Yisro, Shemos 20:122, Honoring Parents, and the Ten Commandments . כיבוד אב ואם ועשרת הדברות

(Please note that I use the word 'nexting' or 'nexted'.  I strongly dislike the word 'juxtaposition', and nexted is the only alternative I like.  I also dislike the word 'neologism,' almost as ugly a word as 'blog.')

It has often been said that the Aseres HaDibros seem to be evenly divided between those that deal with our relationship to Hashem and those that focus on our relationship with our fellow man.  When Moshe Rabbeinu came down with these commandments written on the Luchos, five on each Tablet, the laws were balanced between his two hands, one hand presenting religious doctrine and the other hand human ethics.  The one Dibbur that doesn’t seem to fit is the fifth, Kibbud Av Ve’eim, which ends the first Luach, but seems to belong with the second group, the one that deals with inter-human relationships.  


Indeed, the Ramban here says that there are only four in the "relationship with Hashem" group, and Kibbud begins the six that involve our relationship with our fellow man.  He adds that kibbud is listed first in the second group because it relates to the first of the first group, Anochi.  Honor your father as you honor Me, because I am your heavenly Father, and he is your earthly father.    True, he later says that the luchos were equally divided between man/G-d and man/man, because we honor our parents because they are Hashem's partners, and just as we honor Hashem, we ought to honor His partners, so it is also man/G-d.  The connection seems tenuous, dachuk, in light of his earlier statement that Kibbud is man/man.  In any case, although the Ramban’s explanation does connect Kibbud to Anochi, it would be nice to understand why Kibbud is so closely related to the others that are on the same Luach, those that are בין אדם למקום, between man and Hashem.   

How many times did Hashem teach us the mitzvah of Kibbud Av Ve’eim?  The Kli Yakar in Parshas Kedoshim says that the mitzvah is stated three times: Yisro (Shemos 20:12), Va’eschanan (Devarim 5:16), and Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:3).  What do all the occurrences have in common?  The Kli Yakar says that they all are stated contiguously with Shemiras Shabbos.  Three times is no coincidence.  And I later realized that this occurs a fourth time as well!  The Gemara in Sanhedrin 56b talks about the mitzvos we were given in Mara: Shabbos, Kibbud Av Ve’eim, and Dinim.  There you have it again!  True, Rashi in Beshalach (Shemos 15:25) says the mitzvos of Mara were Shabbos, Dinim, and Para Adumah, but he later explains that when he said Dinim he meant Kibbud Av.  Rashi just added Para on the basis of a Medrash.  In any case, Kibbud Av is mentioned four times.  Every single time, it is contiguous with the Mitzva of Shabbos.  This nexting is undeniably intentional and clearly indicates a linkage.  

In an answer reminiscent of the Ramban, the Kli Yakar explains that every man is created by three partners, a father, a mother, and Hashem.  Shabbos is our way of honoring Hashem for creating us individually, besides the general creation of the world as a whole; similarly, Kibbud is our way of honoring our parents.   

This Kli Yakar would also explain what Kibbud is doing on the first luach.  This deep connection between Kibbud and Shabbos results in every mention of Kibbud being immediately followed by Shabbos, and because of that connection they had to be on the same luach.


But does that mean that the idea that the first luach instructs us about בין אדם למקום, man to G-d, and the second about בין אדם לחבירו, man to man, is not correct? 

A certain very Chashuveh person made an superlative observation which adds a new dimension to the Kli Yakar and ties everything together nicely.  (This person actually said it before hearing the Kli Yakar.)  She said the reason nobody understands why Kibbud is in the first group is because of a true, but imperfectly phrased assumption.  Everyone asks why kibud av is in the first five dibros, when the first group involves Man's duties to Hashem.  But it's a mistake to categorize the first group as bein adam la’makom.  The first five Dibros are bein adam le'yotzro, between man and his creator.

In short: Why is כיבוד אב ואם on the first luach, which otherwise focuses on בין אדם למקום, and not on the second, which deals with בין אדם לחבירו?  Because the first five are not בין אדם למקום, they are בין אדם ליוצרו.

After reading this, you might think the answer is obvious.  It's interesting, though, that it wasn't obvious at all until you read it.  This is another example of
ויפקח א־לקים את עיניה. — א״ר בנימין חכל בחזקת סומין עד שהקב״ה מאיר את עיניהם, שנאמר: ויפקח א־לקים את עיניה.    (ב״ר נ״ג)  ג. 

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Here's a brief summary of existing discussions about the issue of whether Kibbud Av is called  בין אדם לחבירו or בין אדם למקום.  I already mentioned the Ramban in this parsha that groups it with בין אדם לחבירו. 

Minchas Chinuch discusses this and presents two possiblities: that our obligation to others is to refrain from hurting them and to help them under the rules of Tzedaka.  The greater obligations towards our parents are בין אדם למקום.  Or, that the fact that it involves our relationship with another person means that it is automatically בין אדם לחבירו.  He says that one difference would be in a case where a person failed in his obligation of Kibbud Av.  Would he have to ask mechila from the parent, or would teshuva suffice.  Remember, it's the Minchas Chinuch, so everything he says opens a whole avenue of possibilities.

The Maharam Shick (YD 346) says that since the Gemara in Kiddushin 31b says that the obligation remains after a parents' death, it must be  בין אדם למקום.  Again, there are numerous reasons to disagree with this proof.  Even assuming the validity of the logic of his proof, many Achronim discuss whether kibbud after death is real kibbud (Noda Be'Yehuda II Even Ezer 45, R' Akiva Eiger Teshuvos 68, Lechem Mishna 6 Mamrim 11.)

Reb Boruch Ber in his Birkas Shmuel Yevamos 3 says it's a machlokes between Tosfos in the end of Eilu Metzios who holds it's בין אדם לחבירו and Tosfos Yeshanim in Kesuvos 40a who presents both possibilities. 

Yisro, Shemos 20:11. Ki Sheishes Yamim. Why Isn't Shabbos a Universal Mitzvah?

Shabbos commemorates the creation of the universe — “כי ששת ימים עשה...על כן בירך ". In Va’eschanan, Devorim 5:15, Shabbos is also associated with the exodus from Mitzrayim— “וזכרת כי עבד היית...על כן ציוך"

Reb Meir Simcha In Parshas Va’eschanan asks: Hashem's creation of the world is not specific to the Jewish people.  Since Shabbos was intended to memorialize the creation, it should be universal, observed by all mankind. Why, then, is the opposite true; not only is Shemiras Shabbos not obligatory for non-Jews, it is even prohibited to them.  A non-Jew's observance of the Shabbos through shemirah is considered transgressive; עכו'ם ששבת חייב מיתה (Sanhedrin 58b)  In Shemoneh Esrei of Friday night, we stress this exclusionary nature; "ולא הנחלתו מלכנו לעובדי פסילים וגם במנוחתו לא ישכנו ערלים."

Here are eight good answers to this question.  Please note that this is not a purely academic discussion, though there would be nothing wrong with that.  The answers highlight the nature of Shabbos, and can enhance our appreciation of its Kedusha.

{R Meir Simcha’s teretz:} when we commemorate the creation of the universe, we are saying that it was not, as Deists believe, a momentary nexus between G-d and the universe during which matter was created and the laws of nature set into motion, and then left on its own forever.  We believe that the universe has purpose and a destiny, and its Creator is constantly involved in His work through “mechadeish betuvo bechol yom tamid ma’aseh breishis’- He renews the creation every day - and hashgachas Hashem, Divine Providence. Our testimony to briyas ha’olam is very different than simple eidus of sheishes yamim of creation and a day of rest. Only we, who experienced yetzias Mitzrayim, which demonstrated Hashgachas Hashem, can testify from our own experience that the creation was purposeful and that Hashem continues to intervene and direct nature towards that divine purpose. Our national history, our personal experience of ongoing suffering and redemption, continually demonstrates Divine Providence.  A gentile shemiras Shabbos, even by Chachmei Umos Ha'Olam, would be testimony to something they never experienced and which they cannot experience, and it would be, in a sense, a falsehood. (The Sfas Emes in Parshas Bo brings from the RI'M that the Asara Ma’amaros she’bahem nivra ha’olam, the ten utterances that created the world, were transfigured to become the Eser Makkos, the ten plagues, and then the Aseres Hadibros, the Ten Commandments. If you think about it for a moment, you will realize that this approach is consistent with R Meir Simcha, in that the three events were intimately related and naturally consequential.)

{Reb Moshe’s teretz:} Reb Moshe, in the first volume of Kol Rom, on Shemos 20:2, brings the Ibn Ezra who asks that the Aseres Hadibros should have begun with briyas ha’olam and not yetzias Mitzrayim. Instead of asher hotzeisicha, it should say "Anochi Hashem Elokecha ashe barasi es ha'olam.  He answers that awareness of briyas ha’olam is not as important as awareness of continued hashgachah, similar to Reb Meir Simcha.
In Kol Rom 3 on page 103, he directly asks Reb Meir Simcha’s question, and says another answer: The word “tohu” is used in Ma’aseh breishis to describe the chaotic state of the universe before it was given any form.  The Gemara that says that the first two thousand years of the briyah are characterized as “tohu”, primordial chaos, because the Torah was only learned by individuals.  Only after Avraham, who taught the world and had three hundred talmidim, did the millennia of ‘Torah’ begin, which ended the years of ‘tohu’.  So, if a world without Torah is Tohu, it must be that without Torah, the briyah is not finished. Therefore, it is only with yetzias Mitzrayim, which was letzorech matan Torah, that the briyah was truly complete. The reason the world the is Tohu before Mattan Torah is because the creation was conditional: if you accept the Torah, the world will continue to exist, and if not, it will disintegrate.  Since the Creation was conditional, and Torah is the fulfillment of the condition, and Yetzias Mitzrayim was for the purpose of Mattan torah, eidus of the briyah has to include eidus of Yetzias Mitzrayim/matan Torah.

{The Sfas Emes’ teretz:} The Sfas Emes in Shemos 16:29 brings a Zohar which apparently answers this question, by saying that every day has a malbush but not Shabbos, which is Malchus, which only we can be zoche to because we were nizdacheich through yetzias Mitzrayim. (I only mention this because I know it means something to people who learn this aspect of Torah, even though I'm not among them.)

{Ponevezher Rov’s teretz:} The sefer Mishulchan Gavo’ah in Vayikra parshas Emor brings the following vort from the Ponevizher Rov: Shabbos is not just isur melacha. It is the chemdas hayamim, a yom machmadim. It has a kedusha like the kedusha of the mishkan, which was a separate reshus, unique on Earth. Similarly, Shabbos is a time that is unique and separate from all other time. Yisraelim are kodesh— when they create their family and lay the foundation of their home life, they do it with the words ‘mekudeshes li’. Therefore, they can enter into the holy domain of Shabbos. A gentile's unwillingness to accept the will of Hashem contradicts the idea of Shabbos. His observance of Shabbos is a trespass, a falsehood, and a negation of the Shabbos. Maybe the idea is like the din of a korban— that eating the korban is mishulchan gavoha. Only certain people are given the right to eat the korbon, and if someone who is not allowed to eats it he is ne’enash. Although every Yisroel agrees with the idea of korbanos, and is happy to participate in any way he can in the hekdesh, if a Yisroel eats kodshei kodashim, he is punished. The oneg of shevisa on Shabbos is holy, and is like a korbon, and so an akum that partakes of it is like an akum– or a zor– who eats a korban. This pshat is consistent with the rishonim that explain the chiyuv missah of an Akum sheshavas as being based on their issur of gezel, and it also adds that it is gezel of kodshim, a form of gezel that is called me’ilah.
In short, shemiras Shabbos is an act of communion with the kedusha of Shabbos and with Hashem. It is not something that is lying hefker and available to whoever wants it. The ability to participate in shemiras Shabbos is like the meat of korbanos- it is a gift from the Ribono shel Olam to people who have dedicated their lives to Avodas Hashem.

{Rav Hutner’s ha’ara:} The Pachad Yitzchak in the volume on Pesach, in Siman 27, brings that Rashi in Yevamos 48b says that the passuk of “veyinafeish ben amosecha vehageir” means that an akum that does not keep Shabbos is punished, because not-keeping Shabbos is like avodah zara! Tosfos, of course, argues and says that he is not allowed to keep Shabbos. Rav Hutner explains that Rashi must hold like those that say that a geir toshav is mechayev himself to keep the 7 mitzvos in the same manner and with the same philosophical appraoch as a Yisroel keeps those 7 mitzvos, and since for us chillul Shabbos is considered to be like avoda zora, the same applies to him. Therefore, for a geir toshov, chillul shabbos is avoda zora, and he is chayav for the issur of avoda zora. He also brings Rashi in Beitza 16 regarding the fact that goyim will be ne’enash for not keeping Shabbos.

{Harav Reuven Feinstein:}  The first luchos say zachor and mention briyas ha’olam. The second ones say shamor and mention Mitzrayim. Gentiles  should commemorate/zachor Shabbos and are certainly not ne’enash for doing so. But shamor means issur melachah. The issur melachah only applies to Yisrael, because of our status as avdei Hashem that He acquired by taking us out of Mitzrayim. The purpose of the issur melacha is to show that all our work is only to do what our master commands, and when he commands us to stop, we must stop. In fact, the issur melacha only has a associative connection with briyas ha’olom. The causative basis for it is only yetzias Mitzrayim. So an akum that is shoveis from melacha because of Shabbos is saying eidus sheker by claiming to be an eved of Hashem. He may choose to serve Hashem, but he is not His kinyan, His avadim, as we are.

{My teretz:} Shabbos is testimony that the Ribbono shel Olam created the world. A non-Jew has a different idea of what the Ribbono shel Olam is. If he were to keep Shabbos, he would be stating that his-idea-of-God created the world, which is, of course, eidus sheker. And even a geir toshav– if he understood what the Ribbono shel Olam is, he would be misgahyer. His unwillingness to be misgayeir shows that he has a false image of Hashem.  I know it's often said that all monotheist believe in the same God.  It's not true.  How do we define an individual person, how do we distinguish him from other individuals?  By saying that this one does a certain job, has a certain temper, familial relations, preferences and tastes.  Similarly, we 'identify' God by imagining His characteristics, and different religions define those characteristics so disparately that they simply do not identify the same thing at all.  (When I posted this in its original form, in January of 08, LkwdGuy pointed out that a Geir Toshav cannot keep shabbos; it is not among his seven mitzvos.  He asked, since a Geir Toshav accepts the Torah, as the Rambam says, he obviously understands Hashem as we do, so his eidus is no different than ours.  I tried to anticipate and avoid the kashe here, but it's still a good point.  But see what I bring from the Magen Avraham at the end of the post, which answers his kashe.)


{Rabbi Dr. Gary Schreiber:}  The nachash told Chavah that if one eats from the Etz hadaas they will become k'Elokim. However, rather than becoming G-dlike, Chava ate from the etz and was contaminated with zuhama. What happened to the becoming G-dlike? In addition to the etz haddaas was the Etz Hachayim. Initially Adam was not instructed to avoid the etz Hachayim. It was only because he ate from the Etz Hadaas first that he was then forbidden to partake of the Etz Hachaim. DGS suggested that the Etz Hachaim is chachmas ha'Torah and the Etz Hadaas is chochmas ha'olam. By partaking of chachmas ha'aolam prior to chachmas ha'Torah, mankind became contaminated and was no longer able to appreciate the full breadth of Torah. Had he partaken of the etz Hachayim first, he may have been allowed or instructed to partake of the etz hadaas later. By going out of sequence he erred gravely and lost his ability to become a full shutaf with HKBH.  Scientists will tell you that science is amoral. Knowledge is its own good. But this is not true in real life. We must know Torah before engaging in worldly matters so that we can maintain a Torah perspective as we approach the world. The results of unrestrained secular knowledge lead to nuclear holocaust, unrestrained genetic engineering etc. That zuhama was only removed at Matan Torah. We can become shutfim with HKBH in some sense because we have the Torah to guide us. So it is only Yiddin who can become (limited) partners with HKBH who have the full mitzvah of Shabbos.

Briefly:
1. {R Meir Simcha’s teretz:} our eidus is on hashgacha pratis and m’chadeish b’tuvo.
2. {Reb Moshe’s teretz:} before the kiyum hatnai of YM→ MT, the world was really tohu, and since Bri'as Ha'olam includes matan Torah, eidus on the Bri'ah must include eidus on Matan Torah. If you don't keep the mitzvos, you can't say eidus on Matan Torah. Eidus is not just eidus; it is participation in the kiyum ha'olam through kabbalas and kiyum hatorah.
3. {The Sfas Emes’ teretz:} who knows.
4. {Ponevezher Rov’s teretz:} Shabbos has kedushas korban, and it’s assur l’zahr.
5. {Rav Hutner’s he’arah:} Beitza 16 and Yevamos 48 that an akum is ne’enash for not keeping it.
6. {Rav Reuven Feinstein’s teretz:} they can do zachor, but shamor is only for the avadim Hashem was koneh.
7. {My excellent teretz:} their eidus is that their god created the world.
8. {R' D' GS:} Shemiras Shabbos is the key that enables us to join HKBH in creating the world, in changing the world through knowledge and action. This is only possible when one has accepted and understands the Torah, because without Torah the result of knowledge and action will be destruction and chaos.

Micha supported Rav Reuven Feinstein's answer by pointing out that the difference between Yisro and Va'eschanan, but then noted a contradiction to this approach:  He wrote,
"Similarly, "Zakhor es yom haShabbos..." (Yisro) is connected to "ki sheishes yamim asah H' es hashamayim ve'es ha'aretz", but "Shamor" (Va'Eschanan) is "vezakharta ki eved hayisa"."  On the other hand, as he points out,
""VeShameru BY es haShabbos", while "hi beini uvein benei Yisrael os hi le'olam" it returns to the theme of creation "ki sheishes yamim", NOT yetzi'as Mitzrayim."

RYGB, aka Rabbi Bechhoffer, remarked that he believes that Reb Meir Simcha says that gentiles are allowed to and indeed obligated to commemorate Shabbos, but not by resting or kiddush.  Whether Reb Meir Simcha says it or not, it certainly would explain the Rashi that Rav Hutner brings down, as noted above.

great unknown, in the new comments on the post, says that Reb Yaakov says was RYGB attributes to Reb Meir Simcha, and also that he believes there is a Medrash to that effect.  He also points us to the next to last Rashi on Chulin 5a that says האי תנא חמירא ליה שבת כעבודת כוכבים דהעובד עבודת כוכבים כופר בהקב״ה
והמחלל שבת כופר במעשיו ומעיד שקר שלא שבת הקב״ה במעשה בראשית: and since one of the seven mitzvos is Avoda Zara, it follows that they, too, have to somehow commemorate Shabbos.  Not a perfect proof, because without a chiyuv of zachor it could be that merely believing it is enough.  After all, Zechiras Amalek we're yotzei with one time a year.   But the idea of the proof certainly underlies what Reb Reuven/the alleged Reb Meir Simcha/the alleged Medrash say(s).

Here's an extra "requires some thought" part of this dvar torah:
The Magen Avraham 304:24 (cited with approval by the Biur Halacha at the end of that siman) says that a Geir Toshav can be mekabel Shabbos along with other mitzvos; he can accept upon himself whichever mitzvos he chooses, up to 612 mitzvos. He will then remain a ger toshav, but he will be obligated to fulfill the mitzvos he accepted, including Shabbos.
Do all of the teirutzim work with the Magen Avraham?  Does it address LkwdGuy's point?

Just as a minor observation: we have this rule of Akum she'shavas, that Shabbos is exclusively meant to be observed by the Jews, but the reality is that the idea of a day of rest and spirituality is very popular.  The Christians, despite delisting ninety nine percent of the mitzvos, including Bris Milah, kept Shabbos, although they brazenly changed it to Sunday.  The Muslims kept it, albeit repackaged.  Even the Buddhists have their Shabbos concept.  There seems to be something so fundamental about Shabbos, so consonant with human spirituality, that everyone, even those that disparage the mitzvos of the Torah, has to adopt and adapt the concept for their own religions.

Beshalach, Shemos 17:16. Amalek and Marriage

This is from the translation I did for Artscroll/Mesorah of Reb Moshe's journal, with some changes and an addition.

 וַיֹּאמֶר כִּי יָד עַל כֵּס קה מִלְחָמָה לַה' בַּעֲמָלֵק מִדֹּר דֹּר     

And He said, the hand is on G-d's throne: G-d will be at war with Amalek for all generations. 

The verse uses an abbreviated form of the Hebrew word for throne, כֵּס, and the two letter Name of Hashem, קה, rather than the full name.  Rashi explains that the abbreviated forms indicate that Hashems' Name and Throne are diminished so long as Amalek exists.  

ומהו כס, ולא נאמר כסא, ואף השם נחלק לחציו? נשבע הקב"ה שאין שמו שלם ואין כסאו שלם עד שימחה שמו של עמלק כולו, וכשימחה שמו יהיה השם שלם והכסא שלם

With this in mind, the Gemara in Sotah (17a) seems, at first, perplexing.  The Gemara says that Hashem placed the letter yud in the Hebrew word for "man" איש and the letter hei in the Hebrew word for 'woman' אשה so that the Name of Hashem (Yud and Hei) would be formed upon their union in marriage.  If Hashem desired that the union of husband and wife be graced with His Name, why would He choose the incomplete Two-Letter Name as the signature of His Presence?  

The answer is that while it is true that Hashem graces each Jewish couple with His Name, He provides only a foundation, upon which the couple must build a true Jewish home.  Hashem's contribution, while essential, is only a beginning.  It is only the good works of the couple that can complete the Name that is present in their home.  If they succeed in doing so, then true blessing will surely follow, as the passuk states in Shemos 20:21, בְּכָל-הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר אַזְכִּיר אֶת-שְׁמִי אָבוֹא אֵלֶיךָ וּבֵרַכְתִּיךָ.  wherever I mention My Name, I shall come to you and bless you.  (here ends the slightly modified translation of Reb Moshe's dvar torah.)

A friend pointed out that the Name of G-d that is formed by the union of husband and wife is not a product of the letters aleph and shin, which they have in common.  It is a product of the letters yud and hei, the letters which they do not have in common.  Hashra'as Hashechina, the presence of the Shechina in a Jewish home, stems from harmony- the dynamic harmonizing of their differing emotions and thought processes and perspectives.  As the Aruch Hashulchan says in his introduction to his sefer (found in the beginning of Choshen Mishpat, which was the first volume that he published of the set.)

תפארת השיר כשהקולות משונים זה מזה וזהו עיקר הנעימות

The splendor of music is when the voices are different from each other, and that is the essence of its beauty.

Now, let's think about this a little more. 

What's the point of Reb Moshe's vort?

Does it really say anything at all?  Let's see.  It says that a nice peaceful house is good, but it's only a beginning, that the people need to do more, that Avodas Hashem never ends, that you have to build on a good foundation.  Is there any insight here, anything here at all that we didn't know?  Is it, chas veshalom, a platitude?

No, Reb Moshe never said platitudes.  His mind constantly worked on many levels, and careful attention to what he wrote and said revealed some of that thought process.  Here, Reb Moshe chose to emphasize the positive aspect of his observation - that if a person builds on the gift Hashem granted, then bracha will surely come to the house.  But he is teaching another implicit lesson here, and it's not a comfortable one.   The lesson is that a person who fails to take advantage of an opportunity, a person who rests on his laurels, a person who has achieved but can achieve more and fails to do so because he is lazy, that man is the brother of Amalek.  Whether passively diminishing by failing to do Hashem's work, or actively diminishing by doing wicked things - the result is the same.  This person is guilty of the same diminution of the Name of G-d as Amalek.  And this concept is expressed in Mishlei 18:9:

גַּם מִתְרַפֶּה בִמְלַאכְתּוֹ אָח הוּא לְבַעַל מַשְׁחִית

He, too, who is slack (weak) in his work is brother to the destroyer.

 As the Ramchal says in the Mesillas Yesharim on this passuk,

כי הנה העצל, אף על פי שאינו עושה רע בקום עשה, הנה הוא מביא את הרעה עליו בשב ואל תעש שלו. ואמר (שם יח, ט): "גם מתרפה במלאכתו אח הוא לבעל משחית" כי אף על פי שאינו המשחית העושה את הרעה בידיו, לא תחשב שהוא רחוק ממנו, אלא אחיו הוא ובן גילו הוא.

The lazy man, though not actively evil, produces evil through his very inactivity. We read further (Proverbs 18:9), "Also he who slackens in his work is a brother to the Destroyer." Though he is not the Destroyer who commits the evil with his own hands, let him not think that he is far-removed from him - he is his blood-brother.  (R' Aryeh Kaplan's translation)

So Reb Moshe's vort, properly understood, has a plangent resonance: A couple might say, our home is so pleasant and holy, why look outwards?  Why get involved in things outside of the house?  A person might say, "Look what I've achieved!  I've accomplished enough, I can relax, let others do the work."  These people need to know who is really talking.  That is the Amalek in our subconscious mind talking.  When you start thinking that way, remember that the mitzva of Mechiyas Amalek, the mitzva of restoring the Name and the Throne of Hashem, doesn't always involve taking a weapon in hand against 'the other'.

Bo, Shemos 12:46. The Korban Pesach and Good Manners

12:46.  V’etzem lo sishbe’ru bo.  The Chinuch in #16 has a long discussion ahl derech hamussar here about how mitzvos should make you a better person.  Specific to this mitzvah, he says that “It is not dignified for royalty and the mentors of mankind to grind bones and break them like dogs and it is not fitting to do so for anyone other than the poorest of the people and the starving.”  


R Shmuel Rozovsky of Ponevezh (brought in the Itturei Torah) stressed the importance of good manners, and coarsening effect of its opposite.  He brings that Reb Isser Zalman brought a group of talmidim to the Alter to hear divrei mussar and to talk in learning, and afterwards the Alter said nice things about all but one of them.  He told Reb Isser Zalman that nothing would come of that boy.  R’ Isser Zalman was surprised, because davkeh that boy was an illui.  The Alter told him that some sugar spilled on the table, and that boy licked his finger and stuck it into the sugar and put his finger into his mouth (in the presence of the Alter.)  A boy that can do that has no future in dvarim shebikdushah.  The story goes on to say that the illuisheh bochur did become the rav of a city, but for some reason he had to leave the position, and he became a lawyer, and eventually went to jail for fraud.


It’s a nice story and nice mussar, but I wonder how true it is.  A man comes to the Olam Ha'emes after 120, and they do the checklist.  "Shomer mitzvos, 100%; kovei’a ittim, yes, well done!; baal chesed, oh yes indeed; and an honest businessman to boot.  But oy, your manners were terrible.  Go to Hell.”  This doesn’t seem reasonable to me.  Also, remember the Gemara in Kiddushin 71b that says that hamashtin mayim arum lifnei mitaso deserves to go into galus, and Rav Avahu snorted and said that doesn't make any sense- just because he's a boor doesn't mean he deserves to go into galus.  Certain oriental societies have exquisite manners ("when you first meet a business contact, bow slightly and present your card with both hands...") , and those same fine people will vivisect you without qualms.  I've always felt that highly refined social behaviors are a warning flag of a hidden and just-barely-latent hostility.  I personally know some people who would make Emily Post proud and who wouldn't offer you a job if you were starving- a warm smile and a sympathetic back rub, maybe, but not a job- and others who would do anything to help you but whose manners would make a hungry man lose his appetite.


But the fact remains that even though a mashtin lifnei mitaso might not deserve galus, Hashem does hate him, as the Gemara in Nidda 17a says.  And, of course, there is an entire masechta of braisos called Derech Eretz, which sets forth rules of behavior, such as who should eat first, not to gulp your drinks (although I have to admit that at a Renaissance Faire I attended on a very hot day, the person who drew me a beer looked away for a few seconds to get my change and saw my empty twenty two ounce flagon and thought she had forgotten to fill it; I think the rules are different at Renaissance Fairs), and so on.  So there you have it.  Chazal are telling us that a concern for the feelings of your fellow man even in such epicene concerns as table manners, and dignified behavior- even when one is alone- are associated with spiritual refinement, and that boorishness is inconsistent with spirituality.  Irrespective of what pshat is, this is the reason the Tiferes Yisrael learns that דרך ארץ in the Mishna in the third perek of Avos means nimusim and mussar, and that it is listed among the essentials of a fully realized Jewish life:

 רבי אלעזר בן עזריה אומר, אם אין תורה, אין דרך ארץ; אם אין דרך ארץ, אין תורה.  אם אין חכמה, אין יראה; אם אין יראה, אין חכמה.  אם אין דעת, אין בינה; אם אין בינה, אין דעת.  אם אין קמח, אין תורה; אם אין תורה, אין קמח.

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Bo, Shemos 12:13. Acharon- Last or Next. The Mutability of Prophecy

This is a classic vort that every Jewish boy and girl should know.  In case you missed it, or you heard it but don't know who said it, here it is.  For the essence of the vort, all you need to read are the paragraphs marked with ¶, which are the first two and last two of the following paragraphs.  (Imperfect character recognition software resulted in some typos.  If I have time I'll correct it, but it's readable as it is.  If it annoys you, I'll give you my password and you can fix it yourself.)

¶ 1 The Navi said in Chagai 2:9 that גדול יהיה כבוד הבית הזה האחרון מן הראשון,  the glory of this Temple, the Acharon, will be greater than that of the first.  "Although the First Temple has been destroyed, another will be built, and it will be greater than the first."  The Temple he is prophesying is the Second Temple, as the Gemara in Bava Basra 3a says:   The "greater glory" of the Second Temple was only temporal, in that it was taller and lasted longer than the first.

¶ 2  Many, many people have asked that the term אחרון seems terminal; we generally assume that אחרון means "the last one,"  and since that Temple was ultimately destroyed, Chagai's prophecy would seem to dash our hope for a third and final Beis Hamikdash.

This question first appears in the Zohar פי פנחס דף רכא.:

  שאל גוי אחד את  ר ׳ אליעזר אתם אומרים שיהיה לכם מקדש שלישי הא

כתיב בבית שנ י [חגי ב׳, ט׳] גדול יהיה כבוד הבית הזה האחרון מן הראשון, א״כ אחרון משמע שאין אחריו
כלום, ותירץ לתלמידיו אחרון בידי אדם אבל מקדש שלישי יהיה בידי שמים כמו שנאמר [זכריה בי, ט/] ואני אהיה לה נאם ה׳ חומת אש סביב

It's worth knowing that The Beis Halevi in Toldos says a teretz (here paraphrased) along the same lines as the Zohar:

שני הבתים הראשונים היו נבנים כדי שיהיו מוכנים על ידיהם לזכות להשליש, שיהיה קיים לעד, דזה עיקר
בית המקדש הניתן לישראל שיבב״א, והבתים הראשונים הם נקראים מוקדמים, שהם רק הכנה לעיקר הבית שהוא השלישי. נמצא דהבית השני הוא אחרון למוקדמים, וזה שאמר הכתוב גדל יהיה הבית הזה חאחרון למוקדמים

So according to the Zohar's teretz and the Beis Halevi's teretz, אחרון does mean the last one, but it was the last of its kind.  The first two Temples were made by the human hand, and the third will be of divine fire and categorically different.

After the Zohar, the next person that addressed the question is Rashba, in his Teshuvos שו״ת ח״ד סימן קפ״ז:

 חזר ובא עלי מצד אחר ואמר,
הנה הכתוב אומר שאין בית אחר הבית השני, שכן כתוב: ״גדול יהיה כבוד הבית הזה האחרון מן הראשון״. הנה שקראו אחרון׳ ואם יש אחר לאחריו׳ לא יקרא לזה אחרון. אמרתי לא קראו אחרון אלא בהצטרף אל הראשון, וכמוהו ״וישם
את השפחות ואת ילדיהן ראשונה, ואת לאה וילדיה אחרונים, ואת רחל ואת יוסף אחרונים/
הנה קראה ללאה וילדיה אחרונים אע״פ שרחל ויוסף אחרונים להם, אלא שקראם אחרונים
״בהצטרף אל השפחות וילדיהן״. אמר: זה בדיבור בני אדם שאינם יודעים ולא בידם האיחור,
אבל כדברי הנביא שיודע האמת לא יבא. אמרתי :בא אפילו במה שיאמר לנביא מפי הגבורה׳ שכן
כתוב במה שאמר הוא יתעלה למשה ,׳והיה אם לא יאמינו ולא ישמעו לקול האות הראשון והאמינו
לקול האות האחרון, והיה אם לא יאמינו גם לשני אותות האלה ולקחת גם ממימי היאור״, זעה
שקרא לאות השני אחרון אע״פ שבא אחריו אות המים׳ עכ״ל

According to the Rashba, Acharon doesn't mean "the last" when it follows the word "Rishon."  In that case, it simply means "the one that follows."

The Tosfos Yomtov in Dmai 7:3 says that Acharon can mean "the next" even when it does not say Rishon, but most achronim, including the Netziv in his introduction to the Haamek Davar, disagree.  The Rashba also seems to contradict the TY'T.

The Gemara in Nazir 21a addresses the question as well, because the Mishna on the previous daf says the following:  If "Person A" verbally promises to become a nazir, and Person B says "And I," and Person C says "And I," they are all viewed as having enunciated the formula that makes a person a nazir.  However, the status of the latter people depends on that of the prior.  So, the Mishna says, if A annulled his status of Nazir, the verbal promise he made is rendered retroactively meaningless, so the people who followed and said "And I" are also released from being Nazirs.  If the Acharon person annuls his promise, he alone is released, but the others are unaffected.  Amoraim argue in the Gemara about whether the last person is dependent on the first (C means "I am like A") or on the one that immediately preceded him (C means "I am like B.")  The machlokes would be relevant where there are A B and C, and B annulled his Nezirus.  If C is dependent on B, C is also annulled.  If, however, C is dependent on A's declaration, then C remains a Nazir, because A's declaration has not been voided.   The Gemara attempts to prove that C is dependent on B by showing that the Mishna only said that the annulment of the Acharon affects no one else, which implies that an annulment by B would affect others, namely, C.  The Gemara rejects the proof; it could be that when the Mishna says that annulment by the Acharon affects no one else, it means annulment by B.  Why, the Gemara asks, would we call B the Acharon?  Because, the Gemara answers, when you say Rishon, the one that follows is called Acharon, even if there are others that follow.  In other words, Acharon means "later," or "the next", and it does not have to mean "the last," but only where the word Rishon was used.  (This is pointed out by the Rashash there in Nazir.)

The question was thoroughly explored in the Sdei Chemed,  שדי חמד ז״ל בפאת השדה מערכת א׳ אות ס״ו .

The Sdei Chemed also brings a nice idea from Rav RNY Falagi in his Avos Harosh (p. 87a), who connects this to the Gemara in Brachos 61a.  The Gemara there says "first the Nachash was cursed, "Ul'be'sof" Chavah, "Ul'be'sof" Adam.  Since sof and acharon are synonymous, it appears that Acharon/Sof does not have to mean "final," but rather "next."

This can also be seen in  דברים כט כא where it says  הדור חאחרון בניבם אשר יקומו מאחריכם 
There, too, Acharon means "those that follow."

I think that the the best explanation of the passuk in Chagai (and the pesukim in Shemos where Hashem told Moshe about the Os Ha'acharon) is that of the Malbim in Chagai:

 ״ גדול יהיה כבוד הבית הזה האחרון מן הראשון״, כי יהיה הוא הבית האחרון שלא יחרב עוד, ״ובמקום הזה אתן שלום״, ולא יהיה ביניכם שנאת חנם שהוא היה באמת הגורם לחורבן בית שני, לפי זה כל מאמר
זה הוא תנאי, אם יבא עוד רוח אחת, והוא אם יעשו את הדבר אשר כרת עמם בצאתם ממצרים,
אז יהיה הוא הבית האחרון שאין אחריו בית, ויהיה גדול מן הראשון, וכשלא נתקיים התנאי כי
לא שמרו ברית לא היה שלום במקום, כי נתרבו הפריצים והכתות ושנאת חנם, לא נתקיים
היעוד אז, עד שיבנה הבית האחרון בקץ האחרון שאז יתקיימו היעודים האלה,

The point of the Malbim is that words in Tanach, and the words of Nevu'ah, intentionally encompass a multiplicity of meanings.  When Chaggai described the Bayis Sheni as the Acharon, the word held several possible meanings, ranging from benign to malign.  One of those several meanings would definitely come true (like, among many other examples, the story of Rabbah bar Rav Huna chair in Gittin 35).  Which of the meanings will come true- that depends on our behavior.  Chaggai was telling Klal Yisrael that if they will be worthy, the Second Temple would be the Acharon/Ultimate.  If they will be unworthy, then it would be the Acharon/Next.

(It has been said that the Malbim's approach depreciates (see note) the entire idea of nevuah, because it makes nevuah meaningless- saying that many possible outcomes can be read into the nevuah makes it tentative and ambiguous, which means it's not a prediction at all- "I predict that something will happen tomorrow."  I don't think that's a criticism, because the Navi is saying something absolute- that a Bayis will soon be built.  The vagueness is only regarding the future of the Bayis.  It's not like the Yarum Roshcha of the dreams Yosef interpreted.  As pointed out by g in the comments, this is a universally accepted concept, first seen when we were forewarned of four hundred years of exile and servitude at the Bris Bein Habesarim, but the counting commenced long before they went to Mitzrayim, so the literal avdus only lasted two hundred and ten years.  Also, by Yonah and Ninveh, נהפכת was a threat that meant "turned upside down," i.e., physical upheaval.  But after they did teshuva, it turned out to mean spiritual upheaval, i.e., rebirth.  But please see this post on Parshas Bo where I bring the Beis Halevi- and, oddly, the Malbim- that discuss this point in depth, and which argues that while Nevua may be protean as to the ultimate fact, it is specific as to intent, )

¶ 3  The reason all this is here, in this week's parsha, is because of a passuk in this parsha - Shemos 12:13,  וְהָיָה הַדָּם לָכֶם לְאֹת עַל הַבָּתִּים    Many achronim have used this passuk to explain the passuk in Chagai.

¶ 4   Two weeks ago, In parshas Shemos, we read about the miracles Hashem gave Moshe to show Bnei Yisrael.  First, (4:3) there was the miracle of the staff that turned into a snake.  Then Hashem gave Moshe another miracle for a sign, which was Moshe's hand becoming leprous and being healed (4:6).  Hashem said (4:8) that if the Bnei Yisrael don't believe the first miracle, the snake, then they will believe the "Os Ha'acharon," the sign of the leprosy. Afterwards (4:9), Hashem said that if Bnei Yisrael don't believe either of the miracles, there was a third one, turning a cup of water into blood.  So it is evident that when Hashem called the second of the three miracles the "Acharon," it only meant "the next one," not the final one.  In this week's parsha, Hashem told the Bnei Yisrael to put blood from the Korban Pesach on their doorposts; the passuk says that the blood will be a sign on the houses.  Literally, this means that the blood of the korban will designate and make safe the Jewish dwellings.  But in the context of what we've been discussing, it can be understood to mean that the blood, the third of the three signs Hashem gave Moshe, is proof that there will be a third Beis Hamikdash, because there, the word Acharaon only meant "next" and not "final," so in Chagai also, although the second Bayis is called "Acharon," it only means "the second one", because there will be a third.  The blood will be a sign regarding the houses, i.e., the Temples.

 וְהָיָה הַדָּם לָכֶם לְאֹת עַל הַבָּתִּים

Note: 
I found that the Malbim's idea is found in Rashi in Yechezkel 43:10-11 and 43:14-15.

מצאתי, ראויה היתה ביאה שנייה של עזרא כביאה ראשונה של יהושע לבא בזרוע ובנס כדדרשינן עד יעבור ובנין זה מאז היה ראוי להם כשעלו מן הגולה לגאולת עולם אלא שגר' החטא שלא הית' תשובתם הוגנת על מנת שלא לחטוא ויצאו ברשות כורש ובנו לעצמן ויש אומרים בבבל נכשלו בנכריות 

Rashi, in turn, is based on the Gemara in Brachos 4a.



Surgeon General's Warning: 
This is a vort.   It is not meant as a pshat, or a remez, or a drush, or a sod.  It's just a vort, what we call  שעשוע בדברי תורה, in the sense of לולא תורתך שעשועי  .  It has been said by many people.  It's impossible to know who said it first, but none of them meant it to be interpretive.  



Note:

I said that some people feel the the Malbim's approach depreciates nevuah.  Some people might feel that the correct word is deprecate, not depreciate, and it's true that these words are in flux.  In my usage, deprecate is to show disapproval, and depreciate is to belittle, and the correct word here is depreciate.

Va'eira 6:7, Hamotzi and A Cool Hetter

The essential point of this post comprises six paragraphs.  They are all related, but you have to be patient.

The passuk says הַמּוֹצִיא אֶתְכֶם מִתַּחַת סִבְלוֹת מִצְרָיִם, who will take you from the burdens of Mitzrayim.   Since Hashem is talking to Moshe long before they left, the simple meaning of the passuk is that hamotzi is "who is going to take you out."  If so, then, הַמּוֹצִיא would be the wrong word to use in the bracha of Hamotzi, which thanks Hashem for the bread we are eating which He brought forth from the ground, not what He will do in the future.  Nonetheless, the Gemara in Brachos 38a/b says that lehalacha we do say Hamotzi and not Motzi, and we interpret our verse to mean "I will do something that will inspire future generations to remember that I took them out of Mitzrayim."

The gemara there says that someone told Reb Zeira that Reb Z'vid's son was a talmid chacham and an expert in brachos.  Reb Zeira said "send him to me, and I'll decide if he's a talmid chacham."  When the young man came, Reb Zeira gave him bread and told to to eat it.  He said Motzi, not Hamotzi.  Reb Zeira said, "this person you call a baki in brachos?  Everyone knows that Motzi is a good nusach.  If he were a talmid chacham, he should have said Hamotzi, which would be a chiddush in halacha and an interesting pshat in the passuk in Va'eira."  Reb Moshe points out, (and I'm pretty sure he was quoting a Rosh which I can't remember at the moment,) that evidently it was expected that a talmid chacham, in a new place, would choose a non-standard novel nusach of Hamotzi just so that he would have the opportunity to say a shiur and show that he knew how to learn.

It is assur to talk or delay unnecessarily between netilas yadayim and hamotzi.  But the first Magen Avraham in OC 166 brings an opinion (Rabbeinu Tam) that on Shabbos, this problem is not as serious.  The issur hefsek before hamotzi is not like hefsek in davening, where the problem is zilzul, disrespect of the tefilla.  Here, the problem is that you might get involved in something else and distracted, and end up not eating at all.  On Shabbos, when you have a mitzva to eat, and there's a festive table set, there is no such concern, so go ahead and talk.  Actually, he's talking about making kiddush or havdalah before hamotzi, but (as is clear in the Aruch Hashulchan there) the logic pertains just as well to any talking.  We don't hold like that, though, le'halacha.

AND....  It so happens that the Shlah in the first volume toward the end of Kedusha brings from Tshuvos Maharshal that you can talk Divrei Torah between netillas yadayim and hamotzi because you are allowed to interrupt to talk about things that are needed for the meal, and divrei torah are certainly needed at the meal, as Reb Chanina ben Tradyon and Rebbi Shimon say in Avos 3:3-4

רבי חנניא בן תרדיון אומר, שנים שיושבין ואין ביניהן דברי תורה, הרי זה מושב לצים. אבל שנים שיושבין ויש ביניהם דברי תורה, שכינה שרויה ביניהם

רבי שמעון אומר, שלשה שאכלו על שלחן אחד ולא אמרו עליו דברי תורה, כאלו אכלו מזבחי מתים  אבל שלשה שאכלו על שלחן אחד ואמרו עליו דברי תורה, כאלו אכלו משלחנו של מקום ברוך הוא

But no, we don't hold like the Shlah, though, le'halacha.

But what about combining the two heteirim?  If someone wants to talk in learning before hamotzi on Shabbos, he has two svaros to be meikil- the Rabbeinu Tam/Magen Avraham and the Tshuvos Maharshal/Shlah.  Would such a thing be a lechatchila le'halacha? No.  Is it worth doing it just for the shock and awe, and then tell people why you did it, just as Rav Zeira expected Reb Zevid's son to do?  Definitely.  

And it would be perfect for this week's parsha.  Wash, say ahl netilas yadayim, and say a dvar torah before hamotzi.  The Dvar Torah would be to explain that the nusach of Hamotzi is connected to this week's parsha, but at one time, most people said Motzi, not Hamotzi; but Reb Zeira held that a talmid chacham should use the non-standard so he could say a shiur about why he did so and the pshat in the passuk in Va'eira.  So you see that it's good to be somech on daas yachid in the bracha of Hamotzi in order to show a chiddush in Torah.  Normally, we're not allowed to talk before hamotzi, but we are going to follow Reb Zeira's advice and do so because here, there are two reasons why we can be meikil: Shabbos, according to the Magen Avraham/Rabbeinu Tam, and for divrei torah, according to the Shlah/Mahrshal.  Presto!  (For those that feel that I am playing fast and loose with the halacha, please do two things: first, please realize that we're not talking about hilchos mikvaos here; and second, see the second picture in the column on the right.)


Speaking of the dinim of hefsek and this week's parsha:  There's a sefer from the Dubner Maggid on the parshios.  In this week's parsha, he connects Yetzias Mitzrayim to the Rama's din in 119.  The Rama in 119 says that there's less of a problem of smichas geula l'tfila on Shabbos.  Normally, the requirement that we not interrupt is based on the psukim of ya'ancha next to Hashem sfasai tiftach, and since on Shabbos it's not a time of "tefilla to be saved from yom tzara", the psukim don't apply.  The Magid says that on Shabbos we daven for simcha, not to be saved from suffering, and that's pshat in not having a din of tefilla of yom tzara.

So while I wouldn't recommend relying on the Rama regarding geula/tefilla, I do think there's a special mitzva to say a dvar Torah between Netilas Yadayim and Hamotzi on Friday night of Parshas Va'eira. 
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Back from Eretz Yisrael

I've just returned from a trip to Israel for a grandchild's bris.  Baruch she'hechiyanu.  The trip was, of course, wonderful.  All the inconveniences of travel in the winter in economy come to nothing in comparison to the great joy of attending the bris.

One of the issues of air travel is how one can wash his hands for eating bread.  For one thing, you need a keli for netillas yadayim of bread: there are those that say that a disposable kli is no good (see Sharei HaBracha 2:3, but see Teshuvos Igros Moshe OC III 39 who is mattir, and Halacha Berura 159-3).  But the main problem is that the bathroom on a plane might have the halacha of a beis hakisei, which means you can't wash there.  On the contrary, walking in there mandates washing one's hands after walking out.  So how do you wash on a plane?  Some say to dry your hands outside the bathroom, since the drying is the more important part of the process.  This does not appeal to me at all.  Even if the drying is important, that doesn't make it like a netilla.  Some say it's not a problem at all.  Others say you should wash in the galley.  There is no generally accepted halacha on this matter.  For example, here's what the OU says:

What does one do on an airplane? If possible, netilas yadayim should be performed in the galley. If, this is not feasible, contemporary poskim (note 12) have ruled that netilas yadayim may be performed in a bathroom, when no other options are available. Drying of the hands and recitation of the brochah should be done outside the bathroom.


Note 12:
Minchas Yitzchok, wI. 1, #60, IInd wi. 4, #/36, and Yabiya Omer, vol. 3, #1.

On the other hand, here is what the Koph K says:

Many poskim say that the bathroom on an airplane does not have the same status as a regular bathroom in a house or office. Therefore, one may wash his hands for a meal there. (note 17)  Similarly, one who went into the bathroom to get something (and did not use the facilities) would not be required to wash his hands upon exiting the bathroom. (note 18)



Note 17:
Maharam Brisk 1:117, Eretz Tzvi 1:110-111, Masef Lechul Hamachanus 4:96, Chelkes Yaakov 1:205, see 2:174, Minchas Yitzchok 1:60, 4:36, Darchei Chaim V’sholom 91;page 35, Be’er Mordechai 1:1, Be’er Moshe kuntres electric 7:114:8, Rivevos Ephraim 2:6, Halichos Shlomo Tefilla 20:24, Ohr L’tzyion 2:1:10, Sheiros Yosef 1:4:20, Minchas Gidiyon 2:9:page 175:footnote 22, V’ihiy B’nsoa 1:10:page 6:footnote 17, V’yan Yosef 1:2, Sharei Ha’beracha 1:foootntoe 112. The V’lechticha B’derech 8:2:footnote 68 says one should cover the seat beforehand. Some say the bathroom on an airplane has the same dinim as the bathroom in one’s house
Note 18:
Ohr L’tzyion 2:1:10, see Nekius V’kovod B’tefilla page 14:14

So the poskim at the OU advise to view the airplane facilities as more chamur than a bathroom in a house, and the Koph K advise the opposite.  I tend toward the OU's opinion.  To avoid the entire issue, here's what I suggest.


Eat less than a kezayis within kdei achilas pras, and you won't have to wash at all.

In other words: The din of washing for bread is associated with a concern of imparting tuma to the bread.  Bread smaller than a certain volume is not susceptible to Tumah.  Therefore, there is no requirement to wash before eating such bread.  Practically speaking, the amount is a kezayis, and only if eaten within kedei achilas pras.  The Mishna Berura says (158 SK 10) that lechatchila, one should wash without a bracha.  The Aruch Hashulchan says (158:3) that even lechatchila you can eat without washing.  It's funny, though, that the Aruch Hashulchan paskens that way partly because it seems to him that the oilem does that way.  What a different oilem he had: in our day, not one in fifty knows about the difference between a kezayis and less than a kezayis for Netilas Yadayim.

So: practically, this is how it goes.  Set aside less than a kezayis.  The definition of kezayis should be easy to remember from the seder.  Eat it, and wait a ke'dei achilas pras.  How long is ke'dei achilas pras?  Reb Moshe holds that nine minutes should be used for Yom Kippur because of the terrible chumra of Yom Kippur, but he holds that the shiur is most likely three minutes.  So it's up to you.  I would say three minutes is fine for the derabanan of netillas Yadayim.  My father in law says you should wait the entire nine.  On the other hand, you have Rabbi Heineman's shittah, that a kezayis is the size of a golf ball, and achilas pras is two minutes.

One might argue that eating other foods along with the bread extends the time of kedei achilas pras, or is added to the bread to be called a kezayis.  But Reb Moshe holds, as is assumed in my suggestion, that kedei achilas pras is for the bread alone, irrespective of what is eaten along with it.

I know that not every halacha should be publicized.  For example, if your shul gets to mussaf at a time that you can already daven mincha, the halacha is that you should daven mincha first and then mussaf, but Rabanim do not tell people to do that, because it will confuse and perplex them, since they're not familiar with the dinim of tadir and so forth.  Here too, maybe it's not good to tell people that you don't have to wash for less than a kezayis, because it will diminish the importance of netillas yadayim.  Baruch hashem the people I have to worry about stopped reading this a long time ago.

On the subject of eating, I would like to share a story from my time in Israel, in the style of Damon Runyon.

At two thirty in the morning, I find myself awake due to my wife looking for her antacids.  Although she is trying to be quiet, I am not sleeping soundly anyway.  We do not find the antacids, and as I know how unpleasant an acid stomach is, I gallantly insist, over her strenuous protest, that I go out to a 24 hour store not far from the hotel and get some Rolaids or whatever they have there.  So, at three in the morning I am standing in the SOS 24 on George Washington off Keren Hayesod.  I look and look, but no luck.  Actually, there was some luck, but it is only the kind you wish upon your parole officer.  The clerk speaks almost no English.  You have to visualize this: it is chilly, and he is behind the counter, half asleep, possibly stoned, with a Russian winter aviator's hat with flaps hanging down over his ears.  I try to explain what I want with what I am thinking is my perfectly adequate Hebrew.  But how do you say antacid pills in Hebrew?  So I start to slowly and clearly explain to this befuddled clerk that I am in need of something נגד חמצן .  I choose this word because I recall that acid, in Hebrew, is חמצן.  He is looking at me oddly, and I see that I have to make myself clearer, so I say I need pills.   I need פילים נגד חמצן.  It is clear that I am not getting through, so I try again- I need- not פילים... I need טילים! I need  טילים נגד חמצן!  This does not clear things up at all.  So I give up and go to another 24 hour store, and I strike out again, so I just buy apple sauce and cottage cheese, which helps a little.  I later realize that I am expending a great deal of energy trying to explain to the poor clerk that I want anti-oxygen elephants.  Or, if not elephants, then missiles.  Anti-oxygen missiles.  Or, you might say, anti-aircraft missiles.  For my wife's stomach.

For future reference, pills are כדורים  and acid is חומצה.  Is it my fault that oxygen and acid are so close?

Anyway, here's a picture of two of the characters from this week's post:

                    

Separately, here are the older divrei torah on parshas Shemos.  Some are very good.