Noach: Interbreeding and Genetic Manipulation

I'm not finished with the last post.  But its time for Parshas Noach, and there is something I've been meaning to write about.  Earlier Posts on Parshas Noach:

Luxury at a Price
The Two Reasons We Were Zocheh to Tzitzis
The Victim of Victimless Crime


One of the behaviors of the generation of the Mabul, as Rashi says (6:12), was spontaneous inter-specific mating of animals. 
וַיַּרְא אֱ--לֹהִים אֶת הָאָרֶץ וְהִנֵּה נִשְׁחָתָה כִּי הִשְׁחִית כָּל בָּשָׂר אֶת דַּרְכּוֹ עַל הָאָרֶץ:
And God saw the earth, and behold it had become corrupted, for all flesh had corrupted its way on the earth.


Rashi:
כי השחית כל בשר: אפילו בהמה חיה ועוף נזקקין לשאינן מינן:
Even cattle, beasts, and fowl would mate with those that were not of their own species.

This is made clear in the Medrash here, 28:8, in the name of Rav Azariah.

This Rashi might be understood as referring to the animal behavior as a symptom or a reflection of human degradation (see Beis Halevi), but not as inherently iniquitous or repugnant.

But later (8:1), Rashi says that when Hashem remembered the animals in the Ark and looked upon them with favor, this was because Hashem knew that these individual animals had not engaged in inter-specific sexual congress. This does indicate that such behavior is inherently iniquitous or repugnant.  Furthermore, the Gemara in Sanhedrin 108a states that mankind was guilty of intentional cross species animal husbandry.  According to the Mizrachi, (also mentioned by the Maharsha there) this is an alternative to the Medrash of Rav Azariah; according to the Maharal, this is consistent with the Medrash (and see Rav Povarsky's Bahd Kodesh here).  But in any case, whether the interbreeding was spontaneous or forced, it is clear that it ultimately generated chaos, a suspension of the laws of nature-- androlomusia (Medrash 26:5). 


In Vayikra 19:19, the Torah prohibits us from intentional mating of animals of different species:
אֶת חֻקֹּתַי, תִּשְׁמֹרוּ בְּהֶמְתְּךָ לֹא תַרְבִּיעַ כִּלְאַיִם  שָׂדְךָ לֹא תִזְרַע כִּלְאָיִם  וּבֶגֶד כִּלְאַיִם שַׁעַטְנֵז  לֹא יַעֲלֶה עָלֶיךָ.

The Ramban and Rabbeinu Bachaya there say that interbreeding of species for the purpose of creating an animal that is not part of the natural world expresses a denial of the perfection of the world as created (see, e.g., Chulin 127), it is an act of rebellion against God's will, and it is Makchish- it weakens- God's act of creation.  I would say that this 'Makchish,' weakening, is derived from the term androlomusia, a breach in the laws of nature, resulting in chaos.  It is as if natural law- physics, mathematics, biology- is a treaty between Man and God; if Mankind breaches the treaty, all natural law is subject to abrogation by God, as occurred at the time of the Mabul..


Now, here is a paragraph from an editorial in Nature, published June 2007.


Many a technology has at some time or another been deemed an affront to God, but perhaps none invites the accusation as directly as synthetic biology. Only a deity predisposed to cut-and-paste would suffer any serious challenge from genetic engineering as it has been practised in the past. But the efforts to design living organisms from scratch — either with a wholly artificial genome made by DNA synthesis technology or, more ambitiously, by using non-natural, bespoke molecular machinery — really might seem to justify the suggestion, made recently by the ETC Group, an environmental pressure group based in Ottawa, Canada, that "for the first time, God has competition".

I suppose it's nice to see that these people were mechavein to, and so eloquently stated, the essential thesis of the Ramban and Rabbeinu Bachaya.  And, of course, the Ramban issue does not apply only to synthetic biology, but even to gene splicing, which is now so common as to often be done in high school science projects.

The natural halachic reaction to this Rashi is that the fact remains that after Matan Torah, we have 365 prohibitions, no more, no less, and if no specific prohibition covers an act, there is no reason to avoid it other than the vague mussar of "kedoshim tihyu".  After all, the issur of Kilayim in Vayikra 19:19 is called a "chok."  If it is a chok, perhaps the issur is limited to the specific cases that were prohibited and not meant to be extrapolated, and we have no right to establish a binyan av. Perhaps, then, the manipulation of genetic material in a laboratory, which does not involve the unnatural act of mating dissimilar animals, is not prohibited.


Continuing the train of thought, here's a piece of Torah from Reb Elchonon Wasserman.  Every single line in this  piece is a fascinating chiddush.  Items 1 and 2 will appear irrelevant to our discussion, but you will see that they lead back to this topic.  Unfortunately, I can't find a full text copy of the Kovetz Shiurim online, and I'm not getting paid enough to type it, so I'll just give you the mareh makom and a synopsis.  Kesuvos 60, # 203 in my copy.
1.  Citing Rabbeinu Chananel in Chagiga 16- a child conceived through artificial insemination, and certainly in vitro, does not generate tumas leida for the mother.  (Ed: Of course there would be the standard "ein pesichas hakever belo dahm."  But neither the chumra of tumas leidah, nor the kula of dahm tohar, would apply to a child of AI, and certainly not to in vitro fertilization.)
2. This would only be true where AI and IV are rare.  If they were to become common, their halacha would be the same as natural conception. (Ed: in the previous piece he says like Reb Moshe and the Avnei Nezer, that bishul be'chama is only different than bishul in fire so long as it is rare.  Once it becomes common, there would be a din of bishul basar be'chalav, the issur of bishul korban pesach, and a de'oraysa of bishul on Shabbos, even in bishul bechama.  See, e.g., this.)
3. Now that cross-pollination is common, cross-pollination is prohibited between any trees for which grafting would be assur.  (Ed: the Chazon Ish (Zeraim, Kilayim 3) leaves undecided the question of whether grafting among dissimilar citrus trees is prohibited.  According to many poskim, the issur of harkava is the reason that we avoid grafted Esrogim, though the Chazon Ish prohibits grafted Esrogim even if the the issur of harkava does not apply.  According to Reb Elchonon, then, the act of intentional cross-pollination between dissimilar citrus trees would be a safek de'oraysa.  If so, it would seem that the fruit of any naturally cross-pollinated esrog would be passul.  If so, there hasn't been a kosher esrog in the world since the time of Adam Harishon, because cross-pollination with other similar citruses occurs whenever the wind blows.  In fact, I believe that the only reason we can use them on Sukkos, even though they inevitably contain a certain percentage of lemon genes from cross pollination, is that yichus goes after the mother (the ovary/stigma), not the father (the pollen/stamen.))

Some aspects of this issue have been addressed by certain rabbinical figures, some of whom propose that the prohibition of harkava only applies to living entities. Genetic material, on the other hand, is not alive, and, they say, may be manipulated at will.  This might come as a surprise to the Ramban, to Reb Elchanan, and to the editors of Nature.  It is similar to an argument that ma'aseh Onan is muttar for anyone that was already mekayeim pirya ve'riya.

Regarding Cloning, there are those who do not discourage it.  Rabbi J. David Bleich, in Tradition, Spring 1998, argues that cloning is muttar because

"The matter of identification as a member of a species is best summed up in a pithy comment attributed to Rav Chaim Soloveitchik. It is reported that Rav Chaim explained a certain Halachic concept by posing the following query: Why is a horse a horse? The answer is that a horse is a horse because its mother was of that species. For that reason the Mishna, Bechorot 5b, declares that the offspring of a kosher animal is kosher even if it has the appearance and physical attributes of a non-kosher animal and, conversely, the offspring of a non-kosher animal is non-kosher even if it has the appearance and physical attributes of a kosher animal. Thus, identity as a member of a particular species is determined not by distinguishing characteristics, but by birth."

He then cites Reb Elchanan in Kovetz He'aros 8:33 who broadly applies the rule of the Mishna in Bechoros.The Chazon Ish (Yoreh Deah 116:1) has also been cited as support for the approach.

On the other hand, Rav Eliashiv has been quoted (see Torah U’madda Journal 9:195 and 216) as stating that cloning violates the spirit of the Torah, as it is similar to Kilayim.  Rav Eliezer Waldenberg (Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer 15:45:4) emphatically objects to cloning. 

But there is a fundamental distinction between that discussion, which focuses on the product of cloning, and   Rashi and the Ramban's statements, which address the process of hybridization.  In fact, the Chazon Ish in YD 168:1 is arguably a strong source for the prohibition of interspecific gene splicing.

In any case, it could be argued that the Torah is warning us that the creation of new life forms, either by conflation or synthesis, endangers all life on earth.  One doesn't have to be a Luddite or a fundamentalist to recognize that if the black plague, which involved a natural life form which co-existed with humanity for millennia, reduced the population of Europe by sixty percent, the escape of a carelessly or maliciously engineered organism could do at least as well.  I don't mean to rehash the trope of endless science fiction novels and thrillers.  The idea here is that besides the natural danger, a more important factor might be the breach of the natural treaty between man and G-d.  True, Hashem promised that the wholesale abrogation of the laws of nature will never happen again.  But this does not exhaust the list of alternative horrors.  There are many who consider themselves Orthodox Jews who have a hard time believing the literal truth of the story of the Mabul and Noach.  Here's hoping that the thesis I presented here is incorrect, so that we don't have to witness conclusive proof of the literal truth of the story of the Mabul.

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Parshas Noach and Victimless Crime

The following is from Rabbi Frand; I post it here for two reasons. First, because it is excellent, as always. Second, because of an interesting historical oddity that I discuss afterwards.

The Medrash says, "Had Iyov only come to explain the incident of the Flood, that would have been sufficient." According to our Sages there are many verses in the book of Job that refer to the sins of the generation of the Flood.

For example, the verse in Iyov [24:18] says, "He is light upon the face of the water, their portion in the earth is cursed, he does not turn by way of the vineyards." The Medrash relates this verse to the sin of the generation of the flood: They were cursed that they should perish in water. Why? The Medrash tells us that they were cursed because they lived with their wives not for procreation or for their wives' sake, but only for their own pleasure.

The Medrash in fact already alludes to this in last week's parsha. (See Rashi 4:19 on Lemech’s two wives, Odoh and Tziloh.) "The custom of that generation was to take two wives, one for having children and one for pleasure. The one taken for having children would sit ugly and neglected like a living widow; the one taken for pleasure would be sterilized and would sit by him, made up with cosmetics like a harlot (Rashi says “like a Kalloh.”)."

There are two things that require understanding. First, while this is certainly a terrible practice, it is also not the worst of crimes. We all know cases of domestic violence and abuse, things much worse than these. There are hosts of crimes and perversions which we would consider more vile and worthy of destruction. As we know, there are many people today who live for worldly pleasures, neglecting their spouses and families. They aren't nice people. But are they the worst criminals which society has to offer?

Furthermore, what does the Medrash do with the literal interpretation of the verses? The verses themselves tell us what happened to the generation of the flood and why they were punished. "The earth was decadent before G-d, the land was filled with violence." [Bereshis 6:11]. The Torah tells us that there was so much perversion that it even affected the animals.

This is a whole different story. We can understand sending a Flood to destroy the world for that reason. We can understand such an extreme punishment for decadence, perversion, theft and violence. However, the Medrash tells us that their problem was that they lived with their wives for the purpose of their own pleasure. How can one understand this discrepancy?

The explanation is that the Medrash is not contradicting the verses. The Medrash is speaking of root causes. The verses are speaking of the eventual effect. How is a Generation of the Flood produced? How did they wind up so decadent and perverted that they were deserving of destruction? Our Sages tell us it comes from a philosophy of life that says, "Have a good time".
If the pursuit of pleasure goes unchecked, it will eventually deteriorate into a Generation of the Flood. One thousand five hundred years earlier (?), when Lemech took two wives -- one for children and one for pleasure -- that was not the absolute worst of crimes. But, it was a philosophy of life.

Eat, Drink, be Merry, have a good time, and enjoy yourself; self- gratification, live-for-today." When people pursue pleasure with a vengeance, it eventually gives way to "the land became corrupted before the L-rd".

One has to go no further than to look at society today to discover what happens to a culture that is only interested in pleasure and self- gratification, in enjoying the moment -- whether it be with passions of the heart, with alcohol, with drugs, or whatever provides a 'good time' right now.
With this idea, we can understand a teaching of the Rabbis at the end of the parsha. The verse tells us [Bereshis 9:20] "And Noach, the man of the earth, profaned himself and planted a vineyard." The Sages comment that Noach went from being a "righteous and perfect man in his generation" [6:9] to being a "man of the earth", an ordinary farmer.

This is contrasted with Moshe who starts out as being called "an Egyptian man" [Shmos 2:19] and ends up by being called a "Man of G-d" [Devorim 33:1]. Noach was not able to maintain his stature. He went in the other direction - - starting out as being called a righteous man and ending up by being called a man of the earth.

What was his terrible crime? Why did he fall so much in the eyes of G-d? Because he planted a vineyard.

So what is his terrible crime? True, he should have planted wheat; he should have planted string beans, because they are more of a necessity of life. But for that the Torah castigates him that he "profaned himself" (va'Yachal Noach)?

The answer is that Noach failed to learn the lesson of the Flood. Why did the Flood come about? How did it all start? The root cause was that people were into pleasure. What is the first thing one should NOT DO, after a Flood? Seek out pleasures.

Noach chose to plant a vineyard, to plant wine, something he could have lived without. Wine can be wonderful, but it is just for pleasure (I would say that wine has an important place in life, as the Gemorah says “Chamroh v’reichni pikchin,” but after the mabul the appropriate stance would be more aescetic.) This is precisely the lesson he failed to learn and that is how Noach profaned himself.

How did Noach make such a blunder? Noach was a Tzadik. Why did he plant a vineyard? The answer is because we have our Sages to point out the root causes of the evil in the Generation of the Flood. Noach's mistake was to only look at the results and to fail to see the cause. Had he realized that the root cause of the behavior of that generation was the tendency to pursue pleasure, he would never have planted a vineyard. He was smarter than that. He was a bigger Tzadik than that.

His problem was -- as is so often the problem -- that he looked at symptoms and failed to see the disease. We, too, look at outcomes and don't look at causes. This is not a sin of malice or disregard, but a sin of failure to recognize underlying causes.

The underlying cause of the sin of the generation of the flood was not initial decadence. It was a philosophy of "Have a Good Time". That is what Noach failed to see. He looked at the bottom line, rather than at the whole picture. (This ends Rabbi Frand's discussion.)

An interesting modern example of this is the connection of the modern Nudist movement and the rise of Facism. (See W. Will van der, The Transition of German Culture to National Socialism, Source: The Body and the Body Politics as Symptom and Metaphor in the Transition of German Culture to National Socialism" in The Nazification of Art: Art, Design, Music, Architecture and Film in the Third Reich, B. Taylor& W.v.d. Will (eds.) (Hampshire, 1990), pp. 14-52) (Additionally, please note that in the late 1800s, disillusioned with Victorian mores, a collective of writers propagated a movement called Lebensreform, or life reform. Proponents of Lebensreform believed that men should live close to nature, eat strict vegetarian diets, abstain from tobacco and alcohol, and be nudists.)  One would not necessarily see a connection, or that nudism is a terrible transgression.  But there is a whole network of symptoms that are associated with being “poreik ohl,” with breaking the yoke of modesty both physical and intellectual. Decadence starts out being a victimless crime, but ultimately it brutalizes and destroys the soul of the person who indulges and even infects the people around him.

How We Were Zocheh to Tzitzis

9:23. Vayikach Sheim voYefes.

Rashi from Sanhedrin 70— because of the chesed and kibud av of this simlah, Sheim was zocheh to the tallis of tzitzis.

The Mizrachi here asks from here to the gemara Chulin 89 that says we were zocheh to chut shel tzitzis and retzu’ah shel tefillin because of the “michut ve’ad sroch na’al in Lech Lecho 14:23— so, which zechus was essential for bringing us the mitvah? Was it Avrom’s refusal of Melech Sdom’s money, or Sheim’s concern for his father’s dignity?

The Mizrachi says that one was for the white threads and the other for the tcheiles.

The Kli Yokor says that one was for the tallis shel mitzvah and the other for the chut of tzitzis (this teretz is shver, because the beged of tzitzis is just a machshir and has no intrinsic chashivus– you have to put them somewhere. (Someone showed me a likut called Yakro D’Orayso that brings someone who, not mentioning the Kli Yokor, wants to bring rayos that the beged is part of the mitzvoh; his rayos are weak. One is the Rashi on Hiddur that says Tallis no’eh (I thought it was the Gemorah) besides tzitzis no’im, so you see that the beged is part of the mitzvoh. Another is the fact that we say “l’his’ateif batzitzis,” and if the beged is not part of the mitzvoh, why mention the ittuf part. Poor rayos. I think he also brings some irrelevant Netziv from a Mechiltah.)

But then the Kli Yokor adds a very good thing: that tzitzis protects from two things-- arayos and poverty, so the story of Sheim, with the beged to cover Noach, gave tzitzis the sgula of protection from arayos, it covers the ervoh, and the story of Avrohom, where he refused bad money, he refused money that wasn’t kosher, brought the sgula of protection from poverty.)

The Kli Yokor says that tzitzis protect from arayos based on the story of the man and the zonah in Menachos 44, and they protect from poverty because a person that is involved in arayos becomes poor. His ‘poverty’ point seems weak.

However, I found that the Gemorah in Menochos 43a says that Rav Moni was very makpid to get good tcheiles, and ‘hahu sabbo’ told him that the ancient ones were also makpid like that and they were successful in their businesses. This is something you will never forget: Rav Moni– lot’s of money.

One must realize, however, that tzitzis are not magical amulets; we wear them because of Hashem’s mitzvah. But they do assist a person who is trying to do Hashem’s will to earn an honest living and avoid arayos.

This Kli Yokor should give us a greater appreciation of what the mitzvos of the Torah mean, where they come from, and their deeper meanings. Every mitzvoh is like this, but when we are lucky enough to make the occasional discovery about one or the other, we should get chizuk out of it. So next time you put on your tzitzis, or buy a pair of tzitzis, remember that this mitzvah stems from the most ancient times and appreciate and celebrate it as it deserves.


However, I later wondered, what do these Gemoros mean when they say we were zocheh to particular mitzvos because of a maiseh ovos. Since when do we have mitzvos because of the zchus of something we did? Weren’t the mitzvos given because Hashem wants us to have the taryag? And does this mean that all of our mitzvos stem from something we did? And if not, what distinguishes these two mitzvos, in the sense that all other mitzvos are gzeiras melech, and these two stem from a maiseh ovos?

Maybe the answer is that tzitzis is one of the rare mitzvos that, the Bach says, should be done with specific kavonoh. Where there is a din of specific kavonoh, it is important to remember the story behind the mitzvoh. In the case of tzitzis, when a person puts on the tzitzis, he should remember the shame and disgrace of arayos, and the schar of the strength of character one should have in rising above it; and he should remember Avrom Ovinu’s refusal to take money he was entitled to because it was not clean money, and how important it is to trust in Hashem and not accept money or gifts that are not honorable.

However, I later looked at the Gemora in Chullin 89a, and I saw that the Gemora really says a very interesting thing that people don’t realize. The gemora says b’zchus michut etc. Then, the Gemora asks, bishlemo tefillin, it says v’ro’u kol amei ho’oretz...v’yor’u mimeko. But what is there about tzitzis. Rashi there explains, by tefillin we know what hano’oh there is from doing the mizvoh. So it is clear as day that the gemora doesn’t mean that we were zocheh to the mitzvos because of ma’aseh ovos. The Gemora means that we were zocheh to have a specific hano’oh or schar that is generated from doing the mitzvoh.

Another point: the gemora then answers that the hano’oh from tzitzis is that the color of tcheiles is... like the kisei hakovod. Normally, you learn that this means that we look at the tcheiles and we are reminded of all the mitzvos in the Torah. Rashi says this is not correct. Rashi says that the result of the color is that Hashem looks at His kisei hakovod and He remembers the mitzvoh of tcheiles! This is the hano’oh of the mitzvoh, that one who wears tcheiles will be remembered by Hashem, because Hashem is reminded about the mitzvoh when He looks at His kisei hakovod.

It is worth noting that a similar Chazal, in Sotah 17a, says as above regarding tefillin and tzitzis, and also that we were zocheh to Eifer Poroh Adumoh and Afar Sotah from Avrohom’s saying “v’onochi ofor vo’eifer” in Vayeiro 18:27. If you will look at the Torah Temimoh there, you will see that he is completely off the tracks, and didn’t remember the idea that the “zochu” refers to a tangential benefit.

Now, back to the original question the Mizrochi asked, why does the Gemora have two reasons we were zocheh to tzitzis:
R’ Chaim Shmuelevitz says that one was the seed and the other was the earth and water to make it grow, and the Levush Ho’Orah in the same sefer as the Mizrachi says that the brocho to Sheim could have gone to any of his descendants, and it was Avrohom’s act that brought it to us. This teretz, although it sounds most logical, is shver because we don’t find that other nations have any mitzvos at all. Does he mean that we would have had 612 and the Indians would have the mitzvah of tzitzis? R’ Chaim Shmuelevitz’s teretz, however, fits into the Levush Ho’orah’s pshat, because although the seed was given to Sheim, only one of his descendants, Avrohom, made it sprout.

The Lesson of the Yonah - Two Kinds of Sustenance

Parshas No’ach, Bresishis 8:11. Alei zayis toraph befiha.

Rashi brings the Gemara in Eiruvin 18 that “amra yona...” Let my food be bitter as olives from the hand of Hashem, rather than sweet as honey from the hands of man. We see from this expression that although Hashgochas Hashem predetermines whether a person will have enough to eat, it does not necessarily predetermine the quality, or the flavor and pleasantness of the food. So, the Yonah said, I realize that by choosing to subsist directly from the Yad Hashem I might have to settle for food that is as bitter as the olive, while if I shnorr from Noach I would get food that is as sweet as honey, but I prefer the Yad Hashem. Like the Gemara in Sanhedrin 20a that says that in the generation of R’ Yehuda B’reb Ila’i that was characterized by universal limud hatorah, but “hayu shisha miskasim b’tallis echad.” Their absolute bitachon was not rewarded with wealth and comfort, with what we think of when we read "ve'achalta ve'savata.". Hashem only provided them with the minimum subsistance. V'savata does not always mean plenty. V'savata can mean that we are given whatever is best for us. As we see in the story of Chaninah ben Dosah, everything has a price, and sometimes it is better to be poor.

Along this line, see below in Mattos, Bamidbor 32:1, regarding Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven, where R Dov Povarsky says that the Medrash there says that there are two kinds of wealth: a mattanah from Hashem that comes miko’ach haTorah, and wealth that is “chatuf,” snatched. Evidently, it is possible to snatch wealth and power and chochmoh even if they are not granted to you. (In fact, he says that the kind of mattanah that is granted by Hashem is more evanescent than the kind that is chatuf; that is, it vanishes easily when a person no longer deserves it.) Maybe that is what Chazal mean with the story of the Yonah; that it is better to subsist from mattas Hashem rather than from the other ways of getting what you want, namely chatifah or shnorring.