Miketz, Breishis 43:14. The First Acheir: וְשִׁלַּח לָכֶם אֶת אֲחִיכֶם אַחֵר וְאֶת בִּנְיָמִין Also, Chanuka.

Three parts: Part one, Chanuka. Part Two, Parshas Mikeitz.  Part Three, a complaint about abysmally bad taste.

Part I

In honor of Chanuka, I want to link to an older piece that I wrote about Tumah Hutra Betzibur, טומאה הותרה בציבור.  It is a high quality piece, but of interest only to a limited audience.   

Part II

And now, on to Parshas Mikeitz.

וְ*ל שַׁ*י יִתֵּן לָכֶם רַחֲמִים לִפְנֵי הָאִישׁ וְשִׁלַּח לָכֶם אֶת אֲחִיכֶם אַחֵר וְאֶת בִּנְיָמִין וַאֲנִי כַּאֲשֶׁר שָׁכֹלְתִּי שָׁכָלְתִּי 

Yaakov says to his sons, if you must go back to Mitzrayim, and you must take Binyamin, then there's nothing I can do but pray that Hashem give you favor in the eyes of the man who threatened you, and may you bring back your other brother and Binyamin.  

The Ramban here, (also brought in the Shai Latorah I,) says that obviously the "other brother," אֲחִיכֶם אַחֵר, is Shimon.  The Ramban asks why Yaakov refers to Shimon as Achichem acheir, not Shimon beni, my poor son Shimon who has been imprisoned in Mitzrayim.  He answers that Yaakov was still angry about what Shimon did to the people of Shechem, and he wouldn’t even mention Shimon’s name; and Yaakov would have left Shimon in Mitzrayim if not for the fact that they didn’t have any bread in the house.

The Shai Latorah brings that Reb Simcha Zissel Broide/Chevron points out how amazing this is, how makpid Yaakov was on Shimon.  Here it was twenty years later, and according to the Ramban the complaint against Shimon  was not the action Shimon had taken against Shechem, but instead Shimon and Levi’s not having asked Yaakov’s advice/permission.  And still, he was unwilling to take a risk to save Shimon, and when circumstances forced his hand, he only referred to him as "the other one," Acheir.  We see, he says, the degree of seriousness Yaakov attached to family discipline, that it was such an unforgivable breach that he would have left Shimon there in prison, and when the opportunity to get him back arose, he referred to him as his "Acheir," like Elisha ben Avuyah.

            The truth is, the Ramban does say this, but there’s an essential point that was left out in the sefarim that quote it.  We have to ask ourselves, did Shimon ask for mechilah? Did he demonstrate a change of heart?  Did he make an effort to address the problem?  Are we not justified in saying pshat in the Ramban that Shimon was recalcitrant, and would have done the same again?  (These are rhetorical questions.  Answers: No. No. No. Yes.)  If so, Yaakov’s attitude was far more understandable. 

Once again, we have an example of Shimon’s position in the shvatim.  Nowhere in Tanach is anything nice said about him.  I have seen stained glass windows in shuls that had the twelve tribes with a passuk from Tanach about each, and the window for Shimon has a generic passuk that is totally irrelevant to Shimon, because the people who made the windows couldn't find one nice thing in Tanach about that Sheivet.  Shimon was not only a kannai, he was stubborn, and never accepted constructive criticism that he should learn to channel and redirect his anger.  A blind zealotry that rejects the need for discipline and nuance is deadly and even self-destructive.  Levi, on the other hand, apparently channeled their aggressiveness into avodas Hashem and became the great teachers of Klal Yisrael.
(Note: Acheir is the epithet by which Elisha ben Avuya, who lived at the time of the Tana'im, is known.  While his scholarship is not contested, his rejection of orthodox theology resulted in his expulsion from the his peer group (Chulin, Shiluach Hakein) and his eternal disgrace of being referred to as Acheir, the Other.  Reb Meir, the great Tanna, studied with him.  When Reb Meir's attempt (end of Horyos) to depose Rabban Gamliel failed, Rabban Gamliel declared  that henceforth Reb Meir would be quoted  as Acheirim, a dual insult: that his name is not mentioned, and although Reb Meir felt he could study the Torah with Elisha ben Avuya without being influenced by his heretical theology, Rabban Gamliel was here asserting that Reb Meir was influenced by Elisha, and deserved to be called Acheirim just as his teacher was called Acheir.)

Part III

On a completely different topic:

A few years ago, I wrote about the minhag of inscribing the name of the donor or other honorees on sanctified objects.  I wrote the following:

Benefactors donate items to Shuls and Batei Medrash, which are intended to beautify and glorify our places of Tefillah and Torah. For example, people donate Sifrei Torah, or the Paroches on the Aron Kodesh. And, to our bemusement, in middle of that beautiful thing, is a lengthy description of who donated it and why they donated it. We learn that they gave it for their birthday, or in honor of their anniversary, or whatever private motivation that they choose to record in shining letters. It often strikes us as incongruous that while the ostensible motive of the donor is to glorify Hashem, it seems that they are equally motivated by their desire to show off their munificence and perpetuate their own glory. As usual, this attitude does conclusively prove one thing, and that is Daas Baal Habayis Hepech Daas Torah, that where we think we are standing up for the honor of the Torah, in fact we are just venting ignorant feelings of prejudice and jealousy. The Rashba addresses this issue in his Responsa.

The Tshuvos HaRashba in 981 brings a proof from the story of Yosef that when a person does a mitzvah, it is proper to publicize that he did it and why he did it. The Torah sees fit to interrupt the narrative of the sale of Yosef to note that Reuven was purely motivated and that he intended to save Yosef. As cited by the Torah Temimah here, the Rashba then says, and the Rama in YD 249:13 paskens, that one who dedicates an object to tzedakah may write his name on it, and the community cannot interfere with this prerogative. So, all those parochos and things that have a gantzeh megillah about who donated it and why, might look like they aggrandize the donor at the expense of the beauty of the donated object, but the Rashba and the Rama say it’s fine. The truth is, these inscriptions can also be seen as beautiful in themselves, since they give voice to and demonstrate the donor’s love and respect for the davar shebikdusha and his desire to be associated with them.  As  Lkwdguy put it, " while some choose to mark anniversaries with eternity bands, these donors chose to mark theirs with something truly eternal."  Beautifully said.  Lkwdguy must work on Madison Avenue.

 This question came to mind recently.  For a guest's simcha, a family sefer Torah was brought to shul.  It was a sefer torah from Europe, purchased from the gentiles who had saved it from being burned when all the Jews of the town were herded into the shul and burned alive.  The rav of the town was the great great grandfather of the young man who was celebrating a simcha.  On the Mantle of the sefer was a Jewish Star, the yellow star with 'Jude' inside that the Nazis forced Jews to wear.  It was not an authentic relic, it was a new embroidered patch.

So, what do you think about that?  Poignant symbolism, or shameful abuse of a Sefer Torah? Profundity or ignorance?  I vote for ignorance and shameful.  These symbols were used to dehumanize us, to identify us as targets for torture and horrible deaths.  We should never forget our sufferings and martyrdom; but the Sefer Torah is not the proper place to put that reminder.  The Sefer Torah is our glory and our connection to the Ribono shel Olam, it is the precious heart of Klal Yisrael, it is the word and will of Hashem.  You don't put symbols of our degradation and suffering on it.  When we start engraving wedding bands with Arbeit Macht Frei, we can put Jewish stars on Sifrei Torah.  Either it makes the Sefer beautiful or it doesn't belong there. 

Vayeishev, Breishis 38:2. What to Look For in a Mechutan.

וַיַּרְא שָׁם יְהוּדָה בַּת אִישׁ כְּנַעֲנִי וּשְׁמוֹ שׁוּעַ וַיִּקָּחֶהָ

Yehuda saw there the daughter of a Canaani man named Shua and he married her.
Rashi- כנעני: תגרא:  Canaani means, as Onkelos interprets it, a merchant.

Normally, the word "Canaani" means 'a native of Canaan'.  Occasionally, however, it can mean a 'merchant'.  Here, Rashi says that the meaning of the word is only the latter, a merchant, and not a native of Canaan.  In truth, there are other words that can be used to refer to a merchant, but no others that mean Canaanite, so there has to be compelling evidence that it means a merchant.  The reason for this pshat is given in Pesachim 50a: it is extremely unlikely that Avraham having warned Yitzchak to never marry a Canaanite, and Yitzchak having warned Yaakov to stay away from them, that Yehuda would marry one.  Therefore, Canaani can only mean merchant.

The question then is, why did the Torah bother to tell us that Yehuda married the daughter of a merchant?  What difference does that make?  If he was a Canaanite, it's interesting information, considering the family's antipathy to Canaan.  But if he was simply a merchant, who cares?

Harav Eliezer Ginsburg just published (Mesorah) a sefer called Mesilas HaMaharsha, in which he gathers  and discusses everything in the Maharsha that is relevant to Chumash.  This particular discussion has nothing to do with any Maharsha, but he brought it anyway because he liked it.  He says on this passuk that he saw that the sefer Otzar Chaim brings from Reb Nachum of Chernobyl the following: Yehuda did not seek out a woman with a family background of refinement and learning.  Instead, he looked for the daughter of a merchant who was wealthy and who had extensive properties.  The result of this inappropriate focus was that the children she bore were deeply flawed- Eir and Onan.  On the other hand, when he took Tamar, who was a meyucheses, being the daughter of Shem, he then fathered Peretz, the progenitor of the royal house of David.

I would add another point.  Why would the Torah choose this word to describe a merchant, when it obviously has other meanings?  It's like in Yehoshua, where Rachav is called a Zonah (Yehoshua 2:1), which many explain to mean 'a seller of mezonos.'  Why choose such a unpleasant word to describe a mezonos seller?  We have to say that the ambiguity is intentional, perhaps meaning in the old days of "kevuda bas melech penima" that a woman who is in a shop all day, selling little things to numerous customers, is not respectable.  Here, too, we can say that he's was called Canaani to tell us that Yehuda overlooked serious personality flaws- which were like those of the Canaanim- because he was a successful merchant.

Important Reservation!  I take no responsibility for the vort.   If this Reb Nachum is the famous one, then he is a talmid of the Baal Shem and the Mezritcher Magid and can only be questioned, not criticized.  But I must say that you have to be 'brave' to attribute fault to Yehuda.  And I certainly wouldn't take it upon myself to say that if you take a wealthy shidduch even though there's no yichus, you deserve to end up with children that are sexual deviates.  Also, I think that after the Holocaust and two thousand years of galus, anyone that willingly calls himself a Jew is a meyuchas.  It's easy enough to do what Secretary of State Albright's and Governor Allen's  parents did and join the gentile world.  You'd have all the natural advantages of being a Jew without the enormous disadvantages of being known as one.  The main reason I posted it is simply because the vort caught my attention, as it did Reb Leizer's.

Post script/Update:

I had a conversation in the comments with an anonymous writer, and he/she made some valid points.  I realized that the post had left out certain important things, which led to the fair criticism.  I also realized what it is about the vort I found so interesting.  So I need to add the following, based on what I wrote in the comments:

•     Drush, by it's nature, stems from the attitude of the darshan, not from the words of the passuk. That being the case, you have to be more careful- more critical-   when listening to drush than when listening to halacha, because drush is opinion and attitude projected onto the passuk. The provenance of drush is of far greater importance than that of halachic discourse.

The Rambam's dictum about accepting the truth from whoever said it would not apply to mussar, hashkafa, ethics, because the authority of the teacher is most often predicated not on rigorous logic, but instead on the life that person lives, his or her ethical wisdom and moral strength and discipline.

You might say that "yichus" matters more in Drush than in Halacha.  That's an oversimplification, but it's an oversimplification of a truth.

Specifically, I really don't see this vort as telling me anything at all about pshat in the passuk. I think the Drush method was used as a vehicle to voice a criticism of the naive assumption that marrying into wealth is an unmitigated boon. It certainly is wonderful if the spouse is a kind and decent person who also is insulated from the financial worries of life. But if you choose a rich boor over a regular mentsch, you might regret it.

•     As I say above, the key to drush is the wisdom and virtue of the darshan.  Ironically, though, once the darshan is deemed worthy of attention, the scholarly quality or the analytical rigor of his words matters less.  So, in halacha, we don't really care so much about what kind of person the speaker is, but we analyze his words minutely.  In drush, we care very much about what kind of person the speaker is, but once we accept that he is worth listening to, we have to suspend our critical faculty and attend to the deeper truths that he is presenting.

By the way, where does that old expression אין משיבין על הדרש come from?  It's from the time of the Rishonim/early Achronim, as far as I can tell; here's the Rama MiFano, Part II number 125.

•     This whole discussion reminds me! When my kids were going out, I used to warn them to be very, very careful not to be distracted by superficial and unimportant things. If a person is refined, and intelligent, and kind, and from a good family, you can't let these things distract you from what's really important in a spouse: is the person very rich?  (The preceding is not meant seriously.  It is a satire, a burlesque of the unpleasant truth that hides in the shadows of the shidduch world.)

I have a sort-of-relative who was going out with a very wealthy man. On one date, he asked her, "Tell me the truth. Do you like me because of who I am inside, or because I'm filthy rich?" She answered, "Tell me the truth. Do you love me because of who I am inside, or because I'm drop dead gorgeous?" With that conversation, they realized they were perfect for each other, and they are long and happily married.  Invei Hagefen Be'invei Hagefen.  UPDATE: After fifteen years of marriage, they're getting a divorce.   He got bored.

• I also pointed out the irony of criticizing bad yichus when the mother of malchus was Rus, a convert, whose yichus score, technically, is pretty low.  Obviously, a person can overcome even the worst yichus; mamzer talmid chacham precedes kohen gadol am ha'aretz.  And it's even easier to undermine the best yichus in the world.  I will refrain from listing examples.   The point of the vort, I suppose, is that here, there was no countervailing personal quality in the daughter of Shua.

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Vayeishev, Breishis 37:12. Shechem.

 Breishis Rabba 79:7:

שלשה מקומות שאין אומות העולם יכולין להונות את ישראל לומר גזולים הן בידכם ואלו הן מערת המכפלה ובית המקדש וקבורתו של יוסף

.

There are three places that the gentiles cannot say we stole: The Me'aras Hamachpeila, the Beis Hamikdash, and the Burial ground of Yosef.  Each of these places were purchased from their indigenous owners; The Machpeila by Avraham Avinu from Ephron the Hittite, the Beis Hamikdash by David from Aravna, also known as Arauna the Jebusite, and the burial ground of Yosef.  The "Burial Ground of Yosef" refers to the area described in Parshas Vayishlach, Breishis 33:18-19, wherein Yakov purchased land in Shechem from the sons of Chamor- the Chamor whose son, also named Shchem, later kidnapped and assaulted Dinah.  So it is synonymous with the city we call Shechem.

It is perplexing 

• that Chazal are worried about what the Gentiles would approve of and what they would not, as if we should aspire to their ethical standards.

• that Chazal think that Kibush Milchama, the Right of Conquest, which was universally accepted until the twentieth century, and which is still recognized by victors, would not legitimize our claim, as is does for the rest of the world throughout history.

• And do Chazal really think that these old bills of sale eliminate any denial of our right to be there?  The same way the first Rashi in Chumash's Rabbeinu Yitzchak's argument (אמר רבי יצחק לא היה צריך להתחיל [את] התורה אלא (שמות יב ב) מהחודש הזה לכם, שהיא מצוה ראשונה שנצטוו [בה] ישראל, ומה טעם פתח בבראשית, משום (תהלים קיא ו) כח מעשיו הגיד לעמו לתת להם נחלת גוים, שאם יאמרו אומות העולם לישראל לסטים אתם, שכבשתם ארצות שבעה גוים, הם אומרים להם כל הארץ של הקב"ה היא, הוא בראה ונתנה לאשר ישר בעיניו, ברצונו נתנה להם וברצונו נטלה מהם ונתנה לנו:) hasn't done us much good, this one hasn't helped either.  Recently, the imbeciles and murderers at UNESCO declared that two of the three listed in the Medrash, namely, the Me'aras Hamchpeila and the Har Habayis, are mosques whose Islamic background is at least as significant as their association with the Jewish people.  In order to rip our hearts out, they also threw in Kever Rachel.  They didn't even bother with Shechem and Kever Yosef.  Mamesh a stirah to the Medrash! We need to let them know!

Reb Tzadok in his Pirush on Chumash in Vayishlach 33:18 [9] brings from the Zohar (Chelek Beis 125:1) that in order to generate a spirit of holiness, an area needs to be purchased and the full price must be paid.  This, of course, illuminates the deeper meaning of our Medrash.  Reb Tzadok says that the unique quality of the Me'aras Hamachpeila was that prior the the investiture of kedusha in the Har Habayis, the graves of tzadikim were the place of Hashra'as Hashechina, as we find (Sotah 34b) that Kalev prostrated himself on the kevarim in prayer.   I am totally incompetent in this area, so the Zohar's illumination of the Medrash leaves me in the dark, and I will leave it to people who know something about it.

Coincidentally, I saw a  Chasidishe sefer (by Rav Asher Zelig Grinzweig, who happened to be a great man; he is the grandfather of the wife of Ephraim Oschry, who wrote the introduction, and he died at Auschwitz with simcha in the mitzva of mesiras nefesh) that brings from an earlier Chasidishe sefer that when a person buys a new house, he should bury a silver coin in the road near the house and say out loud- in a polyglot of Yiddish, Hebrew, and Aramis- that he's buying the house from the S'A (אני לוקח דיא קרקע בייא אייך מתהום ארעא ועד רום רקיע).  (Just because the man who wrote the sefer was a tzadik and Rosh Yeshiva who died ahl kiddush Hashem doesn't mean I have to like chasidishe maises.)


Whatever the Zohar and the Medrash mean, let's accept this as a premise:  These purchases were prerequisite to the invocation of some exceptional kedusha.  But what about Shechem?

Reb Tzadok explains that Shechem was the first dwelling place of Yakov on returning to Eretz Yisrael, and Yakov wanted to invest the area with a special kedusha of Techumin of Shabbos, and this is why he needed to purchase it.  But still, we have to ask, why did it come out that this special event took place in Shechem?  Was there something special about Shechem that led to its being the first city to be invested with kedusha?

So Reb Tzadok brings the Gemara in Sanhedrin 102a.

וילך רחבעם שכם כי שכם בא כל ישראל להמליך אותו תנא משום ר׳ יוסי מקום מזומן לפורענות בשכם עינו את דינה בשכם מכרו אחיו את יוסף בשכם נחלקה מלכות בית דוד

Reb Yosi taught: Shechem is a place that is predisposed to calamity.  In Shechem Dinah was tortured, in Shechem the brothers sold Yosef, in Shechem the kingdom of David was torn asunder by Yeravam and Rechavam.

Reb Tzadok explains that these three sins are manifestations of the three fatal scourges: Kinah/jealousy, Taavah/desire, and Kavod/haughtiness.  The story of Dinah represents a failing of Taavah.  The sale of Yosef stemmed from Kinah.  Also, he brings Makos 10a that in Shechem, murder was common, which, he says, also stemmed from kinah.  The division of Klal Yisrael into two kingdoms was the result of (Sanhedrin 101b) Yeravam's unwillingness to subordinate himself to the family of David- Kavod. 

Reb Tzadok says that it only by utilizing the kedusha of Shabbos as a means to connect one's self to the kedusha of the Three Avos can a person overcome the three deadly traits of Kinah, Taavah, and Kavod.  This is why Yakov purchased land in Shechem and made Techumin for Shabbos there.  By doing so, he invested it with the kedusha of Shabbos, and enabled us to overcome the three deadly traits.

You surely noticed that the Medrash that started this discussion alluded to Shechem by saying that it was the burial ground of Yosef.  You have to wonder what that has to do with this.  According to Reb Tzadok, it was simply the first place where Yakov dwelled upon returning to Eretz Yisrael, and it needed a special refu'ah for the spiritual illness to which it was prone.  But is there some relationship between its special character and the fact that Yosef was buried there?  This, Reb Tzadok does not discuss.

When I brought this up at our Shabbos Morning Kiddush, a very smart person proposed an excellent explanation.  Yosef represents the ability of a spiritually superior human being to completely overcome any taint of these three flaws.

• Yosef's flight from the wife of Potiphar was, by our standards, a superhuman act.  It's hard enough to fight the yetzer hara of arayos at home; it's doubly hard when in galus, away from your family and your society.  It's almost impossible when you have to fight not only the yetzer hara, but also the yetzer hatov, which was the case here, as Rashi says about the motivation of Potiphar's wife.  Yosef represents the ability to overcome Taavah.

• Yosef represents the ability of a human being to eliminate kinah from his heart.  Did Yosef not realize that wearing the Kesones Pasim, that talking about his dreams, endangered him?  He did not, because the concept of Kinah was so entirely foreign to his experience that it did not occur to him that he should wary of eliciting it in his brothers.  He was above kinah to the extent that Yosef is called "Alei Ayin," which Chazal (Brachos 20) explain means he was immune to Ayin Hara.  Only one who has vanquished his own Kinah is immune to the Ayin Hara.

• Yosef represents the utter victory of humility over pride.  When he interpreted all the dreams, he did not claim superior wisdom; he attributed his abilities to Hashem.  When his brothers came to Mitzrayim, he hugged them and kissed them and told them to not worry about what they had done to him, because it was the will of Hashem and resulted in his being able to take care of them, to feed, clothe, and house them.  His suffering was not important, his high position was not important, all that mattered was his ability to take care of his brothers.  Yosef's supernal humility is a lofty example for the world beaters, the wealthy, the greatest philanthropists, and gedolei Torah, because he was all of these things and remained perfectly humble.

It is for these reasons that Yosef is buried in Shechem.  We look at Yosef and learn that it is not the fate of all humans to fall victim to these three flaws.  With tefilla and zechus avos, we can overcome them, as Yosef did.

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The certain wise person is my wife, the daughter and granddaughter of Roshei Yeshiva and Gedolei Olam.  If hearing a woman's Torah thoughts bothers you, I refer you to the picture directly above the Labels column.

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Vayishlach: Quick Zman Krias Shma Calculation

I feel bad about this lazy streak, so here's a little-known zman krias shma shortcut without having to figure out sha'os zmanios.
Time of sunrise, plus twelve, divide by two.  That's zman krias shma.  (Be careful to adjust for Daylight Savings.)
(Rav Baruch Epstein ob'm)

Eli points out that due to the Equation of Time, this is off a few minutes.  Sorry, Reb Boruch.

Vayeitzei, Breishis 29:27, מַלֵּא שְׁבֻעַ זֹאת וְנִתְּנָה לְךָ גַּם אֶת זֹאת. Ein Me'arvin- Don't Mix Smachos (Simchos)

Very condensed, will probably expand in the next couple of days:


The Yerushalmi (Moed Katan 1:7) says that this passuk, in which Lavan told Yaakov to wait to finish the Sheva Brachos for Leah before marrying Rachel, teaches us that Ein Me'arvin, אין מערבין שמחה בשמחה, that we may not mix Smachos, that we cannot mix celebrations.  One may not make a sheva brachos for two wives together.  This has application for Yomtov as well, because celebrating a wedding on Yomtov would be me'arvin.   Many hold that this is De'oraysa (e.g., Tosfos Moed Katan 8b DH Lefi and Kesuvos 47a DH Demasar, and the Gemara in Chagiga 8 or something where it's also clear.)

On the other hand, the entire idea that we celebrate sheva brachos is derabanan, certainly after the first day (Magen Avraham 546:4.)

1. It's odd that we learn the de'oraysa that ein me'arvin from the sheva brachos story of Yaakov by Lavan, when the sheva brachos itself was derabanan.  It's odd for two reasons.

Reason one: because if the sheva brachos is not de'oraysa, why would the Torah teach us about the inviolability of a simcha when the simcha had no halachic standing, and is, essentially, trivial.  It's as if the Torah would have taught us ein me'arvin because Lavan said "Fine, you can marry my daughter, but I don't want to make the wedding until football season is over."

Reason two: There are two concepts expressed in this story: Sheva Brachos and Ein M'arvin.  If you can't learn the din of sheva brachos from this story, then you shouldn't be able to learn anything at all.  Or: if you say you can learn the din de'oraysa of ein me'arvin from the story, then you ought to be able to learn the din of sheva brachos too. 

2. Also, the Mareh Hapanim in the Yerushalmi in Moed Katan asks, that the Yerushalmi a few pages before, in 3:5, as brought in Tosfos Moed Katan 20a, says that you can't prove halachos from pre-Matan Torah events.  Here, we seem to be doing so.

3. The Gemara in Moed Kattan says you can get married erev Yomtov, because the ikar simcha is only the first day.  The Rambam says that it's muttar to get married Erev Yomtov.  But if we learn Ein Me'arvin from Lavan's instructions, then it ought to proscribe marrying and entire week before Yomtov.  Otherwise, Yaakov could have just waited till that night to marry Rachel, not a whole week.  You see that the Sheva Brachos of Leah, and the din Simcha that they entailed, precluded the Chasan from marrying Rachel, because ein me'arvin.

You cannot answer that the Yerushalmi holds you can't get married a whole week before Yomtov.  First, the mishna says "B'Moed," on yomtov, not a week before the mo'ed, as the Bavli says explicitly, and there's no reason to think that the Yerushalmi rejects what the Bavli holds is pashut pshat in the Mishna.  Second, the Rambam in 10 Ishus brings the Yerushalmi's drasha from the story of Lavan, and the Rambam himself holds you can get married within a week of Yomtov.

4. If Ein Me'arvin prohibits marrying on Yomtov, why does the Rambam in 10 Ishus allow marrying many women at once?  True, the Rambam says that you will then have to set aside sequential weeks for each bride's sheva brachos.  But what about the marriage itself?  Just as one cannot marry on yomtov because the simcha of marriage distracts from the yomtov, one should not be allowed to marry two women at once, because each simcha detracts from the other?

Anyway, let's focus on the first questions.  How can we learn from the Lavan's words that Ein Me'arvin, when we do not learn from his words the din of Sheva Brachos.  And if we're not learning the din of Sheva Brachos, how can we learn the din of Ein Me'arvin?

The answer is the following:

The Rambam says in I Aveilus 1

מצות עשה להתאבל על הקרובים. שנאמר ואכלתי חטאת היום הייטב בעיני ה'. ואין אבילות מן התורה אלא ביום ראשון בלבד שהוא יום המיתה ויום הקבורה. אבל שאר השבעה ימים אינו דין תורה. אף על פי שנאמר בתורה ויעש לאביו אבל שבעת ימים ניתנה תורה ונתחדשה הלכה ומשה רבינו תקן להם לישראל שבעת ימי אבלות ושבעת ימי המשתה: 

It is a Mitzva of the Torah to mourn relatives, as it says "Should I then partake in the offering?  Would that be good in Hashem's eyes?"  Torah aveilus is only the first day, when that is the day of death and burial, but the remainder of the week are not Torah law, notwithstanding that the Torah says (Breishis 50:10) "And he (Yosef) made a seven day mourning for his father."  The Halacha was established only with the giving of the Torah, and not before.  Moshe Rabbeinu instituted the din of mourning a death for seven days and of celebrating a wedding for seven days.

So it is clear that although the concept of Shiva and Sheva Brachos are mentioned in the Torah, they do not have halachic standing; it was Moshe Rabbeinu that gave them the force of Rabbinic Law.  Isn't it odd that these things were known and followed long before, and that the Torah did not give them the force of Torah law, but that immediately upon the giving of the Torah, Moshe Rabbeinu saw fit to give them the force of Rabbinic Law?  And that the twin to Sheva Brachos, ein me'arvin, stated in the same context, is a halacha de'oraysa?

The explanation is that the events that preceded Matan Torah cannot have the force of law.  Only the Torah is the source of law.  But if the Torah describes an event, or quotes some individual, this description must have a purpose.  The purpose might be to limn a righteous or a wicked man, or a miraculous event.  But where that doesn't apply, then the Torah is stating a truth, a fact, a reality.  The reality is that a life-changing discontinuity, an emotional upheaval, necessitates a week of adjustment and assimilation.  This is not a halacha, it is a statement of fact, and it applies not only to Shiva and Sheva Brachos, but to all equally intense experiences.

So although the seven days of celebration after a wedding, and the seven days of mourning after a funeral are realities and necessities of human existence, they are not necessarily halachos.  Here's an example:  The Torah teaches us middos tovos and avoidance of middos Ra'os.  The Ramban says that one can technically fulfill all the mitzvos and still be a sheigitz, a menuval.  How can it be that we are absolutely obligated to have good middos but the Torah doesn't call them Mitzvos?  Because that's the nature of the Torah.  There are mitzvos, and there are facts of life and of existence that are fundamental, but remain outside the rubric of mitzvos.  Sheva Brachos and Aveilus fall under this heading.

Another statement of fact is that when a person celebrates two joyous events together, each one distracts from the other.  You might think that the two would reinforce each other, just as a festive meal enhances a holiday.  So the Torah tells us that no; when the other simcha is for a different reason, it only distracts from the holiday, or from the other celebration.

These are two statements of metzius, fact, not halacha.  Halacha cannot be derived from statements that predate Matan Torah. But the reality of ein me'arvin has halachic relevance.  There are events that the Torah says require simcha, such as Yomtov. Part of that mitzva of simcha is to not do things that will interfere with the simcha.  Since the Torah teaches the fact that two simchas work at cross purposes, the halachic result is that Ein Me'arvin.

On the other hand, we cannot derive any rule from the fact that powerful emotional events need seven days of assimilation.  This may be a fact, but we cannot make it into a halacha.  But Moshe Rabbeinu decided to help Klal Yisrael to live healthy emotional lives by formalizing this idea, but only as a Din Derabanan.

As for questions three and four, you will find a fine answer in the journal Hapardes No. 43 Vol. 7 page 23, in an article written by Rav Yisrael Meir Karno, who grew up in Kelm, as did להבחל"ח my mother, and who was one of the witnesses on my parents' kesuva in Samarkahnd.  (The other eid was Reb Chaim Stein.)    The basic idea is that there are two dinim, one that he will forget the primary simcha, and one that each diminishes the other.  See it inside.

Toldos, Breishis 25:21. Yitzchak's Tefilla & Unintended Consequences. וַיֵּעָתֶר לוֹ ה' וַתַּהַר רִבְקָה אִשְׁתּוֹ.

The Torah makes it clear that the success of Yitzchak's tefilla was an extraordinary event.  When Yitzchak's tefillos were successful, the passuk refers to this as וַיֵּעָתֶר לוֹ ה, and Rashi explains that this means "נתפצר ונתפייס ונתפתה לו."  The tefilla exhorted, appeased, and inveigled Hashem to do as Yitzchak asked.  This seems extreme.  It seems that the tefillos were answered only because they were singularly unrelenting, conciliatory, and convincing.  Why wouldn't Hashem answer Yitzchak as He answers any person that is mispallel?  Clearly, there was some kind of barrier that these particular tefillos had to overcome.  What was that barrier?

In other words: By Moshe Rabbeinu, we find that he davened five hundred sixteen times, and Hashem not only didn't listen, but Hashem told him to stop davening so that the tefillos shouldn't break through.  But that is because there was a shvu'a not to let Moshe enter Eretz Yisrael, so there was an obvious barrier to accepting the tefilla.  But here, where the childlessness was only because הקב"ה מתאוה לתפלתן של צדיקים, either accept it or don't.  Once it was meratzeh, then that should be it.  The words Rashi uses indicate more than just ritzui.  The expressions in Rashi clearly indicate that the success of these tefillos was contrary to some countervailing consideration.

More clearly: if it was just an issue of א"ר יצחק מפני מה היו אבותינו עקורים מפני שהקב"ה מתאוה לתפלתן של צדיקים (Yevamos 64a), then it's just a matter of reaching a certain level or point.  Once that point is reached, then the tefilla ought to be answered.  Here, Rashi doesn't say that the tefilla was answered because it was sufficient.  Rashi says that the tefilla turned the world upside down.  It was  not only a krias yam suf, a revolutionary upheaval, it was a metamorphosis of Hashem's will, kaviyachol. 

The Shai LaTorah vol. I brings that Reb Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld answered this question as follows.  The Chasam Sofer was once asked to be mispallel that a women who was having difficulty in labor have a quick birth.  He said he could not do that.  The Gemara in Kiddushin 72b says that when Reb Akiva died, Rebbi was born; when Rebbi died, Rebbi Yehuda was born; and so on.  Only after his replacement is born does a tzadik die.  "I know," said the Chasam Sofer, "that this child will be a great tzadik that will bring light to the whole world; his birth will make possible the death of the tzadik that he was born to replace.  How can I contribute to the death of that tzadik?"  (See end of post for my comments about this story.)

Here, too, said Reb Yosef Chaim, Eisav's birth led to Avraham's premature death, though for a very different reason:  Avraham Avinu died five years before his time so that he should not see Eisav going letarbus ra'ah (Rashi 25:30.)  If so, the later Eisav is born, the longer Avraham can live; if Eisav were born five years later, Avraham would have lived his whole alloted lifespan.  It was only because Yitzchak prayed so relentlessly and effectively that Hashem listened to the tefillos, even at the cost to Avraham.

Rav Sonnenfeld added that "vayei'aseir lo Hashem" is in Gematria "chamesh shanim."  The Shai LaTorah says that when Reb Aharon Kotler heard this, he said that a Gematria like that can only come from Ru'ach Hakodesh.

So what do we see?  We see that it is possible for a tefilla to be answered even when, unbeknownst to the mispallel, the desired answer is ultimately injurious.  The one who is praying knows nothing about the collateral effect of the answer to his tefilla.  He is only doing what the Torah teaches- when you need something, pray. But if he davens well enough and hard enough and long enough, sometimes the tefilla is answered as he desires, and this sets into motion a cascade of unintended and unexpected and unwanted consequences.  It's like Robert Merton's law of  unintended consequences. a widely quoted admonition that intervention in a complex system always creates unanticipated and often undesirable outcomes.

On the other hand, there is an example of precisely the opposite happening- that because of an inappropriate tefilla, Hashem answers with the opposite of what was asked for.  In Vayeishev, Breishis 37:2,  Rashi says bikeish Yakov leisheiv beshalvah, Yaakov desired to live in peace.  The result of that desire was exactly the opposite, that the trouble of Yosef and the brothers immediately began..  Harav Mordechai Yosef Eisenberg, at his sheva brochos, pointed out that from here we see that a tefilla for something inappropriate can bring the opposite result.  It says bikeish, and, as a result, kofatz.  So we have to be careful about what we daven for, because if  it's something that you shouldn't be asking for, it can elicit the opposite of what you desire.

The difference is that there, what was asked for was wrong.  A tzadik should not seek tranquility.  He is here to overcome and to achieve, not to go on vacation.  Yitchak, on the other hand, was asking for something perfectly legitimate.  He was doing exactly what he should have been doing, and his tefilla was a good tefillah.  So his tefillos were answered, for better or for worse.

Does this sound reasonable to you?  Is that really how tefilla works?  Doesn't the passuk in Mishlei 10:22 say בִּרְכַּת יְהוָה הִיא תַעֲשִׁיר וְלֹא יוֹסִף עֶצֶב עִמָּהּ.?  Not for nothing is this website described as "divrei Torah that require some thought."  In any case, it seems that tefilla is a gamble, which I find very hard to believe.  I'll get back to this later. 

The first time I heard this idea was in a discussion with the Mirrer Rabbi David Zupnik Zatzal.  In Ashrei, we say "Retzon yerei'av ya'aseh, ve'es shavasam yishma veyoshi'eim."  Reb Tzvi Pesach Frank, in the first teshuva in OC (to explain the Bach that says you should say the parsha of Korban Chatas, but don't say the Yehi Ratzon unless you know you actually did an aveira, because if you didn't, it will be chulin ba'azara,) says he saw somewhere that pshat is that Hashem listens to the tefillos of those that fear him; and after the tefilla is answered, after Retzon yerei'av ya'aseh and the wish is granted , and the supplicant realizes that what he got was bad for him, and he now prays "Ribono shel olam, please take away what you gave me!", then Hashem does that, too- ve'es shavasam yishma veyoshi'eim, Hashem listens to their cry and saves them.  (So the pshat in the Bach is that if you say the Yehi Ratzon, and you weren't chayav a korban, then you're in trouble, because the result of your tefilla is "Ke'ilu Hikriv Chatas" whether it's good for you or bad for you, and since you weren't chayav a chatas, you are stuck with chulin ba'azara that you created through your wrongheaded tefilla.)

I found that the Brisker Rov brings the same thing from Reb Chaim in the stencil on Tanach, in Tehillim #145, with a little extra kneitch from Reb Chaim (that there are three dinim.  If the supplicant is a tzadik and can reverse the effect of his tefilla, like Choni Hame'agel who said thanks, that's enough rain, Hashem, then Hashem gives him what he wants.  If he is sort of a tzadik, who deserves an answer, but couldn't reverse the negative effects of the answer, Hashem doesn't answer him at all.  If he's a lower person, Hashem says Fine, have what you want, and see what's going to happen to you.)  Maybe this is where Reb Tzvi Pesach Frank heard it.   But did it really stem from Reb Chaim?

A couple of years later, Rabbi Zupnik found the makor of this idea from long before Reb Chaim.  He showed me that it actually comes from R’ Shlomo Kluger’s pirush on the siddur, יריעות שלמה, found in the R’ Yakov Emden siddur, in the first Ashrei in Shachris.  RS'K says that this is (Taanis 25a) what happened to R’ Chanina Ben Dosa.  He asked to be saved from his crushing poverty, and got the golden leg of a table from his house in Olam Haba.  When he explained to his wife asked what the cost was, she insisted that Reb Chanina be mispallel that the table leg be taken back- ve'es shavasam yishma veyoshi'eim- and, in a doubled miracle, it was taken back to Olam Haba (just like the story (Taanis 23a) of Choni Ha'me'agel.)

Also, there is the Gemara (Sanhedrin 101b and 103b, and Rashi there) that Moshe asked Hashem, how can You allow so many babies to be cemented into the Egyptian walls, and Hashem said, take one of them out.  That one smuggled the Pesel Michah across the Yam suf.  Again, Moshe's tefilla was answered.  He saved that one child, but, as it turned out, at a terrible price.

After some thought, I realized that to say that tefilla is a gamble- that sometimes Hashem grants our wish even when it's bad for us- is just too absurd to accept.  (Maybe Tzadik gozer works that way.  But I just can't see tefilla working like a mechanical vending machine.  If it turns out that I'm wrong, I'm sorry just in case.)  The point of tefilla is to elicit Rachamei Hashem and to be given what's good for us.  We're not ganovim asking Hashem that our break-in be successful (Brachos 63a in the Ein Yaakov).  (When I say I might be wrong, I'm not just being flippant.  It may be that there are two kinds of tefilla- regular tefilla, and insisting in the style of Choni.  Or, it may be that tefilla is just another form of hishtadlus.  Obviously, hishtadlus to get something that's bad for you works, so maybe tefilla can do the same thing.  If this makes sense to you, G-d bless you.  That's why Hashem made chocolate and vanilla.  These ideas don't appeal to me.)  So what's pshat in Reb Chaim and Reb Shlomo Kluger?

Pshat is like we see in Birchas Kohanim: Yevarechecha, and veyishmerecah; Ya'eir, and vichuneka;  Yisa, and ve'yaseim lecha shalom.  Every bracha increases some risk, and every bracha is formulated as (A1) Hashem will give, and (A2). Hashem will guard.  Sometimes, the risk is simply that the bracha will be lost.  Sometimes, the risk is that the bracha will result in Vayishman Yeshurun Vayiv'aht.  Sometimes the risk is the jealousy the bracha engenders.  Sometimes the risk is tza'ar gidul banim.  The point is that when a person gets a bracha, his responsibilities increase as well, and he has to mindful of those responsibilities.  Theoretically, Yitzchak could have raised Eisav in a way that would have kept him from going off.  No doubt it would have been very difficult, but it was possible, as the Medrash says (beginning of Shemos, כיוצא בו (בראשית כה) ויאהב יצחק את עשו, לפיכך יצא לתרבות רעה על אשר לא רידהו) and as Rav Hirsch discusses.  If having a children would actually have been bad for Yitzchak, I don't believe that Hashem would have answered his tefillos.  The yesod of tefilla is Rachamim, to get what is good for you from the Baal Harachamim, not to get what you're asking for.  If a diabetic father begs his son for a jelly doughnut, there's no mitzva of Kibbud Av to give him the doughnut that will put him into shock (Beis Lechem Yehuda YD 240:15)  Does it make sense that such a diabetic's beautiful and sincere tefilla for a jelly doughnut would be answered, or that an addict's prayer for heroin would be answered?  Not to me it doesn't.


Another point: This Rashi, and the idea of tefilla having risks, might seem to be in direct opposition to the story of Chizkiyahu and Yeshayahu and Menashe (Melachim II 20, Brachos 10a bottom of page).  There, Chizkiahu knew that having a child would bring all kinds of tzaros and would undo all the good he had done, so he didn't want to get married.  Yeshayahu told him that the future is none of his business: he had a responsibility to father a child, and he had no right to adjust his behavior on the basis of foreknowledge.  According to that, Yitzchak was right to ask and keep asking, despite the future cost to Avraham Avinu.  Does the story of Chizkiahu contradict the lesson of Yitzchak?  No, it doesn't.  I'll leave it to you to think about.  I'm not Artscroll or the Chidushei Basra.

The moral of the story is that when we are mispallel, we should always have in mind that we only want the thing we pray for if it is ultimately for our good, that we should have siyata dishmaya to properly handle the responsibilities that come with the bracha.   I have a good friend that has decided that the reason he has remained poor is because Hashem knows that he would not handle the nisayon of wealth well.  The thing is, many of us are willing to take the chance:  "Hashem, make me fantastically wealthy, because even though I know it's risky, I'm willing to give the nisayon of wealth a try."  But the truth is, that's not how we should daven.  We should say, Hashem, give me bracha and hatzlacha, but only if it's not "yatza scharo be'hefseido."

After some thought, I decided that there's a simpler approach.  
There are two kinds of tefilla; tachana and insisting.  Tefilla le'ani ki ya'atof is an example of the former.  Choni Hame'agel is an example of the latter.  I think that the former cannot ever be counterproductive.  The latter, however, might be.  You insist?  Well, then, there you go.  Enjoy it.  The only reason I hesitate is because I don't want to say that Yitzchak's tefilla was less than perfect.

    Lehavdil elef havdalos, Oscar Wilde (1854-1900) once said:

"There are only two tragedies in life: one is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting it." 

(As for the story about the Chasam Sofer, I'm not an expert in the Chasam Sofer, but I've read enough of his Torah to have an opinion.  My opinion is that the essence of the story is no doubt true, but I don't believe it was as harsh as it was said over.  I don't believe he said that the woman should suffer yesurei gehenom because he saw something beru'ach hakodesh.  I also don't believe he went around touting his Ruach Hakodesh.  He may have said that the proper tefilla is that she should not have yesurim, but not that the birth should be faster than Hashem intended.)

Vayeira: The Akeida of Yishmael

Yishmael and Hagar: the Muslim claim that the Akeida involved Yishmael

Simple observation: the story that Hashem told Avraham to listen to Sara and to send away Hagar and Yishmael parallels the story of the akeidah, in that the son almost died, and was saved at the last moment by (21:17) ...vayikra malach Elokim el Hagar min hashamayim...., and the malach showed the spring to Hagar, which she had not seen until that moment.  Very similar to Akeidah.  It seems to me that Hagar failed a test here, and so the result for Yishmael was very different than the result for Yitzchak.  So, yes, there was an “akeida” for Yishmael.  But the people involved failed.