Va'eschanan, Devarim 6:13. Honoring Hashem and Talmidei Chachamim

"את ה' אלוקיך תירא"  tells us that we must fear Hashem, and that our behavior must reflect that fear.  For example, the Mishna Berura in 215:20 says that because of this passuk, one who casually enunciates Hashem's name, one who says Hashem's name in a manner that evinces a lack of fear and awe of Hashem, transgresses an issur De'Oraysa.   (I mention this to anticipate the argument that the passuk only discusses the emotion, and that an act is merely a symptom of a lack of fear.  From here we see that the passuk (as a whole) addresses equally heart, mind, and action.)

This passuk is the subject of a famous difference of opinion between Shimon (or Nechemiah) Ha'Amsoni and Rebbi Akiva.  This is in several places in Shas, and the first in Kiddushin 57a.

שמעון העמסוני ואמרי לה נחמיה העמסוני היה דורש כל אתין שבתורה כיון שהגיע (דברים ו) לאת ה' אלהיך תירא פירש אמרו לו תלמידיו רבי כל אתין שדרשת מה תהא עליהם אמר להם כשם שקבלתי שכר על הדרישה כך קבלתי על הפרישה עד שבא רבי עקיבא ולימד את ה' אלהיך תירא לרבות תלמידי חכמים

Shimon the Amsoni made a career of interpreting the word "Es" as a term that expands the explicit terms of the passuk.  For example:  We are all familiar with the rule that Tevilla requires that our hair be in the mikva as well as our body.  This is not explicit anywhere in the Torah.  However, the Gemara (Eiruvin 4a) says 

שערו נמי דאורייתא הוא דתניא ורחץ את כל בשרו את הטפל לבשרו וזהו שער

that from the words "Es b'saro" we learn that not only does his body, his Basar, require tevilla, but even that which is secondary to his body, namely his hair, requires Tevilla as well.

 But when he came to Parshas Va'eschanan, and he saw our passuk, he abandoned his thesis that "Es" expands the passuk.  Rashi explains that Reb Yishmael thought, מה ארבה לירא עמו?  What can I possibly include in fear of G-d?   There is nothing that can possibly be compared to the fear of Hashem!    His talmidim asked him, Rebbi, what of all the drashos you've taught us?  He answered, just as I was rewarded for interpreting, so too shall I be rewarded for relinquishing.  But then (in the next generation) came Reb Akiva and interpreted that our passuk teaches us to fear talmidei chachamim.

Reading the Gemara immediately elicits some obvious and important questions.  What did Reb Akiva know that Reb Yishmael did not?  Or, alternatively, what is the machlokes between Reb Yishmael and Reb Akiva?  And more interesting, what did Reb Yishmael do with the many, many instances prior to this passuk that use the word "Es" with Hashem's name?  In fact, right in our parsha, eleven psukim before, the passuk says לְמַעַן תִּירָא אֶת ה' אֱלֹקיךָ.  What did he do with that "Es" that he couldn't do with this one?

Rabbi Shain, a Rebbi in Yeshiva of Staten Island, in his excellent sefer "Birkas Ish" (in Parshas Miketz), shows us a clear answer to this question that ironically answers nothing at all.

We find, he says, that Onkelos translates אֶת in several ways.  In Breishis 37:2 by הָיָה רֹעֶה אֶת אֶחָיו בַּצֹּאן, וְהוּא נַעַר אֶת בְּנֵי בִלְהָה וְאֶת בְּנֵי זִלְפָּה he translates both Eses to mean עם, with.  In Shemos 9:29, he translates ויאמר אליו משה כצאתי את העיר as from/מן.  Of course, most of the time Onkelos translates את as ית.    It is clear that when את  has a function in the passuk, Reb Yishmael doesn't darshen it as a ribui at all.  It is only the את that means ית that Reb Yishmael darshens as a ribui.

In the context of Hashem's name, he notes that in Breishis 44:18, Yosef said to his brothers .אֶת הָאֱלֹקים אֲנִי יָרֵא; In Shemos 1:17 it says וַתִּירֶאןָ הַמְיַלְּדֹת אֶת הָאֱלֹקים; and in Shemos 14:31 it says וַיִּירְאוּ הָעָם אֶת .  Examining these cases, we find that in every iteration of   "את השם", Onkelos translates it either as מן קדם השם or קדם השם.  The first and last time that Onkelos translates it differently is "את השם", where he translates it to mean ית השם.

So this definitely answers the question.  It is only את that means ית that Reb Yishmael darshens as a ribui.  Even the  קדם and מן קדם have a function in pshat in the passuk.  The one and only time that את means ית in the context of Hashem's name is our passuk, which Reb Yishmael would have had to darshen as a ribui.

The question remains, what is the difference in this passuk from every other similar passuk that made Onkelos translate it to mean ית and not מן קדם or קדם.

Now:
Reb Yonah Valler, in his Kanfei Yona in this week's parsha, says that he understands the Machlokes between Reb Akiva and שמעון העמסוני as similar to the machlokes between the Rambam and the Geonim on chatzitza of hair.  We mentioned above that from the words ורחץ את כל בשרו we learn that when you go to the mikva, you are required to be tovel your hair as well as the rest of your body.  Thus, dirt or knots in the hair that prevent contact with the water raise a  Chatzitza issue.

Generally, the rule of Chatzitza is that רובו ומקפיד, something that covers a majority of the object, and the person doesn't want it there, it is a chatzitza mid'oraysa.  How do we define majority of the surface of a person?  The Rambam holds that we add the surface area of the hair to that of the body, and a majority of that sum is called a majority.  The Geonim hold that the hair is viewed separately, and if a majority of the hair is covered, even though it's a tiny minority of hair plus body, it is a chatzitza de'oraysa.  (We pasken like the Geonim.)

The Ran in the Rif's hilchos Niddah explains the machlokes like this:
The Geonim hold that since we darshen Es to mean hair, it's like two pesukim:  an explicit passuk for "body" and an implicit one for "hair".  Therefore they hold that if the majority of the hair is covered, it's a chatzitza.  The Rambam holds that even after the drasha, all we know is that the hair is counted as appurtenant to the body, so we add the surface of both to determine if the chatzitza covers a majority.

Thus, he says, if you say like the Rambam that the Ribui of Es to add another implicit but coequal and equivalent element, there's no way that we can include talmidei chachamim in our passuk.  Talmidei Chachamim are not coequal with the Ribono shel Olam.  This is the shitta of שמעון העמסוני.  If, however, you say like the Geonim, that the ribui of Es only says that along with A you have to also consider B, then there's nothing wrong with saying that Es by Hashem includes Talmidei Chachamim.  This is the shitta of Reb Akiva.

He adds that this explains why the Rambam in Shoresh II in Mitzvos brings that the Bahag holds that the fear of Talmidei Chachamim is counted as a mitzva separate from fear of Hashem.  The Rambam argues and says that it is appurtenant, not coequal.  This, of course, is the Rambam leshitaso by tevilla of hair.  Es is only appurtenant, not coequal.

So now, let's get back to our question.  שמעון העמסוני knew of our passuk when he started darshening the word Es back in Breishis, and it apparently never bothered him.  What changed?  There can only be two explanations:  That he used to think it meant מן קדם, so you don't have to darshen it as a ribui at all, or that he always knew it meant ית and that it was a ribui, but he used to hold like Reb Akiva that it means appurtenant, not coequal.

TBC

(just to get this Yetzer Hara out of the way, I need to mention that in Yeshivos, they say pshat in Reb Akiva's  chiddush of לרבות תלמידי חכמים is that even a Talmid Chacham needs to be a Yarei Shamayim. The idea is that a talmid chacham should not rely on his gadlus batorah and think he is safe from the yetzer hara. He, too, must remember to work on his yiras shamayim.)

Va'eschanan, Devarim 6:7. Ve'shinantam Le'vanecha.

The mitzva of Limud Hatorah is derived from here and from Vehaya Im Shamo’a’s ‘Velimadetem’ below in Devarim 11:19.

Reb Akiva Eiger in the teshuvos (starting at #29) discusses whether kesiva is ke'dibbur, whether writing has the same halachic status as speech, regarding Oaths, Counting the Omer, and other things. Reb Akiva Eiger holds that it is not ke’dibbur, and that you do not fulfill the mitzva of Talmud Torah by thinking the words of Torah.

He brings a contrary opinion from Teshuvos Shev Yakov, who holds that it is ke’dibbur. The Shev Yaakov brings proof to his opinion from the halacha that one who thinks in learning does not have to make a Birchas Hatorah, but one who writes Torah does have to make a bracha. The difference must be that thinking is not the same as speech, but writing is, and therefore requires birkas hatorah. But Reb Akiva Eiger shlogs op the raya. He explains that we learn the Mitzva of Talmud Torah from the words veshinantam and velimadetem; both of these words mean both to study and to teach. This is why we exclude thinking, hirhur, because you can’t teach anyone Torah by being meharher in learning. On the other hand, when you write, you certainly can teach others through your writing, and therefore it is included in the mitzvah of talmud Torah. Thus, the Shev Yakov’s raya is not good; The Shev Yaakov held that the Mitzva is dibbur, and the difference between thinking and writing is that thinking is not like dibbur, while writing is like dibbur. Reb Akiva Eiger explains that by Torah, there is no din of dibbur at all. The only din is that it has to be a limud which could be used to teach others. This is the only reason that we are mema’eit hirhur. But in the case of other dinim, like sefira or sh'vua, which do require dibbur, ke'siva would not be enough.

We see from here a very interesting thought; that limud hatorah has to have in it the ability to teach others. Limud which is not spread, or a lomeid who does not make an effort to teach others, is missing the ikkar of talmud Torah. If a person learns Torah, and has no influence on the people around him, there is something wrong with his Torah. If your children are not at least as great as you- relative to their capacity and the circumstances-- then it’s a raya that your own limud hatorah was flawed

☞Note, also, that R’ Akiva Eiger wrote the tshuva on the day he got married, as he says in the beginning of the tshuva

Rabbi Moshe Kletenick of Seattle once spoke at his nephew's bris, and said that he heard once that the Rambam in the Yad somewhere says that one brings his child to Hakhel “leiro’os bo,” to be seen with his child. He said over that this means that the parent brings the child to demonstrate that he is a shomer Torah, and he shows that by bringing a child that is being properly raised to do mitzvos.

Sanhedrin 99a: “kol halomeid Torah ve’eino melamda harei zeh bichlal ki dvar Hashem bazah.” One who learns Torah, and does not teach it to others, he is included in the phrase "the word of God he has disgraced."

So whenever we learn, we need to remember that we can't pat ourselves on the back and say that we're good boys, we've been mekayeim the mitzva of Talmud Torah. The Mitzva of Talmud Torah is far deeper and broader than learning alone. It includes learning, incorporating the mitzva so that it is a part of our mind and our emotions, bringing what we've learned to our real life, and teaching others what we've learned. We say this every day in Birchos Kri'as Shma: Lilmod, le'lameid, lishmor ve'la'asos.

In a guest post, Rabbi Doctor Psychrolutes marcidus brought an Reb Yosef Ber Soloveitchik's amazing diyuk that the Rambam is meramez exactly this thought in 1 Talmud Torah:1-4. See http://havolim.blogspot.com/2009/07/land-of-free-part-ii.html


~

Va'eschanan, Devorim 4:39. Ve'yadata hayom Ve'hasheivosa el Levavecha: The Mind and the Heart.

This pasuk tells us that we should know- ve'yadata- that Hashem is the One and Only Master of the Universe. Then, the pasuk tells us, 've'hasheivosa el levavecha,' set it firmly into your heart. Clearly, the second step goes beyond the first, and one might know Hashem's kingship and still not achieve what this pasuk requires of him. What is the difference between 'knowing' and 'setting firmly into the heart'?

In fact, though, there is a very important qualitative difference between the two points of knowledge. Reb Yitzchok Blazer, a student of Reb Yisroel Salanter, once said that the distance between Ve'yadata and V’hasheivosa is far greater that the distance between Lo Yadata and Yadata. From Lo Yadata to Yadata, from 'not knowing' to 'knowing' is a relatively small step. From Yadata to Ve'hasheivosa, from 'knowing' to 'knowledge of the heart' is an Odyssey.

Just knowing something is not at all the same as a full emotional understanding. We have all experienced the difference: This is like when a person tells his best friend, or a father tells a son, close your eyes, lean back, and fall into my arms. Even if you absolutely trust the person behind you, it will be very hard to actually fall and depend on the person to catch you. Only after a few false starts can you convince your body to let go and fall into the other’s arms. It’s not enough that you know— your body has to be convinced.

Reb Eliyahu Dessler (Michtav Mei’Eliahu Vol. 5, on the avoda of Rosh Hashanna.) stresses this difference, which he categorizes as the difference between rational awareness and ‘dveikus’. He says that this journey is the avoda of Rosh Hashanna: if you properly say Malchios, Zichronos, and Shofros, you will come to devykus, which will make teshuva a foregone conclusion. If the dveykus does not lead to remorse and full teshuva for past sins, then your enthusiasm and kavana is just an ephemeral experience, a caprice, a delusion.


This applies just as well to negative or destructive beliefs or behaviors. In the Haftorah of Devorim the Navi talks about sins that are Kashanim and sins that are Katola. Both shanim and tola refer to red-dyed wool Despite their similar appearance to an observer, there is an very important difference between them. R’ Meir Simcha says that Shanim is wool that is only dyed on the surface, so teshuva can result in brilliant white like snow, whereas Tola is red through and through, and teshuva can only result in the less pristine white of Tzemer. This illustrates the difference between an act or behavior that is superficial and one that saturates the personality.

The Darash Moshe and the Ramban observe that the Meraglim in Shemos Shlach 13:3, were listed lefi gedulosom, in the order of their spiritual achievements. But strangely, we find that Yehoshua and Kaleiv are in middle of the pack. Despite the apparent superior tzidkus of the others over Yehoshua and Kalev, what mattered in the end, when faced with nisayon, was the depth of conviction, the emotional saturation, the dveikus— the hasheivoso el levavecha.

What really is the difference between yedi’ah of the mind and yedi’ah of the heart? One example: a woman may know absolutely that married women cannot go outdoors with her hair uncovered. But she might sit in mixed company and talk about private matters that concern only her and her husband. Or, strangely enough (and I’m not making this up), swim at a mixed pool– with a snood to preserve her standards of modesty. People who never miss davenning in shul can let years go by without one Shmoneh Esrei in which they pour their hearts out to Hashem. What the heck are they doing there? The only possible explanation is that simply knowing something means that you know the thing and nothing more. Knowing it in your heart means that you understand and feel the underlying concept and you have made it a part of your emotional and intellectual essence. When a person has reached that level, then everything he does will subconsciously be checked for consistency with his essential belief.

A friend of mine has a talent often associated with "savants." He can tell you immediately what day of the week any date, past or future, will fall on. He doesn’t hesitate for a moment– he knows immediately. There is a certain complex formula that anyone can laboriously work out that will yield the same result. I am told that if a person works through the formula hundreds, or maybe thousands, of times, he eventually develops the intuitive, subconscious skill to know the answer without any apparent thought at all, just as my friend does. That is the difference between ve’yadata and ve’hasheivosa ehl le’vovecha.

And how can you tell who is a tzadik misafa v’lachutz and who is a tzadik in his pnimiyus? You can’t. Not only can’t you tell in other people, you can’t even tell in yourself. It’s like courage— you never know what you are until you are tested, as is well illustrated in Stephan Crane's The Red Badge of Courage. Not only can’t you tell, it is almost unknowable; the Torah (and Sefer Iyov) is full of stories of people who were tested, after which Hashem says “Atta yadati” that you are a real ba’al bitochon. Appearances mean little. Only after being put to the test can one know who he is.

When we put on our tefillin, let us remember this important idea, perfectly symbolized by the Shel Rosh on our head, the straps of the shel rosh that go down to our heart, the Shel Yad next to the heart, with the straps that go down to our hands: it is not enough to 'know'. Torah has has to go from your Head to your Heart to your Hands.