Tazria, Vayikra 12:3. Bris Mila on the Eigth Day

The Taz (YD 265 SK 13) brings a Medrash that says the reason the Bris Mila is on the eighth day, and the reason one cannot bring an animal sacrifice until eight days after it is born, is that Hashem says "Do not come before me until you have appeared before/seen My Matron."  The "matron" here refers to Shabbos.  The Torah requires the eight day wait to ensure that at least one Shabbos will have passed before the special day.  At my oldest son's bris, Reb Moshe (as partially cited in Kol Rom III p. 395) connected this to the requirement that Aharon and his sons, at their original investiture in the Mishkan,  had seven days of Miluim and could only do the avoda on the eighth day.  Similarly, the Kohen Gadol is relocated from his home to a chamber on the Har Habayis for seven days before Yom Kippur.

What does this Medrash teach us?

1.  Only Hashem can allow us to serve Him, and He does so by stating the manner and granting us the means of doing so. Reb Moshe said that we learn two things: that we cannot invent novel means of serving Hashem.  Hashem can only be served in a manner that He expressly sanctions.  Anything else is "Sh'chutei Chutz," as if we brought a sacrifice outside the Beis Hamikdash, which is a cardinal sin.  The second thing is that we can only approach Hashem after we have been imbued with a special kedusha, and it is only only after going through  Shabbos that is one changed by a kedusha that makes avodas Hashem possible.

2.  Bris Mila is a form of Korban.  That Bris Mila shares certain characteristics of a sacrifice.  Indeed, the Abarbanel says that the bris is a type of Korban.  The reason it is done lechatchila on the eighth day and not later is because every korban needs to be without blemish, physically perfect.  But this korban has less to do with the physical as it does with the spiritual.  Thus, mila should be done on a neshama that is spiritually perfect.  This is best done as soon as possible after birth, before the child has a chance to do what people are wont to do.  Seize the moment when the neshama is still perfect.

3(a)1.  Kedusha that leaves a residual effect elevates us; Kedusha that does not leave a residual effect degrades us.  What does Tumah come from?  Or rather, what brings about Tumah?  The Zohar (see Shem MiShmuel Tazria, years '74-5) says that all Tumah comes from the departure of Kedusha.  The way the Baal Ha'akeida (brought in Malbim "Torah Ohr" beginning of Chukas) puts it is so:

אחר שכל דבד אשר יופסד הוא נתהפך אל הדבר היותר רע, ויותר נמאס, מן השורש הזה נמשכו דיני טומאה, כי המיתה הוא הפסד בעה״ח או הצומח, וכשימות האילן שאין בו רק נפש צומחת, נתהוה ממנו רקב ועפר, ואין בו שום טומאה, אבל כשיופסד הבע״ח שיש בו נפש חיונית יקרא נבלה, ויש בה טומאת מגע ומשא, אולם כשיופסד האדם השומר תורה ומצות שיש בו נפש אלקית, נבלתו פחותה ומאוסה יותר מפגרי בע״ח, ויש בו טומאת אוהל וטומאת שבעה

Life is kedusha.  When life leaves any living being, the remains can be tamei.  When the spirit of Hashem leaves a human being, his body causes the greatest tumah.  When a woman ends the time she might conceive a child, she becomes a Niddah.  When a woman gives birth, and the extra neshama of the child leaves her, and she is t'mei'ah.  A Metzora is tamei, because he has lost his connection to Klal Yisrael.

So, why  it that a bris milah can only take place after experiencing the kedusha of Shabbos?  On the contrary!  True, the experience of Shabbos invests us with kedusha, but shouldn't the departure of Shabbos result in Tumah?  We have a neshama ye'seira on Shabbos.   When it leaves us, shouldn't it bring Tumah in its wake? (also discussed in the Shem MiShmuel.)  Life =Kedusha; Life ends, Tuma enters. Shabbos=Kedusha; Shabbos ends...... what should happen?

The answer is that when life departs, it leaves nothing behind.  If anything, the object that has lost its life is worse than if it had never lived.  That is not the case with kedusha.  When kedusha leaves, some effect remains.

3(a)2.  The greater the Tzadik, the greater the residual effect of his Kedusha.  There has been a recurring assertion that the bodies of tzadikim gemurim do not become tamei.  See, for example, Rabbeinu Chaim Kohen brought in Tosfos Kesuvos 103b DH Oso, and the Medrash brought in Tosfos Bava Metzia 114b, middle of the page, though Tosfos disagrees, and the Ramban in Chukas about Missas Neshika;  The issue was exhaustively covered and conclusively laid to rest by Rabbi Marcus Spielman in his Tziyun L'Nefesh Tzvi, Brooklyn, 1976, in which he brings hundreds of mekoros on the topic, and more importantly the sefer has haskamos from Reb Moshe, Reb Yaakov, Rav Rudderman, Rav Hutmer, and Reb Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in which they all unequivocally state that le'halacha, we are not someich at all on the shittas hamatirim.  (See a very nice review of the sources here.)  But the point is that there seems to be some concept that there is less tuma on the bodies of Tzadikim.  Why would this be so?  On the contrary.  According to the Akeida and the Zohar, there should be more!  The answer is that Tzadikim convert their bodies into holy things, and even after their death, their bodies retain kedusha.  The Malbim cited above says something very similar, as does the Shmaitsa in the Hakdama.

3(b).  Each and every Shabbos is an opportunity to incorporate and concretize the spiritual growth of the previous week.  When I was in Yeshiva, my Mashgiach and Rebbi, Reb Dovid Kronglas, knew that I hadn't gone to the Mikva before Rosh Hashanna and he knew why:  I am of Lithuanian derivation, and going to the Mikva was not something men did.  So he came over to me and said, "Elezer, it is kedai to go to the mikva, it is brought in Shulchan Aruch, and every baal teshuva is required to go to the mikva, just as a geir must go to the mikva."  I'm not sure it was he who added that "If tvila can make a goy into a Jew, imagine what it can do for a Jew!"  I, being who I am, immediately decided that the example of a ger is irrelevant, because while going once can have an enormous effect, there is no difference between going once and going a million times.  It's like annealing clay: once it's been in the kiln, it's not going to get any harder if you put it into the kiln another time.  Or it's like hechsher for tuma.  Once it was touched by water, it's muchshar forever.

Of course, I was wrong, and it's certainly a minhag tov to go to the mikva, at least once every year or two.  But I'm not sure about the effect of Shabbos.  We see from the Medrash that experiencing Shabbos is an enormously powerful spiritual event that forever changes whatever it touches.  It makes a person fit to serve Hashem.  It even makes a non-sentient animal fit to be offered as a sacrifice.  But we don't see from the Medrash that the second Shabbos has any effect at all.

But according to what Reb Moshe said at the bris, it changes the whole meaning of the Medrash.  If the idea of Pnei Matronisa applies to the Milu'im, then it must be that Shabbos enables growth in Kedusha not only for a newborn, but even for old wrung out shmattehs.  Each and every Shabbos is an opportunity to incorporate and concretize the spiritual growth you worked for during that week.

4.  You can make a Shalom Zachar on Yomtov instead of Shabbos. The Chasam Sofer (Toras Moshe Parshas Emor DH Mimacharas, the third one with that DH) says that if there's a Yomtov after the baby is born that comes before Shabbos, then the Yomtov does the same thing that Shabbos normally does.  Theoretically, then, (according to the Taz in 265 brought in the beginning of this piece,) you ought to have the Shalom Zachar on the Yomtov and not wait till Shabbos.  But it's best not to mix people up, unless you live in a community of Talmidei Chachamim who would enjoy the azus panim more than worry about the minhag.

5.  It's a good thing Shalom Zachars are not by invitation only.  This last piece, which speaks of the Shalom Zachar, is interesting, but best left in Yiddish, because it might lead to some very lonely Friday nights.

דער חידושי הרי״ם איז אמאל אריינגעקומען אויף שלום זכר.  האט ער זיך ארומגעקוקט און געזאגט מיט גרויס התלהבות: דאס ענין פון שלום זכר איז דאך מקבל צו זיין פני מטרוניתא פארן ברית, באדארף מען זען, אז עם זאל ניט זיין ווער פון די ד׳ כתות וועלכע זיינען ניט מקבל פני שכינה.

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Tazria, Prenatal Influences

There are two similar but separate things that were said regarding the end of Shmini and the beginning of Tazria.  They are often erroneously commingled or interchanged.  It's not that big a deal, because it's not a matter of halacha, and also because neither can be found in any sefarim that the alleged sources printed.  But this is the version I've heard from responsible ba'alei mesorah, and which is also found in some sefarim, albeit always "mipi hashmu'ah."  More importantly, it's worth thinking about what they really mean, so at the end of the post I've added some points that deserve attention.

Both of these Divrei Torah are resonant with the story of the woman that came to the Rebbe and said, "Rebbe, I had a baby a month ago, and I want to know what I can do to make sure he will grow up to be a great tzadik."  The Rebbe answered, Rebbitzen, you are coming to me ten months late.

There are no guarantees in life, and certainly not when it comes to raising children.  But there are things that do make a difference.


The first discussion is from  Reb Akiva Eiger (as brought in Tallelei Oros and Iturei Torah):

The beginning of Parshas Tazria talks about childbirth.   The end of Parshas Shmini describes which species of animals we may eat (the Tahor) and which we may not eat (the Tamei).  The Torah sums up the parsha of kashrus with the passuk (11:47)

  לְהַבְדִּיל בֵּין הַטָּמֵא וּבֵין הַטָּהֹר וּבֵין הַחַיָּה הַנֶּאֱכֶלֶת וּבֵין הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵאָכֵל

To separate the impure from the pure and between the living beings that may be eaten and the living beings that may not be eaten.

Why, in this passuk, does the order change.  In other words, the first phrase lists the non-kosher first- tamei/tahor, and the second phrase reverses that order- may be eaten/may not be eaten.  

To answer this question, Reb Akiva Eiger directs us to the Gemara in Yoma 82b.  The Mishna says that a pregnant woman that has a tremendous craving for a food may eat on Yom Kippur, because denying the craving might cause mortal harm.  The Gemara says that one Yom Kippur, two pregnant women smelled cooking food and were overwhelmed with a  need to eat immediately. The Sages suggested that somebody whisper in the ear of each woman a soft reminder that it was Yom Kippur. One woman calmed down and was able to complete the fast.  The other continued to insist that she desperately needed to eat the food she had smelled, and she was permitted to eat. The Gemara says that the first woman gave birth to the tzadik Rebbi Yochanan, while the second woman gave birth to the wicked Shabsai Otzar Peiri, a notoriously venal profiteer who harmed the community by manipulating the grain markets.

The Gemara says regarding Rebbi Yochanan the passuk in the beginning of Yirmiahu, 

בְּטֶרֶם אֶצָּרְךָ בַבֶּטֶן יְדַעְתִּיךָ, וּבְטֶרֶם תֵּצֵא מֵרֶחֶם הִקְדַּשְׁתִּיךָ

before I formed you in the womb, I knew you, and before you came out, I made you holy.

Regarding Shabsai the gangster, the Gemara applies the passuk in Tehillim 58,

זֹרוּ רְשָׁעִים מֵרָחֶם;  תָּעוּ מִבֶּטֶן, דֹּבְרֵי כָזָב

The wicked go astray from the womb; they err from birth, speaking lies.

Reb Akiva Eiger says that this Gemara answers his question.  When the passuk says בֵין הַחַיָּה הַנֶּאֱכֶלֶת וּבֵין הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵאָכֵל, the word "chaya," whose literal meaning here is  "living being," has a dual meaning, because the same word also can mean "a pregnant woman."  So "Hachaya hane'echeles" is a remez that a pregnant woman that insists on eating when it really isn't necessary, is like a t'mei'ah, in that what she eats has a negative effect on both her and her child.  A "Chaya asher lo sei'acheil" is a remez to a pregnant woman who calms down and controls herself and avoids eating treif, and thereby avoids damage to herself and to her child.  Thus, the order in the two halves of the passuk does not change.  In both parts, we start with the assur and end with the muttar.

Separately, the Vilner Gaon points out that when the Gemara brings the passuk from Tehillim about "The wicked go astray from the womb,", the Gemara is also referring to the passuk later in that chapter, that says 

 חֲמַת-לָמוֹ, כִּדְמוּת חֲמַת-נָחָשׁ;    כְּמוֹ-פֶתֶן חֵרֵשׁ, יַאְטֵם אָזְנוֹ.

ו  אֲשֶׁר לֹא-יִשְׁמַע, לְקוֹל מְלַחֲשִׁים

Their poison is like the poison of a serpent; they are like a deaf adder that stops its ear;

Which will not listen to the voice of charmers....

because the second woman, and her fetus, were not calmed by the whispered voices, just as some snakes are so dangerous that they cannot be controlled by charmers.  The words Lachash, whisper, and Melachashim, charmers, are the same.

The other story, which is all about the Vilner Gaon, is this:  He was asked, when he was six years old, what the connection is between Parshas Shmini and Parshas Tazria.  He pulled out the Gemara we mentioned above, in Yoma, and showed that what a woman gives birth to is very much influenced by what she eats during pregnancy.  So it is very understandable why the Torah follows the laws of Kashrus with the laws of Childbirth.  The last passuk in Shmini is לְהַבְדִּיל בֵּין הַטָּמֵא וּבֵין הַטָּהֹר, and the Torah is pointing out that eating those two kinds of food can influence what kind of child a woman will have.  Not only does the food a child eat affect him, as the Gaon says in YD 81:7, even the food he eats before he's born affects him.  (The main interest of the story is that the Gaon said it when he was six.  The idea itself was said long before then.  The Pardes Yosef in the beginning of the parsha brings it from Igeres HaRamban.)

Now the similarity and the difference between what Reb Akiva Eiger said and the story about the Gaon said should be clear.

I want to point out several things on this topic.

1. The Gemara is full of examples of early childhood influences on spiritual development.  There is the famous Yerushalmi that Reb Yehoshua's mother used to bring his crib into the Beis Medrash so he should soak up the cadence and kedusha of the words of Torah.  We know that Shimshon's parents were warned to avoid wine until their child was born, because of his nazirite holiness.  And recent studies seem to reiterate this idea:  Here is a paragraph from a paper I came across.

A recent study in Korea examined music’s influence on spatial learning ability in developing rats to show that Mozart Effect is strongest during neurogenesis, specifically in the hippocampus where spatial reasoning is most active.  Their procedure was similar to that of CNLM’s spatial task study, however, their focus was on prenatal music exposure, rather than exposure after birth.  Impregnated female rats were randomly divided into three groups; Noise-applied Group, Music-applied Group, and a control group, Undisturbed Group which was left in silence.
Twenty-one days after the rats gave birth, the pups were subjected to a spatial learning ability test which involved the pups finding water in a radial arm maze.  The music-applied pups had the highest number of correct choices in the radial arm maze.
The results of this study suggest that prenatal exposure to classical music in pups does help facilitate brain development in the hippocampus.  They also support the idea that, when applied during neurogenesis, the Mozart Effect is longer lasting, and may even be permanent. However, results with human participants are subject to variability (Department of Physiology Kyung Hee University 2006).

2.  The Gemara in Yoma might be read to mean that Reb Yochanan was a tzadik before he was born, and Shabsai the mobster was a rasha before he was born.  This is not true.  This would contradict every elementary concept of schar ve'onesh, and would provide an excuse for any kind  of bad behavior.  Sorry.  It doesn't.  What we do see from the Gemara is either A or B.

A. That Hashem knows the future, and knows that Rebbi Yochanan was going to be a tzadik.  Since Reb Yochanan was going to be a tzadik, Hashem protected him from food that was assur, like Hashta be'hemtam (Gittin and Chulin 7a). 

In light of the comments that came in, I need to expand a little on this point.  Please note that the passuk in Yirmiahu goes like this:
 בְּטֶרֶם אֶצָּרְךָ בַבֶּטֶן יְדַעְתִּיךָ, וּבְטֶרֶם תֵּצֵא מֵרֶחֶם הִקְדַּשְׁתִּיךָ
There are two halves in the passuk.   
I knew you before I formed you.  
Before you came out of the womb I sanctified you.
I believe that these two halves involve totally different concepts.  The first half means "I, Hashem, knew that you would be a holy man and a navi.  This knowledge is like any knowledge of nevu'ah, the simple fact that Hashem knows what the future holds.  The second half of the passuk means "Knowing that you  were going to be a tzadik and dedicated to My service, I protected you from unholy experiences."

Again, in the original post, I wrote that "This is the pshat we see in the Radak in the passuk in the beginning of Yirmiahu:  the Radak says that Hashem prepared Yirmiahu for his task from the moment he was conceived.  This preparation included whatever influences were necessary for a person particularly adapted for tzidkus and nevuah.  The Radak adds that 

. אביו ואמו נזהרו בקדושה וטהרה בעת ההריון שיהיה הנביא מקודש והחכם גדול"  

But now I see that what I am suggesting is different than the Radak.  The Radak is saying that his parents did all they could to ensure that he could be a tzadik.  What I'm saying, and what I believe the Gemara in Yoma is saying, is that since Hashem knew that Reb Yochanan and Yirmiahu would be tzadikim, Hashem protected them from things that were tamei.

B.  That people are born with tendencies, both physical and spiritual.  What we make of those tendencies is the difference between an Eisav and a David Hamelech.  Both were warriors, both were redheads, but one was Eisav and one was David Hamelech.

3.  Here's an interesting coincidence.  We just saw in the Gemara in Yoma, above, about Reb Yochanan, how his mother was calmed down by the whispered reminder of the kedusha of Yom Kippur.  There is a Gemara in Taanis 21 that echoes this story line.

Reb Yochanan and Ilfa were chavrusos, and both were great talmidei chachamim.  The time came when both had to admit that that they were starving, and they couldn't continue to learn unless they went to seek their fortune.  As they walked, Reb Yochanan heard a voice saying that one of these two would become Rosh Yeshiva.  Reb Yochanan asked Ilfa, "Did you hear that?"  Ilfa said "Hear what?"  So Reb Yochanan decided that the voice must have been meant for him.  He turned back, and was, indeed, made Rosh Yeshiva.  Ilfa, though he remained a great man, went into business and was very successful.  But of course, Ilfa is mentioned in the Gemara only twenty or thirty times, while Reb Yochanan is the pivot of Shas, Bavli and Yerushalmi.

Did you notice, though, that Reb Yochanan and a contemporary, once again, were about to leave a state of purity, and they both heard a whispered voice, and Reb Yochanan listened, and the other did not, and Reb Yochanan turned back while the other went on?  Exactly the same story line, with different words.  אותה הגברת, בשינוי אדרת

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A Modest Proposal: Polar Bears and Jews

We've been beside ourselves with worry about the nuclear power plant in Iran.  I recently realized that instead of worrying, we should embrace this as a golden opportunity.

In a serendipitous finding, recent research has shown that, as one headline puts it,

Nuclear war could reverse global warming, NASA says.

With this in mind, please consider this other piece of news:

Russia's envoy to NATO in January said Stuxnet caused centrifuges producing enriched uranium at the Bushehr plant to spin out of control, which could have sparked a new "Chernobyl tragedy," the 1986 nuclear meltdown in Ukraine.

A moment's thought will show that a creative combination of these two elements can result in two fine things: A reduction of the threat from Iran, and relief from global warming. We can bring relieved smiles to environmental activists and to our brothers in Israel at the same time- making the world safe for both polar bears and Jews.

The only issue that remains was brought up in an email I received, as follows:

Great idea but of course Israel would also need to build a really big fan on its northeast border or post a lot of politicians there.

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Tzav: Drasha for Sheva Brachos (#4) The Korban for Newlyweds.

This is Drush, and not intended for analysis with scalpels.

Rabbeinu Bachay in Parshas Tzav says (second column sixteen lines from the bottom) that newlyweds bring a Korban Todah.   He says that anyone that experiences a special joyous event should bring a Korban Todah, and in particular he says that a Chassan and Kallah should bring this korban.  Most importantly, Rabbeinu Bachaya is telling us that when the passuk in Yirmiahu (33:11-12) says that people will once again  bring the Korban Todah, it is referring to the beginning of the passuk that talks about the joy of the Chasan and Kallah, and the passuk means that Chassanim and Kallos used to- and someday soon will again bring- a Korban Todah.

כֹּה אָמַר ה, עוֹד יִשָּׁמַע בַּמָּקוֹם הַזֶּה אֲשֶׁר אַתֶּם אֹמְרִים חָרֵב הוּא מֵאֵין אָדָם וּמֵאֵין בְּהֵמָה בְּעָרֵי יְהוּדָה  וּבְחֻצוֹת יְרוּשָׁלִַם, הַנְשַׁמּוֹת מֵאֵין אָדָם וּמֵאֵין יוֹשֵׁב, וּמֵאֵין בְּהֵמָה.   קוֹל שָׂשׂוֹן וְקוֹל שִׂמְחָה, קוֹל חָתָן וְקוֹל כַּלָּה, קוֹל אֹמְרִים הוֹדוּ אֶת ה' צְבָאוֹת כִּי טוֹב ה' כִּי לְעוֹלָם חַסְדּוֹ מְבִאִים תּוֹדָה בֵּית ה:, 

I understand that the exuberant Chasan and Kallah would sing  הוֹדוּ אֶת ה צְבָאוֹת כִּי טוֹב ה כִּי לְעוֹלָם חַסְדּוֹ.  But the idea that Chasan and Kallah bring a Korban Todah is interesting, because we usually associate the korban with having survived some mortal danger.  The Gemara (Brachos 54b,  and see Rambam 10 Brachos 8 and OC 219:1) specifies four people who are obligated to bring this korban, and all are people who were saved from danger.  In fact, this idea is reflected in our Tefilla.  One who was saved from this type of danger makes the Bracha Birkas Hagomel.  For general celebration, you can bring a shlamim or an olah, and the appropriate bracha is She'hechiyanu.  So it's interesting that Rabbeinu Bachay says that a Korban Todah is brought to celebrate a joyous occasion.  More importantly, why does Rabbeinu Bachay single out being newly married as the archetypal circumstance of bringing the Korban Todah?

The Gemara (Sota 2a) says אמר ר' יוחנן וקשין לזווגן כקריעת ים סוף שנאמר (תהילים סח) אלהים מושיב יחידים ביתה מוציא אסירים בכושרות, marrying people off is as "hard" as splitting the sea, as it says in Tehillim, G-d settles the solitary in a house; He frees those who are bound in "Kosharos," shackles.  (Rashi in Sotah, expanding on the interpretation of the verse as referring to the redemption from Mitzrayim, says that Kosharos means a season that is temperate, neither hot nor cold, because the geula from Mitzrayim was in the Springtime.)  The Gemara sees in this passuk a connection between marriage- "G-d settles the solitary in a house"- and the redemption from Egypt, "He frees those who are bound in shackles."  Thus, the Gemara equates a successful marriage and the splitting of the sea.

Rashi explains that the miracle of marriage is taking a boy, a yachid, and a girl, a yechida, and creating from these yechidim a completely new home, a new kingdom, and this is a miracle comparable to the splitting of the sea.  The ability of individuals to willingly and successfully cede their independence to a new mutual identity is only possible with divine assistance.

Although the Gemara focuses on the aspect of divine intervention- krias yam suf, one can see in the Gemara another thought.  The passuk is also telling us that that getting married is similar to being freed from a prison Motzi assirim.  In what sense is that true?  

Until someone is married, he is imprisoned by limited emotional horizons.  He suffers from the astigmatism of egotism; he has no idea what it means to care for someone else more than he cares for himself, he lacks the basic understanding of what it means to be a fully realized human being, he is in danger of being emotionally stunted, a Wagnerian Nibelung.  So, despite the Orwellian undertone, getting married really is like being liberated from prison.  

As the Netziv says, the Korban Todah is brought על שנחלץ מצרה; literally, the word צרה means travail, but it is related to the word צר which means tight and constrained.  So the best translation would be that the korban is brought on the occasion of "release from confinement."  That is certainly an apt description of marriage.    נחלץ מצרה means that he was granted expansion, an expansion that unbound him from his isolated strait.

That sentence deserves to be emphasized.   על שנחלץ מצרה means that he was unbound from his strait of isolation.  This is the foundation of the Korban Todah, and it is a perfect description of what marriage can give us.

People often talk of marriage as being bound, restricted.  Chazal tell us that marriage removes our bonds, it frees us.

(Update 3 22 24/Adar II pei daled: I just saw this in the Mirrer weekly. It's nice that he thinks of me as a Chacham.

(ואגב שמעתי מחכ"א לבאר דמה שחידש רבנו בחיי דחתן וכלה צריכים להביא קרבן תודה, יתכן שהוא נכלל בין הד' שצריכים להודות, והוא בכלל יוצא מבית האסורים. והטעם כי איתא במדרש )מד"ר ויקרא פ"ח א'( לגבי זיווגו של אדם וז"ל "קשה היא לפני הקב"ה כקריעת ים סוף, שנאמר )תהלים סח( 'אלוק' מושיב יחידים ביתה, מוציא אסירים בכושרות' מהו בכושרות בכי ושירות, דבעא אמר שירה, דלא בעא בכה, ומה הקדוש ברוך הוא עושה מזווגן על כרחן שלא בטובתן" הרי מבואר ש"מוציא אסירים בכושרות" נדרש הוא על זיווגו של אדם, דהיינו שכל עוד האדם יחידי הוא בבחינת "אסיר" וכאשר מוצא את זיווגו הוא בבחינת "יוצא מבית האסורים", ולכן שפיר נכלל חתן וכלה בכלל הד' שצריכים להודות.  ) 

GS point out that Rashi in Vayishlach, by Machalas bas Yishmael, brings the Yerushalmi that "Chasan mochlin lo."   If so, he says, the chasan certainly ought to bring a korban Todah.  So for one thing, he was spared the onshim of his aveiros.  Secondly, a spiritual hatzala is comparable to a physical hatzala.  (Similar to Megilla 14, where the Gemara says a kal vachomer, if from avdus to cheirus you say Shira, KV from death to life, so Chazal were kovei'a Megillas Esther as part of Kisvei HaKodesh.)

UPDATE, JUNE 2014
I recently prepared to speak at a SB, and said this over to my wife, Malkie shetichyeh.  She pointed out that I should emphasize something that's evident in the Gemara, especially in the way I'm learning the Gemara.  People naturally think of marriage as being bound, restricted, tied up.  You lose the freedom you had as a single, you have to answer to someone that knows what you're doing, you become responsible for someone else's welfare, and so on.  There is definitely an aspect of lost freedom when you get married.  But Chazal are telling you exactly farkert.  The passuk the Gemara in Sotah brings is (Tehillim 68:7)

 אלהים מושיב יחידים ביתה מוציא אסירים בכושרות 

The Gemara is darshening that the end of the passuk refers to Yetzias Mitzrayim; kosharos are chains, or it means Springtime, when the season is pleasant.  The first half of the passuk refers to marriage, and the Gemara says that the passuk teaches us a hekesh, an equation, between the two halves of the passuk.  So the passuk is telling you, you think marriage is a shibud?  You're wrong.  The marriage that the Torah envisions is liberating, just as Yetzias Mitzrayim was a the great liberation of Klal Yisrael.  I just have to find a good way to explain how marriage is liberating.  I do explain it here, but I think it can be done better.

As I mentioned above, the classic use of the Korban Todah is for a person that has has one of the following four experiences:  These can be remembered with the mnemonic Chayim, חיים..  That is, Chavush/freed from prison; ; Yeshurim/recovered from illness; Yam/returned from an ocean voyage; and Midbar/returned from travel in the desert.  Homiletically, one might say that all the elements of obligation for the Korban Todah are present when one gets married.  He was a is a choleh, because if a person doesn’t get married, the Gemara says (Kiddushin 29b), he deteriorates physically (tipach.)  He is like a traveler in the desert, as Hashem said that He remembers the love of our first relationship, when we followed Him into the desert, zacharti lach...lechteich acharai bamidbar, the willingness to risk everything because you love and trust your spouse..  He is like a prisoner freed from jail, because he has freed himself from the emotional prison of yechidus.  And he is like one who has returned from a sea voyage, because after the long and lonely odyssey as he searched, he has finally come into his home port.

In our time, a person who survives a danger stands at the Bimah (or a woman does this at home with a minyan) and makes the Bracha Hagomel.  One could support the notion that a Chassan and Kallah should do the same.  Of course, there is no such minhag.  But certainly, when they say Modim in Shmoneh Esrei, they should express their gratitude to Hashem for bringing them together and helping to create a new household.  It doesn't hurt to also have your marriage in mind when you say "Sim Shalom."

Note:  Besides the Korban Todah, in the time of the Beis Hamikdash, a Chassan would come to the Beis Hamikdash especially on Shabbos, because on the east side of the structure there was a gate made of white glass through which only newlywed men would enter.  When people would see a man come in through that gate, they would all bless him, saying "He Who dwells in this house, may he bless you with sons and daughters!"  (From Pirkei D'Rebbi Eliezer 17.  Although there is no mention of this gate in the Mishna in the first perek of Middos, which enumerates and describes all the entrances to the Beis Hamikdash, it is mentioned in Maseches Sofrim 19:12.)  As it says in Pirkei D'Rebbi Eliezer, even though now we have no Beis Hamikdash, we should do the same when the Chassan comes to Shul on Shabbos.

הנכנס בשער חתנים היו יודעים בו שהוא חתן והיו אומרים לו השוכן בבית הזה יברכך בבנים ובבנות

~

The Supernal Light of Megillas Esther

The Rambam (2 Megilla 18) quotes a Tosefta in Megilla and the Gemara in the first perek, as follows:

All books in the Canon of Prophets and Holy Writings are destined to become naught when the Mashiach comes, other than Megilas Esther.  It will stand like the Five Books of the Torah and like the Oral Law of the Torah which never will be nullified.  Even though all the memory of suffering will be extirpated, as it says "for the old suffering will be forgotten and hidden away from my eyes,"  the days of Purim will never come to an end, as it says "and these days of Purim will never pass from among the Jews and their memory will never end among their descendants."

כל ספרי הנביאים וכל הכתובים עתידין ליבטל לימות המשיח חוץ ממגילת אסתר והרי היא קיימת כחמשה חומשי תורה וכהלכות של תורה שבעל פה שאינן בטלין לעולם. ואע"פ שכל זכרון הצרות יבטל שנאמר כי נשכחו הצרות הראשונות וכי נסתרו מעיני. ימי הפורים לא יבטלו שנאמר וימי הפורים האלה לא יעברו מתוך היהודים וזכרם לא יסוף מזרעם:

In fact, there is a word-association of the Megilla to the Torah.  Regarding the Torah from Sinai, it says קול גדול ולא יסף , and regarding the Megilla, as the Rambam notes, it says   לא יסוף מזרעם.  Both are eternal, only these two share the word Lo Yasuf, never ending.

The Ra'avad there says 

א"א לא יבטל דבר מכל הספרים שאין ספר שאין בו למוד. אבל כך אמרו אפילו יבטלו שאר ספרים מלקרות בהם מגילה לא תבטל מלקרותה בצבור

Nothing from the Canon will be nullified, for every Book has a lesson.  All the Gemara means is that only the Megilla and the Torah will be publicly read.

The Ra'avad has a point, especially since the Gemara also says that all the other holidays will be as naught, but Purim will be celebrated forever.  How can this be?  Are the laws of the Torah limited to only certain epochs?  The Rambam was not, after all, antinomian.

The Chasam Sofer brings from a Sefer M'nos Levi (thanks to Hebrewbooks.org, we have that sefer, too.  It's here and go to page 405 in their numbering system) that when the Gemara says that the other holidays will be "Bateil" it doesn't mean deconsecrated, it means bateil like bittul b'rov, we won't celebrate them as joyously, because the events they commemorate will be trivial compared to the great events of the days of the Mashiach.  But, the Chasam Sofer asks, the Raavad's question deserves an answer.  How can we say that the other books of Nevi'im will be null?

The Chasam Sofer explains that the days of Mashiach will bring deep and widespread spiritual wisdom, and the lessons about the Will of G-d in the books of the Nevi'im will be self-evident and universally known.  

But the Megilla, he says, is different.

And the words that follow in the Chasam Sofer are so amazing, so awesome, that it's hard to believe he wrote them.  Or, put it this way: if I didn't see it myself, I would have thought it was written by someone whose theology was suspect, chas veshalom.  But it's there.

The Chasam Sofer is in Drashos Chasam Sofer, Volume I, page164, (page 368 at Hebrewbooks), beginning of second column, and this is what he says:

דקבלת תורה בימי משה רבינו עליו השלום היה באונס והדר קיבלוהו בימי אחשורוש באופן שאור קדוש הכלול במגילה הוא ממש יותר גדול ונכבד  מתורתנו הקדושה בעצמה

The acceptance of the Torah in the days of Moshe Rabbeinu was under duress (Shabbos 88a).  They later accepted it willingly in the days of Achashveirosh, in a manner that the holy light that inheres in the Megilla is literally greater and more splendid than that of our holy Torah itself.

For may years, I scoffed at people who bought the Megillos written on Klaf.  You fulfill the mitzva by hearing it from the baal korei, for goodness sakes.  You like having a holy megilla?  They buy a Megillas Rus, or, if you're a Litvak, buy a Megillas Eicha.  Why waste so much money?  Is it just another geegaw to put in your breakfront and flaunt in shul?

Well, according to the Chasam Sofer, I was wrong.  Not about what the buyers' conscious motivation, but about the unique spiritual resplendence of Megillas Esther.  The Megilla somehow comprises אורה ושמחה וששון ויקר   I don't know in what sense Megillas Esther holds this numinous light.  Is it a source? A lens? An amplifier?  Is it in the written word or in the reading?  Whatever it is, it is unique.  Once again, our subconscious, our race-memory, our inherent spiritual sensitivity, shepherds us and guides our hands to do sublime things.

A reader in New Hampshire sent in a comment about what aspect of the Megilla involves the Chasam Sofer's light, which belongs here:

Suggestion: reading the megilla with the proper appreciation and simcha regarding the narrative and the nes creates a bond to torah sheba'al peh greater than can be attained from the Torah itself.

This is, after all, the light of kiy'mu v'kiblu.

Also, on the most basic level, it is the only torah shebiksav that is torah sheba'al peh.

And on that note, I direct your attention to an analogous if not identical concept in the Netziv, in an addendum on Purim at the end of Shemos (after Megillas Esther).

When I read it, I immediately checked if my katana was sufficiently sharp.

(note: great unknown's latter line refers to the part of the Netziv that explains that the Torah is symbolized by the sword; Torah She'bichsav by the gloriously bejeweled scabbard, and Torah She'Baal Peh by the sharp and dangerous blade.)

(For interested parties: The Chasam Sofer echoes Reb Chaim Vital in his Shaar Hakavanos - Drush le'Purim on the Ha'ara of the Ataras Ha'yesod.   But irrespective of other layers of meaning, the Chasam Sofer always wrote to be understood literally.)

Two good things that add to this discussion:
I     At a kiddush, we were discussing the difference between Sinai and Purim.  One individual put it nicely.  He said "There's a big difference between Kabalas Hatorah under a mountain and Kabalas Hatorah on top of a  mountain."

II    As for the Chasam Sofer, I realized later that there is a very interesting way (and with all due humility, a very, very good way) of looking at it.  When did Moshe Rabbinu's face begin to emanate rays of light?  After he received the Torah- but not after the first forty days.  Only after the second time he was taught the Torah did his face shine with that light.  Why?  Why only the second time?  The Beis Halevi and the Mabit in his introduction to the Kiryas Sefer both say that only when Torah She'Baal Peh was found only in Moshe Rabbeinu's mind, and not written on the Luchos, and only after Moshe Rabbeinu achieved his Torah knowledge through hard work, was he considered a living sefer torah.  Though they don't mention it, it is obvious that this also explains why only after the second luchos did his face shine.

With this in mind, the Chasam Sofer's idea becomes very reasonable.  Klal Yisrael came to the Ribono shel Olam, not the other way around.  They discerned Hashem's presence and made the unilateral decision to revisit the idea of Torah She'Baal Peh and to accept it with desire and enthusiasm.  For this, Karan Ohr Pnei'hem.  That is the light in Megillas Esther.

The next part is just the Rambam in the previous halacha.  It's worded very strongly, and it's good to be reminded of how he puts it as we prepare for Purim.

מוטב לאדם להרבות במתנות אביונים מלהרבות בסעודתו ובשלוח מנות לרעיו. שאין שם שמחה גדולה ומפוארה אלא לשמח לב עניים ויתומים ואלמנות וגרים. שהמשמח לב האמללים האלו דומה לשכינה שנאמר להחיות רוח שפלים ולהחיות לב נדכאים

Better that a person augment his gifts to the poor rather than make a big feast or fancy Shalach Manos to his friends.  There is no greater or more splendid joy than gladdening the hearts of the poor and the orphans and widows and strangers.  One who gladdens these poor people's hearts is likened to the Holy Shechina, about which it says "To revive the spirit of the lowly and to revive the heart of the downtrodden."

And for a final curiosity, I was looking at Reb Shlomo Alkabetz's sefer, M'nos Halevi, which the Chasam Sofer brought, as I noted above, and he says that Megillas Esther has 166 psukim, which matches the 166 letters in each of parshas Zachor and parshas Vayavo Amaleik, and there are 166 words in Hallel Hagadol (Hodu of Shabbos morning), and it is the gematria of the words יעלזו חסידים בכבוד (because on Purim it's ok to act like Chasidim).

Vayikra

Posts for Vayikra

Names, Echoes, and Ghosts

The People as Organism

Conspicuous Virtue

Dreams and Korbanos

If the spirit moves me, I'll post something new for this year.  So far, I have nothing but a discussion of Rei'ach Nicho'ach on a Bamma, but I'm tired of writing about Kodoshim.

UPDATED A New Discussion about Computers and Shabbos

I found some interesting sources during the week of Parshas Beshalach in ayin gimmel, and I posted the information there, but I'm putting it here at the end of the post as well.


Last week, in Parshas Vayakhel, in passuk 35:33, the words מלאכת מחשבת, Me'leches Machashaves appeared.  These words are understood by Chazal as the fundamental definition of what sort of work is prohibited on Shabbos.  Mesorah's translation is "craft of design."  Most often, the way Chazal interpret this phrase is to limit the legal definition of 'work,' in Hilchos Shabbos, to cases of specific intent.

The next section is divided into two parts.  Option One is for people without experience in Hilchos Shabbos.  Option Two is for people who prefer straight yeshivishe talk.

Option One
In tort law, Specific Intent is defined as follows:

The mental purpose, aim, or design to accomplish a specific harm or result by acting in a manner prohibited by law.  Specific intent requires that the defendant intended to achieve some result additional to the criminal act in order to prove all the elements needed to be found guilty of the crime. It differs from general intent, which only requires proof that the defendant intended to do the prohibited act. For example, the crime of larceny requires not only the general intent to take property, but also the specific intent to permanently deprive another of the property.

Thus, in Hilchos Shabbos,  מלאכת מחשבת means that two elements must be present for a finding of  transgression of Shabbos: intention to do the specific prohibited act, and intention for a particular result.  If a person intended to do one prohibited melacha but did another, he didn't have intention to do that act, and it's not מלאכת מחשבת.  If a person intended to do a prohibited act, but was doing it for a purpose other than the usual purpose of the melacha, then he lacks the intent to achieve the prohibited result, and it's not מלאכת מחשבת. In both cases, מלאכת מחשבת teaches us that this person is not legally culpable for the what he did.

Option Two
In Yeshivish, we would say that Chillul Shabbos requires two things:
כוונה for a  מעשה  and   כוונה  for a תוצאה :  intent to do a specific act, and intent to generate a specific result.  The תוצאה has to be the purpose for which the Melacha was done in the building of the Mishkan.  Classic application: if a person digs a hole, he can be said to be creating a pit, or building a pit.  If he is digging because he wants sand, then even if he digs a perfect hole, it is not Meleches Machsheves.  He is lacking the specific intent required for a melacha of building.


Generally, מלאכת מחשבת narrows the cases that are called Melacha of chillul Shabbos.  But מלאכת מחשבת can also be used to include cases that would otherwise be excluded.  For example: If a person throws wheat and chaff up into the air, and the wind blows away the chaff and allows the wheat to fall to the ground, it is considered his act, because he is intentionally using existing forces to complete the act that he began and he intended (Aruch Hashulchan 242:24.  I don't know why the Aruch Hashulachan says it as if it were a chidush. It is an open Rashi in Bava Kamma 60a. and the Rosh there and the Rach in Shabbos 120b argue and say the svara is because that is the classic definition of the melacha, so the concept is limited to Zoreh.  Similarly, the Gemara says that nursing a child is technically a melacha, but of course it is muttar.  But why is it a melacha?  The woman is just putting the child to her breast, and the child nurses!  The child is doing the melacha, not the woman.  The answer is that because children naturally nurse, if you put a child to a breast with the intention that the child nurse, then the result is called your מלאכת מחשבת.  The same ought to be true by putting a leech on someone's skin, and just like Zoreh is a machlokes Rashi and the Rosh/Rach, this too is a machlokes between the Magen Avraham, who holds it's a grama even when you put grain into an active mill and certainly when you put a leech on skin, against the Even Ha'Ozer who holds it's a perfect melacha gmura, at the end of 328. Another example of this is in Tosfos Shabbos 73b.  For further discussion, see Totzos Chaim 8:3)

So now, here is a new question.

There is a nascent technology called BCI, Brain Computer Interface.  This enables a person to control a computer via his thoughts, or, more correctly, it trains a person to generate brain activity that controls a computer.  The computer doesn't read your mind.  As with Voice Recognition software, the computer and the person work together to create a lexicon of commands.  Brain activity A (visualize Netanyahu) means that the cursor moves the right, Brain activity B (visualize Shulamit Aloni) means left, and Brain activity C (think of smelling a bowl of hot cholent) means stop, and so forth.  See, for example, here.  (This is not what Stephen Hawking uses.  His devices respond to small muscle movements.)

At the moment, this infant technology is barely crawling.  It will soon become enormously efficient and popular.  One can easily imagine an earphone that functions as an inductive coil- or a yarmulkeh with a sensor- sensitive enough to distinguish between various brain activities, which could be used to control a computer.  One could do anything, from turning on a light to starting a war, by means of his brain activity.   All it will take is an Israeli with some spare time and a soldering gun.

Would this be called melacha on Shabbos?  You are not lifting a finger.  You are not moving or even talking.   You are not "doing" any act at all.

My opinion is that the centrality of kavana in the din of מלאכת מחשבת would make this a melacha de'oraysa.  Both the melacha and the result are intended.  The result is proximate and definite and immediate.  This is a melacha gemura.

It goes without saying that Reb Moshe, who prohibited the use of Shabbos clocks for anything but heat and light, would prohibit this at least on a Derabanan level.  But I'm not talking about Derabanans and Kavod Shabbos here, I'm talking about a De'oraysa.

Clarification:
This is not at all related to issues of voice controlled computers or microphones or hearing aids.  In all of those cases, the problem is the sound wave you generated impinging upon the receiver.  And please do not confuse this with infrared motion detectors, or computer controlled motion detectors.  In those cases, your action results in melacha being done, no less than if there were a string attached to you that pulled a switch when you moved.  You are basically pulling the switch.  In our case, you are doing absolutely no physical act.
This is not at all related to issues of whether the use of electrical mechanisms is assur or why it is assur.  I'm talking about a one hundred percent melacha de'oraysa- igniting a fire that cooks a pot of meat- that was done by sending a signal via my brain activity to a computer to do it.

UPDATE I
Over the last two days, I spoke about this to several Talmidei Chachamim.

• One said that it is not a melacha at all and muttar mid'oraysa.  Melacha requires a physical act on my part.  This person is a highly respected posek.  He also holds that Rav Elyashiv's issur to walk where motion activated cameras will turn on is completely wrong, as does Rav Wosner.
• One said that it is melacha gemura and assur mid'oraysa.  Interesting svara offered by the second person:  He said, a melacha was done.  The question is, to whom to be meyacheis the melacha.  So, if a person tells a goy to do a melacha, the melacha is mis'yacheis to the goy.  But if I make the computer do the melacha, it's mis'yacheis to me.  great unknown says that this svara is contradicted by Reb Akiva Eiger in the Teshuvos #8 where he argues on the Nesivos regarding mis'asek.
• Another talmid chacham said that it is no different than the brain telling the hand to light a fire.  The hand's action is my action.  The computer here becomes my hand, and the melacha is a ma'aseh be'yadayim.

UPDATE II

An excellent and helpful comment posted by the antipodean bar nash pc directs us to the Gemara in Sanhedrin 101a.  The Gemara says that it is muttar to 'paralyze' an animal via a lechisha/incantation, even though it essentially traps the animal, and trapping is an Av Melacha.  He said that the reason for this hetter is the absence of an act of Tzeidah.  This is highly debatable, as will soon discuss.  But Reb Chaim Kanievsky assumes that is the pshat in Rashi in the following paragraph.  (And the tzushtell is notable for another reason, as well- he wants to be machria the issue of whether מלאכת מחשב is called מלאכת מחשבת from a case of מלאכת מכשף.)
(I do not have a copy of the sefer.  I copied this from an online citation, and made several minor changes. It  is not complete, as indicated by the ellipses, and I cannot vouch for its accuracy.)

בספר דרך אמונה על הלכות שמיטה ויובל להגאון ר"ח קנייבסקי שליט'א, הקשה: “ויל"ע דבסנהדרין ק"א א' אמרי

לוחשין לחישת נחשים ועקרבים בשבת ואין בכך משום צידה [...] אע"ג דע"י הלחש אינו יכול לזוז ממקומו

עד שנוכל לתופסו מ"מ...מותר דאין זה צידה טבעית ויל"ע מ"ש גבי שביעית דאסור גם פעולה שאינה

טבעית ומ"ש שבת דמותר" (דרך אמונה, שמיטה ויובל, פרק א, הלכה ז, ביאור הלכה ד"ה סוקרין). לאחר

מכן הוא מביא שני תירוצים, בתירוצו הראשון הוא עומד על ההבחנה המהותית שבין שביתת הארץ מעבר

לשביתת האדם ממלאכה, ובין שבת שבו רק האדם שובת, משכך, היות ולחישה אינה פוגעת בשביתת

האדם מותר ללחוש בשבת, אולם בשביעית “האיסור הוא שהארץ לא תיעבד ולכן גם ע"י סגולה הרי הארץ

נעבדה על ידו" (שם). עוד תירץ הרב קנייבסקי, על פי ההבחנה שבין דיבור ומעשה: “דבאמת אין חילוק

בין שבת לשביעית רק החילוק הוא אם עושה איזה מעשה או שאין עושה כלום רק לוחש דכשעושה מעשה

באמת גם בשבת יהיה אסור אבל בלחישה בעלמא גם בשביעית יהיה מותר".

According to his first teretz, there is a difference between the concept of the issurim of Shabbos and the issurim of the rest of the Torah.  He says that Shabbos prohibits the human act, while other dinim prohibit causing a result.  On Shabbos, we don't care that fires are set, as long as you didn't do the act of setting them.  Magical incantations are not included in the legal definition of Melacha, simply because they are supernatural.  Therefore, no melacha has been done and no issur transgressed.  During the year of Shvi'is, we care very much that the land should not be worked, irrespective of who works it, so even a supernatural method that causes land to be worked would be assur on Shvi'is.  According to this, Rashi is dealing with an entirely different issue, that of  " אין זה צידה טבעית" , and this has nothing to do with BCI. 

According to his second teretz, Shabbos and the whole Torah are the same, and l'chisha would be muttar in all cases because it does not involve a human action.  The Torah only prohibits a human action, not thoughts that result in action.  If so, a BCI ma'aseh would be muttar in kol hatorah kulah.

Let me point out that Reb Chaim Kanievsky's point that speech is neither action nor legally actionable is not contrary to the generally accepted issur on talking into a microphone or using voice recognition software to write or control a computer on Shabbos.  The difference is as follows:

In talking into a microphone, the issur is the impingement of the voice/pressure wave/air movement upon the microphone, because that impact directly causes electrical changes, and directly generating electrical changes on Shabbos is assur.  Here, by the Lechisha, there's no issur on Lechisha on Shabbos.  The issur is the trapping.  The man is not trapping, he is talking.  His voice is not doing a melacha; the effect of his voice is causing a melacha to happen.

UPDATE III

Tosfos in Gittin 31a DH B'machshava says that a melacha that is done with intent alone (Tosfos is talking about being mafrish Truma with machshava and the issur of mesakein) is assur on Shabbos.  The Chida in his Pnei David on Beshalach 16:23 brings a raya from Tosfos to the Maharsh Primo who said that since the Mahn that fell in the Midbar could be changed into whatever form you desired by intent alone- you could make it into baked, or cooked, or broiled simply by desiring that it be so- it was assur to make this change on Shabbos.  The Teshuvos Har Tzvi (OC I 174) says that this really is clear in the passuk אֵת אֲשֶׁר תֹּאפוּ אֵפוּ וְאֵת אֲשֶׁר תְּבַשְּׁלוּ בַּשֵּׁלוּ , because the Mechilta says it means that the Mahn actually cooked/baked/broiled itself according to the owner's intent, and it's clear in the passuk that this change had to be done before Shabbos began. (It's not clear to me, though, because according to Reb Akiva Eiger's pshat in the Rambam 9 Shabbos 3 onהמבשל על האור ... דבר שאינו צריך בישול כלל פטורbishul of the Mahn could not be de'oraysa.  It's a great kashe on the Rambam, but irrelevant to the halacha.)

However, the Chida, in his sefer Yosef Ometz (92:2) brings that Tosfos in Menachos 55 says the opposite, that if the hafrasha is done with thought alone, it is muttar on Shabbos.  The Chida's resolution of this stira, and a discussion on the topic as a whole, can be found in the Sefer Sdei Tzofim on Menachos, page 402 (page 408 on Hebrewbooks.org , or if that doesn't work, then go here and then go to page 408).

I know that some people are going to point out Reb Akiva Eiger's Teshuva in 159 about making a kinyan before Shabbos that will be chall on Shabbos.  I say it's irrelevant. I'm too lazy to discuss it, and just wrote this so nobody should say "Ha!  You forgot Reb Akiva Eiger's teshuva!"  I didn't.

Lastly, let me point out that the Rashi in Sanhedrin 101 is not at all clear as to why it is muttar, as indicated in Reb Chaim's two teirutzim.  Concordant with Reb Chaim's first pshat, the Levush and the Mishna Berura (328 SK 143) learn that Rashi was mattir either because it's not the normal derech or because it's supernatural.  According to both the Levush and the MB, we have no proof that Rashi would be mattir machshava.  In fact, it is very likely that if Rashi held that machshava is bichlal not a ma'aseh melacha, he (or the people who read into him) wouldn't have to come up with other hetteirim like shinui or not derech hateva.  Since he (they) did, it proves that machshava can be considered melacha.  Therefore, according to these pshatim in Rashi, our case, which is natural and will soon be common, might be assur gamur:

According to the Rambam who holds that the lachash is a meaningless superstition, the Gemara is no raya at all, since he holds it’s muttar because the lachash doesn't work.

FINAL UPDATE

What we end up having is the following:

• A stirah in Tosfos, Gittin 31 (Assur) and Menachos 55 (Muttar).  UPDATE:  This is not correct.  Both are mattir.
• An ambiguous Rashi (that Rav Kanievsky in his second pshat reads to mean Muttar for sure on Shabbos, and possibly in all isurim; but according to his first pshat, and according to the Levush (OC 328) that Rashi was mattir because it's not the normal derech of Tzeidah, and the Mishna Berura in 328 SK 143 that Rashi was mattir because it's not derech hateva, we have no proof that Rashi would be mattir machshava, and most likely a proof that Rashi would asser. 
• The shittos of the Maharash Primo and Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Assur). 
• The Magen Avraham that holds that putting wheat into a mill that is already turning is called a grama, despite the intent and immediate result.  It’s possible that according to the Magen Avraham, machshava cannot make something that is not called your ma’aseh into your ma’aseh.

Bottom line:

• Assur: Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank.
• Muttar: Rav Kanievsky in his second pshat in Rashi. 
• Most likely Assur in Rashi and L'halacha: Levush, Mishna Berurah, and Reb Chaim Kanievsky in his first pshat in Rashi.
• Probably Muttar: the Magen Avraham.

So the surprising result is that for chillul Shabbos, the preponderance of shittos is that no physical act is necessary.  Chillul Shabbos can be the result of pure machshava IF the machshava causes the melacha directly and immediately and definitely, and it is commonly done in this way.  And it goes without saying that every normal posseik would agree that it would be a zilzul Shabbos to do melacha with machshava.

It could be that Shabbos is unique, that Meleches Machseves results in a chumra that makes it assur, as the Aruch Hashulchan (quoted above) says.  In fact, while not very much like the mleches hamishkan, this would be a nice match with the type of melacha involved in the creation of the world.  What the halacha would be in other issurim besides Shabbos remains unanswered, outside of the universal hetter of Reb Chaim Kanievsky's second pshat in Rashi, which, we have seen, is contrary to the Levush and the Mishna Berura.


UPDATE:
I posted on this again in 2013, in Parshas Beshalach, here.  I'm also pasting the newer post here.  I normally would just erase both and make a new one, but I hate to eliminate the comments, and I don't have the time to put them into the post.


A double portion of the Mahn came down on Friday, because people would not be allowed to carry it to their houses on Shabbos.  This way, they had their Shabbos food in their houses before Shabbos.  They were also told be sure to cook or bake the Mahn before Shabbos began.  

את אשר תאפו אפו ואת אשר תבשלו בשלו

There is a discussion in the Mechilta here about exactly how the Mahn was prepared.  Rebbi Yehoshua holds that the mere thought of baking would miraculously transform the Mahn into a baked preparation, and the thought of cooking would render the Mahn cooked.  Rebbi Elazar HaModa'i says that it would taste as if it were prepared the way you wanted, but there was no physical change.  (I suppose this is what underlies the machlokes Reb Ami and Reb Asi in Yoma 74b whether the tribulation of the Mahn was not having food in the pantry or not seeing the food you're tasting.)

יאמר אליהם הוא אשר דבר ה', אמרו לו אימתי אמר להם מחר: את אשר תאפו אפו, ר' יהושע אומר מי שהוא רוצה אפוי היה מתאפה לו והרוצה מבושל היה מתבשל לו. ר' אלעזר המודעי אומר הרוצה לאכול דבר אפוי היה טועם בו כל אפויים שבעולם והרוצה לאכול דבר מבושל היה טועם בו כל בשולים שבעולם ר' אליעזר אומר על אפוי אפו ועל מבושל בשלו הא כיצד יום טוב שחל להיות ערב שבת מנין שאין רשאין לא לאפות ולא לבשל אלא אם כן עירבו ת"ל את אשר תאפו אפו אפו על אפוי ובשלו על מבושל:

Two years ago, I posted a discussion about BCI technology, with which a person can control a computer via thought patterns.  Absolutely no movement is involved; sensors detect and analyze variations in brain wave activity and the program responds to this variation.  Once you can move and click a cursor with brain activity, you can do every single one of the thirty nine melachos of Shabbos without lifting a finger.  

BCI stands for brain–computer interface (BCI).  Other terms used are mind-machine interface (MMI), and direct neural interface, and brain–machine interface (BMI),  For the latest on BCI, go here.

Having seen this Mechilta, and some other sources, it is time for an update.  Some of this material was briefly mentioned in the original post, but most of it is new, like the Mechilta.

Harav Tzvi Pesach Frank, in his pirush on Chumash here and in a teshuva, and the Mirkeves Hamishna and the Netziv in their peirushim on the Mechilta, note that our Mechilta shows that according to Rebbi Yehoshua, this form of melacha is assur on Shabbos; that it needed to be done before Shabbos, even though the cooking and baking would be effected by thought alone.

(Please note that this Mechilta is completely incomprehensible- to me- if we're going to read it literally from a halachic standpoint.  Even if thought would make it cooked, the thought did not cook it.  I'm not talking about the Bishul b'chama/Bishul b'eish issue, I'm talking about no bishul at all happening.  It turned it into a food that was identical with something that had been cooked.  It was נתהפך to become a thing that is Mevushal, but there is no event of בישול taking place.  What we have here is like a thought that takes an object that was in a Reshus Hayachid and makes it re-appear in a Reshus Harabbim.  There was no akira, there was no ha'avara, there was no hanacha.  Before it was there, now it's here.  We have the shiur of a melacha, and we have the effect of a melacha, but the melacha wasn't done.  There's a consequence without a sequence.  Bishlema by netilas neshama, causing death is the melacha, and however you do it it's assur.  Here, it's the act of bishul that is assur and the fact that the food gets cooked is for the chiyuv on a shiur of the melacha.  It's like Zorei'ah, planting: the issur is the planting, and the fact that the seed sprouts is just a test of whether your act of planting was a melacha.  Here, it's impossible that such a thing would be bishul.  Maybe it would be makeh b'patish, but that doesn't make sense either, since it was perfectly good even without the machshava.  But I don't care that this is shver.  The Achronim see the Mechilta as a raya to this question, so I'm going with that.  I guess the problem is not bishul, but Mesaken Manna, like the next source says.)

The Moshav Zkeinim in Bamidbar (11:8) says the following:

 אמרינן בסיפרי ועשו אותו עוגות וכוי, ותימה הא כתיב (שמות ט״ז כ״ג) את אשר תאפו אפו ואת אשר תבשלו בשלו ואת כל העודף אלמא היה נאפה ומתבשל ואין לומר לאו דווקא אפו אלא תחשבו עליו, ולדבר[יו] (ה)מתבשל למה היה אסור בשבת לחשוב עליו שיש בו טעם תבשיל, וי״ל [דכיון] דלא היה מתהפך אלא על פי דבורו לתבשיל חשוב תקון דהא אפילו הפרת נדרים לצורך שבת איבעיא לן בנדרים (ע״ז אי) ובסוף שבת (קנ׳׳ז אי) אי שרי בשבת, ואע״ג דהתם שרי הכא חשיב תקון

which means that he holds it is assur, although he says דבורו.

On the other hand, Tosfos in several places indicates that it would be muttar; Fact 1.Designating Truma on Shabbos is assur under Mesaken Manna, a toldah of Makkeh Be'Patish.  Fact 2. Although lechatchila one should not designate Truma with thought alone, if one does so it is effective.  Combining Fact 1 and 2, Tosfos in Gittin 31a DH Bemachshava, and in Chulin 7a DH Vedilma and Bechoros 59a DH Bemachshava says that to do so on Shabbos with thought alone would be muttar.  Also, the Shittah in Beitza 34b says this.  (It's easy to mis-read Tosfos, but what he's saying is that even though machshava would be effective and muttar as far as hilchos Shabbos are concerned, the possibility of doing it with machshava is not sufficient to be mattir a physical hafrasha.)

The Achiezer in 2:49:4 talks about our Tosfos, and mentions that he has several problems with Tosfos' Shittah which he does not answer.  But he says that even according to Tosfos, that it's muttar to be mafrish on Shabbos with thought alone, that's only because Tevel has inherent Truma potential, so you're only designating which part is Truma.  But by Hekdesh, where you're creating an entirely new status, and this status causes a transfer of ownership, such a machshava is like a maaseh and would be assur on Shabbos.  But he says that this is only because ownership transfers generate a concern that you might write, and so are assur miderabanan.  The implication is that a real melacha, if done with Machshava, would be muttar.

Along the same lines, see Reb Akiva Eiger brought in the Shaar Tziyun in 633 sk 14, regarding a too-tall sukkah that has a pile of dirt in middle, and before yomtov you weren't mevateil the dirt, that he is not sure if if it is muttar to be mentally mevateil the dirt to the ground, because it would make the Sukka kasher and therefore be mesaken manna/makeh b'patish.  I cannot find this RAE anywhere except this Shaar Tziyun.  Anyway, from this RAE is appears that he's mesupak regarding the issue of mesaken manna with machshava.

And the best part- Reb Meir Don Plotzki (Kli Chemda) in Beshalach proposes that there is a difference between Shabbos and Yomtov.  On Shabbos, which is an eternal and immutable commemoration of Hashem's Shvisa creating the world through His Machshava, the issur includes melacha that is done with machshava.  But Yomtov, whose kedusha is created by Beis Din, by humans, the issur is only on melacha that is done with an act, the human sort of melacha.  Wouldn't that be interesting, to be mattir BCI melacha on Yomtov but not on Shabbos?

I found a nice article on this topic.  He cites most, if not all, of my references, here.  Here's his summation:

סקירת השיטות שראינו, מהן ניתן להפיק שיטה הלכתית בנוגע ל-BCI:

א.    הגרשז"א – המחשבה כמעשה (בהלכות מסוימות) לענין שבת.

ב.    הרב רוזן – בדיקת התוצאות הסופיות של תהליכים (גם פנימיים) וקישורם למקורם.

ג.    עמדת ה'חומרא' של הכלי-חמדה – כשעשיית המלאכה נעשית כרגיל על ידי המחשבה, אזי זו איננה מנגנון של כ'לאחר-יד' גרידא.

ד.    עמדת ה'קולא' של הכלי-חמדה – פעולה המתבצעת על ידי מחשבה אינה מלאכה גמורה בגידרה, אלא 'רק' איסורא.

ה.    הקהילות יעקב – מעמד של 'עדיף מכלאחר-יד' לפעולה סגולית בהלכות שבת, שלא כדרכה.

ו.     הקהילות יעקב – דרכה של פעולה כזו היא תמיד ה'לא טבעית', לא גזרו חכמים בה.

ז.     הרב זאב לב (והגרשז"א) – החילוק בין החפצא לגברא באדם ובפעולותיו בעולם. זהו היחס המפורש ביותר לנושא, ובשילוב עם חילוק החפצא/גברא זהו פיתוח של מערך מחשבתי עם השלכות הלכתיות קונקרטיות.