The Four Crowns in the Mishkan

In Teruma and Tetzaveh, Rashi points out that three keilim had gold crowns: the Shulchan, the Golden Mizbei'ach, and the Aron haKodesh.  Rashi says that these three zeirim/crowns correspond to the three crowns mentioned by Rav Shimon in Avos 4:13 the crowns of Royalty, of Kehunah, and of Torah. (Aron, see Rashi 25:11; Shulchan, 25:24; Mizbei'ach, 30:3.)

שמות רבה לד ב

 א"ר שמעון בן יוחאי: ג' כתרים הם, כתר מלכות וכתר כהונה וכתר תורה. כתר מלכות זה השלחן דכתיב בו "זר זהב סביב". כתר כהונה זה המזבח דכתיב בו "זר זהב סביב". וכתר תורה זה הארון דכתיב בו "זר זהב". 

and

במדבר רבה ד סוף סימנים יג יד 

רבי שמעון אומר שלשה כתרים הם כתר תורה וכתר כהונה וכתר מלכות וכתר  שם טוב עולה על גביהן. מעשה הארון כנגד בעלי תורה ... מעשה השולחן כנגד מלכות בית דוד ... מזבח הזהב כנגד כתר כהונה ... מעשה מנורה כנגד בעלי שם טוב , שנאמר: טוב שם משמן טוב, ולכך היו כל כליה עמה בבגד תכלת שכתר שם טוב על גביהם

 אבות פרק ד משנה יג 

רבי שמעון אומר: שלשה כתרים הם: כתר תורה וכתר כהונה וכתר מלכות. וכתר שם טוב עולה על גביהן.   

(Reb Shimon=Reb Shimon bar Yochai.)

Yoma 72b

אמר רבי יוחנן שלשה זירים הן, של מזבח, ושל ארון ושל שולחן

Rashi says in Yoma there,

שלשה זירין נעשו בכלי הקודש. של מזבח סימן לכתר כהונה ושל ארון סימן לכתר תורה ושל שולחן סימן לכתר מלכות, שהשולחן הוא סימן לעושר מלכים

Many mefarshim ask, where is the fourth crown?  If, as the Mishna in Avos says, the greatest crown is that of Shem Tov, why is that crown not found in the Mishkan?  And now that the Medrash in Bamidbar says that the Menora represents that crown, why did the Menorah not have any crown? If the symbolic crown appeared on the Shulchan, the Mizbei'ach, and the Aron, why did the Menorah have no crown at all?

There are many teirutzim to this question, beginning with the Maharal in Derech Chaim in Avos.  But the ellipsis is obvious and clearly intentional, and so I think it deserves a simple and satisfying answer. (H. L. Mencken once wrote that "For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong."  Unlike most such answers, I think this one is good.)

A כתר-זיר-crown is a symbol of greatness.  By placing a crown on top of a person or a thing, you express its glory. But it is only a symbol.  What a crown expresses is splendor, a shine.  In fact, the idea of a crown is most fundamentally expressed in Iyov 29:2-3, 

מי יתנני כירחי קדם כימי אלוה ישמרני.  בהלו נרו עלי ראשי לאורו אלך חשך

There, we see the crown as a halo, a ring of light.  That is a true crown, symbolically expressed by placing a gold crown on one's head.  In fact, the words   זהב  and זיב , gold and shine, are basically the same.  We use gold to represent and produce a zohar/ziv.  In the same way, the words זר  and  זוהר are essentially the same- a crown, and a shine.  The purpose of the זר is to represent and embody a זוהר.

But the Menorah did not need a symbolic crown.  The purpose of the Menorah was to cast light, and that light is an inherent crown.  The Menorah, which represented the Keser Shem Tov, did not need a golden crown.  It did not need  זהב, because it had  זיב , and it did not need a זר because it had a  זוהר , and it did not need a קרן של זהב because it had  קרני אור.  It did not need a crown, because it had a Corona. When you have a halo, it doesn't make any sense to wear a crown.

After Mattan Torah, the members of Klal Yisrael had עדיים, crowns of glory, which they had to give back after the Eigel.  But Moshe, as far as I know, did not have any עדי.  He had Karnei Ohr, and he didn't need any עדיים.

One last thing. An answer as simple as this will often evoke the reaction that it is so obvious that everyone knows it without being told.  If,you feel that way, why don't you ask someone the question.  "If" they don't give this answer immediately, tell them to think about it for a while and come back to you with an answer.  Then you'll see how obvious it is.  The only criticism I accept on this answer is that it doesn't offer anything meaningful from a hashkafa or chochma standpoint.  It's just a simple fact.

But one question does remain.  Assuming that the light of the menora is the crown that corresponds to the Keser Shem Tov, why is the menorah and its light the best metaphor for that Keser?  The shulchan, the mizbei'ach, the Aron, are obviously appropriate.  But what is it about the Menorah that corresponds davka with Keser Shem Tov?

My initial response is that without the light of the Menorah/Shem Tov, the other kesarim remain in the dark and lose their significance. What good is a Talmid Chacham without Da'as? Or a Kohen that is unpleasant and unsympathetic? Or a King that walls himself off in his Versailles?  Only when they have a shem tov can their other qualities become an additional crown.

I'm open to suggestions.

Titzaveh. Lishmah is Not Binary. Where you need Lishmah, More is Better.

Several months ago we wrote about a disagreement we had with a friend.  Harvey Zupnick said from the Satmarer that given the choice between tefillin written by a yarei shamayim artist, whose work was uniquely beautiful, and that of a known tzadik and parush, whose work was less beautiful, the better choice is that of the great tzadik.

We initially resisted this idea, because we believed that Lishmah is an on/off- if the sefer or the tefillin was done lishma, it's kosher. If it's not, it's not kosher.  Like kavana by a mitzvah if you hold tzrichos kavana.  Later, we learned that certainly in the case of safrus, where lishma involves a great deal of effort and knowledge, it is better to take that of the tzadik.  We also found this to be the case by Bris Millah.

In today's parsha, we found the Netziv addresses this like an arrow.

העמק דבר שמות  כח ג ד"ה ועשו בגדי אהרון לקדשו

ועשו את בגדי אהרן לקדשו. דאחר שנצטוה אהרן להתקדש נתן המקום לו בגדי קודש שיסייעו לו לדבר. 

וידוע דכ״ד שבקדושה לבד שטעון עשיה לשמה עפ״י דין עוד כל מה שמכינים יותר הפעולה לשם קדושה מועלת יותר לתכליתה 

כמש״כ לעיל י״ט ב׳ ובכ״מ מש״ה נצטוה משה שיזהיר להאומנים שהם בעצמם יראי ה׳ לעשות הבגדים באופן שיועילו יותר לקדשו. ובאשר הוא דבר שבלב ע״כ הקדים לומר להם אשר מלאתי את אהרן רוח חכמה והוא יבין וישכיל מכח הבגדים איך שהם פועלים על לבו. היאך נעשו. ומש״ה נצטוה בזה משה בעצמו שידבר אל כל חכמי לב. ולא בצלאל שזה הפרט אינו נוגע לחכמות המלאכה אלא לחכמת המוסר:

Pretty clear. And the funny thing is that his citation to what he says in י״ט ב׳ doesn't seem to be any proof at all. Evidently, he doesn't care, because he holds that it is common sense and should be self evident.  ידוע.  So not only am I wrong, I'm obviously wrong. 

Yes, we could be stubborn and say that Bigdei Kehuna are special, as the Ramban says in 28:1-

הבגדים צריכין עשייה לשמן ויתכן שיהיו צריכין כוונה ולכן אמר ואתה תדבר אל כל חכמי לב אשר מלאחיו רוח חכמה שיבינו מה שיעשו וכבר אמרו דמות דיוקנו מנצח לפני בבית מלחמתי

and Rav Sternbuch says that this is a unique din by bigdei kehuna-

 בדבריו אלה נתכוין הרמב"ן לתרץ את כפל הלשון שבפסוק כיון שכבר אמר הפסוק חכמי לב לשם מה הוצרך להוסיף ולומר אשר מלאחיו רוח חכמה וע"ז תירץ כי הראשון הוא חכמת לב לעשות במלאכה והשני שמלבד תבונת כפיו בקי ומלא הוא בחכמה ויודע לכוון לשמה אולם דבר זה צריך ביאור איזו חכמה צריך לכוונת לשמה והלא כל המצוות שכוונת לשמה מעכבת בהן כל אחד מישראל שהגיע לגדלות והוא בר דעת כשר לעשיית לשמה 

אמנם בזוה"ק כאן מפורש שכדי ראוי הבגדים צריך להיות בעל רוח הקדש ואולי זה רמוז במה שדקדק הכתוב ואמר אשר מלאתיו רוח חכמה היינו שלא די בחכמת התורה שזכה בה ע"י עמלו וטרחו רק צריך גם שיזכה שתשרה עליו רוח ממרום רוח חכמה ובינה רוח דעת ויראת ה' ולזה רמז הרמב"ן במה שהוסיף בקוצר לשונו הזהב וכבר אמרו דמות דיוקנו מנצח לפני בבית מלחמתי ואלו היו דבריו של אלכסנדר מוקדון כשראה את שמעון הצדיק ולמדנו מכאן שהכהן הגדול הוא מלאך ה' צבאות לבוש במלבושי משרתי עליון עד שנעשה בבגדים דמות כרובים ולכן צריך רוח הקדש כדי להיות ראוי לעסוק במעשה הבגדים 

And we could be stubborn and say that you can't prove anything from the klei hamikdash in general, because we know that there's a din of ויקחו לי and Betzalel had Ruach HaKodesh to use the gold from the bigger tzadik in the Aron, for example, and the lesser one for the Brichim, as Reb Chaim Volozhiner said about Lachashov Machashavos.

But that's not what the Netziv says.  He says this is true by Kol Davar Shebikdusha that needs asiyah lishma.  

Similarly, Reb Elyah Lopian in his Lev Eliyahu II 232 brings from Reb Chaim Volozhiner that if you learn from a sefer written by a person who is not good, you might not be successful in your learning, and this is why Sefer Torah sheksavo min yisareif- not just that it MAY be burned, but it SHOULD be burned. But he goes on to apply this even to devarim shel chol that are used in the environment of doing mizvos, which is not consistent with what we're saying.

So it's not just Safrus, or Milah, or Chinuch ( כמה גדולים מעשי חייא.)  It's every place where there's a din of lishmah.

We still say that by regular "tzrichos kavana," it's a simple binary.  

There happens to be a nafkeh minah- by Matza Shemura.  Reb Boruch Ber in Gittin says that the din Lishma by Shemura is really the din of tzrichos kavana, not the lishma like by safrus.  So, if is just a din of kavana, then just have kavana and it's fine.  If you say not like Reb Boruch Ber, and you understand the din of Shemura to be in the parsha of Lishmah, then "more lishmah=better matza."

Harav Oppenheimer points out that it not logical to apply this to all cases that need lishma.  I thought about this over Shabbos, and I think he's right.  Where the object has kedusha, it can have greater kedusha.  Where the object does not have kedusha, such as Tzitzis and Matza Shemura, the din of lishma is yes/no. The Netziv's words support this, of course.  He says כ״ד שבקדושה that needs lishmah, not every case that needs lishmah.  And it's logical. If we're talking about an enhancement in the object, we must be talking about objects which are intrinsically changed.  I don't think that's the case with tashmishei mitzvah.   Does it need genizah?  If it doesn't, then the lishma it is not a change in the cheftza, it's just a hechsher for something else.

UPDATE NISSAN AYIN CHES/APRIL '18.

I just saw the Shai LaTorah Vol. I page 218 where he says the following.

ושמרתם את המצות כי בעצם היום הזה הוצאתי את צבאתיכם מארץ מצרים (שמות י"ב י"ז)

הנה יש לעיין הא גם בלא אזהרה זו מחויבים להיזהר ולהשמר מאיסור חמץ שיש בזה איסור כרת וא"כ מהי ההוספה של "ושמרתם"? ואין לומר שהכוונה לשמור בהקפדה יתירה דהנה גבי שור המועד כתיב ג"כ דיני שמירה והתם סגי בשמירה פחותה וא"כ מה חדשה התורה בחיוב "שמירת מצות"? 

וראיתי בשמו של מרן הגרי"ז זצ"ל דהנה מצינו בגמ' פסחים [מ"ח ע"ב] סימנים ברורים לחמץ כקרני חגבים או סידוק ובעצם לא צריכה המצה שימור כיון שניכר במצה עצמה אם נתחמצה או לא וחדשה התורה במצות ושמרתם שלא לסמוך רק על הסימנים אלא לשמור היטב בשעת טחינה אפיה ולישה 

ועפ"ז נראה עוד שכל מה ששומר טפי וכל פעולה שאדם מחמיר ומדקדק אינו רק הידור מצוה כמו אתרוג נאה אלא קיום מצות עשה שהרי התורה סתמה "ושמרתם" וכל מה שעוסק ומדקדק יותר בשמירת המצה שלא יבוא לידי חימוץ מקיים מצות עשה ממש 

When I read it, I thought that he was saying that our theme, that more lishma enhances the mitzva, applies even by Matza Shemura. But as Rav Oppenheimer said, and my son Shlomo (Brisk!) and son in law Moishe (Mir and Navardok!) agreed, which is exceedingly rare, that is exactly NOT what the Rov is saying. He is simply saying that Lishma by Matza is a mitzva on its own. Yes,  you need that kiyum to make the matza kosher, But it is a self standing mitzva. He definitely is not saying that a better kiyum of that mitzva enhances the Matza itself. As far as the Matza is concerned, either it's lishma and kosher, or it's not lishma and not kosher.

The only issue that remains is the Machlokes brought in the Mishna Le'Melech in Klei Hamikdash about whether Bigdei Kehuna are Klei Shareis or not. Klei Hamikdash 8:5, as follows:

ובגדי כ"ג שבלו גונזין אותם.... ובגדי כהונה אם יש להם דין כלי שרת עיין בתוס' קידושין (דף מ"ד) שכתבו שאם עדיין לא נתחנכו אין להם דין קדושת כלי שרת אלא קדושת בד"ה אבל אם נתחנכו יש להן דין כלי שרת שקדושים קדושת הגוף אך הריטב"א שם חולק בזה וסבירא ליה דאינן קדושת הגוף ככלי שרת שהרי אין משתמשין בהן בגופם ומכשירי עבודה הם ודינן כקדושת דמים ע"כ. 

(It's not only the Ritva, it's the Ramban there in Kiddushin, too.)

If Bigdei Kehuna are only machshirim, like the Ritva, then it doesn't make sense that there should be dargos of hechsher, because the begadim are not the cheftza that matters.  Either they're machshir or they're not.  Of course it's very likely that the Netziv is going with 

Tosfos in Kiddushin that they are klei shoreis, i.e., that they are devorim kedoshim. OR that even if they're not klei shareis that they have kedusha, and are not merely tashmishei mitzva like tzitzis.  For one thing, it could be that they are tashmishei kedusha, not tashmishei mitzva, and that might make a difference. 

I mentioned this problem to Harav Gedaliah Finkel of the Mir Yerushalayim, who brings the Netziv in the introduction to one of his many Imrei Gedaliahs.  Our families were very close, and we've known each other, since we were children here in Chicago. This is what he said.

Probably what the Netziv means is the etzem levisha of the bigdei kehuda [not the making of them] is the necessary hachana that made Aaron hakohen more muchsher for kedusha and avodos hakohanim.

Harav Gedaliah, l'aniyus daati, is right and wrong.  He is right in what he says, because the Netziv does say אשר מלאתי את אהרן רוח חכמה והוא יבין וישכיל מכח הבגדים איך שהם פועלים על לבו. But if that's all the Netziv said, it would be fine.  The problem is that he goes on to say 

מש״ה נצטוה בזה משה בעצמו שידבר אל כל חכמי לב. ולא בצלאל שזה הפרט אינו נוגע לחכמות המלאכה אלא לחכמת המוסר:

But the truth is, he could still be right.  Somehow, and I don't know how, the pshat is that the way they were made is po'eil on Aharon to become more kadosh.  In other words, they are more than a machshir, they are poeil al leiv Aharon, which is equivalent to things that have kedusha.  But then one might say the same thing about Matzah and Tzitzis.  Or, as I mentioned above, we can be mechaleik between tashmishei mitzva and tashmishei kedusha. I've  reached the end of the road. Either approach seems valid.  In any case, one thing I do know- that sometimes, more lishma means a better mitzvah.

UPDATE NISSAN PEI BEIS/APRIL 2022

I saw that Rav Rudderman, quoted in an Artscroll Hagada, says that all mitzvos need hachana, and the hachana makes a tremendous difference in the kedusha the mitzva imparts. He brings the Chasidim Harishonim before shmoneh esrei and our pesukei d'zimra; and what happened at Acheir's bris; then he brings two things from the Sforno. (Artscroll's deserved reputation for accuracy and interpretation speaks for itself, but I think that the raya from tefilla is tzarich iyun. He must have talked about the question and answer of the Gemara about תורתן היאך משתמרת)

Shemos 28:5 - that by the Bigdei Kehuna, even gathering the material needed lishma.

והם יקחו את הזהב וכמו שיכונו בעת העשייה כן יכונו כשיקחו את הזהב וכו':

and Shemos 38:21, that the 

משכן העדות ספר מעלות זה המשכן שבשבילם היה ראוי להיות נצחי ושלא ליפול ביד אויבים. ראשונה, שהיה משכן העדות, שהיו בו לוחות העדות. ב', אשר פקד על פי משה. ג', שהיתה עבודת הלויים ביד איתמר, כי אמנם משמרת כל חלקי המשכן ביד איתמר היתה. ד', ובצלאל בן אורי בן חור למטה יהודה עשה, שהיו ראשי אומני מלאכת המשכן וכליו, מיוחסים וצדיקים שבדור, ובכן שרתה שכינה במעשי ידיהם ולא נפל ביד אויבים. אבל מקדש שלמה שהיו עובדי המלאכה בו מצור, אף על פי ששרתה בו שכינה נפסדו חלקיו, והוצרך לחזק את בדק הבית ונפל בסוף הכל ביד אויבים. אבל בית שני שלא היה בו גם אחד מכל אלה התנאים לא שרתה בו שכינה ונפל ביד אויבים, כי אמנם בית שני לא היה משכן העדות, שלא היו בו לוחות העדות, ולא פוקד כי אם על פי כורש ולא היו שם בני לוי, כמו שהעיד עזרא באמרו ואבינה בעם ובכהנים, ומבני לוי לא מצאתי שם ומן המתעסקים בבנינו היו צידונים וצורים, כמבואר בספר עזרא:

all relating to the Maharsha and the Gaon on עצי שיטים עומדים in Yoma 72 and Reb Chiya's דעבדי לתורה דלא תשתכח מישראל in BM 85.

Titzaveh, Shemos 30:2. One by One, Square.

Describing the Mizbei'ach Hazahav,

א ועשית מזבח מקטר קטרת עצי שטים תעשה אתו.  ב אמה ארכו ואמה רחבו רבוע יהיה ואמתים קמתו ממנו קרנתיו.

"an amah in length, and an amah width, it shall be squared, and two amos its height...."
Shai LaTorah II asks that once we have been told that the top is one amah by one amah, to be told that it should be square seems unnecessary and repetitive.  It is redundant.

I asked this question at my kiddush, and got two answers.  One was that in Kodshim, there is a rule of שינה עליו הכתוב לעכב, that if a din is stated once, it is a mitzva, but if one fails to fulfill the instruction, the korban or utensil remains kosher bedi'eved.  Only if the mitzvah or instruction is repeated does it become essential to the kashrus of the avodah or keli.  By saying Rav'uah, the Torah has invoked the rule of שינה עליו הכתוב לעכב.  This sounds like a good teretz, but the Shai LaTorah brings an answer from Reb Chaim that evidently assumes that this answer is not correct.

The answer he brings from Reb Chaim is that from here we see that the din ravu'a by the mizbei'ach is not merely a result of being one amah by one amah, but an independent requirement.  His words-

על כרחך היוצא מזה דהא דהמזבח "רבוע" הוא, אינו רק תוצאה ל"אמה ארכו ואמה רחבו," אלא דהוא דין מיוחד שעל המזבח להיות רבוע.

I would explain Reb Chaim as saying that even if the dimensions of the mizbei'ach didn't matter, it would have to be ravu'ah.  It so happens, that besides the din of ravu'ah, the dimensions do matter, and they happen to be one long and one wide.  But the essential requirement of ravu'ah is independent of the din of the dimensions.

My wife answered the question by saying that a rhombus can also be described as having sides of one amah by one amah, so of course the Torah needed to tell you that the mizbei'ach had to be square.  The idea is that you can describe something as being one amah long and one amah wide even if the corners are not exactly ninety degrees.

Since she never reads this website, I can admit that she is making a good point.

Rabbi Dr. GS independently said that one by one might also describe a cylinder, but I disagree.  The only place in Tanach that I can remember where the dimensions of a cylinder are described is the Yam shel Shlomo, and the passuk there just mentions the diameter and the circumference- Divrei HaYamim II 4:2,

 ויעש את הים, מוצק  עשר באמה משפתו אל שפתו עגול סביב וחמש באמה קומתו וקו שלשים באמה יסב אתו סביב 

The Rabbi Dr. wrote back:

Could respond where it must be cylindrical it describes it in terms as per Yam shel Shlomo and if it must be square it says merubah

If left ambiguous then either shape would be acceptable 

(By the way, the previous passuk describes the Mizbei'ach Ha'Olah:

ויעש מזבח נחשת עשרים אמה ארכו ועשרים אמה רחבו ועשר אמות קומתו.  )

Another thing I was wondering about is why Reb Chaim didn't ask the question by the Choshen, which is described in 28:16 as being square, a zeres by a zeres- רבוע יהיה כפול זרת ארכו וזרת רחבו.

Teruma and Titzaveh; Shemos 27:20, Variations of Constancy: תמיד

In this week's and last week's parsha we come across the word Tamid many times.  Once you're on the lookout, you will realize that it is found here at a frequency far greater than anywhere else in Tanach.   What you may not realize is this:

The word תמיד appears in the Torah exactly 24 times, either as תמיד  or as התמיד .  How many of those times are in dinim of Kodshim?

Twenty three.

Of the twenty four in Chumash, twenty three are in dinim of Kodshim.  Every one of the seven 'HaTamids' is kodshim.  Of the seventeen 'Tamids' in the Torah, sixteen are Kodshim and one is not.  The sole exception is in Devarim 11:12.

אֶ֕רֶץ אֲשֶׁר־יְהוָ֥ה אֱלֹהֶ֖יךָ דֹּרֵ֣שׁ אֹתָ֑הּ תָּמִ֗יד עֵינֵ֨י יְהוָ֤ה אֱלֹהֶ֙יךָ֙ בָּ֔הּ מֵֽרֵשִׁית֙ הַשָּׁנָ֔ה וְעַ֖ד אַחֲרִ֥ית שָׁנָֽה׃ 

A land the Lord, your God, looks after; the eyes of Lord your God are upon it constantly from the beginning of the year to the end of the year.

In a case like this, it is obvious that the exception proves the rule: that the one ostensible anomaly actually teaches us something important about the other iterations.  I intend to speak about this at greater length in Vayikra, but I will put it briefly here:  תמיד is a state of being.  In an ephemeral, time-bound world, תמיד can truly apply only at its nexus with the eternal, where the physical and the spiritual are kneaded together.  Hashgacha Pratis is another manifestation of this integration.  The physical cannot be permanent; solidity is a symptom of impermanence.  It is that which appears to our senses to be insubstantial, the spiritual, that can be permanent.

The main focus of this post is to discuss the various meanings the word has, and also to analyze its place in the structure of certain sentences.

In these two parshios, the word תמיד is found regarding:
the Lechem Hapanim/Shulchan,
the Menorah,
the Choshen Hamishpat (twice),
the Tzitz,
the Korban Tamid (twice),
and the Ketores.

But 'Constant' is inconstant.  The meaning of the word varies with almost every application.  Sometimes it means constant/every night, sometimes it means constant/every twelve hours, and sometimes it means constant/every second of every day.  Sometimes תמיד means that the object itself should be constantly present, sometimes it refers to the object's effect, and sometimes constancy means there should be no lapse of attention.  In our parsha, Rashi mentions this twice: in 27:20 by the Menora and in 29:42 by the Olas Tamid.  Rashi in Chagiga 26b also discusses this, saying that תמיד in the Menora is like by the Olas Tamid and the Chavitin, that 24 hours shouldn't go by without them, but by the Shulchan, it means (according to the Rabanan in Shabbos 133b) constant without a moment's lapse.  In English, the words "continuous" and "continual"  and "constant" distinguish among various sorts of tamid, but in Lashon Hakodesh we often have single words comprising numerous variations, and we are expected to determine the specific meaning from drashos or context.

The Mizrachi and the Gur Aryeh in this parsha speak briefly about the variation.  Nothing I've seen is completely satisfying, and I wouldn't even bother trying to find the principle myself.  (In fact, the Mizrachi, Gur Aryeh, Malbim and others here assume that Tosfos in Chagia 26 argues with Rashi regarding the Menorah, that Rashi holds it means every night, and Tosfos holds it refers to the Ner Maaravi, but I don't see that is what Tosfos means.  Not only is Tosfos not arguing on Rashi at all, I think that Tosfos is reinforcing Rashi's pshat.)


Now let's talk about sentence structure.  Reb Shimon (Yoma 7b) says that regarding the Tzitz, in the passuk of והיה על מצחו ,תמיד לרצון להם the word תמיד is tied to the following words-- Tamid Le'Ratzon; Reb Yehuda holds it finishes the first phrase-- Ahl Mitzcho Tamid. ;Reb Shimon says a similar thing in another context in Menachos 23. The Shaagas Aryeh in Teshuvos OC 38 writes one of his oft cited pieces on the Rambam's psak regarding the machlokes on the Tamid of the Tzitz, as it applies to Tefillin טומאה דחויה בציבור כרב שמעון, אפילו אינו על מצחו מרצה כרב שמעון, לא יסיח דעתו מן הציץ ומן התפילין כרב יהודה.)


It's interesting that in the passuk in Devarim 11:12, the word תמיד can be read either way, too, and the Trop shows that it is read as the first word of the second phrase. There's an esnachta under the preceding word. 

(אֶ֕רֶץ אֲשֶׁר־יְהוָ֥ה אֱלֹהֶ֖יךָ דֹּרֵ֣שׁ אֹתָ֑הּ) תָּמִ֗יד עֵינֵ֨י יְהוָ֤ה אֱלֹהֶ֙יךָ֙ בָּ֔הּ מֵֽרֵשִׁית֙ הַשָּׁנָ֔ה וְעַ֖ד אַחֲרִ֥ית שָׁנָֽה׃

In Maariv, both at the end of the first bracha and at the end of the last bracha (Baruch Hashem Le'olam, which is not said in Israel, but is said in most places in the US,) there is a word that is called אין לה הכרע.  This means that we do not know whether it belongs at the end of the first half of the sentence or the beginning of the second.  This word is, of course, תמיד.  In the last bracha, it goes המלך בכבודו תמיד ימלוך עלינו לעולם ועד.  Tamid might mean בכבודו תמיד, or it might be intended to mean  תמיד ימלוך עלינו לעולם ועד.  Before saying "Ha, it can't mean the latter, because then it would be repetitive!" please note that the Magen Avraham in  OC 236 favors that way of saying it, without offering any explanation.  The Abudraham says like the Magen Avraham.  On the other hand, the Prisha there, and the Eliahu Rabba brought in the Machtzis Hashekel there, disagree and say it ends the first phrase.   Also, as I mentioned before, the word תמיד in the passuk in Devarim 11:12 seems redundant exactly as our sentence does- תמיד/mei'reishis hashana ve'ahd achris hashana is just likeתמיד/le'olam va'ed.

great Unknown said

we have a parallel construct in "la'ad ul'e olmai olamim [or olmai olmaya"," where no rephrasing is possible. Similarly, "l'olam ul'e olmai olamim."
It is possible that we are dealing here with olam hazeh and olam haba.

The Magen Avraham is particularly interesting to me because around eleven years ago, my father Ztz'l davenned on his father's yahrtzeit and said it like the Magen Avraham.  I heard it from him again a year later, but even without hearing it again, my father, who could finish any passuk in Tanach if you read him the first half, simply did not make mistakes.  I found it interesting that the Magen Avraham's opinion has survived in a world of homogenized nusach and "right way" "wrong way" attitudes.

So, coincidentally, the word תמיד in Maariv and in the passuk of the Tzitz is ein lah hechra.  This really doesn't mean that Reb Shimon and Reb Yehuda's approaches would yield different meanings to the sentence in Maariv, because it obviously depends on the context.  But certainly, the Magen Avraham's opinion echoes Reb Shimon's pshat in the passuk by the Tzitz, and also the passuk in Devarim, where it would make perfect sense as the end of the first phrase but is given the Trop as the first word of the second phrase.

Titzaveh, Shemos 28:29. The Urim Ve'Tumim and the Underpinning of Hashra'as Hashechina.

The Gaon in Aderes Eliahu in Zos Haberacha 8 on the Bracha to Levi תמיך ואוריך לאיש חסידך.

ותומים ואורים הוא נגד ב׳ קדושות שנתן הקב״ה לישראל המשכן והכהנים • המשכן נאמר בפ׳ תרומה ובגדי כהנים נאמר בפ׳ תצוה  • והקב״ה קידש את המשכן שקידש בלוחות שנתן מן השמים • ואת הכהנים קידשן מלמעלה באורים ותומים שהיו ג״כ מעשה שמים.

Hashem gave two kedushos to us, the Mishkan and the Kohanim.  The Mishkan is articulated in Parshas Teruma, and the Garments of the Kohanim in Parshas Tetzaveh.  Hakadosh Baruch Hu made the Mishkan holy by means of the Luchos that were given from Heaven.  He made the Kohanim holy with the Urim ve'Tumim which were also a work of Heaven.

Rav Meir Bergman, in Shaarei Orah, has a beautiful piece on this Gaon.  My presentation is somewhat different than his, but it follows his idea and structure.

The Gemara in Bava Basra 14a associates the words אפריון עשה לו in Shir Hashirim 3:9 אפריון עשה לו with the Aron Kodesh, (according to Rav Yehuda that it's a five tefach amma, and he's working with a pinky tefach, which is six etzbah.)

צא ופרנס ארון לרחבו כמה לוחות אוגדות בארון ששה טפחים נשתייר שם טפח ומחצה צא מהן חצי טפח אצבע ומחצה לכותל זה ואצבע ומחצה לכותל זה נשתייר שם טפח שבו עמודין עומדין שנאמר (שיר השירים ג) אפריון עשה לו המלך שלמה מעצי הלבנון עמודיו עשה כסף רפידתו זהב מרכבו ארגמן 

The end of that passuk says תוכו רצוף אהבה מבנות ירושלים, its interior is floored with love from the women of Jerusalem.   Reb Meir Simcha in Beshalach says

שאם הצבור נשחתין בעבודת גילולים ועריות, על זה נאמר השוכן אתם בתוך טומאותם. אבל בנמוסיות ומדות לשון הרע ומחלוקת על זה כתוב רומה על השמים אלקים, כביכול סלק שכינתך מהם 

that for Hashra'as Hashechina, the primary and fundamental requirement is that each and every Jew love his fellow Jews.  If the people do not heed Hashem's religious laws, Hashem can still dwell among them.  But if their humanism, their relationships with their fellow Jews degenerate, then Hashem removes His Shechina from the people and withdraws to Heaven.  Rav Bergman uses Reb Meir Simcha's idea to say that when the passuk in Shir Hashirim says תוכו רצוף אהבה מבנות ירושלים in connection with the אפריון, the Aron Kodesh, the message is that while the Luchos brought Hashra'as Hashechina and Kedusha to the Mishkan, the condition precedent, the catalyst that enabled the Luchos to do so, the foundation, the armature, was sincere  and unconditional fraternal amity.  The foundation was the אהבה מבנות ירושלים.

By the Urim Ve'Tumim, the passuk says ונתת אל חושן המשפט את האורים ואת התומים והיו על לב אהרון בבואו לפני ה' ונשא אהרון את משפט בני ישראל על ליבו לפני ה' תמיד.  The Torah describes the Urim Ve'Tumim as placed on the heart of Aharon. This phrase, “ahl leiv Aharon,” does not merely describe the placement of the Urim Vetumim. As we will explain, it describes the condition necessary for the Urim Vetumim to function.

The Yalkut here: R’ Shimon Ben Yochai says, the heart that rejoiced when Moshe was elevated to greatness will wear the Urim Vetumim. Rav Chaim Shmuelevitz here in the ma’amar “Sheves Achim Gam Yachad” says that this means that a heart that feels such empathy for others is fit to wear the Urim Vetumim. To understand the messages that come through it, one has to have complete sensitivity and sympathy for Klal Yisroel.

The Choshen only serves to amplify and augment that intrinsic empathy, which enables the wearer to correctly understand its messages, as I've written in a previous post on this parsha, here.

The foundation of the whole Torah and the necessary condition for Hashra'as HaShechina is “ve'ahavta l’rei’acha kamocha.”  זו היא כל התורה כולה ואידך פירושה  That simple passuk in Vayikra 19:18, ואהבת לריעך כמוך אני השם , is telling us a fundamental truth about השראת השכינה.

It is this trait, this Ahava, which Aharon Hakohen personified, that enabled the Urim Ve'Tumim to be mekadeish the Kohanim.  It is this national quality, Klal Yisrael's Ahavas Yisrael, that enabled the Luchos to be mekadeish the Mishkan.

Because this is a blog, and not a sefer, and I can do whatever I want, here's the Yale University seal, and the story behind it.  For those of you that thought I was going to be more circumspect after dropping my anonymity- circumspect, not hidebound.

Titzaveh, Shemos 29:14. Rare Korbanos. And, The Joyful Month of Adar, משנכנס אדר מרבים בשמחה.

The first part of this post is about Mishenichnas Adar Marbim BeSimcha, once Adar has begun, we increase our joy.  The second part of this post is focused Kodshim.  For the ninety nine percent of us that haven't learned kodshim seriously yet, I hope you enjoy the beginning, but I encourage you to get a chavrusa and buckle down.  Don't leave this world without having touched a very big part of the Torah!

Rashi in Taanis 29 says that we try to be more joyful in Adar because it is the month of the great miracles that saved our nation, Purim in Adar, which then leads into Nissan and Pesach.

The Sfas Emes there offers a different explanation which directly relates Av to Adar.  He says that in the month of Av we diminish our simcha because of the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash.  Adar, he says, is the converse of that event, because in Adar we joyfully used to give the Machatzis Hashekel, the annual half-shekel donation which was used to buy communal offerings and appurtenant utensils, and to pay for the maintenance of the Beis Hamikdash.

Reb Reuven Feinstein points out that the Gaon distinguishes Simcha from Sasson.  The Gaon says that Sasson is the celebration of a joyful experience or achievement.  Simcha celebrates a new opportunity to do wonderful things.  שמחים בצאתם וששים בבואם.  A chassan and kallah have both Sasson and Simcha, Sasson for what they've gotten, and Simcha for the opportunity to achieve more happiness and to do new and special mitzvos in the future.  Simcha is enthusiasm, Simcha is excitement.  Of course, we are forever grateful that Hashem saved us from our enemies.  But when we say Mishenichnas Adar Marbim BeSimcha, it doesn't mean just that we are happy about what happened in the past.  Simcha means we take the time to realize that this month gives us special opportunities to grow, to achieve, to contribute to the Geula and the Binyan Beis Hamikdash and the return of the Shechina to Klal Yisrael.  Charles DeGaulle, of a famously sober mien, was asked by a reporter whether he was happy.  He answered "What do you take me for, an idiot?"  He had a point.  Simcha that is satisfaction with what is is a dead end.  Simcha that is enthusiasm for what you can do is the beginning of a journey to greatness.  Marbim BeSimcha is not just commemoration; it is a celebration of an opportunity.  See to it that you really have something to celebrate: take advantage of the opportunity!  Be mechazek others, bring happiness to your friends and neighbors, raise the level of your community-  including the people who are not exactly like you.  Surprise someone whom you barely know with a nice Shalach Manos- not a trivial apple and grape juice.  Give a pastrami sandwich.  B'dieved, pizza will also do.  And don't forget the beer (the mature palate prefers IPA).

(It's been noted that the idea of Marbim does not necessarily apply to the first Adar in a leap year.  Indeed, the Yaavetz holds like that.  Others hold it does apply.  Since safek derabanan lekula, you don't have to be machmir to be marbeh simcha in Adar Rishon.  But you can be marbeh besimcha if you want to, and you won't be nikra hediot.)


AND NOW, KODSHIM.

There is a category of Korbanos called "The Nisrafim."  Unlike most korbanos, which are burned in the Beis Hamikdash, this category comprises Korbanos that, when correctly brought, are burned outside of Yerushalayim.  The only members of this group are:

פר העלם דבר של ציבור

פר ושעיר (העלם דבר של) עבודה זרה

(פר (העלם דבר של) כהן המשיח (ולא כהן  גדול מרובה בגדים

פר כהן גדול ושעיר של יום הכיפורים

All these korbanos are burned outside of Yerushalayim, outside Machaneh Yisrael.  (Yes, Para Aduma is also burned outside of Yerushalayim.   Parah Aduma is irrelevant to this discussion.  It is sui generis.)  These korbanos share one more element.  By most korbanos, the blood is applied to the exterior Mizbeiach, and absolutely not in the Heichal/Ohel Moed.  For these korbanos, however, the blood is applied in various places within the Heichal.

So we find two rare avodos in this group, which we will call A and B.  'A' is the avoda in the Heichal, and 'B' is burning outside the Machaneh.  

When we find association of two atypical characteristics, there are four possibilities:

A → B.
B → A.
Unknown C → both A and B.
Unknown C → A and Unknown D → B.

Evidence for the first linkage, that A causes B, is to be found in the case of a standard Chatas whose blood was inappropriately brought into the Heichal for the purpose of Kapara.  Such a Chatas is not eaten.  Instead, it must be completely burned, as are the Nisrafim listed above.  We see that A, bringing the blood into the Heichal, even where this is erroneous, results in B, the application of the rule of Nisrafim.  It is possible that this converts the exterior Chatas into an interior Chatas, at least to some extent.  Indeed, the Aruch Hashulchan in Kodshim 122  speculatives that bringing it into the Heichal elevates the kedusha of the blood and renders it unfit/overqualified for the lower-kedusha external Mizbeiach.

In fact, the Sfas Emes (Zevachim 82) says a remarkable thing.  Although we hold, like Rebbi Eliezer, that External Chatas blood brought into the Heichal with intent to do the blood avodah there is enough to render it unfit, Rebbi Shimon holds that only actually using the blood in the Heichal renders it unfit.  The Sfas Emes says that there is a world of difference between Rebbi Eliezer's "Unfit" and Rebbi Shimon's "Unfit."  Rebbi Eliezer holds that the korban becomes useless and deconsecrated.  Rebbi Shimon, he says, holds that using the blood in the Heichal generates a kapara for the owner of the korban, although we have to burn the meat outside of Yerushalayim.  The former understands the result to be a derogation, a deconsecration, of the korban.  The latter understands it to be a conversion from one form of Chatas to another, such that the korban is then burned, but the owner gains the intended benefit of the korban.

What does all this have to do with Parshas Titzaveh????

This parsha describes the Miluim, the inauguration of the Mishkan, which included the investiture of the Kohanim.  This involved certain Korbanos.  One of these Korbanos was a Par, a bull, as a Chatas.  The service of this korban was the same as that of any other Chatas, namely, that lines of blood were placed on the corners of the top of the Mizbei'ach, but there was one aspect of this korban that is unique.  It is the one and only exterior Chatas that is burned outside the Machaneh.  In other words, it is the only Chatas whose blood is not placed on the interior mizbei'ach that must be burned outside the Machaneh, and not in the Azara.  Rashi notes this fact in  Shemos 29:14.

וְאֶת בְּשַׂר הַפָּר וְאֶת עֹרוֹ וְאֶת פִּרְשׁוֹ תִּשְׂרֹף בָּאֵשׁ מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה חַטָּאת הוּא, and Rashi says  תשרף באש: לא מצינו חטאת 

 חיצונה נשרפת אלא זו

Reading just this Rashi will leave you with the wrong impression, because there actually was one other such exception- the calf Chatas brought by Aharon on the eighth day of the Miluim.  There Rashi says the same as he says here, that the only exterior chatas's that are burned outside the encampment are that calf and our parsha's bull.  The two are essentially the same, in that they were both investiture Chata'os, one for Kohanim in general, and one for Aharon alone.  (Yes, the korban Chatas that invested the Leviim in Be'haaloscha was also burned.  But I believe it was burned like an Olah, on the Mizbei'ach.) Now this is a classic case of a Gzeiras Hakasuv, a halacha that clearly will defeat any attempt to understand it.  Nonetheless, it does seem to contradict our assumption that burning the internal  chataos is tied to the avoda being done in the Heichal.  Here, the avoda is not done in the Heichal, and it was burned anyway.  But this morning, when I was saying the shiur, I mentioned the Rashi, and someone pointed out that it might be incorrect to say that the unique aspect of this korban is that it is burned outside the machaneh even though the blood avoda in in the Azara.  The chidush might be that although it is a par of the kohen gadol, like that of Yom Kippur, and therefore needs to be burned outside, nonetheless the blood is put on the exterior mizbeiach. To review: We assumed that bringing inside for avoda results in burning outside the Machaneh.  A leads to B.  It is possible, though, that an unknown external factor, C, results in both A and B.  This was shown to be unlikely from the case of an exterior Chatas whose blood was brought into the Heichal for Avodah, so that an undesired A occurs, and the result is B.  Clearly, then, we cannot say that A and B are the results of some outside X.  It seems clear that A results in B.  But if so, how are we to understand the Chatas of Miluim?  There is no A, and still there is a B.  So we might say either that yes, A does cause B, but some other factor can also cause B, or that A and only A causes B, but here, by the miluim, what seems to be non-A has the same effect as A.  So the question is rephrased.  Why, by the Miluim, is an outside Avoda essentially the same as an inside Avoda? And the answer to this comes partially from Ramban, but mostly from the Netziv. The Ramban says that these Miluim Korbanos were really forms of Kapara for Avoda Zara, and so are included in the standard category of Se'ir Avoda Zara.  The Netziv argues and says that they must be Par He'elam Davar shel Tzibur, a similar idea.  But why was the blood on the outside Mizbei'ach? The answer is, as the Netziv says in Shemos 40:9 DH Vehaya Kodesh, that there were No Avodos Pnim until the eighth day of the Miluim, because until then, only the outside Mizbei'ach had been annointed and only it had kedusha- and that kedusha happened to be Kedushas Bama.  According to him, there was no concept of Avodas Pnim until then, or, alternatively, Chutz had the same din as Pnim, because ein pnim mimenu.  Now if Chutz could serve as Pnim, this all makes sense.  Yes, the Miluim had the din of Par He'elam Davar, or Se'ir Avoda Zara.  Therefore, their avodas hadam resulted in Sreifa outside the Machaneh.  The fact that this was done on the outside mizbei'ach didn't matter.  The definition of A is either that the Torah requires an avoda called Zerikas Pnim, and this type of Zerika was done, or that in fact the zerikas dam was done in the Heichal.  Here, the avodas hadam of these korbanos was A.  So even though it was done on the outside mizbei'ach, it had a din of Zerikas Pnim.  Other chata'os done on this mizbei'ach had a din of Zerikas Chutz.  But for these unusual korbanos, what was done was a kiyum of a requirement for a Zerikas Pnim, and so it is called A.  And A results in B. And if that's not marbim be'simcha, I don't know what is. (please note that I am not interested in discussing why these korbanos are burned outside the machaneh.  I am not qualified to discuss that, and I am not at all interested in listening to people who think they are.) I tried to use the Gemara in Rosh Hashanna 26a, that Shofar, which comes l'zikaron, is like pnim, but as attractive as it sounded, it turned out to be a dead end.

Tetzaveh, Shemos 28:30. The Urim VeTumim, Halacha, and Another Ancient Minhag Explained

Rashi Yoma 73b- the Urim VeTumim was the written name of Hashem, placed within the folds of the Choshen, by means of which the Choshen was enlivened with divine knowledge. The Ramban says that the Kohen Gadol would concentrate on the "Urim" names of Hashem, and letters would light up on the Choshen, but he would not yet understand what the letters signified. He would then concentrate on the "Tumim" names, and this would inspire him with the understanding of how to combine the letters and what they meant. Rashi in Yoma understands it differently; that Urim means the letters lit up and made a statement that the Kohen Gadol immediately should understand, and Tumim means that the message thereby received was Tamim- immutable and permanent. But everyone agrees that the Choshen was a line of communication with Hashem, and the statements of the Choshen/Urim VeTumim were a message from Hashem.

Targum Yonasan in passuk 15 says that the Choshen would reveal dinim that were concealed from the Poskim, the judges. In passuk 30, too, he says that the Kohen Gadol would seek Hashem's teaching through the Choshen.

With this, we understand the passuk in Malachi 2:7-- "ki sifsie Kohen...vetorah yevakshu mipihu ki malach Hashem...hu." The Baal Haturim in passuk 15 says that Eifod is gematria malach; the Medrash in 38:3 says that hte kavod rendered to Aharon was that he was dressed "kimalachei hashareis." The malach in the passuk in Malachi is the Kohen Gadol, whose bigdei kehunah, the Choshen, enabled him to answer hitherto unanswerable questions.

So that's the Targum Yonasan. But does everyone agree? Of course not.

There is a stirah in Rashi's shittah itself. Rashi in Eiruvin 45a says "midi de'isur ve'hetter lo mesha'ali be'urim vetumim," matters of isur and hetter were not asked of the Urim VeTumim. But Rashi in Eiruvin 63a says "she'haya asid Yehoshua li'hyos tzarich lish'ol devar halacha mei'Eliezer." The implication is that the questions to Eliezer would be answered by the Urim VeTumim, contrary to Rashi on 45a.

Similarly, the Brisker Rov in Temura 16a: In the Gemara about the three thousand halachos that were forgotten in the days of mourning for Moshe Rabbeinu's death, the Gemara says that the people told Pinchas "She'al!", "Ask". The Griz says pshat that it is impossible to say that the "ask" meant to ask for the forgotten halachos by means of nevu'ah, because no navi can ask Hashem questions except Moshe Rabbeinu, who said "Imdu vi'eshma'a mah yetzaveh Hashem." Nevi'im don't ask, they passively hear what Hashem chooses to impart. Instead, the "She'ahl" meant that he should ask through the Urim VeTumim, and Pinchas answered that he could not do that, because "Lo Bashamayim Hie." That works well with the second Rashi in Eiruvin, and not so well with the first, and not at all with the Targum Yonasan.

The Maharit'z Chiyus discusses this issue to some extent in his pirush on Ta'anis 4a, and he also has a sefer, Toras Hanevi'im, in which he discusses all these sources except for the Targum Yonasan, as well as how Asniel ben Knaz was able to re-create the forgotten halachos; he brings from Rashi in Ta'anis (ibid) that Asniel used Ru'ach Hakodesh, and he brings from the Yefei To'ar in Chayei Sara that Ruach Hakodesh is okay, while Nevuah is not, and he argues both misvara and from a Gemara in Yoma.

The Mechilta here in 22:7 says

 ונקרב בעל הבית . שומע אני לשאול באורים ותומים. תלמוד לומר אשר ירשיעון אלהים. לא אמרתי אלא אלהים שהם מרשיעין.

Similarly, the Chasam Sofer in the last teshuva in OC says that Ruach Hakodesh is only a factor in the sense that it evokes iyun and siyata dishmaya, not as evidence of the truth of a shita.

Even a halacha taught in a dream is a problem that has been widely discussed.
The Chida in his שו"ת יוסף אומץ פב says that if the Mechaber had seen the שאלות ותשובות מן השמים from Rav Yakov of Marvege, יעקב, ממרויש, he would have paskened that women make a bracha on Zman Grama.
נראה ודאי דאילו מרן ז"ל שלטו מאור עיניו הקדושים בתשובות רבינו יעקב ממרוי"ש, דמשמיא מיהב יהבי כח לברך לנשים, ודאי כך היה פוסק ומנהיג
These words have occasioned a degree of surprise, considering BM  59b by Tanur Achna'i.  Indeed, the Shibalei Haleket 157, the Noda Biyehuda YD II 30, and the Shach YD 333:sk25 and 336:sk2 all say that dreams are of no weight in psak.  But all this is not a kashe on the Chida, because he's talking about the Mechaber, who does pasken on that basis, as we see in OC 651:9, where he paskens on the basis of a dream of the Rikanti that we must hold the arba minim together during the naanu'im.

As for the Targum Yonasan, unfortunately, textual issues and questions of authorship have limited its citational authority. And the second Rashi in Eiruvin might mean that Eliezer simply was a bigger talmid chacham, or remembered certain things that Yehoshua forgot. In any case, the only clear raya we have is the first Rashi in Eiruvin, which stated that the Urim VeTumim could not answer halachic questions, and the Griz's assumption that this is what the Gemara in Temura means as well. Thus, the only questions one could ask the Urim VeTumim were matters of fact or safety or success. If the question revolved on issues of halacha, the Urim Vetumim could not be consulted.

The Ketzos in his introduction has a very worthwhile and interesting discussion of this concept. Harav Dovid Goldberg in his sefer on Chumash also discusses the Targum Yonasan and the tzushtell to Sifsei Kohen.

So this is another example of that remarkable rule, Lo Bashamayim Hee. Even thought the Kohen Gadol had access to the perfect truth of divine knowledge, he was not allowed to ask for halachic guidance. The Torah is a Matanah from Hashem, and now it is ours. It's ours to interpret, and guard, and live, and it is we who are to make of it what we can.

Reb Moshe and the Chazon Ish both have said something that, to me, is somewhat similar. They said that Rishonim that have been unearthed in Genizos and libraries have no halachic standing, and can only be used to support a svara said independently. Even if we know for a fact that the same Rashba we rely on in Bava Kamma wrote a pirush on, let's say, Maseches Bechoros, we would not rely on it lehalacha. To have standing in halacha, the sefer has to have gone through the crucible of Klal Yisrael's history. This, too, follows the idea that Klal Yisrael, the nation, its historical experience, and its gedolim, form the reality of the Torah, and nothing can be superimposed on that reality, not historic analysis, not newly discovered evidence of what the Tanaim or Amora'im meant, not Nevi'im with their Nevu'ah, not the Beis Din Shel Ma'alah itself. Emes Mei'Eretz Titzmach.

Life is so strange. Sometimes, we stand in awe, as we realize that we have been exposed to one of those marvelous and mysterious coincidences! Now that we've brought down the interesting limitation on the use of the Urim VeTumim, we begin to understand one of life's great mysteries.
Of all the four parts of Shulchan Aruch, which is the part that people pay least attention to? Which part is so little adhered to that it is like a Sadeh lo avar bah Ish? Well, certainly people honor the laws of Orach Chaim. We are all meticulous in regard to tefilla, chametz, tefillin, and so on. Yoreh Deah? Of course. We would never eat treif or be over on Taharas Hamishpacha. Even HaEzer? Very much so; except for maybe yichud and some harchakos, we are, in general, very careful with these dinim of kiddushin, gittin, Isurei Kehunah, and so on. But what about Dinei Mamonos? Meh. Are we so makpid on Be'yomo titein scharo? Are we meticulous about paying halva'os bizmanam and lo sihyeh lo kenosheh? How about Ani hame'hapeich becharara and Hasagas Gevul? In business, are we as honest as the day is long? Yes, we are. December 21st. But why is this so? Why do so few people take what it says in Choshen Mishpat seriously? Now you know why! Because "Ma'aseh Avos Siman LeBanim!" The original Choshen Mishpat of the Kohen Gadol was not meant to be used for Halacha le'maaseh either! Minhag Yisrael, for millenia, has been that you're not supposed to look at the Choshen Mishpat for shailos in Halacha.

On a serious note: There is a sefer written by Rabbi Yitzchak Sender (author of The Commentator's series) called Machazeh Elyon, about all aspects of Nevu'ah. His very last piece in the sefer deals with this issue, and he shtells tzu many excellent mekoros, such as Mantzepach, where the gemara asks, how could the Anshei KH introduce them, if Lo bashamayim hee, and the Gemara answers "shakchum vechazru veyasdum," and Rashi says ahl yedei ruach hakodesh. He has a very interesting mehalach in the difference between ein navi and lo bashamayim, and cases where neither might apply. It's really worth getting the sefer.

Te'tzaveh, Shemos 29:42. Asher iva’eid lachem shama (the Mizbach Ha’olah.)

Rashi says that there is a machlokes whether the Shechina spoke to Moshe from above the Kapores of the Aron, or from the Mizbach ha’olah. (This is based on the last Braisoh in Maseches M’leches Hamishkon, but we have a girsa there that there are three shittos: Kappores, Mizbei’ach Hazohov, and Mizbei’ach Ho’oloh.) Reb Meir Simcha here says that this is the machlokes as to which kedusha is greater, that of a Beis Knesses (which mirrors the Mizbei'ach, because tefillos k’neged korbonos tiknum), or that of a Beis Medrash (the Aron Hakodesh, which contained the Luchos.) (He also talks about this in Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:2.)

(Also, see Rosh Hashonnoh 31a, where the Gemora says that the source of the voice of the Shechina changed with the deteriorating spiritual level of Klal Yisroel, initially from the Kapores, and changing until it finally emanated from the Midbar.)

But this is very hard to understand. There are psukim (Shemos 25:22 and Bamidbor 7:89) that unequivocally state that Hashem spoke to Moshe from the Kappores! What pressing need was there for Chazal to offer alternatives to the clear and straightforward meaning of the passuk?

The answer is that it is less important to know where Hashem is being mashreh His Shechina than to know how and where we, as individuals, will be able to perceive it. Hashra'as Hashechina may be more common than we realize, it may even be pervasive; it is we who are not receiving the signal. As Dante wrote, as translated by Jean Hollander in the new edition of The Paradiso,
The glory of Him Who moves all things
pervades the universe and shines
in one part more and in another less.
The Hashra'a, the potential, might be universal: the 'zohar,' however, requires a complete circuit, it needs proper reception to function. When Avraham asked Eliezer and Yishmael what they saw on Har Hamoriah, and they said they saw nothing, he told them "Shevu lachem poh im hachamor." If you, who grew in my household, don't see that the Shechina is on that mountain, then there is something wrong with your receiver-- you are 'Ahm hadomeh le'chamor.' And as Yaakov said as he woke from the dream of the Ladder, "Yeish Elokim bamakom hazeh...v'anochi lo yadati." So the question of "from whence issues the voice of Hashem?" is really a distraction, because the more important question is "where do we need to be in order to hear that voice." The answer to this question is, that some people learn how to hear God’s voice through tefilla– through their emotion and enthusiasm, and through mitzvos ma'asiyos, represented by the Mizbei'ach. Some people hear God’s voice through their limud hatorah, their rational faculty, represented by the Aron and the Luchos.

The pesukim that say that the voice emanated from atop the Kappores are stated in the singular and addressed specifically to Moshe Rabbeinu. Hashem spoke to Moshe Rabbeinu from atop the Luchos. Shemos 25:22- "ve'noaditi lecha sham vedibarti itcha...", and Bamidbor 7:89-Ube'vo Moshe...vayishma es hakol midabeir eilav...." But for the majority of the people, the "lachem" of our passuk, Hashem speaks to them through their Avodah, their mitzvos ma'asiyos, their tefilla.

Pascal once said that “Human beings must be known to be loved; but Divine beings must be loved to be known." (This is an interesting insight into the relationship between the word "da'as" and love; not only do we see this by Adam and Chava, Reb Moshe in his first Darash, in a drasha for Shabbos Hagadol, uses the same connection where Avraham said "Bamah eida ki irashena.") Chazal, lehavdil, are telling us that while it is true that some need to love Him in order to know Him, others need to know Him in order to love Him.

But it’s very important to realize that there has to be a complete Beis Hamikdosh. Nobody can know what it is to hear Hashem through pure reason; many philosophers have tried and failed; as the Arvei Nachal says in his criticism of pure reason in last week’s parsha and many other places. He says that “Knowing Hashem means knowing that you don’t know“ (umosar ha’adam min hab’heimah ayin.). Similarly, one can’t come to Hashem simply through emotion, because uninformed emotion is foolishness and walks in the forest and wild dances and all kinds of destructive delusion. A person with only one aspect is a cripple. (My father, HK'M, once told me that a young bochur came in to the Beis Medrash in Slabodkeh/Litteh, with the reputation that he knew Kodshim. Everyone was amazed, because Kodshim was reserved to mature talmidei chachomim. His chavrusa, Reb Leizer Platzinski, said, in five minutes I will tell you whether he deserves your hispailus: when you see a man walking on his hands, there are two alternative explanations: either he is an athlete or he is a cripple. If he can walk on his feet as well, he is an athlete. If he is walking on his hands because he can't walk on his feet normally, then he is a cripple and to be pitied. If this boy knows Nashim and Nezikin, then he's an illui. If he doesn't, then he's just abnormal.) You have to have a complete Beis Hamikdosh, with an Aron and a Mizbei’ach, you have to have a complete and healthy body with all its faculties. Then your relationship with Hashem might grow especially great in one respect and develp a primary focus on emotion or on mitzvos ma'asiyos or on reason.

As far as the Braisa we have, which says three shittos– Kappores, Mizbach ha’olah, and Mizbach Haketores – one might say that this reflects how different people most readily perceive holiness:
Some people hear the voice of God speaking through His Torah; Some people hear the voice of God through doing mitzvos maasi’os; Some people hear the voice of God through emotion. Respectively, these are the Aron, the Mizbach Ha’Olah, and the Mizbach HaKetores.
(I am reminded of what Gandhi once said; "There are people in the world so hungry, that God cannot appear to them except in the form of bread." Unfortunately, there is no shittah that the Shechinah spoke from the Shulchan. But the idea is certainly relevant, that it is through something that a person most thirsts for that he can perceive God, which is, to some extent, connected to Pascal’s idea.)

N.B.
1. Contrary to the assertion of a pestiferous anonymous correspondent, quoting Pascal (and Dante)does not make me Catholic, quoting Gandhi does not make me a Hindu, and quoting both of them does not make me Gil Student, and indeed the latter would not be so hideous a fate.

2. Others have said teirutzim on this kashe, all wonderful, but, to my mind, ranging from the interesting to the obscure to the byzantine. I strongly encourage you to look at the other teirutzim, and to decide which teretz is best supported by the pesukim themselves and least requires suspension of disbelief.

Te'tzaveh, Shemos 28:30. The Urim Ve’tumim.

Ho’Urim ve’es HaTumim Vehoyu al Leiv Aharon. The Urim Vetumim were on the heart of Aharon. This phrase, “ahl leiv Aharon,” does not merely describe the placement of the Urim Vetumim. As we will explain, it describes the condition necessary for the Urim Vetumim to function.

The Yalkut here: R’ Shimon Ben Yochai says, the heart that rejoiced when Moshe was elevated to greatness will wear the Urim Vetumim. Rav Chaim Shmuelevitz here in the ma’amar “Sheves Achim Gam Yochad” says that this means that a heart that feels such empathy for others is fit to wear the Urim Vetumim. To understand the messages that come through it, one has to have complete sensitivity and sympathy for Klal Yisroel.

The Choshen only serves to amplify and augment that intrinsic empathy, which enables the wearer to correctly understand its messages. He connects this to the story in Brochos 31b with Eli Hakohen. When Eli told Chana that she was a drunk— shikora— she answered “lo adoni...” And the Gemora there explains “lo odon atto bedovor zeh, giliso be’atzmecho she’ein ruach hakodesh shoreh olecho sheteida she’eini schuras yoyin.” You are not a master in this matter, you have revealed that the divine spirit is not resting on you, for then you would know that I am not drunk, but rather I am overwhelmed with emotion and I am praying with total concentration. The pshat is that if Eli did not have the necessary sympathy to discern that she acted as she did because she was davening with great kavono because of her emotional desolation, he could not correctly interpret the message of the Urim Vetumim. He thought it said "shikora," drunk, when it actually said "kesarah," like Sarah, who also prayed to have a child.

The lesson is that you need the “leiv Aharon” in order for the Urim V’tumim to work. I once heard a nice story about empathy from my father shlitah. The Baal Shem Tov once said that he learned ahavas Yisroel from a drunken peasant. Two drunken peasants were staggering through the street, holding on to each other, saying "John, you are my best friend!" "Ivan, you are my best friend!" Suddently, John pushes Ivan away and kicks him. Ivan, shocked, said, "John, why did you kick me? I am your best friend!" And John said, "I was sick last week, why didn’t you visit me!" Ivan answered, "But John, my best friend, how was I supposed to know you were sick? I didn’t know you were sick, I don’t see you every day!" John yelled at him, "You call yourself my friend? Why didn’t it hurt you when I was sick?"

On the topic of empathy: see the Radvaz in the Rambam Aveilus 14:1. The Rambam talks about the mitzvos of gmilus chasodim, and the Radvaz says that the mitzvah to be mesamei’ach choson vekallah is tied to the five kollos of matan Torah (Brochos 6b), and then he brings the Gemora in Shabbos 31 from Hillel that “desoni loch lechavroch lo sa’avid.” The Radvaz means to explain the connection between the mitzvah of being mesamei’ach choson vekallah and the kabolas hatorah— that desoni means that you have to feel the other person’s feelings as if they are your own. Since desoni is such an essential part of the Torah, as Hillel said, a person that really feels the ‘sharing of the joy of another person’ and who, by sharing the joy of the choson and kallah increases their simcha, is zocheh to Torah.

My son’s Sheva Brochos recently took place during a terrible snow storm. People were stuck on highways all over, cars were in ditches, and walking five inches outside was challenging, to say nothing of driving. Despite all this, most people that were invited did come to the Sheva Brochos. I was very moved by this unambiguous demonstration of caring and love, and the first thing I spoke about was the mitzvoh of Birkas Hagomeil. The Gemora in Brochos 44 says that if a friend sees you and says a birkas hagomeil on your recent recovery or redemption, and you say omein, you are no longer obligated to make your own birkas hagomeil. The gemora asks, but you need a minyon? And answers, yes, there has to be a minyon there. And the gemora asks, but you need sheim umalchus? And answers, yes, he used sheim umalchus. This is brought in Orach Chaim 219:4. The Ramoh adds a very interesting thing. He says that the friend’s brocho is not l’vatoloh, even though we don’t find that people have to make such brochos on their friends’ nissim, since it is a birchas shevach v’hodo’oh “ahl tovas chaveiro she’somei’ach boh.” The Mishneh Bruroh in 18 brings the Taz that explains that with the words "she’somei’ach boh” the Ramoh limits the relevance of this halochoh to a relative or friend who is truly happy about the recovery or salvation of the person; if, however, he is not truly joyful in his heart, and he only made the brochoh for appearances sake, for the sake of being social (mipnei hasholom), then it is a brochoh l’vatoloh, and he had better not use the sheim umalchus. The Taz makes us face an obvious but unpleasant fact. It is not natural for us to rejoice in our friends’ successes. Nobody questions our sympathy and commiseration for a friend’s loss, but that is a feeling that is relatively easy to achieve. Who knows? Maybe, deep down, we think, better him than me, and are relieved at our escape, maybe it’s a little schadenfreude. But whatever it is, the fact remains that it’s easier to sympathize with a friend’s misfortune than to rejoice at his success or recovery or redemption. The initial and natural emotion upon seeing a friend’s success is envy. It sounds sick, but that’s the fact. R’ Mottel Pagremansky is quoted as saying that to sympathize, you need to be a mentsch, but to be happy with another’s success, you have to be a maloch.

Think about how this plays out in our daily lives. We all know of families that know each other, and who each have a daughter in shidduchim. One girl goes out with a boy, and immediately the other family resents it. We heard about him first! How did they get him and we didn’t! They must have paid someone off! Instead of thinking, Boruch Hashem, it should be with hatzlochoh, we will find what is bashert for us, they think they have been cheated.

But this is not what the Torah wants. For us, the foundation of the whole Torah is “veohavto l’rei’acho komocho.” Besides the issur of coveting a neighbor’s property, the Torah says we must rejoice in his successes as if they were our own.

Some readers will say to themselves that this is a ridiculous and naive idea, and that no human being can feel this way. We would be lucky if we feel that close to our immediate relatives. But to feel this way towards anyone but your spouse or your children is unnatural and abnormal. They are probably right. But we are obligated to overcome this natural feeling and become Torah people, not just natural people. This is the trait that Aharon represented, towards which we should aspire, and which we should all work to achieve.