Pharaoh's Impenetrable Heart.

Hashem hardened Pharaoh's heart so that he would not do teshuva and release the Bnei Yisrael.  This is stated several times.  In Shemos see 3:19, ואני ידעתי כי לא יתן אתכם מלך מצרים להלך ולא ביד חזקה, in Va'eira see 7:3 ואני אקשה את לב פרעה, and in Bo, 11:1, כי אני הכבדתי את לבו. From the emphasis and the repeated explanation that it was Hashem's desire to show the world how mighty Egypt would be like a plaything to Hashem, one might think that this was a singularity, a event exclusive to that one place and time.  It is not.  The ability to do Teshuva has been taken away from other people as well and continues to be a possibility.

I don't mean to provide excuses for people that want to fool themselves into thinking they can't do teshuva.  This only happens to highly accomplished resha'im.  If  you're not a world-class achiever in something else, you probably aren't a world-class Rasha either.  To emphasize this, here is something from the Brisker Rov, (quoted by Rav Shlomo Wahrman, author of שארית יוסף and Rosh Yeshiva of Hebrew Academy of Nassau County,) in HaPardes year Year 62 number 1, 1987, to the effect that even an Amaleiki can do teshuva.

 שמעתי מהגרי״ז מבריסק דתשובה מועלת גם לעמלקים דהרי בשמואל א׳ פט״ו כתיב לך והחרמת את החטאים את עמלק

 דמבואר דהוא רק בזמן שחוטאים משא״כ כשעושים תשובה דשוב אי״ז חטאים וכדאמרה ברוריא דביתהו דר״מ בברכות (י.) עה׳׳פ יתמו חטאים מי כתיב חוטאים חטאים כתיב וכוי אלא בעי רחמי עלויהו דלהדרו בתשובה ורשעים עוד אינם.

So no matter how bad you are, unless you are worse than an Amaleiki you certainly can do teshuva.  And let's not forget Gittin 57b, 

נעמן גר תושב היה נבוזראדן גר צדק היה מבני בניו של המן למדו תורה בבני ברק מבני בניו של סיסרא למדו תינוקות בירושלים מבני בניו של סנחריב למדו תורה ברבים מאן אינון שמעיה ואבטליון

But there are people who do lose access to Teshuva.  First, the Rambam:   (6 Teshuva 3)

ואפשר שיחטא אדם חטא גדול או חטאים רבים עד שיתן הדין לפני דיין האמת שיהא הפרעון מזה החוטא על חטאים אלו שעשה ברצונו ומדעתו שמונעין ממנו התשובה ואין מניחין לו רשות לשוב מרשעו כדי שימות ויאבד בחטאו שיעשה. הוא שהקב"ה אמר על ידי ישעיהו השמן לב העם הזה וגו'. וכן הוא אומר ויהיו מלעיבים במלאכי האלהים ובוזים דבריו ומתעתעים בנביאיו עד עלות חמת ה' בעמו עד לאין מרפא. כלומר חטאו ברצונם והרבו לפשוע עד שנתחייבו למנוע מהן התשובה שהיא המרפא. לפיכך כתוב בתורה ואני אחזק את לב פרעה. לפי שחטא מעצמו תחלה והרע לישראל הגרים בארצו שנאמר הבה נתחכמה לו. נתן הדין למנוע התשובה ממנו עד שנפרע ממנו. לפיכך חזק הקב"ה את לבו. ולמה היה שולח לו ביד משה ואומר שלח ועשה תשובה וכבר אמר לו הקב"ה אין אתה משלח שנאמר ואתה ועבדיך ידעתי וגו' ואולם בעבור זאת העמדתיך. כדי להודיע לבאי העולם שבזמן שמונע הקב"ה התשובה לחוטא אינו יכול לשוב אלא ימות ברשעו שעשה בתחילה ברצונו. וכן סיחון לפי עונות שהיו לו נתחייב למונעו מן התשובה שנאמר כי הקשה ה' אלהיך את רוחו ואמץ את לבבו. וכן הכנענים לפי תועבותיהן מנע מהן התשובה עד שעשו מלחמה עם ישראל. שנאמר כי מאת ה' היתה לחזק את לבם לקראת המלחמה עם ישראל למען החרימם. וכן ישראל בימי אליהו לפי שהרבו לפשוע מנע מאותן המרבים לפשוע תשובה שנאמר ואתה הסבות את לבם אחורנית כלומר מנעת מהן התשובה. נמצאת אומר שלא גזר האל על פרעה להרע לישראל. ולא על סיחון לחטוא בארצו. ולא על הכנענים להתעיב. ולא על ישראל לעבוד עכו"ם אלא כולן חטאו מעצמן וכולן נתחייבו למנוע מהן התשובה:

מונעין ממנו התשובה ואין מניחין לו רשות לשוב מרשעו.  That means "they withhold Teshuva from him and do not let him turn away from his wickedness."

Then, Reb Yisrael Salanter:

Reb Yisrael Salanter says that in the case of a regular person, Hashem seeks his Teshuva.  But a person might fall to a point where Hashem no longer seeks his Teshuva, and even if he makes tentative steps towards teshuva he will receive no divine assistance.  Then there is the very worst possible level, where not only does he receive no assistance or encouragement, but even if he manages to push himself to try to do teshuva, Hashem makes it impossible for him to follow through.  Teshuva does not exist in this person's world.  (I'm not sure if that means that he can't do Teshuva, or if it means that even if he does Teshuva Shleimah, it will not be accepted.  After all, from Middas Hadin, Teshuva is impossible. 

Finally, I found it interesting that several Achronim (the Nesivos, Rav Bergman, and several others, with approximately the same approach) use this idea to explain the discussion between Reb Meir and Bruria in Brachos 10a.  Reb Meir held that since they were beyond teshuva, there was no point in their living, and they would be better off dead, to avoid further sins, and the world would be better without them.  Bruria taineh'd that the inability, or the loss of siyata dishmaya to do teshuva is an onesh, and for onshim you can be mispallel.  So she told Reb Meir to daven that their onesh of "no access to Teshuva" should be removed, and then maybe they could be mashpia on them to do teshuva.   Or it could be they were arguing about whether they were on level two or three of Reb Yisrael Salanter's chart.  Neither pshat, I'm sorry to say, clicks in the words of Reb Meir or Bruria.  Also, I find it hard to believe that Reb Meir had any way of knowing that they were already on the madreiga of Ein Maspikin, because then the Tzadikim of Yerushalayim who weren't mochi'ach the resha'im (Shabbos 55a) would have the same excuse.  There are those that want to support this pshat by saying that Reb Meir recognized the syndrome from the fact that all his efforts to be mekareiv them, and their being unaffected by the proximity of such an Adam Gadol, so it must be that they are beyond hope.  Sorry, not convinced.   But it's a nice pshat anyway, because even if it's not a valid interpretation of the conversation between Reb Meir and Bruria, the idea that even a person from whom Teshuva has been taken away has hope, the hope that through Tefilla his access to Teshuva will be restored.

NOTE:  in the comments, Reb Micha Berger presents a formidable argument to the effect that it is incorrect to characterize the Kappara of Teshuva as being l'maala miderech hateva.  Please see there, where I cite  Rabbeinu Bachay and the Shla'h (partially cited in the notes in the Kad Hakemach and more fully in my comment) and Reb Micha's response and citations.
Reb Micha has since posted on this question at his Aish Das website, writing, as always, with serious thought and care.
 On that topic, here's a nice video about the human ability to change.

Bo, Shemos 12:3 and 6. Bikkur of Mitzvos. בעשור לחודש הזה ויקחו

The Gemara in Pesachim 96a says that there is a concept of ביקור ד' ימים קודם שחיטה, of purchasing a korban four days before it is offered, and examining it on every one of the ensuing four days for blemishes that would render it unfit for avoda.  This rule applies only to the Korban Pesach offered in Mitzrayim and to the Korban Tamid.  The application to the Pesach Mitzrayim is derived from passuk 3, since they were told to purchase the animals that they would need on the fourteenth on the tenth of the month.  Rashi brings it down in passuk 6.  The rule by Tamid is derived from a gzeira shava of תשמרו by the Tamid and  למשמרת here by the Pesach Mitzrayim.  (See Note 1.)


We also find the din of Bikur in Hilchos Rosh Hashanna.  Ashkenazim begin Slichos no less than four days before Rosh Hashanna.  The Elya Rabba (see MB OC 581:SK6) says this is because by Rosh Hashanna it says (Bamidbar 29:1-2)  וּבַחֹדֶשׁ  הַשְּׁבִיעִי בְּאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ, מִקְרָא קֹדֶשׁ יִהְיֶה לָכֶם כָּל-מְלֶאכֶת עֲבֹדָה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ:  יוֹם תְּרוּעָה, יִהְיֶה לָכֶם.  וַעֲשִׂיתֶם עֹלָה לְרֵיחַ נִיחֹחַ, which we interpret to mean that you should make yourselves into a Korban Olah for Rosh Hashanna; since some Olos (namely, the Tamid,) require bikkur, you too should examine yourselves for spiritual blemishes no less than four days before you do your avoda of Rosh Hashanna.  


Rav Shternbuch in his Taam VaDaas here suggests that Bikkur is an expression of Chivuv Mitzvos, an expression of our love for the precious mitzvos.  In truth, you can examine the korban in one day just as well as you can in four days.  The additional days accomplish nothing. (See Note 2.)  But the additional examination shows a passion, an infatuation with the mitzva, that drives you to do the mitzva in the best possible way; it quadruples the preparation, and this is meritorious.  In fact, that is how Rashi uses the din Bikkur in Passuk 6, where he says that the reason Pesach Mitzrayim needed bikkur while Pesach Doros does not is because the Jews of that time lacked mitzvos or merits that would distinguish them from their Egyptian neighbors and that would justify doing a miracle to redeem them.  So Hashem gave them the din of Bikkur so that they would become involved and busy in preparing for the Mitzva four days before.  The zechus of that extra effort helped them merit Yetzias Mitzrayim. 


What I liked about Rav Shternbuch's observation was that he connects this Din Bikkur to peoples' behavior before Sukkos.  I know hilchos Dalem Minim, I've grown Esrogim, and I can confidently pick a Lulav and Esrog in ten minutes.  I always found the obsessive and minute checking people do on their daled minim to be odd.  He says that this is a minhag Yisrael, and it is the equivalent of Bikkur; check again, and again, and again, even though you know exactly what you're going to find, because this is hiddur mitzvah.  One might speculate as to why only particular mitzvos have this din; it's easy to surmise that it is found by daled minim because they have a special din of hiddur.  Tamid is still tzarich iyun.


By the way, if you are going to accuse me of baalebatisheh thinking because I'm speculating about Taamei Hamitzvos, go and look at the last Rambam in Hilchos Temura, to wit:

אף על פי שכל חוקי התורה גזירות הם כמו שביארנו בסוף מעילה ראוי להתבונן בהן וכל מה שאתה יכול ליתן לו טעם תן לו טעם הרי אמרו חכמים הראשונים שהמלך שלמה הבין רוב הטעמים של כל חוקי התורה

Another place you find the term bikkur is, of course, in Bikkur Cholim.  The Gaon (Aderes Eliahu Devarim 1:12) says that the reason the Gemara (Pesachim 30b and Sotah 12) derives Bikkur cholim from the word ילכו is because the tachlis of Bikkur Cholim is the הליכה, the walking, the preparation.  I never understood this Gaon.  I asked this question on an earlier post on this week's parsha which discusses S'char Halicha, here.  But it might be that this is the whole idea of Bikkur- overdo the preparation.  The הכנה is very important, the הכנה has independent significance.  Do more than would be necessary just to ensure that you can do the mitzva.  Plan it out, be super meticulous, ensure that you do it in the most perfect and thorough manner.  If this is what Bikkur means, then ילכו is indeed the paradigm of hachana.


Here is the Gaon:
ילכו זה ביקור חולים מפני שבכל המצוות ההליכה אינה תכלית המצוה אבל כאן ההליכה עצמה היא המצוה


My problem is that in every mitzva, going is preparation, and doing is the fulfillment.  Here too, going is preparation, and visiting, standing there and commiserating or getting him something, or whatever you do when you're mevaker choleh, is the mitzva.  Evidently, the going is a greater part of this mitzva.  What does that mean?  Why is that true?  How does the Gaon know it, and how do Chazal know it?


Michael, in the comments, proposes that because Bikur Cholim is like קבלת פני השכינה, the walking has a special meaning (like by Aliya Le'Regel (see Teshuvos Chasam Sofer ChM 176, and the story with the lady and Reb Yochanan in  Sota 22a and Bava Metziah 107a as I mention in the post I cited above, both involving presenting one's self before the Shechina.)  I found that Harav Avraham Shapiro is quoted as having taken essentially the same approach, as follows:

בבבא מציעא (ל:) מבארת הגמרא את הפסוק: "והזהרת אתהם את החוקים ואת התורות והודעת להם את הדרך ילכו בה ואת המעשה אשר יעשון". (שמות י"ח, כ'). "דתני רב יוסף... 'את הדרך' זו גמילות חסדים,'ילכו' ביקור חולים". שואל ר' אברום: תינח 'את הדרך - זו גמילות חסדים' זה מובן שהרי הדרך של אברהם אבינו שהודיע לבניו אחריו, זוהי הדרך בכללות אותה משה רבנו צריך להודיע לעם ישראל, אבל מנין לנו לומר ש'ילכו - זה ביקור חולים'?     מה הקשר בין הליכה לביקור חולים דוקא

ר' אברום מבאר זאת על-פי דברי המהר"ל מפראג ב'נתיב העבודה' פרק ה', שהביא דברי חז"ל בילקוט שמעוני (משלי תת"ק) שאומר: "לכך אמר שלמה 'אשרי אדם שומע לי' מה כתיב אחריו 'כי מוצאי מצא חיים', אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא אם הלכת להתפלל לבית הכנסת, לא תעמוד לך על פתח חיצון, אלא הוי מתכוין לכנוס דלת לפנים מדלת... ולמה כן? שהקב"ה מונה פסיעותיך ונותן לך שכר". ומבאר המהר"ל שלא על כל מצוה אמרו, שהקב"ה מונה פסיעותיך, אלא דוקא הליכה לבית הכנסת, "שהשם יתברך מצוי בבית הכנסת, ולפיכך כאשר הולך לבית הכנסת הוא נמשך אל השם יתברך להיות לו דביקות בו יתברך". "ולכן אמר שהקב"ה מונה פסיעותיך, כי אף פסיעה אחת יותר רחוק, הקב"ה מונה, כי הכל הוא לפי התנועה יש לו דביקות בו יתברך... ובזה מקבל פני השכינה גם כן". עד כאן מלשון המהר"ל בענין הליכה לבית הכנסת.

על פי זה מחדש מרן, שכיוון שהגמ' אומרת (מסכת שבת יב:): "שאני חולה דשכינה עמו... תניא נמי הכי, הנכנס 

לבקר את החולה לא ישב לא על גבי מיטה ולא על גבי כסא, אלא מתעטף ויושב לפניו, מפני ששכינה למעלה מראשותיו של חולה שנאמר ה' יסעדנו על ערש דוי". אם כן גם מצות ביקור חולים, יש לה ערך מיוחד של קבלת פני השכינה, שהרי השכינה נמצאת עם החולה, ובזה ההליכה לביקור חולים מתדמה להליכה לבית הכנסת. אם כן, גם במצוה זו יש לומר שהקב"ה מונה כל פסיעה ופסיעה שאדם הולך למצוה. בזה מובנת הדרשה של רב יוסף: 'ילכו - זה ביקור חולים'. יש ערך מיוחד להליכה לשם ביקור חולים

UPDATE:
I've been thinking about this, and I'm pretty convinced that this is a legitimate approach.  

• The reason Reb Yochanan agreed that there is special schar halicha for tefilla is because tefilla is the only moment where we are עומדים לפני המלך, where we are standing in the presence of the Ribono shel Olam.  
• Tefillos, as Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi in Brachos 26b says, כנגד תמידים תקנום, so it stands to reason that this aspect of   עומד לפני המלך was present in the Tmidim as well.  
• As Rav Hirsch says, the Temidim, in a sense, are an extension of the experience of the Pesach in Mitzrayim, which was the moment that Klal Yisrael met the Ribono shel Olam, when the Ribono shel Olam Himself was present to smite the Mitzrim and save the Ivrim.  
• And perhaps this is the pshat by bikkur cholim as well- that we should view bikkur cholim like aliyah le'regel, as if we're coming into Hashem's presence.  

In any case, the idea is be that just as the Kohen Gadol required seven days of Hafrasha (Yoma 2a) before avodas Yom Hakippurim, each experience of עומד לפני המלך requires special hachana, such that the hachana is, as the Gaon says, Tachlis Hamitzva, and should be done as if it were a mitzva itself.  Moving toward the Ribono shel Olam is as meaningful as standing before Him.


This is not like Rav Shternbuch's approach.

Notes.

Note 1.  Rashi and most mefarshim hold that the four-day-examination rule applies to all Pesachim and not only the Pesach Mitzrayim.  The only aspect of bikkur that distinguished Pesach Mitzrayim is that it was made Hekdesh on the tenth, a requirement not found by Pesach Doros, which you can and should be makdish right before you bring it in to the Azara.  I believe the Rambam argues and holds that there is no din Bikkur at all by Pesach Doros.  Support for this is found in פרי מגדים מש"ז סי' ת'ל,מנחת חינוך מצוה ה, and here.


Note 2.  Some honorable mefarshim say that the extra days allow you to decide whether a blemish is temporary or permanent.  I seriously don't know what he is talking about; 1. if this were so, it would apply to all korbanos; 2. even a temporarily blemished animal cannot be sacrificed while it is blemished; 3. it would only apply to animals with some blemish.

Note 3.  To a lesser extent, the din of Shimur by Matzas Mitzva is very similar: Shimur is not necessary to ensure that it's not chametz, because you can determine that by looking at the grain later.  It's just an example of extra chashivus given to hachana.

Bo, Shemos 12:34. משארותם צרורות בשמלותם על שכמם. Respect for Mitzva Leftovers.

The Pasuk says that they carried their packs on their shoulders. Rashi says that these packs contained the leftover matza from the seudas mitzva; Al shichmam—on their shoulders- even though they had many animals that could have carried the leftover matza, they carried it in their hands because of chivuv mitzva, an expression of love for the precious mitzva of Matza.

The Taz and Magen Avraham at the end of OC 167 bring from the Abudraham that you should not give animals (or goyim or birds, says the Mishna Berura,) the prusa of hamotzi, the bread upon which you had made hamotzi. So what do you do with it? Make a bread kugel, or put it into the cholent next week, I guess. The Taz there says that the Medrash Rashi quotes on our possuk is a good source for the Abudraham’s idea; if the concept of chivuv mitzvo goes to the extent that they carried the leftovers in their hands and did not allow their animals to carry them, then kal vachomer one should not feed the leftovers to animals.

We find a similar idea here: the Gemora in Brachos 39b and Shabbos 117b says that Rav Ami and Rav Assi, when they would have the Eiruv Chatzeiros bread available, would use that for Hamotzi. “ רב אמי ורב אסי כי הוה מתרמי להו ריפתא דערובא מברכין עליה המוציא לחם מן הארץ אמרי הואיל ואתעביד ביה מצוה חדא נעביד ביה מצוה אחריתי ” once it has been used for one mitzvah, let us do another mitzva with it. In fact, the Shibalei Haleket at the end of 246 says you should davka use a shaleim, an unbroken loaf of bread, for eiruv, so you will be able to use it for hamotzi.  We see that an item that is left over from being used for a mitzva, even a relatively very minor mitzva such as Eiruv Chatzeiros, should be shown respect and used in the most honorable manner possible.

Of course there is a difference between leftover matza from the Korban Pesach of Yetzias Mitzrayim and leftover bread from hamotzi.   Simply saying Hamotzi on a piece of bread is no different than saying Shehakol on a glass of water; we don't find anyone that says that you have to use the leftover water for a mitzva.  But in truth, you don't need a makor for this din. As we see from Rav Ammi and Rav Assi, it's a simple svara-- show respect to an object that was used for a mitzva. You don't have to put your leftover Cholent into Geniza. But when you have the opportunity to use it in doing another mitzvah, you should do so.  Hamotzi, apparently, is a more significant bracha than others, in that there is a hava amina in Brachos 35 that it is Mid'oraysa; so bread that you made hamotzi on is considered a cheftza shel mitzva.

Please note that these ideas are primarily minhagim; the Gemara in Megilla 26b allows us to throw away items used for Mitzvos.  It is on the authority of the Shi'iltos and the Kol Bo and the Maharil that we are machmir beyond the literal meaning of the Gemara.  The more commonly known application of this hanhaga is for items that are specifically for mitzvos, which have no meaning outside of the mitzva, and which have some special preparation for that use, such as making them Lishmah.  For example, in OC 21 we learn that tzitzis don't need geniza, but should not be subjected to disrespectful use, and even the garment to which the tzitzis were attached should not be used in a degrading manner.  Similarly, this is brought in Rama 664:9 on Hoshanos and in Mishna Berura 297 SK 8 on using the Hadas for Besamim for Havdala, and see Magen Avraham in OC 638 SK 2 regarding Schach.  The way the idea is used here is far broader than the those cases.   Also see Mishna Berura 673 SK 27 to use the wax that dripped from the candles in Shul for Chanuka, and Ritva Shabbos 117b that if you used a pas for hamotzi once, and it is still shaleim, (I guess you used a different piece for eating) you should use it for hamotzi another time, as brought by the Mishna Berura in 527 SK 11 and 48, that bread that was used for eiruv should be placed with the bread for hamotzi and eaten at Seuda Shelishis.

This issue arises in the discussion regarding inviting non-Jewish friends and colleagues to the Seder.  It should be obvious that there are many issues that should be discussed on this matter.  Besides the basic incongruity of such guests at a seder, about which the Torah says זאת חוקת הפסח כל בן נכר לא יאכל בו, and the oddity of saying and explaining Shfoch Chamascha, one of the more serious problems is the Halacha discussed in OC 512, and see Mishna Berura there SK 6.  There is also the matter of teaching Torah to non-Jews, as in Igros YD 2 :132.  Of course, an entirely different perspective comes into play if the guest is in the process of conversion, as discussed in Minchas Elazar 3:8.  But directly relevant to this question of non-Jewish guests, and giving Matza and items from any Seudas Mitzva to non-Jews, is the following Kaf Hachaim on Siman 167, starting with SK קמ:

וכתב שם הט״ז בשם ס׳ טעמי המצות להרקנטי שמזהיר מאד  במצה דמצוה שלא להאכילה

 למי שאינו בן ברית ונותן טעם הגון לזה. וכתב שכן ראיתי רבים נוהגים נזהרי׳ מזה בפסח  יעו״ש ואני שמעתי

 מעשה  נורא ע״ז כי בימי  הרב משה  חיים ז״ל זקנו של מהרי״ח ז״ל בעל המחבר בן יהוידע רב פעלים וכו׳ שזימן

 ישראל בפסח  את עכו״ם א׳ שהיה שכינו והאכילו מצה על שלחנו ואח״כ סיפר זה לפני הרב משה חיים ז״ל ואמר לו

 שיזהר ממנו בזאת  השנה כי אפשר שיזיקנו נזק גדול ויהי היום והישראל יושב ובא העכו״ם ההוא וחרבו שלופה בידו

 ונעשה לו נס  וברח מפניו ר״ל 

 קמא)  וכתב עו״ש הרו״ח ע״ש כלי יקר בפי׳ למלכים ב׳ סימן א׳ שלא

 נתן מסעודה מצוה שום דבר מאכל לגוים עע״ז יעו״ש. וסעודות שאומרים בהם ד״ת  כולם חשובים של מצוה

 וכאילו אוכלים לפני  המקום ב״ה כמ״ש  בפ״ג דאבוה ג׳ שאכלו על שלחן א׳ ואמרו עליו ד״ת  כאילו אכלו משלחנו

 של מקום וכו׳ וג׳ ל״ר אלא אפי' א׳ כמ״ש במס׳ ברכות דף ו׳ ע״א יעו״ש

(By the way, many people have the habit of never throwing out bread; they feel that disgracing bread by putting it into the garbage can bring poverty, as indicated in the gemara (Chulin 105b) about the guy who made a picnic and gathered the crumbs. I have a neighbor that throws all of their leftover bread into the alley, the small street behind our houses used for deliveries. It's ironic: to avoid bizayon of bread, they throw it where it will be stepped on and ground into the mud. This is not only stupid but also entertaining. On the other hand, they're still very wealthy, so maybe they're right and I'm wrong.
Another local oddity- a friend, Rav Shimon Kalman Goldstein, told me that he knows a nursing home operator who gives out hand shmura matzos to gentile business acquaintances before Pesach.  SK has told him that based on the Kaf Hachaim, this might be a misuse of Matza Shmura, but it didn't seem to have influenced that person.  I suggested that he most likely doesn't eat gebrokst, so he probably sprinkled them with water before giving them away and 'deconsecrated' them.  Reb Dovid Kronglas once said that every midda can be used for avodas Hashem.  How do you use the midda of krumkeit?  In being דן את כל האדם לכף זכות.  Usually, to be dan people l'kaf zechus, you need to use the midda of saying a krumeh svora.)

A reader wrote in a private correspondence that he once attended a shiur by Rabbi Heinemann on the topic of respect for items used in fulfillment of mitzvos, and another listener asked whether married couples need to show kavod to their mattresses in light of the mitzva of Piriah ve'Rivyah.  I assume the audience at that moment thought it a humorous question.  However, I would say that the concept applies there no less than it does to bread used at the table on Shabbos of to say hamotzi on.  It is, after all, הלחם אשר הוא אוכל, and while some people overeat, or eat with bad manners, or eat because they enjoy eating more than they desire to honor Shabbos with Lechem Mishna, it's still called a cheftza shel mitzva.  I would have answered that we are only mechabeid things that are used in fulfillment of mitzvos, while in that case, the item was used in the ma'aseh mitzva, not the fulfillment of the mitzva.  Which, of course, raises the question of whether it is a ma'aseh mitzva or a real kiyum hamitzva, and children are just the shiur for petur.  This is more something Chaim B. would address;  see, e.g., here, third paragraph.
Chaim disagrees in the comments.  He says that the bed is no more cheftza shel mitzva than the table at which you're eating the Shabbos meal.  To this I respond with Rabbeinu Bachaye in Parshas Teruma, who, in explaining the pasuk in Yechezkel 41:22, 'זה השולחן אשר לפני ה, tells us that the tzadikim of France would be buried in an aron made of the wood of their dining room table.  You want to be buried in an object that served you in your kiyum hamitzvos.  I remember Rabbi Weinberg telling me that he wanted his shtender, from which he said shiurim, to be buried with him.  Unfortunately, when I told this to his family, they didn't believe me.  He probably should have told them himself, or left instructions in his tzava'ah.  I wonder what I would want buried with me....the computer mouse?  Not a good idea.  Maybe a daf yomi calendar.  Or torah from my children and grandchildren.

Bo, Shemos 12:46. The Korban Pesach and Good Manners

12:46.  V’etzem lo sishbe’ru bo.  The Chinuch in #16 has a long discussion ahl derech hamussar here about how mitzvos should make you a better person.  Specific to this mitzvah, he says that “It is not dignified for royalty and the mentors of mankind to grind bones and break them like dogs and it is not fitting to do so for anyone other than the poorest of the people and the starving.”  


R Shmuel Rozovsky of Ponevezh (brought in the Itturei Torah) stressed the importance of good manners, and coarsening effect of its opposite.  He brings that Reb Isser Zalman brought a group of talmidim to the Alter to hear divrei mussar and to talk in learning, and afterwards the Alter said nice things about all but one of them.  He told Reb Isser Zalman that nothing would come of that boy.  R’ Isser Zalman was surprised, because davkeh that boy was an illui.  The Alter told him that some sugar spilled on the table, and that boy licked his finger and stuck it into the sugar and put his finger into his mouth (in the presence of the Alter.)  A boy that can do that has no future in dvarim shebikdushah.  The story goes on to say that the illuisheh bochur did become the rav of a city, but for some reason he had to leave the position, and he became a lawyer, and eventually went to jail for fraud.


It’s a nice story and nice mussar, but I wonder how true it is.  A man comes to the Olam Ha'emes after 120, and they do the checklist.  "Shomer mitzvos, 100%; kovei’a ittim, yes, well done!; baal chesed, oh yes indeed; and an honest businessman to boot.  But oy, your manners were terrible.  Go to Hell.”  This doesn’t seem reasonable to me.  Also, remember the Gemara in Kiddushin 71b that says that hamashtin mayim arum lifnei mitaso deserves to go into galus, and Rav Avahu snorted and said that doesn't make any sense- just because he's a boor doesn't mean he deserves to go into galus.  Certain oriental societies have exquisite manners ("when you first meet a business contact, bow slightly and present your card with both hands...") , and those same fine people will vivisect you without qualms.  I've always felt that highly refined social behaviors are a warning flag of a hidden and just-barely-latent hostility.  I personally know some people who would make Emily Post proud and who wouldn't offer you a job if you were starving- a warm smile and a sympathetic back rub, maybe, but not a job- and others who would do anything to help you but whose manners would make a hungry man lose his appetite.


But the fact remains that even though a mashtin lifnei mitaso might not deserve galus, Hashem does hate him, as the Gemara in Nidda 17a says.  And, of course, there is an entire masechta of braisos called Derech Eretz, which sets forth rules of behavior, such as who should eat first, not to gulp your drinks (although I have to admit that at a Renaissance Faire I attended on a very hot day, the person who drew me a beer looked away for a few seconds to get my change and saw my empty twenty two ounce flagon and thought she had forgotten to fill it; I think the rules are different at Renaissance Fairs), and so on.  So there you have it.  Chazal are telling us that a concern for the feelings of your fellow man even in such epicene concerns as table manners, and dignified behavior- even when one is alone- are associated with spiritual refinement, and that boorishness is inconsistent with spirituality.  Irrespective of what pshat is, this is the reason the Tiferes Yisrael learns that דרך ארץ in the Mishna in the third perek of Avos means nimusim and mussar, and that it is listed among the essentials of a fully realized Jewish life:

 רבי אלעזר בן עזריה אומר, אם אין תורה, אין דרך ארץ; אם אין דרך ארץ, אין תורה.  אם אין חכמה, אין יראה; אם אין יראה, אין חכמה.  אם אין דעת, אין בינה; אם אין בינה, אין דעת.  אם אין קמח, אין תורה; אם אין תורה, אין קמח.

 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Bo, Shemos 12:13. Acharon- Last or Next. The Mutability of Prophecy

This is a classic vort that every Jewish boy and girl should know.  In case you missed it, or you heard it but don't know who said it, here it is.  For the essence of the vort, all you need to read are the paragraphs marked with ¶, which are the first two and last two of the following paragraphs.  (Imperfect character recognition software resulted in some typos.  If I have time I'll correct it, but it's readable as it is.  If it annoys you, I'll give you my password and you can fix it yourself.)

¶ 1 The Navi said in Chagai 2:9 that גדול יהיה כבוד הבית הזה האחרון מן הראשון,  the glory of this Temple, the Acharon, will be greater than that of the first.  "Although the First Temple has been destroyed, another will be built, and it will be greater than the first."  The Temple he is prophesying is the Second Temple, as the Gemara in Bava Basra 3a says:   The "greater glory" of the Second Temple was only temporal, in that it was taller and lasted longer than the first.

¶ 2  Many, many people have asked that the term אחרון seems terminal; we generally assume that אחרון means "the last one,"  and since that Temple was ultimately destroyed, Chagai's prophecy would seem to dash our hope for a third and final Beis Hamikdash.

This question first appears in the Zohar פי פנחס דף רכא.:

  שאל גוי אחד את  ר ׳ אליעזר אתם אומרים שיהיה לכם מקדש שלישי הא

כתיב בבית שנ י [חגי ב׳, ט׳] גדול יהיה כבוד הבית הזה האחרון מן הראשון, א״כ אחרון משמע שאין אחריו
כלום, ותירץ לתלמידיו אחרון בידי אדם אבל מקדש שלישי יהיה בידי שמים כמו שנאמר [זכריה בי, ט/] ואני אהיה לה נאם ה׳ חומת אש סביב

It's worth knowing that The Beis Halevi in Toldos says a teretz (here paraphrased) along the same lines as the Zohar:

שני הבתים הראשונים היו נבנים כדי שיהיו מוכנים על ידיהם לזכות להשליש, שיהיה קיים לעד, דזה עיקר
בית המקדש הניתן לישראל שיבב״א, והבתים הראשונים הם נקראים מוקדמים, שהם רק הכנה לעיקר הבית שהוא השלישי. נמצא דהבית השני הוא אחרון למוקדמים, וזה שאמר הכתוב גדל יהיה הבית הזה חאחרון למוקדמים

So according to the Zohar's teretz and the Beis Halevi's teretz, אחרון does mean the last one, but it was the last of its kind.  The first two Temples were made by the human hand, and the third will be of divine fire and categorically different.

After the Zohar, the next person that addressed the question is Rashba, in his Teshuvos שו״ת ח״ד סימן קפ״ז:

 חזר ובא עלי מצד אחר ואמר,
הנה הכתוב אומר שאין בית אחר הבית השני, שכן כתוב: ״גדול יהיה כבוד הבית הזה האחרון מן הראשון״. הנה שקראו אחרון׳ ואם יש אחר לאחריו׳ לא יקרא לזה אחרון. אמרתי לא קראו אחרון אלא בהצטרף אל הראשון, וכמוהו ״וישם
את השפחות ואת ילדיהן ראשונה, ואת לאה וילדיה אחרונים, ואת רחל ואת יוסף אחרונים/
הנה קראה ללאה וילדיה אחרונים אע״פ שרחל ויוסף אחרונים להם, אלא שקראם אחרונים
״בהצטרף אל השפחות וילדיהן״. אמר: זה בדיבור בני אדם שאינם יודעים ולא בידם האיחור,
אבל כדברי הנביא שיודע האמת לא יבא. אמרתי :בא אפילו במה שיאמר לנביא מפי הגבורה׳ שכן
כתוב במה שאמר הוא יתעלה למשה ,׳והיה אם לא יאמינו ולא ישמעו לקול האות הראשון והאמינו
לקול האות האחרון, והיה אם לא יאמינו גם לשני אותות האלה ולקחת גם ממימי היאור״, זעה
שקרא לאות השני אחרון אע״פ שבא אחריו אות המים׳ עכ״ל

According to the Rashba, Acharon doesn't mean "the last" when it follows the word "Rishon."  In that case, it simply means "the one that follows."

The Tosfos Yomtov in Dmai 7:3 says that Acharon can mean "the next" even when it does not say Rishon, but most achronim, including the Netziv in his introduction to the Haamek Davar, disagree.  The Rashba also seems to contradict the TY'T.

The Gemara in Nazir 21a addresses the question as well, because the Mishna on the previous daf says the following:  If "Person A" verbally promises to become a nazir, and Person B says "And I," and Person C says "And I," they are all viewed as having enunciated the formula that makes a person a nazir.  However, the status of the latter people depends on that of the prior.  So, the Mishna says, if A annulled his status of Nazir, the verbal promise he made is rendered retroactively meaningless, so the people who followed and said "And I" are also released from being Nazirs.  If the Acharon person annuls his promise, he alone is released, but the others are unaffected.  Amoraim argue in the Gemara about whether the last person is dependent on the first (C means "I am like A") or on the one that immediately preceded him (C means "I am like B.")  The machlokes would be relevant where there are A B and C, and B annulled his Nezirus.  If C is dependent on B, C is also annulled.  If, however, C is dependent on A's declaration, then C remains a Nazir, because A's declaration has not been voided.   The Gemara attempts to prove that C is dependent on B by showing that the Mishna only said that the annulment of the Acharon affects no one else, which implies that an annulment by B would affect others, namely, C.  The Gemara rejects the proof; it could be that when the Mishna says that annulment by the Acharon affects no one else, it means annulment by B.  Why, the Gemara asks, would we call B the Acharon?  Because, the Gemara answers, when you say Rishon, the one that follows is called Acharon, even if there are others that follow.  In other words, Acharon means "later," or "the next", and it does not have to mean "the last," but only where the word Rishon was used.  (This is pointed out by the Rashash there in Nazir.)

The question was thoroughly explored in the Sdei Chemed,  שדי חמד ז״ל בפאת השדה מערכת א׳ אות ס״ו .

The Sdei Chemed also brings a nice idea from Rav RNY Falagi in his Avos Harosh (p. 87a), who connects this to the Gemara in Brachos 61a.  The Gemara there says "first the Nachash was cursed, "Ul'be'sof" Chavah, "Ul'be'sof" Adam.  Since sof and acharon are synonymous, it appears that Acharon/Sof does not have to mean "final," but rather "next."

This can also be seen in  דברים כט כא where it says  הדור חאחרון בניבם אשר יקומו מאחריכם 
There, too, Acharon means "those that follow."

I think that the the best explanation of the passuk in Chagai (and the pesukim in Shemos where Hashem told Moshe about the Os Ha'acharon) is that of the Malbim in Chagai:

 ״ גדול יהיה כבוד הבית הזה האחרון מן הראשון״, כי יהיה הוא הבית האחרון שלא יחרב עוד, ״ובמקום הזה אתן שלום״, ולא יהיה ביניכם שנאת חנם שהוא היה באמת הגורם לחורבן בית שני, לפי זה כל מאמר
זה הוא תנאי, אם יבא עוד רוח אחת, והוא אם יעשו את הדבר אשר כרת עמם בצאתם ממצרים,
אז יהיה הוא הבית האחרון שאין אחריו בית, ויהיה גדול מן הראשון, וכשלא נתקיים התנאי כי
לא שמרו ברית לא היה שלום במקום, כי נתרבו הפריצים והכתות ושנאת חנם, לא נתקיים
היעוד אז, עד שיבנה הבית האחרון בקץ האחרון שאז יתקיימו היעודים האלה,

The point of the Malbim is that words in Tanach, and the words of Nevu'ah, intentionally encompass a multiplicity of meanings.  When Chaggai described the Bayis Sheni as the Acharon, the word held several possible meanings, ranging from benign to malign.  One of those several meanings would definitely come true (like, among many other examples, the story of Rabbah bar Rav Huna chair in Gittin 35).  Which of the meanings will come true- that depends on our behavior.  Chaggai was telling Klal Yisrael that if they will be worthy, the Second Temple would be the Acharon/Ultimate.  If they will be unworthy, then it would be the Acharon/Next.

(It has been said that the Malbim's approach depreciates (see note) the entire idea of nevuah, because it makes nevuah meaningless- saying that many possible outcomes can be read into the nevuah makes it tentative and ambiguous, which means it's not a prediction at all- "I predict that something will happen tomorrow."  I don't think that's a criticism, because the Navi is saying something absolute- that a Bayis will soon be built.  The vagueness is only regarding the future of the Bayis.  It's not like the Yarum Roshcha of the dreams Yosef interpreted.  As pointed out by g in the comments, this is a universally accepted concept, first seen when we were forewarned of four hundred years of exile and servitude at the Bris Bein Habesarim, but the counting commenced long before they went to Mitzrayim, so the literal avdus only lasted two hundred and ten years.  Also, by Yonah and Ninveh, נהפכת was a threat that meant "turned upside down," i.e., physical upheaval.  But after they did teshuva, it turned out to mean spiritual upheaval, i.e., rebirth.  But please see this post on Parshas Bo where I bring the Beis Halevi- and, oddly, the Malbim- that discuss this point in depth, and which argues that while Nevua may be protean as to the ultimate fact, it is specific as to intent, )

¶ 3  The reason all this is here, in this week's parsha, is because of a passuk in this parsha - Shemos 12:13,  וְהָיָה הַדָּם לָכֶם לְאֹת עַל הַבָּתִּים    Many achronim have used this passuk to explain the passuk in Chagai.

¶ 4   Two weeks ago, In parshas Shemos, we read about the miracles Hashem gave Moshe to show Bnei Yisrael.  First, (4:3) there was the miracle of the staff that turned into a snake.  Then Hashem gave Moshe another miracle for a sign, which was Moshe's hand becoming leprous and being healed (4:6).  Hashem said (4:8) that if the Bnei Yisrael don't believe the first miracle, the snake, then they will believe the "Os Ha'acharon," the sign of the leprosy. Afterwards (4:9), Hashem said that if Bnei Yisrael don't believe either of the miracles, there was a third one, turning a cup of water into blood.  So it is evident that when Hashem called the second of the three miracles the "Acharon," it only meant "the next one," not the final one.  In this week's parsha, Hashem told the Bnei Yisrael to put blood from the Korban Pesach on their doorposts; the passuk says that the blood will be a sign on the houses.  Literally, this means that the blood of the korban will designate and make safe the Jewish dwellings.  But in the context of what we've been discussing, it can be understood to mean that the blood, the third of the three signs Hashem gave Moshe, is proof that there will be a third Beis Hamikdash, because there, the word Acharaon only meant "next" and not "final," so in Chagai also, although the second Bayis is called "Acharon," it only means "the second one", because there will be a third.  The blood will be a sign regarding the houses, i.e., the Temples.

 וְהָיָה הַדָּם לָכֶם לְאֹת עַל הַבָּתִּים

Note: 
I found that the Malbim's idea is found in Rashi in Yechezkel 43:10-11 and 43:14-15.

מצאתי, ראויה היתה ביאה שנייה של עזרא כביאה ראשונה של יהושע לבא בזרוע ובנס כדדרשינן עד יעבור ובנין זה מאז היה ראוי להם כשעלו מן הגולה לגאולת עולם אלא שגר' החטא שלא הית' תשובתם הוגנת על מנת שלא לחטוא ויצאו ברשות כורש ובנו לעצמן ויש אומרים בבבל נכשלו בנכריות 

Rashi, in turn, is based on the Gemara in Brachos 4a.



Surgeon General's Warning: 
This is a vort.   It is not meant as a pshat, or a remez, or a drush, or a sod.  It's just a vort, what we call  שעשוע בדברי תורה, in the sense of לולא תורתך שעשועי  .  It has been said by many people.  It's impossible to know who said it first, but none of them meant it to be interpretive.  



Note:

I said that some people feel the the Malbim's approach depreciates nevuah.  Some people might feel that the correct word is deprecate, not depreciate, and it's true that these words are in flux.  In my usage, deprecate is to show disapproval, and depreciate is to belittle, and the correct word here is depreciate.

Bo, Shemos 12:28. Vayeilchu Va'ya'asu. Schar Halichah

The pasuk says that the Bnei Yisrael were commanded to bring the Pesach Korban, and "they went and they did" as they were commanded. The phrase "they went" seems superfluous, in that it could have simply said "they did as they were commanded." Rashi says that we learn from this pasuk that not only was their 'doing' viewed as fulfillment of God's will, but their 'going' to do the mitzvah was also reckoned to be an independent meritorious act. This is called Schar Halichah, reward for preparatory effort.

The Gemara (bottom of Sota 22a and Bava Metziah 107a) brings several stories involving Rav Yochanan. One story relates that he noticed a woman who had come to daven in his shul, who could have davenned in a shul that was much closer to her home. He asked her, why did you have to walk so far to daven? She answered, "Rebbi, velo schar pesiyos yesh?" Rebbi, is there no reward for the walking?

This is very strange. Why would you be rewarded for walking to a farther shul when you could daven just as well in one that is close to your house? How about if you took an unnecessarily circuitous route on the way to shul? Would that be a mitzvah? Would it be a spiritual endeavor, or would it be merely aerobic (inspiration or respiration)? (It doesn't say that she came to Rav Yochanan's shul because he was the holy and righteous leader of the people, so don't quote me meforshim that say that pshat, because it's just revisionism, and the Torah says "midvar sheker tirchak".)

One might say that this concept is specific to Tefillah. For example, the Butchatcher's Eishel Avraham says that it is because tefillah is like bringing sacrifices, and in Avodas Korbanos the carrying of the sacrificial parts, the holacha, is an independent avodah. Also, one might say that as one walks, he thinks about the tefillah he is going to, and so his thoughts become a part of his davenning.

In fact, the Netziv here says that the Mechilta Rashi brings is based on the fact that specifically by Korban Pesach it says "Mishchu Uke'chu," draw forth for yourselves a korban pesach, so "schar hachana karov li'schar guf hamitzvah." Again, this indicates a narrowing to the context of Korbanos.

Also, see Bava Kamma 106, where there is an opinion that the land portions in Israel which were farther from Yerushalyim were more prestigious, because their location mandated greater effort in coming to Yerushalayim for the Shalosh Regalim.

UPDATE, EREV ROSH HASHANNA OF 72. 
I am copying over to here something I had written elsewhere on this website.

The Gemara in Bava Basra 122a (אלא לקרובה ורחוקה) strongly implies that the closer a tribe's land was to Yerushalayim, the better the portion.  This is how the Rashbam learns the Gemara- because it is closer to the Kedusha of Yerushalayim, and farther from the dangerous borders.  I once heard from Reb Moshe that one can say the contrary as well- that the farther from Yerushalayim the better, because then you have to walk farther on the Shalosh Regalim, and for every step there is schar halicha (e.g., the woman Reb Yochanan talked to in Sotah 22a).  You are placed in a situation where you have to do more hachana.  I never understood how he could say that, when the pashtus of the Gemara in Bava Basra is directly opposite.  I understand that drush is more flexible, but how can you say the exact opposite of the Gemara?  I then saw that the Chasam Sofer here says exactly like Reb Moshe.

מיהו לולא דברי הרשב"ם היה אפשר לומר דרחוק היה זכות יותר דאיכא שכר פסיעות לילך למקדש 

In any case, this concept is brought in Shulchan Aruch, at least in the context of tefillah. The Magen Avraham in 90:22 says it is better to daven in a more distant shul rather than your Friday night default shul.

But there is an interesting teshuvas Chasam Sofer (ChM 176)that seems to apply schar pesiyos more generally. The story was that there was a shochet who was a leitz, like a class clown. He loved to tease the local tzadik, the mohel. When he had a child, he sent word to the mohel that he needed him to come out to his house. The Mohel traveled four hours, and walked in to general laughter, as, I imagine, the gathered leitzim all said, "Stop the Moyel, it's a goil!" (An old east side joke.) The questions asked of the Chasam Sofer were whether to prohibit the shochet from shechting in the area in the future, and also whether he owed the mohel money for the trip. I don't remember whether he says to kick the shochet out; but he does say that since the mohel was promised the opportunity to perform a Mitzvah, the shochet has the obligations of one who hires a laborer and leaves him sitting idle; therefore he has to pay him the value of the unperformed mitzvah, which the Gemara sets at ten gold coins. Then the Chasam Sofer says that he also has to pay for the schar psiyos, the effort expended in reliance on the promise of performing a mitzvah which turned out to not be a mitzvah; but he says he doesn't have any sources that quantify a value for schar psiyos, so he can't assess a monetary penalty for that, and whatever liability results from that will have to be left for dinei shamayim.

There's also an Aderes Eliahu in Devarim 1:12 that applies schar pesiyos to bikkur cholim, which is alluded to (see Sotah 12) in the words "haderech yeilchu bah," but his explanation of the specific connection between schar halicha and bikkur cholim is terse to the point of obscurity.
UPDATE:  I have a mehalach, so to speak, to answer this question, in a new post on this week's parsha, here.
UPDATE II: I HAVE A NEW MEHALACH, BASED ON THE MARSHA IN SOTAH 46B, HERE.
UPDATE III:

Please note that this relates somewhat to the question on the Mishna in Bikkurim 3:3. 

ג,ג  הקרובים מביאין תאנים וענבים, והרחוקים מביאין גרוגרות וצימוקים.  והשור הולך לפניהם, וקרניו מצופות זהב, ועטרה של זית בראשו; והחליל מכה לפניהם, עד שהן מגיעין קרוב לירושלים.  הגיעו קרוב לירושלים, שלחו לפניהם, ועטרו את ביכוריהן.  והפחות והסגנים והגזברין יוצאין לקראתם; לפי כבוד הנכנסין, היו יוצאין.  וכל בעלי אומנייות שבירושלים עומדין לפניהם, ושואלין בשלומן, אחינו אנשי מקום פלוני, באתם בשלום.

Rav in Mishnayos

וכל בעלי אומניות שבירושלים עומדים מפניהם. אף על גב דאין בעלי אומניות חייבין לעמוד מפני תלמידי חכמים בשעה שעוסקים במלאכתם כדי שלא יתבטלו ממלאכתם, מכל מקום היו חייבים לעמוד מפני מביאי בכורים דחביבה מצוה בשעתה. ומטעם זה עומדים מפני נושאי המטה שהמת בה ומפני נושאי התינוק לברית מילה:

Shoshanim l'David on that Rav, brought in Tos Anshei Sheim

בכורים ג ג  שושנים לדוד 

יש לדחות דשאני התם דבעידנא דאזלי הם עוסקים במצוה ממש דמקרא כתיב והלכת אל המקום וגם בהוצאת המת י"ל דעוסק במצוה ממש שכבוד היא למת לנשאו על כתפו... אבל בזה אכתי לאו עוסק במצוה הוא דאין שום מצוה בהולכת התינוק והכנה למצוה הוא דהויא ומנ"ל דצריכין גם בזה לעמוד. ואפשר דמ"מ שכר פסיעות יש. ומ"מ לא מצאתי כן להפוסקים ז"ל אלא ראה זה במרדכי שצריכים לעמוד כל העם בשעת מילה אמנם לאו משום כבוד העוסקים במצוה מטו בה אלא משום כבוד המצוה עצמה, והביא זכר לדבר ויעמוד כל העם בברית

With the Gaon in mind, we can say that here are Bikkur Cholim is another example.

UPDATE:

I just saw something from Rav Sternbuch on this week's parsha (12:37) in which he basically disregards everything we have above.

כשש מאות אלף רגלי הגברים י"ב , ל"ז

פירש בתרגום יונתן רגלי היינו "מטיילין על רגליהון ולא רכבין על סוסוון" . ונראה שאין הכוונה מפני חיבוב מצוה מטריחים עצמם בגופם, וכעין נושאי המיטה במת שאם אפשר נושאים אותה בכתף מפני כבוד המת, שבמצוה לא מצינו לילך דוקא רגלי דרך ארוכה ולא לנסוע ברכב .

ונראה שכאן הלכו רגלי להורות שאינם מפחדים ממצרים וכאילו נסים מפניהם , שהיו בטוחים שזמן הגאולה הגיע ולא יצליחו להדביקם ולמנוע גאולתם 

Bo, Shemos 13:19. Tefillin and the Very Unfortunate Tattoo

The Minchas Yitzchak 3:11 has an interesting shaileh. A man had served in the army. During his time in the military, he got a tattoo on his left upper arm, precisely where one puts the shel yad of tefillin. The tattoo depicted an unclothed woman. Now the man had become a baal tshuvoh. The question was, could he put his tefillin on his left arm over the tattoo of the woman? Or would it be better to put it on his right arm?

Obviously, he cannot put the tefillin on his other arm. The Minchas Yitzchok suggests various methods by which the person might put on tefillin in a manner which mitigates the disgrace to the tefillin.

The Minchas Yitzchok, surprisingly, does not suggest what seems to me to be the obvious and correct answer. That is, this person should use indelible ink to dress her---Just cover her up with a blotch of India ink or permanent marker, which stains the skin but is absorbed completely and has absolutely no tangible substance. Indelible ink is not a chatzitzah, even if it is evident and the person does not want it there. It is no more a chatzitza than women's hair dye is a chatzitza, in other words, it's not a chatzitza at all. The Chatzitza problem only arises if the extraneous matter has substance.

Parenthetically, I don't want the title of this piece to mislead anyone into thinking that any voluntary tattoo might be Kosher. It is not. It is biblically prohibited for any Jew to voluntarily be tattooed. Remarkably, even most Reform rabbis agree that this prohibition should be honored. Only the most rebellious or angry Jewish person would tattoo himself. It is a permanent declaration that he rejects not only the halachah but also the cultural tradition of the Jewish people.


HOWEVER:

My dear brother sent me a news article that mentioned that tattoos on grafted skin also stay forever. He said that this would be a hetter to get a tattoo. I found the idea repulsive: it's bad enough to get someone else's skin, but to get skin that has a personal tattoo would be horrible. But then I realized that this gives us a better hetter for tattoos. One could have a surgeon remove a piece of skin from his body, have it tattooed, and then put the skin back. An argument could be made that there was no maiseh of nesina of a ksoves while it was bsarchem. Of course, it could be that putting it on your body gufa is called nesina bachem - as the passuk says, וכתובת קעקע לא תתנו בכם. It doesn't say the issur is the writing, it's the nesinah bachem. Still, it's a possibility that we ought to investigate.


UPDATE 2018
I saw this very moving story, and it's a perfect way to end this post.

Rabbi Hanoch Teller writes a story he personally witnessed regarding a young man, Jamie, who had recently become Torah observant and went to immerse in a busy mikveh in Jerusalem. As he walked towards the mikveh, he held his hands over his arms, attempting to cover his tattoos. As he stepped into the mikveh, he slipped and the lewd tattoos that lined his biceps were now exposed for all to see. At an earlier time, Jamie had viewed his tattoos with pride, but that afternoon he felt humiliation.

An elderly Jew stepped forward and in a heavily accented English declared, “Look here, I also have a tattoo.” Stretching out his frail arm, the man pointed to the row of numbers from tattooed on his arm. “It seems we’ve both come a long way.” (From It’s A Small Word After All, 1997)

Bo, Shemos 12:8. Maror and Redemption.

The Bais Halevi (end of Drush 2) brings a Medrash on a posuk in Eichah השביעני במרורים “Hisbi’ani bamerorim, hirvani la’ana.” The Medrash says that this posuk is a remez that the first day of Pesach and Tisha Ba’av fall on the same day of the week, a rule which we know as “Aht Bash” etc. So we see that in Megillas Eichah, which is the description of Tisha Ba’av, there is a passuk that refers to Pesach, and also that the day of the week that the seder falls on is connected to Tisha Ba’av. The Bais Halevi asks, why on Earth would there be such a connection? What does Pesach, the celebration of the redemption from Mitzrayim, have to do with Tisha Ba’av, the day we mourn destruction and exile?

He then asks another question. If ‘merorim’ is a reference to moror, why would it be predicated by the word Hisbi’ani (‘he satiated me’)? We certainly don’t need to eat maror to satiation. (In fact, mid’orayso, you are yotzei maror with a tiny little piece, and you only need a kezayis because the brocho states “ahl achilas maror”, as the Rosh says in Pesochim.) The answer is, though, that according to Hillel we eat the moror together with the meat of the korbon peisach, and since the korbon is eaten when we are full– al hasova– the taste of moror remains in our mouth when we are satiated. But why would the Torah require that the taste of bitterness remain in our mouth after we ate the korbon pesach? After all, we eat moror because there was commemorate slavery and redemption on the same night, but it ended with redemption. So why leave the taam moror for the end and remain with that taste in our mouths?

The answer to both questions is this: we were supposed to be in Mitzrayim 400 years. But “Hakodosh boruch hu chisheiv es hakeitz,” which means that since we were almost assimilated into Mitzrayim, we were on the 49th level o f Tumah, we had to leave then or we would have lost our identity forever. But our early exit from Mitzrayim came with the price of a future golus to make up for the early end of that one. Therefore, we are meramez that the seed of Tisha Ba’av was planted at the moment of the geula from Mitzrayim, which is commemorated by the Korbon Pesach. It was a great redemption, but not a perfect redemption.

And see above Shemos 5:3, that Moshe asked Pharaoh to let them out to be serve Hashem for three days, to be makriv korbonos. Why the duplicity? Why not just confront Pharaoh with the demand to leave? With this we can see that his cheshbon might have been that if they were makriv, maybe the chizuk would have reinvigorated their faith and identity, it would have brought them back from the 49th level of tumah, and thus they would be able to stay the whole 400 years, so that the geula would have been a perfect and permanent one without a Tisha Ba’av to follow. The way Harav Reuven Feinstein shlita said it was that sometimes achishenu can be later than b’ito, which he explained with a reference to the mistake that Belshatzar and Korosh and Achashveirosh made in interpreting the ‘70 years’ of golus. What he means is that an achishenu might leave an outstanding balance which will have to be paid later, so it really extends the problem. Therefore, B’ito is faster than Achishenu.

I also saw that the Malbim says exactly the Beis Halevi’s vort, including the Medrash, in Eicha 3:15. (By the way, the Beis Halevi was long before the Malbim.) Reb Moshe is also quoted as saying the essential parts of the vort in the Kol Rom. Reb Moshe adds that the 400 year geula was meant to be quiet, with the Egyptians realizing what they did was wrong and that the Jews were the am hanivchar. Furthermore, he says, that is what the Geula Ha'asida will be like, too. 

When I said this in shul, someone remarked that we’ve paid over ten times as much as the outstanding number of years! I answered, and this is important to incorporate into the vort, that what it means is that the birth of Klal Yisroel was in a state of potential avdus, that there was a chiyuv of avdus/golus hanging over us. This admixture of avdus into our identity expresses itself in our being subject to golus. In other words, it’s not payment for the years we owe, it’s an element of our identity and our fate. Or, (and probably better for preventing complaints, but possibly not exactly what the Beis Haleivi means,) the geula from Mitzrayim was imperfect. It was glorious, it was with nissim and niflo’os and the Yad Hashem, but it was imperfect, because while it did take us out of Mitzrayim, there remained a shemetz of avdus on and in us.  (♫You can take the Jews out of Mitzrayim but....)