Denigrating Yom Kippur. A Guest Post

The author of this post is an individual of the highest attainments in both Torah and science.  He prefers to remain unnamed

I had posted this some years ago, but to that version I appended a title that the author disagreed with, and the ensuing discussion was included as well.  I recently re-read it, and I realized that it deserves to be posted just as it was written, without distractions

בהלכות תשובה ריש פ"א פסק הרמב"ם: "וכן בעלי חטאות ואשמות בעת שמביאין קרבנותיהם על שגגתן או על זדונן אין מתכפר להן בקרבנם עד שיעשו תשובה ויתוודו וידוי דברים שנאמר והתוודה אשר חטא עליה". נמצא שהתשובה על כל פרטיה וכן הוידוי מעכבים כפרת החטאת והאשם.

אך בפ"ג משגגות הל"י כתב: "אין יום הכיפורים ולא החטאת ולא האשם מכפרין, אלא על השבים המאמינים בכפרתן אבל המבעט בהם, אינם מכפרין לו. כיצד היה מבעט והביא חטאתו או אשמו והוא אומר או מחשב בליבו שאין אלו מכפרין אף על פי שקרבו כמצותן לא נתכפר לו וכשיחזור בתשובה מבעיטתו צריך להביא חטאתו ואשמו", וכאן מפורש שרק המבעט בכפרה לגמרי אין הקרבן עולה לו וצריך קרבן נוסף, אבל מי שמאמין ורוצה בכפרה אלא שעדיין לא שב מחטאו, וכגון שלא קבל עליו להבא בקבלה גמורה עד שיעיד עליו יודע תעלומות וכו', עלה לו הקרבן[1].

הכס"מ בהלכות תשובה שם כתב שמקורו של הרמב"ם הוא מהפסוק "והתודה" שמצריך וידוי (וממילא גם תשובה) עם הקרבן. מקור זה כתב הרמב"ם עצמו בהלכה שם. עוד הוסיף הכס"מ שדברים אלה מפורשים בברייתא בשבועות י"ג. שמניחה כדבר פשוט שחטאת ואשם אין מכפרים אלא לשבים – "דתניא יכול יהא יוה"כ מכפר על שבים ועל שאינן שבים ודין הוא הואיל וחטאת ואשם מכפרין ויום הכפורים מכפר מה חטאת ואשם אין מכפרין אלא על השבים אף יוה"כ אין מכפר אלא על השבים".

מקור שני זה תמוה, שהרי בכריתות ז. פירשה הגמרא את אותה הברייתא במסקנא "אלא, שבין -- דאמר יכפר עלי חטאתי, שאין שבין -- דאמר לא תכפר עלי חטאתי", ואם כן משמעות דברי הברייתא אינה אלא שהאומר לא תכפר עלי חטאתי אינו מתכפר, ואין זה נוגע למי שלא עשה תשובה, והן הן דברי הרמב"ם בשגגות.

לישב סתירת דברי הרמב"ם אפשר לומר שבהלכות שגגות מדובר בעיכוב בכפרת הקרבן עצמו, וזה הוא רק במבעט שהוא כמי שהביא קרבן שלא לרצונו ופסול, אבל כל שאינו מבעט הקרבן כשר, עולה לו ומכפר. אלא שאין כפרת הקרבן לבדה מספקת בלא התשובה והוידוי שעמו. על כן, מי שהביא חטאת בלא תשובה עלתה לו וצריך לשוב ולהתוודות כדי לגמור הכפרה, וזהו שכתב הר"מ בהלכות תשובה.

אם נכונים הדברים, יש ללמוד מכאן גם לענין יום הכיפורים. ממשיך שם הר"מ בשגגות "וכן המבעט ביום הכיפורים אין יום הכיפורים מכפר עליו לפיכך אם נתחייב באשם תלוי ועבר עליו יום הכיפורים והוא מבעט בו הרי זה לא נתכפר לו וכשיחזור בתשובה אחר יום הכיפורים חייב להביא כל אשם תלוי שהיה חייב בו". ושוב קשה, הרי בהלכות תשובה פסק הרמב"ם דלא כרבי, "ועצמו של יום הכיפורים מכפר לשבים שנאמר כי ביום הזה יכפר עליכם" משמע אם לא שב בתשובה לפרטיה לא נתכפר, ולא די בכך שאינו מבעט.

ולנ"ל יש לומר שגם ביוה"כ שונה דין מבעט ממי שלא שב. כשם שבקרבן המבעט בכפרתו כמי שלא הקריב וצריך לחזור ולהקריב, כך ביוה"כ (לדידן דקיי"ל דלא כרבי) המבעט בכפרתו כמי שלא עבר עליו יוה"כ כלל. אבל מי שלא שב אך מאמין ורוצה בכפרת יוה"כ מתכפר בו, אלא שאין די בכפרה זו לכפר לגמרי ועדיין מוטל עליו לשוב ולהתודות כדי לגמור הכפרה, ולכאורה נראה שאינו צריך יום-כיפור נוסף אחר ששב והתוודה, כשם שחייבי חטאות ואשמות אינם צריכים קרבן נוסף[2].

עדיין יש לדון מה המקור לפסק זה, אך אין כאן מקומו.

רובא דעלמא אינם זוכים לעשות תשובה גמורה בכל שנה ושנה (לפחות לפי הרמב"ם[3]). ולכאורה כיוון דנקטינן דלא כרבי מה להם וליום הכיפורים? ולהנ"ל ניחא קצת.

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[1] בספר המפתח של פרנקל מצאתי רק אחד המתיחס לשאלה זו [שו"ת ארץ צבי (פרומר) ח"ב, הגהות על אבנ"ז קכ"ה] אך לא הבנתי תירוצו.

[2] וזה כנראה דלא כתוספות ישנים יומא פה: שכתבו שגם לרבי אין יוה"כ מכפר לגמרי בלא תשובה.

[3] יש כמה ראיות שלשאר ראשונים כל שמתחרט כבר נחשב שב, אבל לרמב"ם לכאורה כל עוד שאין כאן קבלה גמורה להבא שיעיד עליו וכו' לא בא לכלל תשובה.

Just as a little he'ara; last time I posted this, as I said, the discussion revolved around whether the sugya of meva'eit is related to the sugya of the effect of כוונה מתנגדת if you hold  מצות אין צריכות כוונה.  The guest author found only one achron that connects the two sugyos- the Amudei Ohr of Rav Yechiel Heller, Suvalker Rov, Teshuva 28.  Even though I was the one that related the two sugyos, and the Suvalker Rov says it, I no longer believe there is any connection.  In any case, all the other achronim on the sugya, as brought in the Amudei Ohr, implicitly dismiss it.  Another interesting thing we discussed there in relation to the guest authors chidush is the Rambam in 1 Teshuva 2 that says that for one who did not do teshuva,the Sa'ir HaMishtalei'ach is miskaper on kalos but not chamuros.  I saw a nice discussion of this question in the last piece in a pamphlet called Otzros HaTorah from the Lubavitcher, available here.  The pages are disordered on my computer, but you can figure it out quickly.

Pharaoh's Impenetrable Heart.

Hashem hardened Pharaoh's heart so that he would not do teshuva and release the Bnei Yisrael.  This is stated several times.  In Shemos see 3:19, ואני ידעתי כי לא יתן אתכם מלך מצרים להלך ולא ביד חזקה, in Va'eira see 7:3 ואני אקשה את לב פרעה, and in Bo, 11:1, כי אני הכבדתי את לבו. From the emphasis and the repeated explanation that it was Hashem's desire to show the world how mighty Egypt would be like a plaything to Hashem, one might think that this was a singularity, a event exclusive to that one place and time.  It is not.  The ability to do Teshuva has been taken away from other people as well and continues to be a possibility.

I don't mean to provide excuses for people that want to fool themselves into thinking they can't do teshuva.  This only happens to highly accomplished resha'im.  If  you're not a world-class achiever in something else, you probably aren't a world-class Rasha either.  To emphasize this, here is something from the Brisker Rov, (quoted by Rav Shlomo Wahrman, author of שארית יוסף and Rosh Yeshiva of Hebrew Academy of Nassau County,) in HaPardes year Year 62 number 1, 1987, to the effect that even an Amaleiki can do teshuva.

 שמעתי מהגרי״ז מבריסק דתשובה מועלת גם לעמלקים דהרי בשמואל א׳ פט״ו כתיב לך והחרמת את החטאים את עמלק

 דמבואר דהוא רק בזמן שחוטאים משא״כ כשעושים תשובה דשוב אי״ז חטאים וכדאמרה ברוריא דביתהו דר״מ בברכות (י.) עה׳׳פ יתמו חטאים מי כתיב חוטאים חטאים כתיב וכוי אלא בעי רחמי עלויהו דלהדרו בתשובה ורשעים עוד אינם.

So no matter how bad you are, unless you are worse than an Amaleiki you certainly can do teshuva.  And let's not forget Gittin 57b, 

נעמן גר תושב היה נבוזראדן גר צדק היה מבני בניו של המן למדו תורה בבני ברק מבני בניו של סיסרא למדו תינוקות בירושלים מבני בניו של סנחריב למדו תורה ברבים מאן אינון שמעיה ואבטליון

But there are people who do lose access to Teshuva.  First, the Rambam:   (6 Teshuva 3)

ואפשר שיחטא אדם חטא גדול או חטאים רבים עד שיתן הדין לפני דיין האמת שיהא הפרעון מזה החוטא על חטאים אלו שעשה ברצונו ומדעתו שמונעין ממנו התשובה ואין מניחין לו רשות לשוב מרשעו כדי שימות ויאבד בחטאו שיעשה. הוא שהקב"ה אמר על ידי ישעיהו השמן לב העם הזה וגו'. וכן הוא אומר ויהיו מלעיבים במלאכי האלהים ובוזים דבריו ומתעתעים בנביאיו עד עלות חמת ה' בעמו עד לאין מרפא. כלומר חטאו ברצונם והרבו לפשוע עד שנתחייבו למנוע מהן התשובה שהיא המרפא. לפיכך כתוב בתורה ואני אחזק את לב פרעה. לפי שחטא מעצמו תחלה והרע לישראל הגרים בארצו שנאמר הבה נתחכמה לו. נתן הדין למנוע התשובה ממנו עד שנפרע ממנו. לפיכך חזק הקב"ה את לבו. ולמה היה שולח לו ביד משה ואומר שלח ועשה תשובה וכבר אמר לו הקב"ה אין אתה משלח שנאמר ואתה ועבדיך ידעתי וגו' ואולם בעבור זאת העמדתיך. כדי להודיע לבאי העולם שבזמן שמונע הקב"ה התשובה לחוטא אינו יכול לשוב אלא ימות ברשעו שעשה בתחילה ברצונו. וכן סיחון לפי עונות שהיו לו נתחייב למונעו מן התשובה שנאמר כי הקשה ה' אלהיך את רוחו ואמץ את לבבו. וכן הכנענים לפי תועבותיהן מנע מהן התשובה עד שעשו מלחמה עם ישראל. שנאמר כי מאת ה' היתה לחזק את לבם לקראת המלחמה עם ישראל למען החרימם. וכן ישראל בימי אליהו לפי שהרבו לפשוע מנע מאותן המרבים לפשוע תשובה שנאמר ואתה הסבות את לבם אחורנית כלומר מנעת מהן התשובה. נמצאת אומר שלא גזר האל על פרעה להרע לישראל. ולא על סיחון לחטוא בארצו. ולא על הכנענים להתעיב. ולא על ישראל לעבוד עכו"ם אלא כולן חטאו מעצמן וכולן נתחייבו למנוע מהן התשובה:

מונעין ממנו התשובה ואין מניחין לו רשות לשוב מרשעו.  That means "they withhold Teshuva from him and do not let him turn away from his wickedness."

Then, Reb Yisrael Salanter:

Reb Yisrael Salanter says that in the case of a regular person, Hashem seeks his Teshuva.  But a person might fall to a point where Hashem no longer seeks his Teshuva, and even if he makes tentative steps towards teshuva he will receive no divine assistance.  Then there is the very worst possible level, where not only does he receive no assistance or encouragement, but even if he manages to push himself to try to do teshuva, Hashem makes it impossible for him to follow through.  Teshuva does not exist in this person's world.  (I'm not sure if that means that he can't do Teshuva, or if it means that even if he does Teshuva Shleimah, it will not be accepted.  After all, from Middas Hadin, Teshuva is impossible. 

Finally, I found it interesting that several Achronim (the Nesivos, Rav Bergman, and several others, with approximately the same approach) use this idea to explain the discussion between Reb Meir and Bruria in Brachos 10a.  Reb Meir held that since they were beyond teshuva, there was no point in their living, and they would be better off dead, to avoid further sins, and the world would be better without them.  Bruria taineh'd that the inability, or the loss of siyata dishmaya to do teshuva is an onesh, and for onshim you can be mispallel.  So she told Reb Meir to daven that their onesh of "no access to Teshuva" should be removed, and then maybe they could be mashpia on them to do teshuva.   Or it could be they were arguing about whether they were on level two or three of Reb Yisrael Salanter's chart.  Neither pshat, I'm sorry to say, clicks in the words of Reb Meir or Bruria.  Also, I find it hard to believe that Reb Meir had any way of knowing that they were already on the madreiga of Ein Maspikin, because then the Tzadikim of Yerushalayim who weren't mochi'ach the resha'im (Shabbos 55a) would have the same excuse.  There are those that want to support this pshat by saying that Reb Meir recognized the syndrome from the fact that all his efforts to be mekareiv them, and their being unaffected by the proximity of such an Adam Gadol, so it must be that they are beyond hope.  Sorry, not convinced.   But it's a nice pshat anyway, because even if it's not a valid interpretation of the conversation between Reb Meir and Bruria, the idea that even a person from whom Teshuva has been taken away has hope, the hope that through Tefilla his access to Teshuva will be restored.

NOTE:  in the comments, Reb Micha Berger presents a formidable argument to the effect that it is incorrect to characterize the Kappara of Teshuva as being l'maala miderech hateva.  Please see there, where I cite  Rabbeinu Bachay and the Shla'h (partially cited in the notes in the Kad Hakemach and more fully in my comment) and Reb Micha's response and citations.
Reb Micha has since posted on this question at his Aish Das website, writing, as always, with serious thought and care.
 On that topic, here's a nice video about the human ability to change.

Achrei Mos, Vayikra 16:6. Outsourcing Teshuva

Our parsha describes the Korbanos brought on Yom Kippur and tells us that the Kohen Gadol says vidui as he does the avoda of these korbanos.

16:6.  וְכִפֶּר בַּעֲדוֹ וּבְעַד בֵּיתוֹ  he will atone for himself and for his household. 

Rashi- וכפר בעדו ובעד ביתו: מתודה עליו עונותיו ועונות ביתו:  He confesses his sins and those of his household.

16:10.   לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו לְשַׁלַּח אֹתוֹ לַעֲזָאזֵל  for forgiveness, to send it to Azazel

Rashi- לכפר עליו: שיתודה עליו, כדכתיב (פסוק כא) והתודה עליו ו  He confesses (the sins of the Bnei Yisrael) upon it.

Mitzvah 364 in the Chinuch is the mitzva of Vidui, as derived from the passuk in Naso (Bamidbar 5:7.)  The Chinuch (from the Mechilta) explains that because the previous iterations of Vidui (such as our parsha) were associated with Korbanos, one might think that there is no mitzva of vidui without a korban, therefore the Torah says Bnei Yisrael... Ve'hisvadu.  This teaches that Vidui is a stand-alone mitzva, with or without a korban.

The Minchas Chinuch notes that certain rules of Vidui (e.g., that it requires that the person mention his specific aveira, and not make a generic admission)  are derived from Moshe Rabbeinu's vidui in Ki Sisa after the sin of the Eigel (Shemos 32:31.)  The Minchas Chinuch says that if we derive rules from Moshe Rabbeinu's vidui, then we can also derive a rule that one can do vidui through a shaliach, confess by proxy: Moshe had not sinned, he was saying the vidui on behalf of Klal Yisrael.  He supports this by citing the Rambam, who says that in the Avodah of the Kohen Gadol in our parsha, since it is to attain forgiveness for all the Jewish people, the Kohen Gadol says vidui on their behalf.  We see, the Minchas Chinuch says, that although obviously remorse cannot be done by proxy, because remorse is "be'lev," it describes a feeling, and it's not a feeling unless you feel it, but once the sinner regrets the aveira, he can do the Vidui through a Shaliach.

Almost everyone who has written about the Minchas Chinuch disagrees with him.  The idea of attaining forgiveness by having someone else say vidui seems bizarre.  However, I myself don't think there is a problem.  You just have to adjust the Minchas Chinuch a little bit.


It could be that there are two dinim in Vidui: It could be that Vidui is a din in Teshuva, and Vidui is a din in Kapara.  Or, in Yeshivish, Vidui is a din in Teshuva and Vidui is also a din in Kappara; Teshuva foders vidui, and kapara foders vidui.  Normally, when a person does teshuva with his own actions, that itself is all that is necessary to attain kapara as well, so he says vidui.  But sometimes, the person cannot achieve kapara with his actions alone, and someone else needs to step in and do something on his behalf.  When there is another person who is the mechapeir, the mechapeir needs to say vidui because the kapara needs vidui.   So, here, the Kohen Gadol is doing an avodas korban to attain kapara.  The Kohen Gadol is doing the avoda because nobody else can do the Avoda.  Since there cannot be a kapparas korban without vidui, a part of the avoda is saying vidui.  Moshe Rabbeinu also was doing something Klal Yisrael couldn't do.  Their sin was beyond help, and it was only because of Moshe's special closeness to Hashem that he could gain Kapara for us.  Since Kapara needs Vidui, he needed to, and was able to, say vidui for us.  Only the Mechapeir can say vidui. 

Technically, this would mean that a  person would not have to say vidui when he brings a Chatas, because he can't get the kapara through his own actions.  But, in fact, that's not true.  He does Smicha.  Since he does smicha, he can and must say vidui himself.  But on Yom Kippur, only the Kohen Gadol does the avoda.  Only the avoda brings Kapara.  Kapara requires that the mechapeir should say vidui.  That's why the Kohen Gadol can say Vidui.

So the point is that unlike the Minchas Chinuch, I am saying that there is a vidui that cannot be done with a shliach, and there is a vidui that can be done with a shliach.  The vidui that is a chelek of teshuva must be done by the shav.  The vidui that is a chelek of the chalos of the kapara can be done by a shliach where there is a reason that the shav cannot do the avodas hakapara himself.

Another application:

The Abudraham (here) says that the reason Chazal instituted Modim Derabanan is because you can't make a shliach to say thank you.  However, he did not mean that the shliach tzibur can't be motzi.  Of course, where there is a minyan, he can be motzi.  But it is better to say Thank You yourself.

Life lesson:

There are some things you have to do in person.  You can't get someone else to say that you're sorry or that you're grateful.  I can't tell you how many times someone has said to me "Oh, you're going to be seeing so and so?  Tell him thank you for me."  My response is always the same:  "You can't make a shliach to say thank you."  But if you don't have entree to the person you need to thank, or to whom you need to apologize, and you have to send an interlocutor, then the interlocutor can speak on your behalf.  This is an application of כל מלתא דאיהו לא מצי עביד שליח לא מצי עביד except exactly backwards.  Only where you can not do it yourself, and the mechapeir is someone else, on there can the other do it for you.


Examples of people who have trouble with the Minchas Chinuch:


  page 202

  page 215

  page 52

  page 569

and someone else that holds that bichlal it's not shayach shlichus or shomei'a K'oneh by vidui:
the Mishnas Yaavetz.

I recently saw that Rav Bergman in Shaarei Orah II on Yom Kippur says there are two kinds of teshuva on Yom Kippur. One is that of individuals, and the other is Klal Yisrael as a whole. The public vidui we do expresses the teshuva of the Klal. If so, we can say that the Kohen Gadol's vidui is also specific to the teshuva of the klal, and has zero shaychus to the vidui of individual teshuva.

Nitzavim, Devarim 30:2. ושבת עד ה'.... בכל לבבך ובכל נפשך ושב ה' אלוקיך את שבותך וריחמך Teshuva on Aveiros and Teshuva on Mitzvos.

Our parsha mentions the concept of Teshuva.  Teshuva might be one of the Taryag Mitzvos (Ramban here), or it might be too fundamental to be called a mitzva (Minchas Chinuch 364 explaining the Rambam in the Yad).  In any case, our pesukim are talking about Teshuva, and they tell us that teshuva can be doubly effective, that it not only ends punishment, but that it can also bring us to a state of grace and love and blessing.

The Mesilas Yesharim (perek 4) says that Middas Hadin, the Divine Attribute of Strict Justice, would not allow for Teshuva.  Under Middas Hadin, the punishment for a sin would be immediate and devastating, and the sin would be irreparable.  It is only through Middas Harachamim that these consequences are ameliorated.  The sinner is given time to repent, the punishment is diminished, and Teshuva  uproots and erases the sin entirely.  This modification of Middas Hadin is only possible through the Chesed, the charity, of Middas Harachamim.  (I've included the Hebrew and English text of the Mesillas Yesharim at the end of the post.  It's Elul, it's time to look at the Mesillas Yesharim.)

Reb Elchanan Vasserman asks the following question from the Gemara in Kiddushin 40b (which is also brought in the Rambam 3 Teshuva 3).

ר"ש בן יוחי אומר אפילו צדיק גמור כל ימיו ומרד באחרונה איבד את הראשונות שנאמר (יחזקאל לג) צדקת הצדיק לא תצילנו ביום פשעו ואפילו רשע גמור כל ימיו ועשה תשובה באחרונה אין מזכירים לו שוב רשעו שנאמר (יחזקאל לג) ורשעת הרשע לא יכשל בה ביום שובו מרשעו וניהוי כמחצה עונות ומחצה זכיות אמר ריש לקיש בתוהא על הראשונות

Briefly:  A life-long perfect tzadik that rebels at the end of his life loses all that he has done in the past.  Reish Lakish explains that this is not true if he sins out of some momentary desire or weakness.  It is true only when he recants and regrets his good deeds-- he is toheh ahl harishonos.  

From this Gemara we see that natural law mandates that regretfulness for past mitzvos erases all the mitzvos.    Reb Elchanan (Kovetz Maamarim, Ahl Hateshuva, p 21) asked the Chafetz Chaim, How then can the Mesillas Yesharim say that the power of Teshuva to erase past sins is a gift arising from Middas Harachamim?  According to the Gemara, regret is a natural and universal solvent: if you regret good acts, the good is erased.  If that's the case where the result is suffering and punishment, then kal vachomer (Meruba middas tova mimidas puranus) the same would naturally be true in the opposite regard- that regret for sin will erase the sins and prevent punishment.  Why does the Mesillas Yesharim say that the ability of Teshuva to erase sin is a singular and unparalleled gift from Hashem?

(Some people answer that only after the gzeiras hakasuv that Teshuva erases sin did it follow that Toheh ahl Harishonos erases mitzvos.  With all due respect, I think that's just infantile, a reflexive ‘lomdus’ that doesn’t make any sense.  The latter does not follow the former at all.  The protocol of Din does not have to echo that of rachamim.  That's the whole point of saying that midda tova is meruba.)

The Chafetz Chaim  answered that while it is true that all regret erases past behavior, Teshuva is unparalleled in two ways.  1. Teshuva brought about by fear of punishment does not mean that the baal teshuva regrets his aveiros like the Toheh, the sinner in Kiddushin, regrets his mitzvos.  A man who is doing Teshuva out of fear only regrets the deadly consequence of his sins.  Despite his lack of true regret, Teshuva meiYira erases his sins.  2. And if the Teshuva was from love of Hashem, Teshuva meiAhava, it doesn't erase the sin- it reconstitutes the sin into a meritorious act, as if it were a mitzva.  This is  unparalleled in the case of one who regrets having done a mitzva, and is the unique result of Middas Harachamim.

Reb Elchanan points out that the Ramchal's words do not seem to accord with the Chafetz Chaim's pshat.  The Ramchal said that even the erasure of sin is only possible because of Middas Harachamim, while the Chafetz Chaim said that erasure of any past mitzva or aveira is the natural result of charata, of regret.

I'd like to point out that my reading of the pesukim in Yechezkel, both the pasuk brought in Kiddushim from perek 33 and also the passuk in Yechezkel perek 18 brought in Yoma 86, indicates to me that just as Teshuva can change aveiros to mitzvos, exactly so can Toheh ahl Harishonos, regret for past mitzvos, change them into Aveiros.  And it's not only my reading.    The Arvei Nachal (by the author of the Levushei Srad and the Tiv Gittin) on Parshas Va'eschanan Drush II, says exactly that.  This, too, does not seem to accord with the words of the Chafetz Chaim.

Also, I wonder, what kind of Toheh is the Gemara in Kiddushin talking about?  Is it talking about a Toheh that matches the Teshuva we are told to do?  Is a man called a Toheh only if he deliberately and thoughtfully reexamines the mitzvos he did, is deeply ashamed of them, mournfully regrets doing them, and makes a firm conscious decision to never do mitzvos again?  Does he have to re-create himself, as the Rambam says of the Baal Teshuva?  I doubt it.  It means just what it says:   that he regrets having done the mitzvos.  If that's enough to erase mitzvos, why wouldn't similar regret be enough to completely erase aveiros?  Why does teshuva require the wrenching effort of בְּכָל לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל נַפְשֶׁךָ?

Unfortunately, this all seems to point toward something I've often quoted from a well known and highly respected Mashgiach that I've had business with.

 "Good Comes and Goes, but Bad is Forever."

He didn't put it in those exact words, but pretty close, and I think the aphorism sums up his philosophy, that a spiritual fall generates an indelible change that forever increases the risk of relapse. Spiritual advances, on the other hand, are fragile, easily lost, and effortlessly extirpated. They disappear easily, and when they do, they don't leave a trace.

Reb Yitzchak Hutner in his Pachad Yitzchok answered Reb Elchonon's question along the same lines (minus the cynicism.)  He said that going from life to death is part of the teva, the natural order of Hashem's universe.  Going from death to life is not.  Order requires constant energy, while disorder is the default state.  Anyone can be meimis a chai.  Not everyone can be mechayeh a meis.

Another way to put this: Middos Ra'os take root much more easily than middos tovos.  Uprooting them is much harder than uprooting good middos.  What is true for Middos is also true for the effect of mitzvos and aveiros.  That alone would serve to explain why Toheh is derech hateva, while Teshuva is lema'ala miderech hateva.  Besides being painfully obvious, the Beis Yosef in the beginning of Orach Chaim says this about Azus Panim. Bad behavior is dyo, an indelible dye, while good behavior is sikra, faint and superficial.  One would think that observing disgusting behavior is not likely to influence you to emulate that behavior.  But in our parsha, in 29:16, it says that if you observe the disgusting pagan rites, beware of the effect on you, and know that you might be influenced by it.  Similarly, the Gemara (beginning of Sotah, brought by Rashi in Ki Sisa) says "haro'eh sotah b'kilkula, yazir atzmo min hayayin."  If you see a Sotah ugly disheveled and publicly disgraced, be on guard!  You are in danger of following her example.  Avoid wine!  Thus, we see that the result of Toheh is natural, while Teshuva is practically a miracle.

But one can say another mehalach.  And do me a favor: after reading it, the teretz is obvious.  But it wasn't obvious before you read it, so don't give me a hard time.  Hakol b'chezkas sumin....

Toheh works like Kavana misnagedes in mitzvos (Rosh Hashanna 28).  Even if you hold Mitzvos einan tzrichos kavana, that is because (as Reb Moshe says in the Darash on Ushmartem es hamatzos, Shmos 12:17) stama lishma , or because if the person realized that he had done the mitzva he would be pleased, or because of the Rambam in the second perek of Hilchos Geirushin.  But certainly, the desire to do Hashem's will is fundamental to all mitzvos, and if you do the mitzva intending that it not be a mitzva, you have done nothing at all.  For aveiros, on the other hand, even if you do an aveira with kavana misnagedes, for example, you do the aveira because you enjoy it but have kavana davka not to transgress Hashem's will, it doesn't make a bit of a difference, you're still punished for the aveira.  And worse than that: when one does a mitzva and davka doesn't want to be mekayeim Hashem's will, the act of doing the mitzva is the biggest moreid bemalchus.  Of course his mitzvos turn into aveiros.

With these teirutzim we can answer a kashe on a Tosfos in Sanhedrin 37b.  The Gemara says that even though our courts are no longer empowered to administer capital punishment, Hashem makes sure that the appropriate punishment occurs.  Tosfos asks, but we see many people who deny the entire Torah who live and prosper?  Tosfos answers that perhaps their Bris Milah suspends their punishment and they are given the reward for that mitzva before they die.  The problem is that obviously these people are Toheh.  If so, then according to the Gemara in Kiddushin they should get nothing at all for their mitzvos!  But according to our teirutzim, there is no kashe.  Tosfos chose the mitzva of Millah very carefully, because Millah is different than all other mitzvos.  The din of Toheh only applies to mitzvos that a person does and whose effect derive from the intention to do Hashem's will, or whose effect is the positive result of the act.  But Millah is neither.  It is done on one person by another person, and its effects are absolute, no matter what the mahul wants or thinks, as David Hamelech pointed out.  That's why Avraham Avinu saves mehulim from Gehinom, but Moshe Rabbeinu doesn't do so for people who've done the other Taryab.  So while all other mitzvos can be erased through Toheh, davka Millah can not.  And now you see why Tosfos mentioned Millah davka.

I suppose I should write Reb Elchanan's teretz, but that will have to wait.  Anyway, I like these teirutzim more, and they also answer the other kashes I mentioned above, about changing the mitzvos to aveiros and the ease of toheh compared to the difficulty of teshuva, and Tosfos in Chulin.

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Cited text of Mesillas Yesharim

, וזה, כי לפי שורת הדין ממש, היה ראוי שהחוטא יענש מיד תיכף לחטאו בלי המתנה כלל, וגם שהעונש עצמו יהיה בחרון אף, כראוי למי שממרה פי הבורא יתברך שמו, ושלא יהיה תיקון לחטא כלל, כי הנה באמת, איך יתקן האדם את אשר עיות והחטא כבר נעשה? הרי שרצח האדם את חברו, הרי שנאף, איך יוכל לתקן הדבר הזה? היוכל להסיר המעשה העשוי מן המציאות.

אמנם, מדת הרחמים היא הנותנת הפך השלשה דברים שזכרנו: דהינו, שיתן זמן לחוטא ולא יכחד מן הארץ מיד כשחטא, ושהעונש עצמו לא יהיה עד לכלה, ושהתשובה תנתן לחוטאים בחסד גמור, שתחשב עקירת הרצון כעקירת המעשה, דהיינו, שבהיות השב מכיר את חטאו ומודה בו ומתבונן על רעתו ושב ומתחרט עליו חרטה גמורה דמעיקרא כחרטת הנדר ממש שהוא מתנחם לגמרי והיה חפץ ומשתוקק שמעולם לא היה נעשה הדבר ההוא ומצטער בלבו צער חזק על שכבר נעשה הדבר ועוזב אותו להבא ובורח ממנו, הנה עקירת הדבר מרצונו, יחשב לו כעקירת הנדר ומתכפר לו. והוא מה שאמר הכתוב (ישעיה ו): וסר עונך וחטאתך תכפר, שהעון סר ממש מהמציאות ונעקר במה שעכשיו מצטער ומתנחם על מה שהיה למפרע.

וזה חסד ודאי שאינה משורת הדין, אך על כל פנים הנה הוא חסד שאינו מכחיש הדין לגמרי, שהרי יש צד לתלות בו, שתחת הרצון שנתרצה בחטא וההנאה שנהנה ממנו בא עתה הנחמה והצער. וכן אריכות הזמן איננו ויתרון על החטא, אלא סבלנות קצת לפתוח לו פתח תקון. וכן כל שאר דרכי חסד: כענין ברא מזכה אבא (סנהדרין קד), או מקצת נפש ככל הנפש (קהלת רבה ז כז), המוזכרים בדברי החכמים, דרכי חסד הם לקבל את המעט כמרובה, אך לא מתנגדים ומכחישים ממש מדת הדין, כי כבר יש בהם טעם הגון להחשיב אותם. אך שיותרו עבירות בלא כלום או שלא ישגיח עליהם, זה היה נגד הדין לגמרי, כי כבר לא היה משפט ודין אמיתי בדברים, על כן זה אי אפשר להמצא כלל. ואם אחד מן הדרכים שזכרנו לא ימצא לחוטא להמלט, ודאי שמדת הדין לא תשוב ריקם.

For on the basis of justice alone it would be dictated that the sinner be punished immediately upon sinning, without the least delay; that the punishment itself be a wrathful one, as befits one who rebels against the word of the Creator, blessed be His Name; and that there be no correction whatsoever for the sin. For in truth, how can a man straighten what has been made crooked after the commission of the sin? If a man killed his neighbor; if he committed adultery-how can he correct this? Can he remove the accomplished fact from actuality?


It is the attribute of mercy which causes the reverse of the three things we have mentioned. That is, it provides that the sinner be given time, and not be wiped out as soon as he sins; that the punishment itself not involve utter destruction; and that the gift of repentance be given to sinners with absolute lovingkindness, so that the rooting out of the will which prompted the deed be considered a rooting out of the deed itself. That is, when he who is repenting recognizes his sin, and admits it, and reflects upon his evil, and repents, and wishes that the sin had never been committed, as he would wish that a certain vow had never been made, in which case there is complete regret, and he desires and yearns that the deed had never been done, and suffers great anguish in his heart because of its already having been done, and departs from it for the future, and flees from it then the uprooting of the act from his will is accredited to him as the uprooting of a vow, and he gains atonement. As Scripture states (Isaiah 6:7), "Your wrong will depart, and your sin will be forgiven." The wrong actually departs from existence and is uprooted because of his suffering for and regretting now what had taken place in the past. 


This is certainly a function of lovingkindness and not of justice. In any event, however, it is a type of lovingkindness which does not entirely negate the attribute of justice. It can be seen as according with justice in that in place of the act of will from which the sin arose and the pleasure that it afforded, there is now regret and suffering. So, too, the time extension constitutes not a pardoning of the sin, but rather God's bearing with the sinner for a while to open the door of repentance to him. 

Ki Savo, Teshuva, and Elul. Inherent and Adherent Kedusha.

Note: I don't know why I wrote this in such an odd tone, but the thoughts are good anyway.  Also, there are three or four places where I should have said כביכול.  So כביכול, כביכול, כביכול.


Reb Yomtov Lippman Heller, the Tosfos Yomtov, had (through his daughter) a great great grandson who learned at the feet of Reb Meshulem Igra, and who was a great and creative Talmid Chacham. His name was Aryeh Leib Hacohen Heller. Reb Aryeh Leib wrote a sefer you might recognize, even though these days the sefer is out of style. It is called the Ketzos Hachoshen, and many say that it forever changed the model of how Gemara is learned. Because of the great respect and love the Torah world had for that sefer, its author is never called Reb Aryeh Leib, he is called the Ketzois. (Or the Xois.)  He also wrote a sefer called Shev Shmaitsa, which expanded the Divrei Torah he said at his Sheva Brachos. In both his introductions to the Ketzos and to the Shev Shmaitsa, he says many wonderful things. For Elul, I would like to be mefarseim and think about one particular thing that he says in his introduction to the Shev Shmaitsa. I don't know if it has any shaychus to Ki Savo.

Toward the beginning of the Hakdama, (if you've gotten to the part where he says that iluyim tend to say svaros that are not glatt, you've gone too far,) he says that many people have asked, "Why is it that Adam Harishon's teshuva was not fully accepted? He did teshuva, so why was he not reinstated to his status of before the Chet?" Why were the gzeiros of expulsion from Gan Eden and death not reversed? Why was he not restored to that divine splendor that misled some malachim into thinking he was God himself, but instead remained condemned to that woeful and harsh existence that is the human condition?

The Ketzos answers that the superhuman greatness of Adam's existence before the Chet was possible only for a Yetzir Kapav of the Ribono shel Olam, a creation formed directly by Hashem's hand. Adam's teshuva was a superlative achievement, and it saved Adam from untold suffering in Olam Hazeh and Olam Haba. We can even say that Adam, with his teshuva, had recreated himself, as the Rambam says about every ba'al teshuva. But this new creation was the doing of man, not Hashem. Adam had recreated himself, and that which Man creates cannot live forever, cannot exist in Gan Eden, and cannot shine with the splendor of Hashem. At first, Adam was Hashem's creation. With his teshuva, Adam created himself.

With this, he explains the words

הֲשִׁיבֵנוּ ה אֵלֶיךָ וְנָשׁוּבָה חַדֵּשׁ יָמֵינוּ כְּקֶדֶם

"Hashiveinu Hashem ei'lecha ve'nashuva, chadesh yameinu ke'kedem." If Hashem pushes us to teshuva, rather than our teshuva being the product of our own effort, then we will be, once again, like Adam before the Chet, because in that case, we will have been re-created by Hashem.


The Ketzos'es words are wonderful for many reasons. First, because what he says is exactly the kind of lomdus you would expect from the Ketzos. Second, because the idea that the renewal of teshuva is a true re-creation of the person to the extent that the original identity and characteristics no longer necessarily pertain, is very strong. Third, the idea that man is capable of creating himself is somehow very moving. In Adam's case, this came with a cost. In our cases, it is only beneficial.

But, it's a Ketzos, so it raises more questions than it answers.
1. Everyone, even a tzadik gamur, even if you haven't sinned and done teshuva, we are all constantly making choices about whether to sin or not to sin. Even if we choose the right thing, it is those choices, which we ourselves make, it is our Bechira, that maintains our spirituality, that keeps us spiritually alive. Why is this not also our own ma'aseh yadayim?
2. Isn't it true that "אלמלא הקב"ה עוזרו אין יכול לו?" If not for Hashem's help, we could not withstand the Yetzer Hara (B'B 75a). If so, it is not really "our" teshuva. It is Hashem's again.
3. Along the same lines: It seems to me that doing God-like work, the work of creating a man, is impossible if not by virtue of the God-given ability to rise above nature and to be God-like. If so, it doesn't seem right that the result would be a diminution of our similarity to Hashem. In other words: it's true that the object of the creation was created by a man, but the man who was doing the creating has become more, not less, God-like by doing so.
4. And most importantly: if the Ketzos is right, what's pshat in

מקום שבעלי תשובה עומדים צדיקים גמורים אינם עומדים

"makom she'ba'alei teshuva omdim sham, tzadikim einam omdim sham?" And don't tell me the glib answers, because in Sanhedrin 99 it's clear that this statement is an assessment of rank.

Before discussing these questions, I want to point out an interesting thing. In Ki Sisah, Shemos 34:29, the passuk says Karan ohr ponov, that when Moshe came down with the second luchos, his face shone with a powerful light of kedusha. Rabbeinu Bachya asks, why did this happen only after the Luchos Sheniyos? Why did this not happen when Moshe Rabbeinu came down with the first luchos?

The Beis Halevi in his drashos, and the Mabit in his introduction to his Kiryas Sefer, say the same answer (my taitch; best to see inside; also, please note that neither of them address Rabbeinu Bachya's question, but what they say answers the question anyway). The first Luchos were crafted by Hashem and included the entire Torah Sheba'al Peh, and once a person read them, he would never forget them. After those luchos were broken, Klal Yisrael did teshuva for the sin of the Egel, and their teshuva was accepted, and the Torah was given to them once again. Moshe Rabbeinu was told to craft new Luchos, but Hashem did not write the Torah Sheba'al Peh on them, and now it required hard work to learn and to remember the Torah. Moshe Rabbeinu, upon receiving the first luchos and knowing the Torah, was like Tashmishei Kedusha, an object that serves the Torah. But when Torah Sheba'al Peh existed nowhere but in his mind, and it came to reside there through his hard work, he became Kedusha Atzma, inherent kedusha in himself. Before, the kedusha was adherent. Afterwards, the kedusha was inherent.

The Torah itself didn't change. But where before it was Hashem's Torah, and we were the beneficiaries of that gift, afterward it became our Torah. Even after all the siyata dishmaya that is necessary to learn, understand, and retain the Torah, it is we, by our hard work and mesiras nefesh, who recreate ourselves, who do the ibbud and kesiva li'shma, to incorporate and reflect the Torah.

I think the same is true of Adam Harishon after his teshuva. Yes, by falling, he was irreparably diminished. Just as was the case with the Torah after the Luchos Sheniyos, whatever he would achieve from that point on was not a gift, it had to be worked for and guarded. But as a result of his work- his teshuva and his efforts to guard his teshuva- his accomplishments were his. My father zatzal used to say, how could it be that Adam, the yetzir kapav of the Ribono shel Olam, could have sinned? The answer is that he was lacking one thing: Chinuch. He was what he was as a gift from Hashem, and gifts are easily lost. Only that which you earn is truly yours. In a sense, he was diminished, but he was also far greater than before.

So, let's go back to the four questions we had on the Ketzos.
1. Everyone, even a tzadik gamur, even if you haven't sinned and done teshuva, we are constantly making choices about whether to sin or not to sin. Even if we choose the right thing, it is those choices, which we ourselves make, it is our Bechira, that maintains our spirituality, that keeps us spiritually alive. Why is this not also our own ma'aseh yadayim?
Answer: there's a difference between maintaining and recreating. Every day, with our bechira to do good and not do bad, we maintain Hashem's briyah, and it is still Hashem's briyah. With Teshuva, we are recreating something that was destroyed. There's a difference between a Shomeir and an Uman. There's no hava amina that a shomer that saves the pikadon from being destroyed is koneh the pikadon. But Uman koneh bishvach keli, because he is making something that was not there before.

2. Isn't it true that "ilmalei Hashem ozro. lo yachol lo?" If not for Hashem's help, we could not withstand the Yetzer Hara. If so, it is not really "our" teshuva. It is Hashem's again.
Answer: When it comes to Bechira, it is one of the fundamental rules of the briyah that Hashem does not mix into our decisions involving yiras shamayim. So our teshuva, even if it could not happen without Hashem's help, has a din of zeh eino yachol ve'zeh eino 'yachol' (kaviyachol). In such a case, both are considered to have done it.

3. Along the same lines: It seems to me that doing God-like work, the work of creating a man, is impossible if not by virtue of the innate ability to rise above nature and to be God-like. If so, it doesn't seem right that the result would be a diminution of our similarity to Hashem. In other words: it's true that the object of the creation was created by a man, but the man who was doing the creating has become more, not less, God-like by doing so.
Answer: There's a difference between the Gavra and the Cheftza. Of course, a baal teshuva, the gavra, has done something that elevates him to the kisei hakavod. But the cheftza, the body, will forever be different.

4. And most importantly: if the Ketzos is right, what's pshat in

מקום שבעלי תשובה עומדים צדיקים גמורים אינם עומדים

"makom she'ba'alei teshuva omdim sham, tzadikim einam omdim sham?" And don't tell me the glib answers, because in Sanhedrin 99 it's clear that this statement is an assessment of rank.
Answer: Again, that's the difference between the Gavra and the Cheftza. The Cheftza of our existence in Olam Hazeh is never the same, the same way the Torah of the Luchos Shniyos was not the same as it was in the Luchos Rishonos. By doing teshuva, the person gets a kinyan on his ruchnius and elevates himself to a madreiga that even a tzadik gamur never can reach.

Bekitzur: the luchos sheniyos were missing some of the unique Atzilus of the luchos rishonos, and after his teshuva, Adam Harishon was never the same as he had been before his chet. But only with the luchos sheniyos did Moshe have the Karnei Ohr, and the same was true for Adam Harishon and the same is true for every Baal Teshuva. In the final tally, the gifts you are given don't count for much at all. All that matters is what you make of yourself.



Here is the language of the Ketzos regarding Adam HaRishon.

דבר זה נתקשו בו רבים מדוע לא רצה ד' בתשובת אדם הראשון ולא השיב חרב המות אל נדנה ונ"ל במ"ש באות ג' בשם כתבי האר"י דבחטא האדם הרוח האלהי ישוב אל האלהים וע"י התשובה חוזר אליו וזה כוונת מאמרם ז"ל בעל תשובה כקטן שנולד דמי ועליו נאמר ועם נברא יהלל יה לפי"ז קודם חטא אדם הראשון היה הרכבתו מאתו יתברך והיה יציר כפיו של הקב"ה שנתן לו חלקו וראוי היה שלא יכלה ולהתקיים באיש אמנם לאחר החטא כשנסתלק חלק האלהי ואחר כך כשחזר בתשובה והחזיר החלק האלהי והרי הוא כאלו עשה את עצמו והיה בבחינת ועם נברא ומעשי אדם לא יוכלו להתקיים באיש רק במין ומאז עלה מות בחלונינו ובזה יובן הא דאיתא במדרש השיבנו ה' אליך ונשובה חדש ימינו כקדם כימי אדם הראשון והיינו שאנו רוצים שיהיה מקודם אתערותא דלעילא ויהיה התשובה ע"י הקב"ה ואח"כ ונשובה ואז נהיה יציר כפיו של הקב"ה ונחיה ולא נמות וזהו כימי אדם הראשון קודם חטאו אשר רק בשמרו לעשות מצות ד' יחזיק בקרבו החלק האלהי לעד ויהיה תמיד בבחינת באר וזהו כוונת מאמרם ז"ל וצדיק באמונתו יחיה היינו בבטחונו שאינו בוטח ברוב חילו כי הכסף איננה עצמות כי אם בד' נכון לבו ובאמונתו יחיה והוא הנקרא חיות שנובע מעצמו 

Here is where he says that illuyim aren't as glatt as lesser baalei kishron that have to work on themselves.

מיהר"ם אלמושנינו בביאורו לספר קהלת י א זבובי מות יבאיש יביע שמן רוקח יקר מחכמה ז ומכבוד סכלות מעט ע"ש שכתב דהישרים בשכלם אינם חריפים כל כך דהחריפות אינו אלא אגב שבשתא ולפי שאלו שאין שכלם ישר ויש להם מעכב בשכלם כאשר יגבר השכל עולה השכל בחריפות גדול כאשר אנו רואין בתבערת אש כאשר יוצק עליו מעט מים אז יגבר ויתלהב האש ביתר שאת ויתר עז ממוקדה מקדם בלעדי מעט המים כן הדבר הזה אם יש לשכל קצת מנגד והוא הסכלות מעט ואז יתגבר עליו השכל ויהיה מחודד יותר ויותר ע"ש ובזה נראה לפרש 

Parshas Nitzavim and the Mitzvah of Teshuva

Reb Meir Simchah in this week’s parsha, Parshas Netzavim, says an interesting thing. He says that now that there is an option of doing teshuva, to not do tshuvoh is not just a bitul asei, but rather it is an aggravating factor in the punishment of the underlying aveira. In other words, the punishment for not doing teshuva is worse than the punishment for the aveira you should have done teshuva for. (Devarim 30:11.)

So, why is it so hard for us to seriously focus on the Mitzvah of Teshuva? Here are some of the usual suspects. I don't want you to think that they are self-evident, dreary platitudes. Simple is not the same as simplistic. As the Mesilas Yesharim illustrates, simplicity sometimes hides profound truth. And, as the Mesilas Yesharim definitely doesn't say, it's taken a long and dissolute life to come up with this list.

A. Lust. I am not ready to give up my pleasures. Self-denial is both out of style and not good for your mental health.

B. Pride. I’m as good as anyone else, I’m at least as good as those rabbis, those professional Jews, and I don’t need to apologize for my lifestyle. And I’m certainly not going to admit they are any better than me by changing to be more like them.

C. Sloth. I know I ought to do tshuvoh, but it’s just too much effort, both mentally and physically, for me.

D. Fear of Peer Group Reaction, fear of what other people will think of you. Your friends will think you've gone frum, or your family will be angry at you for not going with the flow of their comfortable lives and assumptions. In some circles, doing teshuva is very anti-social. I know a young couple that was ostracized by their erstwhile friends, and suffered a great deal of emotional pain, and eventually moved out of the neighborhood, because the young woman decided to wear a sheitel. Way to go, friends!!!

E. Despair. I’m no good, I'm beyond redemption. Or, I’ve tried it before, and it didn’t work, and I would just be lying to myself to think it’s going to work now. This is usually just a rationalization for A, "Lust" and C, "Sloth."

F. Denial. You believe that changing your lifestyle would be so terribly traumatic, (see A, "Lust" and D, Fear of Peer Reaction,) that you create a delusional reality that supports your refusal to undertake it. Sometimes the tool of denial is convincing yourself that you are not capable of doing tshuvoh (see E, "Despair,") and sometimes B, "Pride," that you don't need to.

You might recognize some of these factors from the last time you thought about going on a diet, because it's really the same issue of will power and admitting failure and the need to change. This is what keeps the people in the women's magazine business prosperous. When you fast on Tzom Gedaliah, though, keep in mind that the same conscious decisiveness that keeps us from eating on that day demonstrates that we can indeed do teshuva and eliminate other bad behavior.

A few years ago, I read a story in the paper about the arrest of a suspect in a crime (by Stefan Esposito). The article said that the suspect "allegedly" shot someone several times in a parking lot, but the victim survived and was able to identify him. Also, a security camera in the lot filmed the crime, and every time the suspect fired the gun the flash very clearly illuminated his face. Also, an off duty policeman witnessed the crime, pursued the suspect, chased him and arrested him two blocks away, at which time he was found to be in possession of the weapon used in the crime.

The article ended by stating that

"the suspect faces an uphill legal battle."

In the beis din shel maaloh, they can build a good case against ovrei aveirah as well. Our lives are recorded and played over during our trial, and malachim who witnessed the events testify about what occurred, and worse yet, the suspect has signed a document stating exactly what aveiros he did. We face an uphill legal battle.

But despite what might seem to be pretty bad odds, there is a great deal we can do to ameliorate the consequences of our aveiros.

Remember the Minchas Chinuch. He says if not for the passuk that passels a Sukkah Gezulah, the fact that you’re not mekayeim the mitzvah because of Mitzva Haba’ah be’aveira wouldn’t be that much of a problem, because even if you haven’t been mekayeim the mitzvah by eating there, at least you weren’t mevateil the assei by eating outside of a Sukkah: you did eat in a Sukkah, just you weren’t mekayeim the mitzvah. Same thing with teshuva: even if you can’t be mekayeim the mitzvah of teshuva, at least don’t be mevateil the assei.

Many people don’t realize how broad the concept of tshuvah is. It runs from the Gemara in Kiddushin where "shema hirheir tshuvah b’libo" makes him a safeik tzadik gamur, to extremes like tshuvas hamishkal and galus. Simply accepting that what you have done is wrong, and being ashamed of what you have done, is a great mitzvah. You may not be ready for the extreme end of the scale, but anyone can be m’kayeim the great mitzvah of tshuvah by recognizing the need to do it, and knowing how easily accessible the beginning of the range of options is.

We see this in the Mishna in Yoma. Reb Akiva says Ashreichem Yisrael, how lucky you are, Yisrael, that you have the option of Teshuva, and he brings two pesukim: Vezarakti aleichem Mayim Tehorim, and Mikvei Yisrael Hashem; teshuva is like the sprinkling of the ashes of the Parah Adumah, and it is like immersing in a Mikva. Rav Pam Zatzal explained that Reb Akiva is illustrating the broad range of the Mitzva of Teshuva: If one immerses himself in a mikva, as does a geir who re-creates himself, this is the greatest mitzva. But being sprinkled with the ashes of the Para Aduma, which seems to be a far lesser personal investment in tahara--it is a mere sprinkling on a person that does not even remove his clothes, his begadim tzo'im, also brings tahara and purification. Reb Akiva is telling us Ashreichem Yisrael-- Teshuva at any level is a magnificent, wonderful gift to Klal Yisrael.

In Parshas Vayeilech, the Ramban on 31:17-18 says that "Ki ein Elokai bekirbi" is not a real vidui, and it is certainly not a teshuva shleima. But it is recognition of the sin, it is some degree of regret. And in the next passuk, 31:18, the Ramban explains that this tiny little incomplete teshuva results in a tremendous lessening of the tochecha; it ends the Tzaros Ra'os ve'Rabbos, but it doesn't end the galus entirely. Klal Yisrael has to do a better teshuva to end the galus. But it is a powerful and effective step which bears fruit immediately.

Similarly, the Ramban on Devarim 30:14, Mah Hashem sho'eil mei'imach, and Ki karov eilecha hadavar me'od, says that the Davar is Teshuva. The minimum requirements are few and within reach. See, also, Kiddushin 49b: if a wicked man proposes to a woman, and the woman's acceptance is conditional on his being a holy man, a tzadik gamur, and the man is known to be a lowlife scoundrel, we still have to consider her possibly married, because "shema hirheir teshuva be'libo," maybe he had thoughts of repentance in the moments prior to his proposal. Evidently, this would classify him as a tzadik gamur!
I wish you, in this Eish Shechora ahl gabei Eish Levana, a Kesiva Vechasima Tova Le'alter le'chayim tovim. Thank you for your valuable insights, mar'ei mekomos, and mussar.

Din V'cheshbon

Here are the explanations of Din Ve'cheshbon. This is something that should be attended to carefully or not at all, so please set aside a little time, and focus.

A. Gaon— What you failed to accomplish.
Din is the judgment for the mitzvos and aveiros. Cheshbon is the accounting of what good the person could have been doing if he hadn’t wasted the time doing the aveiros. This is based on the Gaon that says that a person who does any aveirah is judged not only on the aveirah but also on the time he was doing the aveirah for bitul torah. The Gaon is brought down in Reb Meir Simcha in his Meshech Chochmoh, Devorim 32:51, on "al asher me’altem bi/al asher lo kidashtem." He brings this ‘dual sin’ idea from Rashi in Bamidbar 20:12, but I don’t see it any more than from this passuk. And Reb Meir Simcha also discusses this at greater length, and with attribution to the Gaon, in Breishis 18:28.


B. Evidence from your behavior that you had the ability to do better.
Someone told me that R’ Shach was asked, what does Cheshbon mean? If Cheshbon means an accounting for time that you wasted, not-learning shouldn't be separate from other aveiros, because it’s an inherent aveirah, and it is just another element in the din. He answered that if a person does nothing and doesn’t learn, he could claim that he had no koach and no aptitude for anything requiring thought and effort. But if he managed to plan and do so many other things, he was successful in his business, he managed to find the time to plan and do aveiros, Hashem demonstrates from his own behavior that he had plenty of koach, plenty of aptitude for doing what he liked to do. This is called cheshbon.

This is what the Beis Halevi says on the story of Yosef and the brothers. Chazal say that when Yosef revealed himself to his brothers, O, what a tochaca this was to them! This is because Yoseph rebuked his brothers when they said they were worried about Yaakov’s health. When the brothers asked Yosef for clemency because Yeish lonu ov zokein, the first thing Yosef asked them when he revealed himself was ha'od ovi chai, meaning "Your anxiety about the effect of your not coming home on your father, the effect on his health that losing a child would have, is very touching. And where was your concern when you told him I had been ripped apart and eaten by a wild animal?" His idea is that our own behavior will be proof that our rationalizations for bad behavior are knowing lies.

Similar answer: Evidence from your behavior that you knew that what you were doing was wrong.
You couldn’t come up with tzedakah or tuition, but you managed to scrape together enough money go to the mountains for a couple of months (Oy, I couldn't survive in the city! It was mamesh pikuach nefesh!); you can’t shut up in shul (don't give me mussar! If you had kavana, my talking wouldn't bother you!) but at the movies, or at a concert, you read the riot act to someone who whispers to his friend or whose cell phone goes off.


C. Rav Rudderman— the effect on other people.
Din is his personal aveiros. Cheshbon is the effect his behavior had on other people, and if it had influence on them, the ripples continue to spread throughout history. For example, if a respected person does a bad thing, and an observer says that he, too, can do such things, or he loses his respect for Torah, then when he raises his own children he will not instill in them a love for Torah and Mitzvos, and the children will be less then they could have been. All this is on the head of the person who did the aveirah. (Remember, though, that the proper reaction when you see a choshuveh person doing an aveirah is not "if he can do it, the whole thing is a fake," but instead "even great people are not perfect, all humans are frail. May Hashem help me to overcome my evil inclination!"

Along these lines: the Tanchuma in Parshas Ha’azinu toward end of Ohs Aleph, that says that "kapeir le’amcho Yisroel" is for the living, and "asher podiso" is the meisim, and the Tanchuma brings this idea that meisim need a kaporo, and can be niskaper by the maisei tzedoko of the living, from a Toras Kohanim. The Gemora in Horyos 6a indicates that if some of the tzibbur are alive and getting a kapporo, then the meisim also get a kapporo, and it’s not called a chattos for a meis, but this is only in the context of a korbon chattos. Evidently, even the dead need kapparah. How can this be, if they were judged when they died? It may be that their behavior when alive continues to have ramifications in the world of the living, both for the good and for the bad, and for this they continue to be judged.

This, Rav Rudderman said, is what Chazal mean when they say that the Sifrei Chaim and the Sifrei Meisim are opened on Rosh Hashanna. In fact, the Brisker Rov brings down from Reb Chaim that this is pshat why when Shaul raised Shmuel from the dead, Shmuel was afraid-- lamah hirgaztani, and he brought Moshe Rabbeinu along as witness that whatever he did was justified ahl pi hatorah.


D. Judgment according to what you specifically knew.
People are judged according to what they know in Torah. Knows more— judged more strictly. Also, people are judged according to the skills and opportunities they had. This is a pshat in "techilas dino shel odom al haTorah," (although the Gemora that says this in Sanhedrin 7a means for not bothering to learn Torah.) So first a person is judged on his actions. Then there is a cheshbon of what the person knows. The judgment is re-visited on the basis of the level of understanding the person had. Rav Rudderman says this as pshat in "Atta yodei’a es kol hamif’ol, vegam kol yetzur lo nikchad mimeko, that this is what gam kol yetzur means.)

This, by the way, is also the pshat in the tefilla "Ma’asei ish ufekudoso." Pekudoso refers to his purpose in this world, and the talents he was given to accomplish some specific work in life. Each person is judged by a general standard, and also by the standard of what he would have and should have accomplished if he had used his abilities as Hashem intended them to be used. In a similar vein, Pekudoso can also refer to the pikodon he was given, the wealth that Hashem gave him— it is given to be used for avodas Hashem in this world. If a person just wastes it, or does nothing with it, there is a cheshbon: You were made steward of this wealth for for a purpose; did you use it as you were intended to?


E. R Meir Simcha in Nitzavim– failure to do teshuvoh when you realized you had sinned.
Sort of like the Gaon, that cheshbon is for the failure to do tshuvoh, which can be worse than the underlying aveirah. We may be driven by our nature to do aveiros, but there is no excuse for not doing teshuva. The Cheshbon is, what did you do when you realized you had sinned?


F. I suppose the simplest answer is this: Din is a determination of what you had done that was meritorious and what that was sinful. Cheshbon is the calculation of the relative weight of your actions-- are you rov zechuyos? Are you mechtza ahl mechtza? However, I have not seen this explanation; when the answer that appears most simple and intuitively correct is not given by the gedolim, I have to think about why they did not say it. Maybe it is a valid interpretation, but they don't say it because it doesn't really offer much in the way of a new perspective that would help us to analyze our behavior or improve ourselves.


G. Chaim B of www.Divreichaim.blogspot.com added a pshat; Brisker Rav (P' Braishis): din is doing what is right for the circumstance; cheshbon is whether you should find yourself or put yourself in those circumstances to begin with.


H. Reb Yitzchak Lampronti, the Ramchal’s Rebbi, in his sefer Pachad Yitzchak– deciding whether you have eliminated the result of your sin.
Why is it, he asks, that in Divrei Hayamim, there is a lengthy discussion of the king Menashe’s teshuva, but in Melachim, there is nothing, zero, mentioned except how terrible Menashe was? (Reb Yehuda in Cheilek learns the pesukim in Divrei Hayamim kipshutam, that Menashe did real teshuva.) And the same question can be asked about Yishma'el's teshuva. He answers that teshuva is crippled when the result of your behavior exists in the world. Me’uvas lo yuchal liskon, Chazal say, refers to a man who fathers a mamzer. He may do teshuva, but it is a poor and weak teshuva, maybe no teshuva at all, because the evidence of his sin, the result of his sin, walks the earth. So when Yirmiahu wrote Sefer Melachim, he did not mention Menashe’s teshuva: although he did teshuva, his talmidim, the vast number of Jews whose worship of Avodah Zarah was aided and encouraged by Menashe, and their children and children's children, were still worshiping Avodah Zarah. So his teshuva was like no teshuva at all. But Divrei Hayamim was written by the Anshei Knesses Hagdola after Churban Bayis Rishon, at which point the Yetzer Hara of Avoda Zarah was killed. Thus, the people whose association with Avoda Zarah abandoned their beliefs, and so the results of Menashe’s sins no longer existed in the world– and at that point his teshuva became real and meaningful. The mussar haskeil is that one who does teshuva must carefully think about the results of his aveiros, and he needs to rectify everything that resulted from his behavior.

Din Ve'Cheshbon, Yahrtzeits, and Rosh Hashanna

All of mankind is accountable for their acts, and that every one of our actions has consequences. As the Ahm Hanivchar, having been chosen, and having experienced so much revelation, we are under even greater scrutiny than others. When considering the coming days of judgment, we must take a moment to think about the nature and ramifications of the Yemei Hadin.

Chazal tell us that we face Din Ve'Cheshbon, literally, judgment and reckoning. As if judgment weren't enough. What, exactly, does this double expression connote? There are several very interesting interpretations, each of which is true, each of which ought to stimulate a timely self-examination.

There are: The Vilner Gaon; the Beis Halevi; Reb Chaim Brisker/Rav Rudderman; the Brisker Rav, and the Pachad Yitzchak, (not Rav Hutner) by Rav Yitzchak Lampronti, the Rebbi of the Ramchal.


Bli neder, I will be coming back to discuss these more carefully during the coming days. Additionally, I will discuss fasting on Rosh Hashannah when Rosh Hashanna is a Yahrtzeit, and the general issue of fasting on Rosh Hashannah. Chazal tell us that "Sifrei Chaim ve'Sifrei Meisim Pesuchim Lefanav;" this means that even those that died long ago are judged anew on Rosh Hashanna. What is this second judgment? What wasn't covered the first time? Evidently, there is another judgment of the dead on Rosh Hashannah, and it is possible that they are also judged on their Yahrtzeit....

Pharaoh's Teshuvoh

A story from R Schwadron, from his sefer Leiv Sholeim.

About how Pharaoh’s tshuvoh is very similar to that of most people. He admitted his sins, and said Hashem is “hatzadik,” and we also say oshamnu and “attoh tzodeik ahl kol habo oleinu.” And just like he just wanted to be rid of the makkoh, and as soon as the makkoh was over he was chozeir l’suro, we often are chozeir l’sureinu with the first cup of coffee after Yom Kippur. This is because we are asking to have an easier life and we promise to do tshuvoh later, after Yom Kippur, and we are asking for Hashem’s grace on credit. When was Pharaoh really chozeir b’t’shuvoh? When he ran to Moshe and said “Go right now!!!”

We shouldn’t just promise to do t’shuvoh some time later, we need to make immediate kabbolos that we really intend to honor.

Despair, Teshuvah, and Hope.

Sometimes, a person is convinced that he is so sinful that teshuva won’t help. This state of despair can mean one of two things. One: that he is, indeed, worthless, or Two: that he is not.
Let's say he is indeed an irredeemable rasha. Well, that’s not a exemption from doing avodas Hashem. It can even be liberating– you don’t have to bother trying to repair what you’ve done wrong, but there’s no reason not to do whatever good you can, bein odom lechaveiro or lamokom, in the time you have. But most likely the possibility of proper t’shuva still exists, but he is denying it– it’s an avoidance mechanism–because he doesn’t want to give up his irresponsible way of life.

(We lie to ourselves all the time. I am reminded of this whenever someone dies, and a relative says "If only I had taken the opportunity to call them more often, take care of them better, kiss them, tell them I love them, sit and learn from them......" on and on. What this really means is that the person knew, deep in his heart. that he could have been doing this all along, but decided he didn't want to. Only when the relative is safely dead can he say "If I had been more thoughtful I would have done a, b, c...." No. You're lying to yourself. You didn't get wiser because the other person died. You never wanted to do these things and you never would have done these things.)

Someone pointed out to me that Reuven’s teshuva did not regain for him what could have been his. His malchus and kehuna were irretrievably gone– pachaz kamayim, ahl tosar. Period. Similarly, Adam’s delayed teshuva did not get him back into gan eden, the dohr hamidbar did teshuva for the chet hameraglim and the chet ha’eigel, but the gzeiras hamidbar stood; and Shaul did teshuva for his chet with Amaleik but lost his malchus anyway, and so on. So Acher might have been right about the futility of his attempting teshuva.

On the other hand, we find that Menashe’s teshuva did enable him to retain his malchus-- and his aveiros were much more serious than most of the aforementioned.

As a consolation, the Chasam Sofer here does say that "yeser se'eis ve'yeser oz" means that Reuven's position as King of Baalei Teshuva is greater than his previous status as progenitor of Malchus and Kehuna, because bemakom....

Things to consider on this topic:

I think that one of the factors here is that if before teshuva the person’s rights/position were given to someone else, or a set of circumstances was set into motion, it is not revoked. You can’t be sho’eil on hefker once someone else has taken the object, and you can't be shoeil on hekdesh once the Kohen has the korban/trumah.

Not regaining previous entitlements is not the same as not being forgiven.

When you look at Reuven’s case, you also have to see the obvious contrast with Yehuda, whose teshuva seems to have regained him whatever he had previously lost. Adam's teshuva did not help, but Kayin's did. We know that it is possible to completely abandon a particular chet without changing the middah that caused it (Prishus/Nekius). Maybe the difference is whether there was just charatah/azivas hachet or also the actual changing of the middah that caused the chet.

In parshas Vayechi, in Breishis 49:4, on Pachaz kamayim, Reb Elya Lopian says that the loss of malchus and kehuna was not an onesh for the chillul yetzu’ei aviv; as Rashi points out, pachaz here is a noun, not a verb, so the accent is at the beginning. The chilul showed how he allowed his middah of 'pachaz' to come out, and the middah is the reason he could not have malchus or kehunah. He adds, you can’t say it was a real punishment, because the Torah and Chazal stress how Reuven did teshuva. It must be that it was not an onesh, but rather a necessary result of the fact of the middah ra’ah that was inconsistent with kehunah and malchus.

He brings a Chofetz Chayim that says that laundering clothes can take out stains, but it doesn’t sew on new buttons. The idea is that teshuva is a good thing, and it does remove the p’gam of the aveiroh, but there might be a middoh ra’ah that has to be removed, and teshuva is not going to remove a middah ra’ah. That takes a lot of separate work.

I saw the magi’ah in the Shelah in the later section on Teshuva, toward the end of the sefer, that says (with my additions) that a person should be careful not to treat symptoms, but to find and cure the underlying cause, both in the case of health problems and spiritual problems. A person goes to the doctor with a rash, or a cough. The doctor might look at the rash, and say, yes, you have a rash, and prescribe a lotion, or prescribe a cough suppressant for the cough. This is foolish, because he is only treating the symptom. A better doctor will look further, and determine what is causing the rash or the cough, what the underlying problem is. A wiser doctor would not rest at that point. He would try to investigate and to find out why this person caught this illness. Maybe he has mold in the walls of his house. Maybe he has a friend who is a carrier, from whom he caught the disease. He might find the source of the fungus, or a reservoir of bacteria. And even worse— the patient might have systemic condition of depressed immunity— that he catches what others would shrug off easily. In the context of teshuva, this would be called a lack of character. The lesson is that the same way a good doctor will treat the symptom, the underlying cause, and the weakened immunity, a baal teshuvah must treat the act of sin, the underlying taivah, and the failure of yiras shamayim and bitachon.

See the Tanchuma on the passuk by Reuven that says on the word “alah” at the end of the passuk: “Alah— tehei meruchak ad sheyavo Moshe shekasuv bo ‘Umoshe alah el ha’Elokim’ v’karevcha v’yomar ‘Yechi Reuven ve’al yamus.” What is the shaychus of Reuven’s kappara to Moshe’s kabbalas haTorah? The answer (from Harav Morgenstern of Beis Medrosh LaTorah) is this:

Chazal say that Hashem said “barasi yetzer hara, barasi Torah tavlin.” Until matan Torah, teshuva removed the pegam of a chet, but did nothing for the underlying middah. Therefore, despite Reuven’s teshuva, the middah megunah remained a middah megunah. But tavlin is a spice, which changes a food’s flavor and makes it taste better. Torah enables a person to change his middah ra’ah and make it into a middah that serves Hashem. After matan Torah, the middah of the shevet of Reuven that prevented them from reaching their potential became responsive to change and improvement, it became a potential tool for avodas Hashem, in the sense of ‘bishtei yetzirecha.’

It’s worth thinking about this— first, teshuva that doesn’t address the underlying problem may be teshuva, but it doesn’t really solve anything, as the Mesillas Yeshorim says. Second, obviously, just learning doesn’t do a thing for a person’s middos ra’os. There has to be an intention and an effort to change through the limud haTorah.

Vayeilech, Devarim 29:16. Exposure to Kedusha and Exposure to Tumah

29:16. Vatiru es shikutzeihem...giluleihem...pen yeish bochem...asher levovo poneh hayom...la’avod es elohei hagoiyim hoheim. Mishulchan Govo’a brings from the Brisker Rov in the stencils: the avoda zoro is described as stinking, disgusting and revolting, like golol and vermin. Why, then, does Rashi say in passuk 17 that since you saw them, pen yeish bochom— lefichoch ani tzorich lehashbiachem? The answer is that even if the aveira is disgusting, seeing it leaves a negative roshem on the neshomo, and this roshem can result in going to serve the avoda zoro. Once there’s a “Vatir’u,” there’s a danger of “levovo poneh.” (This reminds me of Tom Lehrer’s song about pornography– "Stories of tortures Used by debauchers Lurid, licentious and vile..... Make me smile." There are things that at first sight turn the stomach with disgust, but strike a responsive chord in the primitive mind and which can engender an appetite. Like many acquired tastes--e.g., coffee and vodka--the effect co-opts the natural distaste.)

This is the same idea as “kol horo’eh sottah bikilkula yazir atzmo min hayayin” in Emor, Vayikro 19:29. On the topic of indelible effect of exposure to rishus, see Breishis 27:1 about Rivkah being inured to avodoh zoroh because of her time at home, though she had left at the age of three.

The complementary idea is that exposure to kedusha is beneficial. See Vayeileich 31:10 about the mitzvah to bring infants to Hakheil.

So, people should realize that when it says “shivti b’veis Hashem,” it is referring to the need to engineer one’s environment so that he will be in the presence of kedusha and never in the presence of tumah. Many people say that a person should be able to live anywhere, that his faith should be strong enough to see anything and remain firm. This is true to the extent that if you know that you’re going to be exposed to all kinds of things, you have to develop resistance, which is probably not going to happen by simple avoidance before exposure. But the best thing is to do your best to ensure that the problem doesn’t arise in the first place, to create a environment that is suffused with kedusha and protected from tumah.