Vayeishev, Breishis 37:12. Shechem.

 Breishis Rabba 79:7:

שלשה מקומות שאין אומות העולם יכולין להונות את ישראל לומר גזולים הן בידכם ואלו הן מערת המכפלה ובית המקדש וקבורתו של יוסף

.

There are three places that the gentiles cannot say we stole: The Me'aras Hamachpeila, the Beis Hamikdash, and the Burial ground of Yosef.  Each of these places were purchased from their indigenous owners; The Machpeila by Avraham Avinu from Ephron the Hittite, the Beis Hamikdash by David from Aravna, also known as Arauna the Jebusite, and the burial ground of Yosef.  The "Burial Ground of Yosef" refers to the area described in Parshas Vayishlach, Breishis 33:18-19, wherein Yakov purchased land in Shechem from the sons of Chamor- the Chamor whose son, also named Shchem, later kidnapped and assaulted Dinah.  So it is synonymous with the city we call Shechem.

It is perplexing 

• that Chazal are worried about what the Gentiles would approve of and what they would not, as if we should aspire to their ethical standards.

• that Chazal think that Kibush Milchama, the Right of Conquest, which was universally accepted until the twentieth century, and which is still recognized by victors, would not legitimize our claim, as is does for the rest of the world throughout history.

• And do Chazal really think that these old bills of sale eliminate any denial of our right to be there?  The same way the first Rashi in Chumash's Rabbeinu Yitzchak's argument (אמר רבי יצחק לא היה צריך להתחיל [את] התורה אלא (שמות יב ב) מהחודש הזה לכם, שהיא מצוה ראשונה שנצטוו [בה] ישראל, ומה טעם פתח בבראשית, משום (תהלים קיא ו) כח מעשיו הגיד לעמו לתת להם נחלת גוים, שאם יאמרו אומות העולם לישראל לסטים אתם, שכבשתם ארצות שבעה גוים, הם אומרים להם כל הארץ של הקב"ה היא, הוא בראה ונתנה לאשר ישר בעיניו, ברצונו נתנה להם וברצונו נטלה מהם ונתנה לנו:) hasn't done us much good, this one hasn't helped either.  Recently, the imbeciles and murderers at UNESCO declared that two of the three listed in the Medrash, namely, the Me'aras Hamchpeila and the Har Habayis, are mosques whose Islamic background is at least as significant as their association with the Jewish people.  In order to rip our hearts out, they also threw in Kever Rachel.  They didn't even bother with Shechem and Kever Yosef.  Mamesh a stirah to the Medrash! We need to let them know!

Reb Tzadok in his Pirush on Chumash in Vayishlach 33:18 [9] brings from the Zohar (Chelek Beis 125:1) that in order to generate a spirit of holiness, an area needs to be purchased and the full price must be paid.  This, of course, illuminates the deeper meaning of our Medrash.  Reb Tzadok says that the unique quality of the Me'aras Hamachpeila was that prior the the investiture of kedusha in the Har Habayis, the graves of tzadikim were the place of Hashra'as Hashechina, as we find (Sotah 34b) that Kalev prostrated himself on the kevarim in prayer.   I am totally incompetent in this area, so the Zohar's illumination of the Medrash leaves me in the dark, and I will leave it to people who know something about it.

Coincidentally, I saw a  Chasidishe sefer (by Rav Asher Zelig Grinzweig, who happened to be a great man; he is the grandfather of the wife of Ephraim Oschry, who wrote the introduction, and he died at Auschwitz with simcha in the mitzva of mesiras nefesh) that brings from an earlier Chasidishe sefer that when a person buys a new house, he should bury a silver coin in the road near the house and say out loud- in a polyglot of Yiddish, Hebrew, and Aramis- that he's buying the house from the S'A (אני לוקח דיא קרקע בייא אייך מתהום ארעא ועד רום רקיע).  (Just because the man who wrote the sefer was a tzadik and Rosh Yeshiva who died ahl kiddush Hashem doesn't mean I have to like chasidishe maises.)


Whatever the Zohar and the Medrash mean, let's accept this as a premise:  These purchases were prerequisite to the invocation of some exceptional kedusha.  But what about Shechem?

Reb Tzadok explains that Shechem was the first dwelling place of Yakov on returning to Eretz Yisrael, and Yakov wanted to invest the area with a special kedusha of Techumin of Shabbos, and this is why he needed to purchase it.  But still, we have to ask, why did it come out that this special event took place in Shechem?  Was there something special about Shechem that led to its being the first city to be invested with kedusha?

So Reb Tzadok brings the Gemara in Sanhedrin 102a.

וילך רחבעם שכם כי שכם בא כל ישראל להמליך אותו תנא משום ר׳ יוסי מקום מזומן לפורענות בשכם עינו את דינה בשכם מכרו אחיו את יוסף בשכם נחלקה מלכות בית דוד

Reb Yosi taught: Shechem is a place that is predisposed to calamity.  In Shechem Dinah was tortured, in Shechem the brothers sold Yosef, in Shechem the kingdom of David was torn asunder by Yeravam and Rechavam.

Reb Tzadok explains that these three sins are manifestations of the three fatal scourges: Kinah/jealousy, Taavah/desire, and Kavod/haughtiness.  The story of Dinah represents a failing of Taavah.  The sale of Yosef stemmed from Kinah.  Also, he brings Makos 10a that in Shechem, murder was common, which, he says, also stemmed from kinah.  The division of Klal Yisrael into two kingdoms was the result of (Sanhedrin 101b) Yeravam's unwillingness to subordinate himself to the family of David- Kavod. 

Reb Tzadok says that it only by utilizing the kedusha of Shabbos as a means to connect one's self to the kedusha of the Three Avos can a person overcome the three deadly traits of Kinah, Taavah, and Kavod.  This is why Yakov purchased land in Shechem and made Techumin for Shabbos there.  By doing so, he invested it with the kedusha of Shabbos, and enabled us to overcome the three deadly traits.

You surely noticed that the Medrash that started this discussion alluded to Shechem by saying that it was the burial ground of Yosef.  You have to wonder what that has to do with this.  According to Reb Tzadok, it was simply the first place where Yakov dwelled upon returning to Eretz Yisrael, and it needed a special refu'ah for the spiritual illness to which it was prone.  But is there some relationship between its special character and the fact that Yosef was buried there?  This, Reb Tzadok does not discuss.

When I brought this up at our Shabbos Morning Kiddush, a very smart person proposed an excellent explanation.  Yosef represents the ability of a spiritually superior human being to completely overcome any taint of these three flaws.

• Yosef's flight from the wife of Potiphar was, by our standards, a superhuman act.  It's hard enough to fight the yetzer hara of arayos at home; it's doubly hard when in galus, away from your family and your society.  It's almost impossible when you have to fight not only the yetzer hara, but also the yetzer hatov, which was the case here, as Rashi says about the motivation of Potiphar's wife.  Yosef represents the ability to overcome Taavah.

• Yosef represents the ability of a human being to eliminate kinah from his heart.  Did Yosef not realize that wearing the Kesones Pasim, that talking about his dreams, endangered him?  He did not, because the concept of Kinah was so entirely foreign to his experience that it did not occur to him that he should wary of eliciting it in his brothers.  He was above kinah to the extent that Yosef is called "Alei Ayin," which Chazal (Brachos 20) explain means he was immune to Ayin Hara.  Only one who has vanquished his own Kinah is immune to the Ayin Hara.

• Yosef represents the utter victory of humility over pride.  When he interpreted all the dreams, he did not claim superior wisdom; he attributed his abilities to Hashem.  When his brothers came to Mitzrayim, he hugged them and kissed them and told them to not worry about what they had done to him, because it was the will of Hashem and resulted in his being able to take care of them, to feed, clothe, and house them.  His suffering was not important, his high position was not important, all that mattered was his ability to take care of his brothers.  Yosef's supernal humility is a lofty example for the world beaters, the wealthy, the greatest philanthropists, and gedolei Torah, because he was all of these things and remained perfectly humble.

It is for these reasons that Yosef is buried in Shechem.  We look at Yosef and learn that it is not the fate of all humans to fall victim to these three flaws.  With tefilla and zechus avos, we can overcome them, as Yosef did.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

The certain wise person is my wife, the daughter and granddaughter of Roshei Yeshiva and Gedolei Olam.  If hearing a woman's Torah thoughts bothers you, I refer you to the picture directly above the Labels column.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Off to Israel

I'm going (a foot of snow and forty mile an hour wind permitting) to Israel for Chanuka iy'h to connect with  the past and to embrace the future. Have a lichtige Yomtov!

Earlier posts on the Parsha;

Jewish wives are not and never were chattel.
How the Torah retained certain pre-Torah forms but entirely redefined their substance.

A little boy- a Na'ar- at sixty years old.
Being patronized is not an insult when it is done by your patron.

The danger of a dream fulfilled.
Thank G-d you don't always get what you want.


All the love wearing the Kesones Pasim brought Yosef.
A thought about the strange prayer said during Birchas Kohanim.

No good deed goes unpunished.
Why Yosef's kindness to the sons of Bilha and Zilpa didn't win him any friends.

Is it appropriate to inscribe your name on the things you donate to a Shul?
It seems self-serving, but it has ancient roots.

Vayeishev, Breishis 38:1-end. Yehuda and Tamar and Yibum. (Edited for Intelligiblilty)

Reb Yakov, in his Emes LeYakov, has a a very interesting interpretive description of how Yibum-Levirate Marriage- was done before Matan Torah. Especially interesting is his addendum in the back of the sefer. There, he explains that in the Pre-Matan-Torah Yibum, (as the Ramban says,) the father of the man who died was the first choice to be me’yabeim (which is absolutely forbidden in our law of Yibum), and the son he fathered from his son’s widow took the name (which is totally unnecessary in our law of Yibum) and status of his late son (also no longer relevant). Reb Yakov says that this Pre-Matan-Torah perspective is reflected in the words of our Matan-Torah Parsha of Yibum, even though it no longer has any halachic relevance. As Rava in Yevamos 24a says, that the pasuk of “ve’haya habchor asher etc” is learned completely not kipshuto—unique in all the Torah, we totally disregard the literal meaning of the pesukim in the parsha of Yibum. Reb Yakov says that this is because the pasuk, the Torah she'biksav, is written kipshuto of the halacha before Matan Torah, reflective of the Historic Pre-Matan-Torah Yibum, but shelo kipshuto, in reliance on Torah she'Baal Peh, for the Halachic Post-Matan-Torah Yibum with which we are familiar.

R’ Yakov was a very brave man. He must have realized how dangerous it is to suggest that the behavior of the Avos imperfectly foreshadowed the Torah, or that the Torah Law of Har Sinai was a modification of what the Avos did, as if there was an evolutionary process of discovery involved, an incremental socio-spiritual evolution leading to revelation, or that the Torah She'Biksav reflects a no longer pertinent halachic position. The orthodox view is that the Avos did voluntarily everything as was later revealed and commanded on Har Sinai, (with some little exceptions that need to be explained away, such as Yakov marrying Rachel and Leah, or the Prashas Derachim's derech in the machlokes Yosef and the Achim). I bet that some day someone is going to asser R’ Yaakov’s sefarim because of this me’halach.

But now that Reb Yakov has taken that risk, I would like to suggest another application of this concept. We all know that kiddushin, the formal act which creates a state of marriage, can be done in three ways, as the first Mishnah in Kiddushin states. The most common method is by giving the woman a ring, or any item of value. This is derived from a gzeirah shava from Avraham Avinu’s purchase of a piece of land: just as one can execute a transfer of ownership of land by formally handing an object of intrinsic value to an agreeable seller, one creates a state of marriage by formally handing an object of intrinsic value to a woman. For as long as I can remember, I have had to deal with people who complain that the language of the Torah, the laws of Kiddushin, and the means of transacting Kiddushin, are reminiscent of the purchase of chattel. Many people have taken this misapprehension and built upon it a view that Chazal did, indeed, view a wife as the property of her husband. This is incorrect. It is incorrect and wrong-headed and dumb.

I say 'dumb' in the sense of willfully insensate. Despite the language of Shelo asani Isha, despite the pe'tur of zman grama, and despite the fact that divorce is by Torah law under the exclusive purview of the husband, anyone impartially and thoroughly reading the whole of Rabbinic literature will know that this is nonsense. If one finds the endless stories in Tanach and in the Gemara insufficient to demonstrate the domestic parity of husband and wife, the reaction is most likely symptomatic of a need to rationalize one’s disrespect for Chazal by demeaning them and viewing them as as primitives. But, in any case, here are some examples.

• Gittin 39b. If the Gemara isn’t clear enough, see Rashi there DH "Ve’kadaykis Minah.” This Gemara, and Rashi, state unequivocally that a husband has no (zero, nill) monetary ownership in his wife. All the rules that a woman’s income go to her husband are for her benefit, in that they come with equivalent and counter-balancing obligations on the part of the husband. Furthermore, any woman that wants to remain independent during marriage has the unfettered ability to negotiate that right prior to the marriage. 
• The Avnei Milu'im (44:4)  makes this point as well, that the reason the kiddushin of a woman who is married is meaningless is because she's chayvei krisus to the second person, not because she's already the property of the first person..  
• If the husband does not make it clear to his wife before marriage that he retains the right to plural marriage, he does not have that right. 
• According to most poskim, a woman may unilaterally declare her financial independence during the marriage even absent prenuptial agreement. 
• Furthermore, the Torah obligations of spouses weigh heavily on the husband and barely on the wife at all. The Torah obligation of a husband is to provide “she’eir, kesus, and ona,” meaning room, board, clothing, and marital relations. A wife’s obligation is to live in the city her husband chooses, and to participate in marital relations.  (Reb  Moshe makes this point in the Igros and Dibros repeatedly.)

Having said all this, why does it still look like you’re buying something? A man gives a woman an item of value and says "Harei aht mekudeshes li." She gives nothing. Orthodox Jews do not do double ring ceremonies, at least not under the Chupa. We learn this from "Ki Yikach Ish Isah," when a man will "take," or, one may translate with equal validity, "purchase", a woman, just as a man "takes" or "purchases" a parcel of land. So why is there such a disconnect between the formality of the chalos kiddushin and the halachic and social reality of kiddushin?

Perhaps we can explain this with Reb Yaakov’s approach. Perhaps before Matan Torah, wives were, indeed, purchased. Prior to Matan Torah, a wife was legally viewed as her husband’s property, and kiddushin was a purchase no different than a land purchase. BUT Matan Torah redefined marriage. The essence of marriage became completely different. Even so, the form of executing a state of marriage was retained. Despite the very different concept of what marriage means, and the essential difference between the significance of pre-matan torah and post-matan torah marriage, the method of bringing about a state of kiddushin remains the same.

Now, if I read this somewhere, I would suspect the author of being shelo be'dara de'una. But the fact is that this is no more radical than what Reb Yakov says about Yibum. In fact, if you think about it for a minute, you might want to consider whether the two ideas are associated; it was with the changed definition of Marriage, (whether one belongs to the other or that it is a mutual benefit relationship of equals, whether the physical superiority of the man is a determinant, or the spiritual equality is the more relevant,) that the definition of Yibum changed as well. (As the Comment from "Brisker" points out, this is also indicated in the Rambam's description of the different character of informal pre-MT marriage and formal Matan Torah marriage.) The change in Yibum was concomitant with the change in Marriage. This is the "requires some thought" part of this week's vort.

(Full disclosure:  Although I brought the Avnei Miluim 44:4 above to support my point that a woman is not acquired by her husband, many achronim disagree with the Avnei Miluim, such as the Dvar Avraham (3:10), Reb Elchonon (Kovetz He'aros 3), and the Chazon Ish (EH 148 but I don't remember where there.).

Vayeishev, Breishis 37:2. Na’ar.

The passuk refers to Yosef as a "na'ar," a child. Rashi says that he was 17 years old, and the term na'ar would normally not apply to a young man of 17. He was called na’ar because he did ma’asei na’arus– he was too self absorbed, he carefully combed his hair and looked in the mirror. As the Medrash says, later, when Yosef was tempted by the wife of Potiphar, the Satan was looking for a weak spot in Yosef's personality. When the Satan saw Yosef so carefully grooming himself, he said "Hadein Didi Hu," "This one's mine."

I heard an interesting thing in the name of the Imrei Emes; (The yichus of the vort is that I heard it from Harav Yisroel Hersh Nekritz who heard it from Rav Jaeger of Shaar Yashuv.)

The Imrei Emes would pay a visit to the Rov of any town he came to. On one such visit, he told the local Rov a Rov the following vort on this passuk.

This is not the only time we find the the word "na’ar" applied to an older person. At the akeidah, Avraham told Yishmael and Eliezer "ואני והנער נלכה עד כה..." There, too, the Torah refers to the 37 year old Yitzchak as a na'ar. Why is there no discussion of teh incongruity of his being called na’ar? The answer is that there is a big difference between the Torah calling you a na’ar and your father calling you a na’ar. To a father, you’re a na’ar no matter how old you are, and that’s just the natural thing to be called.

As he was leaving the Rov’s house, an elderly almanah called out to the Imrei Emes, Rebbe! Give me a bracha! So he gave her a bracha. Then she said, "Rebbe, ah bracha fahr der kind!" (a bracha for the child.) Der Kind, her son, was in his seventies, but to her, he was a na’ar. So the Imrei Emes was able to demonstrate the truth of his vort on the spot.

Just a side comment:
Although speakers of Yiddish assume that the Yiddish word Na'ar (child/juvenile) is related to the Germen Narre (fool), this is not the case. The similarity is coincidental. Whether the Yiddish word, Naar, developed from the Hebrew or the German is utterly unknowable. It is, of course, most likely that the conceptual and linguistic resonance of the two homophones encouraged the incorporation into Yiddish. See here,  Paolo Agostini's comment.  (Here's what he says, in case of link rot:)
However, I'd like to point out that IMHO the Yiddish word nar [נאר] 'a fool' 
(e.g. haltn/shteln tsum nar, 'to make a fool of'; narn 'to deceive, to 
fool', narish 'foolish, silly, stupid, dumb', narishkayt 'folly, 
foolishness', etc.) has nothing to do with Hebrew na'ar  [נער] 'boy, lad, 
youth; servant' etc. The Yiddish word is a borrowing from German Narr 
(Middle High German: narre, Old High German narro) 'fool, crazy' (zum Narren 
halten/stellen 'to make a fool of s.o.', narren 'to fool s.o.', Narrheit 
'tomfoolery', etc.). On the other hand though, the origin of the German word 
is unsure, since it does not occur in other Teutonic languages. It is 
thought to derive from late Latin nario 'Nasenruempfer, Spoetter', i.e. 
's.o. who turns up his nase, s.o. who makes fun of s.g., mocker'. In fact, 
in OHG times the word was also used in the meaning of 'court jester, court 
fool'. 

Vayeishev, Breishis 37:3. The Kesones Pasim.

What ‘chein’ did the ksones bring Yosef? Not very much, of course. The gift of the ksones brought down on Yosef an avalanche of tzoros (Shabbos 10b--ba’avur mishkal shnei sla’im milss....) So why, if receiving the ksones triggered the jealousy of the brothers and the ensuing hardship for everyone involved, do we ask, during birchas kohanim, that Hashem should bring us chein in everyone’s eyes, as happened when Yakov dressed his son in the ksones hapasim? What kind of brocho is that? Do we want to be thrown into a pit of scorpions and sold like a dog?

Of course, the main reason we refer to the story of the kesones pasim is because saying 'pasim' enables us to safely enunciate the letters of the Sheim Hashem that is in Birchas Kohanim. But it does also have to make sense, and certainly we would not ask for something that resulted in such suffering.

Rashi here says that the word 'pasim' stands for Potiphar Socharim Yishme’elim and Midyanim. Perhaps this means that with the ksones came a brocho that ultimately saved him from all these threats, and so the ksones was a good thing. Even so, why ask for a refu’ah which causes the makkeh that it heals?

But see Rav Rudderman’s sefer Sichas Levi in this parsha where he discusses the hashgacha pratis in the mechiras Yosef, and stresses that we, humans, are nearsighted, and only see what is immediately apparent, constrained in time and place. The story of Yosef teaches us that we must learn to think in broader terms. Things may be incomprehensible in the particular, but perfectly clear in the broader perspective. All that a person experiences is a part of a great plan of how Hashem leads the world, and suffering leads to yeshu’os and nechomos--our reactions are like those of a patient who feels anger against the anaesthesiologist for piercing his arm with a needle. Thus, the kin’oh and mechiras Yosef was a great brocho, despite the suffering along the way for Yosef and Yakov. Similarly, the Medrash in this parshas says that the seuda the brothers ate after the mechira foreshadowed the fact that what they had just done would result in the placing of Yosef into a position in which he was enabled to save countless people from starvation.

In truth, the ksones did bring chein to Yosef, and it probably was this quality of the ksones that generated the jealousy. If so, the ksones is just like any brocho, which brings kin’ah from others. This is why every brocho of the birchos kohanim has a second part which asks that Hashem protect us from the negative effects that receiving a brocho can have, e.g., yevorechecha, ve’yishmerecha (min hamazikim which might come after the brocho is received). We always ask for a brocho even though we know that if the brocho is fulfilled, others might envy us for our happiness and success.

I was talking to Reb Shmuel Faivelsohn several years ago, and he said that Yosef, when wearing the ksones, did have chein, but his brothers refused to see it because of already-existing hatred— a form of denial, which is the refusal to see a reality because of the emotional trauma accepting it would cause. This is what we mean with the words “be’einei kol ro’av”. The brothers were not ‘ro’av’.

Vayeishev, Breishis 37:2. Yosef’s Friendship with the Children of Bilha and Zilpa: No Good Deed Goes Unpunished.

Rashi says that the other brothers did not respect the children of the shfachos, and so Yosef was careful to spend time with them and show them his respect. See also Rashi in Breishis 50:16-when the brothers sent a message to Yosef, claiming that Yakov had left a tzava’a instructing Yosef to not take revenge, they sent the message with the children of Bilha, because Yosef was close to them-“ragil etzlam”.

So where were they when the others planned to kill, and then sold, Yosef? Why didn’t they defend him? Of course, the bnei hashfachas had the same complaint against him when he brought what they considered to be loshon hara to their father, but it is clear that there was a failure of sympathy happening here.

Rashi in Breishis 49:5, d’h Shimon v’Levi, says that Yakov, when he was giving the brachos, said that it was Shimon and Levi who were the primary instigators of the plot against Yosef.  Rashi demonstrates that this is the case because Reuven and Yehuda wanted to save him; the bnei hashfachos “lo haysa sin'asan shleima” because Yosef had befriended them; Yisachar and Zevulun would never have taken a stand in the presence of the older brothers; so it must have been Shimon and Levi. But even though their ‘sin’ah’ was not ‘shleimah,’ they participated enough to be considered equally guilty.

But simple observation shows that the pariah, when given a chance to join the dominant group by attacking someone even more disfavored, will join the attack with the greatest zeal. Along the same lines, the Lutzker Rov in Aznayim Latorah in parshas Mishpatim talks about a freed slave being the worst taskmaster. The psychological tactic in play is that the former slave is expressing his anger and relieving his memory of powerlessness and frustration by causing others to suffer. In order to validate his treachery, he will recast his erstwhile benefactor’s solicitude as patronizing.

I have heard that Rav Pam used to keep a stone on his desk. A talmid asked why it was there, and he said that there are some people for whom you do a chesed, and with the passage of time, they turn around and want to stone you; he kept the stone on his desk in the hope that at least they should use a small stone instead of a big one.

I would suggest that a solution to this problem that you should communicate your feeling that it is your honor and privilege to be able to help them; or, use the Rambam's (10 Matnos Ani'im 9, הנותן למי יתן ולא ידע העני ממי לקח. כגון גדולי החכמים שהיו הולכין בסתר ומשליכין המעות בפתחי העניים. וכזה ראוי לעשות ומעלה טובה היא) "high level of Charity" simply out of a need for self preservation: ensure that the beneficiary of your chasadim does not know who you are.

Vayeishev, 37:22. Reuven’s advice to not kill Yosef.

In this passuk, Reuven convinces the brothers to not kill Yosef immediately, but rather to throw him into a pit. In the next possuk it says that his intention was to come back later and bring him home. Later, Yehuda told them not to kill him, but to sell him instead, and they listened to him (37:26-7). After the brothers sold Yosef, it says that Yehuda left his brothers, and Rashi (38:1, Medrash Rabboh 42:3) brings from Sottah 13 that they demoted him from his gadlus, and blamed him for not telling them to bring Yosef back home. They said, if you had told us not to sell him, and to bring him home, we would have done that.

Think about that. The brothers were implacable in their intention to rid themselves of Yosef. It was only with Reuven’s and Yehuda’s intervention that they didn’t carry out their even more malicious and violent plans. And now they complain, and strip Yehuda of his leadership position, for not talking them out of it completely? They should have kissed his feet for at least stopping them from murdering Yosef!

The mussor haskeil, the lesson to be learned, is that leadership ability is a gift, but it is a gift that imposes an absolute obligation. A leader does not merely have the ability to lead, but instead he has a personal obligation to his community to lead them. A community is like a body, and you can’t expect the hands to do what the eyes do, nor the heart the work of the mind. The leaders are the “einei ho’eidoh,” the eyes of the community. Everything they could have prevented, but did not, is their fault.

The brothers were, then, justified in their anger, ironic as it seems. We cannot complain that the common man does common things. This is in his nature. The responsible party is the person who has the ability to influence others but who abdicates his responsibilities. Humility, friendliness, indifference, the preference for personal growth over communal responsibilities, these are all self-serving and unsatisfactory excuses for not taking the helm. If you can change the life of others for the better, if you have the knowledge and strength to influence others, then that is your basic and immediate and unavoidable responsibility. The mistakes and failures of the tzibbur are not their problems, they are yours.

Vayeishev, 37:22. L’maan hatzil osso miyadam. Putting the Donor's Name on Ritual Objects

Benefactors donate items to Shuls and Batei Medrash, which are intended to beautify and glorify our places of Tefillah and Torah. For example, people donate Sifrei Torah, or the Paroches on the Aron Kodesh. And, to our bemusement, in middle of that beautiful thing, is a lengthy description of who donated it and why they donated it. We learn that they gave it for their birthday, or in honor of their anniversary, or whatever private motivation that they choose to record in shining letters. It often strikes us as incongruous that while the ostensible motive of the donor is to glorify Hashem, it seems that they are equally motivated by their desire to show off their munificence and perpetuate their own glory. As usual, this attitude does conclusively prove one thing, and that is Daas Baal Habayis Hepech Daas Torah, that where we think we are standing up for the honor of the Torah, in fact we are just venting ignorant feelings of prejudice and jealousy. The Rashba addresses this issue in his Responsa.

The Tshuvos HaRashba in 981 brings a rayah from this passuk that when a person does a mitzvah, it is proper to publicize that he did it and why he did it. The Torah sees fit to interrupt the narrative of the sale of Yosef to note that Reuven was purely motivated and that he intended to save Yosef. As cited by the Torah Temimoh here, the Rashba then says, and the Rama in YD 249:13 paskens, that one who dedicates an object to tzedakah may write his name on it, and the community cannot interfere with this prerogative. So, all those porochos and things that have a gantzeh megillah about who donated it and why, might look like they aggrandize the donor at the expense of the beauty of the donated object, but the Rashba and the Rama say it’s fine. The truth is, these inscriptions can also be seen as beautiful in themselves, since they give voice to and demonstrate the donor’s love and respect for the davar shebikdushah and his desire to be associated with them.  As LkwdGuy put it, " while some choose to mark anniversaries with eternity bands, these donors chose to mark theirs with something truly eternal."  Beautifully said.