Yisro, Shemos 20:8. Remember the Day of Shabbos to Make it Holy. זכור את יום השבת לקדשו

The Rambam says that you can make kiddush Friday night even if it is not yet Shabbos.  This indicates that you can make Kiddush De'oraysa not only in the daytime, but even before you accept Shabbos upon yourself.  In other words, you can make kiddush and then polish your shoes and take a shower and go to a movie and then come home and eat your seuda.  


Because you shouldn't believe such things without evidence-


Reb Elchanan (Kovetz Shiurim II 30:1): 

דברמב"ם פכ"ט מהל' שבת כתב דמצוות זכור את יום השבת אינה דוקא בשבת אלא סמוך לכניסתו וסמוך ליציאתו ומה"ט יוצא גם בהבדלה מבעוד יום אף דהבדלה ג"כ דאורייתא להרמב"ם

The Netziv (Meromei Sadeh beginning of Arvei Pesachim 99b): 

דעת הרמב"ם שאין תוספת לשבת ומכ"מ קי"ל דמקדש מבעוד יום

In the course of a discussion over at Chaim B's site, an idea developed in the comments that we were told has been said by Reb Yosef Ber (US).  The idea was the although Shabbos is the classic example (e.g., Chulin 101b) of a kedusha that exists without any human input, the passuk in the Aseres Hadibros that says לקדשו might indicate that we too are Mekadeish Shabbos in some manner- not a mere commemoration, but a chalos kedusha that we create.

The sources for this idea are the the Ramban in Yisro and the Yerushalmi brought in Tosfos in Arvei Psachim, as follows.

Ramban Shemos 20:7.

אבל לרבותינו עוד בו מדרש ממלת לקדשו, שנקדשהו בזכרון, כענין וקדשתם את שנת החמשים שנה (ויקרא כה י), שהוא טעון קדוש ב"ד לומר ביובל מקודש מקודש, אף כאן צוה שנזכור את יום השבת בקדשנו אותו. וכך אמרו במכילתא (כאן): לקדשו, קדשהו בברכה, מכאן אמרו מקדשין על היין בכניסתו, אין לי אלא ליום, ללילה מנין, ת"ל ושמרתם את השבת (להלן לא יד), וזהו קדוש היום, והוא מן התורה, אינו אסמכתא. וכך אמרו (ברכות כ ב): נשים חייבות בקדוש היום דבר תורה, וזה על קדוש הלילה, לפי שכל הטעונים קדוש מתקדשים בכניסתן פעם אחת, כגון קדוש החדש, וקדוש היובל

Yerushalmi:
I'm too lazy to find the Yerushalmi, but I think it's in one of the tosfosin on the first daf of Arvei Psachim.  The idea is that Yerushalmi brings that the nusach of the bracha is מקדש ישראל והשבת, just like we say  on Yomtov.  On Yomtov, it makes sense, because our kiddush Hachodesh is a necessary ingredient in determining which day has Kedusha.  The kedusha of Shabbos, on the other hand, seems to have nothing to do with our input.  The language of the Yerushalmi's bracha indicates that we do contribute to the chalos din kedusha of Shabbos.

The concept is not unique.  For example, Nedarim 13a:

בכור נמי מתפיסו בנדר הוא דתניא משום רבי אמרו מנין לנולד בכור בתוך ביתו שמצוה להקדישו שנאמר (דברים טו) הזכר תקדיש ומאן דשרי כי לא מקדיש ליה מי לא מיקדיש

Reb Tzadok in his Pri Tzadik in Yisro:

 והנה בנוסח האר״י הק׳ נמצא בקידוש מ״ב  תיבות ובזהר הק׳ מפורש שיש בהברכה ל״ה תיבות  ונדחקו ליישב זה.

 אכן נראה ברור שלא נחשבו התיבות הכפולות שנמצא בברכה זו שהם ז׳  תיבות . ברוך אתה ה׳ בנו ושבת באהבה וברצון. והענין שנכפלו ז׳ תיבות הוא שמה שישראל מכניסים הקדושה לשבת הם מחזירים ג״כ  להש״י שמכירין שהוא ג״כ מהשי״ת

וזהו שנמצא בברכה ז׳ תיבות כנגד מדת מלכות. והיינו ל״ה תיבות שבהם ז׳ פעמים ה׳ כנגד ה׳ מדות שמצד ישראל שכל א׳ כלול מז ׳. ועוד ז׳ תיבות נגד מדת מלכות שהם כפולים לרמז שהם גם מצד השי״ת. והוא דמה שמודים על השבת שהנחיל לנו שע״י זה מכניסים קדושה לשבת זה מחזירים להשי״ת ׳ ומודים לו על שנחן לנו כח להודות לו ע״ז ולהכניס קדושה לשבת וזה שנכפלו תיבות בא״י .  

וכן מה שישראל מכניסים הקדושה ע״ י  שמענגים השבת כמ״ש (מ״ר נשא פ׳ י׳ וש״מ) מקדשו במאכל ומשתה וכו׳ והיינו שמקבלים השבת  באהבה וברצון זהו ג״כ מצד השי״ת וע״כ נכפלו תיבות בנו ושבת באהבה וברצון. ומרמז שמה השי״ת הנחיל באהבה וברצון השבת  ובחר בנו הוא ע״י שישראל מקבלים השבת באהבה וברצון ורוצים בהשי״ת  וכגגד זה השי״ת הנחיל השבת באהבה וברצון ובחר ורצה בנו וכאמור

(It has also been sort of spoken about by R' Aryeh Leib Frommer, the Kozhiglover Rov.  He was one of the Roshei Yeshiva in 'Chachmei Lublin' and wrote the Teshuvos and the Hagadas Eretz Tzvi, and a sefer on Chumash.  This is from his Eretz Tzvi al HaTorah, here.  (He has a similar idea in his teshuvos, towards the end, but it is not as well developed as this.)

ושמרו בנ״י את  השבת לעשות את השבת וגו׳ (ל״א, ט״ז). בתרגום יונתן "למעבד תפנוקי שבתא". נראה לענ״ד לבאר, עפימ״ש השל״ה, אהא דאי׳ בש״ס (פסחים סח, ב) הכל מודים בשבת דבעינן נמי לכם, מ׳׳ט וקראת לשבת עונג, וכ' השל״ה דטעמא דמילתא כדאמרינן התם, הכל מודים בעצרת דבעינן נמי לכם מ״ט יום שניתנה בו תורה הוא, וכן שבת דבשבת ניתנה תורה לישראל. מבואר מזה חידוש גדול, דחיוב עוגג שבת הוא מצד דניתנה בו תורה. ועוד חידוש, אע״ג דשבת קביעא וקיימא, מ״מ יש בו צד קדושה שבאה מחמת ישראל, שמחמתו חיוב עונג שבת, דהרי מת שניתנה תורה בשבת היא ע״י שהוסיף משה יום אהד מדעתו, ומתן תורה שבו גורם ג״כ קדושת שבת, כמבואר בשל״ה,  נמצא דיש לישראל ג״כ חלק בקדושת שבת.

 ודבר זה מתאים עם דברי הפני יהושע (שבת פ״ו, ב) בהא דיליף דבשבת ניתנה תורה מגזירה שוה זכור זכור, והקשה הא הקב״ה אמר ליתן תורה בערב שבת, ומה הי׳ נעשה אז עם הגזירה שוה, ותירץ דאם היתה התורה ניתנת בערב שבת היה תוב

 בלוחות הראשונות שמור ולא זכור, עי״ש. ולפי הנ״ל  נכון, דשמור קאי על מצוות לא תעשה של שבת, דהשמר הוא לא עשה, וזכור על מצות עשה דשבת דהיינו עוגג, ועשה דעונג נתחדשה ע״י שניתנה תורה בשבת, וא״כ אם היה מתן תורה בערב שבת לא היה כתוב זכור רק שמור לבד. וק״ל. ובזה אתי שפיר דברי הפסוק: לעשות את השבת, על עונג שבת, דלגבי מצוה .

 זו דעוגג נהשב כאילו ישראל מקדשי ליה לשבת, דחלק הקדושה הזו אשר מחמתה הייבים בעוגג באה ע״י שהוסיף משה יום אחד מדעתו, ע״כ שפיר כתוב על זה : לעשות  את השבת, שהם עושים גוף השבת, דכמו בקבלת התורה קדשו ישראל

 את השבת בגרימתם שמתן תורה היה מחמתם, כך תמיד בעסק התורה מוסיפין היל בקדושת יום השבת, וע״כ איתא בתגדב״א (פכ״ו) זכור — מקדשו במקרא ובמשנה, גם איתא בתנדב״א (פ״א) שבת יעשה כולו תורה. גם נכון לפי זה שכל ענין מתן תורה סדרו חז״ל במס׳ שבת, מחמת דכל קדושת השבת שנוספה במתן תורה [זולת מה שניתן במרה] בא ע״י מתן תורח, ע״כ שפיר  מישך שייכי אהדדי

Anyway, the point I'm making is this:  It seems to me that the Rambam's idea of making kiddush Erev Shabbos only makes sense if Kiddush is statement of recognition, a ceremonial commemoration.  If our saying Kiddush is supposed to make a chalos hekdesh, there is absolutely no way that you should be able to do it before Shabbos Mamosh.  You can't be mekadiesh something before it exists.

It's kind of ironic that when Reb Elchonon says over the Rambam about making kiddush before you're mekabel Shabbos, as I brought above in the beginning, he quotes the passuk זכור את יום השבת without the last word- לקדשו.  I think that Zachor, you can do on Friday.  לקדשו, on the other hand, if you want to say that  לקדשו means that you are making a chalos kedusha, that needs to be on Shabbos itself.


Reb Chaim B tells me that Rabbi Wahrman of HANC uses many of these Marei Mekomos and comes to exactly the opposite conclusion.  I'm ok with that.

Yisro, Shemos 19:16. The Awesome Spectacle of Mattan Torah. קולות וברקים

The Torah and Chazal describe the awe inspiring experience of Mattan Torah.  The sensory overload (Rashi, Shemos 20:15, רואין את הנשמע, שאי אפשר לראות במקום אחר), Chazal say, was literally breath taking (Shabbos 88b).  After a fraught moment of utter silence (Shemos Rabba 29:9, צפור לא צווח עוף לא פרח שור לא געה אופנים לא עפו, שרפים לא אמרו קדוש קדוש, הים לא נזדעזע, הבריות לא דברו, אלא העולם שותק ומחריש ויצא הקול אנכי), Heaven touched Earth (almost: Sukkah 5a, ולא ירדה שכינה למטה והכתיב (שמות יט) וירד ה' על הר סיני למעלה מעשרה טפחים), the voice of Hashem pierced our minds and our bodies, and we heard the Aseres Hadibros.


Rashi in Parshas Ki Sisa, Shemos 34:3, says the following:

" הראשונות ע"י שהיו בתשואות וקולות וקהלות שלטה בהן עין הרע אין לך יפה מן הצניעות"

Rashi is drawn from the Tanchuma there in 31,

 הלוחות ראשונות על שנתנו בפומבי, לפיכך שלטה בהם עין הרע ונשתברו. וכאן אמר לו הקדוש ברוך הוא, אין לך יפה מן הצניעות, שנאמר, מיכה ו ח: "ומה ה' דורש ממך כי אם עשה משפט ואהבת חסד והצנע לכת":

The point of the Tanchuma is that the first luchos were given in uproar and thunder and great masses of onlookers, and the Ayin Hara had power over them, and they ultimately were broken.  The second luchos were given in quiet and privacy and will last forever.  Nothing is better than Tznius.

I simply don't understand this Tanchuma.  I have nothing to propose here.  The best I can do is to try to ask a she'ailas chacham.  


1.  What does Ayin Hara have to do with the sin of the Egel?  Does the Tanchuma mean that when the Sattan showed Klal Yisrael a mirage of Moshe Rabbeinu's bier, he was motivated by a jealousy that stemmed from the marvels of Mattan Torah?  Or that the Ayin Hara caused the Eirev Rav to demand an Eigel?  Or that if not for the Ayin Hara, they couldn't have been broken even if thrown down?


2.  We do find a concept of Tznius in doing mitzvos.  The example that I always use is the Gemara in Zevachim 59b.  There is a machlokes Tana'im about how tall the Mizbe'ach in the Mishkan was.  Rebbi Yehuda says it was three amos tall, and the curtains were five, allowing you to see the Kohen, but not the avoda in his hands.  Reb Yosi says it was ten amos high.  The Gemara asks, but if it was ten amos high, everyone could see the avoda!  This is impossible!

?? אפשר כהן עומד ע"ג המזבח ועבודה בידו וכל העם רואין אותו מבחוץ  

The Gemara answers that according to Reb Yosi, the Kla'im were fifteen amos high, and the kohen had privacy when he did the avodah.  Apparently, the Gemara found it inconceivable that the Avoda would be visible from outside the Mishkan.


3.  On the other hand, we find the din of ברוב עם הדרת מלך, that it is a Hiddur, or a Kiddush Hashem, to have many onlookers when you do a mitzva.  You might be thinking, as I initially did, that Rov Am only applies when everyone present is participating in the mitzva, not merely looking.  You might be right.  But almost all the achronim and poskim, with a great deal of support from Chazal (Yoma 70a, Machatzis Hashekel 147 SK 11,) hold that the din of Rov Am applies even when one person is doing the mitzva and the others are merely looking.  As Reb Heshy Lichtman pointed out to me, if Chillul Hashem is exacerbated by witnesses to an aveira, kal vachomer Kiddush Hashem is enhanced by witnesses to a mitzva.  The raya from Yoma is very debatable.  Heshy's raya is solid.


So, how does this Tanchuma accord with the din of Rov Am?  If Rov Am is a Hiddur and a Kiddush Hashem, how can it possibly create a danger of Ayin Hara?  And if the two are not mutually exclusive, which is the preferred path?


4.  When the Tanchuma uses the words Ayin Hara, does it mean Reb Yitzchak or D'bei Reb Yishmael in Bava Metzia 42a:

א"ר יצחק אין הברכה מצוייה אלא בדבר הסמוי מן העין שנאמר (דברים כח, ח) יצו ה' אתך את הברכה באסמיך תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל אין הברכה מצויה אלא בדבר שאין העין שולטת בו שנאמר יצו ה' אתך את הברכה באסמיך

A Chkira.  What is the primary cause of the damage of Ayin Hara: pride or envy?  Is Ayin Hara caused by the other person's envy, or is it a consequence of pride on the part of the victim?  Are we missing the problem of Ayin Hara by focusing on the jealousy, when we should be looking at the pride that makes a person vulnerable to jealousy?  Maybe Ayin Hara happens when a person is not only happy that he has something, but when he's happy that "I have it AND YOU DON'T."  If that is the case, maybe what the Tanchuma means is that we felt pride that everyone else knew we had a unique and personal relationship with the Ribono shel Olam, and it was that pride that set us up for the Chet Ha'Eigel?  If that's the case, then maybe the result of the תשואות וקולות וקהלות was פירסום, and the result of the פירסום was pride, and as a result of this pride, the connection of the Luchos to Klal Yisrael was attenuated.


I saw the פרדס יוסף in כי תשא brings down that when Reb Meir Shapiro opened his yeshiva, he made a big showy event, and someone asked him how what he was doing shtimmed with the Tanchuma, and he answered that he was aware of the risk, but the Klal needed to be shaken awake (אויפטרייסלונג) by such an event.  I've seen the Rav Kook was asked about this when he inaugurated his building as well, and he answered something along the lines of a distinction between publicizing a concept and publicizing an action (הקול והפרסום לצורך הכרזתם של האידיאלים הם יפים מאד, אבל מצד המעשים יותר יפה היא הצניעות, that sound is good for Besamim but bad for wine in Menachos 87, as I've written about here.).  I also saw the the Shem MiShmuel addresses what exactly Ayin Hara means in this Tanchuma, but I don't understand what he is saying.  Bottom line:  I'm still looking for a pshat that I understand.

Yisro, Shemos 20:122, Honoring Parents, and the Ten Commandments . כיבוד אב ואם ועשרת הדברות

(Please note that I use the word 'nexting' or 'nexted'.  I strongly dislike the word 'juxtaposition', and nexted is the only alternative I like.  I also dislike the word 'neologism,' almost as ugly a word as 'blog.')

It has often been said that the Aseres HaDibros seem to be evenly divided between those that deal with our relationship to Hashem and those that focus on our relationship with our fellow man.  When Moshe Rabbeinu came down with these commandments written on the Luchos, five on each Tablet, the laws were balanced between his two hands, one hand presenting religious doctrine and the other hand human ethics.  The one Dibbur that doesn’t seem to fit is the fifth, Kibbud Av Ve’eim, which ends the first Luach, but seems to belong with the second group, the one that deals with inter-human relationships.  


Indeed, the Ramban here says that there are only four in the "relationship with Hashem" group, and Kibbud begins the six that involve our relationship with our fellow man.  He adds that kibbud is listed first in the second group because it relates to the first of the first group, Anochi.  Honor your father as you honor Me, because I am your heavenly Father, and he is your earthly father.    True, he later says that the luchos were equally divided between man/G-d and man/man, because we honor our parents because they are Hashem's partners, and just as we honor Hashem, we ought to honor His partners, so it is also man/G-d.  The connection seems tenuous, dachuk, in light of his earlier statement that Kibbud is man/man.  In any case, although the Ramban’s explanation does connect Kibbud to Anochi, it would be nice to understand why Kibbud is so closely related to the others that are on the same Luach, those that are בין אדם למקום, between man and Hashem.   

How many times did Hashem teach us the mitzvah of Kibbud Av Ve’eim?  The Kli Yakar in Parshas Kedoshim says that the mitzvah is stated three times: Yisro (Shemos 20:12), Va’eschanan (Devarim 5:16), and Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:3).  What do all the occurrences have in common?  The Kli Yakar says that they all are stated contiguously with Shemiras Shabbos.  Three times is no coincidence.  And I later realized that this occurs a fourth time as well!  The Gemara in Sanhedrin 56b talks about the mitzvos we were given in Mara: Shabbos, Kibbud Av Ve’eim, and Dinim.  There you have it again!  True, Rashi in Beshalach (Shemos 15:25) says the mitzvos of Mara were Shabbos, Dinim, and Para Adumah, but he later explains that when he said Dinim he meant Kibbud Av.  Rashi just added Para on the basis of a Medrash.  In any case, Kibbud Av is mentioned four times.  Every single time, it is contiguous with the Mitzva of Shabbos.  This nexting is undeniably intentional and clearly indicates a linkage.  

In an answer reminiscent of the Ramban, the Kli Yakar explains that every man is created by three partners, a father, a mother, and Hashem.  Shabbos is our way of honoring Hashem for creating us individually, besides the general creation of the world as a whole; similarly, Kibbud is our way of honoring our parents.   

This Kli Yakar would also explain what Kibbud is doing on the first luach.  This deep connection between Kibbud and Shabbos results in every mention of Kibbud being immediately followed by Shabbos, and because of that connection they had to be on the same luach.


But does that mean that the idea that the first luach instructs us about בין אדם למקום, man to G-d, and the second about בין אדם לחבירו, man to man, is not correct? 

A certain very Chashuveh person made an superlative observation which adds a new dimension to the Kli Yakar and ties everything together nicely.  (This person actually said it before hearing the Kli Yakar.)  She said the reason nobody understands why Kibbud is in the first group is because of a true, but imperfectly phrased assumption.  Everyone asks why kibud av is in the first five dibros, when the first group involves Man's duties to Hashem.  But it's a mistake to categorize the first group as bein adam la’makom.  The first five Dibros are bein adam le'yotzro, between man and his creator.

In short: Why is כיבוד אב ואם on the first luach, which otherwise focuses on בין אדם למקום, and not on the second, which deals with בין אדם לחבירו?  Because the first five are not בין אדם למקום, they are בין אדם ליוצרו.

After reading this, you might think the answer is obvious.  It's interesting, though, that it wasn't obvious at all until you read it.  This is another example of
ויפקח א־לקים את עיניה. — א״ר בנימין חכל בחזקת סומין עד שהקב״ה מאיר את עיניהם, שנאמר: ויפקח א־לקים את עיניה.    (ב״ר נ״ג)  ג. 

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Here's a brief summary of existing discussions about the issue of whether Kibbud Av is called  בין אדם לחבירו or בין אדם למקום.  I already mentioned the Ramban in this parsha that groups it with בין אדם לחבירו. 

Minchas Chinuch discusses this and presents two possiblities: that our obligation to others is to refrain from hurting them and to help them under the rules of Tzedaka.  The greater obligations towards our parents are בין אדם למקום.  Or, that the fact that it involves our relationship with another person means that it is automatically בין אדם לחבירו.  He says that one difference would be in a case where a person failed in his obligation of Kibbud Av.  Would he have to ask mechila from the parent, or would teshuva suffice.  Remember, it's the Minchas Chinuch, so everything he says opens a whole avenue of possibilities.

The Maharam Shick (YD 346) says that since the Gemara in Kiddushin 31b says that the obligation remains after a parents' death, it must be  בין אדם למקום.  Again, there are numerous reasons to disagree with this proof.  Even assuming the validity of the logic of his proof, many Achronim discuss whether kibbud after death is real kibbud (Noda Be'Yehuda II Even Ezer 45, R' Akiva Eiger Teshuvos 68, Lechem Mishna 6 Mamrim 11.)

Reb Boruch Ber in his Birkas Shmuel Yevamos 3 says it's a machlokes between Tosfos in the end of Eilu Metzios who holds it's בין אדם לחבירו and Tosfos Yeshanim in Kesuvos 40a who presents both possibilities. 

Yisro, Shemos 20:11. Ki Sheishes Yamim. Why Isn't Shabbos a Universal Mitzvah?

Shabbos commemorates the creation of the universe — “כי ששת ימים עשה...על כן בירך ". In Va’eschanan, Devorim 5:15, Shabbos is also associated with the exodus from Mitzrayim— “וזכרת כי עבד היית...על כן ציוך"

Reb Meir Simcha In Parshas Va’eschanan asks: Hashem's creation of the world is not specific to the Jewish people.  Since Shabbos was intended to memorialize the creation, it should be universal, observed by all mankind. Why, then, is the opposite true; not only is Shemiras Shabbos not obligatory for non-Jews, it is even prohibited to them.  A non-Jew's observance of the Shabbos through shemirah is considered transgressive; עכו'ם ששבת חייב מיתה (Sanhedrin 58b)  In Shemoneh Esrei of Friday night, we stress this exclusionary nature; "ולא הנחלתו מלכנו לעובדי פסילים וגם במנוחתו לא ישכנו ערלים."

Here are eight good answers to this question.  Please note that this is not a purely academic discussion, though there would be nothing wrong with that.  The answers highlight the nature of Shabbos, and can enhance our appreciation of its Kedusha.

{R Meir Simcha’s teretz:} when we commemorate the creation of the universe, we are saying that it was not, as Deists believe, a momentary nexus between G-d and the universe during which matter was created and the laws of nature set into motion, and then left on its own forever.  We believe that the universe has purpose and a destiny, and its Creator is constantly involved in His work through “mechadeish betuvo bechol yom tamid ma’aseh breishis’- He renews the creation every day - and hashgachas Hashem, Divine Providence. Our testimony to briyas ha’olam is very different than simple eidus of sheishes yamim of creation and a day of rest. Only we, who experienced yetzias Mitzrayim, which demonstrated Hashgachas Hashem, can testify from our own experience that the creation was purposeful and that Hashem continues to intervene and direct nature towards that divine purpose. Our national history, our personal experience of ongoing suffering and redemption, continually demonstrates Divine Providence.  A gentile shemiras Shabbos, even by Chachmei Umos Ha'Olam, would be testimony to something they never experienced and which they cannot experience, and it would be, in a sense, a falsehood. (The Sfas Emes in Parshas Bo brings from the RI'M that the Asara Ma’amaros she’bahem nivra ha’olam, the ten utterances that created the world, were transfigured to become the Eser Makkos, the ten plagues, and then the Aseres Hadibros, the Ten Commandments. If you think about it for a moment, you will realize that this approach is consistent with R Meir Simcha, in that the three events were intimately related and naturally consequential.)

{Reb Moshe’s teretz:} Reb Moshe, in the first volume of Kol Rom, on Shemos 20:2, brings the Ibn Ezra who asks that the Aseres Hadibros should have begun with briyas ha’olam and not yetzias Mitzrayim. Instead of asher hotzeisicha, it should say "Anochi Hashem Elokecha ashe barasi es ha'olam.  He answers that awareness of briyas ha’olam is not as important as awareness of continued hashgachah, similar to Reb Meir Simcha.
In Kol Rom 3 on page 103, he directly asks Reb Meir Simcha’s question, and says another answer: The word “tohu” is used in Ma’aseh breishis to describe the chaotic state of the universe before it was given any form.  The Gemara that says that the first two thousand years of the briyah are characterized as “tohu”, primordial chaos, because the Torah was only learned by individuals.  Only after Avraham, who taught the world and had three hundred talmidim, did the millennia of ‘Torah’ begin, which ended the years of ‘tohu’.  So, if a world without Torah is Tohu, it must be that without Torah, the briyah is not finished. Therefore, it is only with yetzias Mitzrayim, which was letzorech matan Torah, that the briyah was truly complete. The reason the world the is Tohu before Mattan Torah is because the creation was conditional: if you accept the Torah, the world will continue to exist, and if not, it will disintegrate.  Since the Creation was conditional, and Torah is the fulfillment of the condition, and Yetzias Mitzrayim was for the purpose of Mattan torah, eidus of the briyah has to include eidus of Yetzias Mitzrayim/matan Torah.

{The Sfas Emes’ teretz:} The Sfas Emes in Shemos 16:29 brings a Zohar which apparently answers this question, by saying that every day has a malbush but not Shabbos, which is Malchus, which only we can be zoche to because we were nizdacheich through yetzias Mitzrayim. (I only mention this because I know it means something to people who learn this aspect of Torah, even though I'm not among them.)

{Ponevezher Rov’s teretz:} The sefer Mishulchan Gavo’ah in Vayikra parshas Emor brings the following vort from the Ponevizher Rov: Shabbos is not just isur melacha. It is the chemdas hayamim, a yom machmadim. It has a kedusha like the kedusha of the mishkan, which was a separate reshus, unique on Earth. Similarly, Shabbos is a time that is unique and separate from all other time. Yisraelim are kodesh— when they create their family and lay the foundation of their home life, they do it with the words ‘mekudeshes li’. Therefore, they can enter into the holy domain of Shabbos. A gentile's unwillingness to accept the will of Hashem contradicts the idea of Shabbos. His observance of Shabbos is a trespass, a falsehood, and a negation of the Shabbos. Maybe the idea is like the din of a korban— that eating the korban is mishulchan gavoha. Only certain people are given the right to eat the korbon, and if someone who is not allowed to eats it he is ne’enash. Although every Yisroel agrees with the idea of korbanos, and is happy to participate in any way he can in the hekdesh, if a Yisroel eats kodshei kodashim, he is punished. The oneg of shevisa on Shabbos is holy, and is like a korbon, and so an akum that partakes of it is like an akum– or a zor– who eats a korban. This pshat is consistent with the rishonim that explain the chiyuv missah of an Akum sheshavas as being based on their issur of gezel, and it also adds that it is gezel of kodshim, a form of gezel that is called me’ilah.
In short, shemiras Shabbos is an act of communion with the kedusha of Shabbos and with Hashem. It is not something that is lying hefker and available to whoever wants it. The ability to participate in shemiras Shabbos is like the meat of korbanos- it is a gift from the Ribono shel Olam to people who have dedicated their lives to Avodas Hashem.

{Rav Hutner’s ha’ara:} The Pachad Yitzchak in the volume on Pesach, in Siman 27, brings that Rashi in Yevamos 48b says that the passuk of “veyinafeish ben amosecha vehageir” means that an akum that does not keep Shabbos is punished, because not-keeping Shabbos is like avodah zara! Tosfos, of course, argues and says that he is not allowed to keep Shabbos. Rav Hutner explains that Rashi must hold like those that say that a geir toshav is mechayev himself to keep the 7 mitzvos in the same manner and with the same philosophical appraoch as a Yisroel keeps those 7 mitzvos, and since for us chillul Shabbos is considered to be like avoda zora, the same applies to him. Therefore, for a geir toshov, chillul shabbos is avoda zora, and he is chayav for the issur of avoda zora. He also brings Rashi in Beitza 16 regarding the fact that goyim will be ne’enash for not keeping Shabbos.

{Harav Reuven Feinstein:}  The first luchos say zachor and mention briyas ha’olam. The second ones say shamor and mention Mitzrayim. Gentiles  should commemorate/zachor Shabbos and are certainly not ne’enash for doing so. But shamor means issur melachah. The issur melachah only applies to Yisrael, because of our status as avdei Hashem that He acquired by taking us out of Mitzrayim. The purpose of the issur melacha is to show that all our work is only to do what our master commands, and when he commands us to stop, we must stop. In fact, the issur melacha only has a associative connection with briyas ha’olom. The causative basis for it is only yetzias Mitzrayim. So an akum that is shoveis from melacha because of Shabbos is saying eidus sheker by claiming to be an eved of Hashem. He may choose to serve Hashem, but he is not His kinyan, His avadim, as we are.

{My teretz:} Shabbos is testimony that the Ribbono shel Olam created the world. A non-Jew has a different idea of what the Ribbono shel Olam is. If he were to keep Shabbos, he would be stating that his-idea-of-God created the world, which is, of course, eidus sheker. And even a geir toshav– if he understood what the Ribbono shel Olam is, he would be misgahyer. His unwillingness to be misgayeir shows that he has a false image of Hashem.  I know it's often said that all monotheist believe in the same God.  It's not true.  How do we define an individual person, how do we distinguish him from other individuals?  By saying that this one does a certain job, has a certain temper, familial relations, preferences and tastes.  Similarly, we 'identify' God by imagining His characteristics, and different religions define those characteristics so disparately that they simply do not identify the same thing at all.  (When I posted this in its original form, in January of 08, LkwdGuy pointed out that a Geir Toshav cannot keep shabbos; it is not among his seven mitzvos.  He asked, since a Geir Toshav accepts the Torah, as the Rambam says, he obviously understands Hashem as we do, so his eidus is no different than ours.  I tried to anticipate and avoid the kashe here, but it's still a good point.  But see what I bring from the Magen Avraham at the end of the post, which answers his kashe.)


{Rabbi Dr. Gary Schreiber:}  The nachash told Chavah that if one eats from the Etz hadaas they will become k'Elokim. However, rather than becoming G-dlike, Chava ate from the etz and was contaminated with zuhama. What happened to the becoming G-dlike? In addition to the etz haddaas was the Etz Hachayim. Initially Adam was not instructed to avoid the etz Hachayim. It was only because he ate from the Etz Hadaas first that he was then forbidden to partake of the Etz Hachaim. DGS suggested that the Etz Hachaim is chachmas ha'Torah and the Etz Hadaas is chochmas ha'olam. By partaking of chachmas ha'aolam prior to chachmas ha'Torah, mankind became contaminated and was no longer able to appreciate the full breadth of Torah. Had he partaken of the etz Hachayim first, he may have been allowed or instructed to partake of the etz hadaas later. By going out of sequence he erred gravely and lost his ability to become a full shutaf with HKBH.  Scientists will tell you that science is amoral. Knowledge is its own good. But this is not true in real life. We must know Torah before engaging in worldly matters so that we can maintain a Torah perspective as we approach the world. The results of unrestrained secular knowledge lead to nuclear holocaust, unrestrained genetic engineering etc. That zuhama was only removed at Matan Torah. We can become shutfim with HKBH in some sense because we have the Torah to guide us. So it is only Yiddin who can become (limited) partners with HKBH who have the full mitzvah of Shabbos.

Briefly:
1. {R Meir Simcha’s teretz:} our eidus is on hashgacha pratis and m’chadeish b’tuvo.
2. {Reb Moshe’s teretz:} before the kiyum hatnai of YM→ MT, the world was really tohu, and since Bri'as Ha'olam includes matan Torah, eidus on the Bri'ah must include eidus on Matan Torah. If you don't keep the mitzvos, you can't say eidus on Matan Torah. Eidus is not just eidus; it is participation in the kiyum ha'olam through kabbalas and kiyum hatorah.
3. {The Sfas Emes’ teretz:} who knows.
4. {Ponevezher Rov’s teretz:} Shabbos has kedushas korban, and it’s assur l’zahr.
5. {Rav Hutner’s he’arah:} Beitza 16 and Yevamos 48 that an akum is ne’enash for not keeping it.
6. {Rav Reuven Feinstein’s teretz:} they can do zachor, but shamor is only for the avadim Hashem was koneh.
7. {My excellent teretz:} their eidus is that their god created the world.
8. {R' D' GS:} Shemiras Shabbos is the key that enables us to join HKBH in creating the world, in changing the world through knowledge and action. This is only possible when one has accepted and understands the Torah, because without Torah the result of knowledge and action will be destruction and chaos.

Micha supported Rav Reuven Feinstein's answer by pointing out that the difference between Yisro and Va'eschanan, but then noted a contradiction to this approach:  He wrote,
"Similarly, "Zakhor es yom haShabbos..." (Yisro) is connected to "ki sheishes yamim asah H' es hashamayim ve'es ha'aretz", but "Shamor" (Va'Eschanan) is "vezakharta ki eved hayisa"."  On the other hand, as he points out,
""VeShameru BY es haShabbos", while "hi beini uvein benei Yisrael os hi le'olam" it returns to the theme of creation "ki sheishes yamim", NOT yetzi'as Mitzrayim."

RYGB, aka Rabbi Bechhoffer, remarked that he believes that Reb Meir Simcha says that gentiles are allowed to and indeed obligated to commemorate Shabbos, but not by resting or kiddush.  Whether Reb Meir Simcha says it or not, it certainly would explain the Rashi that Rav Hutner brings down, as noted above.

great unknown, in the new comments on the post, says that Reb Yaakov says was RYGB attributes to Reb Meir Simcha, and also that he believes there is a Medrash to that effect.  He also points us to the next to last Rashi on Chulin 5a that says האי תנא חמירא ליה שבת כעבודת כוכבים דהעובד עבודת כוכבים כופר בהקב״ה
והמחלל שבת כופר במעשיו ומעיד שקר שלא שבת הקב״ה במעשה בראשית: and since one of the seven mitzvos is Avoda Zara, it follows that they, too, have to somehow commemorate Shabbos.  Not a perfect proof, because without a chiyuv of zachor it could be that merely believing it is enough.  After all, Zechiras Amalek we're yotzei with one time a year.   But the idea of the proof certainly underlies what Reb Reuven/the alleged Reb Meir Simcha/the alleged Medrash say(s).

Here's an extra "requires some thought" part of this dvar torah:
The Magen Avraham 304:24 (cited with approval by the Biur Halacha at the end of that siman) says that a Geir Toshav can be mekabel Shabbos along with other mitzvos; he can accept upon himself whichever mitzvos he chooses, up to 612 mitzvos. He will then remain a ger toshav, but he will be obligated to fulfill the mitzvos he accepted, including Shabbos.
Do all of the teirutzim work with the Magen Avraham?  Does it address LkwdGuy's point?

Just as a minor observation: we have this rule of Akum she'shavas, that Shabbos is exclusively meant to be observed by the Jews, but the reality is that the idea of a day of rest and spirituality is very popular.  The Christians, despite delisting ninety nine percent of the mitzvos, including Bris Milah, kept Shabbos, although they brazenly changed it to Sunday.  The Muslims kept it, albeit repackaged.  Even the Buddhists have their Shabbos concept.  There seems to be something so fundamental about Shabbos, so consonant with human spirituality, that everyone, even those that disparage the mitzvos of the Torah, has to adopt and adapt the concept for their own religions.

Yisro: Kiddush Friday Night- Minhag Avos versus the Arizal's Innovations; Mesora and Kabbala

Or, Custom versus Lurianic Innovation.

Or, Memoria, Curia, and Luria: Minhag, Halacha, and Kabbalah.

The first section is from Rabbi Pinches Friedman, translated and made beautiful by Rav Dr. Baruch Fox.  The item he sent me was longer, but I found this part to be most interesting, in that it highlights the ambivalence of the poskim regarding the Arizal's kabala-centric innovations.  After this section, I begin my discussion.

In this week’s parsha, parshat Yitro, we read about the revelation at Mount Sinai, when the Almighty chose to give Yisrael the Torah and convey the Ten Commandments. In this essay, we wish to focus on the fourth commandment (Exodus 20,8): "זכור את יום השבת לקדשו". -- “Remember the Sabbath day to sanctify it.” Our sages of blessed memory expound this verse in the gemorah (Pesachim 106.) as pertaining to the mitzvah of Kiddush: "זכור את יום השבת לקדשו, זוכרהו על היין בכניסתו, אין לי אלא בלילה ביום מנין, תלמוד לומר זכור את יום השבת ביום". We sanctify and remember the Shabbos over wine, both at night and during the day.

Thirty-five Words in "ויכולו" and Thirty-five Words in the Beracha of Kiddush

The Magen Avraham (271,22) writes in the name of the Arizal (Shaar HaKavanot) that the Kiddush formula contains seventy words—thirty-five in the paragraph of "ויכולו" and thirty-five in the actual berocheh. The source for this is found in the Zohar hakadosh (Intro. 5:):

"ויכולו אית ביה תלתין וחמש תיבין, ובקידושא דאנן מקדשין תלתין וחמש תיבין, וסליק כלא לשבעין שמהן דקב"ה, וכנסת ישראל אתעטר בהו".

Translation: “Vayichulu” contains thirty-five words, the kiddush we recite contains thirty-five words; they add up to seventy names of the Almighty, and Yisroel are adorned and protected by them.

The Kabbalists and most Chassidim follow the custom of the Arizal; the customs of the Chasam Sofer mention that the Ksav Sofer, zts”l, also followed this custom, and here is the formula:

"ויכולו השמים והארץ וכל צבאם, ויכל אלקים ביום השביעי מלאכתו אשר עשה, וישבות ביום השביעי מכל מלאכתו אשר עשה, ויברך אלקים את יום השביעי ויקדש אותו, כי בו שבת מכל מלאכתו אשר ברא אלקים לעשות:

ברוך אתה ה' אלקינו מלך העולם, אשר קדשנו במצוותיו ורצה בנו, ושבת קדשו באהבה וברצון הנחילנו זכרון למעשה בראשית, תחלה למקראי קודש זכר ליציאת מצרים, ושבת קדשך באהבה וברצון הנחלתנו, ברוך אתה ה' מקדש השבת".

In Shaar HaKavanot, the Arizal goes on to say:

"ולכן אותם הנוהגין לומר אחר תיבות זכר ליציאת מצרים, כי בנו בחרת ואותנו קדשת מכל העמים ושבת קדשך כו', הם טועים טעות גמור, כי מוסיפין בחשבון התיבות, ואין לומר סדר גירסא זו אלא בקידוש של יום טוב בלבד, והטועים העתיקוהו משם בסדר הקידוש של שבת".

—anyone who customarily adds the words כי בנו בחרת ואותנו קדשת מכל העמים ושבת קדשך כו' is making a big mistake; that formula should only be recited on Yom Tov.

Nevertheless, it is quite clear that every individual is obligated to follow the custom of his father and his Rabbis, as the Magen Avraham, the great possek, writes:

 "ולי נראה שאין לשנות שום מנהג, כי לכל מנהג יש טעם ויסוד דוק ותשכח".

We also find in the Likutei Maharich:

"והנה נוסח סידורי אשכנז, כי בנו בחרת ואותנו קדשת מכל העמים, וכן הוא בסידור רב עמר"ם ורמב"ם ובמחזור ויטרי ובמהרי"ל ובאבודרהם, אך על פי האר"י ז"ל אין לאומרו".

In other words, even though the Arizal instructs us not to include the additional words כי בנו בחרת ואותנו קדשת מכל העמים, they are included in the formula found in Ashkenaz siddurim as well as the siddurim of Rav Amram, the Rambam, the Machzor Vitri, the Maharil and the Avudraham.
(end quote from Rav Friedman; now back to me.)

We find this approach often in the Magen Avraham.  For example: the Magen Avraham says that the two mentions of the word נא  (Na) in Shmone Esrei are incorrect, because the psukim they are drawn from do not have the word na in them.  (Obviously, they were put in there because Moshe Rabbeinu's tefilla for his sister used na twice, and mekubalim say that using na twice empowers a tefilla.)  Nevertheless, the Magen Avraham says that one should daven as his father did; that even though the nusach is wrong, it is better to follow your minhag and say the 'technically' incorrect nusach. 

It goes without saying that there are limits to this rule.  In the balance between accuracy of nusach and fealty to minhag, the Magen Avraham holds that the latter is more important.  When we say tefillos, even though we only perceive our own voice, in truth our voice joins the chorus of the voices of our fathers and grandfathers all the way back to Mattan Torah; we are all speaking as one and Hashem hears us as one (Yafeh tefillas tzadik ben tzadik....).  On the other hand, in matters of issur and hetter, minhag might not be the dominant consideration  (see Maseches Sofrim 14:18 for the oft-quoted statement מנהג עוקר הלכה, and Tosfos, Menachos 20b dh Nifsal ומנהג אבותינו תורה היא, and for a thorough discussion see OC 690 Be'er Heitev sk 15 that begins with a quote from the Magen Avraham regarding the Rama's mention of the minhag that children make noise when the name Haman is read during the Megilla.  Bottom line is, don't be such a curmudgeon, and let the kids have a good time.)

Another interesting point about the Arizal's nusach is the following:
Reb Tzadok in his sefer on the Torah, in Parshas Yisro, #5, points out that the Zohar's formula has thirty five words, while that of the Arizal has forty two words.  Reb Tzadok explains that of the forty two, seven are repeated.  These are ברוך, אתה, ה', בנו, ושבת, באהבה, וברצון.  He says that the repetition means that the Kedusha that Klal Yisrael infuses into Shabbos, is an echo of the Kedusha from Hashem, that they recognize that whatever they can give came from the Ribono shel Olam.  That's the last of the paragraph that I understand.

Here is the rest of the Drasha Reb Baruch sent me.  I put it in small font to make clear the distinction between his words and mine.

The Seventy Nations: אל"ה מול אל"ה


We wish to provide a deeper understanding of the Friday night Kiddush, according to the opinion of the Zohar hokadosh and the Arizal—reciting a formula comprised of two segments, each containing thirty-five words. Let us first introduce a teaching of the Bnei Yissoschar (Shabbos 1,10) explaining a quote from our blessed sages (Shabbos 118:): "אלמלי שמרו ישראל שבת ראשונה לא שלטה בהן אומה ולשון"—“If the people of Yisroel had only kept the first Shabbos, no nation or people would have ever ruled over them.” He bases his teaching on the words of the Megaleh Amukot (Lech Lecha) pertaining to the “covenant of the parts” (Bereishis 15,10):

"ויקח לו את כל אלה ויבתר אותם בתוך".—“He took all of these to Him, and he split them in the center.”

It is known that there are seventy guardian angels above, split into two groups—thirty-five on the left side of kedushah led by סמא"ל, the guardian angel of Eisav, and, opposite them, thirty-five on the right side of kedushah, led by רה"ב, the guardian angel of Yishmoel.

These seventy guardian angels can be represented as אל"ה opposite אל"ה, i.e. ל"ה, thirty-five nations on the right with their leader, their א', opposite ל"ה, thirty-five nations of the left with their leader, their א'. This is the allusion in the verse cited above: "ויקח לו את כל אלה" –he took the two sets of אל"ה comprising the seventy nations and their heads--"ויבתר אותם בתוך"—he split them in two halves and placed Yisroel between them. This is also alluded to in the verse (Tehillim 20,28): "אלה ברכב ואלה בסוסים"-- corresponds to the two sets of אל"ה representing the seventy nations--"ואנחנו בשם ה' אלקינו נזכיר—refers to Yisroel.

The Megaleh Amukot tosses in a wonderful insight. This division between the nations explains why the holy nation of Yisroel’s day of rest is Shabbos kodesh. In stark contrast, the Moslems’, the descendants of Yishmoel, celebrate their holy day on Friday, to the right of Shabbos kodesh; whereas, the holy day of the Christians, descendants of Eisav, is Sunday, to the left of Shabbos kodesh; Yisroel again occupy the central position, having been allotted Shabbos kodesh to sanctify and cherish.

Based on this concept, the Bnei Yissoschar points out that the sanctity of Shabbos, located centrally between these other nations’ holy days, nullifies the negative forces of Yishmoel and Eisav (and the seventy nations beneath them) to its right and its left. This is how he explains the teaching: “If the people of Yisroel had only kept the first Shabbos, no nation or people would have ever ruled over them.” Had they kept the very first Shabbos, they would have nullified the negative forces of Eisav and Yishmoel to the left and right of Shabbos kodesh and the roots of the seventy ministering angels. As a result, no nation would have ever been able to rule over them.

Shabbos Kodesh Separates the Negative Forces of Yishmoel and Eisav

We see that Shabbos kodesh acts like an iron curtain separating the legions of Yishmoel and Eisav and preventing them from joining forces. This is the meaning of the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 71:):

"פיזור לרשעים הנאה להם והנאה לעולם". By separating the forces of evil, the powers of kedushah of Yaakov triumph over them and the entire world benefits.

This in my opinion, is what Yisroel’s sweet psalmist is alluding to in "מזמור שיר ליום השבת" which is entirely based on praise for the holiness of Shabbos (Tehillim 92,10): "כי הנה אויביך ה' כי הנה אויביך יאבדו יתפרדו כל פועלי און".. We can deduce from the repetition of the phrase "כי הנה אויביך" that Dovid homelech is teaching us an important lesson concerning the power of Shabbos and its ability to separate the evil forces of Yishmoel and Eisav. "כי הנה אויביך ה'"

“For behold Your enemies, Hashem” refers to the thirty-five nations on the right side led by Yishmoel;

"כי הנה אויביך יאבדו" , “For behold Your enemies shall perish,” refers to the thirty-five nations on the left side led by Eisav; "יתפרדו כל פועלי און", “All evil-doers shall be dispersed,” due to the sanctity of Shabbos standing between them, they will all be eliminated.

This coincides beautifully with the verses of the poem "אזמר בשבחין" instituted by the Arizal to be sung on Friday night: "ימינא ושמאלא ובינייהו כלה". "ימינא" alludes to the thirty-five nations on the right side headed by Yishmoel’s ministering angel; "ושמאלא" alludes to the thirty-five nations on the left side headed by Eisav’s ministering angel;

"ובינייהו כלה" alludes to the Shabbos kallah and queen standing between them and keeping them apart.

This also sheds light on our understanding of the concept of תוספת שבת –extending the sanctity of Shabbos upon ushering her in and ushering her out. By ushering Shabbos in early on Friday night, and extending Shabbos into the domain of the children of Yishmoel’s holy day, we subdue their negative forces to the right of the kedushah. By delaying the end of Shabbos, we draw kedushah into the domain of the children of Eisav’s holy day and, thus, subdue the negative forces to the left of the kedushah. These two supplements, תוספת שבת, in effect subdue the roots of all the seventy nations.

Yishmoel Is the Negative Aspect of “Chesed” Eisav Is the Negative Aspect of “Gevurah”

Our explanation of this concept that Shabbos possesses the power to negate the two negative forces of Yishmoel and Eisav, can be expanded even further. Let us first explain why Yishmoel’s ministering angel is on the left side, while Eisav’s ministering angel is on the right side, and Shabbos kodesh stands in the middle separating them. The Megaleh Amukot (beginning of Vayeitzei) explains, in the name of the kabbalists, that Yishmoel and Eisav represent the impurities and refuse separated out from the attributes of “chesed” and “gevurah” (severity). Yishmoel represents the impurities of “chesed,” since he utilizes this attribute to pursue inappropriate, illicit relationships and desires of this mundane world. He is, therefore, the impure derivative of Avraham’s “chesed” of kedushah on the right side.

In contrast, Eisav represents the negative side of “gevurah.” He utilizes this attribute to justify murdering those who get in his way. Consequently, his father Yitzchak, upon seeing gehinom enter with him, declares (Bereishis 27,40):

"ועל חרבך תחיה". Eisav, who derives from Yitzchak, gevurah of kedushah, is therefore on the left side. “Chesed” represents the right side and “gevurah” the left. So, Yishmoel, representing the impure aspect of “chesed,” is located on the right; while, Eisav, the impure aspect of “gevurah,” is located on the left.

The gemorah (Shabbos 118.) teaches that Shabbos is the portion and legacy of Yaakov Ovinu. It is well known that his attribute is “tiferet,” the combination and balance of “chesed” and “gevurah.” We can now understand how the kedushah of Shabbos—the portion of Yaakov Ovinu who represents the balance of “chesed” and “gevurah”—possesses the power to nullify both Yishmoel—the negative aspect of “chesed,” on the right—and Eisav—the negative aspect of “gevurah,” on the left.

It is now clear, why the Friday night Kiddush contains seventy words—thirty-five in the paragraph of “Vayechulu” and thirty-five in the Kiddush berocheh. They correspond to the thirty-five nations on the right, led by Yishmoel, and the thirty-five nations on the left, led by Eisav, which are nullified by the kedushah of Shabbos.

This is the meaning of the words of the Zohar hokadosh quoted above:

"ויכולו יש בו שלשים וחמש תיבות, ובקידוש שאנו מקדשים שלשים וחמש תיבות, ועולים לשבעים שמות של הקב"ה, וכנסת ישראל מתעטרת בהם" The seventy names of the Almighty are to vanquish the seventy nations. On Shabbos kodesh the Divine Presence adorns Herself with these seventy names to subdue the thirty-five nations on the left and thirty-five nations on the right.

We can also provide a sweet explanation for the teaching in the Tikunei Zohar (Tikun 24, 69.) that it is customary to add two more words to Kiddush, "סברי מרנן". By doing so, we end up with seventy-two words in kiddush, equivalent to the numerical values of ויכל"ו and also ביי"ן.

"וצריך לברכא לון ולקדש לון בקידוש על היין, בשבעין תיבין דקידוש ויכ"לו כחושבן ביי"ן, וצריך למימר סברי מרנן".

The reason for this custom is easily explained based on what we have learned. The thirty-five nations on the right are led by the ministering angel of Yishmoel; while the thirty-five nations on the left are led by the ministering angel of Eisav. If we include these two ministering angels, we arrive at a total of seventy-two. Therefore, between the thirty-five words of "ויכולו" and the thirty-five words of the berocheh, we add the two words "סברי מרנן" to counteract and eliminate the two leaders, themselves, of the seventy ministering angels.

The Two Parts of Kiddush Correspond to the Written Law and the Oral Law

Following this path, let us develop one more idea concerning our blessed sages’ decision to divide the seventy words of Kiddush in this manner, specifically. The thirty-five words in the paragraph "ויכולו" are found in the written Torah; whereas, the thirty-five words of the Kiddush berocheh were formulated by our sages of blessed memory. We find in the Tikunei Zohar (Intro. 11:) that the written law emanates from the right side, the attribute of “chesed”; while the oral law emanates from the left side, the attribute of judgment.

It turns out, that the written Torah negates the negative forces of Yishmoel which are also affiliated with the right side; whereas, the oral Torah serves to negate the negative forces of Eisav which are, similarly, associated with the left side. This insight sheds light on the deeper purpose of this Rabbinic enactment. They instituted a two-part formula for Kiddush. The first part contains the thirty-five word paragraph of "ויכולו" which appears in the written Torah and is designed to nullify the thirty-five nations on the right side—the negative forces led by Yishmoel.

Additionally, they, the sages of the oral Torah, instituted the Kiddush berocheh, also containing thirty-five words. This formula, an illustration of the oral Torah emanating from the left, is designed to nullify the thirty-five nations on the left—the negative forces of Eisav.

Yisro 18:6. Kabbalas Panim- Greeting a Great Man. אֲנִי חֹתֶנְךָ יִתְרוֹ בָּא אֵלֶיךָ

    Rashi on this passuk says that Moshe and Aharon went out to meet Yisro, and so Aharon’s children came along.  Seeing the family of the leaders of Klal Yisrael going, the Seventy Zkainim came along.  And “who could see such a group going out and not join them?” So Yisro ended up getting a kabbalas panim from all the chashuvim of Klal Yisroel.  This reminds me of what the Chafetz Chaim said about R’ Meir Shapiro.

        In 2005, a dayan from Brussels was visiting the city and he spoke at a siyum on Maseches Brachos.  He said when he lived in London, he had an elderly neighbor named Ziggy Stern (an Oberlander, whose son, I think, manufactures zippers and also put out the Kushios Atzumos from Reb Akiva Eiger.)  Mr. Stern told him a story.

When he was a boy of fifteen, his father sent him a message in the yeshiva that he should come home for a week, because the Chafetz Chaim was coming to Vienna, and would be staying at their house, and he had a chance to be meshameish the Chofetz Chaim for a week.  So he came home and became the Chafetz Chaim’s shamash.

Every rav and gadol and rebbe asked for appointments, and the Chafetz Chaim would share his time very parsimoniously, allowing appointments only at specific times and for very limited amounts of time.  Even the Imrei Emes got the in-and-out treatment (Shalom aleichem, Bo'achem l'shalom, Barchuni l'shalom, Tzeischem l'shalom).   When R’ Meir Shapiro asked for an appointment, Stern conveyed the request to the Chafetz Chaim, saying that a young Rov named R’ Meir Shapiro (Reb Meir was born in 1887, the Chafetz Chaim in 1838, an age difference of 49 years ) would like to come and talk to him, the Chafetz Chaim said he can come.  Stern asked, when should he come?  He answered, “whenever he wants.”  How long can he stay?  “As long as he wants.”  So they arranged that they would meet on a certain day at eleven in the morning.  That morning, the Chafetz Chaim told Stern to bring him his Shabbos clothing.  At ten thirty, the Chafetz Chaim was looking out the window, and when Harav Shapiro came, the Chafetz Chaim walked downstairs to be mekabeil panim, and after the meeting, he walked him out.  Stern gathered his courage, and asked the Chafetz Chaim, why is it that you asked for your bigdei Shabbos, let him come when he wanted, and walked him in and out?  The Chafetz Chaim answered, “do you know who that is?  That is R’ Meir Shapiro, who created the idea of the Daf Yomi.  When he comes to the olam ha’emes, Rabbeinu Hakodosh and Ravina and Rav Ashi and all the tana’im and amora’im are going to go to be mekabeil panim, because “ehr hoht zeir Torah fahrshpreit in der gantzeh velt” (he spread their Torah thoughout the entire world.)  If he is going to have azah kabbalas panim in der olom ho’emes, ich vill ehm eich mekabeil ponim zain” (If he's going to have such a greeting in the world of truth, I also want to be among those who greet him.)

There are a lot of things to think about in that story; the value of harbatzas Torah, the importance of showing respect to a person that has spread Torah to the common man, and the incisive wisdom of the Chafetz Chaim in assessing what truly deserves respect.  But hanogei'a le'inyaneinu, it is a good example of what Rashi mentions.

In January of 2011, I was reminded of this story.  I was sitting and relaxing Motzei Shabbos at 10:50 at night, and the phone rings.  The Caller ID says it's from my bank, MB Financial.  Why on earth would my bank call in middle of the night on Saturday?  Did someone steal my identity?  Am I overdrawn?  I answered the phone, and it was a bank officer who was preparing to say a daf yomi shiur the next morning, and he was stuck on several things in the Gemara, for example, how do we know that the hagasha of a Korban Mincha is to the lower half of the Mizbei'ach.  Why he was preparing the shiur in his office in the bank I don't know.  But I do know that if not for Reb Meir Shapiro's inspiration, I wouldn't have gotten the call, and even if I had, I probably wouldn't know the answer to his questions.

Yisro, Shemos 20:3. Worship No Other Gods in My Presence. לא יהיה לך אלהים אחרים על פני

Hashem warns us that we must not worship other gods "in My presence." Obviously, since Hashem is present everywhere, this means everywhere. But this is really self evident. What is gained from saying "ahl ponoy"?

I read an interesting story by (the recently deceased) John Updike in the New Yorker of January ‘08 called "Outage." Strange, unsettled weather causes a power outage in a rural village and the surrounding area in Maine. A man, standing in line in a store while the clerk laboriously adds numbers longhand, has a conversation with the woman behind him. Both their spouses are out of town. The woman seems slightly anxious and distracted, and she tells him that she’s nervous about being alone in her isolated house in the weird half-light and amid the creaking trees. Out of simple kindness, he accompanies her to her home, and things, predictably, deteriorate and develop their own momentum. Just at the moment that it becomes clear to the characters that they are going to be unfaithful to their spouses, the lights suddenly come on, the burglar alarm starts chirping, the dishwasher starts churning, and they are jolted back into reality. As if awoken from a daze, he realizes that he has no business being there, and he apologetically leaves, and the woman, too, is relieved to see him go.

To me, the story is a powerful evocation of a truth (besides the fact that Yichud is, even for decent people, a really bad idea): when we find ourselves in a changed environment, sometimes we feel detached from the rules and morals we live by; we’re in kind of a dream-state where everything is different, or we think of our everyday life as a distant, half-forgotten dream. Indeed, Updike, in an running undertone, refers to the pale and ghostly appearance, the seeming intangibility, that the day lends to the things and people in the story.

My mother shlita told me that many refugees from Eastern Europe who gathered in Russia during the war, frummeh people who had lived blameless, innocent lives, just dropped away all their morals and upbringing, and the moral decay in arayos and gneiva in a great number of the people was terrible to see. Outside of the cocoon of their past, irretrievably torn from their community, they became entirely different people, brutish and amoral.

To some extent, people feel this when they go on vacation, or even on a business trip. The great avoda is to so deeply inculcate and incorporate our moral beliefs that change in circumstance does not result in anomie, the feeling that our life-mores don't apply, so that when we find ourselves in a different matzav, our regular life doesn’t seem like an easily forgotten dream. Wherever you find yourself, you are always "Ahl Ponoi." Everyone is brave on the firing range, as they learn how to shoot a rifle and crawl under barbed wire. When people actually face the enemy, they learn that their putative bravado may turn out to be a thin facade. It's easy to fool yourself into thinking that you've succeeded in this hard avodah. But in fact, it's a never-ending task; the only way to really know if you've succeeded is through trial by fire, rachmana litzlan.

(By the way, even without involving the Ribono shel Olam, if you think you can get away with stuff on vacation, you're wrong. First of all, bad behavior sticks. As a certain famous Mashgi'ach once said to me, "Good comes and goes, but bad is forever." You can't be a sheigitz away from home and then come back and put on the mask of tzidkus; once damage is done, the roshem of the aveira stays there, deep inside, even if you don't see it in your safe, predictable daily life. Second: here's a classic example of why it doesn't work: my wife and I took one of our kids to a low-class redneck type vacation area- a sprawling bedlam of tattoo parlors, go-cart tracks, and "Ripley Believe it or not" type attractions, the Wisconsin Dells. We picked what was basically a trailer park type of motel on the outskirts of a trailer-park town, so that "we shouldn't run into anyone who knows us." We would put on baseball caps, wear T-Shirts, and 'go native.' It wasn't exactly a "yilbash shechorim" matzav, but it was the same basic idea. As soon as we settled in, who parked next to us in the lot? The founder of our local Pirchei, who had planned exactly the same thing.  UPDATE: More recently, we went on a two day trip to Louisville, Kentucky.  Who lives in Louisville?  Well, there's a nice orthodox minyan there, and who did I meet at the minyan?  My very frum neighbor, my car mechanic.)

Yisro, Shemos 18:23: וְגַם כָּל הָעָם הַזֶּה עַל מְקֹמוֹ יָבֹא בְשָׁלוֹם. Sometimes, It’s Better to Know Less

The Netziv says that Moshe was not dan b’pshara, he did not arbitrate disputes, because when litigants presented their case to him, he immediately knew what the halacha would be al pi ‘yikov hadin es ha’har’, (Let the law pierce the mountain). This type of scorched-earth psak, while Torah-true, does not necessarily contribute to shalom. (I don't know why the Netziv does not cite the Gemara about ‘he’emidu divreihem al din Torah (Bava Metziah 88), that one of the sins that brought the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash was that they insisted on following the letter of the law in civil disputes, which, I think, is essentially the same point as the Netziv.)

This is reminiscent of the vort of Rav Yosef Ber (Y.U.) who said, in his sefer about his father (I think ‘Ish Ha’halacha’) that the reason that Moshe was not as famous as Aharon for being a rodef shalom was because he stood for absolute and unwavering truth. Aharon, on the other hand, could be ‘meshaneh mi’pnei hashalom’. For example, Aharon would go to 'Reuven' and tell him that his enemy 'Shimon' wanted to end their fight, but that Shimon couldn’t bring himself to approach Reuven.  Then he would go to Shimon and tell him the same thing about Reuven wanting to end the fight, and they would reconcile. Moshe Rabbeinu couldn't do that. He would say that Reuven was wrong, or he would say that both of them were wrong, or he would say there was nothing to fight about and they were both fools. None of these objurgations, true as they were, would bring peace to anyone. Ha'emes ve'hasalom ehavu is no easier than vegar ze'ev im keves.

The most interesting thing about the Netziv is what he says in the note on the bottom, at least in the old print of the Haamek Davar. He says that the great wisdom of Yisro was suggesting that Moshe Rabbeinu get dayanim that were not such talmidei chachomim as he, because they would be able to be dahn bipshara.

The lesson the Netziv is teaching is that sometimes it pays to go to someone who knows less, because mediation can be a better approach than a black and while decision of who is right and who is wrong, who wins and who loses. When there’s an outright winner and loser, there’s going to be hard feelings– the winner will be upset that he had to go to court to get what he should have been given without the trouble of litigation, and the loser will forever resent the dayanim. In cases where the court orders a compromise, too, sometimes pshara satisfies both sides, and sometimes it satisfies neither. Usually, dayanim know they were successful when both sides are angry at them. But with the passage of time, often both sides feel vindicated.

A good illustration is found when we examine the concept of compromise in Halachic applications. Example: Rashi (horizontal) and Rambam (vertical) on Mezuzah and Bimah. Diagonal is good according to both, so it’s a good pshara. Same thing with the shittos about parshah stumah and pesuchah. But sometimes a pshara will not be right according to either side, as the Gemara often says about daas shlishis not being machria where it doesn’t contain elements of the two other shittos. But even the latter might be better for shalom, expecially in matters of shalom bayis.

The implicit lesson of the Netziv is that of the Gemara in Bava Metzia 88: even when you are one hundred percent right, it is wise to accept-even to seek- some degree of compromise. The price of insisting on the full exercise of your rights is often greater than the advantage you think you will gain. The ego boost of proving you are right and the other guy is wrong, and the immediate financial gain, should be subjected to a serious and honest cost/benefit analysis, and you might find that giving in a little will be the wiser path. The intangible benefits of a reputation of being a gentleman, of being reasonable, of winning but not grinding your opponents into the dirt, can be very valuable. And the benefit of Shalom is priceless, for you and for all of Klal Yisrael.