Re'ay, Devarim 13:1. Bal Tosif and Krias Shema

Our parsha tells us the din of Bal Tosif.  In the past, we discussed the question of why every asmachta is not a problem of Bal Tosif.  Today, we're going to talk about Bal Tosif and Kerias Shema.

The sefer Divrei Yaakov brings a machlokes Chafetz Chaim and Chazon Ish whether there's a din of בל תוסיף on קריאת שמע.  In other words, if a person said קריאת שמע after the proper time with kavana to be mekayeim the mitzva, is he over בל תוסיף.  Both are mipi hashemu'ah, but the sources are very reliable.

Chafetz Chaim:

בספר הצדיק רבי שלמה [והוא תולדות של הצדיק רבי שלמה בלוך תלמיד של החפץ חיים] בעמוד מ״ב אות ס״ב כתוב שאמר הרב הנ״ל בשם החפץ חיים שהקורא קריאת שמע לאחר זמנה בכוונה למצוות קריאת שמע עובר בלאו דאורייתא דבל תוסיף עכ״ד

Chazon Ish:

 בספר מעשה איש חלק ג' עמוד ק״כ כתוב בשם ספר המעיר סימן ב' ס״ק אי שאמר החזון איש שדוקא בעושה דבר הרשות לשם מצוה יש איסור בל תוסיף כגון סוכה ביום השמיני אבל בעושה דבר מצוה לשם מצוה אחרת כגון הקורא קריאת שמע לאחר זמנה שהקריאת שמע הוא דברי תורה אלא שהוא כיוון לקריאת שמע הויא מחשבה בעלמא ובמחשבה אין בל תוסיף עכ״ד

Reb Moshe in the Igros, OC OC II:60, says exactly the same thing as the Chazon Ish, but he leaves it as a safek le'halacha.

 ובעצם מסופקני אם יש איסור בל תוסיף בק'ש שהוא גם למוד תורה, שלא מצינו שאיכא בל תוסיף בק'ש. וראיה שהרי רצו לקבוע עשרת הדברות בק'ש בדף י״ב ואם איכא בל תוסיף בק'ש הרי היה זה בל תוסיף ככהן שמוסיף עוד ברכה, וא'כ כ'ש שלקרות שלא בזמנה אף במכוין למצוה ליכא בל תוסיף וצ״ע לדינא

I want to point out a little problem with their svara that saying Krias Shema is a maaseh mitzva because of the Mitzva of talmud torah.

• The Radvaz (III:416) says (arguing with the Ran in Nedarim 8a) that after you have learned one thing a day, the other learning you do is a reshus, not a chova.  
• I say, and I think it's pretty obvious, that even if you hold  מצות אינן צריכות כוונה, that's only by a mitzva chiyuvis, because of סתמה לשמה.  But by a mitzva kiyumis, there's no סתמה לשמה, and so everyone would agree that מצוות צריכות כוונה.  
• If so, if a person says Krias Shema חוץ לזמנו, and he has kavana to be yotzei the mitzva of Krias Shema, but he does not have kavana for the mitzva of Limud Torah, he won't fulfill any mitzva of Talmud Torah, and there ought to be בל תוסיף, because it's not a maaseh mitzva.

But with a small adjustment, we can say like Reb Moshe and the Chazon Ish.  The Lechem Mishna in the beginning of hilchos Tefilla says that the ikar of Krias Shema is Yichud Hashem, which is actually a mitzva twenty four hours a day.  If so, if Krias Shma is a form of the mitzva of yichud, then a person that has kavana to fulfill the mitzva of Krias Shema is automatically having kavana to fulfill the mitzva of Yichud Hashem.  If so, even if saying it after the zman is not a kiyum of the mitzva of Talmud Torah, it is a kiyum of the mitzva of Yichud Hashem.

Lechem Mishna:

מצות עשה להתפלל בכל יום שנאמר וכו'. י"ל למה לא התחיל בהל' ק"ש מ"ע לקרות ק"ש כמו שהתחיל כאן בהלכות תפלה וי"ל כדתירץ ספר חרדים דמצות יחוד חייב אדם לייחד בכל רגע ולכך לא חשבה לאחת ממ"ע שבתורה לבד 

NOTE:
There is an interesting mussar haskeil here.  We've discussed the Gaon's shitta that one should be careful to not have kavana for the mitzva when he says Shema in Le'olam, because  you'll be yotzei before the Birkos Krias Shema (and similarly when you sing Tzur MiShelo.)  (I believe that the Gaon also holds that you don't have the maalah of Smichas Geula LiTefilla when you are not being yotzei Krias Shema now.)  Here we learned that the Chafetz Chaim holds that if you say Krias Shema after the zman, you can be over Bal Tosif.  This means that if a person says Krias Shma after the zman of the Magen Avraham, but during the zman of the Gr'a, not only will he not be mekayeim the mitzva according to the Magen Avraham, but he will be over Bal Tosif as well.  The same is true when you say Krias Shma in Kedusha of Mussaf, which is very often long after Zeman Kerias Shema.  To avoid this problem, you would have to have kavana that you're not saying it for the mitzva if the result is an issur of Bal Tosif.
Thus, that there are two times that a person has to be careful not to have kavana to be yotzei Kerias Shema, once in Le'olam and once after the Zman of the Magen Avraham, or generally after the zman.

Re'eh, Devarim 12:30-31. Adopting Non-Jewish Religious Behaviors

12:30-31.

   השמר לך פן תנקש אחריהם אחרי השמדם מפניך ופן תדרוש לאלהיהם לאמר איכה יעבדו הגוים האלה את אלהיהם ואעשה כן גם אני. לא תעשה כן לה' אלקיך כי כל תועבת ה' אשר שנא עשו לאלהיהם כי גם את בניהם ואת בנותיהם ישרפו באש לאלהיהם

TheTorah tells us that it is assur to learn from Gentiles how to worship God, that religious eclecticism, or syncretism, is prohibited. 

R Moshe here in Kol Rom II says that the passuk means that we should never decide what form our avodas Hashem should take, because human philosophy, undirected, will inevitably err.  The initial errors will be very small, but they will begin a false trajectory that will ultimately lead to the worst abominations.  The originators of Moleich worship may have been fine people who sought to express their awe and love for their Creator, but they ended up killing their own children without seeing that as a contradiction to their desire to become better people.  We have Maseches Derech Eretz to teach us manners, and we should never look to the goyim, or even within ourselves, to decide what is good.  Even when we seek to do good and be civil and just, error will creep in and ultimately bring us to very bad ends.

The Beis Haleivi goes farther.  He says that the passuk is teaching us that even if we see in other religions what appears to be a beautiful and spiritual method of serving Hashem, that we must not copy it, because even those religious behaviors that seem pleasant and refined and spiritually elevating,  a behavior that appears to be at worst innocuous, actually expresses something that is inimical with spirituality.  It may even mask a terrible and degenerate and depraved instinct.  The proof is that these same religions do some things that are obviously depraved, like maavir b’no lamoleich.   You may not see a connection between that and the avodos they do, but the connection is there nonetheless.  They are all sinful; some are grotesque and depraved.

חלק ג, דרשות, דרוש יב

על ידי זה שציויתיך שלא לאכול ממנו ועל ידי זה האזהרה אכלת אותו, דלולי האזהרה לא היה לו תשוקה לעץ זה כלל כי כמה אילנות יותר טובים היו בגן ובודאי דיותר טוב היה לו לאכול מעץ החיים שעמד אצל עץ הדעת בתוך הגן, ורק על ידי האזהרה אכלת, וכדי בזיון וקצף.

ובזה יבואר לנו היטב מה דאיתא במסכת בבא מציעא דדרש הא דכתיב גבי שרצים המעלה אתכם מארץ מצרים… הכי פירושו: דתפס ליה הכתוב מצוה קלה דאפילו בשכר מצוה זו שנזהרין משרצים דאין בו שום תאווה בעצם, רק תאווה זו הקטנה משום דהוא אסור, ועל ידי זה יש מקום למצוא תאווה לאוכלן גם כן – כדאי הוא להעלותן ממצרים, דבעובדי עבודת כוכבים הכלל הוא להיפוך דגם דבר שאינו ראוי להיעשות, רק דיודעים דדבר זה אסור, משום הכי עושין אותו.

וזהו ביאור הכתוב (דברים יב, ל): השמר לך פן תנקש אחריהם אחרי השמדם מפניך ופן תדרוש לאלהיהם לאמר איכה יעבדו הגוים האלה את אלהיהם ואעשה כן גם אני. לא תעשה כן לה' אלקיך כי כל תועבת ה' אשר שנא עשו לאלהיהם כי גם את בניהם ואת בנותיהם ישרפו באש לאלהיהם. דבא להזהיר שלא לחקור אחרי מעשיהם איכה יעבדו הם ואעשה גם כן אני. פירוש דתכוון לטובה, שתרצה לעשות כן לה', רק תרצה ללמוד מהם נימוסי העבודה והכבוד האיך לנהוג בעבודת ה'… ואמרו בגמרא (עירובין דף ק ע"ב) שיש ללמוד דרך ארץ מתרנגול, צניעות מחתול, ובא להזהיר שהם גרועים מן הבהמה, ומהם אין לך ללמוד שום דבר טוב. ואמר לא תעשה כן לה' אלקיך כי כל תועבת ה' אשר שנא עשו לאלהיהם, כאומר; הנני מוסר לך כלל במעשיהם כי הם בחרו רק מה ששנא ה' אותו יעשו, זהו הכלל במעשיהם. ונתן אות או מופת לדבריו, כי גם את בניהם ואת בנותיהם ישרפו באש לאלהיהם, ובודאי דמצד טבע האנושית לא היה שום אדם עושה כן לשרוף באש בניו ובנותיו, והם עושים כן רק משום דה' שנא מעשה זו, הרי לך כלל מכל מעשיהם שאין להם תכלית אחר רק זה, דהוא שנוא לה', ואם כן האיך תתרצה ללמוד מהם דבר טוב לעשות כן.

וזהו שאמרו דגם אם לא היה לישראל רק זכות זה שאינם אוכלים שרצים שלא יהיה להם תאווה לעשות הרע מצד שהוא רע גם כן כדאי היה להעלותן ממצרים. וכן מצינו שחשבו זכות שנגאלו ממצרים שלא גילו הסוד שאמר להם משה ושאלה אשה משכנתה (במדבר רבה כ/כב), והרי זה היה טובתם  ומכל מקום נחשבו להם זכות מה דלא 

According to Reb Moshe, the issur and the connection to Molech is understandable.  Humans, over time, inevitably have moments when we fool ourselves and rationalize desires that stem entirely from self interest.  We tell ourselves that they are le'sheim Shamayim when they are not.  Unless there are clear guidelines of what is appropriate, terrible things will creep in and ruin whatever good originally motivated us.  Unlike science, which usually reveals error, religious philosophy, even if initially well motivated, will veer off into the most terrible behavior.   But the Beis HaLevi is hard to understand. 

How can the Beis HaLevi say that all Gentile religious behaviors are not only wrong but even motivated by an antipathy to the Ribono shel Olam?  There are three things I want to say about the Beis Halevi.  One is introductory, and two are explanatory. 

Before even addressing the question, you have to realize that many things that we see in other religions stem from our Mesora.  Christianity and Islam intentionally imitate and incorporate some elements of Judaism, as does Reform "Judasim."  To the extent that they are loyal to their original inspiration, what they do might have legitimacy.  The Beis HaLevi is talking about religions that have no shaychus to Judaism.

To explain why, in those cases, he says that all that they do is a mask for Rishus, here are two explanations.

1.  Because we believe that not recognizing the Ribono shel Olam is the same as knowing and denying.  The person must have a reason to  refuse to accept what is, to the honest thinker, self evident.  If so, all his religious behaviors grow from a poisonous root.

2.  Man-made religion is just another way to give voice to the id without creating tension with the ego.  It enables a person to do what he wants to do without his conscience bothering him.  Behaviors that any normal human being would be ashamed of, become a mitzva when they are re-cast as religiously motivated. By declaring ourselves to be in the pursuit of some great and worthy goal, we free ourselves from the constraints of our consicence.  Human-sourced religion serves only man, and it ultimately serves the worst traits in man.  Only divinely inspired religion serves God.

A moment of thought will show how true this is.  Chazal tell us that our Toras Emes can turn into a sahm hama'ves.  If so, kal vachomer ben beno shel kal vachomer other religions.

Re'eh, Devarim 12:30-31. Despite everything, they love Yiddishkeit.

I'm in Staten Island for a few days, and in this part of the Island, you can't even buy the NYT, one of my shameful habits when I come to New York.   So I bought the /Staten Island Advance.  I came across this article, about yet another Jew with an absurd vision of Judaism.   Please note the Tzitzis.

 In case the link doesn't work, here it is.

Staten Island's Congregation Om Shalom blends Judaism with yoga, meditation, Buddhism and Hinduism 

Joanie Sobsey and Rabbi Samtosha, also known as Sam Steinberg, strike a yoga pose as they stand in front of 320 St. Mark’s Pl., where they plan to open Congregation Om Shalom. (Staten Island Advance/Hilton Flores)

By Maura Grunlund/Staten Island Advance
Email the author | Follow on Twitter
on August 02, 2013 at 9:00 AM, updated August 02, 2013 at 12:50 PM

STATEN ISLAND, N.Y. -- Sam Steinberg, newly ordained as Rabbi Samtosha and guided by an image of G-d as Stevie Nicks in purple robes, is developing a new synagogue in St. George that will blend Judaism with yoga, meditation, Buddhism and Hinduism.
Rabbi Samtosha, whose religious name means “contentment” in Sanskrit, is forming Congregation Om Shalom, a name that incorporates a yoga chanting sound; the logo is the Star of David with the symbol of Om in the middle. The first service of what the rabbi describes as “Jewish fusion” is planned for Rosh Hashanah, with the observance beginning the night before, on Sept. 4; the rabbi, who was ordained on June 27, is negotiating to rent space at Brighton Heights Reformed Church.

The synagogue where Joanie Sobsey of Dongan Hills — the rabbi’s significant other, and a yoga instructor and nurse practitioner — will serve as spiritual director, is welcoming to people of all faiths and lifestyles. The rabbi, who is divorced with two adult children, and Ms. Sobsey met on Match.com and have been together for more than eight years. She works for Teen Rap at Staten Island University Hospital.
“My girlfriend once asked me what is my image of G-d,” the rabbi said. “My image is Stevie Nicks onstage in purple robes. Maybe three times a year when I’m praying I get so connected, tears come to my eyes — and that’s when I’m praying to Stevie.”
As part of his course study at the Rabbinical Seminary International in Manhattan, Rabbi Samtosha read the holy books of all the major religions; he feels that incorporating aspects of all faiths helps to reduce or eliminate animosity between various religions and factions within religions.
“I want anyone looking for spirituality to come to us,” said the rabbi, who is a teacher with the Special Education Itinerant Teacher (SEIT) program and the son of Holocaust survivors Alex Steinberg and the former Helen Klaczko Steinberg.
“We are open to everyone, Jews, non-Jews, atheists, agnostics, interfaith couples, LGBT,” added the rabbi, whose brother is Lev Raphael, the author of books about the children of Holocaust survivors and his experiences as a gay Jew.
The rabbi who lives in St. George and has called the Island home since 1998, plans to marry any couple who obtains a valid marriage license.
“We will perform all marriages anywhere, anytime, interfaith and LGBT,” the rabbi said.
The yearly dues at the bargain price of $18 will include tickets for Rosh Hashanah. The rabbi especially hopes to attract the many unaffiliated Jews who live in the borough and don’t go to services or attend only on high holy days because thus far they haven’t been engaged spiritually or they can’t afford to join a synagogue and/or buy high holy day tickets.
“It’s a lot of money to belong to a synagogue,” the rabbi said. “It’s also boring.”
Congregation Om Shalom services will be markedly different from those offered at any other synagogue on the Island. The atmosphere will be comfortable and informal, with participants encouraged to take off their shoes.
“I don’t want them taking the dirt of the outside world into the spiritual place,” the rabbi said.
Ms. Sobsey, who teaches at Integral Yoga in Manhattan and whose spiritual name is Jayasri, which means “victorious and glorious goddess” in Sanskrit, will help members slowly into the service, using breathing exercises to help them banish thoughts of work and weekend to-do lists, so that they may be “in the moment” and thus find contentment based on Buddhist teachings.
“Half of all the Buddhists in America are Jews,” the rabbi said, adding that he was asked to do a service by fellow Jews who happened to attend a recent yoga retreat that he was at in the Berkshires.
Integral Yoga participants of various faiths also have said that they want to attend services. The new synagogue will be located near the ferry terminal in St. George to accommodate potential synagogue members from Manhattan and Brooklyn.
Rabbi Samtosha won’t be droning on for long periods of time in Hebrew as some religious leaders do during the services.
“Ninety percent of my service is going to be English because Hebrew intimidates people,” the rabbi said, stressing that his New Year’s message will take less than three minutes.
Services will have a “lot of singing and dancing” and towards that end the rabbi is contemplating Stevie Nicks tunes and has complied a list from YouTube of interfaith songs such as “Heaven and Earth” by Neshama Carlebach, “What if God Was One of Us” by Joan Osborne and “My God is Real” by Krishna Das.
“I posted our congregation’s playlist in Facebook and Neshama Carlebach, the daughter of the late Shlomo Carlebach, liked it,” the rabbi said.
Rabbi Samtosha plans to rent space by the hour until he raises the $100,000 per year needed to operate a permanent location. He will be writing to Mayor Michael Bloomberg and other Jewish philanthropists throughout the city asking for donations. But Rabbi Samtosha said that if each of the estimated 34,000 Jews on Staten Island gave $2, Om Shalom would be close to reaching its financial goal. Services are planned for Sept. 4 at 7 p.m. and Sept. 5 from 10 a.m. to noon. To buy tickets or for information, e-mail rabbisamtosha@gmail.com. or call 718-710-0599.

I am not printing this to make fun of this man.   He's just another nebach, and it's not news that we have plenty of those.  And he is not alone; there are many like him.  As King Achish said, חסר משוגעים אני?   I want to point out two very important things.

1.  It is as if the Staten Island Advance wanted to print an illustration of this week's parsha by providing a perfect and timely illustration of the passuk that warns us not to inquire after the religious behavior of others, lest we imitate them.  Parshas Re'ay, 12:30-31:

השמר לך פן תנקש אחריהם אחרי השמדם מפניך ופן תדרש לאלהיהם לאמר איכה יעבדו הגוים האלה את אלהיהם ואעשה כן גם אני.   לא תעשה כן לה' אלהיך  כי כל תועבת ה' אשר שנא עשו לאלהיהם כי גם את בניהם ואת בנתיהם ישרפו באש לאלהיהם

How embarrassing it is to read “Half of all the Buddhists in America are Jews,” the rabbi said ....  Judaism, the mother of so many world religions, the basis of that which elevates Western Civilazation, the fountainhead of ethics and morality, it is the Jews that run after the most absurd alternatives, so long as they are foreign, as if a person would run away from a beautiful and kind and wise woman to consort with some woman he picks up in the street- she may be ugly, she may be dirty, but at least she's a shiksa.

.

This never ends well.  See the Beis Halevi in the Drashos #12.

2.  Here's a question.
Why is this man wearing tztizis?  Why is this man wearing a Yarmulkeh?  Why is he calling himself a rabbi and calling his spirituality space a Shul by the name of Om Shalom?  Why can't he simply make a new religion, or call himself and dress as a Swami or a Lama?

On one level, one might answer that he's trying to take advantage of the brand recognition of Judaism.  He needs to fill  his Temple with paying customers.  There isn't much interest in a Swami or a Lama in Staten Island.  So he's looking for followers by saying that he's an exponent of Judaism.  By calling himself a Rabbi, he can tap into the market of people that feel a need to go to shul on the High Holidays.

But I don't think that's the pshat. We've seen it with the YCT graduates that say apikorsus and claim to be Orthodox.  Why is it so important for them to claim Orthodoxy?  The answer is that they love Yiddishkeit.  They love what it means to be a Jew, and they refuse to abandon it.  They need to convince themselves that they are being loyal to True Judaism.  Unfortunately, they never had the teachers that could make Yiddishkiet beautiful and embracing, so they went off לחצוב להם בורות בורות נשברים אשר לא יכילו המים,  But they need to think of themselves as Jews, so they say this nonsense about syncretism and eclecticism and modernity.  The bottom line is that the Torah warned us about them long, long ago.  They want to be Jews.  They love Yiddishkeit.  Unfortunately, they lack the background to properly appreciate it.

Great unknown, in private communication, pointed out that bastardization often comes from love.

Re'ay: Devarim 14:3, Loathsome Foods. לא תאכל כל תועבה and Kosher Lobster

It's natural to assume that there is something loathsome about non-kosher types of animals, that there is something inherently bad about them, and that this negative quality is inseparably tied to their essence.  If that were true, there could not possibly be any loophole that would enable us to find, for example, lobster or shrimp that was kosher.  They can't possibly be kosher, because it is their quality of shrimpness and lobsterness that makes them anathema.  This perspective is the safest and easiest to follow.  Our passuk seems to support this attitude:  It says  לא תאכל כל תועבה, do not eat any  תועבה foods, and תועבה does mean disgusting or abominable.  

In fact, though, the essence of these prohibitions is not the esthetic character or the palatibility of these things.  We abstain from them specifically and exclusively because Hashem told us not to eat them.  They are abominable because they are treif, not that they are treif because they are abominable.  Indeed, there are theoretical means through which one could produce real shrimp and lobster that are 100% kosher.  We're not talking about surimi, minced pollock that is extruded into ersatz shrimp-like shapes.  We're talking about real swimming ten-legged crustacean antennaed cocktail shrimp, the real thing.  And I'm not talking about some theoretical exception to the biblical law which is rabbinically prohibited.  I'm talking what's-for-breakfast-muttar, as kosher as lox.  

Chulin 66b:

דכתיב את זה תאכלו מכל אשר במים וגו' בימים ובנחלים הוא דכי אית ליה אכול דלית ליה לא תיכול הא בכלים אע"ג דלית ליה אכול 

Chulin 67a:

דבי ר' ישמעאל תנא במים במים שתי פעמים אין זה כלל ופרט אלא ריבה ומיעט במים ריבה בימים ובנחלים מיעט במים חזר וריבה ריבה ומיעט וריבה ריבה הכל מאי רבי חריצין ונעיצין לאיסורא ומאי מיעט בורות שיחין ומערות להתירא 

Rambam 2 Ma'achalos Asuros 17:

המים שבכלים שהשריצו הרי אותן שרצים מותר לשתותן עם המים שנאמר וכל אשר לו סנפיר וקשקשת במים בימים ובנחלים אותם תאכלו. כלומר במים ובימים ובנחלים הוא שאתה אוכל את שיש לו ואין אתה אוכל את שאין לו אבל בכלים בין שיש לו בין שאין לו מותר:

2 Ma'achalos Asuros 18:

שרץ המים הנברא בבורות ובשיחין ובמערות הואיל ואינן מים נובעין והרי הן עצורים הרי הן כמים שבכלים ומותר. ושוחה ושותה ואינו נמנע ואף על פי שבולע בשעת שתייה מאותן השרצים הדקים:

So: the Torah tells us that creatures that live in the water are only kosher if they have scales and fins.  But the Torah tells us that this requirement is limited to water creatures that live in oceans and natural lakes.  If they live in artificial ponds or tanks, they do not require any signs of kashrus, and they would be kosher even without scales or fins.  On the other hand, the Gemara (Chulin 66b-67a,b) continues, this is true only so long as they haven't left the water.  The moment they leave the water, they fall under the heading of land creatures, and thus require signs of kashrus, which they don't have. 

One problem is that if they are the product of eggs or fry that were produced by other crustaceans that were assur, they would be assur under the rule of היוצא מן הטמא טמא, that which comes out of a prohibited animal is prohibited as well.  But in the case of shrimp and lobster, the eggs are microscopic, and so if one would put treif shrimp into a breeding tank, and they spawned, the water containing the spawn would be kosher, because the eggs and larvae are invisible.  When they came into legal existence by becoming visible, they are in a tank or pond, and are automatically kosher.  Thus, if they grew from microscopic size while in a tank, and so long as they are in their tanks, they are kosher.  Once they leave their tanks, they become treif.  

What if they are killed in the water and only are taken out of the tank after they're dead?  (This is not far-fetched.  Lobster is usually prepared by cooking alive in water, and shrimp is usually frozen before shipping, and they could easily be frozen or cooked while immersed.)  This is the subject of an argument between two sets of Rishonim- we'll call it a machlokes Rashi vs. the Rambam.  According to Rashi, if they're killed in the water and taken out afterwards, they remain kosher.  The Rambam holds that they do become treif even if they're taken out after they're dead.

I think it's fascinating that the argument between Rashi et al and the Rambam et al stems from one single letter, the letter Vov.  The Gemara in Chulin (67b) asks a question and does not resolve it, and therefore we are machmir.  

בעי רב יוסף פרשה ומתה מהו מקצתה מהו לאויר העולם מהו תיקו 

But there's an argument as to exactly how the question was worded.  According to Rashi, the Gemara asked what the halacha is if "פירשה ומתה", if it came out of the water/fruit/seed AND THEN IT DIED (before it actually moved around), whether it is assur on the basis of שורץ על הארץ since it never was actually shoreitz, it never was actually shoreitz after it came out.  According to the Rambam, the correct reading of the Gemara is not פירשה  ומתה , it is "פירשה מתה", it came out of the fruit AFTER IT WAS DEAD.  So, according to Rashi's girsa ומתה with a Vov, the Gemara was not asking about a case where it was removed already dead.  That is for sure muttar.  According to the Rambam's girsa of מתה without a Vov, that is exactly what the Gemara is asking, that even if it was removed after it was dead, maybe it is assur anyway.  Since the Gemara doesn't resolve the question, we would pasken it is assur.  (Please note: it's easy-and, unfortunately, common-  to misinterpret the Gemara as meaning that the hetter for insects inside harvested fruit is the same as the hetter for fish in containers.  That is incorrect.  They are entirely different concepts.)

Who do we pasken like?  As you will see, the bottom line, the normative halacha, is the subject of dispute.

Aruch Hashulchan 84:41-43

ודע דלדעת רש"י ותוס' והרבה מן הראשונים לא מיקרי פירש אלא כשפירש חיה אבל אם פירשה  מתה לאו כלום הוא שהרי   עיקר איסור פרישה  הוא משום דמקרי שורץ על הארץ והרי במיתתה לא תוכל לרחוש ושריצה פירושו דבר הרוחש ומנענע ...

ולפ״ז תולעים שבחומץ ובפירות תלושם...שהרתיחן על האור ומתו התולעים  לא איכפת לן אח"כ אם פירשו אבל הרמב"ם והרי"ף ורבנו חננאל והרשב"א ס"ל דגם פירשה מתה הוי בעיא דלא איפשיטא

...

 ובוודאי נראה כיון שיש פלוגתא דרבוותא יש להחמיר אלא שנראה מרבותינו בעלי  הש״ע  בסעיף ד׳ שתפסו לעיקר כדעת המקילים ודעת האוסרים  כתבו בשם יש אוסרים

and he goes on to say that he doesn't agree with the Shulchan Aruch's preference to be meikil, nor with the Shach, the Pri Chadash, and the Kreisi U'Pleisi that are meikil, and he ends by paskening that ובודאי שיש להחמיר, we certainly should be machmir.

One more point needs to be mentioned.  I discussed this with my son in law, Harav Avraham Lawrence, and he said that the hetter only applies when the water spontaneously generated the Shratzim, not when they were spawned by Shratzim that are assur, because יוצא מן הטמא טמא.  I said that the fact that the spawn is microscopic, and the larvae (the microscopic nauplii) are kosher, no less than the invisible protozoa that live in many foods that we eat, and יוצא מן הטמא טמא can't asser when there is a break in the chain of issur.  I believe that his argument is without merit, but גברא רבה אמר מילתא לא תחיכו עליה, and if anyone tries to actually do this, I would bet that the argument will be presented.  Wrong doesn't mean that someone's not going to vociferously argue it.  (Rabbi Dr. Richard Resnick argued even further- that since we know that spontaneous generation is not factually true, the whole hetter should no longer be relied on, and the Gemara that was mattir Sheretz Hamayim that the Gemara was mattir if it wasn't piresh should be overturned.  Again, I think he's wrong because a. we pasken like the Gemara regardless of their errors of natural science, and b. the microscopic stage breaks the chain of issur.)

Let me make this crystal clear.  Many authorities within the last several hundred years (Shach, Kreisi U'Pleisi, etc.) would in actual practice fully allow such shrimp and lobster.  In the mundane reality of psak, despite these opinions,because more recent poskim have tended to the side of issur, (e.g., the Aruch Hashulchan,) any current posek that wanted to rely on the mattirim would encounter significant resistance. (Pond catfish would be assur anyway, because they develop from eggs that are visible as soon as they are spawned, and, as I noted above, since their parent is assur, they are assur as well- היוצא מן הטמא טמא- despite their having been raised in a tank or pond.)

But all this does not diminish the truth of the underlying point that I am making, because most say that even the machmirim are only machmir under rabbinical law, but under Torah law everyone would agree that it is muttar.  The main thing is that you see that it is not the shrimpiness of the shrimp that makes it assur, nor is it the clamminess of the clam.  It is the fact that the Ribono shel Olam prohibited it.  The same is true in the cases of כלאי גפנים, which has an element of intent, as we see in :בבא בתרא ב; and ערלה, which is only assur if it is owned by a person but not if it is hefker; and בשר בחלב  which is בטל בששים only because it is not considered  דרך בישול; and non-cloven-hooved animals, as we see in the rule of קלוט במעי פרה.  These foods are abominations if and only if, when and only when, Hashem said they are assur, because we follow the law of Hashem.  If and when Hashem says it's muttar, you can make a shehakol and eat it with a good appetite.  It's not abominable any more.  (Let's hope the Aris Greenspan and Zivotofsky don't get any ideas about this.....)

This should give us a deeper appreciation of the words we find in the Sifra (end of Kedoshim, Vayikra 20:26, brought by the Rambam in Shmoneh Prakim in the name of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.)

ר' אלעזר בן עזריה אומר מנין שלא יאמר אדם "אי אפשי ללבוש שעטנז. אי אפשי לאכול בשר חזיר. אי אפשי לבוא על הערוה" אבל "אפשי ומה אעשה ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי כך"? תלמוד לומר "ואבדיל אתכם מן העמים להיות לי"-- נמצא פורש מן העבירה ומקבל עליו עול מלכות שמים.

Just for convenience, here is the text of the Rambam's discussion on this Chazal, though he quotes it in the name of a different Tanna.

אמרו הפילוסופים שהמושל בנפשו אע״פ שעושה המעשים הטובים והחשובים הוא עושה אותם והוא מתאוה אל הפעולות הרעות ונכסף אליהם ויכבוש את יצרו. ויחלוק עליו בפעולותיו אל מה שיעירוהו אליו כחותיו ותאותו ותכונת נפשו. ויעשה הטובות והוא מצטער בעשייתם ונזוק. אבל החסיד הוא נמשך בפעולתו אחר מה שתעירהו תאותו. ותכונתו. ויעשה הטובות. והוא מתאוה ונכסף אליהם. ובהסכמה מן הפילוסופים שהחסיד יותר חשוב ויותר שלם מן המושל בנפשו. אבל אמרו שהמושל בנפשו כחסיד בענינים רבים. ומעלתו למטה ממנו בהכרח. להיותו מתאוה לפועל הרע ואע״פ שאינו עושה אותו. מפני שתשוקתו לרע היא תכונה רעה בנפש. וכבר אמר שלמה המלך עליו השלום כיוצא בזה (משלי כא) נפש רשע אותה רע. ואמר בשמחת החסיד במעשה הטוב. והצטער מי שאינו צדיק בעשייתה זה המאמר (שס ושם) שמחה לצדיק עשות משפט ומחתה לפועלי און. זהו הנראה מדברי הנביאים נאות למה שזכרוהו הפילוסופים. וכאשר חקרנו דברי חכמים בזה הענין נמצא להם שהמתאוה לעבירות ונכסף אליהם הוא יותר חשוב ויותר שלם. מאשר לא יתאוה אליהם ולא יצטער בהנחתם עד שאמרו שכל אשר יהיה האדם יוחר חשוב ויותר שלם תהיה [יותר] תשוקתו לעבירות והצטערו בהנחתם יותר גדול. והביאו בזה הדברים (סוכה נכ.) ואמרו כל הגדול מחבירו יצרו גדול ממנו. ולא דים זה. עד שאמרו ששכר המושל בנפשו גדול לפי רוב צערו במשלו בנפשו ואמרו(אכוח ס״ה מכ״ג) לפום צערא אגרא. ויותר מזה שהם ציוו להיות האדם מתאוה לעבירות. עד שהזהירו מלומר שאני בטבעי לא אתאוה לזאת העבירה ואע״פ שלא אסרה התורה. והוא אמרם [ת״כ פ׳ קדושים ע״ש] רשב״ג אומר לא יאמר אדם אי אפשי לאכול בשר בחלב. אי אפשי ללבוש שעטנז. אי אפשי לבוא על הערוה. אלא אפשי ומה אעשה אבי שבשמים גזר עלי. ולפי המובן מפשוטי ב׳ המאמרים בתחלת המחשבה הן סותרין זה את זה. ואין הענין כן. אבל שניהם אמת. ואץ מחלוקת ביניהם כלל. והוא שהרעות אשר הן אצל הפילוסופים רעות. אשר אמרו שמי שלא יתאוה אליהם יותר חשוב מן המתאוה אליהן ויכבוש את יצרו מהן. הם הענינים המפורסמים אצל כל בני אדם שהם רעות כשפיכת דמים. וגניבה וגזילה ואוגאה. ולהזיק למי שלא הרע לו. ולגמול רע למטיב לו. ולבזות אב ואם. וכיוצא באלו. והן המצות [יומא סז: ושם חשיב גס גילוי עריוח והרמב״ס חשיב לקמן ג״ע וצ״ע. ועי׳ במהרש״א ס״א אסשר ליישב קצת] שאמרו עליהם חכמים ז״ל שאילו לא נכתבו ראוים הם לכתב (א) ויקראו אותם קצת (חכמינו האחרונים) [חכמים הראשונים]. אשר חלו חלי המדברים מצות השכליות ואין ספק שהנפש אשר תכסף לדבר מהם ותשתוקק אליו. שהיא חסרה. (נ) ושהנפש החשובה לא תתאוה לאחד מאלו הרעות כלל. ולא תצטער בהמנעם מהם. אבל הדברים שאמרו עליהם החכמים. שהכובש את יצרו מהם הוא יותר חשוב. וגמולו יותר גדול. הם התורות השמעיות וזה אמת שאלמלא התורה לא היו רעות כלל. ומפני זה אמרו שצריך האדם שיניח נפשו אוהבת אותם. ולא יהיה [לו] מונע מהם (אלא) [רק] התורה ובחון חכמתם ע״ה ובמה שהמשילו. שהם לא אמרו אל יאמר אדם אי אפשי להרוג הנפש אי אפשי לגנוב אי אפשי לכזב אלא אפשי ומה אעשה אבי שבשמים גזר עלי. אבל הביאו דברים שמעיים כלם. בשר בחלב. ולבישת שעטנז. ועריות. ואלו המצות וכיוצא בהן. הם אשר קראם הש״י חקות וארז״ל [יומא סז:] חקים שחקקתי לך אין לך רשות להרהר בהן. ועובדי כוכבים משיבין עליהם. והשטן מקטרג בהן כגון פרה אדומה. ושעיר המשתלח וכוי. ואשר קראו אותם האחרונים שכליות. יקראו מצות. כפי מה שבארו החכמים. הנה התבאר לך מכל מה שאמרנו איזה מן העבירות יהיה מי שלא ישתוקק אליהם יותר חשוב מן המשתוקק אליהם. וכובש יצרו מהן. ואיזה מהן יהיה הענץ בהפך וזה חרוש נפלא. בהעמיד שני המאמרים ולשונם מורה על אמיתת מה שבארנו. וכבר נשלמה כוונת זה הפרק

Postscript: 

I'm incorporating the valuable he'aros that arose in the comments.

First, I should have pointed out the Gemara in Bava Metzia 61b that seems to indicate that there is an inherent repulsiveness in shratzim, and shratzim, I think, would include the creatures we've been talking about.

לכדתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל דתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל אמר הקב"ה אילמלא העליתי את ישראל ממצרים אלא בשביל דבר זה שאין מטמאין בשרצים דיי א"ל ומי נפיש אגרייהו טפי מרבית ומציצית וממשקלות א"ל אע"ג דלא נפיש אגרייהו טפי מאיסי למכלינהו

Second, great unknown pointed out that if one were to boil the lobster in its tank, together with some nice potatoes and onions and tomatoes, and after cooling the whole thing one would strain out the חתן הנשף, the  resulting bisque would be both tasty and 100% kosher and muttar according to all poskim.

Finally, I suggested that, especially in light of the Gemara in Bava Metzia, this might be an excellent example of נבל ברשות התורה.  I might be wrong, though, when you consider the Rambam in Shmoneh Prakim I brought above.  The concept of נבל ברשות התורה, by definition, is impossible to pin down.  But it would certainly feel grotesque, wouldn't it?  And if any of you militant Rambam Rationalists takes this seriously and does it, I strongly suggest that you do it under cover of darkness, or you will acquire the permanent sobriquet "Lobster Fresser."  Or, in proper German, Hummer Fresser.

Va'eschanan, Eikev, and Re'eh. Why a Chassan Speaks; Fat is Fate; and Resentful Meshulachim

I haven't posted recently.  Here are a few things I found interesting.  I hope you find them interesting.

I In Parshas Va'Eschanan, Devarim 6:7 - ודברת בם, בשבתך בביתך ובלכתך בדרך, ובשכבך ובקומך, and in Parshas Eikev, Devarim 11:19 -  ושננתם לבניך, ודברת בם, בשבתך בביתך ובלכתך בדרך, ובשכבך ובקומך , the passuk tells us that we need to learn and teach Torah.  Targum Yonasan adds, in both cases, ותהויין הגיין בהון במותביכון בבתיכון בזמן מיעסקכון בחיתונכון, which means, most probably, that you should learn Torah when you are busy with your wedding.  This is very strange, in light of the classic Chazal that the people involved in making a wedding, and certainly the Chassan, are granted a dispensation on the obligation of Limud HaTorah.  In any case, if you want an interesting source for our minhag that Chasanim say Divrei Torah at Aufrufs and Sheva Brachos, here you have it.

Truth is, I believe the reason our minhag is for a Chassan to speak at the Aufruf and Sheva Brachos because they are so distracted and busy that if they didn't have to speak, days would go by and they would not learn a word.  Now that they have to speak in public, to a critical crowd, in front of a new wife and in laws and strangers, they have no choice but to learn more diligently than usual.  This is also why a father is expected to say a Dvar Torah at a Bris.  In fact, I remember being in the delivery room when my bechor was born, and immediately thinking about what I would say at the bris.  But the Targum is interesting.

After citing the Targum and my pshat, here are the usual reasons offered to explain why chassanim speak at the Sheva Brachos.

a.  The Gemara (Sanhedrin 101) says that at every festive gathering, we should say divrei Torah:

התורה חוגרת שק ועומדת לפני הקב"ה ואומרת לפניו רבונו של עולם עשאוני בניך ככנור שמנגנין בו לצים אמר לה בתי בשעה שאוכלין ושותין במה יתעסקו אמרה לפניו רבונו של עולם אם בעלי מקרא הן יעסקו בתורה ובנביאים ובכתובים אם בעלי משנה הן יעסקו במשנה בהלכות ובהגדות ואם בעלי תלמוד הן יעסקו בהלכות פסח בפסח בהלכות עצרת בעצרת בהלכות חג בחג 

so it's not specific to a Sheva Brachos, but an application of the Gemara's general instruction to say divrei torah at festive gatherings.

b.  Many people have said that because the Gemara (Pesachim 49a) says that the marriage of the daughter of a talmid chacham to an am ha'aretz is ill fated and not a seudas mitzva:

תניא רבי שמעון אומר כל סעודה שאינה של מצוה אין תלמיד חכם רשאי להנות ממנה כגון מאי א"ר יוחנן כגון בת כהן לישראל ובת תלמיד חכם לעם הארץ דא"ר יוחנן בת כהן לישראל אין זווגן עולה יפה

so the Chassan endeavors to demonstrate that he is a talmid chacham and so it is a auspicious marriage and a seudas mitzva.  By the way, many have said that this explains why we "hak up" the Chassan, why we often interrupt him during the speech and don't let him finish his prepared divrei Torah- because we are saying that he doesn't need to prove that he's a talmid chacham, we know that he's a talmid chacham without his having to prove it to us with his speech.

II
If you're fat, it's not because you're a slovenly and undisciplined bum.  It's fate.  Regarding the passuk in Devarim 30:15, that says ראה נתתי לפניך היום את החיים ואת הטוב ואת המוות ואת הרע, the Medrash Tanchuma in Pekudei says : הקדוש ברוך הוא גוזר על הטיפה מה יהא בסופה, אם זכר אם נקבה, אם חלש גיבור, אם עני אם עשיר, אם קצר או ארוך, אם מכוער או נאה, אם עבה או דק, אם בזוי או גס. וכן גוזר על כל קורותיו. אבל אם צדיק אם רשע, לא, אלא הדבר ההוא נותנו בידו של אדם בלבד, שנאמר: ראה נתתי לפניך היום את החיים ואת הטוב, ואת המות ואת הרע (דב' ל טו).   Basically, fat is fate.  Relax and enjoy it.



III
In parshas Re'eh, the Torah objurgates a person that refuses to lend money to a fellow Jew out of fear that the borrower will take advantage of the law of Shemita and not pay back the loan.  The Torah refers to such a person as a Beli'al, the equivalent of an idolater.  The Chafetz Chaim in the intro to Ahavas Chesed discusses this, and brings the Chinuch that says it's talking about a borrower who, under the terms of the loan, should pay back before the debt-annulment of Shevi'is takes place (so we're not dealing with out-and-out Tzedaka,) but you're worried that he won't pay back on time and he'll push you off until Shevi'is comes.

משרשי המצוה כדי לחזק ולקבוע בנפשינו מדת הנדיבות ולהרחיק בתכלית ריחוק מדת הכילות, ואין נדיב יותר בעולם כמלוה מעותיו בלי משכון עם היותו יודע שהזמן קרוב להשמיט מעותיו ולהפסידו ממנו באם לא יוכל לגבותם קודם השמטה. והוציא הכתוב בלשון השמר לך לומר שאל יעלה על רוחך כי על נזק הדל אני מזהירך פן יחסר לו אשר לא תתן לו, כי לא כן הוא ועל הנוגע לך מזהירך כי יקרך עון. וזהו שאמר השמר לך פן יהיה דבר עם לבבך בליעל לאמר קרבה שנת השבע שנת השמיטה של שמיטת קרקעות וכרמים וזיתים, ובהם כמונו כעניים שוים בהם, ואיך עוד אפתח ידי לתת עוד לו מממוני צדקה, נמצא העניים אוכלים אותנו בשלש פיות. דע כי לב בליעל הוא, קשה המעשה כע"ז כמ"ש ז"ל כל המעלים עינו מן הצדקה כאלו עובד ע"ז, נאמר כאן בליעל ונאמר יצאו אנשים בני בליעל.

Declining to lend such a person doesn't sound like idolatry to me, and I'm not sure what the problem is.  It's possible that the problem is that you don't believe that Hashem will pay you back for the borrower's non-payment.  But it seems to me that to lend him money, when you have a legitimate concern about his unfairly delaying until Shevi'is, is no worse than building a fence around your land to keep out vandals.

In any case, what I want to know is this:  Does Usha's rule of Chomesh apply to loans.  Of, better, the Gaon holds that Chomesh is De'oraysa when the poor man is in front of you.  Does that rule of Chomesh apply to loans?  When are you obligated to lend money, and to what extent does this obligation extend?  And you can't say that it's a wishy washy rule, that you ought to do it but if you don't it's no big deal, because it is a very very big deal: the Torah warns you that if you don't lend the money, you are in serious trouble.  What triggers the obligation, and under what circumstances of the borrower and under what financial condition of the lender does it apply.  As we will see in a moment, it is not limited to destitute borrowers.  But it certainly doesn't apply to a profligate wastrel or a speculator that wants to invest in commodity futures.  I don't know the answer to this question, and I would be very happy to hear from someone who has something good to say about this.

4.  Again on the passuk (15:9) השמר לך פן יהיה דבר עם לבבך בליעל לאמר קרבה שנת השבע שנת השמטה ורעה עינך באחיך האביון ולא תתן לו וקרא עליך אל ה' והיה בך חטא., that it is akin to idolatry to refuse a loan to a person that is in need.  From a cursory reading of the passuk, one would understand it to refer to a man who needs a loan because he is hungry or desperate for sustenance of some sort.  However, the Chinuch here in Mitzvah 488 says that it is broader, and it includes a businessman who needs a loan. 
Additionally, the Rambam applies it as a general mitzva, not limited to loans.  The Rambam brings this passuk in three places:

9 Shmitah V'Yovel 30

מי שנמנע מלהלוות את חבירו קודם השמיטה שמא יתאחר החוב שלו וישמט עבר בלא תעשה שנאמר השמר לך וגו'. וחטא גדול הוא שהרי הזהירה עליו תורה בשני לאוין שנאמר השמר לך פן וגו'. וכל מקום שנאמר השמר או פן או אל הרי זה מצות לא תעשה. והתורה הקפידה על מחשבה רעה זו וקראתו בליעל. והרי הוסיף הכתוב להזהיר ולצוות שלא ימנע אלא יתן שנאמר נתן תתן לו ולא ירע לבבך בתתך לו וגו'. והבטיח הקב"ה בשכר מצוה זו בעולם הזה שנאמר כי בגלל הדבר הזה יברכך וגו':

10 Matnas Aniyim 3
כל המעלים עיניו מן הצדקה הרי זה נקרא בליעל כמו שנקרא עובד עכו"ם בליעל. ובעכו"ם הוא אומר יצאו אנשים בני בליעל ובמעלים עיניו מן הצדקה הוא אומר השמר לך פן יהיה דבר עם לבבך בליעל. ונקרא רשע שנאמר ורחמי רשעים אכזרי. ונקרא חוטא שנאמר וקרא עליך אל ה' והיה בך חטא. והקב"ה קרוב לשועת עניים שנאמר שועת עניים אתה תשמע. לפיכך צריך להזהר בצעקתם שהרי ברית כרותה להם שנאמר והיה כי יצעק אלי ושמעתי כי חנון אני:
1 Malveh V'Loveh 1
מצות עשה להלוות לעניי ישראל שנאמר אם כסף תלוה את עמי את העני עמך. יכול רשות תלמוד לומר העבט תעביטנו וגו' ומצוה זו גדולה מן הצדקה אל העני השואל שזה כבר נצרך לשאול וזה עדיין לא הגיע למדה זו. והתורה הקפידה על מי שימנע מלהלוות לעני שנאמר ורעה עינך באחיך האביון וגו':

Although our passuk refers to "your desperate brother," it is clear, again, from the Rambam in Shmita V'Yovel it is clear that he applies it to anyone who needs a loan, even if he is not an Evyon.  As I mentioned above, I don't know the extent of this obligation.

5.  The passuk says that if one refuses to give the loan, he has sinned.  The Rambam quoted above emphasizes this as well. Rashi in our passuk also says a remarkable thing about this:  The passuk says that if the poor man cries to Hashem, Hashem will listen to his cries and punish the one who refused to lend him money.  

and he will cry out [to the Lord] against you: One might think this is a requirement [namely, that this poor man is obliged to “cry out… against you”]. Therefore, Scripture says, “[On his day you shall give him his payment…] so that he will not cry against you [to the Lord]” (Deut. 24:15). - [Sifrei 15:138]		וקרא עליך: יכול מצוה, תלמוד לומר (דברים כד, טו) ולא יקרא:
and it will be a sin to you: in any case, even if he does not cry [against you]. If so, why does it say,“and he will cry out… against you?” [It means that God says:] I hasten to punish in response to the one who cries out more than to the one who does not cry out. — [Sifrei]		והיה בך חטא: מכל מקום, אפילו לא יקרא. אם כן למה נאמר וקרא עליך, ממהר אני ליפרע על ידי הקורא יותר ממי שאינו קורא:

Regarding the first Rashi:  Why on Earth would I have thought that the rejected applicant is obliged to cry out against the one who refused?  Regarding the second Rashi, and the passuk in general: What obligates a man to lend to another?  If a person refuses to take a lulav and esrog, if a person refuses to wear Tefillin, is the punishment so severe?  Why is this so serious here?  What right does the supplicant have to the lender's money?  So let's assume that if a person is in a position to lend money, he is a Gizbar, he is a steward of the money, not its owner, and a steward who is entrusted with assets to be used for another's benefit, and he refuses to do so, is a thief.  But this is a complaint the Hashem has against the wealthy man.  What right does the supplicant have to complain?  It's not his money, he was asking for a favor, what kind of chutzpah is it that he asks Hashem to punish the man who refused to do him a favor?  I would think that such a person is imbalanced, or a potential thief himself, because he views the money as his entitlement, when it actually belongs to the other person.  Bishlema by an item given in collateral, the lender's refusal to let the borrower use it in a time of need is unfair, because until the court takes it from the borrower and gives it finally to the lender, it is to some extent the property of the borrower.  But here, what right does the supplicant have to complain to Hashem- to the extent that you need a passuk to tell you that although he MAY complain to Hashem, he has no OBLIGATION to do so!

I am well aware that meshulachim and aniyim curse the people who don't give them as much as they think they're entitled to.  I've seen this many times.  But it's an ugly trait, and unfit for any normal member of Klal Yisrael.  I assume it stems from the fact that they have taken tzedaka for so long that they perceive the money in your pocket as belonging to them.  They no longer see the demarcation between what's yours and what's theirs, at least insofar as taking is concerned.  But it's not a good middah.  It is a very very bad middah.  The reason it's called "my money" is because it is my money.  What is the hava amina that the poor person is obligated to complain to Hashem????

Re'ey, Devarim 12:3-4. Erasing Hashem's Written Name

 It is assur to erase or obliterate any of the seven primary names we use for Hashem.  This halacha is stated in YD 176:8, and in the Rambam 6 Yesodei Hatorah 1.  The words of the Rambam are:

כל המאבד שם מן השמות הקדושים הטהורים שנקרא בהן הקדוש ברוך הוא, לוקה מן התורה--שהרי הוא אומר בעבודה זרה, ואיבדתם את שמם . . . לא תעשון כן לה' אלוקיכם

The source of the issur is the passuk in our parsha, "you shall destroy their names (of the pagan gods); you shall not do so to Hashem your G-d."

My son, a Rov and Rosh Kollel, mentioned that one of the members of his community is a jeweler who has for many years bought and sold scrap gold.  Several years ago, he asked whether there was a problem melting down those pieces that have Hashem's name on them.  My son told him doing so might be assur on the basis of our passuk.  Since then, he has accumulated a significant amount of gold that he cannot melt down.  On the one hand, it has quadrupled in value since he acquired it.  On the other hand, if he cannot melt it down, it is of no value to him at all.  Assuming these shaimos have kedusha, he does not have the option of recycling the pieces into new jewelry that incorporates the old pieces, because the Kedushas Hashem precludes such use.  We don't use Hashem's name as an ornament.  (I once saw a non-Jewish man- nice looking fellow, with a wife and two blond kids- at a highway rest stop in Kentucky, with a tattoo of the YKVK on his inner forearm in giant blue letters, from wrist to elbow.  He didn't even know what the names of the letters were, only that this is how the Jews write G-d's name.  It could have been worse.)

My son did not state for a fact that it was assur, only that it might be assur.  He had not yet made a careful analysis of the sugya, and in any case such a question ought to be addressed by a widely recognized and experienced posek of the highest caliber.  Under the circumstances of a possible issur de'oraysa, caution is not only prudent but legally required.  (Note, also, that Reb Moshe says in a teshuva that this issur is uniquely strict in that it is not mitigated by a countervailing Assei: we do not say Assei docheh lo saaseh by lo saasun kein.)

This question raises three issues that need to be examined sequentially.
1. Assuming that erasing is assur, is Grama (indirect destruction) muttar.
2. If the person who made the name was unaware of its meaning, is it assur to erase it.
3. Assuming that a name written without awareness is muttar to erase, and assuming that most are written by non-speakers of Hebrew and are therefore muttar to melt down, but some were written knowingly, do we go bassar Rove, do we rely on the majority to allow melting all of them.

Issue one: Grama

Assuming it is assur to erase the word, is it muttar to do so indirectly, by means of a Grama?  The Aruch Hashulchan decides that Gramma is not an option.  The following is the relevant section of the Aruch Hashulchan  (276:36-7):

סעיף לו

ודע דבשבת (קכ ב) אמרינן דגרמא במחיקת השם מותר, מדכתיב: "לא תעשון כן לה' אלקיכם" – עשייה הוא דאסור, הא גרמא – שרי. ולכן אם היה שם כתוב על בשרו, ונזדמנה לו טבילה של מצוה – יורד וטובל אף על פי שהשם יתמחק, עיין שם. והרמב"ם הביא זה בפרק ששי מיסודי התורה, עיין שם.

ותמיהני על הטור ושולחן ערוך שלא הביאו דין זה בשום מקום, והרי אין מי שחולק על זה? ויראה לי דהדין עמם, דהך דינא לא משכחת לה רק בהדין הנזכר, ודבר זה לא שכיח כלל. אבל בעניין אחר לא משכחת לה, דזהו וודאי לגרום הגרמא, כגון להעמיד מים סמוך לה כדי שתשפוך על השם ותמחקנו – פשיטא שאסור, דזהו גופה עשייה גמורה היא. ולכן גם הש"ס לא צייר דין זה רק בטבילה, כמו שכתבתי.

(I want to point out that this mehalach of the Aruch Hashulchan forms the basis of Reb Moshe's teshuva, which was argued against by many, in OC 4 8:2.  Not that Reb Moshe needs support against the individuals that argued with him, but there it is anyway.)

סעיף לז

ולפי זה ברירא לי במקום שיש טעות ואי אפשר למחוק השם לפי הדינים שנתבארו – אסור גם לעשות גרמא להמחיקה. וכתבתי זה לפי שראיתי לגדול אחד שהתיר לעשות גרמא למחיקת השם (עיין פתחי תשובה סעיף קטן י"ט בשם הב"א). ולדעתי איסור גדול הוא, וחלילה לעשות כן.

ומצאתי לגדול אחד שעמד על השמטת הטור ושולחן ערוך דין זה, וכתב משום דאמרינן במגילה (כו ב):

ספר תורה שבלה – נותנין אותה בכלי חרס, וקוברין אותו אצל תלמיד חכם.

ומדלא התירו רק בכלי חרס למען יעמוד ימים רבים, ולא התירו בלא זה שהיה נמחק מיד – שמע מינה דלית הלכתא כהך דשבת, וגרמא נמי אסור (נודע ביהודה תנינא, חלק אורח חיים, סימן י"ז "מבנו").

ודברים תמוהים הם, שהרי הרמב"ם פסקם להשני דינים, ומבואר להדיא שאין סותרין זה את זה. ולפי מה שכתבתי לא קשיא כלל. ולכן בלא כלי חרס – הרי הוא עושה הגרמא, ואסור כמו שכתבתי.

See the comments regarding the teshuva he brings from the Noda B'Yehuda's son and the numerous problems with that teshuva.  My dear friend and Rebbi, Rabbi Moshe Brown, in his sefer Maadanei Moshe, on page 263, also distinguishes, as does Eli in the comments, between a Sefer Torah and other sheimos.


Issue Two: What makes a name a Name?

Certainly, if a Jeweler had hand-made this jewelry, and he knew what he was writing, there would be an insuperable problem.  The question is in a case where the jewelry was stamped out or otherwise fabricated by a person that had no idea what the letters mean, and for whom the jewelry had no more significance than a random design.  I don't know this for a fact, but I am assuming that the final step of the manufacture of most jewelry of this sort is done in China or India, or in any case by people who have no idea at all what they are doing.


There is a Tashbeitz brought by the Beis Yosef that indicates we are meikil in such a case. תשב"ץ ח"א קעז; סמ"ק ק"ס, הובאו בב"י בד"ה רעו, ט

However, the Shach in 276:12 says that one may only apply this hetter when doing so enables you to fix a sefer torah (under the logic of net benefit, that mekalkel al menas l'saken is called a tikun), implying that it would be assur for mere monetary benefit.  (I believe that this logic underlies the Aruch Hashulchan's argument as brought above.)

But I found that the Noda B'Yehuda YD II 180 is mattir be'feirush in precisely such a case, because the person who did the stamping knew nothing about what the letters meant.   Also, the Chazon Ish (YD 162:3) says that where the person did not even know that he was writing a name, and certainly did not know he was writing Hashem's name, it is muttar to erase it.  The Satmerer Rov was also mattir in a pre-war letter printed in the Satmerer journal Olas Hachodesh of Chodesh Av Tof Shim Mem beginning on page 529.

Yes, some poskim disagree with the Noda B'Yehuda, but since I'm not paskening for anyone here, I can tell you that in my opinion they don't really matter.  The svara is pashut- it's no different than the letters אל; if you wrote it to mean "to," you certainly can erase it.  Harav Chaim Medini didn't have any problem with the שדי in his שדי חמד.  (A lamden might argue that those cases are different because they gave the words a different meaning, whereas in our case, it was Stam, neutral, and maybe neutral is more of a problem.  I don't agree with that, and why I don't agree is a whole different discussion, involving the Machane Efraim's hagahos on the Tur about how a Sheim acquires kedusha- awareness or intent, and the Raavad brought in the Ran in Nedarim that says that the Kedusha of a Sheim is a davar hanadur, and the Kli Chemda in this week's parsha that says that according to the Raavad, you can be shoeil on the Kedusha of a Sheim, but the teshuvos at the end of the Avnei Miluim #18 says that being shoeil on the kedusha of a sheimis just as bad as mechikah, and the Asvan De'Oraysa #15 (P 27b) that argues on the Avnei Miluim.  In any case, if you say that according to the Raavad you can be sho'eil, that means that Stam is zero, because she'eila won't make it kavana misnagedes.)

Also, I happened to speak to Reb Shmuel Kaminetsky about this the other day, and he stated his strong agreement with the Chazon Ish, although he said the hetter would not apply by pesukim from Tanach (like the hundred Shekel note).  This was before I saw the Noda B'Yehuda, and I thought the Chazon Ish was a sole mattir.

I later saw that Reb Shmuel's distinction was made by Reb Moshe in OC 4 8:1, by the Achiezer 2 48:2, and others, as I mention in the comments. 

Issue Three: Rove

Assuming that an unwittingly written Sheim is not Sheimos, what if some of these pieces of jewelry were made by individuals who knew they were writing G-d's name, but most were written without knowledge?  Can we rely on the Rove and melt the whole bunch down?  Although in general we go bassar rove, that may not be the case by a davar chashuv or by issurei hanaah.

I would respond that while this would be a problem in Taaroves, it is not a problem in cases of Kol Deparish.  My son said even a better reason it's not a problem:  because a Sheim is not assur b'hanaah.  I had postulated it was assur b'hanaa because the Gemara says that a utensil that has Hashem's name on it is assur to use, which , to me, sounded like issur hanaah.  But he said that It's just assur to use it because of zilzul.  That is not the same as something which is inherently assur b'hanaah, and there's no reason to think it's not batteil b'rov.

I know that this too brief.  If I have time I'll expand it.  But the bottom line is that if it's unwittin', it can be unwritten.

Dear Eli has sent me a very valuable mar'eh makom, as follows:

Following the footsteps of R. Akiva (Kerisus 15):

I came across Chavos Yair (http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=857&st=&pgnum=44 middle of left col. brought by Mishna Berura OC 334,52) which is relevant to your discussion:

"ולפי זה במטבעות שנטבעין במדינות שוודין בשם של ד' אותיות היה צ"ע, ומ"מ נראה שמותרים הם כי נטבעו להוציאם והוה ליה ככתיבת השם בפירוש לשם חול"

So, even though the manufacturer knows the letters mean a Sheim, still it's considered Chol when done with the purpose of Chol usage.

I was surprised to learn 17th century Swedish coins had Shem of daled osios. Here is one such coin:

located here.


Post Script:
Circumstances under which Mechika would be allowed.

The Chasam Sofer in the last volume of the Teshuvos (#8) was asked about a case where a Rasha attached a Sheim Hashem to a place where it would disgrace the sheim.  He paskens that the issur is to cause disgrace by erasing; therefore, where erasing would prevent a greater disgrace, it is muttar to erase it.  See here.
The awesome aspect of this teshuva is the very end, where he says that you can't have a child do it, because without intent to prevent disgrace, the act of erasure is inherently disgraceful.  Since the intent of a child is not recognized by the halacha, his erasure would be an erasure without intent of preventing disgrace, which would be an issur de'oraysa.

Re'ay, Devarim 14:8, and Pirkei Avos 5:7-8. Expensive Esrogim and Swine Flu

I was just speaking to my middle son in Israel, and he told me that he is fine now, but last week his doctor told him that he and his family had Swine Flu. Baruch Hashem he is over it now.

Just after I found out about this, I was talking to a Rosh Yeshiva that is staying at my house. I don't want to mention his name, but he is one of the most respected Roshei Yeshiva in the world, and a very deliberate and experienced person as well.

He told me that I should look at the Mishna in this week's perek of Pirkei Avos, which says:

ה,ז [ח] שבעה מיני פורענייות, באין על שבעה גופי עבירות: מקצתן מעשרין, ומקצתן שאינן מעשרין--רעב של בצורת בא, מקצתן רעבים ומקצתן שבעים. גמרו שלא לעשר, רעב של מהומה ושל בצורת בא. שלא ליטול חלה, רעב של כליה בא. דבר בא לעולם על מיתות האמורות בתורה שלא נמסרו לבית דין, ועל פירות שביעית. חרב באה לעולם על עינוי הדין, ועל עיוות הדין, ועל המורים בתורה שלא כהלכה. [ט] חיה רעה באה לעולם על שבועת שוא, ועל חילול השם. גלות באה לעולם על עבודה זרה, ועל גילוי עריות, ועל שפיכות דמים, ועל שמיטת הארץ.

ה,ח בארבעה פרקים הדבר מרובה--ברביעית, ובשביעית, ובמוצאי שביעית, ובמוצאי החג שבכל שנה: ברביעית, מפני מעשר עני שבשלישית; בשביעית, מפני מעשר עני שבשישית; במוצאי שביעית, מפני פירות שביעית; במוצאי החג שבכל שנה ושנה, מפני גזל מתנות עניים.

The essence of these mishnayos is that if Klal Yisrael doesn't heed and respect the special rules pertaining to the fruits of the year of Shevi'is, it can result in the divine punishment of Dever. Dever is disease.

Last year was Shevi'is. One of the rules of Shevi'is is that the fruits cannot be marketed in the normal manner. This is the rule of "sechorah be'peiros Shevi'is." There are many ways around this rule, the most famous being the mechanism of Otzar Beis Din. From Rabbi Aron Tendler, writing on the Star K site:
Otzer Bais Din - literally the "Storehouse of Bais Din". This concept works as follows: although the Torah forbids marketing the fruits of the Sabbatical year, sheviis3, it is clearly permitted to eat them. Not only may the owner pick for his own needs, he may also pick fruit for a friend who needs, as long as he does not market the fruit as he normally does. Can I hire someone to go into my friend’s field and pick fruit for me? Certainly! This doesn't violate the laws of shmitta at all, since I'm not buying the fruit; rather I am paying someone for the labor on my behalf. Taken one step further, I can even hire the farmer himself to harvest the fruits for me, and pay him a flat hourly fee for his labor, as long as it is clear that the money paid is for his labor on my behalf, and not a purchase of the fruits, which I am taking for free.

Enter the Otzer Bais Din, as prescribed in a Tosephta. Based on the above principle, the Bais Din approaches a fruit growing farmer and hires him to harvest his own fruit for the public, in exchange for a flat wage. This agreement stipulates that the farmer will transport the fruit to a storehouse rented by the Bais Din, who will distribute the fruit to the public. The Bais Din is then permitted to pass on to the consumer the expense in making these fruits accessible to the public. Consequently, when the consumer picks up this fruit from a Bais Din distribution point, or from an authorized grocer , he isn't paying for the fruit as a consumer; rather, he is simply reimbursing the Bais Din for making the ownerless fruits of shmitta accessible to him. Our farmer has thus been transformed with this arrangement from a purveyor of fruits, forbidden by the Torah during shmitta, to a common laborer earning a wage for his labor, which is permitted during shmitta. (end quote)

Now, when one relies on Otzar Beis din, the price must reflect the unique character of the sale. In past years, Otzar Beis Din esrogim were sold unseen, in a sealed box that didn't let people choose quality and therefore we paid only for labor, which is the same for a good and for a bad esrog. Also, they are supposed to be far, far less expensive.

None of this was done last year. You picked your esrog, and the price was higher than it has ever been in the past. It could be argued that this was an affront and showed disrespect for the entire concept-- a barely if at all legal maneuver that resulted in a a total contradiction of the idea of sheviis. While a wonderful campaign was waged to support the holy farmers who adhered to the letter and spirit of the law of Shmita, the Esrog market was blithely relying on a tissue of hetterim that even if (I don't believe it, though) legal, was completely inappropriate and shameful.

There were individuals in the Esrog business who did adhere to the law of shmitta, and it was very difficult for them. And I certainly understand that not everyone can look at a big pot of money ready for the taking, money that can buy tranquility and respect and a chasan and apartments and so on, and say "No." Won't power is even more rare than will power. People who are adrift at sea have been driven by the torture of thirst to drink the salt water that surrounds them. It's a pity, but that doesn't change the consequences a ki hu zeh.

So; what does this have to do with Swine Flu? If the connection escapes you, the name is conveniently indicative of the metaphysical source of the problem, both Chazer and Chazer Fissel. The expression Chazer Fissel derives from the porcine habit of lying down with feet forward and head downward. This is said to symbolize the fact that a pig has one mark of kashrus,the cloven hooves, but does not chew its cud; it proudly presents its feet, its mark of kashrus, while hiding its mouth, the sign of its true treif nature. In other words, Chazer Fissel means "It may be wearing a shtreimel but it's still just a chazer." In English that would be "Pious pretensions to the contrary, it's still just a pig."

יד,ח וְאֶת הַחֲזִיר כִּי מַפְרִיס פַּרְסָה הוּא וְלֹא גֵרָה טָמֵא הוּא לָכֶם

If you would quibble that Dever is not the flu, you might be right. So it's a dever acher.

Re'ay, Devarim 14:3. Not Torah, Not Politics, Just So. (well, a tiny bit of Torah.)

This post started out have absolutely nothing to do with Divrei Torah, posted just because I thought the people who read this blog might find it interesting. As you will see, this, too, turned out to have a Torah connection.

I plant a garden for my mother shetichyeh. There are a few absolutes; the garden must have dahlias (which, in Lithuania, were called Georginas) and asters, but not zinnias. Zinnias are 'common.' There have to be tomatoes so the great-grandchildren can enjoy picking them. And there has to be rhubarb, for rhubarb and strawberry compot. Beyond that, I have a free (and calloused) hand.

The past two years, I've planted corn, or, in my mother's words, kukuruza. Corn cannot be planted in the single digits. Especially in my case, where the purpose is so that my mother can look at the back yard and see lush greenery reminiscent of the summers of her childhood, I have to plant a good stand of corn. So last year I planted an area of around fifteen by ten, and this year I planted fifteen by thirty feet of corn. I really can't guarantee a crop, what with malevolent squirrels, rabbits, and raccoons, but, at least, a block of corn eight feet tall looks nice waving in the wind, and that is the primary reason it's there.

This year, though, I do have some ears of corn, at least for the moment. If the four-legged vandals realize what I have, they'll rip it apart in a night, but if it lasts a week or so, my grandchildren will have something to pick.

This morning, I noticed that one ear of corn was swollen, and I recognized that it was infected with corn smut. What, you ask, is corn smut? Here's something I found about it:
GourmetSleuth Huitlacoche [wee-tlah-KOH-cheh]
Mexican Corn Truffle Huitlacoche (also spelled cuitlacoche) is a fungus (Ustilago maydis) which grows naturally on ears of corn. The fungus is harvested and treated as a delicacy. The earthy and somewhat smoky fungus is used to flavor quesadillas, tamales, soups and other specialty dishes. (...) Another interesting story told by Ms. Fussell is that of a dinner presented by the James Beard House in New York City in 1989. The purpose was to give Americans a tasting of the corn smut but with a new name “Mexican Truffle”. The menu was created by Josefina Howard of Rosa Mexicano restaurant and included huitlacoche appetizers, soup, crepes, tortilla torte, and even an huitlacoche ice cream.

One slight correction: it does not grow on the corn, it takes over the corn and renders each kernel grotesquely swollen and blackened.

So, this year, I decided to grill it and see what it tasted like. We had, in other words, corn smut for a side dish. I wrapped it in tin foil, put it into hot charcoal in the barbecue, and served it for dinner.

We had a dinner guest, Mrs. Victoria Weisenberg, a friend and colleague of my rebbitzen, who teaches college microbiology and anatomy. She was thrilled to actually see something she had lectured about, less thrilled to be dared to taste it, but after some moments of good, sensible hesitation, she did taste it. My rebbitzen has more seichel than that, so it was just me, Mrs. Weisenberg, and my oldest son. As we put it, we had an warm and congenial dinner, and then we all sat down and enjoyed some smut.

Having partaken, I can tell you that you're not missing anything. Even disregarding an appearance that would fit nicely in a shadowy corner of a painting by Hieronymus Bosch, its taste and texture were utterly insipid, without character, and bland. But, on the plus side, it didn't kill anyone.


The photo above is the piece of the ear that was left over after dinner. The next photo is not mine, just something I found on the net.



And that explains the title of this post, which refers to

יד,ג לֹא תֹאכַל כָּל תּוֹעֵבָה

When I posted this initially, I invited local readers to taste the piece I had left over. But when I checked it a few hours later, it had already begun to melt into primordial ooze. And despite that, the next day, when the woman who helps clean the house came, she saw it on the counter and said "Oh, where did you get that? It is very good." And she took it home to add to her home-made tortillas.

Now, even corn smut can raise interesting questions of halacha. The Bracha on corn is Ha'adama, because it grows from the earth. Plants are autotrophes, photosynthesizing their food from water and simple minerals. The bracha on Fungi, on the other hand, is She'hakol, because they are considered to grow from "the air;" they are heterotrophes, organisms that eat ready-made complex organic food. What about Corn Smut? On the one hand, it clearly is a fungus that grows on corn. On the other hand, since it doesn't develop into an independent entity, as do the fruiting bodies of mushrooms and other fungi, perhaps it remains defined as part of the corn, albeit spongy, swollen and black corn. (The logic is similar to ubar yerech imo; the child, once it is born, is obviously an independent entity. But so long as it is contained within and deriving nutrition from its mother, it is halachicly viewed as a part of her.)

I believe that the latter is correct, but I am not certain. So, in the highly unlikely case that you do eat corn smut, I suggest that you make sure you've already made a hamotzi or both she'hakol and ha'adama. I'm proud to say that this is very likely a question of first impression. We take our satisfactions where we find them.

~

Re’ay, Devarim 13:1. Bal Tosif and Bal Tigra, the Prohibition to Add to or Subtract from the Mitzvos.

Reb Meir Simcha in Hilchos Mamrim asks the following question. The Rambam defines one of the cases of Bal Tosif as one who presents a din Derabanan as if it were a De’oraysa. If so, how do we understand the endless drashos in the Sifri and the Torah Kohanim that are presented as De’oraysas and are really asmachtos, i.e., Derabanan?

And what about the many Gemoros that discuss drashos as if they were de’oraysa, and ask many kashes, and end up saying “ella derabanan ukra asmachta be’alma.” This indicates that the din was passed off as a de’oraysa until it was demonstrated that it was only a derabanan! This should be Bal Tosif!

(I would think that the answer is that when the drasha was given, it was stated that it was derabanan, like the Ritva in Eiruvin, and that caveat was forgotten. But Reb Meir Simcha apparently holds that this is not mistavra, because if it were presented as a derabanan, what was the point of hanging it on a drasha, if not to scare people into believing it was really a de’oraysa.)

So he answers with a remarkable chiddush: there are two kinds of drashos. One is gufei Torah, and one is a drasha gemura, but it’s not as chamur as gufei Torah. To claim that a drasha is gufei Torah is Bal Tosif. To claim that a drasha is a drasha gemura but not gufei Torah, even if you say that it is a de’oraysa and it’s really not, is not Bal Tosif. Exactly how the categorization is made is unclear.

It seems to me that Rashi in Yevamos towards the beginning of Ha’isha, on 90b, addresses this in the context of the afke’inhu rabbanan le’kiddushin minei sugya, and Rashi says it is 100% wrong, and there is no difference between a be’feirushe possuk and a drasha like kiddushei kesef.

See also the Brisker Rov in Megillas Esther where he explains why Ploni was worried that a later beis din could overturn the ruling that was mattir Rus and his children would be passeled. He says that even a drasha of the yud gimmel middos can be overturned by a later beis din. He brings that the Rambam in Mamrim 1:4 says that the double lashon in Lo Sosur of mishpat asher yomru and davar asher yagidu refer to drashos based on yud gimmel middos and kabbalah ish mipi ish, and the difference is that the former can be overturned while the latter cannot.


******************************

The rest of this is just my notes on a related sugya- whether you're over on Bal Tigra when you are mekayeim a mitzva but leave a part out, like tzitzis without tcheiles.

Peiros Te'eina, from someone named Rothschild.

 אמר לו רבי אליעזר הרי הוא עובר על בל תגרע. ז״ל שו״ת הלכות קטנות (ח״ב סר״פ) שאלה כל דבר שהוא למצוה ולא לעכב ולא עשאהו אם עובר משום לא תגרע. תשובה, מהא דפ״ח דזבחים כשלא נתת עברת על בל תגרע משמע דעבר, דהא מתן ד׳ למצוה היא ולא לעכב כדתנן הניתנין על מזבח החיצון אם נתנן במתנה אתת כיפר, וה"ה לא יצק לא בלל וכו', וצ״ע לפ״ז אם לוקה הכהן שהקריב מנחה שלא

 בללה משום לא תגרע וכוי, ע״כ. וכה״ג הוכיח מכאן הביאור הלכה (סלייד ד"ה יניח של ר״ת) וכתב ע״ז בזה״ל וזה הוא תוכחת מגולה להאדם הרוצה להתרשל ממ״ע לפעמים במצות בדבר שהוא רק לכתחלה, וע״ש באורך. ולולי דבריו היה נראה דיש לחלק דלא נאמר בל תגרע רק בממעט ממנין הנאמר במצוה, כגון הממעט מד׳ מינים בלולב או מד׳ פרשיות בתפילין וכיו״ב או אפילו כשמקריב מנחה בלי לבונה, אבל במקריב מנחה שאינה בלולה לא חיסר ממספר הנאמר במצוה, אלא דדעת הרשב״א בר״ה דגם המבטל מצות עשה עובר בבל תגרע. גם על עיקר הראיה מכאן לכאן׳ ילה״ע דאפשר דהנותן מתנה אחת באמת לא יצא מצות הזאה אלא דמ״מ גזיה״כ דמכפר, ודו״ק. מספר פירות תאנה

The Biur Halacha toward the end of 34.

יניח של ר"ת - נ"ל דגם בזה צריך ליזהר לכוין שאינו עושה כן רק משום ספיקא ובזה לכו"ע לא עבר על בל תוסיף ובל תגרע דאם יכוין סתם בזה לקיים מ"ע דתפילין הגם דאין בזה משום ב"ת דהאי לחודיה קאי וכו' עכ"פ שמא באמת הדין כרש"י ותפילין אלו פסולים דהחליף פרשיותיה וכמו שכתב הרא"ש והטור ונמצא דעובר בזה על בל תגרע דהלא מבואר בסמ"ג ל"ת שס"ה דהעושה ג' טוטפות בתפילין עובר על בל תגרע וה"נ דכוותיה דהלא אין לו רק שתי פרשיות שקבועין במקומן ואין לחלק דהתם עכ"פ ג' כשרין הן ויש ע"ז רק שם מגרע משא"כ כאן ע"י שקבועין קצת פרשיות בהקציצה שלא במקומן נאמר דהקציצה כולה מיקרי קציצה פסולה ואין עליה שם מגרע ז"א דהלא שם בודאי אין על הקציצה שם תפילין כלל דהלא קי"ל דארבע טוטפות מעכבין זה את זה ואפ"ה נכלל זה בלאו דלא תגרע. ולהיפך אין לחלק דשם גרע מעיקר התפילין משא"כ כאן דז"א אחד דכיון שלא הניחה במקומה הוי ג"כ כמו שחיסרה ועוד דמי גרע זה מדמים הניתנין במתן אחד במקום דצריכין מתן ב' שהן ד' דאמרינן בעירובין דף ק' ע"א ובר"ה כ"ז דעובר על בל תגרע אף דקי"ל בזבחים בפ' ב"ש דבדיעבד כיפר עכ"פ הלא גרע הלכתחלה במצות השם [הג"ה וזה הוא תוכחת מגולה להאדם הרוצה להתרשל ממ"ע לפעמים במצות בדבר שהוא רק לכתחלה] ק"ו בזה דהוא לעיכובא אף בדיעבד ועוד דהלא כתב הרמב"ם בספר המצות שלו דלאו זה הוא בין אם מגרע מהכתוב בתורה ובין אם הוא מגרע מהמקובל בע"פ וה"נ כיון דמקובל לנו בע"פ שסדר הנחתם הוא כך והוא משנה בודאי הוא מגרע בזה אם לא שנאמר כמש"כ העט"ז בשם המקובלים דאלו ואלו כשרים הם אבל אנו רואין שהטוש"ע וכל הפוסקים לא קיבלו דבר זה להלכה וידוע דכל היכא שהפוסקים חולקים עם המקובלים הדין כהפוסקים וכן הוכיח הגאון ר' ברוך פרענקיל בהגהותיו מן הגמרא ועוד שירא שמים המניח תפילין דר"ת הוא רוצה לצאת ידי כל הדיעות ולא שעי"ז יפול בחשש ספקא דאוריתא ע"כ הנכון לעשות כמו שכתבנו שיכוין בפירוש שאינו מניחן רק משום ספיקא ואפילו סתמא לא מהני בזה דהא קי"ל בר"ה כ"ז ע"ב לעבור בזמנו לא בעי כונה ואף דשם איירי הענין לענין בל תוסיף פשוט דה"ה לענין בל תגרע ועיין בט"ז בסוף סימן תרנ"א ואין לאמר דכאן מיקרי שלא בזמנה משום דכבר יצא בתפילין דרש"י והוא דומה ללולב דפסק שם הט"ז דאינו עובר על בל תגרע אח"כ אם נוטל ג' מינים אם לא שיכוין בם בפירוש לשם מצוה דשאני התם דמדאגבהיה נפיק ביה משא"כ בתפילין דעצם זמנן הוא כל היום והוא מברך עליהן בכל פעם שמניחן ולא גרע עכ"פ מבכור דמסיק שם בר"ה דמיקרי כל היום זמנו או בברכת כהנים אלו מתרמי ליה צבורא אחרינא אף דבדוחק יש לחלק מ"מ הדרך היותר נכון הוא כמו שכתבתי ובפרט דיש דיעות בפוסקים דסברי דחיוב תפילין מן התורה הוא להיותן עליו כל היום עיין בספר ישועות יעקב בודאי מיקרי כל היום זמנו. וכתבתי זה לאפוקי ממה שראיתי לאחד שכתב היפך זה ולא עיין בזה כל הצורך. ויש עוד הרבה דברים שמצאתי אח"כ בפתיחה להפמ"ג בענינא דבל תוסיף ואכ"מ להעתיקם:

Beis HaLevi:

שו"ת בית הלוי (חלק א סימן מב) "ואין להקשות דא"כ מי שיש לו רק מין א' וכגון לדידן דאין לנו תכלת אמאי מותר ללבוש בגד בת ד' כנפות ולהטיל בו לבן הא עובר על הלאו [דבל תגרע] יש לומר דשרי משום עשה דוחה ל"ת". 

More:

וכ"כ בביאור הגריפ"פ על ספר המצוות לרס"ג (עשה ז) "דכיון דתכלת ולבן מצוה אחת הן נמצא כשמטיל חדא מינייהו הו"ל בכלל אזהרת לאו דבל תגרע".

 וכ"כ שפת אמת (ראש השנה כח ב.

 ולכאורה כמו"כ ס"ל השאגת אריה (סימן מא) “והרי לר"י במטיל לג' ולא לד' עובר על בל תגרע כדאמר בפ"ז דזבחים (ד' עט) גבי הניתנים מתן ד' שנתערבו בניתנין מתן א' דאם נותן במתנה א' דהרי הוא עובר על בל תגרע אף על גב דקי"ל כל הניתנין במתן ד' שנתן במתנ' א' יצא. הה"נ אף על גב דד' ציציות לר"י אין מעכבין זא"ז מ"מ בהטיל לג' ולא לד' עובר על בל תגרע”. 

וע' שו"ת בית שלמה (או"ח סימן טו ב וטז ב) שחלק ע"ז.

The Beis Shlomo is just arguing on the SA, and says that we pasken you're only over on BT when you're mekayeim the mitzva but missing a part, not where the missing part is me'akeiv.  But it's not like the MB who says that if you're over BT when you're mekayeim but missing, KV you're over when the missing makes you not be mekayeim.  

http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=611&st=&pgnum=24
http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=611&st=&pgnum=22