Parshas Emor Vayikra 21:24 A Non-Kohen that Shechts a Korban

 When a Yisrael Shechts a Korban

21:24. V’el kol Bnei Yisroel. At the end of the Parsha that describes the mumim, the physical disfigurements, that disqualify a kohen from doing the sacrificial service in the Temple, the passuk says that Moshe told these dinim to Aharon and his sons and to all the Bnei Yisroel. The kashe is, what does this have to do with the Bnei Yisroel? This does not seem to have any relevance to non-kohanim, and, like the vast majority of Korban law, it should be addressed only to the Kohanim.

Rashi answers this by saying that this is a command to Beis Din to know and enforce these halachos for the Kohanim.

The Ibn Ezra here in 21:24 (as understood by Reb Meir Simcha here) says something much more interesting. As we know, the vast majority of the avodah, the sacrificial service, may be done only by a Kohen. However, the Shechita of Korbanos, even Kodshei Kodoshim, may be done by any Jewish person, male or female, tahor or tamei. Inasmuch as whoever can shecht chulin for consumption can shecht kodashim, one assumes that Shechita does not carry with it any particular restrictions. The Ibn Ezra is mechadesh that a Yisrael who shechts a korban cannot be a ba’al mum. (Can you imagine what Erev Pesach looked like in the Beis Hamikdash? I assume that the pesachim were shechted by the Yisraelim that brought them, or that all the shochtim in Israel were called up for duty. According to the Ibn Ezra, they would all have to strip and be examined by Beis Din to establish that they are not ba'alei mum! Unless perhaps the Beis Din trusted people to reveal and ask about any possible mum problem, since there is a chezkas kashrus and, I suppose, a rove that they are not ba'alei mum.)

Reb Meir Simcha asks from an open Mishna in the beginning of the third perek of Zvachim that says “kol hapsulim sheshachtu shchitasam ksheira,” and this includes ba’alei mum.

The sefer Kanfei Yona, by a Yona Voller, suggests that the Ibn Ezra means lechatchila. (He brings the Gemora there that asks that ‘sheshachtu” is mashma bedi’eved, but a passul can shecht lechatchila, and the Gemara answers that a tomei shouldn’t shecht lechatchila because he might be mitamei the korban, which is mashma that all the other psulim can shecht lechatchila, and he is madche that tomei is befeirush in the Mishneh, but ba’al mum is not, so the Gemara can’t use ba’al mum to be meyasheiv the loshon hamishneh.)

This Ibn Ezra reminds me of several things.
First, R’ Gifter in Parshas Shemini (Vayikra 10:9) says that the issur of shasui yayin (that one who has drunk wine cannot do avodah) applies equally to a Yisrael that shechts; this is similar to the idea of the Ibn Ezra here. So Erev Pesach, not only do you have to strip, you also have to breath into a breathalyzer.
Also, this issue relates to the machlokes (Rashi in Yevamos) about whether a Yisrael can shecht a korban tzibur on Shabbos.
Also, this relates to the machlokes Rabbeinu Efraim and Tosfos about whether a sakin has to be a kli shareis-- it seems to me that if the sakin does not have to be a kli shares, the shochet would have no particular requirements. Yes, of course it's easy to disagree with this.
It is universally accepted that the Yisrael, or the Kohen, who shechts, can be mefagel during shechita. If so, it obviously has aspects of avoda, so it’s logical that a Mum would be a problem.

But I still need to understand why mum and shasui are problems when tumah is not.

Emor, Vayikra 22:24. Ube'artzechem Lo Sa'asu. Spaying Pets. Part I

My Chavrusa told me a remarkable story. He knows a talmid chacham, a musmach who was a practicing Rav for several years, who then went to medical school and became a doctor. He told my chavrusa that he had a nice surgical practice that included the performance of vasectomies. One day, he said, he came across a halacha that he simply had never known-- that performing an elective vasectomy is a Mitzvah! Unfortunately, it is a Mitzvas Lo Sa'aseh, not a Mitzvas Asei. In all his years in Yeshiva, and despite his Semicha studies, he simply had never learned this halacha.

This law is derived from the passuk in Parshas Emor, Vayikra 22:24. The Torah lists various blemishes which disqualify animals from use as Korbanot. Among these blemishes is a list of disfigurements or removal of the genital organs. The passuk ends with the words "ube'artzechem lo sa'asu," which, Chazal teach us, means that it forbidden to remove or destroy or render non-functional the genital organs of any creature, from insect to human. I was surprised that the sugya of Chardal in Bava Basra 80, which refers to this halacha, escaped this person's notice, or at least I was surprised until a very close relative, who shall remain nameless, mentioned that he, at the age of thirty, has yet to learn Maseches Bava Basra. (But he knows dinei Taharas Hamishpacha ten times better than I do.) No doubt, our scholarly bretheren are familiar with this law, probably not from the Gemara, but rather from Josephus' The Antiquities of the Jews (Chapter 8, Section 40), where he discusses Jewish disgust with the practice, and describes it as an affront to God's will.  (See text of Josephus at end of this post.)

It goes without saying that the halacha has a vast body of qualifications and specifications which might have strict or lenient application. The point is that one must be aware of the halacha. Castrating (sirus) a calf is biblically prohibited. Sirus of dogs is prohibited; Sirus of goldfish is prohibited; sirus of bumblebees is prohibited; for all I know, sirus of the copepods in the tapwater you New Yorkers drink is prohibited; and telling a non-Jew to do it for you is assur as well, albeit miderabanan.

Recently, ordinances have been proposed or passed in Los Angeles and Chicago which require all owners of dogs and cats to spay or neuter their pets, or face fines up to $500. Certified Breeders are exempt; Orthodox Jews are not. A brief has been filed in support of a legal challange to the ordinance in LA, claiming that the ordinance impedes the practice of religion for Jews(here and here ) This is a Bubbeh maiseh, of course; Jews can avoid the conflict by not owning a dog or a cat, or they can buy them fixed.

Others have defended the practice by quoting Harav Amar, the Rishon Letzion, as having said that having a non-Jewish vet spay the animal is allowed because it helps to avoid tzaar ba'alei chaim. This is at best a half truth, possibly a total fabrication, but most likely just a misunderstanding. But at least the halacha is getting some press.

One of my favorite halachos is the rule that one is allowed to cut off the comb of a rooster, although this renders him impotent (Shabbos 110b). The reason this is allowed is because this has no physical effect on the generative organs, but, as Rashi there explains, only throws the rooster into mourning for his lost glory-- מתאבל על כבודו שאבד. It is like taking the car away from a teenager.

There is a related halacha involving men: the Torah states that a Jewish man who suffers certain genital disfigurements is prohibited from marrying certain women. This is known as the halacha of Petzu'ah Dakkah. In cases of prostate surgery, which often involves the severing of the vas deferens, which is a part of the shvilei hazerah, the issue arises as to whether the surgery will render the patient a Petzu'ah Dakkah. However, the normative halacha follows the Chazon Ish and Rabbi Feinstein, who held that although severing the vas deferens in the scrotum would render a man a Petzu'ah Dakkah, since prostate surgery is only within the abdomen, it does not render the man a Petzu'ah Dakkah. This is a purely halachic distinction: there is no biological difference where the vas is severed. Still, the halachic leniency has been generally accepted.

Many people (some of whom have published articles under this misapprehension) have mistakenly connected the Petzu'ah Dakkah leniency to elective vasectomy, and have assumed that since internal ligation or severing does not create Petzu'ah Dakkah, this act is also not prohibited mi'deoraysa under the Issur of Sirus, of Be'artzechem lo sa'asu kein. The Aruch Hashulchan EH 5:24 states explicitly that this is WRONG WRONG WRONG. They are different issurim with different rules. Methods that are allowed under the former may be prohibited under the latter. The reason "kos shel ikrin," hormonal castration, is only a rabbinic prohibition, is that it does not generate immediate gross physical change in the reproductive organs. But it is clear that internal severing or ligation of reproductive organs, while perhaps not covered by the rule of Petzu'ah Dakkah, is prohibited under the rule of Be'artzechem. Mi'deoraysa. And like all isurim de'oraysa, is only permitted in very limited circumstances.

Among the issues that must be considered:
1. Does the issur min hatorah of Sirus apply to females? This issue is relevant for women who wish to do a hysterectomy; if it is an issur derabanan, avoidance of pain would be a mattir. If it is de'oraysa, only piku'ach nefesh is mattir. The Gaon holds that it is de'oraysa. Most current poskim (e.g. Reb Moshe) hold it is an issur de'rabanan and is allowed in cases of great need. The Taz (EH 5:6), a minority opinion, allows neutering of females when done for their benefit.

2. Are non-jews prohibited from doing Sirus? (This is Rav Chidka's shittah in Bava Metzia 90b. Rav Chidka's shittos, by the way, are always fascinating. He is the Tanna that holds that you need to eat four meals on Shabbas, and he says that your own Neshama will testify against you at the final judgment.) If the issur applies to non-Jews, asking a non-Jew to do it would be Lifnei Iveir. The Beis Shmuel (EH 5:16) considers this a safek de'oraysa. The Aruch Hashulchan (EH 5:26) and the Chasam Sofer (Teshuvos CM 185) hold that Sirus is not a Noahide proscription.

3. Even assuming that non-Jews are not prohibited from doing Sirus, a Jew is not allowed to ask a non-Jew to do what he himself may not do. Most people are familiar with this issur derabanan in hilchos Shabbas. In fact, however, it applies to all issurim. If non-Jews have no personal issur (see #2), and the problem is only amira le'akum, there are those who allow a double amira le'akum: telling A to tell B to do it. (Sho'eil U'meishiv 3:1:229, Chasam Sofer CM 185.)
And since Amira Le'Akum is derabanan, it might be muttar where the animal is in pain.

4. Rav Unterman (Otzar Haposkim I Pps 164-165) suggests a procedure which cuts the blood supply to the reproductive organs. This would be a grama, and therefore assur mi'derabanan for Jews, but would be allowed for non-Jews. Rav Unterman, however, stated this as a personal opinion, and warned that he would not make a final decision until his method was sanctioned by other poskim.

5. There are some poskim (see #3) that say that even if we accept the Beis Shmuel, and rule that non-Jews are biblically prohibited from doing Sirus, one may sell his animal to a non-Jew, and instruct that non-Jew, A, to instruct another person, B, to do the sirus. If the idea that Lifnei Iver does not apply by Lifnei De'lifnei does not appeal to you, then this hetter won't help much.

So, the bottom line is that you have the Taz in #1, you have the Aruch Hashulchan and Chasam Sofer in #2, you have the Sho'eil U'meishiv 3:1:229 in #3, you have Rav Unterman's angiostasis in #4, and you have the lifnei de'lifnei people in #3 and 5.

So, what to do?

Well, if you decide your shailos like many people do,

,

or you consult and rely on Harav

,


then go ahead and rely on the mattirim. If, on the other hand, you take a safeik issur de'oraysa seriously, you'll have to find a competent Yarei Shamayim Poseik and ask him what to do, and let the burden fall on his shoulders.

NOTE:  Text of Josephus, Chapter 8 section 40, taken from Project Gutenberg:
40. Let those that have made themselves eunuchs be had in detestation; and do you avoid any conversation with them who have deprived themselves of their manhood, and of that fruit of generation which God has given to men for the increase of their kind: let such be driven away, as if they had killed their children, since they beforehand have lost what should procure them; for evident it is, that while their soul is become effeminate, they have withal transfused that effeminacy to their body also. In like manner do you treat all that is of a monstrous nature when it is looked on; nor is it lawful to geld men or any other animals.
The translator of this section comments:
[ This law against castration, even of brutes, is said to be so rigorous elsewhere, as to inflict death on him that does it which seems only a Pharisaical interpretation in the days of Josephus of that law, Leviticus 21:20, and 22:24: only we may hence observe, that the Jews could then have no oxen which are gelded, but only bulls and cows, in Judea.]

UPDATE 2023: I came across this, from the Star K. Very helpful.

HALACHOS OF PET NEUTERING

By: Rabbi Mordechai Frankel

INSIGHTS FROM THE INSTITUTE PET CARE PETS

February 2021

Q: May one ask a vet to spay a pet?

A: I frequently get asked this question. People who have pets often prefer to have them neutered, as this makes the animals more docile. However, there are serious halachic issues associated with this. Poskim differentiate between whether a male or female animal is being neutered. The neutering of a male animal is known as castration, whereas neutering a female animal is called spaying.

The Torah (Vayikra 22:24) states that castrating men and male animals is forbidden. This prohibition is known as sirus.1 It is also forbidden to remove a woman and female animal’s reproductive organs. The Gr”a is of the opinion that this is a Torah prohibition. The Taz, however, feels that causing a female animal to become infertile is permitted. According to the Taz, the reason it is forbidden to remove a female animal’s reproductive organs is solely due to tzaar baalei chayim (causing an animal pain).2

[Of course, it is medically possible to cause a woman to become infertile without removing any organs, and the Poskim discuss whether and when a woman is allowed to do so. That topic is beyond the scope of this article.3]

The Gemara quotes an opinion that the prohibition against castrating male animals applies to both Jews and non-Jews. According to this view, a non-Jew is not allowed to castrate his own animal.4 The Gemara brings an opposing opinion that a non-Jew is commanded to keep only the sheva mitzvos benei Noach but is permitted to castrate an animal. That opinion agrees, however, that a Jew who owns an animal cannot instruct a non-Jew to castrate it for him.5

The Shulchan Aruch paskens this latter way, and states that it is forbidden to instruct a non-Jew to castrate a Jew’s animal, but it is permitted for a non-Jew to castrate his own animal. The Rema adds that according to this opinion a Jew may sell an animal to a non-Jew even if he knows that the non-Jew will castrate it. The Rema, however, states that others pasken like the first opinion in the Gemara that it is forbidden for a non-Jew to castrate his own animal. The Rema adds that according to this viewpoint it is forbidden to sell an animal to a non-Jew if it is certain that he will castrate it, as doing so would transgress the prohibition of lifnei iver (causing someone else to sin). The Rema concludes that even this opinion would allow the sale to the non-Jew if he will not be castrating the animal himself. This is because the Jewish seller does not transgress the prohibition of livnei iver if the non-Jewish buyer employs a third party to perform the castration.6

Thus, there is a machlokes as to whether a non-Jew may castrate a male animal. We can now address the question of spaying female animals. Is a non-Jew allowed to spay a female animal by removing its reproductive organs? According to the first opinion in the Rema that a non-Jew is allowed to castrate a male animal, he would also be permitted to spay a female. According to the second opinion in the Rema that a non-Jew is forbidden to castrate a male animal, it is debatable whether he is also forbidden to spay a female. According to the Gr”a that removing a female’s reproductive organs is a Torah prohibition, it would be forbidden. However, according to the Taz that the concern is that of tzaar baalei chayim, it would be permitted for the non-Jew to do so.

Rabbi Heinemann shlit”a once asked Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l whether a person is allowed to have a non-Jewish vet spay a Jew’s female animal. Rav Moshe paskened that a Jew should not instruct a vet to spay his animal. However, Rav Moshe said that the Jew could tell the vet that he personally is halachically forbidden to spay his animal and would, therefore, like to transfer ownership of the animal and sell it to the vet. After the vet spays the animal, the Jew may then buy it back. This is halachically permitted because of a sfek sfeika – two areas of doubt. First, it is questionable as to whether a non-Jew is commanded to avoid sirus. Second, it is questionable as to whether the prohibition of sirus applies to a female animal.7

Rabbi Heinemann says that the Jew can imply that he may want to buy back the animal after the procedure is performed, but he should not state so explicitly. The Jew may also give the vet some money before the sale, knowing that the vet will use that money to buy the animal from him. For example, the Jew can give the vet a present of $10 and then have the vet buy the animal for $10. After the spaying, a procedure for which the vet generally charges $100, the Jew may buy back the animal from the vet for $100. Better still is to transfer ownership of the animal to the receptionist or some other non-Jew and have him or her get the vet to spay the animal. This procedure may be used only in order to spay a female animal but may not be used in order to castrate a male animal.8

---

1. רמב”ם פט”ז מהל’ איסורי ביאה הל’ ב

2. שו”ע אהע”ז סי’ ה סעי’ יא וט”ז שם ס”ק ו וגר”א שם ס”ק כה

3. עי’ בשו”ע שם סעי’ יב שמותר לאשה לשתות כוס של עקרין, ועי’ בח”מ וב”ש וט”ז ופ”ת שם ובשו”ת אג”מ אהע”ז ח”א סי’ יג וסי’ סג וח”ד סי’ לד.

4. סנהדרין דף נו ע”ב ודף נז ע”א

5. ב”מ דף צ ע”א וע”ב

6. שו”ע ורמ”א שם סעי’ יד, ועי’ בב”ש שם ס”ק טז שהוא ספיקא דדינא.

7. שמעתי ממו”ר ר’ היינעמאן שליט”א. והישראל לא יצוה את העכו”ם להדיא לסרס את הבהמה אע”פ שהוא של העכו”ם, ואף שהשו”ע הנ”ל כתב שאסור לומר לעכו”ם לסרס בהמה שלנו ומשמע שלסרס בהמה של עכו”ם מותר, עי’ בתוס’ ב”מ דף צ ע”א ד”ה חסום שלדעת הר”י אסור.

8. שמעתי ממו”ר ר’ היינעמאן שליט”א. ואף שהרמ”א התיר לומר לעכו”ם אחד להגיד לעכו”ם שני אף לגבי סירוס זכרים, מ”מ כאן שהוא דרך הערמה יש להחמיר. ואף שלצורך פרנסה מצינו היתר כה”ג אף בדרך הערמה, מ”מ שלא לצורך פרנסה נראה לו שאין להתיר. ועי’ באוצר הפסוקים אהע”ז סי’ ה ס”ק פה מה שהביא בזה משו”ת שואל ומשיב מהדורא תליתאי ח”א סי’ רכט ושו”ת חתם סופר חו”מ סי’ קפה ושו”ת האלף לך שלמה אהע”ז סי’ כג ושו”ת מהר”ם שיק סי’ יא.

Emor, Vayikra 21:7. Isha Zonah V’chalalah Lo Yikachu. Jewish Names that are Abbreviations.

There's too much to talk about in this week's parsha, so I'm going to take advantage of my anonymity to post a fluff piece this week, at least for the time being.

I don't know about other languages or cultures, but it's fascinating that so many Jewish names are acronyms-- abbreviations that are pronounced as a word. Here is a list of the names I am aware of.
Azulai --- Isha Zonah V’challalah Lo Yikachu
Babad --- Ben Av Beis Din
Brill --- Ben R’ Yehuda Levoei or R’ Yomtov Lipmann
Charlap --- Kvod Harav Roshi L’Polen
Katz --- Kohen Tzedek
Mazah --- Mizera Aharon Hakohen
Segal --- S'gan Levi
Shalit --- Shivisi Hashem Le'negdi Tamid if it ends with a Tof, or Sheyichyeh L’orech Yamim Tovim if it ends with a Tes
Shatz --- Shliach Tzibbur
Shick --- Sheim Yisrael Kodesh
Shub --- Shochet U’bodeik
Tatz --- To’ein Tzedek
Zak --- Zera Kodesh

Let's go back to the first on the list, Azulai. This is a name found among Sefardi Kohanim, and a local Rav Azulai was the one that first mentioned the derivation of his name. I must say that the logic for choosing this particular phrase, (which prohibits kohanim from marrying women whose kedusha status has been diminished or sullied by certain events,) is passing strange. It would be the equivalent of calling a Yisroel "Limbi"-- Lo yavo mamzer bik'hal Hashem.

Note: There is a fascinating article by Dr. Steven Oppenheimer, DDS, in "Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society" Fall 1997 called "Secular Names"in which he discusses and analyzes the various opinions regarding having Jewish and non-Jewish names, both first and last. I have posted it elsewhere: check the labels for "names."

Miriam Bas Bilgoh and Parental Responsibility

Regarding the story of Miriam Bas Bilga in the end of Maseches Sukkah. In the case of an adulterous bas Kohen, the Torah says (in Parshas Emor, Vayikro 21:9) Es ovi’ho hi mechalleles. Rashi there brings from Sanhedrin 52a "Chilleloh ubizesoh es kvodo, she’omrim olov orur shezu yolad orur shezu gideil."

This has application in halocho lemaiseh— the Gemora in Sanhedrin 52a brings a braisa from R’ Meir and R’ Yishmoel that the community no longer should honor him, and that the community says about this rosho "orur shezeh yolad, orur shezeh gideil, orur shezeh yotzo meichalotzov, (and the Marsho says that these expressions refer to his/her mother, nursemaid, and father, respectively) and the Gemora there bring that R’ Ashi holds that this braisa justifies the fact that we call a rosho "reshi’a bar reshi’a" even if his father is a tzadik (which seems to show that the father really is a tzadik, but we call him a rosho when talking about his son). In Orach Chaim 128 in the Ramo he brings shittos that the community no longer has to give the father, a Kohen, the first aliah or precedence in bentching. The Mogein Avrohom in s’k 62 says two things: first, that the chillul of the father is only when the daughter was mezaneh, because the father should have seen to it that she was never alone with someone else, and then he brings the Mordechai that applies this din to a meshumedes, but the Mogein Avrohom explains that really meshumedes is also based on the assumption that she was mezaneh, and although she left his house when she was mishtamedes, the father could have instilled an aversion for promiscuity when the daughter was younger, as we find that Shmuel didn’t let his daughters sleep in the same bed so that they would not get used to contact with another body. The Mishneh Brurah, however, says that we are not noheig like those that penalize a Kohen with daughter-problems.

Note, too, that if the parents are blamed for bad children, they should take credit for good ones. See the Gemora in Yoma 86 where the tzidkus of a son reflects on the father, and vice versa, at least in the way people see him, and the Mahrsho there that says that people ascribe the son’s behavior to whether the father taught him lishmo or lo lishmo.

But the very serious issue here is, I don’t understand how you can blame the father. Was Avrohom responsible for Yishma’el? Yitzchok for Eisov? Dovid for Amnon, Avsholom, and Adoniahu? (Regarding Adoniahu, see Melochim I 1:6, "velo atzovo oviv miyomov leimor madu’a kocho osisoh." Krasner in his Nachlas Shimon brings the Abarbenel that says that unlike Eli, whose sons were called ro’im, and who was considered at fault for not rebuking them, see beginning of Shmuel I, Adoniahu was not a sinner, but only expected to inherit his father’s throne. But he also brings Rashi who quotes a Chazal that from here we learn that "kol hamonei’a tochocho mibonov meivi’o lemissoh.")

Research on the relationship between parenting and youthful offending has found an association between lax parenting and youth crime (Humm, 1991). Loeber and Stoutbamer-Loeber (1986, cited in Goetting, 1992, p. 4) found that "lack of parental supervision, parental rejection and lack of parent-child involvement, were among the most powerful predictors of juvenile conduct problems and delinquency."–

And what about bechira? Shouldn’t we take as given that everyone has a free range of bechira, so this girl, too, had bechira, and could have chosen to be good, but chose of her own free will and free choice to be bad, that choice having nothing to do with her father’s way of raising her? Does this prove that bechira is narrowly restricted to the area around habituation, and the father is responsible for raising a daughter whose range of bechira is at the bottom of the scale? What about the alleged Gaon that a person is ne’enash for bittul Torah during his baptism? Doesn’t a person also get schar for not going to get baptized while he is learning Torah?

See R’ Shternbuch’s Ta’am Voda’as here on 21:9, where he says, k’darko, that you shouldn’t think that Rashi’s "She’omrim orur shezeh yolad..." means that people say it but it is not necessarily true– he says that it is really true. That is, that if a son goes off the derech, "vadai no’utz hakilkul vehapgam b’oviv." And if a parent hasn’t implanted ahavas Torah and yiras shomayim to the level sufficient to protect from the yetzer hora, "beyodu’a shepogum hu atzmo bemiddas ha’arochoso lechayei kedusha vetaharo." I really would like to know what R’ Shternbuch would say about the gedolim of Torah and Mussor that had children that, rachmono litzlan, went off the derech.

But several things are clear: first, if a parent is told that he is absolutely responsible for the moral behavior of his child, that he is exclusively responsible for what his child does, that parent would be extremely serious about how he raises the child. And second, the fact that the parent is responsible does not diminish the child’s responsibility at all. The parent may have made it easier for the child to sin, but as long as the child is not an onnus, as in the case of a tinok shenishbeh, the child remains 100% responsible.

It is, however, very important to remember that the Gemora’s expression "shuto d’y’nuko b’shuko oh d’avuhei oh d’imei" limits itself in two very important aspects. First, it says "d’y’nuko," which means this is true only in the case of a young person. Second, it says "b’shuko," which means that this is true only when the child does so in a public fashion, and not merely among his friends. Similarly, the din of Bas Kohen is specific to a na’aroh of 12 years old who was mezaneh after hasro’o, which is basically in public, so it both in the age and in that it is "beshukoh."

However, note that at the end of the parsha of Bas Kohen, we have the story of Shlomis bas Divri’s son, the mekallel, and there is a definite association of his aveira with his mother’s attitude.

Speaking of the alleged Gaon, I saw that the Biur Halocho in 199:2 discusses this, and brings a Rambam that Yerovom Ben Nevot is ne’enash for cooking on Yomtov shelo letzorech, etc. See there. And I saw someone quote the Tollner Rebbe in Yerusholayim, a young and talented Rebbe, who said that he heard from the Gerrer re: the Gemora in Shabbos that saying Yehei shmei rabboh with all your koach is a mechaper even for chillul shabbos, and even for shemetz avodah zora, that you see from there that even a person with a shemetz AZ can say YShR with all his koach.
Anyway, this is all not like R’ Dessler’s "point of bechirah" concept.

Also, see the Sfas Emes in the beginning of Parshas R’ay who says that despite having done an aveira, a person has bechira every day to do teshuva, as it says "hayom brocho uklolo." I think that the truth is that the bechira exists, but the likelihood is that the person will continue doing what he has done before– anything is possible, but the smart money is on habit. For example: at the end of Achrei Mos, the Torah warns us to not do a list of disgusting things; and at the beginning of Kedoshim, the Torah tells us to be holy and refined. It seems that the Torah is talking to two people, and each has to be told different things.