Vayikra 4:27, Korban Chatas. The difference between Distraction and Misdirection

If I have time, I'll try to make this intelligible, but as it is now, it will only make sense if you've learned the sugyos in Klal Gadol and Horyos.

 ואם נפש אחת תחטא בשגגה מעם הארץ  בעשותה אחת ממצוות ה' אשר לא תיעשינה ואשם

We darshen from בעשותה that misaseik is pattur from a korban.  There is a machlokes Nesivos and Reb Akiva Eiger in the Tshuvos (I:8) whether a Misaseik is a maaseh aveira or not   Reb Akiva Eiger holds it is a maaseh aveira (at least in kol hatorah kula outside of Shabbos, where even RAE agrees that because of meleches machsheves it's not a maaseh aveira at all).  The petur from a korban because of the drasha בעשותה that excludes מתעסק is only a petur from a korban, but it's not an oneis, it's a shogeig and needs kapara.

Reb Akiva Eiger:

ונ"ל דבר חדש דמה דממעטינן מאשר חטא בה פרט למתעסק, לא דמתעסק לא נעשית העבירה כלל אלא דמקרי עבירה בשוגג, ואך בשוגג כהאי ממעטינן מאשר חטא בה דפטור מקרבן אבל מ"מ מקרי שגגת איסור, אבל מה דממעטינן מטעם דמלאכת מחשבת אסרה תורה היכא דליכא מלאכת מחשבת אינו בכלל מלאכה ולא נעשה העבירה כלל. 

דמתעסק הוי ככל מילי עבירה אלא דמקרי שגגת עבירה, ובכה"ג גזה"כ  לפטרו מחטאת אבל עבירה יש כאן אלא דמ"מ בשבת כיון דלא ידע מהמחט לא מקרי מלאכת שבת, [ומה"ט נקטו בדבריהם מלאכת שבת ולא נקטו מתעסק, דמצד מתעסק היה מלאכה דאורייתא, רק מטעם מלאכת מחשבת הוא דרבנן] 

I think it's odd, then, that in explaining why  יחיד שעשה בהוראת ב"ד is chayav a korban, the Noda biYehuda תניינא יו"ד סי' צ"ו says that of course he's an oneis gamur, but he's chayav a korban because the fact is that what he thought was a beis din. what he though was a pesak, was not.  It was an error.  And we're not talking about following your local Orthodox rabbi, we're talking about a pesak of the Sanhedrin of semuchim that is seated in the Lishkas HaGazis in the Beis HaMikdash in Yerushalayim.

אך צריכין אנו לשום לב דאנן קי"ל יחיד שעשה בהוראת ב"ד חייב חטאת דקי"ל כחכמים וכ"כ הרמב"ם ז"ל, ולכאורה יפלא למה יתחייב היחיד בזה ואף שהב"ד פטורים אם לא עשו רוב הקהל על פיהם מ"מ יחיד זה מה פשעו ומה חטאתו ואין לך אונס גדול מזה שעשה ע"פ הוראת ב"ד, והתורה אמרה ע"פ התורה אשר יורוך, שאפילו אומרים על ימין שמאל נשמע להוראתם וא"כ לא היה רשאי היחיד להרהר אחריהם ולמה יחשב זה לשוגג ולא לאונס.

והנלע"ד לחלק דשאני נסת ע"פ עדים אף שמותרת להנשא על פיהם מ"מ אונס זה בא ע"פ טעות הוא שהרי באמת העדים העידו שקר והעדים הטעו אותה בשקר לכן נחשב הדבר טעות שגגה ולא אונס, משא"כ שמשה שלא בשעת וסתה שהיא מותרת לשמש ואין כאן טעות דע"פ דין תורה מותרת לשמש, הנה בודאי אפילו אם פרסה נדה באמצע הביאה אנוס הוא על הכניסה שהרי אין כאן שום טעות וכו', ובזה ניחא ג"כ שהיחיד שעשה בהוראת ב"ד חייב קרבן אף שהוא אנוס שהרי כתיב ע"פ התורה אשר יורוך, מ"מ אונס זה ע"פ טעות הוא בא שהב"ד טעו בהוראה ולכן נחשב שגגה אלא שאם עשו כל ישראל על פיהם העושים פטורים מן הקרבן, והיינו לא מטעם אונס אלא כיון שהב"ד חייבין קרבן לכן העושים פטורים, משא"כ כשעשה היחיד על פיהם שאז אין הב"ד חייבין קרבן, חייב היחיד קרבן. ובזה יתורץ קושית הרב לח"מ והרב מש"ל מה שהקשו על הרמב"ם בפרק י"ד מה' שגגות דלמה הוצרך למיהב טעמא שאין זו הוראה אלא טעות הא לדידן דקי"ל יחיד שעשה בהוראת ב"ד חייב לא אכפת לן אם הוא הוראה או טעות, וע"ש מה שהסביר בזה.

So it comes out that the Noda biYehuda's  יחיד שעשה בהוראת ב"ד is an oneis gamur, but he's chayav a korban, while Reb Akiva Eiger's מתעסק is definitely not an oneis, but he's pattur from a korban because of the gzeiras hakasuv of מתעסק.  It's not a kashe, it's just peculiar, and it points to the lomdus of misaseik in the parsha of korbanos, that the lomdus of מתעסק doesn't necessarily apply to issues of guilt and maaseh issur.

Vayikra 1:2. Sharing the Weight

The Medrash Rabba in the beginning of Vayikra:  Normally, that which is too heavy for one can be borne by two; too heavy for two, can be borne by three, and so on.  Can one man possibly bear something too heavy for six hundred thousand?  But at Mattan Torah, all Klal Yisrael stood and said "we can't bear any more."  But Moshe heard the voice alone, and he survived.  And we see that here in the beginning of the parsha there was a special call to Moshe in our passuk, "And He called to Moshe."

אמר רבי תנחום בר חנילאי: בנוהג שבעולם משוי שקשה לאחד נוח לשנים, ולשנים נוח לארבע, או שמא משוי שקשה לס' רבוא, נוח לאחד?! כל ישראל עומדים לפני הר סיני ואומרים (דברים ח'): אם יוספים אנחנו לשמוע וגו', ומשה שומע קול הדבור עצמו וחיה?!תדע לך שהוא כן, שמכולן לא קרא אלא למשה, לכך נאמר: ויקרא אל משה

Achronim ask that the metaphor is invalid.  A physical burden carried by two is easier, because each person is only carrying half.  By Mattan Torah, the number of listeners is irrelevant, because every one of them is hearing the entire thing individually- sharing the experience does not lessen the experience at all.

So Reb Dovid Soloveichik (Shai laTorah III) and Reb Berel Povarsky (Bad Kodesh here) say the same answer- that you see from here the power of a tzibur, that bearing the spiritual thing together makes it easier for each, or that it's too esoteric to explain, or something along those lines.  Reb Dovid's words, as quoted there-

ומבואר במדרש דלא כן הפשט, אלא שהיה זה "קול רוחני" אשר כל כלל ישראל "כאיש אחד בלב אחד" היו שומעים אותו  ומשו"ה נקרא "משוי של ששים רבוא"  והבן הדבר כי עמוק הוא

It's too עמוק for me to be והבן הדבר, so I had to find a pshat I could understand.  Even if you shtell tzu the din of כל דבר שבקדושה, לא יהא פחות מעשרה, it doesn't explain Klal Yisrael's fear of listening- especially since Moshe Rabbeinu was among them.  So here's what I suggest.

What does it mean that Klal Yisrael couldn't hear the voice of the Ribono shel Olam?  It clearly wasn't a matter of physical force, because then it wouldn't be a gadlus that Moshe could bear it.  It must be a spiritual thing.  What was it about hearing the Ribono shel Olam that was so spiritually challenging?

The Rambam in Peirush haMishnayos at the end of Makkos says that in a lifetime of doing thousands of mitzvos every day, we cherish the hope that once in a lifetime we might do one mitzva perfectly.  My father, zatzal, for example- in Samarkhand, he once gave a man every penny he had, and then gave him his shoes.  He decided that he would find a way to survive, while the other man was so desperate he needed everything my father could give him.  That was a pure and perfect mitzva of tzedaka.  But this is a rare, rare thing.

When the Ribono shel Olam gave us the Torah, it was an unimaginably powerful exposure to the kedusha of the Torah and the perfection of the Ribono shel Olam.  The people said that this is beyond their ability.  When you get a perfect vision of what a mitzva is, and what kedusha is, then you feel that you have to do every single mitzva, every day, perfectly.  But the reality is that such a thing is not possible for flesh and blood.  It seemed like they would need to be not just malachim, but greater than malachim.  On the other hand, Klal Yisrael as a whole includes individuals that dedicate their whole lives to a particular mitzva.  You have the masmidim whose every breath is limud haTorah.  You have others that run after poor people to help them and encourage them.  You have others that wear fifty talleisim for a perfect mitzva of tzitzis. At our Kiddush this morning, we hosted Rabbi Abraham Cooper of the Weisenthal Center, and we realized, once again, what it means to totally and absolutely dedicate one's life to advocacy for Klal Yisrael.  Within Klal Yisrael as a whole, perhaps every single mitzvah can be fulfilled as it should be.  But when we saw Mattan Torah, and we heard the mitzvos from Hashem, we felt that even with the din of areivus we cannot possibly do what needs to be done.  Even if the burden was shared, the mitzvos could not be fulfilled as perfectly as we saw they ought to be fulfilled, and we despaired, perhaps we were even terrified by the expectations, and we couldn't survive facing the contrast between our duty to Hashem's perfect plan and our hopeless human failings and inadequacy.

But לגבי משה רבינו מילתא זוטרתי היא (Brachos 33b)  Moshe Rabbeinu was a perfect man, and he was able to gaze upon the purity and spirituality of the mitzvos and live his life such that every single mitzva would be done with his whole heart and his whole soul, exactly as is the will of Hashem.

Vayikra. Moshe Rabbeinu's Name, Echoes, and Ghosts

Moshe Rabbeinu had, besides "Moshe," ten other names that were given him by his family and Klal Yisrael. His parents certainly did not name him 'Moshe' and they most probably called him Tovia, as implied in the pasuk that describes his birth. The ten names are

 ירד, חבר, יקותיאל, אביגדור, אבי סוכו, אבי זנוח, טוביה, שמעיה בן נתנאל, הלוי (בן אביתר), משה

1. Yered
2. Avigdor
3. Chever
4. Avi Socho
5. Yekusiel
6. Avi Zanuach
7. Tuvia
8. Shmaya ben Nesanel 
9. Ben Avitar
10. Levi.
(Vaykira Rabba 1:3, and at great length in Yalkut Shimoni Vayikra 1, remez 428; and 2 remez 166, Most of these names are mentioned in I Divrei Hayamim 4:18, and Shmaya ben Nesanel there in 24:6.)

Now, in Tanach, the name used is not necessarily the name by which the person was known, but instead, a name is used as an adjective, or to teach us something fundamental about the person. Indeed, the Yalkut cited above explains the intent and meaning of each of the other ten names. But there has to be a significant reason for preferring one name over his birth-name. Why does the Torah choose this name over all others?

R’ Chaim Shmuelevitz’s sefer at the beginning of Vayikra brings that Hashem used the name 'Moshe' instead of the other nine names because this was the name given him by Bisya, the daughter of Pharaoh. She had bravely and sympathetically endangered herself to save Moshe, and a person’s mesiras nefesh leaves a mark, a Roshem on the object of their self-sacrifice. A holy act permeates and changes the soul of the beneficiary of that mesiras nefesh. Thus, Bisya’s deed contributed to Moshe’s character of selfless dedication to others, and the name she gave him, which alludes her act of drawing him from the water, was the most appropriate way to refer to him.(Reb Chaim doesn't go this far, but the symmetry is too tantalizing to ignore: Perhaps it was Bisya's brave and selfless act of drawing Moshe from the water that enabled Moshe to draw Klal Yisrael out of the water of the Yam Suf when they were threatened by the army of Egypt eighty years later-- imagine that! Pharaoh's daughter not only contravened her father's order by saving Moshe, but it was specifically her act that gave Moshe Rabbeinu, that implanted in him, the ability to destroy her father at the Yam!)

This concept is particularly relevant to the first Parsha of Korbanos.  A korban, more than anything else, is created by intent and designation.  This kedusha, the result of an intent to use it for Avodah, makes the Korban into an entirely different kind of animal- to the extent that using a korban to pull a plow together with a non-korban would fall under the issur of using dissimilar animals to plow at the same time.  The Korban is not the same kind of animal as the non-korban.

----Two parenthetical remarks.
1.  Bisya was later called Basya, so don't start fights by calling your granddaughter Bisya; but that's a whole different discussion.
2.  Nachum G (NOT to be confused with Nachum J!) contributed a very worthy he'ara, as follows:

חז"ל tell us that from the fact that the Torah only uses the name which בת פרעה gave, we can see גדול שכרן של גומלי חסדים. Rav Moshe Eisenmann שליט"א understands this in conjunction with the מדרש לקח טוב and the ספורנו that the name she gave him משה (rather than the expected משוי) indicates that since he was saved by being pulled from the water, he would now have to spend his כוחות in saving others. It was that education she gave him which led to him to becoming the leader he was (who did so many great things for the nation, as the גמרא מגילה יג indeed דרשן-s from his other 9 names), which is the גמלת חסדים the חז"ל were referring to.

He says that this can be found in an online shiur here and in his פירוש על דברי הימים א page 402, in his book "Of parents and Penguins" page 27.

See also HaRav Shmuelevitz's expansion of this concept in Drasha Number 3 of his sefer, where he says that even an inanimate object can be imbued with a person’s work, as we find that Elisha sent told Geichazi to take Elisha's walking staff and to use it to resurrect a dead child. Because Elisha had walked all over Eretz Yisroel to strengthen people in avodas Hashem, just as Elisha had used it in his life work of bringing life to the spiritually dead, so too the stick had the koach of being mechayeh meisim.

On the other hand, this spiritual imprint is fragile and easily ruined; or, you can say that it is easy to suppress this harmonic. Geichazi’s leitzonus as he was carrying the mish'enes caused it to lose its koach, because he put leitzonus into the stick, and leitzonus and kedusha cannot coexist.

On May 9, 2006, I took Ovi Mori zatzal to see Dr. David Koenigsberg, a cardiologist, at his office at Swedish Covenant Hospital in Chicago. Dr. Koenigsberg rents space in that office, and after the visit, he introduced me to the doctors from whom he rents, Arminio and Narcisa Sarucci. From Romania, they are highly educated, (Arminio is listed as speaking French, Italian and Romanian) practitioners of internal medicine. Dr. Koenigsberg, a close talmid of Harav Aharon Soloveitchik, had earlier been surprised to learn that they had purchased R Aharon's house after he was niftar.  Arminio and Narcisa told me an interesting story. A friend of theirs was moving, and they offered to let him stay with them until things settled down. One morning, he came down for coffee, and told them that he had a remarkable dream. He dreamed that as he was lying in bed, the room filled with Rabbis with long beards who sat there and loudly, vigorously, talked to each other. The friend had no idea that R Aharon was the previous occupant of the house, and he only found out the next morning, when he sat down to breakfast with the Saruccis.

I asked the Suruccis if they did an exorcism, but they said no, they liked it.The truth is, it shouldn’t be a surprise that R Aharon left a roshem on the house. A kadosh v’tahor whose every energy was spent in harbotzas Torah and avodas Hashem had to leave some roshem. What surprised me was that the current occupants had done nothing that eliminated that spiritual imprint, as Geichazi had done with the matteh of Elisho. The roshem may be powerful, but it is fragile, and it seems that they are people with good middos.

They then told me that Dr. Surucci's first cousin had married the daughter of the late Rabbi Alexander Safran, (pronounced Shafran, Grand Rabbi of Romania and later Grand Rabbi of Geneva, the son of the famous Rabbi Zeev Bezalel Safran from the city of Bacau. He earned his Ph.D. at the University of Vienna and was known as one of the most charismatic orators of his time. He was exiled from Romania in 1947 by the communist government.) I wonder if there is some connection to the Jewish people in that family, through consanguinity, lenity, or charity.

Some people reading this will feel that this concept is foreign to Jewish belief. Since when do we venerate or fetishize inanimate objects? Can an 'object' have inherent kedusha? I, too, found it surprising. In fact, Reb Meir Simcha emphatically says exactly this in his discussion of the Sheviras Haluchos, that Moshe Rabbeinu wanted to make the point to Klal Yisrael that 'objects' only reflect the kedusha status of Klal Yisrael, but have no inherent kedusha. But I say two things in response: first, if Reb Chaim Shmuelevitz felt it was valid and true, I’m comfortable with it as well. I would not say this about every Gadol; some focus on branches of Torah that give me the heebie jeebies. Reb Chaim Shmuelevitz was just your regular kadosh vetahor, a gadol in mussar, torah, and ma'asim tovim. Second, there is a big difference between venerating an object, which is wrong, and recognizing that it retains the influence of a mitzvah that was done with it. We are simply saying that the object retains the holiness and significance of the ma'aseh mitzvoh, not that the object is intrinsically holy because of its nature.

In any case, I later realized that what he was saying is really implicit in the rishonim. In parshas Ki Sisa, Shemos 25:23, on the words V’osiso Shulchon, the Ramban says a fascinating thing. He says that ever since the creation of the world, Hashem doesn’t do yeish mei’ayin, and there has to be a root for brochoh to be chal on and to grow into abundance. He brings the story of Elisha in Melochim II 4:2 about the אסוך שמן where Elisha gave the woman a bracha and by Eliahu in Melochim I 17:16 with the קד הקמח. These are his important words:

 וכן הדבר שזה סוד השולחן, כי ברכת השם מעת היות העולם לא תברא יש מאין. אבל עולם כמנהגו נוהג, דכתיב וירא אלקים את כל אשר עשה והנה טוב מאד, אבל כאשר יהי שם שרש דבר תחול עליו הברכה ותוסיף בו, כאשר אמר אלישע הגידי לי מה יש לך בבית, וחלה הברכה על אסוך שמן, וכן השולחן בלחם הפנים בו תחול הברכה, וממנו יבא השובע לכל ישראל, לכך אמרו כל כהן שמגיעו כפול אוכל ושבע  

In other words, since the Shulchon was the means of bringing satiety to the world, the lechem on the shulchon was the epitome of sova, and "any kohen who ate a piece of the lechem haponim, even a crumb, was sated."

In truth, I shouldn't have to look for rayos.  Isn't this the same concept as putting kedusha into a sheim of kisvei hakodesh?  If being makdish with kavana for the sheim makes a roshem, why shouldn't being makdish for any maaseh of kedusha or chesed be makdish?  And if it's makdish, doesn't it make sense that it would create a bond between gashmiyus and ruchniyus?

The Chinuch says this is true for many other things as well. See Mitzvas Asei 97, where he brings the Gemora in Sukkah about nisuch hamayim and the omer and other things. His important statement is the anything that is used in the service of the Ribono Shel Olom becomes a conduit for brochoh, it attains and embodies the spiritual quality of the mitzvah that was done with it. (Chazal have an expression "moshol hediot", a metaphor that is phrased in mundane terms. Here's a moshol hediot: the rishonim say that a mamzer is not only the result of an illicit act, but that he personifies and embodies the illicit act: he is a "shtik ni'uf. Well, the opposite is true in the case of holy acts.)

And, here's a blockbuster.  In the Gaon's Even Shleimah 5:4 in the footnotes you will see from Reb Chaim Volozhiner and the Gaon what we have said and even more.

He says

דהראשונים בכל מקום קיבוצם להשראת השכינה לא רצו שיהי׳ בבית, שהוא מעשה אדם, שמא היה בו מעשה אחד שלא בכוונה קדושה, וע״כ הסתופפו בין האילנות, תחת מעשה ה׳, משום דאין השכינה שורה אלא על פועל צדק, וכמו שנאמר (ב״מ פ״ה) בר׳ חייא דשדינא מתנא כו׳ ראה שיהי׳ מתחלה ועד סוף בפועל צדק ושמעתי שהגר״ח מוואלאזין הי׳ אומר שהלומדים  בספרים שנדפסו בדפוס אדם שאינו הגון אין להם הצלחה בלימודם

Nachm G added the following, which is closely related to what the Gaon said.

With regards the השפעה of our deeds on even inanimate objects. Rav Elyeh Lopian זצ"ל extensively uses this principle. I also recall learning that this is פשט in the משנה that שנים שיושבים ואין ביניהם דברי תורה הרי זה מושב לצים שנאמר ובמושב לצים לא ישב, where לכאורא the פסוק does not prove the point which the משנה seems to make. However what the משנה is saying is that you can have a situation where two people are trying to learn, but somehow "it's not going". The reason is because previously people were talking דברי לצנות there and that spiritually ruined the air and space, causing them now not being able to learn. That is why צדיקים won't sit in a מושב לצים i.e. where previously לצים sat.

Ha also directs us to a very similar pshat from the Gerrers in the  ליקוטי בתר ליקוטי on Avos here.

It seems to me that this concept is relevant to our lives. Most of us are frum because of the great sacrifices our parents made to remain Jews and to see to it that we were brought up properly as Jews. This is not only history, it is opportunity and responsibility. We are the 'cheftzah shel mitzvah.' Not only have we have been bequeathed some ability or trait directly from our forebears’ sacrifice, we embody it. We have it in ourselves. When we realize what others went through so that we can be frummeh yidden, we can access this koach that was put into us and use it for avodas Hashem. This can be used to grow, and to not use it repudiates and discards the blood and sweat and tears spilled by those who gave us these abilities. Being the child of an ‘illui’ or a 'gvir' doesn't really change who you are, but being the child of parents who were mosseir nefesh does. This status of Hekdesh can be the foundation of a life of Torah, a Bayis Ne'eman, and, like the Be'er Miriam, a font of strength from which one can draw kedusha his entire life.

Vayikra. A Guest Post from Rav Pinchas Freidman, Shvilei Pinchas

This post was translated and graciously provided to us by Dr. Baruch Fox.  If you want to get Rav Friedman's divrei Torah weekly, please write to Dr. Fox at  rebboruch at Yahoo


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HKB”H the Supreme Heavenly Priest Takes the Best “Kometz” from
Our Torah Study and Fulfillment of Mitzvot

In this week’s parsha, parshat Vayikra, we learn about the “korban-minchah”--"קרבן מנחה לה'".  It differs from all of the other offerings which are brought primarily from animals; the korban-minchah is brought from vegetation—from fine flour to which oil and frankincense are added, as it is written (Vayikra 2, 1): 

"ונפש כי תקריב קרבן מנחה לה', סולת יהיה קרבנו ויצק עליה שמן ונתן עליה לבונה, והביאה אל בני אהרן הכהנים, וקמץ משם מלוא קמצו מסלתה ומשמנה על כל לבונתה, והקטיר הכהן את אזכרתה המזבחה אשה ריח ניחוח לה'"—When a soul will bring a meal-offering (a korban-minchah) to Hashem, his offering shall be of fine flour; he shall pour oil on it and place frankincense on it.  He shall bring it to the sons of Aharon, the Kohanim, and he shall scoop from there his full three fingers full, of its fine flour and of its oil, as well as all its frankincense; and the Kohen shall cause its memorial portion to go up in smoke upon the altar—a fire-offering, a satisfactory aroma to Hashem. 

Rashi comments:  "ונפש כי תקריב, לא נאמר נפש בכל קרבנות נדבה אלא במנחה, מי דרכו להתנדב מנחה - עני, אמר הקב"ה מעלה אני עליו כאלו הקריב נפשו" “soul” was not used with reference to any voluntary offerings except for the meal-offering.  Whose practice is it to dedicate a meal-offering?  It is a poor person's.  HKB”H said:  I consider it on his behalf as if he offered his soul. 

Now that the Beit HaMikdash has been destroyed—due to our countless transgressions—and neither the Kohanim, Leviim or Yisroelim are able to perform their prescribed service, we are no longer able to actually bring a korban-minchah.  Nevertheless, we learn an important principle from the great author of the Bnei Yissaschar.  He writes in his Derech Pikudechah (Intro. 3, 5) that even if we are unable to actually perform a particular mitzvah today, we are still required to examine and study the reasons and implications associated with that mitzvah.  Thus, we can ascertain how to at least fulfill the mitzvah in thought; by doing so, it will be considered as if we actually fulfilled that particular mitzvah. 

In our current state, we, the holy Children of Yisroel, exist in exile as poor paupers who would ordinarily donate a korban-minchah to Hashem.  Therefore, it behooves us to seek the essential lesson inherent in the offering of the korban-minchah.  In this manner, we can at least bring Hashem a korban-minchah in thought and in an alternative form--which the Blessed One will treat as if we had actually brought a real korban-minchah. 

“Fine flour mixed with oil” Combining Torah-study with Good Deeds

Let us begin our journey by introducing a statement of Chazal’s in the Midrash Tanchuma (Acharei Mot 10): 

"צפה הקב"ה שבית המקדש עתיד ליחרב, ואמר הקב"ה לישראל, כל זמן שבית המקדש קיים ואתם מקריבין קרבנות לתוכו מתכפר עליכם, ובזמן שאין בית המקדש קיים במה מתכפר עליכם, התעסקו בדברי תורה שהן משולין כקרבנות והן מתכפרין עליכם".

Anticipating the destruction of the Beit HaMikdash, HKB”H said to Yisroel:  “When the Beit HaMikdash no longer exists, how will you achieve atonement?  Occupy yourselves with words of Torah, which are analogous to sacrifices—they will atone for your sins.”

With this idea in mind, let us consider how words of Torah represent an alternative to a korban minchah.  We find in the Midrash that "סולת", fine flour, alludes to the Torah.  For, one must labor to refine one’s learning just like one refines coarse flour.  The Siftei Kohen in parshat Pinchas (Bamidbar 25, 5) provides us with a beautiful allusion.  When we spell out each letter of the Hebrew word for fine flour, סל"ת, we get the following:  סמ"ך למ"ד תי"ו.  The numerical sum of these letters plus one equals the numerical value of the word תור"ה, 611. 

Notwithstanding, to achieve the ideal state of perfection, Torah must be combined "בשמן", with oil—which represents good deeds.  This analogy is found in the Midrash (Bamidbar Rabbah 13, 15) which discusses the offerings brought by the heads of each tribe during the inauguration of the Mishkan. 

We see, therefore, that even during this bitter exile, when we no longer have the Beit HaMikdash, it is imperative that we bring a korban-minchah to Hashem in an alternative form in order to fulfill, in the best way possible, the words of the passuk:  "ונפש כי תקריב קרבן מנחה לה'"--when a soul will bring a meal-offering (a korban-minchah) to Hashem.  As we learned from Rashi:  " מי דרכו להתנדב מנחה - עני"—it is a pauper who brings a korban-minchah.  This alludes to times of exile, when we are truly paupers both physically and spiritually. 

Concerning periods of exile, we have learned (Berachot 8a):  "מיום שחרב בית המקדש אין לו להקב"ה בעולמו אלא ד' אמות של הלכה בלבד"—in the aftermath of the destruction of the Beit HaMikdash, the only thing remaining for HKB”H in His world is a mere four cubits of halachah.  Hence, during times of exile, we must continue to offer Hashem a form of the korban-minchah:  "סולת יהיה קרבנו"—an offering of finely, refined flour—by toiling in our Torah-study to clarify the true meaning of each and every halachah until it is as clear and pure as well-refined flour; "ויצק עליה שמן"—then we must combine what we have learned with good deeds, representing oil; "ונתן עליה לבונה"—and we must sanctify our thoughts, like pure frankincense, by devoting our Torah-study and good deeds exclusively to Hashem. 

“And he shall scoop from there his full ‘kometz’”

Following this lead, let us proceed to delve into the mitzvah of “kmitzah”—taking a scoopful of the “minchah” with a unique three finger procedure—that was an integral part of the korban minchah ritual:  "והביאה אל בני אהרן הכהנים, וקמץ משם מלוא קמצו מסלתה ומשמנה על כל לבונתה, והקטיר הכהן את אזכרתה המזבחה אשה ריח ניחוח לה'"—he shall bring it to the sons of Aharon, the Kohanim, and he shall scoop from there his full three fingers full, of its fine flour and of its oil, as well as all its frankincense; and the Kohen shall cause its memorial portion to go up in smoke upon the altar—a fire-offering, a satisfying aroma to Hashem.  It is important to understand the practical significance of this procedure.  Why does the Kohen take a mere three-finger scoop-- from the entire meal-offering brought by the pauper--to offer on the altar as a satisfying present to Hashem? 

Surely, this unique ritual possesses an underlying message of great significance relevant to a Jew’s service of Hashem.  Let us begin by examining a fascinating Midrash concerning the creation of man (B.R. 8, 5): 

"אמר רבי סימון, בשעה שבא הקב"ה לבראות את אדם הראשון, נעשו מלאכי השרת כיתים כיתים וחבורות, מהם אומרים אל יברא ומהם אומרים יברא, הדא הוא דכתיב (תהלים פה יא) חסד ואמת נפגשו צדק ושלום נשקו. חסד אומר יברא שהוא גומל חסדים, ואמת אומר אל יברא שכולו שקרים, צדק אומר יברא שהוא עושה צדקות, שלום אומר אל יברא דכוליה קטטא [שכולו מריבות].

מה עשה הקב"ה, נטל אמת והשליכו לארץ, הדא הוא דכתיב (דניאל ח יב) ותשלך אמת ארצה. אמרו מלאכי השרת לפני הקב"ה, רבון העולמים מה אתה מבזה תכסיס אלטיכסייה שלך, [רש"י: חותמו של הקב"ה אמת], תעלה אמת מן הארץ, הדא הוא דכתיב (תהלים פה יב) אמת מארץ תצמח".

When HKB”H decided to created the first man, Adam HaRishon, the ministering agents were not all in agreement with this decision.  Conflicting groups felt that man should be created, while others felt that he should not be created.  Chesed, Kindness, said that he should be created because of the acts of kindness he performs.  Emet, Truth, said that he should not be created—arguing that he is full of lies.  Tzedek, Righteousness, argued that he should be created, because of his righteous and charitable acts; while Shalom, Peace, felt that he should not be created, because he is extremely argumentative. 

In response, HKB”H took Emet and threw him down to earth, as the passuk states (Daniel 8, 12):  ותשלך אמת ארצה—and Emet was thrown down to earth.  The ministering agents said to HKB”H:  why are you abusing Your trademark in this fashion?  As Rashi explains, HKB”H’s trademark is truth. 

All of the commentaries are baffled by this Midrash.  Why did HKB”H choose to throw Emet down to earth.  Firstly, if HKB”H wished to create man despite Emet’s objections—that man is by nature a liar—no one could prevent Him from doing so—even without tossing Emet down to earth.  Secondly, if HKB”H intended to provide the angels with a response, what message did HKB”H send them by throwing Emet down to earth? 

The Yifeh Toar explains that Emet represents the Torah, as indicated by the formula of the berachah:  "אשר נתן לנו תורת אמת"—Who gave us the Torah of truth (emet).  Now, the angels forming the group of Shalom were also against the decision to create man.  They argued that he is prone to fights and disputes; his internal inclination, his yetzer, will persuade his body to battle and dispute his soul, causing him to sin.  Yet, HKB”H left Shalom alone and chose to take Emet—representing the Torah—and throw her down to earth.  This demonstrative act indicated that HKB”H ultimately planned to give Yisroel the Torah down on earth.  By occupying themselves with Torah study, they would have the ideal remedy to combat the yetzer.  As the Gemarah (Kiddushin 30b) explains, the Torah is the antidote for the yetzer hara. 

In this manner, he explains the ministering angels’ objection:  "רבון העולמים מה אתה מבזה תכסיס אלטיכסייה שלך, תעלה אמת מן הארץ"—Master of the Universe, why are you abusing your trademark; bring Emet back from earth.  This is quite similar to the angels’ argument at the time the Torah was given (Shabbat 88b):  "מה אנוש כי תזכרנו ובן אדם כי תפקדנו"—what is a mortal that You should remember him or the son of man that You should recall him?  They claimed that it would be an insult to the Torah to remain down on earth among such lowly, physical creatures.  Instead:  "תנה הודך על השמים"—bestow Your glory upon the heavens.  HKB”H replied that indeed the Torah would be glorified and honored by being given to Yisroel.  For, the passuk states:  "אמת מארץ תצמח"—Emet (truth) will sprout forth from the earth—only down on earth can the Torah be clarified properly. 

“Truth will sprout from the earth” Like a Fruit that Sprouts when the Debris Is Cleared away

Following his hallowed trail, I would like to propose an interpretation of our sages’ enigmatic portrayal of this heavenly dialogue between HKB”H and the groups of angels.  He tossed Emet down to earth so that:  "אמת מארץ תצמח"-- Emet (truth) will sprout forth from the earth.  How does this act constitute a decisive rebuttal of Emet’s original argument:  "אל יברא שכולו שקרים"—that man should not be created, because he is by nature a liar?  First, though, let us address Yisroel’s sweet psalmist’s words (Tehillim 88, 12):  "אמת מארץ תצמח".  Why is the clarification of Emet defined in terms of growth from the earth? 

It appears that with this particular phraseology:  "אמת מארץ תצמח", David HaMelech conveyed to us an essential fact concerning the refinement and revelation of truth in this world.  It is truly analogous to growth from the earth.  A fruit must be refined and revealed from within its husk and outer peel; wheat must be separated from the chaff.  We have learned in the Gemarah in the name of Rashbi (Berachot 55a):  "שאי אפשר לבר בלא תבן"—it is impossible to have wheat without chaff.  In the exact same manner, the truth must be revealed from within the depths and context of lies; it is necessary to separate out the illuminating elements of truth from the falsehood.  Since we have already learned that Torah is compared to fine flour, let us examine the process of how wheat is grown and ultimately processed into fine flour. 

To begin with, the earth must be plowed and the rocks must be removed so that the ground will be suitable to yield produce.  Next, the seeds of wheat are planted, the ground is fertilized and irrigated with water, and the process of growth begins from the depths of the earth.  The external shell of the seed decomposes underground, and the new growth sprouts forth from amidst the decomposition.  Thus the wheat sprouts forth, breaks through the surface of the earth and is revealed above the ground.  This, however, is not the end of the process.  The thorns and debris that surround the wheat and threaten to ruin the produce must be cleared away.  With these laborious steps the process is finally completed and wheat worthy for consumption is produced. 

After the wheat has been grown, a new process begins—transforming the wheat into fine flour.  First, the wheat must be refined and separated from the surrounding chaff.  Then it must be finely ground into thin flour.  This flour must be sifted to remove the impurities.  Only after all of these steps have been performed is the true “solet,” the desired end-product obtained.  Now, one is ready to bake bread from this fine flour.  It is not for naught that we bless and thank Hashem for the final product of this complicated process:  "ברוך אתה ה' אלקינו מלך העולם המוציא לחם מן הארץ"—Blessed art Thou, Hashem . . . Who brings forth bread from the earth. 

“And this stumbling-block will be under your control”

This, then is the meaning of the passuk:  "אמת מארץ תצמח"—the truth is only revealed after this painstaking process of growth from the earth.  For, it is impossible for a lowly, physical being to arrive at the truth of a matter without first removing all of the thorns surrounding the rose.  The veils of falsehood must first be removed to reveal the underlying truth, in the sense of (Tehillim 12, 9):  "סביב רשעים יתהלכון"—the wicked walk on every side. 

This process of clarifying the truth from the surrounding falsehood is ever so apparent in the study of Torah.  It is impossible to arrive at a true halachah, based on legitimate Torah precepts, without first considering all possible scenarios.  Initially, the truth is not apparent, yet with HKB”H’s assistance the path to the truth is eventually illuminated.  Based on the passuk in Yeshayah (3, 6), the Gemarah describes this phenomenon as follows (Gittin 43a):  "והמכשלה הזאת תחת ידיך - אין אדם עומד על דברי תורה אלא אם כן נכשל בהן"—“and this stumbling-block is under your control,” a person does not arrive at the true meaning of words of Torah unless he has first stumbled in interpreting them. 

The process of refining the truth also applies to the issue of the performance of mitzvot.  It is impossible to serve Hashem with the perfect mindset and intent from the outset.  As we have learned in the Gemarah (Pesachim 50b):  "אמר רב יהודה אמר רב, לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ומצוות אף על פי שלא לשמה, שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה"—one should strive to engage in Torah study and the performance of mitzvot even if one’s intent and purpose are initially insincere or misguided; for, by performing mitzvot in this less than ideal manner, one will eventually come to perform mitzvot in the desired, ideal manner. 

In the introduction to the sefer Teshuot Chen, authored by Rabbi Gedalyahu of Linitz, zy”a, a pupil writes the following in his name: 

"כאשר שמעתי מפי הרב המחבר מורי ורבי ז"ל [בעל תשואות חן], שאמר במאמרם ז"ל (פסחים נ:) לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה שלא לשמה, שהוא דוקא כמשמעות מלת 'לעולם', שאין להיפטר מזה בתחילת היכנסו לעבודת השם יתברך, וכמו שבלתי אפשר לעלות על שליבת הסולם העליונה, אם לא פסע תחילה על שליבה שלמטה ממנה, כן צריך להיות שלא לשמה קודם הלשמה".

He focuses on the word "לעולם", meaning always, in the phrase "לעולם יעסוק אדם".  From the use of the word "לעולם" he deduces that this is not only a recommendation for less than ideal circumstances but is actually an essential step in the process.  To achieve the truth regarding the performance of mitzvot and service of Hashem, it is necessary to initially perform mitzvot and serve Hashem with improper intent.  It is analogous to climbing up a ladder.  It is impossible to reach the upper rungs of the ladder, without first stepping on the lower rungs. 

This coincides beautifully with what the Maor Einayim (Likutim parshat Nitzavim) writes regarding Chazal’s statement in the Gemarah (Berachot 34b):  "מקום שבעלי תשובה עומדין, צדיקים גמורים אינם עומדין"—in the place that penitents stand, the thoroughly righteous do not stand.  After all, at some stage of their lives, penitents, “ba’alei teshuvah,” have sunk to the depths of falsehood and darkness.  In that state, they came to recognize the emptiness, meaninglessness and lies that permeate our lives.  Hence, when they step out of the darkness, they are able to appreciate the enlightenment of truth more so than a person who has never sunk to those depths.  This is the lesson conveyed by the wisest of all men (Kohelet 2, 13):  "וראיתי אני שיש יתרון לחכמה מן הסכלות כיתרון האור מן החושך"—and I perceived that wisdom exceeds folly as does the light exceed the darkness.  One cannot fully appreciate the light until one has been stuck in the darkness.  Similarly, the truth cannot be fully revealed until it is seen in relation to its opposite--falsehood and lies. 

The Rectification of Falsehood Occurs when It Is Used to Reveal the Truth

Let us present the thought-provoking, yet alarming, words of the Sefat Emet (Toldot 5633).  He writes that in the realm of falsehood, it is impossible to arrive at the point of truth without combating falsehood with devices of falsehood.  This, in fact, is the method by which falsehood is rectified.  This explains why Yaakov Avinu—who is associated with truth, as per the passuk (Michah 7, 20):  "תתן אמת ליעקב"—grant truth to Yaakov—employed trickery and deception in his dealings with the wicked Eisav in order to acquire the blessings.  He states that it is not considered a lie if the ultimate goal is to arrive at the truth.  Then the Sefat Emet adds: 

ובוודאי בעולם הזה שנקרא עלמא דשיקרא, היתה כוונת הקב"ה לבוא להאמת על ידי זה דוקא, ועל ידי נקודה אמיתית שבלב אדם יוכל לעמוד נגד חבילות של שקר, כי שקר אין לו רגלים ואין לו קיום באמת, לכך נקודה אמת מבטל הרבה שקר".

This world is referred to as “almah d’shikrah,” a world of lies.  It was certainly HKB”H’s design that the truth be revealed specifically in this manner.  Guided by a pure focus of truth in a man’s heart, he can overcome many elements of falsehood.  As we know, a lie has no legs to stand on; therefore, a single truth can eradicate a large body of lies. 

In this manner, we can comprehend the words of our sweet psalmist:  "אמת מארץ תצמח"—truth shall sprout from the earth.  Clarification of the truth by human beings on earth requires a process of growth and development.  The thorns and debris--representing the forces of falsehood that embrace and envelop the truth—must be removed.  The external coverings must be ground down and sifted out.  Eventually, the unadulterated truth is revealed in her full glory and majesty.

Now, let us return to our sages’ enigmatic words.  At the time of creation, HKB”H sought the ministering angels’ counsel, whether or not to create man.  Emet, representing truth, voted against the creation of man, on the grounds that:  "אל יברא שכולו שקרים"—he is full of lies by nature.  To supply a resounding response:  "מה עשה הקב"ה, נטל אמת והשליכו לארץ, הדא הוא דכתיב ותשלך אמת ארצה"—HKB”H took Emet and threw her down to earth.  This divine act was meant to demonstrate that truth can only be revealed by means of an arduous process; the layers of lies surrounding it must be cleared away.  As we learned from the Sefat Emet, this process serves to rectify the falsehood, as well, since it served as a means of arriving at the truth. 

The other angels, observing this divine act, were perplexed.  Not comprehending, they remarked:  "רבון העולמים מה אתה מבזה תכסיס אלטיכסייה שלך, תעלה אמת מן הארץ"—Master of the Universe, how can You abuse Your trademark in this fashion?  Bring Emet back up from earth.  To explain the significance of HKB”H’s response, the Midrash cites the passuk:  "אמת מארץ תצמח"—truth shall sprout forth from the earth.  In other words, the truth of Torah can only be revealed through a process of growth and development on earth.  It necessitates man’s laborious efforts to remove the thorns and debris until the polished halachah is arrived at—resembling pure, fine flour. 

Let My Soul Be like Dust to All

Let us expand on the subject of why HKB”H threw Emet down to earth.  The Zera Kodesh, authored by the holy Rabbi of Rophshitz, zy”a, (Ha’azinu), provides us with a wonderful interpretation of the verse that appears toward the end of Shemoneh Esreh:  "ונפשי כעפר לכל תהיה"—and let my soul be like dust to all.  Here are his illuminating words: 

"והנה אנו מתפללין, ונפשי כעפר לכל תהיה... הפירוש הוא כך, דהנה אנו רואים בארץ ועפר, שמצמיח לנו כל מיני טובות שבעולם, ועוד הפלא ופלא מצינו בארץ, שכל מה שמוסיפים עליה זבל היא מצמחת יותר, אף שהזבל הוא דבר מאוס מאד, וכן כל מה שהזבל מטונף בטינופת יותר מצמיח עוד יותר.

והענין הוא, שהארץ מבררת אף קצת מהקצת טוב עדיין שבטינופת, ונוטלת מזה הטוב כוח הצמיחה, עד שפועלת שמזה הטינופת בא גם כן איזה דבר שבקדושה שפועל כוח הצמיחה, ואחר כך מברכים עליה המוציא לחם מן הארץ וכל ברכת הנהנין, וזהו שאומרים ונפשי כעפר לכל תהיה, שמכל דבר אף מה שנראה לעין שאין בו טוב כלל כנ"ל, גם כן נפשי תוציא מזה ניצוצי קדושה והטוב שבו כעפר".

He remarks on the phenomenon of growth from the earth.  We see that although the earth is composed of dust and dirt, all sorts of bounty and good things grow from the earth.  Remarkably, the more fertilizer that is added, the more and better things grow.  This occurs despite the fact that fertilizer is disgusting.  In fact, the dirtier and more decomposed the better. 

The secret, however, is that the earth finds the minute good that still remains within the manure.  From that tiny positive, good element it extracts the potential for growth.  Consequently, some element of kedushah results from this refuse.  Subsequently, we are able to recite the blessing of “He Who brought forth bread from the earth”-- המוציא לחם מן הארץ—and all of the other blessings that we recite over things that we derive pleasure and benefit from.  This is also the message conveyed by the words "ונפשי כעפר לכל תהיה"-- and let my soul be like dust to all.  From all things, even those things that appear to be devoid of any good, such as dust, let my soul find sparks of kedushah to extract. 

Let us embellish his sacred idea with a small idea of our own.  We know that man’s body was formed from the dust of the earth, as it is written (Bereishit 2, 7):  "וייצר ה' אלקים את האדם עפר מן האדמה"—and Hashem G-d formed the man of dust from the earth.  So, just like HKB”H created the earth with the unique power to refine sparks of kedushah—even from manure—so too man, who was created from the earth, possesses this same potential.  Man has the ability to refine the sparks of kedushah wherever they may be found in this world.  This is the meaning of our prayer:  "ונפשי כעפר לכל תהיה"-- and let my soul be like dust to all.  We are praying that we may manifest the very same potential that HKB”H implanted in the dust of the earth—from which man was created. 

For this reason, HKB”H threw Emet down to earth in response to Emet’s claim that it would be preferable if man was not created.   HKB”H indicated that just the opposite was true.  For, the earth has the potential to reveal sparks of kedushah even from manure and thereby to produce vegetation such as wheat.  Similarly, man who was created from the earth, has the potential to clarify and reveal the truth from within the shrouds of falsehood--"אמת מארץ תצמח"—truth shall sprout forth from the earth. 

HKB”H Chooses the Finest Scoopful

Continuing on along this exalted path, let us proceed to explain the deeper significance of the mitzvah of “kmitzah” associated with the korban-minchah:  "והביאה אל בני אהרן הכהנים, וקמץ משם מלוא קמצו מסלתה ומשמנה על כל לבונתה, והקטיר הכהן את אזכרתה המזבחה אשה ריח ניחוח לה'"-- He shall bring it to the sons of Aharon, the Kohanim, and he shall scoop from there his full three fingers full, of its fine flour and of its oil, as well as all its frankincense; and the Kohen shall cause its memorial portion to go up in smoke upon the altar—a fire-offering, a satisfactory aroma to Hashem.  The Gemarah (Yoma 19a) states:  "הני כהני שלוחא דרחמנא נינהו"—the Kohanim are the agents of HKB”H. 

HKB”H designed this mitzvah to teach us a vital lesson.  It is incumbent upon every Jew to bring a poor man’s offering to HKB”H—a “minchat-ani.”  He accomplishes this obligation by engaging and toiling in Torah study to the best of his ability—to clarify the true meaning and purpose of each halachah until it resembles pure, refined flour.  Then, he must combine it with oil—mitzvot and good deeds—and, lastly, add frankincense to the mixture—indicating that he is acting with the purest of intentions. 

Once this ritual has been completed, HKB”H, the supreme Kohen, proceeds to perform the act of “kmitzah,” as it were:  "וקמץ משם מלוא קמצו מסלתה ומשמנה על כל לבונתה"-- and he shall scoop from there his full three fingers full, of its fine flour and of its oil, as well as all its frankincense—from all of our Torah-study and performance of mitzvot, HKB”H takes, as it were, the best scoopful, representing the pure frankincense.  "והקטיר הכהן את אזכרתה המזבחה אשה ריח ניחוח לה'"-- and the Kohen shall cause its memorial portion to go up in smoke upon the altar—a fire-offering, a satisfactory aroma to Hashem.  For this choice three-finger scoopful is what provides Hashem with true satisfaction. 

In summary, we have learned that the purpose of our service to Hashem is to diligently study Torah and perform mitzvot until the ultimate truth is revealed—fulfilling the potential instilled in us of:  "אמת מארץ תצמח"—truth shall sprout forth from the earth.  Once we have fulfilled this obligation and have presented the supreme Kohen, HKB”H, with our poor man’s minchah offering, we can request that He fulfill the mitzvah of “kmitzah” on our behalf. 

Three Fingers Represent Three “Vav”s

According to what we have learned, we can now provide an explanation for the significance of the three finger “kmitzah” procedure.  As Rashi explains (Vayikra 2, 2):  "מלוא קמצו - יכול מבורץ - מבצבץ ויוצא לכל צד, תלמוד לומר במקום אחר (שם שם ו) והרים ממנו בקמצו, לא יהא כשר אלא מה שבתוך הקומץ, אי בקמצו יכול חסר, תלמוד לומר מלוא, הא כיצד, חופה ג' אצבעותיו על פס ידו, וזהו קומץ במשמע לשון העברית".  The three finger scoop is not to be overflowing, nor is it to be deficient; it is to be precisely what is contained between his three middle fingers and his palm; this is the definition of a “kometz.” 

Let us now present an idea from the great Rabbi David of Leluv’s, zy”a, commentary on the piyut Atkinu Seudata--which was composed by the Arizal and is recited on Friday night.  In the piyut we find the phrase "בווין תתקטר".  These words can be translated very literally as stating that the “vav”s should be bound together.  Now, the Zohar hakadosh states (Acharei 73a):  "ג' דרגין אינון מתקשרן דא בדא, קוב"ה אורייתא וישראל"—the three entities of HKB”H, the Torah and Yisroel are intimately connected with one another.  We can suggest that each of these sacred entities is represented by the letter “vav.”  For, the letter “vav” can be represented by three different spellings:  וא"ו or וי"ו or ו"ו.  Each of these spellings is referred to as a “milui” of the letter “vav”—i.e. the full spelling of the name of the letter.

The first milui, וא"ו, has a numerical value of thirteen—the same as the word אח"ד, meaning one and alluding to HKB”H, the one and only One.  The second milui, וי"ו, has a numerical value of twenty-two and alludes to the Torah that is composed of the twenty-two letters of the aleph-bet.  The third milui, ו"ו, has a numerical value of twelve and represents the twelve tribes, which make up the congregation of Yisroel.  It is the connection of these three “vav”s that the Arizal is alluding to with his poetic words:  "בווין תתקטר"—HKB”H, the Torah and Yisroel must unite as one, for they are meant to be inseparable.  This was the idea from Rabbi David of Leluv, zy”a. 

Finally, we have learned in the Mishnah (Avot 6, 11):  כל מה שברא הקב"ה בעולמו לא ברא אלא לכבודו"—everything HKB”H created in His world, He only created solely for His own glory.  In fact, every good deed should be aimed at enhancing and fortifying the tri-fold unit made up of the glory of HKB”H, the glory of the Torah and the glory of Yisroel.  In this light, we can better appreciate the significance of the ritual of “kmitzah,” which was performed with the three middle fingers.  Those three fingers symbolically represent three “vav”s.  This teaches us that the supreme, heavenly Kohen, HKB”H, selectively takes a scoopful, equivalent  to His three-finger “kmitzah,” from all of our Torah and mitzvot.  He chooses only that portion that serves to enhance the glory of the triple entity formed by the Torah, HKB”H and Yisroel. 

Vayikra. A General Discussion about Korbanos.

To the modern mind, animal sacrifice is so foreign as to be incomprehensible.  I would like to propose a perspective that some of you might not be aware of.

In the donations to the construction of the Mishkan, three very puzzling behaviors are mentioned.
1. The hair of the goats that was used to make the curtains was spun off of the bodies of the living goats:  unlike wool, which is shorn, goat hair is plucked off gently from the goat, as in the case of Cashmere.  The spinners spun the hair as they removed it from the living goats.  (Rashi, Shemos 35:26)
2. The gold and silver ornaments the women donated were not brought in boxed or wrapped.  They were worn to the office and given directly from their bodies to the collectors.  (Rashi, Shemos 35:22)
3. The oil for the menora was not pressed from olives on the ground: they climbed ladders into the trees and began the oil removal right there as they pulled the olives off of the branches. (Rashi, Shemos 35:14)

In all these cases, the life force that was associated with the offering was an integral part of the donation.  The same is true with animal sacrifice.  We're not killing cows, we're not just ending their lives in order to eat them: we are weaving their life-force into the spiritual web of the universe.  Vayikra 17:11- כי נפש הבשר בדם היא ואני נתתיו לכם על המזבח לכפר על נפשותיכם כי הדם הוא בנפש יכפר.


This is not exclusive to the sacrifice of animals and birds.

Vayikra. A Brisker Discussion on Korbanos and Chametz

I've written the English parts, on a whim, with more standard English than usual, excepting words like Chametz and passuk. 


This is what the Briskers call "A Famous Question."  

The Gemara in Pesachim 5a and 28b brings opinions that Chametz is prohibited on the fourteenth of Nissan in the afternoon, even before Pesach begins that night.  The Gemara derives this from two pesukim.  Rava on 5a derives it from Shemos 34:25 לא תשחט על חמץ דם זבחי, and Reb Yehuda on 28b derives it from Devarim 16:3- ומנין לאוכל חמץ משש שעות ולמעלה שהוא בלא תעשה שנאמר לא תאכל עליו חמץ.  The language of the Rambam (1 Ch'uM 8) is 

אסור לאכול חמץ ביום ארבעה עשר מחצות היום ולמעלה שהוא מתחלת שעה שביעית ביום. וכל האוכל בזמן הזה לוקה מן התורה שנאמר לא תאכל עליו חמץ, כלומר על קרבן הפסח. כך למדו מפי השמועה בפירוש דבר זה לא תאכל חמץ משעה שראויה לשחיטת הפסח שהוא בין הערבים והוא חצי היום

The Ra'avad argues and says 

 וכל האוכל בזמן הזה לוקה מן התורה. א"א מלקות מחצות ואילך אינו מחוור דכיון דקי"ל כר"ש בלפני זמנו ואחר זמנו דלא דריש הנך קראי לא תאכל לא תאכלו בלפני זמנו ואחר זמנו נהי דאסור באכילה מן התורה מביום הראשון תשביתו שאור או מלא תשחט על חמץ כדרבה אבל איסור הנאה ליכא מן התורה ומלקות נמי ליתא

Note that the Rambam says that the source of the prohibition is Rava's passuk from Daf 5a, and the Ra'avad's is Reb Yehuda on 28b.

The Gemara in Zevachim 56a says: How do we know that the blood of a Korban becomes deconsecrated and profaned with sunset/Shkiah?  

אמר רב יצחק בר אבודימי מנין לדם שנפסל בשקיעת החמה שנאמר (ויקרא ז) ביום הקריבו את זבחו יאכל ביום שאתה זובח אתה מקריב ביום שאי אתה זובח אי אתה מקריב 

Only on the day that you shechted the Korban may you place its blood on the altar; afterwards, the blood is passul.  

Tosfos asks, who needs this passuk?  We know that sacrificial service can only be done during the daytime from Vaykira 7:38, ביום צוותו את בני ישראל להקריב את קרבניהם, and so the blood service can only be done during the day.  Once sunset has passed, it is no longer day, and you would have to wait until the next day to continue- which is impossible, because all items that have been sanctified for use on the altar are profaned with the break of dawn.  So who needs to know that Sunset profanes the blood, when you won't be able to use it until the next day, at which point it is profaned, on the basis of a different passuk, at the break of dawn?  Although there is an opinion that items that are kept on the roof of the Altar are protected from the profanation caused by Daybreak, what of the other opinion, that being on the Altar affords no protection at all?

Tosfos in Zevachim 56a and in Menachos 20b says two answers.

1. That although there is a general profanation of sacrificial items at daybreak, there is reason to think this problem would not apply to sacrificial blood. Our passuk is needed to tell us that sacrificial blood is subject to the same profanation. 

2. That although, according to Rabbeinu Tam, night begins with the second definition of Sunset, Shkiah Shni'ah, which is fifty nine minutes after what we call Shkiah Rishonah, the first Sunset, this does not apply to Sacrifices.  The tremendous novelty of this passuk is that unlike all other definitions of day, which, according to Rabbeinu Tam, ends at the second Shkiah, in the context of Sacrifices, day ends with Shkiah Rishonah.

The Rambam (4 Ma'Hak 1) says

כל הקרבנות אין מקריבין אותן אלא ביום שנאמר ביום צוותו את בני ישראל להקריב את קרבניהם ביום ולא בלילה. לפיכך אין שוחטין זבחים אלא ביום ואין זורקין דמים אלא ביום השחיטה שנאמר ביום הקריבו את זבחו ביום הזביחה תהיה ההקרבה. וכיון ששקעה החמה נפסל הדם

In this Rambam we see that he attributes the profanation of the sacrificial blood to the passuk that requires the service to be done by day, which is consistent with the first answer of Tosfos- that the problem with left over blood is that daybreak profanes it, and we need our passuk only to tell us that sacrificial blood is no different than other sacrificial items, and so once you can't continue the service at night, the next day it is profaned already by daybreak.

So someone asked Reb Chaim Brisker the following question:

If the prohibition of Chametz on the fourteenth is based on לא תאכל חמץ משעה שראויה לשחיטת הפסח, that you cannot eat chametz when you may shecht the Korban Pesach, then this issur should end as soon as the time of Shechita ends.  Of course, at that point it is already Pesach, and the Yomtov prohibition of Chametz is in place.  But if you combine the Rambam with Rabbeinu Tam, then this creates an absurdity:  The time of Shechita ends at the first shkiah, and the Yomtov only begins at the second shkiah, then there are 59 minutes during which the prohibition of "chametz during Shechita time" has ended, and the prohibition of "chametz during Pesach" has not yet begun.  This, of course, is impossible.

Reb Chaim answered him that although it is true that the sacrificial blood is profaned at the first Shkiah, this does not prove that it is not "the time of Shechita."  The profanation of the sacrificial blood is specific to the blood, but if one were to shecht the korban at that time, although the blood produced would indeed be absolutely profaned, the act of Shechita would be viewed as a legitimate sacrificial act.  Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that the inevitable profanation of the sacrificial blood proves that this is not "the time of Shechita."  It is the time of shechita, but if you shecht, the blood will become profaned.  True, the profanation of the blood would render the shechita futile, but that does not prove that the act of Shechita was not a legitimate sacrificial act.

I have several major problems with Reb Chaim's answer.  (I know that the person who asked the question was not worried about either the Rambam or Rabbeinu Tam, because there is no reason on Earth to think they agree with each other on the derivation of the pre-pesach issur and they certainly don't agree on the shkiah issue.  He was just asking a clever what-if question.  But Reb Chaim's answer has to make sense.  And Reb Chaim was not playing games, because he is quoted by the Brisker Rov and by Rav Shach in his Avi Ezri 1 Ma'Hak 4, who says he was very happy to have thought of Reb Chaim's answer before hearing it from the Brisker Rov.)  

Problem 1.  While Shechita is a sacrificial act, the purpose of shechita is to produce sacrificial blood.  The Gemara in Chulin (33a) states that unlike the shechita of non-hekdesh animals, 

אי בקדשים, כי לא יצא מהן דם כשרה? הוא עצמו לדם הוא צריך 

 that an act of Shechita of a korban that did not produce blood is not shechita.  If so, to say that shechting at a time when the blood will inevitably become useless is, to my mind, exactly the same as a shechita that does not produce blood at all.  Therefore, you cannot call this "the time of Shechita" because the Shechita itself will be passul for having produced no blood.

Problem 2.  The Rambam, like Tosfos' first answer, doesn't hold that Shkiah profanes the blood.  He says that you can't do the service after the day ends, because sacrificial service must be done during the day, and since you have to wait until the next morning to continue, daybreak will then profane the blood.  So techincally, there is no "Profanation of the sacrificial blood caused by Shki'ah."  There is only a forced end of the service of the day.  So how can Reb Chaim say that it is day for shechita despite a tangential profanation of the blood.  The Rambam clearly stated that the reason the blood becomes useless is because the day's sacrificial work has come to an end, and that includes the shechita.  It is no longer "the time of Shechita."

In thinking about this second problem, I realized that even according to Tosfos first answer/the Rambam, the blood does become profaned at the moment of Shkiah.  Since at the moment of shkiah its fate was sealed, there is nothing you're going to able to do with it, then even though the cause of that problem is the inability to use it at night and the inevitable profanation of daybreak, this causes it to become immediately profaned under the rule of Mishmeres/Hesech HaDaas, that items of sacrificial service have to be held in preparation, in expectation, in anticipation of service.  Here, their uselessness is immediate with shkiah, so they become profaned at the very moment that their uselessness becomes inevitable.  But this doesn't help Reb Chaim.  The blood is only useless because it's not day any more, and if it's not day for the blood, it's not day for Shechita either.

3.  Why would anyone think that the erev Pesach prohibition of Chametz, which begins when you can shecht the Korban, ends before you've eaten the korban?  To me, it is self evident that if the Torah prohibits chametz when you can begin the sacrificial service of the Pesach, then how much more so is chametz prohibited when the Korban is ready and waiting to be eaten.  This is not a kal vachomer, an a fortiori.  It is too obvious to need any rule of a fortiori.  There is no logic on Earth to think that chametz is prohibited during the initial preparatory stages of a korban but permitted during the pendency or the denouement of the korban.  So although the Rambam uses a passuk that refers to "the time of shechita,"  it is obvious that the same prohibition applies FROM "the time of the shechita" until the korban has been consumed (at which point, of course, the Pesach prohibition of Chametz has come into effect.)

Vayikra 1:2. Adam ki yakriv mikem korban. Areivus- The Nation as an Organism.

אָדָם כִּי יַקְרִיב מִכֶּם קָרְבָּן
"If a man among you will bring a korban."

This passuk starts with in the singular-Adam- and ends with a reference to the plural- mikem. The medrash here (4:6) talks about mutual responsibility and group identity of the nation.

תני חזקיה (ירמיה נ) 'שה פזורה ישראל' נמשלו ישראל לשה. מה שה הזה לוקה על ראשו או בא' מאבריו וכל אבריו מרגישין. כך הן ישראל אחד מהן חוטא וכולן מרגישין. (במדבר טז) האיש אחד יחטא תני רשב"י משל לבני אדם שהיו יושבין בספינה נטל אחד מהן מקדח והתחיל קודח תחתיו. אמרו לו חבריו מה אתה יושב ועושה? אמר להם מה אכפת לכם? לא תחתי אני קודח? אמרו לו, שהמים עולין ומציפין עלינו את הספינה! כך אמר איוב (איוב יט) ואף אמנם שגיתי אתי תלין משוגתי. אמרו לו חביריו (שם לד) כי יוסף על חטאתו פשע בינינו יספוק אתה מספיק בינינו את עונותיך

A person on a boat takes an chisel and begins gouging a hole in the floor of his cabin. Everyone screams at him to stop, and he answers, “What business is it of yours?  I'm making the hole in my own cabin.” The passuk here is telling us that a man’s behavior is “mikem”, he is a part of the organic whole of the nation. His sin affects the community as a whole, by coarsening and polluting the entire world. When he does teshuva and brings a korban, he elevates and benefits the entire briyah.

Same idea— Sanhedrin 27, going on the passuk in Vayikra 26 “vekashlu ish b’achiv,” that “ish b’avon achiv, shekulan areivin zeh bazeh.”  This is one of the places that Chazal say "Kol Yisrael areivin zeh Bazeh," usually quoted as "Kol Yisrael areivin zeh lazeh."  We are responsible for each other, and we answer for each others' behavior.

One of the practical ramifications of this concept is this: Sometimes, a person can fulfill a mitzva through an agent.  Example- blowing the shofar or reading the megilla.  However, the agent needs to be obligated to do the mitzva as well.  A woman cannot blow the shofar for men, because women are, technically, not obligated to blow the shofar.  If so, can a person who has already fulfilled a mitzva do it as an agent for someone else?  And can he make a bracha when doing so, because the words of the bracha are "asher kidshanu be'mitzvosav ve'tzivanu," who has obligated us to do this mitzvah," and the agent is no longer obligated.  But because of the rule of Arvus/Areivus, the agent is considered to have a current "obligation" to do the mitzvah: the obligation to see to it that others fulfill it.  Thus, not only can he be an agent on behalf of the others, he can even say "vetzivanu", because he is still obligated.  As long as the others haven't done the mitzva, I haven't fulfilled the mitzva.

The word Areivin and the idea of Arvus has often been associated with the rules of a guarantor or a co-signer on a loan, also called an Areiv.

The sefer Shearim Metzuyanim Behalacha brings from the Siach Yitzchak the following: The opinion of the Bahag is that if you already fulfilled a mitzvah, you can't be motzi someone if the person knows how to make a bracha himself.  This Sefer explains the reasoning of the Bahag like this: there's no din arvus where the loveh can pay himself.  The guarantor of a loan is not liable unless the debtor cannot or refuses to pay.  Here too: if the other person is willing and able to make the bracha, you have no arvus at all.


I assume the Siach Yitzchak he brings is the pirush in the Siddur Hagra from Rav Yitzchak Maltzan, who was a well known talmid chacham and posek and mechaber of several sefarim, and who am I to disagree, but I beg to differ.  I think he is wrong for several reasons:

1. The bahag is talking about the bracha, not the mitzvah. If he can't do the mitzva himself, then you have arvus on the mitzvah, and once you're an arev on the mitzvah, you can make the bracha even if the guy could make the bracha himself.

2. See the sefer Mishulchan Gavoah in Nitzavim that brings that Reb Chaim explains the difference between areiv (guarantor) and kablan (co-signer); An areiv is only responsible for results of loveh's default; it is not a liability for the loan, it is a promise to pay that only comes into being when triggered by the debtor's default.  A Kablan, on the other hand, is responsible for the loan itself. Since you can use arvus to make a bracha for other person, Reb Chaim says it must be that the arvus of mitzvos is really kablanus. Reb Boruch Ber says this explains the Gemara in Shabbos that when Klal Yisrael is punished for failure to be mekayeim mitzvos, the tzadikim are punished first. Why? As areivim, they should not be first. Answer- they're not just areivim, they're kablanim.

So according to Reb Chaim, the pshat in Bahag is wrong, because if we're kablanim, our obligation exists even where the principal is capable of fulfilling his obligation.

On the other hand, it could be that this is gufa the machlokes: Because R' Akiva Eiger there brings from Pri Chadash that we don't hold like the Bahag. What's the machlokes?  Maybe the Bahag holds we have a din Areiv, and the Pri Chadash holds we have a din Kablan.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Vayikra 1:2. Adam ki yakriv. Conspicuous Virtue (Virtue Signaling)

Rashi brings from Beitzah 20 "Adam ki yakriv," that your korbanos should be like the korbanos of Adam Harishon; just as the korbanos of Adam Harishon could not possibly have been stolen, since the entire world was his, you too may bring korbanos only if they are yours.

Dr. Zvi Krinsky said an interesting pshat in the tzushtell to the korbanos of Adam Harishon. Some people do mitzvos in a special or flamboyant way because they want to impress others; they are very makpid on hidur mitzvah when other people can see what they're doing. When they buy a lulav and esrog, or a Megillah, they are very particular about hidur, but when they buy tzitzis, they don’t spend the time or money to be makpid in hiddur. Some people only daven a long shmoneh esrei when there are people watching. (Two points— spending more for hiddur to show off, and doing mitzvos in a showy way to make people think you are a kadosh. Dr. Krinsky was talking about yuhara; I added hiddur mitzvah.) We should learn from the korbanos of Adam to be mehadeir mitzvos not to impress people— there were no people for Adam to impress— but rather because of our love and respect for the mitzvah itself, or as a way of becoming kadosh. Do the mitzvah le'sheim mitzvah, not le'sheim showing off, or showing how holy you are.

I do not think it is that simple. First of all, Reb Yehuda/Rav's rule (Pesachim 50b) of the rule of Le'olam ya'asok adam bemitzvos afilu shelo lishma.... should apply to hiddur no less than to other mitzvos. But I would argue that this kind of hiddur is not just a bedi'eved, a "mitoch shelo lishma" din, but it might actually be inherently praiseworthy.

The Gemora in Shabbos 133b, Sukah 11b, and Nazir 2b, says "hisna’eh lefanav bemitzvos," which literally means ‘beautify yourself before Him with mitzvos’. This seems to focus on the "beautify yourself with..." aspect more than the "beautify the mitzvah" aspect. The renowned dikduk expert, Rabbi Dr. Avremi Isenberg says that the use of ‘hispa’eil’ (a reflexive construction) doesn't prove anything, because the His'pa'eil form is sometimes used for Pi'eil, just as "ke’ilu hiskabalti" means nothing other than ‘ke’ilu kibalti. However, the difference is that with Hiskabalti, it means "I view myself as if I had received the money." Here, that logic does not apply, and it seems to intend the literal reading of "beautify yourself." Also, the Gemara in Yoma 70a and Sottah 41b says

אח"כ כל אחד ואחד מביא ספר תורה מביתו וקורא בו כדי להראות חזותו לרבים

which means that they brought their sifrei Torah to show other people their beauty, unmistakably indicating that ‘hisna’eh’ is meant literally-- that Chazal encourage us to take pride in how we do mitzvos, to show off how beautiful our tashmishei mitzvah are.

The first instinct, of course, is to see such behavior as vanity or Mechzi keyuhara (which, in this context, would be like "lekanteir, see Tosfos Pesachim 50b). But perhaps there’s nothing wrong with preening or being showy by beautifying a mitzvah that you are doing. Mechzi keyuhara is, of course, a terrible thing. But perhaps that’s only where you are sanctimonious, where you act in a misleading way to fool people into thinking you’re on a higher madreigah than you actually are, because people will emulate you in your other foolish behavior, or because if you later do something bad it will be a chillul Hashem, or, in the case of lekanteir, because you enjoy disparaging others. But showing off how much you spend on a mitzvah, and that your esrog is the nicest one in shul, is not necessarily so bad— it’s not a lie, and it may even foster the other people’s chavivus mitzvos-- it is constructive rivalry. Kin'as sofrim tarbeh chachma, and kin'as gvirim tarbeh ke'vod shamayim.

My son, Moshe, said that the person is only showing off with it because it is something he cares about. If he was indifferent to the mitzvah, he wouldn’t think it worth showing off with; he would spend his money on things that he wants to be identified with more, and just get by with a minimal cheftzah shel mitzvah. While showing off with your cheftzah shel mitzvah may not be a refined middah tovah, it is a middah tovah anyway, and the benefits far outweigh the detriment. Anyway, think of it like jewelry— "mitzva jewelry". It may be that the main purpose of jewelry and fashion is to show off to other people, and this vanity is easy to catergorize as ignoble; but the reality is that people do wear jewelry, and this is considered normal behavior. So why shouldn’t our tashmishei mitzvah be our jewelry? This is somewhat similar to making feasts, which appeal to our desire for good food, for seudos mitzvah. The same way that the satisfaction of our desire for rich and plentiful food, when used lesheim mitzvah, is good, so too satisfaction of the desire to stand out and be envied can be used le’sheim mitzvah.

The first person to comment on this idea said that my suggestion is panglossian and naive. He said that it is more likely that such people are not demonstrating their love for mitzvos. Rather, he sourly said, they simply take note of the things the members of their peer group desire and attribute significance to, and they acquire these things and do them in a showy way so as to demonstrate their superiority and gain the respect of those people, but they themselves really have no interest in the inherent significance of the mitzvah.

I agree that he makes a valid theoretical point. In response, I make a modification will accomodate both our opinions. That is: the exclusively public hiddur phenomenon may be a one step "Capture the Flag" process or a two step "Rolls Royce" process. "One step" is, as he said, that the mitzvah object is an arbitrary symbol of dominance and superiority, just as the Flag in the game of Capture-the-Flag is an arbitrary symbol of victory with absolutely no intrinsic value. It's just a shmatteh. "Two step" would be that the mitzvah is inherently significant, and everyone would enjoy doing it in the best and most beautiful way. On the other hand, the time, effort and expense are impediments to seeking out and buying the best esrog, for example. But since a shining beautiful esrog will elicit everyone's admiration, people are willing to spend more time and money to buy the best one possible. The example would be buying a Rolls Royce. Everyone says that a Rolls is a very stable, powerful, and luxurious car. It is definitely not a shmatteh. But who is crazy enough to spend half a million dollars for it and then worry about birds and gravel? And imagine what the kids in carpool are going to do to it. But it turns necks and elicits awe, and it symbolizes success and power, and so people are willing to spend the money.

So, my friends, you'll have to decide for yourself. In theory, both possibilities are valid: Those people who spend fortunes for mitzvos that others will see, might be playing Capture the Flag, or they might be driving a Rolls Royce.

I heard from Reb Moshe something that, I think, addresses this issue. There was a time when people would have fistfights about aliyos, and sitting on the Mizrach wall was something people would dream about and fight for for years. Now, we are all so much more civilized, and we don't mind not getting shlishi and we sit wherever we sit. Reb Moshe said that this is not because we are more mature. It is because the kavod of the aliyos and the seat in shul mean less to us. We have plenty of ways of finding satisfaction and honor at work and at home and on the golf course, so we just don't care about kavod Beis Haknesses. It's not that we are more understanding, it's that the Shul and Krias Hatorah mean less to us.

I think that something I heard from Reb Yerucham is a very good tzushtell to this topic. Harav Dovid Zupnik Zatzal once told me that he heard in the Mir from Reb Yerucham that Kin'as sofrim is good when you wish the other person would know more and you would still know more than he does, and it's bad when you would be perfectly happy if he knew less, as long as you knew more than him. The first person is motivated only by a desire to establish dominance. The second is motivated by the desire to excell in Torah, both in Gadlus beTorah and in dominance over the field.

The Wall Street Journal had a De Gustibus column on March 23, 2007, by Joseph Rago. He talked about Veblen’s 1899 "Theory of the Leisure Class," in which he introduced the idea of conspicuous consumption, defined as "specialized consumption of goods as an evidence of pecuniary strength." This is, of course, specific to the "expenditure of superfluities." The author of the column updated Veblen’s essay to extend to "conspicuous virtue." People buy more expensive things that are free trade, renewable, cage free, and live strong bracelets, partly, and allegedly, because they want to support the causes these things represent, but to a great degree because they want to proclaim their virtue. (He suggests that this trend has become popular partly because of guilty consciences about consumerism and materialism. That was certainly true in '07, but with the current recession, this fashion has attenuated.)

This is a very nice way of describing the ‘hisna’eh’ attitude: conspicuous virtue, where the motive is partly the underlying mitzvah, but also to proclaim your virtue. In any case, the idea I said above is still true: there is a mixed motivation, but in the final analysis it stems from pride in ability to fulfil the mitzvah– I can be a better eved Hashem than you can be. Jewelry is an example of conspicuous consumption; a nice esrog, a few black Brisker Matzos, silver and vermeil tefillin boxes, are mitzvah jewelry, conspicuous virtue.

The expensively tailored frilly, lacey, kittel, a garment that is supposed to remind us of the fragility of life and its inevitable end, a garment that symbolizes simplicity, humility, and the rejection of gashmius, is evidence of either insanity or obliviousness, and deserves a post of its own. And some pictures.

1. Don't tell me about the bigdei lavan of the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur, the Pilusin, that cost a fortune. It's not a tzusthell; a Kohen Gadol's levisha of his begadim is a ma'aseh avodah in itself, and so it is a cheftzah shel mitzvah. Also, you don't bury him in them.

2. Please don't tell me about Rebbes that have silk-and-silver-trimmed, fur-collared Kittels. If there are, I don't want to know about it.

3. If your wife or your shver bought your kittel for you, then it's not your fault. It just means they love you.

HOWEVER: Lakewood Guy mentioned that his wife wants to buy him a fancy kittel for the seder, and said that he can use a simple one for Yom Kippur and at his levayah le'achar mei'ah ve'esrim shanim tovim ve'aruchim. It would seem that she is making a valid point, and that the symbolism of the kittel is not at all the same on those two occassions. On Yom Kippur, it symbolizes purity from sin and reminds us of the Yom Hamissah. For Yom Kippur, then, the kittel should be unadorned. At the Seder, it symbolizes Cheirus, and there is no reason to not make it beautiful. Under the chuppah, well, whether it symbolizes yom hamissah depends on who you're marrying, and whether it symbolizes purity depends on why you're marrying her.

HOWEVER II: Unfortunately, the Taz in OC 472 SK 3 says that the reason we wear a kittel at the Seder is so that our simcha doesn't get out of hand. We wear the kittel to temper our joy by reminding ourselves of the day of our death. The Taz was a Litvak. Anyway, I haven't found anyone that disagrees with the Taz. And he means it le'halacha, because he applies the reasoning to pasken that an Aveil may wear a kittel during the first year seder.

In Hilchos Yom Kippur, OC 610:4 in the Rama, he says that we wear the kittel on Yom Kippur for two reasons: to symbolize angelic purity, and to remind ourselves that every passing second brings us closer to the abyss. There, too, the Taz says that the first reason would preclude an Aveil from wearing the kittel, while the second would allow it, and he follows the second reason.

So: I would like to agree with LakewoodGuy's wife. The Taz, on the other hand, says she's wrong. For the sake of a healthy marriage, I would say that our wives really don't need to know about the Taz; I know mine would blow a gasket (what does that mean??? Too much simcha? Simcha is the mitzvas hayom!!! We've been working for a month to be marbeh simcha!!! What's wrong with simcha???? Who is this Taz????) So just be quiet and let her buy you a fancy kittel for the seder.

IMPORTANT UPDATE:
First of all, I have another post on this issue, a follow up to this discussion.  Second, I have to put in a mareh makom someone sent me that addresses this issue, whether I like it or not:  The Matteh Ephraim/Elef Lamatteh in 610.

Note: the paragraph that was here earlier, which discussed the differences between paskening for mamonus and paskening for kodshim, is in the shop for repair. We can't tell you when it will be ready. Maybe after Pesach.