Metzora. Nigei Battim and Locard's Exchange Principle

Locard's Exchange Principle- "Every contact leaves a trace"  The idea is that every encounter creates mutual physical consequences. When any object encounters another object, they will affect and leave a mark on each other. If you enter a space, you will leave a trace there, and the space will leave a trace on you.   Maybe we should think of it as Reb Chaim Kanievsky's Exchange Principle.


Rav Chaim Kanievsky as quoted in Derech Sicha Parshas Vayeira

השוכר דירה מחילוני 

שאלה שכר דירה של חילוני והדירה גמורה ומסויידת אם יעשה בה איזה שינוי כי שמא תהי' ח"ו איזו השפעה שלילית 

תשובה כדאי לעשות בה איזה שינוי שיסייד שוב את חדר השינה 

Chizkuni here (14:34)

כי תבואו אל ארץ כנען לא נאמר כי תבואו גבי נגעי אדם וכלים לפי שאף במדבר היו נוהגים אבל בנגעי בתים שלא היה להם במדבר נאמר כי תבואו אל ארץ כנען ד"א בשביל מעלת ארץ ישראל שהמקדש עתיד להיות בתוכה הוזקקה להיות נקייה וטהורה 

ונתתי נגע צרעת י"מ לפי הפשט לפי שהזהיר להלן אבד תאבדון את כל המקומות אשר עבדו שם הגוים ואין אנו יודעים באי זה מקום עבדה לפיכך בא הנגע בבתים להודיע המקום שעבדו שם הכנענים כדי לאבדו 

Kli Yakar here (14:34)

וי"א שטעם נגעי הבתים לפי שהאמוריים בנו בתיהם לשם ע"ז ע"כ הקב"ה מביא נגעים על הבתים כדי לנתוץ אותם ובזה נ"ל ליישב מדרש האומר כנגע נראה לי בבית זו ע"ז ילק"ש מצורע תקסג ודרש כל פר' זו על בהמ"ק שנחרב בעבור הע"ז שהעמידו שם כו' וכי יעלה על הדעת לומר שבעל מדרש זה דעתו להוציא כל הפר' מפשוטו ולפרשה על חורבן בהמ"ק אלא ודאי שגם דעתו ליתן טעם לנגעי בית בעבור שהאמוריים בנו אותם לשם ע"ז וע"כ הוא בא לידי נתיצה ומכאן למד לומר שגם בהמ"ק אשר בו העמיד מנשה הצלם בא לידי נתיצה בעון זה וכל הפרטים שנאמרו כאן נמצאו גם בחורבן הבית כמ"ש כאן ובא אשר לו הבית כך בחורבן בהמ"ק בא אשר לו הבית זה הקב"ה ובמ"ש כאן והגיד לכהן כך יגיד הקב"ה לירמיה מן הכהנים אשר בענתות וכמ"ש כאן כנגע נראה לי כך יאמר גם הקב"ה ובדרך זה מבואר כל המדרש והפסוקים כולם בפשוטם 

ואין להקשות על טעם זה א"כ למה לא יבואו הנגעים על הבתים מיד בבואם לארץ בשלמא לטעמא דמטמוניות שמא אין בל בעל הבית זוכה לאותו מטמון תשובה לדבר שגם בביעור ע"ז מגלגלין זכות על ידי זכאי ודווקא אם ידור בבית איזו איש הגון מצד מעשיו אין נכון שידור הוא בבית שיש בו נדנוד ע"ז ונוכל לומר שפסוק זה בשורה טובה לישראל כמ"ש איכה ד"א כלה ה' את חמתו ויצת אש בציון וטובה זו היא שמכלה חמתו בעצים ואבנים ואינו נוגע בגופות כך בשורה וו בנגעי הבתים זה"ש כנגע נראה לי בבית בכף הדמיון כעין הנגע הראוי לבא עלי נראה לי בבית גם לטעם צרות העין אמר כעין נגע הראוי לבא על צרי העין והוא פיזור ממונם כך נראה לי בבית כי סופו לבא לידי שיפזר הכהן ממונו ומה שצוה ליקח לחטא הבית צפרים כבר אמרנו להורות שהעושה עשה יעשה לו כנפים כצפרים עפות אבל לרש"י שלא זכר כ"א מעשה פטיט קשה מה ענין זה לנגעי הבתים ע"כ אמרנו למעלה שהצפרים יש בהם רמז גם על המדת הממון הגורם רום לב ועל כן יקח גם עץ ארז 

These are based, I assume, on the Zohar in the beginning of Tazria, who says that certain houses just need to be gotten rid of so that Klal Yisrael can have kedusha and hashra'as haShechina.

Remarks

1. It's worth noting that Nigei Battim cover a range of problems with a range of consequences. If there is just hesger, it probably comes from Lashon Hara and Tzarus Ayin.  You do teshuva, it's done. If you have to tear out some stones, it is probably so you can find something hidden in the wall. It's only where the house is torn down that the idea of the Zohar/Chizkuni/Kli Yakar applies.

2.  Nobody I know, and I know many people, ever ever dreamed of plastering their rooms to kasher them from the negative influence of the previous tenant or owner.
3. I would understand this more by sechirus than by kinyan, and Reb Chaim's case did involve sechirus. (The opposite is true by Keilim and food- there's no chiyuv tevilla by sechirus, but there is by kinyan.  But this could be because tevilla would be a good thing by sechirus, but it simply won't accomplish anything, it's a waste of time.  That's why if you own keilim shutfus with a goy there is no mitzva of tevilla.)
4. The Chizkuni/Kli Yakar only are true because of the din of אשריהם תשרפון באש and that is only because bittul doesn't help on the Avoda Zara in Eretz Yisrael, since the goyim were considered our shluchim- see AZ 53b.  The dinim of אבד תאבדון and ונתצתם את מזבחתם ושברתם את מצבתם ואשריהם תשרפון באש ופסילי אלהיהם תגדעון are only because there was no din of bittul  Many great yeshivos are in buildings that were built as churches, and they had someone be mevateil before the purchase closed. This is discussed in the Biyur HaGra in OC 649:3 based on Reish Lakish in AZ 47a, whether it is ma'us. The Rama paskens that lechatchila you should not use it. 
5. Where did Reb Chaim get the idea that plastering makes a difference?  From the Rambam in Tzara'as 15:1, who says that if after one week the nega is weaker, and the house is tahor, you still need to scrape off the are of the mark and re-plaster it.  The Rash and the Rosh in Nega'im 13:1 require at least re-plastering the whole room and maybe more.
6. I've mentioned in the past the Reb Chaim Volozhiner was very makpid on a setting that was made with kedusha; Reb Elyah Lopian in his Lev Eliyahu II 232 brings from him that if you learn from a sefer written by a person who is not good, you might not be successful in your learning, and others bring in his name that learning in a room that was built and used for things that are inconsistent with Torah will not bring hatzlacha.
7. If  you want to plaster your bedroom, zolst du zayn gezunt und shtark.  People have different sensitivities.  I have a friend (a rov and rosh yeshiva) that bought a house where a man murdered his wife, and he was so happy, he got it for a really low price because nobody wanted to buy it.  As he said, the price was "slashed."  On the other hand, my parents passed away in their house.  My father in the study, and my mother seven years later in her bedroom.  I use my father's study, even though I occasionally remember that morning of Rosh HaShanna when I came.  But I don't anticipate being able to sleep in my mother's bedroom, where she was nifteres, for a while. But one of my daughters and my son in law did sleep there. So it's a matter of emotion and sensitivity, and perhaps that is what Reb Chaim was thinking about.  Even Loccard was talking about microscopic fibers and flakes.

Metzora: Being Tamei, but not Mekabeil Tumah. בית המנוגע

Reb Chaim (Stencil, Sukka 12b) asks: assuming that there's a din (הוויתו על ידי דבר המקבל טומאה) that a mikva is not kosher if it's kashrus depends on something that could become tamei, then you shouldn't be able to have a mikva in a house in Eretz Yisrael, because the house could become tamei if it has צרעת and is declared to be a בית המנוגע.  If the wall of the house is a wall of the mikva, and removing the wall would mean there would be no mikva, then the potential for the wall to be tamei would mean that the mikva is הוויתו על ידי דבר המקבל טומאה, its existence and kashrus relies on something that is susceptible to Tumah.

יש לחקור אם יכול לעשות מקוה בבית ולא יהא כאן החסרון דהוויתו על ידי דבר המקבל טומאה אף דבית מתטמא בנגע צרעת. 

Reb Chaim answers that a בית המנוגע is inherently tamei, but is totally incapable of receiving any Tumah, and all we care about by Mikva is the susceptibility to "received" Tumah.

וצ"ל דטומאת צרעת היינו דעצם הבית נעשה לדבר טמא ולשרץ אבל לא שיש לבית תורת קבלת טומאה מנגע ומה דבדבר המקבל טומאה אינו יכול לעשות מקוה הוא משום דין זה שמקבל טומאה הוא כמו חלות דין של טומאה על החפץ אבל מה שבית יכול להתטמא בנגע אין עוד על הבית שום טומאה ולא מקרי הוויתו על ידי דבר המקבל טומאה.

He asks, but if so, then why does the Gemara in Sukkah say that fibers of flax, אניצי פשתן ,  cannot be used for Schach, inasmuch as they are subject to Tumas Tzaraas if they develop the marks of Tzaraas?  But he just postulated that an object that has Tzaraas cannot be said to have contracted Tumah!  He answers that flax with the sign of Tzaraas, besides being an object of Tzaraas, also separately contracts Tumas Tazaraas.

והא דאיתא דאין מסככין סוכה באניצי פשתן משום דשתי וערב מתטמא בנגעים ומקר' ממלא דבר המקבל טומאה משום דבגד המתטמא בנגע מלבד דהוא נעשה לדבר טמא ולשרץ עצמו עוד יורד עליו דין קבלת טומאה וסימנך דאחרי טהרתו צריך טבילה לטהור הרי דקבל טומאה מהנגע דבדין שהוא נגע צרעת לא שייך טבילה וכיון שריבתה התורה לענין נגעים שגם שתי וערב תורת בגד לו לענין נגעים אינו כמו בית המתטמא בנגע אלא כמו בגד שיש לו גם תורת קבלת טומאה  דיש להשתי או להערב תורת בגד לדין נגעים

Additionally, the fact that these linen fibers require tevilla to become tahor shows that besides being objects of Tumah, they received tumah, because tevilla would do nothing for a Tzraas identity.

.  והראי' על זה דגם הם צריכים טבילה ולכן פסולים לסכך שיש עליהם תורת קבלת טומאה לענין נגעים ולא דמי לבית

There is a natural tendency to read into Reb Chaim the approach of the Sifri Zuta in Chukas that says that a dead human body is not tamei, it only causes tumah in people or things through ohel or maga or hesit.   

(The Sifrei was popularized in the US by Reb Leizer Silver, here, responded to here and here, it's brought down by Reb Aharon in his משנת ר' אהרן טהרות כז in the footnote at the very end, and written about by me here.)

But with all due respect to the people that learn Reb Chaim like that, (not really; I think they should be ashamed of themselves, because it's the lazy way out,) that's not what Reb Chaim means.  He says that the house is tamei.  It's only that it is not a received Tuma, it is an inherent tuma by being defined as a בית המנוגע- it became a Sheretz.  Only susceptibility to received Tumah is a problem either for Mikvaos or Sukkah.

How does Reb Chaim know to make this chiluk?  By S'chach, that's a simple question to answer.  He doesn't need a svara, all he needs is the source for the psul of mekabel tumah. The Gemara (11b-12a) gives us three drashos that tell us that schach cannot be made of something that is mekabel tumah.  Reb Yochanan's drasha is from the words באספך מגרנך ומיקבך, that you use פסולת גורן ויקב, whose prominent characteristics are gidulei karka and, for our discussion, that are not mekabeil tumah.  The fact that they could become tamei if they become a sheretz does not change this character.  As long as they are not mekabeil tumah from something else that is tamei, this characteristic matches פסולת גורן ויקב.

By Mikva, I don't know how his chiluk matters.

I don't have the patience to type up the other place Reb Chaim says this, in Niddah, but here's the picture.

I think the Netziv says the same thing, but with more clarity, in the name of his son Reb Chaim.  Everyone asks, how can the Rambam say that Nigei Batim can cause Tumah to everything in the house, no matter what it is (based on Reb Meir's pshat in וצוה הכהן ופנו את הבית בטרם יבא הכהן לראות את הנגע, ולא יטמא כל אשר בבית ואחר כן יבא הכהן).  If so, nothing should be kasher for S'chach, because even psoles goren and Yekev are mekabel tumah if they're in a  בית המנוגע.  He says the teretz from his son R' Chaim:

הקשה המל״מ ... מסוכה ד׳ י״ב דחבילי עצים אין מסככין בהם משום תעשה ולא מה״ע ותיפוק לן משום דמקבלים טומאה היינו שנטמאים בבית המנוגע• וע״ז יישב בני הרב מ׳ חיים ברלין שי׳ דודאי הני לא מקבלי טומאה אלא בשעת ביאת הכהן ומטמא את הבית  בזה גזרת הכתוב דכשם שהבית מיטמא, כך כל אשר בו מיטמאין, אפי׳ דברים שאינם מקבלים טומאה לעולם. אבל הנכנס  בבית אח״כ אינו מקבל טומאה אלא כמו בכ״מ.  וממילא מיושב הא דסוכה ג״כ דאי נימא דבזה מיקרי מקבל.טומאה  אפי׳ פסולת גורן ויקב גמי מקבלי טומאה. וזה ברור

That means that they are not mekabeil tumah in the normal sense.  The Kohen's declaration of Tuma on a בית המנוגע creates a one step chalos tumah not only on the house but also on all its contents, but that's a one step event, not two steps of "tuma on house and then house to contents."  It is a direct chalos tumah on the house and all its contents.  This is not a psul schach.


I mentioned above that Reb Aharon briefly talks about the Sifri Zuta.  This is what he says:

אך אין הדבר פשוט כל כך לומר דמת אין בו טומאה דהא אסור מן התורה להכניסו בעזרה, כמו שרץ, ורק במחנה לויה הותר להכניסו כמבואר בסוטה דף כ', ואפשר דרק לאיזה ענין פרטי כיוונו בספרי זוטא הנזכר לעיל.

Reb Aharon's problem was addressed by the אמבוהי דספרי brought by Reb Leizer Silver, as well as the responses I linked to above, but in the end, it's still most likely a stira to the Gemara in Sota Reb Aharon brings.  I don't think Reb Aharon saw the SZ inside, because if he had, it would have changed a lot of what he writes in the main body of the piece regarding נבלת עוף טהור.

The Living Dead: Four Kinds of People with Moribund Souls

Avoda Zara 5a, and Nedarim 64b:  Four are considered as if dead: the poor; the blind; the leprous; and the childless.

ארבעה חשובים כמתים אלו הן עני סומא ומצורע ומי שאין לו בנים

I saw a very striking pshat from Reb Chaim Shmuelevitz that I want to share.  He says that Chazal's expression, as if dead, means that the person lacks something that in a healthy human being would be a natural pathway to empathy and assistance to others.  This is not to say they are incapable, it means that it is not as simple for them.

The poor refers to one who is so burdened with his need to make a living, to find what he needs, (whether because of actual or only perceived poverty- איזהו עשיר השמח בחלקו and vice versa, as Shlomo HaMelech says in Koheles 6:4, איש אשר יתן לו האלקים עשר ונכסים וכבוד ואיננו חסר לנפשו מכל אשר יתאוה, ולא ישליטנו האלהים לאכל ממנו-) that he doesn't have the time to think about the needs of other people, and certainly doesn't have the means of helping others.  This is reminiscent of Maslow's hierarchy of needs.

The blind, because we all have experienced the effect of the powerful image.  We were all fully aware, intellectually, of starvation in Biafra, but it was a terrible photograph in Life magazine that shocked millions into a full emotional awareness and sympathy.  

A leper, or more accurately, a Metzora, because both the cause and the effect of Tzara'as is being outside the community.  The causes of Tzaraas are all manifestations of a basic indifference to the suffering of others, and the punishment of Tzaraas is to be driven out of the community.

One who has no children, we know, may not sit on the Sanhedrin (Sanhedrin 36b, and Rambam 2 Sanhedrin 3 -
 אין מעמידין בכל הסנהדרין לא זקן מופלג בשנים. ולא סריס מפני שיש בהן אכזריות. ולא מי שאין לו בנים כדי שיהא רחמן
Rashi explains זקן. ששכח כבר צער גדול בנים ואינו רחמני וכן סריס, A person who has not experienced, or who has forgotten, what it means to raise a difficult child and to love him despite the pain he causes, is missing something that teaches a person to be merciful.  Having children enhances the ability to sympathize, and one who has no children has a challenge in achieving that degree of sympathy.

I want to stress that there are poor people, and blind people, and people who have no children, that are gedolim and saints of kindness.  What Chazal mean is that while a normal and emotionally healthy Ben Yisrael has a natural rachmanus, and has to be a rasha to choose to harden his heart and ignore those that need his help, these four people might have not that natural and automatic reaction of rachamim.

It is also possible that Chazal are speaking metaphorically.  There are people who can see, but they are blind when it comes to to the needs of others.  There are some that are so busy accumulating things that they are totally uninterested in helping others to make it.  There are those that simply never experienced what it means to have a child, which means that your heart is walking around outside of your body.  And there is the Metzora, who exhibits every one of these traits.  Such people may be healthy, and wealthy, and happy, but they are dead men walking.

Metzora. The Living Dead and the Asymptomatic Metzora.

The Tuma of a Metzora shares many dinim with the Tuma of a dead body.  Most famously, Tzara'as and Meis are the only Tum'os which cause Tuma to everything else that is under the same roof, Tumas Ohel.   Why is this so?  Is it because of his necrotic limbs?  Is it because he is separated from the community as if he had passed away?  When it comes to the arcane philosophy of Tuma, speculation is particularly unreliable.  But we may speculate if we keep in mind that it is, ultimately, only conjecture.  But here's a fascinating thing.  The Gemara (Eirchin 15) says that the sin that leads to Tzara'as is extreme egosism and antipathy.  It is possible that this has some connection with his macabre halachic status.  I saw a remarkable thing on this topic by Rabbi Joshua Hoffman, and I quote the relevant paragraph:

Readers familiar with the playwright Eugene O'Neill's semi-autobiographical masterwork, Long Day's Journey Into Night, may recall the final scene of the play, in which Jamie, the older son in the family, who is an alcoholic and a failed writer and actor, reveals the innermost depths of his heart to his younger brother, Edmund. Jamie tells Edmund, in the midst of a drunken stupor, that, although he loves him and is devoted to him, part of his inner-self wants him to fail. In part, Jamie says, he wants his brother to fall into dissolution, as he had, so that he would not make him look worse in light of his success as a writer. Jamie, in explaining this to his brother, tells him that it is the dead part of himself that seeks to do this. This is exactly what a person who is addicted to leshon hora does,and to the extent that he is obsessed with his evil talk, he is, in effect, dead, and bringing death to those around him, as well. In this way, he is effectively killing the 'adam' aspect of his own personality as well as those of others. When this happens among Jews, the entire nation suffers, because it loses the unique contributions that only these people can make. For this reason, the metzora must be isolated from society until he is able to once again become a productive member of it by actualizing his own potential, and allowing others to actualize theirs.

The dialogue in the play:

Jamie:....I’ve been rotten bad influence.  And worst of it is, I did it on purpose.

Edmund: Shut up!  I don’t want to hear–

Jamie: Nix, Kid!  You listen!  Did it on purpose to make a bum of you.  Or part of me did .  A big part.  That part that’s been dead so long.  That hates life.  My putting you wise so you’d learn from my mistakes.  Believed that myself at times, but it’s a fake.  Made my mistakes look good.  Make getting drunk romantic.  Made whores fascinating vampires instead of poor, stupid, diseased slobs they really are.  Made fun of work as sucker’s game.  Never wanted you succeed and make me look even worse by comparison.  Wanted you to fail.  Always jealous of you.                                        

A page later–

Jamie: .... Oscar Wildes’ “Reading Gaol” has the dope twisted.  The man was dead and so he had to kill the think he loved.  That’s what it ought to be.  The dead part of me hopes you won’t get well. ....  He wants company, he doesn’t want to be the only corpse around the house!  

Rabbi Hoffman's complete dvar Torah is reproduced at the end of the post.)

Reb Yeruchem also says something that relates to this question.  In 13:2 it says אדם, כי-יהיה בעור-בשרו שאת או-ספחת או בהרת, והיה בעור-בשרו, לנגע צרעת--והובא אל-אהרן הכהן, in 13:9 it says נגע צרעת, כי תהיה באדם; והובא, אל-הכהן, and in 14:2 it says זאת תהיה תורת המצרע, ביום טהרתו:  והובא, אל-הכהן, on the day of his cleansing he shall be brought to the Kohen.  The Sforno in Bamidbar 6:13 points out that this expression of being brought somewhere is found in four places: Metzorah, Sottah, Eved Ivri that will be nirtza, and Nazir in Bamidbar there.  But Chazal say that “yavi osso” by Nazir really means “yavi es atzmo.”  So the Sforno, as interpreted by R’ Yeruchem, explains that the difference is whether a person floats downstream or struggles upstream.  The metzorah, sottah, and eved all take the path of least resistance, and give in to their yetzer hara, or the bad influence of society or their friends.  They are what an acquaintance of mine calls “floaters,” and they are taken places.  The nazir, on the other hand, is what he calls a “doer,” he takes his life in his own hands and with courage and discipline determines his own path. (Others call them leaners and pushers.  Same idea.)  This person is taking himself where he needs to go.  I saw this brought in a sefer called “Maayan Hashavua,” on last week’s parshah, and he shtells tzu the Gemara in Chullin that only a kosher fish can survive in fast flowing waters.  A kosher fish will fight the current and survive, while a non-kosher species will be pushed and pulled to death.

Truth is, the Sforno’s he’ara is mostly homiletic, not interpretive.  The expression ‘v’huvah’ by the three really don’t need explanation. By a sottah, although she needs to prove her innocence, she won’t want to go because the whole thing is a terrible disgrace.  By eved ivri the din of v’huvah makes sense, because he is formalizing his cession of mastery over himself to the other person, so it is necessary that his master bring him.  We find a similar din by eved knaani, where his tvila l’sheim geirus/avdus has to be through the act of his master who puts him into the water.  And by metzorah, chances are the person will not go willingly to be declared a metzora, especially since it is only the kohen’s declaration of diagnosis that creates the tumah status.  So the he’arah is not strong in last week’s parshah, where it is talking about going to the kohen to be declared a metzora.  BUT in this week’s parshah, which is talking about his becoming tahor, and it still says v’huvah el hakohen, you could say that ‘v’huvah’ teaches that he needs to be shown that he should learn to be master of his fate, and not be so easily swayed by his flawed character traits.  He should learn to be a mentsch, not a shmatteh.  So you can use THIS ‘v’huvah’ to show that all three are meant to teach the same lesson.

In any case, this is another example of a metzora sharing the characteristic of a person who is dead.  He is a floater.

And finally, there is the famous Medrash in Vayikra 16:2, that says:

 ד"א "זֹאת תִּהְיֶה תּוֹרַת הַמְּצֹרָע" הה"ד (תהלים לד, יג): "מִי הָאִישׁ הֶחָפֵץ חַיִּים" מעשה ברוכל אחד שהיה מחזיר בעיירות שהיו סמוכות לציפורי והיה מכריז ואומר מאן בעי למזבן סם חיים אודקין עליה ר' ינאי הוה יתיב ופשט בתורקליניה שמעיה דמכריז מאן בעי סם חיים א"ל תא סק להכא זבון לי א"ל לאו אנת צריך ליה ולא דכוותך אטרח עליה סליק לגביה הוציא לו ספר תהלים הראה לו פסוק "מִי הָאִישׁ הֶחָפֵץ חַיִּים" מה כתיב בתריה (יד): "נצור לשונך מרע סור מרע ועשה טוב" א"ר ינאי אף שלמה מכריז ואומר(משלי כא, כג): "שֹׁמֵר פיו ולשונו שומר מצרות נפשו" א"ר ינאי כל ימי הייתי קורא הפסוק הזה ולא הייתי יודע היכן הוא פשוט עד שבא רוכל זה והודיעו "מִי הָאִישׁ הֶחָפֵץ חַיִּים" לפיכך משה מזהיר את ישראל ואומר להם "זאת תהיה תורת הַמְּצֹרָע" תורת המוציא שם רע

What is the elixir of life?  Avoiding Lashon Haran. And it's not enough to merely avoid lashon hara.  The passuk continues- (14-15) נצור לשונך מרע;    ושפתיך, מדבר מרמה. טו  סור מרע, ועשה-טוב;    בקש שלום ורודפהו  It's not good enough to avoid lashon hara by isolating yourself from society.  Involve yourself, seek peace, pursue a just society.   If avoiding lashon hara is life, if involvement in the community and the pursuit of peace and justice is life, then, of course, מכלל הן אתה שומע לאו, the person who constantly spreads lashon hara, the miser, the misanthrope, is, in a sense, dead. 


The physical manifestation of Tzara'as no longer occurs.  It is a metaphysical disease that exposes in a person's body the degeneration of his soul, as the Ramban says, and the physical manifestation of Tzara'as can only occur under certain conditions which no longer pertain.  But don't make the mistake of thinking that the parsha of Metzora is no longer relevant.    Just because the physical expression of this ailment no longer occurs does not mean that the underlying spiritual disease no longer occurs.  On the contrary, as spirituality declines, the disease of the neshama occurs more and more often.  We just have no way of knowing who among us suffers from the disease.  But one thing is for sure:  A person that deserves to have Tzara'as, the rumor monger, the one who hates to see others happy and successful, the miser who turns away from the needy, the person who is constantly bickering and smirking and sneering, that person is an asymptomatic metzora, and he causes Tuma to everyone and everything around him.  Even being in the same room with him contaminates you.

Rabbi Hoffman's complete dvar Torah, entitled "Dead Man Walking."

This week's Torah reading deals in large part with the laws of tzara'as, which is usually translated as leprosy. These laws begins with the statement, "If a man will have on the flesh of his skin a s'eis, or a sapachas, or a baheres, and it will become a tzara'as affliction on the skin of his flesh, he shall be brought to Aharon the kohein or to one of his sons the kohanim (Vayikra 13 . 1). It is interesting to note that while in the Hebrew language there are four words for man - ish, gever, enosh and adam, the word used here is 'adam,' which, according to the Zohar, connotes the highest level of man. Why would the Torah use this expression when dealing with a person who has contracted the highest level of impurity? Wouldn't he seem to be on a lower level?As we have noted in the past, the Talmud ( Bava Kama,38a) tells us that the word 'adam' applies only to a Jew. Rabbi Ephraim of Lunshitz,in his Olelos Ephraim, explains that this term is different from the other three Hebrew terms for man in that the other three words take on a different form in the plural that in the singular.  The plural of ish is ishim of gever is gevarim, and of enosh is anashim. However, the plural of adam is adam.By saying that only a Jew is called adam, what Chazal are telling us is that the individual Jew is inextricably bonded with the collective of the Jewish people. This is not true of any other nation.  As my teacher, Rav Aharon Soloveichik, explained, if someone from England moves to America, after a generation or two his family will no longer be identified as English,but as American. A Jew, however, no matter where he comes from and no matter where he goes,is always identified as a Jew. Based on this explanation, we can understand the qualification made by Rabbeinu Tam,that a non- Jew is sometimes referred to, in Scripture, as 'ha-adam,'but not as 'adam.' Ha-adam - the man- refers to a specific person, and, so, can be used in reference to a non-Jew,as well.However,'adam'-man-can only refer to a Jew, because it implies that the individual is inextricably bound to the collective. If we now take another look at the term adam, and connect it to the term for primeval man-adam harishon-we can understand it to be an allusion to the uniqueness of the individual, and the special mission he is given to accomplish in the world.  The mishnah in Sanhedrin (37a) tells us that man was created as a single individual in order to impress this quality of his uniqueness upon him.  Man, says the mishnah, is obligated to say, each day, that the world was created for him, meaning that he has a unique role to play in the world that no one else can fulfill.  When we see this notion in the context of the connection of each individual Jew to the Jewish collective, the message conveyed is that the unique mission that each individual Jew is charged with is inextricably connected with the goals of the Jewish nation as a collective. With this observation in mind, we can return to the use of the term adam in connection with the affliction of tzara'as.

Although the rabbis view tzara'as as a punishment for any of seven different sins, the primary sin that it is associated with is leshon hora, or evil talk.  One of the nefarious effects of such talk is to impair the self-image of the person who is spoken about.  Actually, the rabbis tell us that leshon hora kills three people-the one who speaks it, the one of whom it is spoken, and the one to whom it is spoken. We can explain this to mean that in all three cases, the activity of leshon hora impedes the person involved from actualizing his true self and accomplishing his mission in life, because his attention is focused on the evil talk and what it communicates about that person, rather than each person focusing on what he really has to contribute. When this happens, not only is the individual involved effected, but society as a whole loses, because the unique roles that these people were charged with accomplishing will now not be fulfilled, and, so, in a sense, these people can be considered as dead in terms of their contribution to the nation. Perhaps this is why the rabbis tell us that a metzorah is considered as being dead.                                      
Readers familiar with the playwright Eugene O'Neill's semi-autobiographical masterwork, Long Day's Journey Into Night, may recall the final scene of the play, in which Jamie, the older son in the family, who is an alcoholic and a failed writer and actor, reveals the innermost depths of his heart to his younger brother, Edmund. Jamie tells Edmund, in the midst of a drunken stupor, that, although he loves him and is devoted to him, part of his inner-self wants him to fail. In part, Jamie says, he wants his brother to fall into dissolution, as he had, so that he would not make him look worse in light of his success as a writer. Jamie, in explaining this to his brother, tells him that it is the dead part of himself that seeks to do this. This is exactly what a person who is addicted to leshon hora does,and to the extent that he is obsessed with his evil talk, he is, in effect, dead, and bringing death to those around him, as well. In this way, he is effectively killing the 'adam' aspect of his own personality as well as those of others. When this happens among Jews, the entire nation suffers, because it loses the unique contributions that only these people can make. For this reason, the metzora must be isolated from society until he is able to once again become a productive member of it by actualizing his own potential, and allowing others to actualize theirs.

On a completely different topic:  I was checking the precise definition of the word "macabre," because I used it in the first paragraph to mean "death like," or "gruesome."  I found the history of that word very surprising- as was the explanation of Mel Gibson's incongruous project- as follows:

From the Online Etymology Dictionary:

macabre (adj.) 

early 15c., from O.Fr. (danse) Macabré "(dance) of Death" (1376), probably a translation of M.L. (Chorea) Machabæorum, lit. "dance of the Maccabees" (leaders of the Jewish revolt against Syro-Hellenes; see Maccabees). The association with the dance of death seems to be via vivid descriptions of the martyrdom of the Maccabees in the Apocryphal books. The abstracted sense of "gruesome" is first attested 1842 in French, 1889 in English.

The typical form which the allegory takes is that of a series of pictures, sculptured or painted, in which Death appears, either as a dancing skeleton or as a shrunken corpse wrapped in grave-clothes to persons representing every age and condition of life, and leads them all in a dance to the grave. ["Encyclopaedia Britannica," 11th ed., 1911] 

From The Free Dictionary:

ma·cabre·ly adv.

Word History: The word macabre is an excellent example of a word formed with reference to a specific context that has long since disappeared for everyone but scholars. Macabre is first recorded in the phrase Macabrees daunce in a work written around 1430 by John Lydgate. Macabree was thought by Lydgate to be the name of a French author, but in fact he misunderstood the Old French phrase Danse Macabre, "the Dance of Death," a subject of art and literature. In this dance, Death leads people of all classes and walks of life to the same final end. The macabre element may be an alteration of Macabe, "a Maccabee." The Maccabees were Jewish martyrs who were honored by a feast throughout the Western Church, and reverence for them was linked to reverence for the dead. Today macabre has no connection with the Maccabees and little connection with the Dance of Death, but it still has to do with death.

And from The Oxford Dictionary:

Origin:

late 19th century: from French macabre, from Danse Macabre 'dance of death', from Old French, perhaps from Macabé 'a Maccabee', with reference to a miracle play depicting the slaughter of the Maccabees

When I showed this to a good friend, a scholar of the classics and alumnus of Oxford and the University of Chicago, this was his reaction:

I first came across that etymology a few years ago while I was researching the concept of yiras hashem in the Middle Ages. I'm sure it's true. The role played by the  Maccabees in the history of Christian thought and culture (including etymology!), and their significance for Christian theology in particular is far, far greater than in Judaism.  Unlike the Jews, the Catholics include The Books of Maccabees  in their text of the O.T. Bible (Vulgate) and it's heroic figures are (mis)interpreted as the archetypes for all future Christian martyrs, to whom the Church owes its' very existence. ( Hence Mel Gibson's work over the last several years to produce a film about the Maccabees  is misunderstood by Jews as only a cheap, fraudulent means to curry favor with the Jewish community. In fact, a deeply committed Catholic such as Gibson would have long felt a very profound attachment to the Maccabees and, as an actor and producer, would wish to see their deeds glorified on stage).

Metzora, Vayikra 14:35. Saying It's So Makes It So. Schrödinger's Cat's Psoriasis

When a homeowner sees what might be Tzaraas on the walls of his house, he is required to ask a Kohen to inspect it and decide whether it is tzaraas.  When he speaks to the Kohen, the formal phrase he must use is "כנגע נראה לי בבית," "(Something that looks to me) like a (tzaraas) blight has appeared in the house."  The Mishna in Nega’im 12:5, brought by Rashi, says that even if he is a talmid chacham, and he knows with absolute certainly that the affliction has all the characteristics of Tzaraas and will be declared Tamei, he should say ‘ke'nega,’ not ‘nega’- "like a blight," not "a blight."  Only the declaration of a Kohen creates the status of Tumas Tzaraas.  The wisest non-kohen can say what he wants, but the status of Tumah is dependent on the declaration of a Kohen.  The house is not Tamei unless the Kohen makes that declaration., and the Tumah is not retroactive.

Rav Rudderman (Sichos Levi,)  brings the Tosfos Yomtov in Nega’im that discusses this legally required ambivalence.   The Tosfos Yomtov brings several explanations:

• The Mizrachi here quotes his teachers as saying that the reason for the noncommittal  expression is  since he cannot make a legal determination, he should fall back to the general rule of למד לשונך לומר איני יודע "teach your tongue to say "I don't know."  
• The Mizrachi himself says that this is because the Torah stresses respect for the Kohen, so one should not make a determination that is the Kohen's to make.  
• Or, he says, possibly because it might influence the Kohen to rush to a decision, and it should be, lechatchila, solely the Kohen's decision.  
• The Gur Aryeh says the reason is that until the Kohen's declaration, it is not Tzaraas, and to say it is a nega is a lie.  
• The Korban Aharon argues with the Gur Aryeh, and says that just because you need a Kohen's declaration to create a Tumah status of Tzaraas doesn't mean that it's not a Nega until the Kohen says it is.  It is a nega whether the Kohen talks or not, but it's only Tamei if the Kohen calls it Tzaraas.  
• This complaint of the Korban Aharon on the Gur Aryeh might sound like he's just picking on the Maharal for nothing., as the Tosfos Yomtov points out.  (The Tosfos Yomtov, by the way, was a talmid of the Maharal.)  Obviously, the Gur Aryeh holds that the word Nega means Nega Tzaraas, and it's not a Nega Tzaraas until the Kohen says so.  Yes, you could argue and say "No, "nega" is a description of an objective  physical fact irrespective of whether it acquires Tuma or not,"  but you've got to admit it could go either way.   We will discuss this later.
• The Tosfos Yomtov himself says that the requirement is because of אל תפתח פה לשטן, don't say something that gives an entrée to the Satan, as the Gemorah Brachos 19 says about תנא משמיה דר' יוסי לעולם אל יפתח אדם פיו לשטן אמר רב יוסף מאי קראה דכתיב (ישעיהו א) כמעט כסדום היינו לעמורה דמינו מאי אהדר להו נביא שמעו דבר יי' קציני סדום.  Pshat is that under normal circumstances the bright red or green Nega mark might have faded by the time the Cohen came, and the man's statement "Nega" might have a bad influence that strengthens the Nega, resulting in its remaining unfaded and declared Tamei.  (By the way, Tajikistan's national flag is the color of Tzaraas- red, green, yellow and white.)

The Gemora in Moed Kotton 18a illustrates the idea of speech influencing reality with the story of Pinchas, Shmuel’s brother, whose infelicitous comment contributed to Shmuel becoming an aveil, and Reb Yochanan’s pshat that since Avrahom Avinu said “nishtachaveh venashuvah” they did both come back from the akeida.  The Gemora says this is based on the passuk “bris krusa lisfasayim.”

פנחס אחוה דמר שמואל איתרע ביה מילתא על שמואל למישאל טעמא מיניה חזנהו לטופרי דהוו נפישן אמר ליה אמאי לא שקלת להו אמר ליה אי בדידיה הוה מי מזלזלת ביה כולי האי הואי (קוהלת י) כשגגה שיוצא מלפני השליט ואיתרע ביה מילתא בשמואל על פנחס אחוה למישאל טעמא מיניה שקלינהו לטופריה חבטינהו לאפיה אמר ליה לית לך ברית כרותה לשפתים דאמר ר' יוחנן מנין שברית כרותה לשפתים שנאמר (בראשית כב) ויאמר אברהם אל נעריו שבו לכם פה עם החמור ואני והנער נלכה עד כה ונשתחוה ונשובה אליכם ואיסתייעא מלתא דהדור תרוייהו 

Rav Rudderman says pshat, that since in Breishis it says “vayipach be’apav nishmas chayim vayehi ha’adam lenefesh chaya,” and Onkelos says “vehavas ba’adom leruach memalela,” this shows that it is the cheilek Eloka mima’al that expresses itself in our power of speech, and this is why speech has the power to influence reality.

Rav Rudderman brings the Ri Migash in the Shita in Kesuvos (I don't know where and would appreciate a mareh makom) that says pshat in the Gemara in Shabbos 127b (that one who is dan chaveiro lekaf zechus “danin oso lizchus”) that it means the following:  Reuven says that Shimon is a good man.  In Shamayim, they will judge Shimon in a better light, they will be dan Shimon lezchus, since here on Earth someone- Reuven- was dan him lezechus.  (This is a very novel way to learn Danin Oso, which, as in the She'iltos in Shmos and in the Tana d'bei Eliahu Zuta 16 is applied to Reuven  on the basis of Tov Ayin Hu Yevorach, because of Midah ke'neged Midah.)

He explains that based on this Ri Migash, the converse must also be true; if Reuven speaks lashon hara, against Shimon, his words incite a kateiguria in shamayim against Shimon, the target of his slander.  This is why a ba’al lashon hara gets tzara’as.  He is shown that Dibbur creates consequences, dibbur is like a hammer.  He is taught a lesson:  The words of the Kohen will create a condition of  Tzaraas, just as Reuven, the baal lashon hara, caused  terrible damage with his dibbur.  His ultimate Tahara, too, will be only by means of the Kohen's dibbur.  People don’t realize how dangerous dibbur can be; they don’t realize that their dibbur can have terrible effects both upon the target of their words and upon themselves.  So in this parshah, the Torah teaches that it is the pronouncement. the mere dibbur, of the Kohen that creates, and eventually  ends,  a condition of tuma.  It also teaches here the idea of “ahl tiftach peh lasattan,” also a din of dibbur affecting the tangible world.

This is why the lesson of “kenega” is taught in this parsha.  Someone who sees what looks like tzara’as in his house should immediately realize that he has caused damage to others with his words, and so he should become extremely careful with his speech, starting with the lesson of saying ‘kenega,’ and not ‘nega.’

All this was from Rav Rudderman.  The remainder is only his to the extent that he is responsible for his talmid.

We noted above that the Korban Aharon's dispute with the Gur Aryeh seems trivial.  The Gur Aryeh meant that it's not a Nega until the Kohen says so, in the sense that Nega means Tzaraas that is tamei.  Evidently the Korban Aharon held that it is physically identical Nega with or without a Kohen, and the fact that it's not Tamei until the Kohen makes the declaration just means that the dibbur of the Kohen makes it into a Nega that is Tamei.  

The opinion of the Korban Aharon reminds us of the rule of Tumas Hatehom.  The Gemara in Nazir says that if a man brought his Korban Pesach, and later an excavation revealed that he had, a few days before Pesach, walked over a dead body, a body that nobody in the world knew was there, then he is absolutely tamei, BUT he does not have to redo his Korban Pesach.  This is a pure Halacha l'Moshe MiSinai.  But the bottom line is that only human awareness of the Tuma results in consequences regarding the Korban Pesach.

Nobody would say that the dead body was not tamei.  Nobody would say that the man who walked over the body is not tamei.  BUT we do NOT say "Obviously this man was Tamei when he brought the korban, and a tamei who brings a korban does not fulfill his obligation."

So in that case, human knowledge has an effect of consequence, but does not affect actual tumah.  It's as if it were tamei, but the Torah says that such Tumah has no legal relevance in a certain context.  Here, too, the Korban Aharon is saying that undeclared Tzaraas is 100% Tzaraas, but it is a Tzaraas with zero legal consequences.

To this, I say, "Who told you that?"  Maybe the Tzaraas does not exist until the Kohen declares it, as the Gur Aryeh says?  The Gur Aryeh and Rav Ruddernam, hold that the Nega undergoes a physical change pursuant to the Kohen's declaration.  It is physically, albeit invisibly, altered when the Kohen says "Tamei."



In any case, this idea is more common than you might think.  Often, a legal status depends on a non-physical event.  One might categorize this type of rule as follows:

1.  Designation.  ייחוד   Designation for an unusual purpose, by a person who has the ability to act upon the designation, can change the legal character of an object.  Examples of this sort of "setting aside" are Hekdesh/Truma, Kiddushin, Nezirus, Yichud of klaf for STA'M, Shmura Matza, Beis Hakisei.  I think one could include Pigul in this category.

2.  Declaration. פסק  An official declaration of a status can effect that status. Examples: Tzaraas, here, and see Nega'im 12:5. Mishna in Rosh Hashanna about when the month begins, Rebbi Yehoshua, Rabban Gamliel, and Rebbi Akiva

3.  Approval.  ניחותא  Examples:  Nichusa of Ki Yutan/Yitein by hechsher, that the mashke is not a machshir unless it's nicha lei.  Nichusa by Kilayim.

4.  Awareness. ידיעה  Awareness comes in two flavors: a, where all that matters is that some human being is aware of a condition, and b, where being personally unaware removes all legal liability, even when knowledge would have been easily attained.
a. The fact that a human being is aware of a condition gives that condition legal standing.  If there is no such person in the world, the condition has no legal standing.  Examples: Tumas Hatehom, which has a diminished effect for Nezirus and Pesach where nobody knows or ever knew that the body is there, not could anyone easily see it.    Zevachim 104a by treifus found in a korban after zerika and after hefshet.  Rosh in Chulin 7:37 about bittul b'rov.  Tshuvos Harashba I:730.  However, the Chazon Ish Bechoros 23:2 says it's impossible to say that a hidden treifus that you now know of is not retroactive.  Whether you apply the din Kavu'a, depends on when the safek became relevant or known.
b. The fact that this person is not fully aware of a condition means it has no legal relevance to that person.  Example:  Orla in Chutz La'aretz (Kiddushin 39).

5.  Davar She'Eino Shelo. בעלות Of course, you can't asser someone else's object by declaring it an idol and bowing to it.  The surprise is the Shittas HaRaavad in his chidushim to Bava Kamma 67b where he says that the din of Tumas Medras by a Zav only applies to a Medras that belongs to him.  This is not based on "amod ve'anaaseh melachteinu" because Beis Din will take it away from him.  According to the Raavad, it's based on 15:5, Mishkavo, and the Gemara there in Bava Kamma says "velo hagazul."


This is not relevant to the Rambam 's shitta in Safek de'oraysa.  That is only relevant to culpability, not status.
The difference is that in the Rambam's case of safek, you would be called Annus.  in the cases we're discussing, you're not even annus, the issur doesn't exist at all.

This list is far too comprehensive to be useful, because it mixes many ideas.  The Designation group is not a chiddush.  It's perfectly reasonable that a person can be makdish something, and it will have special dinim.  Declaration of Rosh Chodesh is a function of Beis Din, as Rebbi Akiva told Reb Yehoshua.  The din of Tumas Hatehom is not that the body wasn't tamei.  It was tamei, and the man who walked over it is and was tamei, but there are limited kulos regarding the consequence of his tumah.  Awareness by Orlas Chutz apparently means that it is only assur if you know beyond any doubt that it's assur.

The real puzzles are the cases of Tumas Tzaraas and Kilayim and Tumas Medras by a Zav.  By Kilayim, it ought to be a fact, a reality.  Would anyone say that Basar and Chalav or Shatnez depends on Nichusa?  By Tzaraas, it's either Tzaraas or it's not.  Who cares that a Kohen didn't declare it?  And when he does declare it, why doesn't it go le'mafrei'a?  And by Mishkav/Medras of a Zav, it's a mattress.  He did lie on it.  Who cares if it's his?

To understand the approach of the Gur Aryeh and Rav Rudderman, based on grunk's comment, let's try this to explain the din of Tzaraas:

If the whole point of the Parsha of Tzaraas is to illustrate the power of speech, to show how this man's lashon hara injured others through the power of his speech, then, as Rav Rudderman says, the best way to show this is by making Tzaraas dependent on the Kohen's decision.  But what is the logic of such a thing?

The logic, and the point of the parsha, is that sometimes, reality is affected by human thought, similar to the case of Schrödinger's cat.  (Please see this for a nice explanation of this idea.)  In the case of Tzaraas, there is some sub-empirical characteristic that is indeterminate until the moment of the Kohen's decision.  The decision creates awareness, and the awareness generates the determinate state.  You might say that the effect generates the cause.


Let me try again, by using Yeshiva language. Theoretical physics avers that reality is sometimes undetermined until it a determination has to be made.  In yeshivish, we would put it this way:  Even in the world of reality, there can be many hava aminas until a hachra’a.  The universe tolerates many equally true hava aminas.  But a hachra’a is absolute, and no two hachra’os can exist at the same time.   We find the idea of multiple truths expressed in Eilu Ve'eilu, Lo Bashamayim hee, and by the kapara for diminishing the Moon, as thoroughly discussed in the introduction of the Ketzos Hachoshen and Reb Moshe's Igros.  Until the Hachra'a, all the hava aminos are equally valid and true.  The hachra’a, the decision,  is sometimes a result of human observation.  Schrödinger's cat is a thought experiment that accentuates this counter-intuitive rule.  Until the Kohen makes a decision, the Nega remains in an indeterminate state.  The decision of the Kohen determines the reality of the Nega and tips it towards a physical condition that results in Tumah.    This is the opinion of the Maharal and Rav Rudderman.  Although the Tosfos Yomtov said that the effect of othe dibbur was that if not for his words, the mark might have faded, Rav Rudderman and the Gur Aryeh take it further and says that it is not Tzaraas until the Kohen says it is.

Notes:

1.  I don't like it when people with a Yeshiva education use Latin when there are Hebrew, English, or Aramaic equivalents.  Sometimes, there aren't any equivalents, and this is one of those times.  This post is an example of Ignotum per ignotius, “explaining” something incomprehensible with something even more incomprehensible.  This strategy works well in drush, but not in logic.  However, like it or not, this is a well known phenomenon, as beautifully illustrated here:

2. Even to the extremely limited extent I understand Tzara’as, I still don't understand Kilayim or Medras Hazav. 

Metzora, Vayikra 14:46-7. Tefillin Wearer and Tefillin Carrier: Who Goes First?

An accepted rule: If two people come to a doorway, and one of them is a Kohen, the Kohen should enter first, because we must show respect and honor for the high kedusha of Kohanim, and precedence shows respect.  Similarly, if one is a talmid chacham, the chacham enters first.  If two people come to a doorway, and one of them is carrying tefillin, the person carrying the tefillin enters first, because in this way we honor the kedusha of the tefillin.  What if one person is carrying tefillin, and one man is wearing tefillin?  Who should enter first? Simple logic would tell you there should be no difference between the two, or if there is a difference, we should show honor to the tefillin that are being worn, since not only are they holy, but they are being used to fulfill a mitzva, they are engaged in the specific function for which they were written, which ought to increase their holiness.

If that were true, would I be writing this?

The Beis HaLeivi and Reb Yaakov Kaminetzky are quoted as saying that the person carrying tefillin goes in front of the person wearing tefillin.  They prove this from this week's parsha, Parshas Metzora.

Passuk 14:46:
וְהַבָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת כָּל יְמֵי הִסְגִּיר אֹתוֹ יִטְמָא עַד הָעָרֶב.
From here we learn that anything susceptible to Tumah, whether it is a person or a utensil or clothing, which enters a house that had been declared tamei under the law of Tzaraas, becomes tamei immediately.

Passuk 14:47:
  וְהַשֹּׁכֵב בַּבַּיִת יְכַבֵּס אֶת בְּגָדָיו וְהָאֹכֵל בַּבַּיִת יְכַבֵּס אֶת בְּגָדָיו.
From here Chazal learn that clothing that enters the house while worn by a person is tamei only after it remained in the house long enough for a person to eat four beitzim of bread- kdei achilas pras, at least three minutes.

So the rule, as stated here in the Toras Kohanim, and the Mishna in Nega'im 13:9, is as follows:
If one enters a house that has Tzaraas while carrying a hat in his hand, he and the hat are immediately tamei.  If, however, one enters the house wearing the hat, he is tamei immediately, but his hat is only tamei if he and it remain in the house for three minutes.

Rashi in Eiruvin 4a explains that in the latter case, the clothing is considered tafeil, secondary, to its wearer, and so we cannot view them as having "come" into the house.  The man came into the house; his clothing is there only because he is there.  Tosfos in Chulin 71b explains that the clothing becoming tamei a few minutes later is a secondary and delayed effect of the tumah of the wearer.  As Tosfos says, the Tumah comes to the clothing only through the tumah of the wearer; evidently, the clothing are not really in the house at all, they are not called בָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת; and their tumah is only because a man who is in a Tumah house is wearing them for an extended period.

On the basis of this Rashi and Tosfos, say the Beis HaLeivi and Reb Yaakov, we must say that if one carries tefillin, the tefillin are entering the room, and they should enter the room first.  Where one is wearing the tefillin, the tefillin are not viewed as entering the room, they are not בָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת; the person enters the room, and the tefillin happen to be there.  An item that is secondary to its wearer is not viewed independently, and therefore we cannot say that the tefillin entered the room.  Since they are not "entering the room", they are not in the equation of "who should enter first."

The problem I have with this rule is that the Toras Kohanim here says that the rule that the tumah of the worn clothing is delayed is a kula, a leniency, based on passuk 47, not a din in tafel.  That without the passuk we would think the clothing is tamei immediately because it is "ba el habayis," but the passuk tells us a kula that they need she'hiyah.

 כל כבוס בגדים שבתורה להחמיר וזה להקל

Worse, Tosfos Chulin 71b D"H למאי brings another Toras Kohanim that says that this din applies only to a Jew wearing clothing.

ועוד הקשה רבינו אפרים דבתורת כהנים ממעט בהמה וכותי דלא בעו שהייה בכלים שהן לבושים מוכבס בגדיו המטמא בגדים מציל בבית המנוגע כותי ובהמה שאינם מטמאים בגדים אינם מצילים בבית המנוגע

Secondly, the Toras Kohanim brought by Tosfos Chulin 71b D"H למאי, and the Rambam in 16 Tumas Tzaraas 6-7 says that this rule is only true where a Jew, who is susceptible to tuma, wears the clothing.  If a gentile or an animal in clothing would walk into this  house, they, of course, would remain non-tamei, but the clothing they are wearing would be tamei immediately.

Tosfos - 

ועוד הקשה רבינו אפרים דבתורת כהנים ממעט בהמה וכותי דלא בעו שהייה בכלים שהן לבושים מוכבס בגדיו המטמא בגדים מציל בבית המנוגע כותי ובהמה שאינם מטמאים בגדים אינם מצילים בבית המנוגע

More importantly, the Rambam characterizes this din as a din that the person is "matzil" his beged, not a din of bittul.

מי שנכנס לבית מנוגע וכליו על כתפיו וסנדלו וטבעתו בכפיו הוא והן טמאין מיד שאינו מציל מלטמא מיד אלא כלים שהוא לבוש בהן

Tosfos in Chulin does ask the second question, but he doesn't really answer it.  He also asks, it says in the Toras Kohanim that if one would put his ringed finger into the window of the house, the ring would become tamei after kdei achilas pras.  He asks, if the tumah comes to the worn object only through the man's tumah, in this case, where the man is not tamei at all, the ring should never become tamei.  Tosfos says that maybe this tumah is only derabanan.

So, it appears that the Tosfos, which is the basis of the Griz and Reb Yaakov, is very difficult, and resorts to dochek answers to explain bigdei akum and posheit yado lechalon.

And more importantly, even according to Tosfos, the concept of Tafel only applies where the person can become tamei.  The becomes a factor where a person that cannot become tamei walks into the house while wearing clothes- a gentile. Only in a case where the wearer can become tamei, the tumah only effects his clothing through him.  Where he cannot become tamei, the clothing immediately become tamei as well.  This is not at all a proof that clothing is secondary to a person, or that the clothing is not considered to have entered the house, it's a din that as far as tumah is concerned a person who can become tamei renders his clothing tafel.  This is also clear in the Rash in Nega'im 13:9.  This has nothing to do with tefillin.  The din of the tefillin going in first has nothing to do with the person, and a person in a shul is no different than an akum or an animal in a house of Tumah.  Also, it seems that according to them, it would be muttar to wear tefillin into a bathroom, so long as  you don't stay there for more than k'dei achlas pras.

Furthermore, according to them, the Gemara in Makkos 22b is difficult:

אמר רבא כמה טפשאי שאר אינשי דקיימי מקמי ספר תורה ולא קיימי מקמי גברא רבה

On the basis of their svara, the behavior of those people is not tipshus, it is an excellent lomdus.

I find the connection to tefillin extremely hard to understand.

(In order to avoid false starts on teirutzim it is important to know that keilim that were in the house before it was declared tamei, that remained there, are tamei immediately.  There is no requirement of "coming into the house" for becoming tamei.  Simply being there is enough to make them tamei without delay.  See Shavuos 17b.)

In the same Toras Kohanim, there is a machlokes Reb Yehuda and the Rabanan (mentioned briefly in Tosfos in Chulin.)  If a person stood outside the house and put his hand into the house through a window, and he has a ring on his hand, the man does not become tamei at all.  When does the ring become tamei?  The Rabanan say it only becomes tamei after KAPras.  Rav Yehuda says it is tamei immediately.  The Rabanan asked Reb Yehuda, why should it become tamei right away? Even if the man walked into the house wearing the ring, where he himself becomes tamei, the tumah of the ring is delayed: certainly, kal vachomer, the tumah of the ring should be delayed when the wearer is not tamei at all?  Reb Yehuda answered that this is clearly false, because when a gentile wears a ring into the house, and the gentile cannot become tamei, the ring is tamei immediately.  We see, says Reb Yehuda, that it is the fact that the wearer becomes tamei that delays the tumah of his ring.

Everyone agrees that keilim sitting in a house are tamei immediately; and that keilim that independently come into a house are tamei immediately. Everyone agrees that keilim worn into a house by a Jew have a delayed tumah, whereas if worn by a gentile they are tamei immediately. The machlokes is where you stuck your gloved or ringed hand into the house; Reb Yehuda, immediate. Rabbanan, delayed.

We pasken, as seen in the Rambam, like the Rabanan.  But what is the machlokes about?  Obviously, they are arguing about the nature of the delay of tumah where a garment in worn into a house.  But what is the machlokes?

It seems to me that the machlokes is related to the Gemara in Shabbos 5a, אגוז בכלי וכלי צף ע״ג מים.  See Tosfos there d'h Egoz and Shabbos 11a d'h Lo.

The pshat is this:
The din tumah by nigei batim is not ohel.  If it were ohel, everything would become tamei immediately.  The din tumah is that a bayis hamenugah is metamei things whose kviyus makom is in the house.  An object whose makom is on a person, even if they are in the house, don't become tamei immediately, they only become tamei because they're on a person whose makom is in the house.  This is only true by a Yisrael, because his chashivus as an equal to us means that he is the ikkar, and the clothing are seen as batel to him, not having an independent kviyus in the house.  But by Akum and Be'heima, it is irrelevant to us that the beged is being used by someone or something.  As far as we're concerned, the same way the person's makom is in the house, the beged's makom is in the house as well. This is what Rashi and Tosfos mean by "Tafel."


Rebbi Yehuda, on the other hand, holds that it is the fact that the wearer is susceptible to Tumah that causes the delay of tumah of what he is wearing.  We don't pasken like Rebbi Yehuda.

In any case, this is a unique halacha involving tzaraas which is only metamei something whose makom is in the house.  We find no such halacha by other tumos, such as Tumas Ohel; in the case of Tumas Ohel, it doesn't make a difference whether a glove is carried or worn into the house.  Therefore, this unique halacha by nigei batim has Z  E  R  O shaichus to being mechabed by tefillin.

The Beis HaLeivi and Reb  Yakov, on the other hand, hold that the special din by nigei batim of  בָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת is what causes the distinction between wearing and carrying.  Therefore, in any case where there's a din of בָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת, the corollaries will apply.  By kavod when entering a room, the idea is also בָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת, and therefore the same idea will apply.  My tzad is that it's not a din directly in בָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת; it's just that בָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת creates a rule of kvius makom.  Kvius makom is not relevant to kibud.

Having posted this, I learned several things.  1. There is Set A, people who read long and complicated divrei Torah in Torah Journals.  2. There is Set B, people who read divrei Torah on the web.  3.  Intersection(A,B)  is miniscule. 4. If I want a shakla vetarya with chaveirim who read the posts, I better stick to either hashkafa or short divrei Torah.

Additionally, I'm sticking in something from Rav Sternbuch in Titzaveh 28:38, whose connection should be obvious.

והיה על מצחו תמיד כ"ח ל"ח 

במסכת יומא ז' ע"ב למדו מפסוק זה כי הכהן הלובש את הצפן אסור לו להסיח דעתו ממנו והוסיפו עוד ללמוד בק"ו מצען לתפילין מה צקו שאין בו אלא אזכרה אחת אמרה תורה על מצחו תמיד שלא יסיח דעתו ממנו תפלין שיש בהן אזכרות הרבה שהציץ אין בו אלא שם אחד ואלו יש בהם אחד ועשרים שם של יו"ד ה"א בשל ראש וכמותן בשל יד רמב"ם על אחת כמה וכמה ובתוס' שם הקשו דהא הק"ו הוא ק"ו פריכא דמה לציץ שכן השם בגלוי מה שאין כן תפלין שהאזכרות מתופין בעור ומכח קושיא זו הסיקו התוספות שאין הק"ו ק"ו גמור מדאורייתא אלא סברא היא לחכמים לתקן שאסור להסיח דעת מתפלין מכח ק"ו זה.

ולדעת הראשונים הסוברים שאיסור היסח הדעת בתפלין הוא מדאורייתא , נראה לבאר דפליגי על התוס' בסברת איסור היסח הדעת , ומשום הכי לא קשיא להו קושית התוס ' . דמהתוס' מוכח דפירשו דאיסור היסח הדעת הוא שמסיח את דעתו ממה שהוא כעת נושא עליו את האזכרות , דמי שנושא עליו אזכרה , מחמת קדושתה של האזכרה חייב הוא שלא להסיח דעתו ממנה . ולכן הקשו התוס' שפיר , דיש לחלק בין אזכרה מגולה לאזכרה מחופה . אולם הראשונים דפליגי יש לפרש בדעתם שאין האיסור מחמת נשיאת הציץ , אלא דע"י שלבוש בציץ חלה בו בעצמו קדושה , והאיסור הוא שלא להסיח דעתו מקדושתו שלו עצמו . ולהכי לא קשיא לדידהו כלל קושיית התוס' , דאיזה סברא היא לחלק בין אזכרה מגולה לאזכרה מחופה , דגם כשהאזכרות מחופות שפיר מקדשות את האדם הלובשן.

ויש להביא ראיה לדעת הראשונים דפליגי על התוס' , דהא איסור היסח הדעת בציץ ובתפלין אינו אלא כשלובשם כדינם , הציץ על מצחו והתפלין בזרועו ובראשו , אבל אם אוחזם בידו , בודאי אין איסור היסח הדעת כלל . ואי יסוד איסור היסח הדעת הוא מחמת נשיאת האזכרות , וכמו שביארנו דהכי מוכח מקושיית התוס' , מאי נפ"מ איכא בין נושאן כמצותן או כידו . אמנם כדעת הראשונים החולקים על התוס' , יתבאר היטב , וכנ"ל.

והנה דעת רבנו יונה (עי' בשאג" א סי ' ל"ט) שאיסור היסח הדעת מתפלין הוא בשחוק וקלות ראש דוקא , אבל אם אינו עוסק בשחוק וקלות ראש , אע "פ שאין בתפלין בדעתו ומחשבתו , אינו עוכר כאיסור . וצ "ל שדעת רבנו יונה הוא כדעת התוס' דהק"ו אינו אלא מדרבנן , והם לא החמירו לאסור רק בשחוק וקלות ראש . אבל לשטות הראשונים רס "ל דהק "ו הוא מדאורייתא , אסור לו להסיח דעתו מהתפלין כלל (עיי"ש בשאג" א שהביא שכן דעת הרמב"ם והרמב"ן)

Tazria, Vayikra 13:3. A Kohen Must See the Tzara'as.

The Torah says that if a nega appears, only a kohen may pasken whether it is Tzara'as. If he is not a Talmid Chacham, he has to take a lamden with him to tell him what to pasken. But the Kohen has to examine the nega'im, and, ultimately, he has to pasken.

Rabbi Dr. Gary Schreiber pointed out that the avoda of the miluim, the process by which the Kohanim were inaugurated, has similarities to the tahara process of the metzora. If you carefully compare the two, you will find that they have avodos in common which are rarely found elsewhere. He said an excellent, and, I think, new, pshat that explains both connections of Kehuna to Tzara'as.

A kohen is subject to the temptation of gaavah, because of his entitlements (the twenty four Matnos Kehuna) and his kedusha (which enables him to do the avodah and requires him to be tahor). Also, Kohanim are aware of everyone’s sins, because whoever brings a korban chatas has to be misvadeh; furthermore, when someone brings a chatas, he has to clearly explain to the Beis Din of the Kohanim why he is bringing it, so they can be sure that the Korban Chatas is indeed required and that it is not chulin ba'azara. So he might say lashon hora. This is a dangerous position to be in: you are born with superior kedusha, Klal Yisrael has to sweat to wrest a living from the earth while you sit at home and get your food-- grain, fruit and meat-- delivered tied with a bow, and you are privy to all their embarrasing failures and sins. It would not be surprising if Kohanim viewed the rest of Klal Yisrael as if they were a bunch of donkeys. This natural tendency to ga'avah and lashon hara can bring Tzara'as.

So the Torah says that the kohanim must personally look at nega’im. They need to see what the result of gaavah and lashon hara are. This constant visual reinforcement will help them control their yetzer hora. Very few oncologists smoke, and many dermatologists obssesively avoid exposure to sunlight, because day after day they see the deadly results of irresponsible and self destructive behavior; so, too, Kohanim are obligated to closely examine the nega'im of Tzara'as, and this will remind them to eschew the traits that bring Tzara'as - Ga'avah and Lashon Hara.

And this explains why the Avodas HaMilu'im recalls Taharas Metzora. The foundation ritual of Kehuna mirrors the taharas metzora process, so that every kohen will read this parsha and remember that the superior status he was granted brought with it a concomitant danger, and that every day he must be on guard against the temptations of ga'avah and lashon hara. Indeed, this concept is found in the Bracha the Kohanim give Klal Yisrael: Yevarechacha Hashem Veyishmerecha: every blessing brings along a heightened risk and the need for shemira. Kohanim, too, are blessed with many things, and these blessings create the need for greater shemira.

(Dr. Schreiber's words:
"...the similarity between the avoda of the taharas hametzora and the miluim of the kohanim which requires blood placed on the the bohanos of each of them. The kohen will hopefully carry the initial impression with him through his years of avodah and refrain from the failings that lead to one becoming a metzora.")

Update 2017: R Avrohom Bukspan sent a comment that connects a Medrash on this inyan. Vayikra Rabba 15.

רבי בשם רבי חמא בר חנינא: 

צער גדול היה לו למשה בדבר, כך הוא כבודו של אהרן אחי להיות רואה את הנגעים?! 

אמר ליה הקב"ה: לא נהנה (אותו) מהם כ"ד מתנות? 

מתלא אמר: דאכיל בהדי קורא ילקה בהדי קילא, (= האוכל מן הקור לוקה מן הקורה).

There are too many pshatim on the words דאכיל בהדי קורא so we won't go into that, but, as I responded to Reb Avrohom, 

Very interesting pshat in the Medrash. Pashtus, it means that if a person shares his blessings with you, you can't turn your back on him when he's suffering and say it has nothing to do with you, you have to share his pain as well. But the way you're connecting it to this pshat, it's Chazal's way of describing what Gaavah is all about- that when it comes to taking, you think you're entitled, so that when the man needs sympathy, you don't feel any obligation to him. "I took because I deserve, and it's an honor for him to give me. I owe nothing to him!" So the Torah says, no. It was a gift, and you should be makir tov to the extent that his pain is your pain.

Update 2021:

Just to outline the similarities between Taharas Metzora and Chinuch Kohanim and Leviim. Chinuch Leviim is in Behaaloscha, and Kohanim is in Tzav.

1. Taglachas: 

Metzora, (ויקרא יד, ט) 

וְהָיָה בַיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי יְגַלַּח אֶת כׇּל שְׂעָרוֹ אֶת רֹאשׁוֹ וְאֶת זְקָנוֹ וְאֵת גַּבֹּת עֵינָיו וְאֶת־כׇּל־שְׂעָרוֹ יְגַלֵּחַ 

Leviim וְהֶעֱבִירוּ תַעַר עַל כָּל בְּשָׂרָם" (במדבר ח, ז)

2. Kibus:

Metzora וְכִבֶּס אֶת בְּגָדָיו" (ויקרא יד, ט) 

Leviim וְכִבְּסוּ בִגְדֵיהֶם וְהִטֶּהָרוּ" (במדבר שם)

3. Tevilla.

4. Tenufa, by Metzora on his living Korban, by the Leviim on them personally.

5. Dam and Shemen on the persons:

Metzora  וְלָקַח הַכֹּהֵן מִדַּם הָאָשָׁם וְנָתַן הַכֹּהֵן עַל תְּנוּךְ אֹזֶן... וכו" (ויקרא יד, יד, י'ז)

וּמִיֶּ֨תֶר הַשֶּׁ֜מֶן אֲשֶׁ֣ר עַל־כַּפּ֗וֹ יִתֵּ֤ן הַכֹּהֵן֙ עַל־תְּנ֞וּךְ אֹ֤זֶן הַמִּטַּהֵר֙ הַיְמָנִ֔ית וְעַל־בֹּ֤הֶן יָדוֹ֙ הַיְמָנִ֔ית וְעַל־בֹּ֥הֶן רַגְל֖וֹ הַיְמָנִ֑ית עַ֖ל דַּ֥ם הָאָשָֽׁם׃

Kohanim, (ויקרא ח, כד-ל)וישחט ויקח משה מדמו ויתן על־תנוך אזן־אהרן הימנית ועל־בהן ידו הימנית ועל־בהן רגלו הימנית

ויקרב את־בני אהרן ויתן משה מן־הדם על־תנוך אזנם הימנית ועל־בהן ידם הימנית ועל־בהן רגלם הימנית

Shemen, by the Kohanim, ויקח משה משמן המשחה ומן־הדם אשר על־המזבח ויז על־אהרן על־בגדיו ועל־בניו ועל־בגדי בניו אתו ויקדש את־אהרן את־בגדיו ואת־בניו ואת־בגדי בניו אתו 

UPDATE 2022.

I just saw an email from R Zweig's yeshiva in Miami. He says that the lesson of davka these three limbs is that a kohen, elevated to Keser Kehuna, holier than every other Jew, needs to be reminded that his is a position of service, not self-aggrandizement. So you put the dam on his hand, leg and ear - The kohen is charged with the work of doing for others, and going to others, and listening to others.  The same lesson is taught the Metzora, who needs to change from self centered to sympathetic.

His words:

In this week’s parsha, we find Hashem giving Moshe instructions for the official installation of Aharon and his sons as kohanim – the priestly class of Bnei Yisroel. Moshe then gathers all of Bnei Yisroel to watch as he follows a step-by-step process for initiating Aharon and his sons as the kohanim.

Aside from the steps that might be expected in the process of elevating their status – immersion in a mikveh, dressing them in priestly vestments, applying and sprinkling the special anointing oil to all the vessels in the Mishkan and to Aharon and his sons as well, etc. – we find a very unusual ritual.

Several sacrifices were offered: a bull was brought as a sin offering, a ram was brought as a burnt offering, and a second ram was brought as a peace offering (see 8:22 and Rashi ad loc). Moshe then applied the blood of the peace offering to Aharon’s and his sons’ right ear lobes, right thumbs, and right big toes.

This ritual is only performed in one other place in the Torah: by the purification of a person who has been struck by tzora’as – commonly (and incorrectly) translated as leprosy.

hat is the meaning of this enigmatic ritual and what is the relationship between initiating the kohanim and cleansing one who has recovered from tzora’as?

Aharon and his sons were being elevated to a new status over the rest of the Jewish people. They were now receiving forevermore one of the three crowns that Hashem gifted to this world; they were receiving the crown of kehuna. Without proper perspective, being crowned can be a dangerous affair as it can easily lead one to harbor false notions of self-importance. A person can actually begin to believe that he is receiving this honor because there is something intrinsically great about himself.

The unique ritual of placing the blood on the ear lobe, thumb, and big toe is intended to address this issue. The unifying connection between all of these parts of the body is that the ears, fingers, and toes represent the person’s extremities. When a person gets cold, the first parts that are affected are the extremities – namely the ears, fingers, and toes – because they are the furthest from the core of the body. Yet, when a person is asked to point to himself, he always points to his core. Thus, by emphasizing the extremities, this ritual demonstrates that the position is not about them personally, it’s about what they can do for others.

The message they receive is that while being anointed a kohen is an honor, it is more significantly a great and awesome responsibility. The Talmud has a dispute about whether the kohanim are agents of the people to Hashem or agents of Hashem to the people, but everyone agrees that they are merely agents. In other words, they are facilitators not principals. This is the message conveyed by placing the blood on the extremities.

This is also true of a person who has been struck by tzora’as. This punishment comes as a consequence of speaking loshon hora. The core motivating force of one who speaks loshon hora is the desire to elevate oneself by putting others down. While every sin contains an element of self-centered behavior, loshon hora is the sin of focusing on the perceived importance of oneself and trying to elevate the opinions of others regarding one’s own self-importance. This is why a person needs a kohen to declare them unclean and the process of purification is the same as the kohen’s initiation. The message they are supposed to receive and internalize is that they need to focus less on themselves and their own importance.

ADDITIONAL UPDATE 2022

Dr. R' Hertzka Grinblatt offered another very good explanation for the commonality among Metzora and Kohen and Levi. He said that all three need to be kovei'a themselves in a machaneh.

The Metzora needs to be allowed into Machane Yisrael; the Levi into Machane Levi'ah; the Kohen into Machane Shechina.

This is a case of תן לחכם ויחכם עוד, and also an application of די לחכימה ברמיזה. Because you can cavil that the Metzora was already muttar to enter the machane after the Shtei Tziporim; and the Levi? He doesn't need any hetter to go into the Har HaBayis. But the point is still excellent. There are three machanos. Each of the three is the place of the parts of Klal Yisrael. For all three of these people, it is part of the process that is KOVEI'A them into their machane position. Again, I can explain it for you, I can not understand it for you.