Torah at the table, Kissing people in shul, and Putting the Crown of the Sefer Torah on your head.

One of the enjoyable aspects of having a Torah website is checking the stat counter and finding out the location of the isps that are accessing the divrei torah and what search terms led them to the page.  Most people are looking for Drashos for various occassions.  Many people also want to know why Jews rarely own dogs, or other odd things that have been discussed here.  Single Page accesses that only last a few seconds are likely to be mistakes, but occassionally people in the strangest places access this website and spend time looking around.  I've always assumed they come from Jewish soldiers, traveling businessmen or roving Israelis.  Yesterday, though, was the first time someone in The Islamic Republic (I think someone needs to think about whether theocracy and republicanism are at all consistent) of Iran stumbled upon my Torah thoughts.  The search term that brought him here was "kissing,"  but he/she did hang around for a while.  من تصور ميکنم که او دوست من است  

I
The Magen Avraham in 166 SK 2 brings the Maharshal in his Tshuvos #34 that if one is waiting after netillas yadayim for the rest of the group to finish washing in order to make hamotzi, and he is asked a Torah question, it is a sin to sit silently. You should talk words of Torah, and you should not worry about interrupting between Netillas Yadayim and Hamotzi.  The Maharshal explains that since it is meritorious to say Divrei Torah at a meal, divrei torah should be considered a direct necessity of the meal. Talking about things that are necessary for the meal is not a hefsek.

The Magen Avraham brings that many poskim disagree with the Maharshal and do prohibit talking in learning after netillas yadayim. The Maharshal himself actually holds that talking is not prohibited, only discouraged, and this might be the basis of his hetter. That is, if the Maharshal held that hefsek was a real problem, he probably wouldn't have been mattir just based on the mishna in Pirkei Avos.  And even the Maharshal only says that if you are asked a question, you should answer.  He doesn't say that you should bring a sefer and arrange a chavrusa for after netillas yadayim while the rest of the yeshiva is washing.

The halacha might not be like the Maharshal, but I like the idea anyway. A meal without Torah is like zivchei meisim; divrei torah are necessary to change the meal from an animalistic and vulgar necessity into a holy and beautiful experience; therefore, Divrei Torah are a vital part of the meal; therefore one may talk in learning after netillas yadayim.

ג,ד  רבי שמעון אומר, שלושה שאכלו על שולחן אחד, ולא אמרו עליו דברי תורה--כאילו אכלו מזבחי מתים, שנאמר "כי כל שולחנות, מלאו קיא צואה בלי מקום" ישעיהו כח,ח. אבל שלושה שאכלו על שולחן אחד, ואמרו עליו דברי תורה--כאילו אכלו משולחנו של מקום ברוך הוא, שנאמר "וידבר אליי זה השולחן אשר לפני ה'"יחזקאל מא,כב.

II
Speaking of the Maharshal-- the Maharshal, Rav Shlomo Luria, had a close relative - depending on what you read either a cousin (sheni be'sheni) or a nephew (rishon be'sheini) - named Reb Moshe.  This Reb Moshe, also known as Moshe Issreles, wrote the Rama.  While the Maharshal was very critical of the Rama (see Tshuvos Rama #7 for the Rama's response) for writing (HASKOOOLISHE SFOOOREM!) about Aristotelian philosophy, he had, in general, a high opinion of the Rama, as do most of us.  The Rama in OC 98:1 brings that one should not kiss his little children in shul, in order to inculcate in them that even his great love for them does not come before the love of Hashem. I believe that this restriction only applies to "Banav haktanim," i.e., 1. his children, and 2. who are little. Not banav? OK. Not ktanim? OK.

This does not mean that it is OK to lean over the mechitza to kiss your neighbor's spouse, which used to happen every Shabbos at a certain Orthodox shul I attended many years ago. Although Frost used the expression "Good fences make good neighbors" ironically, sometimes davka good neighbors need good fences.

In the interest of honesty, here are two poskim, among many, that disagree with me: The Yechaveh Da'as and another posek.  And, closer than Morocco and the Eida Chareidis, Eli in the comments also takes issue with this, although I disagree with his raya from the Darchei Moshe and the Binyamin Ze'ev.   And here's a tshuva from the Pnei Meivin of Munkatz, who doesn't want to commit on the issue.

On the other hand, Harav Reuven Feinstein did tell me that he holds, as I said, that the issur is only on Banav, which involves a level and type of love completely different from the love you have for friends and teachers or even brothers.  The additional point that I made that the issur is limited to banav haktanim is mine, and I did not hear it from him.


III
Again speaking of the Maharshal, Rav Yosef Karo and the Maharshal were contemporaries, and they engaged in a great deal of halachic correspondence.  There is an interesting minhag mentioned by Rabbi Karo in Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim, as I will explain.

There's a story about Congregation Kehilath Jeshurun, a shul on the Upper East Side of Manhattan commonly known as KJ, that gave a guest the honor of Gelila, the wrapping and covering of the Torah. The rabbi, Rabbi Haskel Lookstein, discerned that the man was completely unfamiliar with the procedure, so he carefully and discretely instructed him step by step, and he managed to do it correctly. After the gelila was finished, Rabbi Lookstein, relieved to have smoothly handled the problem, handed the atarah, the crown of the sefer, to the honoree, who looked at it for a moment, shrugged, and put it right on his own head. This story is often used as a cautionary tale to young rabbis to never, ever assume any knowledge at all on the part of baalei batim. Something might be obvious to you, but if you don't make it crystal clear to the baalei batim, it will be misunderstood. However, it's worth knowing that in OC 154:10 the Mechaber brings that in some places, they had a minhag to place the Atara on the head of the Chassan Torah, the person who is honored with the last aliyah on Simchas Torah. The Mechaber adds that one may not extend this minhag to chassanim (unless special arrangements were made when the atarah was purchased, see Taz and MA.)

So Rabbis, although this is not likely to ever happen any more, because our ataros usually have tubular sheaths for the Atzei Chaim, and so the crown would not fit on a person's head unless he had horns, if this ever happens in your shul, remember the minhag the Mechaber brings, and use it to alleviate the mortifying embarrassment which was your fault for not preventing it in the first place.

UPDATE:
I was just told by a talmid chacham and ish ne'eman that his father, who was gabbai in a shul in Cincinnati in the sixties, told him that this happened in his shul-- that the guy put the atarah on his head after gelilah.  My informant says that he does vaguely remember this happening, but he was a young child at the time so his memory is not clear.

Tu Bi'Shvat, A Guest Post translated and annotated by the Celebrated Rav Dr. Baruch Fox

The Fabulous Insight of Hagaon Rabbi Shmuel Engel, zts”l


On Tu B’Shevat the Power of Repentence from Love on Succos Is Realized

It is a Jewish custom, accepted as bona-fide Torah law, to eat many different kinds of fruit on Tu B’Shevat—especially from the seven species that Eretz Yisroel is famous for. The source for this custom is found in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 131,6) where Tu B’Shevat is included among the days on which Tachanun is omitted. The reason being that it is the New Year for the trees, as we have learned in the Mishnah (Rosh Hashanah 2.):

"באחד בשבט ראש השנה לאילן כדברי בית שמאי, בית הלל אומרים בחמשה עשר בו".

“The first of Shevat is the New Year for the tree, in accord with the teachings of Beis Shammai; Beis Hillel say it is on the fifteenth (tu) of the month (of Shevat).” Rashi comments:

"לענין מעשר, שאין מעשרין פירות האילן שחנטו קודם שבט על שחנטו לאחר שבט, שבאילן הולך אחר החנטה". Concerning tithing (maaser), one cannot separate tithes from fruit that emerged before Shevat on fruit that emerged after Shevat: the time of emergence (ripening) is the determining factor. The gemorah (ibid. 14.) explains the rationale for Tu B’Shevat’s designation as the New Year for trees: "הואיל ויצאו רוב גשמי שנה".

--most of the year’s rain has passed. Rashi explains: most of the rainy season has passed, the resin (sap) has risen in the trees, and the fruit are found to emerge from this time on.



In summary, Tu B’Shevat is the New Year for the trees, because it commemorates the beginning of the emergence/ripening of the fruit. The Magen Avraham (ibid. 16) quotes the Tikun Yissochar: "בט"ו בשבט ראש השנה לאילנות, ונוהגין האשכנזים להרבות במיני פירות של אילנות".. The custom has become widespread throughout the Jewish world to consume lots of fruit on Tu B’Sehvat; the later kabbalists even instituted a special “tikun” in this regard.

The “New Year for the Tree” to Rectify the Sin of the Etz HaDa’as

We find an amazing chiddush from Rabbi Tzaddok hokohen of Lublin, zy”a, in the Pri Tzaddik (Beshalach). He points out that Rabeinu hokadosh specifically uses the terminology "ראש השנה לאילן"—using the singular for “the tree” rather than the plural " לאילנות"—“for the trees.” He interprets this as an allusion to the fact that on Tu B’Shevat we are to rectify the sin of Adom horishon who ate from the etz HaDa’as—which is referred to as an "אילן" (Berachos 40.):

"אילן שאכל ממנו אדם הראשון".

This is why it is customary to eat lots of fruit and to recite beroches over them on Tu B’Shevat; we wish to imbue them with blessing and kedushah and to remedy the damage caused to the fruit by Odam horishon. The Midrash explains (B.R. 12,6) that the perfection and completeness of the fruit was confiscated as a result of the sin of the etz HaDa’as; furthermore, they will not return to their pristine state until Moshiach ben Dovid comes.



This is why Tu B’Shevat, the time the fruit begin to emerge, is designated as the tree’s New Year. On this day, the world is judged as to whether or not the damage caused to the trees will remain or whether we will merit rectification of the fruit—as it will be once again in the future.



It still remains to be explained, why Tu B’Shevat is the appropriate time for this tikun? Why did the Almighty arrange that Tu B’Shevat would be the time for us to occupy ourselves with the correction of the sin of the etz HaDa’as?



Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel Consistent with Their Own Doctrines

To shed light on this matter, I would like to introduce a fabulous insight concerning Tu B’Shevat that I learned from the genius, Torah great, Rabbi Shmuel Engel in his sefer "שפתי מהר"ש ענגיל" (Beshalach). He examines the language of the Mishnah:

"באחד בשבט ראש השנה לאילן כדברי בית שמאי, בית הלל אומרים בחמשה עשר בו". In particular, why did Rabeinu hokadosh deviate from the usual formula "דברי בית שמאי" –this is the opinion of Beis Shammai—and choose, instead, the formula "כדברי בית שמאי"—like the opinion of Beis Shammai. [Note the addition of the letter “kaf” in the word כדברי.]



His brilliant explanation is founded on the gemorah (Be’ah 16.): "כל מזונותיו של אדם קצובים לו מראש השנה ועד ראש השנה". The gemorah (Yevamos 37.) explains that a fetus is not apparent until one third of its gestation has passed. In the same manner, the abundance that was decreed for the year at the beginning of Tishrei, on Rosh Hoshanah, only becomes evident after four months have passed. After one third of the year has passed, the decree of abundance from Rosh Hoshanah becomes apparent in Shevat.



To better understand the difference of opinion between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel—whether the New Year for the tree is on the first of Shevat or the fifteenth of Shevat—let us introduce the well-known commentary of the Kedushas Levi (Vayelech) explaining the Midrash Tanchuma concerning Succos (Emor 22):

"ולקחתם לכם ביום הראשון, וכי ראשון הוא והלא ט"ו יום הוא, ואת אמרת ביום הראשון, אלא ראשון הוא לחשבון עוונות".

Based on the gemorah (Yoma 86:), he explains that by means of teshuvah m’yirah intentional transgressions are transformed into inadvertent transgressions; whereas, teshuvah m’ahavah transforms intentional transgressions into merits. Now, on Rosh Hoshanah and Yom Kippur, Yisroel repent out of yirah, inspired with fear and reverence by the day of judgment and the image of the Almighty King sitting on His throne.



On the other hand, after the high holidays, after the Almighty has forgiven Yisroel their sins, as the verse states (Vayikrah 16,30): "כי ביום הזה יכפר עליכם לטהר אתכם מכל חטאותיכם לפני ה' תטהרו", we celebrate the holiday of Succos. Yisroel dwell in their Succahs, secure and protected by “emunah,” and repent out of ahavah, full of joy and spiritual enlightenment.



As a result, there is no point in tallying Yisroel’s transgressions after the high holidays, since up until that time, they have only performed repentance out of yirah, and the transgressions have not yet been transformed into merits. On Succos, however, when Yisroel perform repentance out of ahavah and the transgressions have actually been transformed into merits, it is time to tally and be rewarded by the Almighty--"ראשון לחשבון עוונות".



Beis Shammai’s Attribute Is Yirah, Beis Hillel’s Is Ahavah

In Shaar Hogilgulim (Intro. 34), the Arizal explains that Hillel the elder was rooted in ahavah; consequently, he was extremely humble and performed frequent acts of chesed. In contrast, Shammai the elder was rooted in severity and judgment; consequently, he was very strict. For this reason, the halachah accords with Beis Hillel, since the world could not survive by the standard of strictness and severity. The world’s survival depends on chesed, as it is written (Tehillim 89,3): "כי אמרתי עולם חסד יבנה". .



With this background, Rabbi Shmuel Engel clarifies Beis Shammai’s and Beis Hillel’s positions regarding Tu B’Shevat: "באחד בשבט ראש השנה לאילן כדברי בית שמאי, בית הלל אומרים בחמשה עשר בו". The Mishnah compares man to a tree (Avos 3,17):

"כל שמעשיו מרובים מחכמתו למה הוא דומה, לאילן שענפיו מעטים ושרשיו מרובים, שאפילו כל הרוחות שבעולם באות ונושבות בו אין מזיזין אותו ממקומו"

“Anyone whose good deeds exceed his wisdom—to what is he compared? To a tree whose branches are few, but whose roots are numerous—even if all the winds in the world were to come and blow against it, they would not budge it from its place. . .”

Therefore, Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel debate when a man’s good deeds become apparent based on man’s comparison to a tree.



Consistent with their doctrine of yirah, Beis Shammai view Rosh Hoshanah as the time of our ultimate and complete service to Hashem. Therefore, the abundance that descends on the first of Tishrei, becomes apparent four months later—one third of a year later—on the first of Shevat. This explains the nuance of Rabeinu hokadosh’s wording in the Mishnah; by saying “כדברי", like the opinion of, he is teaching us that their position in this matter, accords with their overall doctrine of yirah.



Beis Hillel, on the other hand, whose essence is chesed and love of Hashem, view the first day of Succos as the time of our ultimate and complete service of Hashem, the fifteenth of Tishrei. In reference to the first day of Succos, the verse states: "ולקחתם לכם ביום הראשון". This verse is expounded as "ראשון לחשבון עוונות"; as per the elucidation of the Kedushas Levi, by means of repentantance from ahavah, our willful transgressions become merits and Hokadosh Baruch Hu recalculates our merits. Although the divine poet Rabbi Amnon proclaims: "בראש השנה יכתבון וביום צום כיפור יחתמון", the essential abundance doesn’t descend to this world until the fifteenth of Tishrei when Yisroel perform repentance from ahavah. Four months later comes out on Tu B’Shevat. This is how Rabbi Shmuel Engel explains Beis Shammai’s and Beis Hillel’s positions.



The Tikun for the Sin of the Etz HaDa’as Is on Rosh Hoshanah and on Succos

In honor of Tu B’Shevat, let us spice up this idea and expand it further. Tu B’Shevat is in reality the New Year for the trees, since that is when the fruit begin to emerge and ripen; thus, the custom to indulge and eat lots of fruit on this day. While it is true that man is compared to a tree, what connection, though, is there between the tree’s New Year and Yisroel’s repentance from ahavah on Succos?



We cited the holy words of Rabbi Tzaddok hokohen, zy”a, above, pointing out that Rabeinu hokadosh deliberately used the expression "ראש השנה לאילן" in the singular—to teach us that Tu B’Shevat is a day to concern ourselves with the tikun of the sin of the etz HaDa’as, which is referred to as an “אילן.” We then questioned why the Almighty chose this day, specifically, for that purpose?



By combining Rabbi Shmuel Engel’s idea with that of Rabbi Tzaddok hokohen’s, everything falls neatly into place. Let us just preface our explanation with Rabeinu Nissim’s explanation of why the first day of Tishrei is the day of judgment for all of creation (Rosh Hoshanah 16.). We find in the Midrash (Pesiktah 23) that the world was created on the twenty-fifth of Elul; on the sixth day, the first of Tishrei, Rosh Hoshanah, man was created; on that very same day, he was commanded not to eat from the etz HaDa’as, he transgressed, and the Almighty expelled him from Gan Eden. Also on that same day, he regretted his transgression, he repented and was absolved of his guilt by the Almighty:

"אמר לו הקב"ה זה סימן לבניך, כשם שעמדת לפני בדין ביום זה ויצאת בדימוס, כך עתידין בניך להיות עומדים לפני בדין ביום זה ויוצאין בדימוס, וכל זה אימתי בחדש השביעי באחד לחודש".

On Tu B’Shevat We Realize If We Succeeded in Correcting the Sin of the Etz HaDa’as

We have learned that Rosh Hoshanah is the day of judgment for all of creation, since Adom horishon sinned on that day and all of the souls were contained within him at the time of the sin. As a result, the death sentence was decreed on all living creatures. So, on Rosh Hoshanah and Yom Kippur, we repent out of yirah for our part in the sin of the etz HaDa’as; whereas, on Succos, we repent out of ahavah for our part in that sin.



Now, on Rosh Hoshanah, when Adom horishon sinned, the Almighty expelled him from Gan Eden and decreed (Bereishis 3,17): "ארורה האדמה בעבורך... וקוץ ודרדר תצמיח לך ואכלת את עשב השדה, בזעת אפיך תאכל לחם" . We cited the Midrash earlier that explained that as a result of the sin and the subsequent decree, the fruit of the land and the fruit of the tree were cursed.



We can now begin to appreciate the connection Rabbi Tzaddok hokohen draws between Tu B’Shevat, "ראש השנה לאילן", and the correction of the sin of the etz HaDa’as, "אילן שאכל ממנו אדם הראשון". We’ve established that the abundance that descends upon the world on Rosh Hoshanah is not apparent until one third of the year passes. It turns out, then, that every year in the month of Shevat, we find out whether or



The halachah accords with Beis Hillel; the New Year for the tree is celebrated on the fifteenth of Shevat. Tu B’Shevat is one third of a year after the first day of Succos—when Yisroel began to repent from ahavah. We have learned that on Tu B’Shevat the effectiveness of our teshuvah for the sin of the etz HaDa’as becomes apparent--the teshuvah we began out of yirah on Rosh Hoshanah and progressed to teshuvah m’ahavah on Succos. On Tu B’Shevat, one third of the year after the first day of Succos, how wonderful it would be to complete the tikun for the sin of the etz HaDa’as, and merit the complete redemption and the coming of Moshiach ben Dovid, bimheirah b’yameinu, Amen.

Fish and the Jews: A Guest Post by Dr. Baruch Fox

Not only did I not write this, I haven't even read it carefully yet.  But the translator is a good friend, a renowned surgeon who has, for the last ten years, focused his laser-like gaze upon an area of Torah-thought to which I remain a stranger, and I trust that whatever he writes/translates is worthy of your attention.



Tavlin L'shabbos
Rav Pinches Friedman, translated by Dr. Baruch Fox


An Important Lesson We Learn from Fish

Who Were Not Corrupted by the Sin of "Eitz Hadas" or "Dor Hamabul"

Among the many reasons we have discussed for the sacred custom of eating fish on

shabbos, we wish to explore in depth the following explanation found in the holy seforim:

the fish were not involved in the corrupt behavior that pervaded the rest of creation

during the “dor homabul,” - the generation of the flood.

We will open our discussion with a story from a collection of the holy Rabbi Yisroel of

Tchortkov, zy”a, in his sefer Ginzei Yisroel, described to him by Rabbi Yosef of Rodvill,

zy”a, concerning his grandfather the holy Rabbi Yisroel of Rozhin, zy”a.

One shabbos night, while standing behind the Rabbi of Rozhin's chair, he witnessed his

custom of eating the fish's eyes. It dawned on him that a praiseworthy reason for this

custom was due to the lack of involvement of the fish in the corruption that consumed all

other living creatures during the generation of the flood. This is why fish do not require

the process of shechitah, slaughter, as a means of tikun, rectification, like other animals

do; instead, they are permitted for consumption after mere collection or trapping; their

tikun is simpler and less painful than shechitah.

It is well known that the initial step in all transgressions involves the sense of sight.

Rashi comments (Bamidbar 15,39): " העין רואה והלב חומד והגוף עושה את העבירות ". “The

eye sees, and the heart craves and the body performs the transgressions.” It appears

that the fish's eyes remained pure and untainted, accounting for their avoidance of

corruption.

He deduced that this was the reason that the holy Rabbi of Rozhin customarily ate the

eye of the fish. The holy Rabbi immediately sensed his thought process, turned to him

and said, “Young man, you have hit upon the truth.”

We learn from this story that the custom to eat fish on shabbos stems from the fact that

the fish refrained from sin; furthermore, tzaddikim followed the custom of eating a fish

eye, since the fish's eyes were untainted. (G-d willing, we will discuss at length another

reason for this custom in upcoming articles.)



The Ben Ish Chai in his sefer Benayahu ben Yehoyadah (Sanhedrin 108.) explains that

fish were chosen as a shabbos delicacy to teach that the fire of gehinom is not in force

on shabbos, just as the boiling waters of the flood did not affect the fish.

“All That Were On Dry Land, Excluding Fish”

Let us examine how we know that the fish remained uncorrupted, and what allowed for

that possibility. The verse describing the generation of the flood states explicitly

(Bereishis 7,22): " כל אשר נשמת רוח חיים באפיו מכל אשר בחרבה מתו ". Rashi elucidates

based on the gemorah (Sanhedrin 108.): " אשר בחרבה, ולא דגים שבים " – "that were on

dry land, excluding fish." A similar teaching is found elsewhere in the gemorah

(Kiddushin13., Zevachim 113:): "בדור המבול לא נגזרה גזרה על דגים שבים, שנאמר מכל אשר

בחרבה מתו ולא דגים שבים" . "In the generation of the flood, the decree was not applied to

fish in the sea, as it is written 'of everything that was on dry land, died'-- but not the fish

in the sea."

An additional inference can be found in the verse (Bereishis 6,12): "כי השחית כל בשר את

דרכו על הארץ .” "For all flesh had corrupted its way on earth" - "on earth," specifically,

excludes fish who live in the seas. Rabeinu Eliyahu Mizrachi in his commentary on

Rashi notes that Rashi comments on this verse (ibid.) that even domestic animals,

beasts and birds had relations with those that are not of their own species - Rashi omits

mention of fish.

The Maharal of Prague in his sefer Gur Aryeh cites the words of the Mizrachi and

explains why the fish did not sin along with all of the other creatures. It is due to their

good fortune that they do not dwell among the corrupt human beings on dry land, who

contaminate all of creation.

"Like Those Fish that Proliferate and Become Numerous"

This provides us insight into the blessing Yaakov bestows upon Ephraim and Menashe

(Bereishis 48,16): " וידגו לרוב בקרב הארץ ". Rashi comments: "וידגו, כדגים הללו שפרים

ורבים ואין עין הרע שולטת בהם ". - "May they reproduce like these fish that proliferate and

become numerous, and the evil eye has no effect on them." We can suggest that his

intention was to bless them that they not mingle or get involved with wicked people who

inevitably corrupt others. Rather, they should be "like these fish that proliferate and

become numerous" – in a permissible fashion with their own species; "and the evil eye"

– of the generation of the flood; "has no effect on them" – to corruupt them, since they

live in the seas separate from mankind.

This also sheds light on Yaakov's blessing to Zevulun (Bereishis 49,13): "זבולון לחוף ימים

ישכון והוא לחוף אניות וירכתו על צידון ". "Zevulun shall dwell by seashores; he shall be at the

ship's harbor, and his end is at Sidon." Rashi comments:


"והוא יהיה מצוי תדיר על חוף אניות במקום הנמל שאניות מביאות שם פרקמטיא, שהיה זבולון

עוסק בפרקמטיא וממציא מזון לשבט יששכר והם עוסקים בתורה, הוא שאמר משה שמח זבולון

בצאתך ויששכר באהליך, זבולון יוצא בפרקמטיא ויששכר עוסק בתורה באהלים".

It is important for us to understand why Yaakov insisted that Zevulun's business

transactions take place near the seashore.

We can suggest that Yissochar, the pillar of Torah scholarship, who sits and learns in the

Beis Midrosh, is in a protected environment, away from evil influences; however,

Zevulun, who is involved in commerce, is more likely to associate with people who

constitute dangerous and damaging influences. Therefore, Yaakov blessed him: " זבולון

לחוף ימים ישכון ", so that he would learn a lesson from the fish living in the seas (who

were not corrupted by the evil influences in the generation of the flood). Just like the fish

avoided corruption due to their separation from the creatures on dry land, he should

have the good sense to distance himself from harmful, evil people while transacting his

business affairs.

This explains the rationale behind our custom of eating fish on shabbos and also why

the Almighty prohibited work on shabbos. All week long, while a man is busy earning a

living, he is likely to come in contact with indecent, disreputable people and could fall

prey to their negative influence. Come shabbos, however, we are commanded to

completely separate ourselves from those potential influences and immerse ourselves in

Torah study and service of Hashem. By eating fish on shabbos, we are reminded of how

the fish avoided corruption in the generation of the flood due to their separation from the

corruption of mankind.

The Yismach Moshe's Insight

The Yismach Moshe supplies a wonderful solutiion to the Maharal's question. In

addition, he examines the perplexing subject of how it is even possible for animals to

become corrupt – are freedom of choice and avoidance of sin relevant to them?

He explains that the reason why the animals behaved corruptly in that generation, was

because they were reincarnations of wicked people who had already corrupted their

ways while still alive. Fish, however, that can only be reincarnations of tzaddikim – who

need to rectify minor flaws – did not, therefore, sin at all during the time of the flood.

Here are his holy words:

"יש להבין בדור המבול דנגזר כליה על כל הברואים, אם אדם חטא בהמה מה חטאה, וכי דעת יש

להם שקבלו גמול ועונש. ויש לתרץ זה בכמה אנפין, ואחד מהן דהלא מבואר במסכת אבות (פ"ה

מ"ב) שכל הדורות היו מכעיסין ובאין, עד שהביא עליהן את מי המבול, אלמא דכמה דורות היו

חוטאין, ולפי זה התגלגלו בודאי בדומם צומח חי כנודע מפי חכמי האמת, וגם כן היו משוקעין

ברשעתן, עד שאפילו בגלגוליהם החזיקו ברשעתן ודבקו באינם מינם, לכך על הכל נגזר שאף הם היו

באותו החטא.

והנה נודע מפי חכמי האמת דרוב צדיקים מגולגלים בדגים, ולפי זה אז שלא היו צדיקים בהדורות

רק המסויימים כמו משותלח וחנוך וחבריהם, והם היו צדיקים גדולים שאינם צריכין להתגלגל כלל,

והשאר היו רשעים, ואם כן לא היו שום גלגול כלל בדגים, מהיכי תיתי יתענשו, אבל עכשיו יש

גלגולים בצדיקים בדגים למרק עבירות קלות שבהן".

The Yismach Moshe also answers a question posed by his Rabbi the holy Chozeh of

Lublin, zy"a:

"ויקח חמאה וחלב ובן הבקר וגו' (בראשית יח ח). שאלני מורי הצדיק וקדוש מוה"ר יעקב יצחק

מלובלין זלה"ה, מאי טעמא לא נזכר בתורה הקדושה בסעודת המלאכים דגים, וכן (בראשית לא נד)

ויזבח יעקב בהר, ובדברי רז"ל נזכר בשר ודגים. והשבתי לפי שעיקר הסעודה להעלות ניצוצות

ולתקן גלגולים.

והנה איתא בכתבי האר"י דרוב צדיקים מגולגלים בדגים, והיינו ודאי צדיקים קטנים, אבל הצדיקים

הגדולים אין צריכין לשום תיקון, ואז בימי אברהם לא היו רק הצדיקים הגדולים הנזכרים בתורה,

וקלסיה מאד, ואמר שמשום זה לא נזכר גם כן בסעודת שלמה דגים, לפי שאז היתה סיהרא

במילואה ואיש תחת גפנו, היינו שהיו הכל נשמות חדשות".

Why aren't fish mentioned when Avraham Ovinu serves the malachim a meal? On the

other hand, with regard to a meal served by Yaakov (Bereishis 31, 54), the Rabbis do

mention the inclusion of fish.

He answers that the main purpose of the meal is to elevate the "sparks" and to rectify

the reincarnated souls. The Arizal teaches that most tzaddikim reincarnate into fish – the

lesser tzaddikim, that is; for the greater tzaddikim do not require tikun. In Avraham's

times there were only great tzaddikim; so, serving fish was not necessary; all the

neshomes were originals and not reincarnations.

Rabbi Tzaddok Hokohen, zy"a:

The Fish Did Not Sin by the Tree of Knowledge

Now let us see an amazing, novel interpretation found in the Pri Tzaddik of Rabbi

Tzaddok Hokohen of Lublin, zy"a (Vayakhel 3). The reason for eating fish is because

they didn't participate in the sin of the tree of knowledge, as did all the other living

creatures. He cites the Midrash (B.R. 19,5) on the verse (Bereishis 3,6):

"ותקח מפריו ותאכל ותתן גם לאישה עמה ויאכל, וגם ריבוי, האכילה את הבהמה ואת החיה ואת

העופות, הכל שמעו לה".

According to the Midrash, Chava offerred the forbidden fruit to all of the animals and

birds and they partook. Rav Tzaddok infers that she did not feed the fruit to the sea

creatures and this is why they remained uncorrupt during the times of the flood. Here

are his holy words:

"ואיתא בגמרא (שבת קיח:) במה מענגו בתבשיל של תרדין ודגים גדולים וראשי שומין, וכידוע דענג

שבת בא לתקן הקלקול הראשון מהנחש, ומין דגים לא היו בקלקול אכילת עץ הדעת, כי היו נכסים

במים וגם לא מתו במבול, ואין בהם שום בירור מאיסור חלב דם וטריפות, מפני שהם הבעל חי

הראשון שנזכר בהם נפש חיה ולא היה בו שום שבירה."

Elsewhere, he adds (Emor 6) that fish do not have the prohibitions of "cheilev" and "gid

honasheh," and do not contain the admixture of good and evil. Adom and Chava were in

Gan Eden on dry land; the fish living in the waters and not on dry land, were ,

technically, not in Gan Eden.

דגי"ם Is An Abbreviation for י"ג מ'כילין ד'רחמי

We can add a bit of spice for shabbos to further clarify this phenomenon. In Yod'ei Binah

(end of Noach), written by Rabbi Elazar of Lantzout, a son of the Bnei Yissoschar, zy"a,

he wishes to explain why the sea creatures were saved from the flood based on a

teaching in the gemorah (Sanhedrin 108.):

"תנא דבי ר' ישמעאל אף על נח נחתך גזר דין אלא שמצא חן בעיני ה', שנאמר נחמתי כי עשיתם ונח

מצא חן בעיני ה'".

Noach himself did not merit being saved from the flood, because he did not rebuke

others in his generation; nevertheless, he found favor, " חן ", in the eyes of the Almighty

and was saved. We might suggest that he found favor in the merit of the "thirteen

attributes of mercy" which are described in the verse (Shemos 33,19): " וחנותי את אשר

אחון ". "And I shall show favor when I shall show favor." Now, דגי"ם is an abbreviation for

י"ג מ'כילין ד'רחמי which are the thirteen attributes of mercy. Thus, they were saved in the

same merit as Noach was saved.

Upon first glance, this requires much more explanation. How is it plausible that the fish

were saved because their name constitues the abbreviation ? י"ג מ'כילין ד'רחמי We need

only look to the verses describing the creation to understand the matter more clearly.

Only the fish merited the Almighty's blessing (Bereishis 1,22):

ויברך אותם אלקים לאמר פרו ורבו ומלאו את המים בימים" ". "Be fruitful and multiply and fill the

waters of the seas." Why did only the fish merit this blessing? Also, why is this blessing

nearly identical to the blessing bestowed upon man (ibid. 27):

"ויברא אלקים את האדם בצלמו בצלם אלקים ברא אותו זכר ונקבה ברא אותם, ויברך אותם אלקים

ויאמר להם אלקים פרו ורבו ומלאו את הארץ וכבשוה".

The Fish Were Created to Serve as Examples for Yisroel

We have learned in the gemorah (Avodah Zarah 3:):

"אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל, מאי דכתיב (חבקוק א יד) ותעשה אדם כדגי הים כרמש לא מושל בו,

למה נמשלו בני אדם כדגי הים, לומר לך מה דגים שבים כיון שעולין ליבשה מיד מתים, אף בני אדם

כיון שפורשין מדברי תורה ומן המצוות מיד מתים".

Men are compared to fish to teach us that just as fish cannot survive out of the water, on

dry land, so, too, mankind cannot survive outside a world of Torah and mitzvos.

The Mishnah states (Avos 6,12): " ."כל מה שברא הקב"ה בעולמו לא בראו אלא לכבודו

Hashem created fish that can live only in water, to serve as an example and model for

all of Yisroel who are compared to fish. Yisroel can only survive and exist while occupied

with Torah which is compared to water. The moment they leave the Torah, they die a

spiritual death.

This is the very same, wonderful analogy Rabbi Akiva presented to Papus (Berachos

61:): the fox tried to trick the fish into leaving the water, under the ruse that he would

protect them from the fishermen's nets. Just as the fish would not have survived out of

the water, so, too, we will survive without Torah study. This is why only the fish were

blessed with a special blessing, so similar to man's blessing-- their purpose is to provide

an example for Yisroel to live in a world immersed in Torah.

This also explains the formula " פרו ורבו ומלאו את המים בימים ": we should proliferate in

our Torah studies and be zocheh to intuit numerous novel interpretations, chiddushim.

This concept is described in Derech Pikudechah (Mitzvah 1, 25 and 26):

"והנה גם בנידון דידן ישנו מצות פריה ורביה גם ברמז, לפרות ולרבות בתורה להוליד בכל פעם

שכליות חדשים בתורה. ומדי דברי בזה אדבר בפרט הלזה, כאשר דעתי אי"ה בכל מצוה רמזי מצוה

התלויים בה, אשר אפשר לקיימה בכל עת אפילו בהעדר המצוה הגשמיית הגופניית, כי התורה

נצחיית הוא בכל עת ובכל זמן, והנה בזאת המצוה אפשר לקיים בכל עת ובכל זמן מצות פריה ורביה

בתורה, להוליד בכל פעם שכל חדש בתורה כמו שכתבו המקובלים".

This enhances our understanding of the praise sung by the fish (Perek Shirah, chapt. 4):

דגים אומרים (תהלים כט,ג ) קול ה' על המים אל הכבוד הרעים ה' על מים רבים" ". "The voice of

Hashem is on the waters, the G-d of Glory thunders; Hashem is on the vast waters."

Since their purpose is to teach Yisroel the lesson and secret of their survival and

existence, they sing out: " קול ה' על המים " - "the voice of Hashem is upon the waters."

This is the voice of Hashem which was heard when the Torah was given (Devarim 5,19):

קול גדול ולא יסף" " – a voice which continues without cease, a perpetual voice (as

described by Rashi based on the Targum). This voice rises above the waters, the abode

of the fish, who were created as living examples to teach that the Torah is the essence

of our existence. Therefore, the G-d of Glory thunders upon the vast waters.

The Fish Were Spared from the Sin in the Merit of the Torah

We have now been enlightened and can understand how the fish did not fall prey to sin

by the tree of knowledge or in the generation of the flood – as opposed to all other living

creatures. They were created as a model for Yisroel that there is no life without Torah.

Torah is the antidote against the yetzer horah. Torah is also compared to water. Fish that

live in water are protected from the yetzer horah.

Following this lead, we can now explain the holy words of Rabbi Elazar of Lantzout: the

fish were saved because their name דגי"ם is an abbreviation for י"ג מ'כילין ד'רחמי – the

thirteen attributes of mercy. The holy Maggid, Rabbi Dov Ber of Mezritsch, zy"a, explains

that the thirteen hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded parallel the

thirteen attributes of mercy. Utilizing one of the hermeneutical principles, invokes the

corresponding attribute of mercy. Utilizing the first principle, kal va'chomer, invokes the

first attribute, א"ל ; utilizing the second principle, gezeirah shovah, invokes the second

attribute, רחום ; and so on.

We have seen that the fish were spared from sin in the merit of Torah which is compared

to water. We know that Torah is expounded by means of the thirteen hermeneutical

principles which correspond to the thirteen attributes of mercy. The very name דגי"ם , an

allusion to these attributes, teaches us that the purpose of their creation was to serve as

a reminder to occupy our lives with Torah.

This takes us back to the custom of eating fish at our shabbos tables. The Tur (Orach

Chaim 290) writes in the name of the Midrash:

"אמרה תורה לפני הקב"ה, רבונו של עולם כשיכנסו ישראל לארץ זה רץ לכרמו וזה רץ לשדהו ואני

מה תהא עלי, אמר לה יש לי זוג שאני מזווג לך ושבת שמו שהם בטלים ממלאכתם ויכולין לעסוק

בך".

Shabbos is a day dedicated to Torah; it equips us and empowers us to fend off the

yetzer horah the rest of the week.

We, therefore, follow the custom of eating fish at all of our shabbos meals; fish, the only

living creatures that did not participate in the sins of the tree of knowledge and the

generation of the flood. As we contemplate, how they found the strength to avoid the

sins all other creatures fell prey to, we realize that they symbolize life in a Torah

environment. We should then realize, that if we, human beings, actually occupy

ourselves with the study of Torah - which is compared to water - how much more likely

that we will merit salvation from the yetzer horah.


If you've ever seen the fish symbol on the back of a car, you might be interested in this fine collection.

Va'eira. The Mitzrim were an Instrument of G'd's Will

Many Rishonim ask a question on this parsha, and that is, "Why were the Mitzrim punished, if they were merely instruments of Hashem's will, as expressed to Avraham at the Bris bein Habesarim?"  See Rambam 5 Hilchos Teshuva 1 et al. and 6 Hilchos Teshuva 11 and 12, and Raavad there. The Ramban in Lech Lecha also asks the question and says the second answer of the Raaved.

UPDATE: 
After posting this, and as discussed in the comments, I realized that it is incomplete without immediately mentioning two elements:  The Rishonim that say that the petur of Kaasher zamam velo kaasher assa is based on the evidence that what happened fulfilled Hashem's will; and the Ohr Hachayim's discussion of Yosef's statement to his brothers that "Elokim chashava letova."  Please bear these in mind while reading the rest of this.


I don’t understand what the Rambam is asking. First of all, why doesn’t he simply say like Reb Akiva that “Hakol tzafui vehareshu nesuna,” that all is foreseen but man still has free will?  This clearly means that Hashem foresees what will happen, but does not influence mankind's choices.  See Reb Meir Simcha in his pirush on the Rambam here where he has a special Ma’aracha called Hakol Tzafui, toward the end. Second of all, why is the Rambam asking davkeh because of the nevu’ah? Why isn’t it a general question of yedia and bechira? Elah mai, that it is a question specifically because they would have a teretz to excuse them from an onesh because they can say that Hashem had said this would happen. What kind of teretz is that?  Did they hold they had a din of Shor Ha'Itztadin, like the Mishna in Bava Kamma 39a, and like Rav on 40b, that not only is it not chayav missah, but is even kasher as a korban?


I think the pshat is that since this event was clearly retzon Hashem, then anyone who does it is doing a ma'aseh mitzva--albeit a mitzva shelo lishmah. And it is not shayich to be ma’anish a person for doing a mitzva even if his cheshbon was to do an aveira. For example, if a person is chayav an onesh misa from Beis Din, and he runs away and someone, who knows nothing of the court decision, kills him out of hatred in cold blood, that person certainly is not ne’enash; partly because the other is a gavra ketilla, but logically also because he is getting what he deserves.  Even though this is a good pshat, it sure isn’t what the Rambam has in mind.

The Lekach Tov here brings that this is why the first sign to Moshe was the nachash-it was a symbol that Hashem intended that the Mitzrim be like a rod to chastize the Bnei Yisroel, but the Mitzrim had changed from a rod to a snake, and hurt the Bnei Yisroel more than they deserved.

And the Gaon also speaks about this in Bo, Shemos 11:2 where it says “ve’yishalu...klei chesef....” He says: 1. That the main geula was by the Yam, because it was only there that the Mitzrim could be punished for having drowned the children. 2. That even at the Bris Bein Habsorim Hashem told Avrahom “ve'gam es hagoi asher ya’avodu dan Anochi,” and that this meant “if they do more that Hashem was gozer on the Jews. 3. That Yisro, when he said regarding Krias Yam Suf, “ki badavor asher zadu aleihem,” he meant that the mitzrim were more vicious than Hashem had decreed proper for the Jews because of “ze'don libam.”

And, when learning Makkos, I brought up the Ramban mentioned below in the parsha of zomemim on the idea of ‘velo ka’asher asa’, that this is because the fact that beis din punished him shows that he deserved it. I realized that this is the same idea— if the defendant deserved it, then even though the zomemim were resha’im who were unjustly accusing him of something he did not do, because they wanted to hurt him, they are not punished. And the same idea is true by a man that killed beshogeg— the mishnah in Avos that says that what happened was Hashem’s will. Then you have to apply the machlokes and the Ohr Hachayim about whether the act of a rasha carries out or subverts Hashem’s will, because if every rasha’s act carries out Hashem’s will, then according to the Ramban you shouldn’t be able to punish him. This is similar to the idea the Chinuch says about the issur of Nekama: Mitzvah 241 in Parshas Kedoshim, Vayikra 19:18; “A man should know and take to heart that all that happens to him from good to bad is intended to happen to him from Hashem, and from the hand of man...nothing will happen except His will Borch Hu, and so if a person causes him suffering or pain, a man should know in his soul that his sins caused it and Hashem decreed it upon him, and he should not direct his thoughts to revenge from the person because he is not the reason for the bad, rather the sin was the cause.” Of course, the Chinuch agrees that in cases where restitution is allowed, one can pursue restitution. But the idea is that one cannot bear a grudge against a malefactor for the pain he inflicted. This is hard to reconcile with the Ramban, unless you differentiate between injury by the hand of a jew and of a non-jew. But it doesn’t say “lo sikom berei’echa,” does it? And anyway the theology shouldn’t depend on the actor.

Shemos 2:14. Achein, Noda Hadavar. Leeches and Piranhas

What is it about the internet that brings out our dark side?  I used to think it was the anonymity, the magnified thrill of doing in public what you had been constrained to do in private, the childish desire to open your mouth while chewing to elicit the disgust of the other people at the table.  But now people attach their real names to uncharacteristically intemperate essays, writing things that a moment's reflection ought to have cut off.  It seems that the internet doesn't only allow writers to turn over the rock and reveal the squirming decay and ugliness that decency had hidden.  It seems that the internet actually does damage to the soul.

Let's take the most recent example.  Let's say we have an honorable individual who has founded and directed a rabbinical organization for years.  He has antagonized people on both sides of the Orthodox spectrum, from those who hate him for his unwillingness to bend the rules, to those who hate him for what they consider to be his willingness to bend the rules.  The hatred he has attracted is not unique; Moshe Rabbeinu was accused of fattening himself off of the sweat of the Jews, and Yechezkel Hanavi was accused of having an adulterous affair with a married woman.  This is to be expected.  Every ethnic group has its weaknesses, and devouring our leaders is one of ours.  As related in this week's parsha (2:14.), when Moshe Rabbeinu confronted Dassan and Aviram, 

וַיֹּאמֶר מִי שָׂמְךָ לְאִישׁ שַׂר וְשֹׁפֵט, עָלֵינוּ הַלְהָרְגֵנִי אַתָּה אֹמֵר כַּאֲשֶׁר הָרַגְתָּ אֶת הַמִּצְרִי וַיִּירָא מֹשֶׁה וַיֹּאמַר אָכֵן נוֹדַע הַדָּבָר

'Who made you our prince and judge?' retorted [the other]. 'Do you mean to kill me as you killed the Egyptian?' Moses was frightened. 'The matter has become known,' he said.

Rashi there explains,

Moses was frightened: [To be explained] according to its simple meaning [that Moses was afraid Pharaoh would kill him]. Midrashically, it is interpreted to mean that he was worried because he saw in Israel wicked men [i.e.,] informers. He said, Since this is so, perhaps they [the Israelites] do not deserve to be redeemed [from slavery]. [From Tanchuma, Shemos 10]

Indeed, the matter has become known: [To be interpreted] according to its apparent meaning [that it was known that he had slain the Egyptian]. Its midrashic interpretation, however, is: the matter I was wondering about, [i.e.,] why the Israelites are considered more sinful than all the seventy nations [of the world], to be subjugated with back-breaking labor, has become known to me. Indeed, I see that they deserve it. [From Shemos Rabbah 1:30]

 So, nothing is new as far as how we treat our rabbinic leaders.  Dassan and Aviram were also among the greatest of the Jews, or Pharaoh would have ignored them, and the Jewish people would have ignored them as well.  It must be that they had some achievements and skills that elevated them in peoples' eyes.  And even so, their behavior towards Moshe Rabbeinu was so repugnant that he was moved to despair; "If this is how the Jews behave, no wonder they suffer so much; I wonder if they deserve to ever be redeemed."



Compounding the problem is the Mishna in Pirkei Avos 5:17:  כל מחלוקת שהיא לשם שמים סופה להתקיים

Literally, that means that any dispute that is motivated by a desire to serve Hashem will have positive lasting results.  In my experience, it really means that when people fight in the name of Hashem, they have no moral limitations, and they will never compromise, and the fight will be dirty, and it will never end.  And the parties will never regret it.  "It was le'sheim shamayim!!!!"



I wonder; when accusations were made against this individual, did people say to themselves "this accusation, if it spreads and is taken to be true, will kill this man.  His reputation will be destroyed, his wife will divorce him, his children will hate him, his yeshiva will fall apart, he will end up penniless and despised.  So I had better be more than certain that the accusations are true before openly saying I believe them, and I better not publicize them."  Or, "I will not open my mouth unless the evidence is so compelling that if the accused were my own father, I would believe it."  Or, "Publicizing this is morally indistinguishable from disemboweling him.  Is this something I'm comfortable doing?"

These are rhetorical questions.  I actually am not wondering at all.  What has happened, at least in the case of the guardians of our morals, our righteous fifth column, is that they accepted evidence that would not have been accepted in any court in any civilized country, to say nothing of the extremely strict procedural rules in a Beis Din dealing with capital punishment.  When the government of Iran distributes Photoshopped illustrations of missile launches, when any talented ten year old Goebbels could dice and splice an innocuous telephone conversation into a damning depravity, what evidentiary value do photographs and taped conversations have?  Is it for nothing that the Torah requires live witnesses?  We're not talking about "kabdei'hu ve'chashdei'hu," respect but suspect.  We're talking about making a person into a graf shel re'i.


This is not a case where the accused is a clear and present danger to others, as in the case of child molestation or marital violence.  In those cases, of course, the suspect should immediately be placed where he cannot do any harm.  Our hypothetical suspect presents no danger to anyone.


What if it turns out that the accusations were true, and not part of an orchestrated smear campaign funded by an extremely wealthy nemesis?  Will that justify retroactively the behavior of the lynch mob?  No, it won't.  The question is, was this behavior justified on the basis of the evidence presented.  If the initial evidence was faulty, later proof of guilt will not justify anything that was done before the real proof was presented.


So, I was just wondering.  Assuming this is the fate of Klal Yisrael, and that this kind of blithe willingness to participate in a man's destruction is just another iteration of the behavior Moshe Rabbeinu saw so many years ago, here is the real question. 

Which is better; a piranha or a leech? 

On the one hand, a piranha is a nice looking fish, with glittering silver scales and bright red markings on its belly and ventral fin.  With a little imagination, you can even see a coy smile on its face.  On the other hand, when is smells blood in the water it horribly rips its victims to shreds, leaving nothing behind but striated bones and a faint echo of pain and despair. 

A leech, on the other hand, is an ugly boneless slug of cartilage, lacking even a rudimentary spine, but at least it doesn't rip its victims to pieces, it only sips a bit of their blood.  

It's a tough choice.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

A Hypothetical that (is) WAS Giving Me Trouble

This post is all business, and not in the least entertaining.  It is just a problem I have understanding a Gemara.

Hypothetical, based on a Mishna in Bava Basra:

A and B are partners in a business.  A and B invested in the business, and hired M (Manager) to manage it.  M is paid a salary.  Years pass. B and M die.  The business is liquidated, and it is now worth three thousand dollars more than A and B invested in it.  A, the surviving partner, tells the heirs of B and M that when they began the business, M was promised that besides his salary, he would have an equal share in the equity the business developed.  Therefore, A says, the three thousand dollars should be divided equally among A, the heirs of B, and the heirs of M.  The heirs of B and M have no idea whether this is true or not.

How do you divide the three thousand dollars?

The obvious answer is:
        B is entitled to one thousand five hundred dollars, half the assets, because there is no evidence that shows that M was a partner, and so the only partners, as far as the heirs of B know, are A and B.  Until evidence is produced, B is entitled to half the assets.
        A agrees that he is entitled to no more than that one third, because he says there are three partners.  Therefore, A is entitled to what he claims is his, namely one third of the assets, one thousand dollars.
        M will receive the remainder, five hundred dollars, or one sixth of the assets.
This is indeed the solution stated in the Mishna in Bava Basra 134A.

(I changed the characters from the case in the Mishna, but the idea is the same.  The case the Mishna gives is that the father of A and B died and left an estate to his children.  A says that he knows for a fact that X is also a brother, and so they should each get one third (there is no bechor).  B says he has no idea whether X is a brother or not, and is not interested in giving away a portion of the estate to X until his relationship is proven conclusively.  So B says he wants half of the estate.  X also says he doesn't know for sure whether he's a brother.  The Mishna says that if there were three fields in the estate, B gets one and a half (half the estate), A gets one (one third of the estate), and X gets one half  of  a filed (one sixth of the estate --זה אחי אינו נאמן ויטול עמו בחלקו.)

I don't think this is the right solution.
I think that once B has taken half the assets, A and M should split the remainder.  M's claim is against the assets that remain after B has taken what he thinks is his, not against B.  A agrees that he and M are on an equal footing.  Therefore, A and M should split the remaining assets.  The money wasn't labeled A's, B's, and M's.  It's just anonymous money.  B did not take half of M's share, he took one thousand five hundred dollars.  All that remains is one thousand five hundred.  If A and M are equal, they should divide that remainder.  That is, B takes one thousand five hundred, and A and M each take seven hundred and fifty.  Or, in the case of the Mishnah and the fields, B takes one and a half fields, and A and X take three quarters of a field each.

To make it more clear: if there were three partners, A B and M, and B takes more than a third of the assets because he has a grudge against M.  A knows that B's act is wrong, and that B had no right to do what he did, but nobody can stop B.  He left the country, or he's a tough guy.  What will you do with the remainder of the assets?  Of course, you will divide it equally between A and X.  B's act of theft doesn't change the rules.  Here too, B's taking one and half thousand is, from A's perspective, nothing more than an act of theft.  B might justify it by saying he's entitled to take it.  But A knows that's not true, so it's nothing more than theft from the remainder of the assets.

Maybe my mistake is in assuming that M's claim exists in the form of an ownership of a percentage of the assets.  Maybe partnership interests are not viewed as ownership of assets but are viewed as a quantatative claim against each of the other partners in a percentage determined by the number of partners.  In other words: There are three partners, A B and C.  A's one third holding exists in the form of a claim against B (or B's capital account) for one sixth, and a claim against C for one sixth; B's one third holding is in the form of a claim against A for a sixth and against C for a sixth, and so on.  If that is the case, then here, according to A, M has a claim against A and B for one sixth each, and no more.  So after B has taken his half, including the one sixth that A says M is entitled to from B, his claim against A is still only for one sixth of the assets.

I just don't know why Chazal would assume this Byzantine interpretation to be correct.

I am happy to announce that those of you that thought that my kashe is a TIPSHUS are WRONG.

Not only am I not wrong, but I found that  the    אור שמח in  פי"ב מנז"מ הי"ט asks the kashe, thank you very much Reb Meir Simcha.  In fact, he even asks the kashe the same way I tried to explain it to my wife last night at supper (with a case of shutfim dividing partnership assets after a portion of the assets were stolen.). (The demonstrated fact that my Seichel has not gone haywire may be the biggest chiddush in this post.)
Yes, Reb David Povarsky holds it's not a kashe.  See his shiurim here.  But A., I think he's wrong, and B., right or wrong, I'm quite content to have my seichel hayashar validated by saying something Reb Meir Simcha said.

So what does Reb Meir Simcha say?  He answers

אלא ודאי מוכרח דכיון שהוא יש לו ראיה
ליטול חלקו שהניח אביו שדה שלמה ,
רק החסרון הוא בהאח שבא ממדינת הים
שאינו יכול לברר שהוא אח , וא"כ כיון דמה
דהאח הראשון מחזיק בחלקו שדה ומחצה
הוי מדינא , מצד חסרונו בראיה שאין לו לברר
בב"ד שהוא אח , לכן איהו מפסיד ואין לו
לאחיו השני בזה ההפסד כלום

(Please note that Reb Meir Simcha relabeled the parties: the man he calls "Hu" is A, and the man he calls "Ach Rishon" is B.)

Translation:

(connected to the discussion in Bava Kamma 53 on כל היכא דלא אפשר לאשתלומי מהאי משתלם מהאי:)

It must be that since (known brother A) can prove his right to a whole field (because he's certainly entitled to one field out of the three), and the fault is in the inability of (X) who has come from far away to prove that he is a brother, so the fact that (known brother B) takes his share of one and a half fields is legally supported by the failure of (X) to prove his relationship, so (X) loses and (known brother A) does not have to share in (X's) loss (by allowing X to take half of the one and a half fields that remain after B took his share).

I think that what he's saying is this. Here,   A says to X, you can't take your fair share from B because we can't prove your case.  Until we or  you prove your case, B is really entitled to take the larger share.  Since it is the weakness in your ability to prove your case that results in B's legal right to take the larger share, it's your problem, not mine.

Hakaras hatov: I found the teretz during a search of hebrewbooks.org.  What a wonderful resource that is!     

And, Harav Eli sent me the a pdf from Reb Shmuel Rozovsky on Bava Basra to Daf 134, who says that Rabbeinu Gershom learns pshat in the Gemara as I suggested.  If I can get it from pdf to here, I will, bln.

Another Use for Apples

This is from Sefer Lekutei Segulos Yisrael– Yisrael Lisegulaso (Feldheim, 2008), based on the sefer of Rav Shabsai Lipshitz (Dayan of Yulnitza) zt”l.  Thank you to Rabbi DK for permission to post this.

Translation of  Segulah #4: For love between man and wife, take a new needle and a new apple, inscribe a circle on the apple, write inside the circle the man's name and beneath it the word "Adam", and the wife's name and beneath it the word "Chava" (Eve), and both should eat the apple.

 I don't know exactly what he means by having them both eat the apple.  Simultaneously? Sequentially?  The same day?  One thing I do know:  I wouldn't leave any pieces of that apple lying around where the poilishe shikseh might find it.  By the way, the association of apples and love is not unique to our tradition: See, e.g., here.


Maybe this is connected to the passuk in Shir Hashirim 8:5

 מִי זֹאת, עֹלָה מִן הַמִּדְבָּר, מִתְרַפֶּקֶת עַל דּוֹדָהּ; תַּחַת הַתַּפּוּחַ עוֹרַרְתִּיךָ
( Who is this that cometh up from the wilderness, leaning upon her beloved? Under the apple-tree (Tapu'ach) I awakened thee)

On the other hand, we are far from certain as to the identity of the "Tapu'ach."  Although this has meant "apple" in the past two millennia, there are many good reasons to suspect that the Biblical tapuach refers to a completely different species.  See, for example, Tosfos Shabbos 88a d'h Piryo, who brings evidence that tapuach means the citron/esrog, which at least has a strong gender symbolism in the sefarim that discuss such things.  But try eating one with your wife!  Some modern writers suggest that the tapuach of Tanach is the apricot.  I certainly would say that eating an apricot together, especially a magic apricot, is a more sensual experience than eating an apple or an esrog.  Make sure that neither of you inhale the pit.

I also liked the segula (#5) that to eradicate an inappropriate love, drink water in which willow twigs have been cooked.  I knew it would cure headaches and fevers.  Nice to know that it cures a very different kind of fever as well.  My only quibble is that in the sense that Hashem always provides the cure before creating the disease, I would have put #5 before #4.

The Sefer is available here  and, as of this posting, it's on sale.

~~~~~~
N.B.

This remark is in the comments, but I wanted to emphasize it.
Despite the tone of this post, I want you to know that the individual that edited this book for Feldheim is a Talmid Chacham muvhak and an exemplary yarei shamayim.  If there were more like him,  we would be zocheh to Achishenu.  With the current events surrounding the EJF, and the encouragement and occasional participation of allegedly honorable individuals in the mob-action lynchings of the principals of that organization (example: Rav Elya Ber Vachtfogel agreed to affiliate himself with the EJF after Rabbi Tropper resigned, and he was immediately called by the henchman of a certain gadol in Eretz Yisrael who explicitly threatened him with public humiliation if he didn't not only retract his acceptance but also claim to have never agreed to join the organization), it is only the adinus (tranquility) and the rei'ach Gan Eden of such people as this book's editor that clears the stink from my nostrils and protects my faith in the concept of of the spiritually salutary effects of a life of Torah.