the war – the war wouldn’t be over for years – but about being able to live in Israel as Jews, with access to the beis hamiqdash.

Yalkut Shimoni at the End of Iyov and Sukkos

התמלא בשכות עורו. אמר רבה בר בר חנה עתיד הקב"ה לעשות סוכה לצדיקים לע"ל (כתוב בישעיה רמז תק"ג). אמר ר' לוי כל מי שמקיים מצות סוכה בעולם הזה אף הקב"ה מושיבו בסוכתו של לויתן לעתיד לבא שנאמר התמלא בשכות עורו וגו', את מוצא בשעה שבאו יסורין על איוב היה עומד וקורא תגר אחר מדת הדין שנאמר מי יתן ידעתי ואמצאהו אדעה מלים יענני, אמר לו הקב"ה איוב מה אתה עומד ואומר מי יתן ידעתי ואמצאהו הרי עורו של לויתן שאני עתיד לעשות לצדיקים לעתיד לבא אם חסר אני מטלית אחת ממנו יש לך למלאת שנאמר התמלא בשכות עורו, וא"ת עורו של לויתן אינו דבר משובח, א"ר פנחס הכהן בר חייא ור' ירמיה בש"ר שמואל בר רב יצחק פספסי הרוחות שלו מכהות גלגל חמה שנאמר האומר לחרס ולא יזרח. ירפד חרוץ עלי טיט, אין לך מזוהם של דג אלא מקום רפידתו, ומקום רפידתו של לויתן יפה של זהב לכך נאמר ירפד חרוץ עלי טיט. ד"א האומר לחרס ולא יזרח מקום רפידתו חרוץ הוא זהב שנאמר ירפד חרוץ עלי טיט.

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This is from the Yalkut Shimoni toward the end of Iyov. The reason I posted it is this: The fortieth perek of Iyov, where Hashem responds to Iyov's bewildered complaint, has a surprising number of (40:21-22, and 40:31) apparent references to Sukkos. Some mefarshim have translated these words to mean very different things, (e.g., 'Tzalzel' either meaning 'shade' or 'a fish-processing knife'). Thus, התמלא בשכות עורו can mean "Can you riddle his skin with barbs," meaning "Would you, Iyov, dare to lay a hand on the Leviathan?". But others read it as meaning "Will you complete the Sukkah with (the Leviathan's) hide?"

The Yalkut (40:31) takes the latter approach, and says that the pesukim allude to the following dialogue between Hashem and Iyov.

I'll try to translate.

"Will you finish the Sukkah with the Leviathan's hide?" Rabbah bar bar Channa said: in the future, Hashem will make Sukkos for the Tzadikim. Rav Levi said, whoever fulfills the mitzva of Sukka in this world, Hashem will settle him in a Sukka made of the hide of the Leviathan in the coming future, as it says "Will you finish the Sukkah with the Leviathan's hide."
You find that when suffering came upon Iyov, he complained about his strict punishment and said "If only I could know, if only I could find Him, I would like to know what words He could use to explain what is happening to me!" Hashem answered, "You say you want to know? Look: I will one day make a Sukka from the hide of the Leviathan; if it will be missing one side, will you complete it? If you say 'with the skin of the Leviathan,' is that not praiseworthy?
Rav Pinchas... and Rav Yirmiah... say, the corners of his sides dim the orbit of the Sun... there is no more foul part of a fish than its bottom; the bottom of the Levyasan is as beautiful as gold."

(end of Yalkut)

I can't tell you what this mysterious Yalkut means. But I do know the following:
1. It has something to do with Sukkos.
2. Hashem comforted the tragedy-beset Iyov by showing a connection between the suffering of the righteous in this world and the fact that a Sukka is kosher even when missing one entire wall.
3. It says that only Hashem can complete the fourth side of a sukka made from the hide of the Leviathan.

This may be one of the many medrashim that is so hopelessly obscure as to remain hefker to whatever pshat people want to impute to it. But I am hoping to get a clear and convincing pshat before yomtov is over. I know that Reb Aharon Soloveichik has a pshat in the Yalkut. I have to think about it before posting it.

Chaim B of DivreiChaim.blogspot.com referred me to Reb Tzadok, who says (see comments; it's on page 244 of the hebrewbooks.org volume I) that the idea of Sukkas Oro Shel Liviyasan means that tzadikim, having overcome the Yetzer Hara in this world, will be seated in a sukka made from an animal that represents untrammeled physicality and driving desire, (the Liviyasan being a combination of the Nachash and Dagim, which profligately engage in pirya verivya,) and that this animal was the source of Adam and Chava's "kosnos ohr." Thank you, Chaim. But Reb Tzadok's pshat does not address the connection to Iyov.

See further in the comments for a pshat from the Yismach Moshe that does specifically talk about this Medrash. I'm still hoping for more kipshuto.

Thanks to the wonders of the internet, I received a pshat from the author of the earlier post (on Meva'eit), who said the following:

Sukka is known to represent Hashem's protection and Hashgacha (e.g. Erchin 32b ואגין זכותא עלייהו כי סוכה, and the interchange of Shomer Amo Yisrael Laad <-> Hapores Sukkat Shalom).

Sukka tells us that it is just so that one could be in a place where the 4th wall is missing, the 3rd is only tephach, and the other two are some combination of God, Lavud & Dophen Akumma. Yet, it is a kosher Sukka.(Note: The writer is referring to the halacha that a sukka does not need four walls. A Sukka is halachically adequate if it has two 'whole' walls, a third wall that is a few inches long, and no fourth wall at all. Even the two 'whole' walls don't have to be whole: they can be perforated and short and afford no privacy or protection.)

We often look around and see holes in this protection shield. Iyyov feels he was left out there, no Mechitzos, no protection around. But, when he would see the full picture, the full Sukka, it should become clear that what looked like nothing around was in fact part of the bigger Sukkat Livyatan. Would he then dare to "fix" it?

And now I understand what I had heard in the name of Reb Aharon Soloveichik. I was missing some minor elements of what Reb Aharon said, but having seen this pshat, it is clear to me that this is precisely what Reb Aharon meant.

The Sukka represents Hashem's protection, the Hashgacha Pratis of Klal Yisrael. But the Sukka, ironically, is the merest scrap of a house-- not only is the roof barely functional, but the walls are merely ideas or symbols of walls, more absent than present. The mussar haskeil is that davka this Sukka teaches us that Hashem's inexorable hashgacha, the hashgacha that makes us indestructible, seems to be so fragile, it's barely there, but is no less real for that. As Reb Aharon said, the Mechitza that is there ahl pi din (tzuras hapesach, pi tikra, omeid meruba ahl haparutz, lavud, dofen akuma, Gud Asik, Pasei Bira'os, and all the dinim we use to create mechitzos, as Reb Eli mentioned) can be more real than a physical mechitza. Similarly, the deficiencies and deprivations we perceive in our life experience are often only epiphenomena; the deeper reality of the richness of a Torah life is truer than that which our limited perception can comprehend.

Yasher Kochachem to Rabbanim and Doctoirim Gary S, Chaim B, and Eli E!

I later saw that the Aruch Laner mentions this medrash too: 

Aruch Laner explains that by showing Iyov the halacha that a sukkah is composed of only three walls, of which the third may be only a tefach, Hashem demonstrated that this world's existence is temporary, as it serves as a portal of passage to the eternal world of the souls in the World-to-Come.  If a person 's lot is one of suffering, he need  not feel that he has been deprived of his deserved comfort and tranquility.  In fact, this state of difficulty should provide hope that his true reward will be eternal.   

A Remarkable Brisker Chumra on S'chach

I saw the strangest thing in the Brisker sefer (anonymous, printed taf shin nun gimmel) on the moadim. He brings that R Chaim was choshesh for the shitta of the Magen Avraham in OC 14 and 649 that l’chatchila only a bar chiyuva can make tzitzis or put s'chach on or even tie the lulav together.  Not only was Reb Chaim machmir like the Magen Avraham, but he was machmir more than the Magen Avraham:  The Magen Avraham says that the whole thing is just Lechatchila; and also, if the child is thirteen we are not chosheish that he is not a gadol.  Apparently, Reb Chaim was chosheish to such an extent that when he found out that a thirteen year old had put the s'chach on a sukkah, he refused to eat there, because he didn't want to rely on Chazaka d'Rabba for De'oraysas.  (Obviously, Reb Chaim wasn't machmir because the Magen Avraham says so, he was machmir because held like the Magen Avraham, but not just as a chashash lechatchila, but mei'ikar hadin.)

R Moshe talks about this chumrah in Igros OC 5 page 133. He disagrees with the Magen Avraham on two points.

First, he (and the Mishneh Brura) says that the Rema that says that yeish omrim that a woman should not tie tzitzis is not because of Rabbeinu Tam’s limud that the same way women cannot write tefillin because “uchsavtam/uk’shartam” which teaches that “kol she’yeshno b’kshira yeshno b’ksiva,” applies to all mitzvos, but rather the Maharam’s “dabeir el b’nei Yisrael v’assu lahem tzitzis,” which teaches “v’lo akum,” and which the Maharam says also excludes women.  The Maharam is specific to the mitzvoh of tzitzis and unrelated to other mitzvos.

Second, he says that even Rabbeinu Tam, whose shitta excluding a non-bar-chiyuva the Magen Avraham says would apply to tzitzis, agudas lulav, and putting up the s'chach, does not really hold like that. Rabbeinu Tam’s limud only applies to objects which have no meaning outside of the mitzva, like lulav agud and tzitzis. But where the object exists independent of the mitzva, like schach l’sheim tzeil, even Rabbeinu Tam would agree a woman can make the sukka.

Reb Moshe notes that Tosfos in Gittin 45a DH Kol says that RT said his din on tzitzis and igud lulav and asks that Rabbeinu Tam’s din should also apply to passel a women from putting on the s'chach, and this is shver from ganba’ch and Tosfos bleibs shver. R Moshe says that the answer to Tosfos’ kashe is that Rabbeinu Tam never meant to apply his din to Sukka.

Then R Moshe has an interesting discussion about the idea of Hiddur Mitzva. He says that the Machzor Vitri’s pshat in hiddur mitzvoh is that you should be machmir to do the mitzva fully with all chumros and things that contribute to the kiyum hamitzva, and has nothing to do with esthetic beauty. For example, putting on a gartel is a noi mitzva because it adds to Hikone. So it could be that Rabbeinu Tam holds like the Machzor Vitri, and holds that the din hiddur we find by igud lulav is because it contributes to holding the minim together, which is a to’eles in the kiyum hamitzva. If so, this explains Rabbeinu Tam’s reason for not having a women do the igud, because igud is not just hiddur, it is a part of the tzuras hamitzva. (See Parshas Lech Lecha, Breishis 12:1, where I bring from the Brisker Rov that the ambiguity of the identity of the land to which Avram was told to go was intended so that the halicha should be mitzva atzma and not just hachanoa.)

I am told that the Briskers hold that the Rambam holds like the Machzor Vitri.

This was originally posted in '06, and has been edited for stylistic consistency and clarity.  Mostly the former. 



However, you can’t go too far with this shittoh, because the Rambam in 7 Issurei Mizbei’ach says that from the possuk by Hevel, which says that Hevel brought beautiful korbonos and “vayisha Hashem el Hevel v’ehl minchoso” shows that whatever mitzvoh you do should be done in a beautiful way. The Rambam there says clearly that he is referring to esthetic beauty. But it is also interesting that he doesn’t prove it from the regular din of hiddur mitzvoh or from v’anveihu. Also, the Brisker Rov somewhere in his pirush on the gemora says that there is a special din by korbonos of ‘meichelveihem,’ which is not connected to ‘v’anveihu.’

So the bottom line is that R Moshe holds that even if you are machmir like Rabbeinu Tam, it would only apply to tzitzis and lulov, but not other mitzvos. But b’etzem he holds like the Maharam, which is limited to tzitzis, and would be mattir even lulov. He says he is surprised that the Bikkurei Yaakov paskened like RT, and he paskens instead like the Maharam. Imagine how surprised he would be at the story of R Chaim not sitting in the Sukkoh because a boy of thirteen put on the schach, and maybe he didn’t have shtei sa’aros.