Shlach. Tzitzis for Women

Last week, at our Kiddush, a friend recounted an interesting experience. He had been on one of his long walks in the forest preserve, and he saw two women on the path. They were dressed in tzniyusdikkeh old-fashioned-Orthodox garb. He was surprised to see that one of them was not only wearing tzitzis, and not only were the strings worn outside her clothes, but that she also had techeiles in her tzitzis.
It was ironic, he said, because, in consideration of the heat and humidity, he himself had left both long pants and tzitzis at home.

His story led perfectly in to our Torah discussion at the Kiddush, because Parshas Shelach ends with the parshah of Tzitzis.  Coincidentally, the local Kollel had printed a discussion by a dear friend and colleague on that very topic. I am reproducing the article here 

After the article, I bring sources, some of which were cited in the article, with comments and interpretation.

Our discussion will follow the sources section.

Women and Tzitzis 

Rabbi Henoch Plotnik 

-Rabbi Plotnik, an alumnus of Chicago Community Kollel, is a Ra'm at Yeshivas Meor HaTorah and Mora d'Asra of Bais Tefila in Chicago. 

The Gemara in Menachos (43a) teaches us that women are exempt from the mitzvah of tzitzis due to its status as a time-dependent mitzvah (z'man grama). This mitzvah is time-bound since only an article of clothing worn by day is obli-gated in tzitzis, as derived from the pasuk "u're'isem oso" in this week's parshah. Additionally, the well-known words of the Targum Yonasan ben Uziel include women wearing tzitzis and tefillin under the prohibition of "lo yilbash," forbidding a woman from wearing men's clothing. As a general rule, even some-one who is exempt from a mitzvah can certainly perform it vol-untarily, provided that there are no other prohibitions involved. In fact, the halachah for Ashkenazim follows the opinion of the Rishonim (Rabbeinu Tam) that women are even allowed to make a brachah when performing a "z'man grama" despite the implication of the word "v'tzivanu" ("and He commanded us"). Those that follow Sephardic custom may not recite the brachah as per their tradition, following the opinion of the R"i.

The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 17) paskens that women are indeed peturos from tzitzis; the Rema adds that as is the case for other z'man grama mitzvos, they have the option to put on tzitzis and make a brachah. It should be noted that the Rema is only discussing a feminine article of clothing; wearing distinctively mate attire would certainly violate "to yilbash" (R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt"l in Shulchan Shlomo 3:18). The Rema adds that a woman should not wear tzitzis because it is "michzi k'yuhara" - an activity perceived as haughty and arrogant. Traditionally, women have never worn tzitzis; breaking with that long-standing conduct of bnos Yisroel since time immemorial is viewed as yuhara, hardly a commendable virtue. Furthermore, the Rema comments that since the mitzvah of tzitzis is not a "chovas gavra" (meaning, even men are not technically obligated to seek out a four-cornered article to obligate themselves in tzitzis if they don't own one, unlike tefillin where the observance is imperative), women should not put themselves in a position where they would need to wear tzitzis. (However, the minhag haolam is for us [men] to go out of our way and acquire clothing that is obligated in tzitzis.) The Bi'ur Halachah (190) adds that since the Gemara makes no mention of women per-forming this mitzvah, they should always refrain from making a brachah even in the event that they do wear them. He makes the same point concerning mitzvas shofar. 

In 1976, when women's "equality" movements were sweeping across the country, Rav Moshe Feinstein wrote a teshuvah (O.C. 4, #49) addressing the issues that were coming to the fore, one of which was the subject of women wearing talleisim. After explaining how Hashem in His ultimate wisdom exempted wom-en from mitzvos aseh shehaz'man grama and that Chazal neither encouraged nor mandated their observance, Rav Moshe writes unequivocally that even if "times have changed," the Torah has not. Those waging war against its tenets and principles and demanding "equality" are guilty chas v'shalom of very serious prohibitions. Although women were certainly given license to voluntarily perform those mitzvos, their true motivation must be the desire to fulfill the mitzvah, and not to make political or aggressive statements. If undermining Hashem's Torah is the underlying reason for their actions, their position is akin to kefirah, believing that the Torah needs to be changed. A woman is no less capable of achieving kedushah than a man but for reasons known only to the Giver of the Torah, women were given different mitzvos to perform. Being chosen for an alter-native role in mitzvah performance should not be per-ceived as a slight to their honor. 

Interestingly, the Maharil (the basis for many of the cus-toms mentioned by the Rema) was asked why he didn't protest against a certain woman who consistently wore a tallis katan. His response was that he was concerned that she may not heed his words "and better she should remain a shogeig and not a meizid." Clearly the Maharil held this practice was something that fundamentally needed to be rectified. In fact, in that same teshuvah (37, chadoshos) he refers to such women as "hedyotos," a term reserved for those who are actually simpletons and misguided despite their apparent good deeds. 

The Aruch Hashulchan as well writes concerning women and tzitzis, "We do not allow this, such is the custom, and it should not be changed." It would also seem that any contemporary woman who dons what is recognizable as a classic men's tallis would be in violation of "lo yilbash" as quoted above from R' Shlomo Zalman. 

As far as tefillin are concerned, the Rema strongly condemns the practice of women wearing them; as the com-mentaries explain, since tefillin require extra attention to "guf naki," they are best worn only by those who are absolutely obligated to do so. The Gemara does record that one woman, Michal bas Shaul, wore tefillin (Eruvin 96a). The Kaf Hachaim writes that she was a lone excep-tion, as she possessed the neshamah of a man as well as other unique considerations. The common perception that Rashi's daughers wore tefillin has no reliable source and therefore need not be investigated. (For an exhaustive treatment of this popular myth, see article by Dr. Ari Zivi-tovsky available through the OU and their website.) 

In conclusion, neither social upheaval nor modern influence should ever encourage or cause us to waiver from true Toras Imecha, our badge of pride and honor since matan Torah. Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky zt"l explained that the reason minhagei Yisrael are termed Toras Imecha is because just as a mother instinctively senses what her child needs, Klal Yisrael has developed and maintained those customs we instinctively know we need in order to perpetuate the kedushah and sense of mission we are privileged to transmit. Observing what we have always done in the past, will guide us in how to proceed in the future. 


OC 17 2

נשים ועבדים פטורים מפני שהיא מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא.

הגה: ומכל מקום אם רוצים לעטפו ולברך עליו הרשות בידו כמו בשאר מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא (תוספות והרא"ש והר"ן פרק ב' דראש השנה ופרק קמא דקדושין) אך מחזי כיוהרא ולכן אין להן ללבוש ציצית הואיל ואינו חובת גברא (אגור סימן כ"ז) פירוש אינו חייב לקנות לו טלית כדי שיתחייב בציצית ולקמן בסימן י"ט אמר כשיש לו טלית מארבע כנפות (ולבשו).

The Agur quoting the Maharil as brought by the Rama

 ונשאל מהר״י מולן והשיב דנשים הלובשות ציצית שטות הוא ומחזי כיוהרא. ואחת היתה בשכונתינו שהיתר. לובשת 

ציצית

The Maharil in our version of the Maharil

 אמהרי"ל במקום שיש איש יודע לתקן ציציות אל תתקנם האשה ואמר דלא נהירא בעיניו מה שיש נשים מכניסות עצמן לחיוב ציצית ושאלו לו מפני מה אינו מוחה ביד הרבנית (מ' ברונ"א) בעירו שהינחה בכל עת טלית קטן והשיב שמא אינה מקשבת לי ועל כה"ג אמר מוטב יהו שוגגין ואל יהו מזידין 

Taz

(ג) הואיל ואינו חובת גברא — בזה מתורץ למה מברכות הנשים על לולב, דהוא גם כן מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא. ותירץ, שאני הכא שאינו חובת גברא, שאפילו איש אין עליו חיוב דאורייתא לקנות טלית בת ד' כנפים, אלא אם מתעטף חייב לעשות ציצית; מה שאין כן לולב, דגבי איש הוא חובת גברא שהוא חובת הגוף:

Mishna Berura 

(ה) ואינו חובת גברא — בזה מתרץ למה מברכות הנשים על לולב דהוא ג"כ מ"ע שהזמ"ג ותירץ שאני התם שאינו חובת גברא שאפילו איש אין עליו חיוב דאורייתא לקנות טלית בת ד' כנפות אלא אם מתעטף חייב לעשות בו ציצית משא"כ לולב דגבי איש הוא חובת גברא שהוא חובת הגוף. ודע דאנן פסקינן גבי ציצית חובת גברא ולאו ח"ג ותרוייהו לקולא חובת גברא לקולא למעוטי חובת מנא שכל זמן שאינו לובש הטלית אע"פ שיש לו ד' כנפות פטורה מציצית לאו חובת גברא שאינו חייב לקנות לו טלית כדי שיתחייב בציצית רק אם יש לו טלית מד' כנפות ולובשו אז חייב בציצית עיין סי' י"ט:

Kaf HaChaim

(ה) שם בהגה: אך מחזי כיוהרא ולכן אין להן ללבוש ציצית וכו' — ועוד יש חשש איסור משום לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה. לבוש סעיף ב'. ובדברי האר"י ז"ל בשכר הכוונות שהבאנו לשונו לעיל סימן ט"ז אות ב' מפורש שאין הנשים שייכות במצוה זו, יעויין שם. וכן כתב בן איש חי פרשת לך לך אות י"ג. ועיין לקמן סימן לח אות ט:

(ו) שם בהגה: הואיל ואינו חובת גברא — פירוש, שאינו חייב ליקח לעצמו טלית, כמו שכתוב ריש סימן כ"ד. מגן אברהם ס"ק ב. וכן כתב הט"ז ס"ק ג. מאמר מרדכי אות א'. ומה שכתב בשולחן ערוך סימן יט סעיף א: ציצית חובת גברא הוא, בא לאפוקי ממאן דאמר כלי קופסא חייבין בציצית, כמו שכתב הט"ז שם ס"ק א. אבל לא בא לומר ליקח לעצמו טלית שאינו חייב, כמו שכתוב סימן כד. ומה שקרא אותו חובת גברא, לפי שאם בא ללבוש בגד בת ד' כנפות חייב להטיל בה ציצית, כמבואר בסימן י"ט טור ובית יוסף:

ומזה נתבאר לנו דציצית חובת גברא, ולא חובת גברא, ותרווייהו לקולא. חובת גברא לקולא, למעוטי כלי קופסא, שכל זמן שאינו לובש הטלית, אף על פי שיש לו ד' כנפות פטורה מן הציצית, וכמו שכתוב בסימן י"ט. ולא חובת גברא, שאינו חייב לקנות לו טלית כדי שיתחייב בציצית, רק אם יש לו טלית בת ד' כנפות ורוצה ללובשו חייב להטיל בו ציצית, וכמו שכתוב בסימן כ"ד טור ושולחן ערוך. ועיין מה שנכתוב שם על סימן כד סעיף א בסייעתא דשמיא:

Aruch HaShulchan

....גם בציצית לכאורה יכולות להתעטף ולברך.

ג

אבל באמת לא שמענו זה. ואין מניחין אותן ללבוש טלית, וכל שכן לברך. ואינו דומה לשופר וסוכה ולולב דהוי פעם אחת בשנה והמצוה כרגע, אבל ציצית מצוותה כל השנה ולא נאה לנשים. ועוד: דכל המצות הם חובה לאנשים, ולכן יכולות גם הן לעשות כן. אבל ציצית אינו חובה כמו שכתבתי בסימן י"ט, ואיך נניח לנשים לעשותה? וזהו כוונת רבינו הרמ"א שכתב: ומכל מקום אם רוצות... אך מיחזי כיוהרא. ולכן אין להן ללבוש ציצית, הואיל ואינו חובת גברא. עד כאן לשונו, כלומר: דמיחזי כיוהרא כיון שהיא תמידית, וגם כיון שאינו לחובה לאיש אלא כשיש לו בגד של ארבע כנפות. ולכן אין מניחים לנהוג מצוה זו. וכן המנהג ואין לשנות.

ד

It is worth emphasizing one thing the Aruch HaShulchan says: that Tzitzis is different than other Zman Grammas in that it is constant. He says that this constancy is a good reason for women to not wear them.  What does he mean by this? He means that if a woman takes a lulav or hears shofar, she is a woman that is doing mitzvos like a man.  If a woman were to wear tzitzis every day, the halachic distinction between men and women, the firm standard of the ptur of zman gramma, would be attenuated. Speculatively, I would suggest that this is what the Targum Yonasan (Devarim 22:5) means when he says on Lo Yilbash לא יהיה גוליין דציצית ותפילין דאינון תיקוני גבר על איתתא. It's hard to understand why a simple daled kanfos would be a beged ish.  Maybe this is what he means.

Igros Moshe

 אגרות משה או"ח ח"ד סי' מט בעניין פטור נשים ממצוות עשה שהזמ"ג

איברא דאיכא רשות לכל אשה לקיים אף המצות שלא חייבתן תורה ויש להם מצוה ושכר על קיום מצות אלו וגם לשיטת התוס׳ רשאות גם לברך על המצות וכמנהגנו שמקיימות מצות שופר ולולב וגם מברכות שא״כ  גם על ציצית שייך לאשה שתרצה ללבוש בגד שיהיה בצורה אחרת מבגדי אנשים אבל יהיה בד׳ כנפות ולהטיל בו ציצית ולקיים מצוה זו. ורק להניח תפילין כתבו התוס' עירובין דף צ״ו ע״א ד״ה מיכל דצריך למחות בידן משום דתפילין צריך זריזות מרובה בגוף נקי ובהיסח הדעת שמטעם זו אף אנשים שמחוייבין בתפילין נמנעין מלהניחם כל היום אלא רק זמן המועט דתפלה בשחרית, וכן איפסק ברמ״א או״ח סימן ל״ח סעי׳ גי, ובתרגום יונתן על קרא דלא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה איתא לא יהי גוליין דציצית ותפילין דהינון תיקוני גבר על איתא לא סבירא להו לתוס׳ זה, ופשוט שהתוס׳ סברי שאינו מתרגום יונתן. אבל פשוט שהוא רק בחשקה נפשה לקיים מצות אף כשלא נצטותה, אבל מכיון שאינו לכוונה זו אלא מצד תורעמותה על השי״ת ועל תורתו אין זה מעשה מצוה כלל אלא אדרבה מעשה איסור שהאיסור דכפירה שחושבת דשייך שיהיה איזה חלוף בדיני התורה היא עושית גם במעשה שחמיר.

To Reb Moshe's teshuva, I would like to add a reference to the Meiri in Sotah 22b:, who says that tzitzis are sometimes used in the service of hypocritical dissimulation, to which he applies the passuk "ויציצו כל פועלי און"

In light of the Aruch HaShulchan's reason for opposing women wearing tzitzis, you recognize the special attraction tzitzis has for women that want to break down the mitzva distinction between men and women.

Yalkut Yosef from R Yitzchak Yosef on the Kitzur

ו נשים פטורות ממצות ציצית, ככל מצוות עשה שהזמן גרמא. ואף על פי שבשופר וסוכה ולולב אם רצו הנשים לקיימן רשאיות, ובלבד שלא תברכנה על המצוה, [למנהג הספרדים ועדות המזרח], ואין בזה משום כל הפטור מן הדבר ועושהו נקרא הדיוט, מכל מקום במצות ציצית אין להן לחייב את עצמן ולהתעטף בציצית, אפילו בלי ברכה, דמיחזי כיוהרא. ויש אומרים שיש בזה גם חשש משום לא יהיה כלי גבר על אשה, ואף על פי שהעיקר לדינא שאין בזה האיסור הנז' מכל מקום ראוי למונען מזה, ובפרט בזמן הזה כאשר הרפורמים מנהיגים כן בקהילותיהם. [ילקו''י שם עמוד שכג. ושאר''י ח''א עמוד רס]. 

************************************************

As an aside, it is important to mention that there are women that are obligated to wear tzitzis. We have written about this before.   Most of the people who read this are not members of that group.  Additionally, I am told that among some Chasidisheh groups, the Rebbe's wife puts on tzitzis and tefillin. This is probably a myth, but I don't care if it's true or not. I'm discussing Torah from Sinai.

I am unaware of even one poseik that mentions the idea of women wearing tzitzis with approval.  On the contrary- it is absolutely clear that the poskim disapproved of women wearing tzitzis. That, however, might be a cultural artifact, and therefore mutable if necessary. Therefore, while remaining aware of the historical and cultural opposition of all recorded poskim, we will limit our discussion to strictly halachic issues. 

...

1.  Let me share my biggest problem with this sugya.  I think that unlike other zman gramas, and even according to Rebbeinu Tam, a woman's bracha on Tzitzis is a bracha levatala. The mitzva of tzitzis is a two step process. If the beged is chayav, you put tzitzis in. If the person is chayav, you get a mitzva for wearing it. But if the beged is not chayav in the first place, it does not become a cheftza shel mitzva. Only a man's ownership of a beged creates the chiyuv to put in tzitzis before wearing that beged. I think that since a woman is not chayeves, her beged is not chayav, and she cannot create the cheftza of tzitzis by putting strings into a beged that is not chayav.

This has nothing to do with Rabbeinu Tam/Ri as brought in OC 14 whether women can put tzitzis into a beged. I'm talking about their beged being in the parsha of tztizis at all. Nobody is mattir tzitzis that were put into a beged before it was owned by a Jew, because it is not in the parsha of a beged of chiyuv (and later it would be min he'asui.) I say the same is true by a beged owned by a woman. As far as I can tell, the only beged that would be kosher would be one that is either owned by a man at the time of putting it together, or owned by a man who intends to sell it to a man. 

Therefore, the only beged that a woman could make a bracha on would be a beged into which tzitzis were placed while it was owned by a man.

It is possible that this is what the Maharil meant.  Although the Rama does not identify this as a problem, I believe that is because he is talking about Tzitzis that a women purchased or was given by a man who owned it when it was made and made it for a man.  But if it was made while the beged belonged to a women, it is passuuuul and it's a bracha l'vatala.

2.  We are machmir lechatchila like the Maharam that בני ישראל ועשו להם ציצית is darshened to mean that women cannot put the tzitzis into the beged, and that only a man can do so. According to the Maharam, a woman making a bracha on a woman-made beged would be making a bracha levatala. Also, people should know that if they're relying on Rabbeinu Tam's opinion in making a bracha on tzitzis, their Rabbeinu Tam would not allow them to make a bracha on tzitzis fashioned by a woman, on the basis of כל שישנו בקשירה ישנו בכתיבה (Gittin 45b.) To do so would be a bracha levatala.They would have to use tzitzis made by a man. Women making a bracha on tzitzis are using Rabbeinu Tam when it suits them and disregarding him when it does not.  

In any case, according to the Maharam and Rabbeinu Tam, the only tzitzis a woman could make a bracha on are where the tzitzis were inserted into the beged by a man.

As I said at the end of #1, I do agree that if a woman would walk into Eichlers and buy a pair of Tzitzis, that she could make a bracha on them.  

Someone (R'D'NJS of M'A) said the following:  

there is no halachic construct to say  that one can not be motzi oneself his / her own mitzva
even if you say women are peturot from tzitzit and therefor their beged [1] or tieing [2] is invalid, it is invalid for men but not for herselfi think that is axiomatic . [ and dont start with havdala and megilla please ] 
I responded to him that while in my heart I know he's right, I am too much of a technician to allow my mind to accept it.  Furthermore, I have to say that his teretz is somewhat demeaning to the concept of Eino Metzuveh v'Oseh.

However: we have to think about the Gemara in Hasfina about Rav Chanina ben Dosa's wife.  This is something Rabbeinu Tam has to deal with, too, but I don't recall if anyone discusses it. The Gemara in BB 74b says

דדביתהו דר"ח בן דוסא דעתידה דשדיא תכלתא בה לצדיקי לעלמא דאתי  

3. It's peculiar that a woman would wear Tzitzis out, when the inevitable result is to draw attention to one's clothing. I think this is what most surprised my friend in the forest preserve. Considering that in Chazal tzitzis are thought of as a means of reinforcing modesty, it's somewhat strange to use them in a fashion that has the opposite effect. On the other hand, the term "modesty" is malleable enough to support whatever thesis one wishes. Even so, my wife, whose insight into women's motivations is more reliable than mine, vehemently stated that any woman that wears her tzitzis out wants to be looked at- for her, the mitzva of tzitzis is וראיתם אותה, not for וראיתם אותו. Poor tzitzis..... .

Shlach, Bamidbar 14:23. The Meraglim. Appreciating Eretz Yisrael

(with the author's permission)
From Stories from the Land of Israel by Rabbi Chanan Morrison of RavKookTorah.org

(expatiated)

"And [the spies] began to speak badly about the land that they had explored." (Num. 13:32)
A dispirited discussion took place at Beit HaRav, Rav Kook's house in Jerusalem, not long after the end of World War II. The Chief Rabbi had passed away ten years earlier; now it was his son, Rabbi Tzvi Yehudah Kook, who sat at the head of the table.

One participant at the Sabbath table had brought up a disturbing topic: the phenomenon of visitors touring Eretz Yisrael and then criticizing the country after returning to their homes. These visitors complain about everything: the heat, the poverty, the backwardness, the political situation - and discourage other Jews from moving here, he lamented.

Rav Tzvi Yehudah responded by telling over the following parable, one he had heard in the name of Rabbi Samuel Mohilever, the rabbi of Bialystok.

-The Failed Match-

There was once a wealthy man who sought the hand of a certain young lady. She was the most beautiful girl in town, and was blessed with many talents and a truly refined character. Her family was not well-off, so they were eager about a possible match with the prosperous fellow.

The young woman, however, was not interested in the match. Rich or not, the prospective suitor was known to be coarse and ill-mannered. She refused to meet with him.

The father asked her to at least meet with the young man in their home, so as not to embarrass him. After all, one meeting doesn't obligate you to marry him! To please her father, the young woman agreed.

The following Sabbath afternoon, the fellow arrived at the house as arranged, and was warmly received by the father. Shortly afterwards, his daughter made her entrance. But her hair was uncombed, and she wore a faded, crumpled dress and shabby house slippers. Appalled at her disheveled appearance, it did not take long before the young man excused himself and made a hurried exit.

What everyone says about this girl - it's not true, exclaimed the astonished young man to his friends. She's hideous!

Rav Tzvi Yehudah stopped briefly, surveying the guests seated around the table. Superficially, it would appear that the brash young fellow had rejected the young woman. But in fact, it was she who had rejected him.

The same is true regarding the Land of Israel, the rabbi explained. Eretz Yisrael is a special land, only ready to accept those who are receptive to its unique spiritual qualities. The Land does not reveal its inner beauty to all who visit. Not everyone is worthy to perceive its special holiness.

It may appear as if the dissatisfied visitors are the ones who reject the Land of Israel, he concluded. But in fact, it is the Land that rejects them!

A thoughtful silence pervaded the room. Those present were stunned by the parable and the rabbi's impassioned delivery. Then one of the guests observed, Reb Tzvi Yehudah, your words are suitable for a son of your eminent father, may his memory be a blessing!

-Seeing the Goodness of Jerusalem-

Rav Tzvi Yehudah's response was indeed appropriate for Rav Kook's son. When visitors from outside the country would approach the Chief Rabbi for a blessing, Rav Kook would quote from the Book of Psalms, "May God bless you from Zion" (128:5).

Then he would ask: What exactly is this blessing from Zion? In fact, the content of the blessing is described in the continuation of the verse: "May you see the goodness of Jerusalem."

The rabbi would explain: The verse does not say that one should merit seeing Jerusalem; but that one should merit seeing 'the goodness of Jerusalem.' Many people visit Jerusalem. But how many of them merit seeing the inner goodness hidden in the holy city?

And that, he concluded, is God's special blessing from Zion.

(Stories from the Land of Israel. Adapted from Malachim Kivnei Adam, pp. 227-278, 230)

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NOTES:

1.  Perhaps Rav Tzvi Yehuda was thinking about the passuk in Shir HaShirim 2:3, כתפוח בעצי היער כן דודי בין הבנים בצלו חמדתי וישבתי ופריו מתוק לחכי, as I heard it explained by the Novardeker Rosh Yeshiva Zatzal, Hagaon R Avraham Jofen.  The Medrash there says

כתפוח בעצי היער. ר' הונא ורבי אחא בשם רבי יוסי בן זמרא: מה התפוח הזה, הכל בורחין ממנו בשעת השרב. ולמה כן? לפי שאין לו צל לישב בצלו, כך ברחו אומות העולם משבת בצל הקדוש ברוך הוא ביום מתן תורה. יכול אף ישראל כן? תלמוד לומר: בצלו חמדתי וישבתי. חמדתי אותו, וישבתי. אני הוא שחמדתי אותו ולא האומות

The point of the Medrash is that the Tapuach, the "apple tree," has very poor shade.  Many people that seek shelter there become irritated- strangely, they find it worse than no shade at all!- and run away from it to find more hospitable conditions.  But there are some for whom the Tapuach is such a joy and privilege that when they find one and seek shelter there, they have a matchless and indescribable pleasure.  Of course it's indescribable!  You can only understand it if your soul understands the spiritual joy that it comprises.  If you haven't attained that level, you simply will be incapable of appreciating it.  That is what the passuk says:  בצלו חמדתי,  I yearned for its shade, וישבתי, and finally I found it, and I sat under its branches, and then פריו מתוק לחכי, what a pleasure it was, only then could I appreciate what a treasure I had. For others, it is torture, and they run away from it.   For me, it is Gan Eden.

There are some things that you can only appreciate in direct proportion to your ruchniyusdikeh hachana.  One is Torah.  As Rav Avraham Yitzchak Kook says (Orot HaTorah 7:4) if a person does not enjoy learning Torah, it is a symptom of a dangerous spiritual flaw.  You can't "force yourself to love the Torah."  All you can do, and what you must do, is find and correct the spiritual flaw, and then the love of limud haTorah will come naturally.

מעוט מתיקות נעימת התורה בא מחסרון בטבע הישראלי של הנשמה, שצריכין לתקנה על ידי תשובה מכוונת לחסרון זה. וכיון שנותנים את הדעת לתקן את החסרון מיד חוזר האור העליון של הטבע הקדוש של הנשמה לזרח, וחוזרת מתיקות התורה להתחיל להגלות.

Another is, as the Gemara in the beginning of Yoma says, Hashra'as HaShechina, such as the Chanukas HaMishkan and Yom Kippur and Mattan Torah.

Finally, Eretz Yisrael.  Without the proper wisdom and refinement, you will simply not see what is there.

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2.  This morning (עש"ק שלח תשע"ה, June 2015) I said this over in Shul, and Harav Shlomo Tennenbaum added something that is exactly on target.  He said that he saw this in the name of the Chafetz Chaim, said over by his son in law Rav Aharon HaKohen, (mechaber of עבודת הקרבנות.)  Our passuk (14:23) says

 אם יראו את הארץ אשר נשבעתי לאבתם וכל מנאצי לא יראוה

The Chafetz Chaim said that the repetition in this passuk  (אם יראו .....לא יראוה) tells us that it applies not only to the Meraglim, but to all generations, forever.  A מנאץ might live in Eretz Yisrael, but לא יראוה, he does not see it.  He sees only with his physical eyes, but his eyes see only a tiny slice of the spectrum, and he is missing the glorious rainbow of what there is to be seen. Just as Yishmael and Eliezer, who were דומה לחמור, saw nothing on הר המוריה, so too מנאצי השם might live in Eretz Yisrael, but all they see is dust and gravel and thorn and gashmiyus.  Only a maamin who lives in Eretz Yisrael truly sees it.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

3.  A commenter self-identifying as Dovid Leib was hakking a tchainik that what I'm writing about is really just choosing wishful thinking over empiricism.  I say that the whole of Klal Yisrael and our hashkafa is the triumph of the spirit over the mundane, and of our sublime hashkafa over the dismal face of reality.  If you can't accept that simple and fundamental idea, then this is indeed not for you.

Shlach, Bamidbar 15:35. Kashering Chillul Shabbos

This was originally posted in 2011.  I am re-posting because of an important addition, number VI below.

Synopsis:
Doing Melacha on Shabbos is a capital aveira.  But doing melacha to save a life is not only allowed, it is a mitzva.  Two questions arise.  Why doesn't the rule of Ho'il allow all melacha on Shabbos since the fruit of the melacha might be used for a sick person?  Also, even assuming that Ho'il does not allow melacha on Shabbos, what if a person was intentionally mechallel Shabbos, but in fact the fruit of his melacha was needed for and used by a sick person?  Would this retroactively kasher/excuse his chillul Shabbos?

If you're looking for chizuk in hashkafa or mussar, this is not it, but you could go to here or here.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Our parsha tells us of the M'kosheish, a man that openly and rebelliously was mechallel Shabbos, and that he was found guilty of this crime and executed.

Chillul Shabbos is a capital aveira. The punishment is not merely theoretical, it can actually be carried out where there was hasra'a and zadon. There are two fundamental questions about what might excuse a mechallel Shabbos be'meizid.

I
Question one: 

While it is permitted to cook on Yomtov for a Yomtov meal, it is prohibited to cook on Yomtov in preparation for a weekday meal.  The rule called "Ho'il" relaxes this prohibition, because even though he intends to use the food for the weekday meal, if unexpected guests were to come on Yomtov, he would serve what he cooked to his guests on Yomtov, so the cooking is viewed as if it were for Yomtov use..  Ho'il allows us to say that as long as guests could possibly come, the issur of Yomtov is removed.  We don't care if guests actually come or not: as long as they could come, and there is a potential that the cooking you are doing on Yomtov will be needed for Yomtov, you're off the hook.  The issur of cooking on Yomtov for a weekday only applies, then, if you cook right before the end of yomtov, when it is impossible for guests to come and eat.

Pikuach Nefesh is Docheh Shabbos.  If there were a sick person who needed whatever the Mekosheish was being mekosheish, it would be muttar- indeed a mitzvah- to do it.  So why don't we apply the rule of Ho'il?  As long as what the mechallel Shabbos is doing might possibly be necessary to save a choleh, he should be pattur.

Tosfos asks this question in two places.  
First, it's important to see the Gemara in Menachos 64a

דאיתמר שמע שטבע תינוק בים ופרש מצודה להעלות דגים והעלה דגים חייב להעלות דגים והעלה דגים ותינוק רבא אמר חייב ורבה אמר פטור ועד כאן רבה לא קא פטר אלא כיון דשמע אמרי'  נמי דעתיה אתינוק אבל לא שמע לא ואיכא דאמרי א"ל היינו פלוגתייהו דרבה ורבא דאיתמר (לא) שמע שטבע תינוק בים ופרש מצודה להעלות דגים והעלה דגים חייב להעלות דגים והעלה תינוק ודגים רבה אמר פטור ורבא אמר חייב רבה אמר פטור זיל בתר מעשיו ורבא אמר חייב זיל בתר מחשבתו 

A.  In Menachos 64a Tosfos DH Le'haalos he says

להעלות  דגים והעלה דגים ותינוק:  לא דמי לאופה מיו״ט לחול דבפרק אלו  עוברין דפטרינן מטעם הואיל ומקלעי ליה אורחין ונימא  הכא נמי הואיל ופטר ליה אתינוק פטור נמי אדגים דהתם הוא דאפייתו חזיא לצורך יו״ט אבל הכא צידת דגים לא חזיא בשבת

He seems to mean that ho'il only helps when there is one act and one result, but if the one act had two results, and one of the results is not excused by the ho'il, then he is chayav.

B.  In Pesachim 46b Tosfos says 

א"כ ביטלת כל מלאכת שבת הואיל וראוי לחולה שיש בו סכנה וי"ל  כיון דלא שכיח כלל לא אמרינן הואיל

Here, Tosfos simply says that ho'il won't work where the excuse-event is extremely unlikely.  This is similar to the Tosfos' (Gittin 33a) teretz on hasra'as safek because you might be sho'eil.

The two teirtuzim are completely different and have different ramifications le'halacha.

II

Question two:
Let's assume that Ho'il does not apply to Melacha on Shabbos.  Even so, there ought to be a way to kasher chillul Shabbos.
If a person was willfully mechallel Shabbos, and as it turned out, the fruit of his chillul Shabbos was actually needed to save someone's life, such that if he hadn't done the melacha, it would have been a mitzva to do it, is he pattur?  Does this circumstance, which the malefactor was not aware of but which did exist at the time of the chillul kasher his chillul Shabbos, or does pikuach nefesh require awareness of the hetter to be invoked?  Is unwitting pikuach nefesh docheh Shabbos?

PLEASE note that Questions one and two are different.  Question one is why doesn't ho'il patter chillul Shabbos: in other words, regardless of whether the fruit of the melacha was needed, the possibility that it might be needed is enough to allow bishul on Yomtov, and so why doesn't the possibility it might be needed for pikuach nefesh allow most melachos on Shabbos.  Question two is, assuming there's no din of Ho'il on Shabbos, what if in fact someone ran into the house of the mechallel Shabbos and said "Baruch Hashem you cooked soup, because Shmerel the Choleh is dying for chicken soup!"  Would this excuse the sheigitz that cooked the soup?

The discussion among the Achronim regarding Question two is as follows.

A.  Rav Yosef Dovid Zintsheim (in his Yad Dovid on Menachos, available from Machon Yerushalayim,) writes that this hangs on the Machlokes Rabba and Rava in Menachos 64a (that we brought down in Section I,) and that according to Rabba, if you end up using the cooked food for the sick person, the chillul Shabbos will be kashered.  In other words, it will lemafrei'a not be called chillul.

B.  Reb Meir Simcha (Ohr Sameiach 2 Shabbos 16) modifies this slightly, and says that Rabba in the Gemara in Menachos is only saying he's pattur from Skila, that there won't be missas beis din, but certainly the person needs kapara no less than the woman in "va'hashem yislach lah," in Nazir 23a, where the Gemara says that a person who thought the food was treif and ate it anyway, and it turned out it was kosher, this person needs kapara and even is chayav Makkas Mardus.

C.  Reb Meir Don Plotzki (Kli Chemda in Vayechi) says that Rabba in the Gemara in Menachos is only saying he does not/can not bring a Korban for a Shogeig, but even Rabba agrees that the malefactor is chayav Missas Beis Din, or at least Kareis. 

What a difference between Reb Meir Simcha and RMDP!

D.  Reb Elchonon in Kovetz Shiurim Pesachim 193, to Daf 46b, says that the machlokes whether you say Ho'il is whether you go after the act, which might be justified, or the kavana, which is to use it after yomtov. He says that according to Rav Chisda that you don't say ho'il, even if guests come you'll remain chayv. BUT he brings the Meiri there, who says that even according to Rav Chisda, who doesn't hold of Ho'il, if guests do show up he's pattur; the same would apply to Shabbos and Pikuach Nefesh.  (Don't tell me that there's a difference between cooking on Yomtov and pikuach nefesh on Shabbos.  The Gemara in Pesachim 47b makes it clear that the rationale of Ho'il applies to cases of Dechiya.)  In any case, Reb Elchonon disagrees with the Meiri.

III
Question two has an interesting permutation.  Borer, separating good from bad, is muttar only if you are going to eat/use the good now.  If you are putting it away for another time, e.g., you are being borer Friday night for use at Seuda Shlishis, that is pure Borer and is Chillul Shabbos.  Reb Yosef Chaim of Baghdad (Rav P'alim OC 1:12) discusses a case where the person was borer good from bad to eat later, but then he changed his  mind and ate it right away.  Pattur or Chayav?  Also, what if he was borer to eat right away, but then didn't.  Pattur or Chayav?  You can see that the issue is similar.

A.  Rav Yosef Chaim says that all that matters is what he was intending when he did the breira.  Unlike Yomtov, there is a din of M'leches Machsheves on Shabbos.  This rule can apply to say that if he did the melacha with the intent that is part of the definition of the melacha, then it is a melacha, and nothing that happens later will change that.  Furthermore, this case is not exactly like the Gemara in Menachos.  In Menachos, what he did was an act that was muttar, although he did not know it.  Here, the act is assur.  What he does later does not change the nature of the act retroactively.

B.  He says that if not for this answer, we would have a conundrum.  How can any borer be chayav when the rule of Ho'il would say that since he might eat it right away, it should be muttar whether he does or doesn't eat it now.  Tosfos in Pesachim will not help us, because this is obviously not uncommon.  We must say, therefore, that Ho'il is totally inapplicable to Shabbos, because the rule of M'leches Machsheves defines the melacha on the basis of intent, irrespective of what he could have planned and what might happen.

C.  I have a little trouble understanding what he is saying.  As I understand it, the cases where Boreir is muttar are based on Derech Achila.  Derech Achila requires intent at that moment.  If the intent was not as Derech Achila, nothing you do later will matter.  Conversely, if the intent was Derech Achila, it doesn't matter whether you ate or did not eat.  

IV
There was a Rov in Chicago many years ago by the name of Rabbi Yosef Kagan.   He was a grandson of the Chafetz Chaim, whose daughter married a man named Kagan, just like her own name.  He was a great talmid chacham, but was not the type to seek out people to talk to.  In 1961 he printed a little sefer called עיוני הלכה והגיונות, and one of the divrei Torah is on our sugya.  He also talks about how Meleches Machsheves plays out in the Gemara in Menachos.  He reads the following into the Binyan Shlomo: that even Rava who holds that one who caught fish and saved a drowning child is chayav, that is only when he intended to catch fish and he caught fish, and the child was not what he had in mind.  Only then does Rava hold that Meleches Machsheves makes him chayav.  But if he cooked something to eat on Shabbos, and it turned out to be needed by a choleh, everyone would agree that he is pattur.  To the omniscient view, his entire act was muttar.  Only where he also caught fish, or by korbanos, where the din of Hiddur requires awareness of Hiddur, does Rava argue.  He then uses Meleches Machsheves just like Rav Yosef Chaim, to eliminate Ho'il from Shabbos calculations.  He  reads this pshat into the Tosfos there DH L'haalos.

V
The Gemara in Pesachim 47b asks, if we use Ho'il, then why is a person who plows on Yomtov chayav?  Plowing would be muttar if he were doing it to turn over soil to use for Kisui HaDam, so even if he's doing it for a different reason, ho'il should be mattir- Ho'il if he were to shecht a bird he would need it for kisui, under which circumstances charisha would be muttar.

Tosfos brings that the Rashbam understands the Gemara to mean that Charisha for Kisui is a Melacha She'eina Tzricha LeGufa.  If he would use the dirt for Kisui, it would turn out that the Charisha was muttar because it was a Melacha She'eina Tzricha LeGufa.  The R'i argues on the Rashbam.  He says that if you say "Ho'il that I could have done it as an eina tzricha legufa it would be muttar, so it's muttar now too," then "ביטלת כל מלאכת שבת" once again.  So Tosfos says a different pshat.  But this leaves us to wonder, why indeed don't you say a hetter of Ho'il on all melachos Shabbos, Ho'il I could end up using the fruit of the melacha in a way that makes the melacha eina tzricha le'gufa?

Reb Meir Simcha in the Ohr Sameach (1 Yomtov 7, last paragraph) says an amazing yesod:
Ho'il works only when in either case it is a melacha, but in the ho'il case, it is a melacha that is muttar.  But kavana of eina tzricha le'gufa is not a melacha at all; what you did was a melacha, and ho'il cannot reclassify what you did as a non-melacha.

Perhaps we can say the same thing to explain why ho'il won't work to be mattir on the basis of using it for a choleh.  It could be that just like hana'a from a mitzva is not called hana'a, so too, melacha for a choleh is not in the hagdara of melacha at all.  Ho'il cannot take a melacha and make it into a non-melacha.  I know this is highly debatable, but if Rav Shach's Avi Ezri can be full of svaros like this, why can't I say them once in a while?

VI
Reb Akiva Eiger in Tshuvos 5, Chasam Sofer in Tshuvos 79.  If you've gotten this far, look them up yourself.


Addition June 2015
VII
I just realized that this question is directly related to something we had once written about- Reb Shlomo Zalman's warning about which doctor should do pikuach nefesh on Shabbos.  The tzushtell is good, but it causes so many problems that I think we have no choice but to accept the svara from Reb Meir Simcha above in V and II B.

This is what I had in the other piece, which is relevant to this discussion.Regarding פקוח נפש on Shabbos, Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach  zt”l's psak is quoted by HaRav Yehoshua Yeshaya Neuwirth zt”l as follows:  (SSK 32:130)

ושמעתי מהגרש"ז אוירבעך זצ"ל , דנראה דעדיף טפי לעשות המלאכה ע"י שומר מצוות שכוונתו למצווה, כי ע"י עבריין אשר כוונתו רק עבור בצע כסף, אע"ג דקעביד מצוה, מ"מ הו"ל כנתכוין לבשר חזיר ועלה בידו בשר טלה, דמבואר בקידושין לב. תוד"ה דמחיל, דגם ע"ז יש משום "ולפני עור" וגם אפשר דבני"ד גרע טפי, כיון שבאמת יש כאן חילול שבת, ויתכן שהרופא נחשב כאינו מחלל שבת רק אם כוונתו להצלה ולא אם מכוון  לתשלום, וראה גם בספר בית הלוי עה"ת פרשת שמות. על הפסוק ״וירא אלוקים את בני ישראל״ל

Here is the Beis Halevi:

שמות, ד"ה וירא

ומזה יצא למי שהיא פרוץ באחת ממצות ה׳ , אע״נ דלפעמים נתרחש לו אונס שלא יכול לקיימה מ״מ לא מקרי אונס  וכמו בשמירת שבת ונדומה דלפעמים אנוס הוא לעשות מלאכה או עבור חולה ר״ל וכדומה מ״מ לא מקרי אונס רק לאותם שהיו שומרים אותו אם לא היה האונס, אבל המחלל שבת כשאינו אנוס, גם במלאכה שהוא אנוס מקרי מחלל, וכן הוא בכל האיסורים

As we (not the royal we; I refer to the numerous contributors to that particular piece,) discussed, it is clear that RSZ is saying that the hetter of Pikuach Nefesh requires that the motivating intent is to save a life.  Where the motive is self-interest, it appears that there is no hetter of pikuach nefesh even where a life is saved.  Obviously, this is a shocking chiddush, which we discussed there at length.  But as far as the question of the day, according to RSZ, you couldn't kasher chillul Shabbos.  The hetter of dechiyah only applies where the melacha was done with the intent of saving a life.  Why?  We have to say like Reb Meir Simcha, despite all the problems it causes.

Shlach. Reb Yerucham on the Meraglim

I heard a strong vort in Reb Yerucham's name.  Everyone is perplexed by the fall of the Meraglim, the greatest in the Dor Dei'ah, a fall of מאיגרא רמא לבירא עמיקתא.  On the other hand, you have Rachav, who was, as Reb Yerucham puts it, the lowest of the low.  Rachav realized that the Ribono shel Olam would give victory to His people, and that they were a nation to whom to cleave.  She became such a tzadeikes that Yehoshua, who could have married the biggest meyucheses in Klal Yisrael, davka wanted her for a wife.  What a contrast between precipitous fall from heaven to hell and a instantaneous ascent in the opposite direction!  You can even imagine that their neshamos passed each other in the elevator shaft.

Reb Yerucham says that every farmer knows that the most vigorous and beautiful tree that has a speck of rot deep inside is doomed.  The tree might be beautiful and vigorous, but if rot has taken hold in the heartwood, the beauty and vigor and majesty of the tree do not matter at all.  On the other hand, you can have the most putrid decayed material, but if there's a seed that has sprouted in it, all the decay will be absorbed into a flourishing and beautiful tree.

It doesn't matter who you are.  What matters is whether there is a spot of rot in your heart, or if you are planting seeds of growth in emuna and yiras shamayim.

Here are Reb Yerucham's words.

לעומת זה רואים אנו ברחב הזונה, שלבד מה שהכניסה עצמה בסכנה גדולה בהצפינה את המרגלים, כי לו לא היו מאמינים לה ומחפשים, הלא היה אחת דתה להמית, אלא שהיתה כל כך בטוחה בנצחון של ישראל כאילו היה זה דבר שנתהוה כבר. וכל זה בא לה מזה ששמעה אודות קריעת ים סוף ומלחמת סיחון ועוג. וזה הספיק לה כבר בכדי שלא לנטות אפילו במשהו מהדרך הישר, שהכל היה כל כך ברור אצלה כשמש בצהרים, ששוב אין להסתפק בזה כלל

ויש לנו כאן מחזה מול מחזה, מצד אחד המרגלים, המסולתין שבישראל, עדי ראיה של כל האותות והמופתים והגילויים שביציאת מצרים, ואף על פי כן מה"בא לטמא" שתבעם הכתוב לפי מדרגתם הרמה נכשלו וטעו. ולעומת זה רחב הזונה והטמאה, גויה פשוטה, לא ראתה ולא ידעה כלום, ואף על פי כן מה"בא לטהר" שלה, מה"כי שמענו" הגיעה לאמונה כל כך חזקה עד כגון מעשה זה... (דעת תורה דברים עמוד צ) צ

Shlach: Three Easy Pieces

All three pieces in this post are associated to some extent with the Kli Yakar.  

I

Synopsis:

Human humility and honest self awareness are congruous.

Godly Humility: How we can describe Hashem as having the apparent trait of humility.

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Bamidbar Shlach 12:3, Moshe was more humble than any man on the face of the earth.

1.  It has been noted that  if you were to ask Moshe Rabbeinu "Who is the most humble man on earth?"  He would respond "I am."  He wrote it in the Torah because Hashem told him to, and he knew it was true, and that it was a praiseworthy and unprecedented achievement to have reached that madreiga of humility.  Bishlema his yedi'as hatorah, of course he knew was far beyond any other man.  But to be aware that you are the most humble of men seems to be self-contradictory.  In fact, however, this awareness did not diminish his humility at all:

Similarly, the Gemara (end of Sotah, 49b), Reb Yosef's ve'ha  ika ana, where the Mishnah says that with the death of Rebbi, humility died.  Reb Yosef protested, but what of me?  (Of course, some interpret the "Ana" in Rav Yosef's statement as referring not to himself but to some other Tanna who was famously humble.  This is not pashut pshat in the Gemara.)

Here is a famous example:

Reb Chatzkel Abramsky, the Av Beis Din in London from 1934 to 1951, a talmid of Reb Chaim Brisker, and author of the great Chazon Yechezkel on Tosefta, was was once sued by a shochet who claimed he had been fired unfairly.  As his testimony began, his attorney asked him to state his name and his position. The attorney then asked, "Is it true that you are the greatest halachic authority in the United Kingdom?  Rav Abramsky said, "Yes. That is true."

At that point the judge interjected and said, "Rabbi Abramsky, do your laws and ethics not teach you to be humble?  Would you not say that this is somewhat haughty on your part?  Rav Abramsky responded, "Yes, we are taught to be humble. But I am under oath."

So it is an inescapable fact a man can know he is humble, and remain humble.

But if humility means knowing that you are no better than anyone else, how do we explain this?  He knew he was a tzadik in anivus, and that anivus is the key to a relationship with the Ribono shel Olam!

• Life is not a sports event.  In a race, you are judged by comparing your position to that of others, irrespective of the competitors disparate natural talents.  Perhaps life is similar, and we are judged by comparison with others: see, e.g., the machlokes Rav and Shmuel by Noach Tzadik Tamim Hayah Bedorosav.  But the score is based on how close you have gotten to your tafkid, to your personal potential.  Your primary competition is your perfect self.  Moshe, knowing his flaws and failures, was humble.  He knew that he was not where he ought to be.  This awareness of his flaws and his regret for his failures meant that he was humble.  His humility was simply a matter of honest self awareness.  Nobody can be proud of an unflinching awareness of his failings.  
• Kesef Mishna: Awareness of the greatness of other creations of Hashem makes you realize the vast chasm that separates you from perfection makes renders utterly trivial any superiority you may have over others human beings.  (Kesef Mishna in 4 Yesodei Hatorah 12.)
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2.  Rav Yosef, earlier in Sotah, says that you always find that Hashem appears with anivus.  Although Hashem is "clothed with Gei'us," that is only His 'garb,' but within that garb, Hashem chooses the middah of Anivus.  Hashem, says Rav Yosef, chose Har Sinai and the Sneh to demonstrate that anivus.  How is anivus shayach by Hashem?  

That is the other part of anivus: appreciating the good qualities of others, irrespective of what you are, or of what others are.  A small mountain, a thornbush, have qualities of their own.  Respecting those qualities and loving the thing or person who has them is a form of anivus as well.  See, for example, how the Ruach Chaim explains this in Avos 4:1.

The Kli Yakar (first piece in Mikeitz, Breishis 41:1) begins with another Gemara (Megilla 31a) that associates the Ribono shel Olam with the Middah of Anivus, and explains it as follows:

 אמר רבי יוחנן, כל מקום שאתה מוצא גבורתו של הקדוש ברוך הוא, אתה מוצא ענוותנותו, דבר זה כתוב בתורה ושנוי בנביאים ומשולש בכתובים, כתוב בתורה, כי ה' אלהיכם הוא אלהי האלהים ואדוני האדונים, וכתיב בתריה, עושה משפט יתום ואלמנה, שנוי בנביאים כה אמר רם ונשא שוכן עד וקדוש וגו', וכתיב בתריה, ואת דכא ושפל רוח, משולש בכתובים, דכתיב סולו לרוכב בערבות ביה שמו, וכתיב בתריה אבי יתומים ודיין אלמנות   בנוהג שבעולם, שאדם שיש לו איזו מעלה יתר שאת על חבירו, אינו זוכר את חבירו הקטן מערכו, ובל ישא את שמו על שפתיו, מצד רום לבבו, וזו היא טענת הפילוסופים על השי"ת לאמר שלגודל רוממותו ית' אינו משגיח בשפלים בכל מה שתחת גלגל הירח, ולבטל דיעה נפסדה זו נאמר (ש"א ב ג) אל תרבו תדברו גבוה גבוה יצא עתק מפיכם כי אל דיעות ה' ולו נתכנו עלילות, ר"ל אל תדברו שמצד שהקב"ה גבוה מעל כל גבוהים אין לו ידיעה בפרטי מעשינו, כי אל דעות ה' שיש לו ידיעה בכולם ולו נתכנו כל עלילות מעשה איש. וכדי לאמת דבר זה שהקב"ה שוכן את דכא ושפל רוח, צירף הקב"ה בשמו הגדול ית' ארבע אותיות של מספר מועט יותר מכל האותיות שבאלפ"א ביתא, כשתכתוב יו"ד ה"א וי"ו ה"א הסתכל בכל האותיות כשתכתבם במלואם לא תמצא שום אות שיעלה למספר מועט כמו אלו. וכן אמרו רז"ל (מגילה יא.) א"ר יוחנן כל מקום שאתה מוצא גדולתו של הקב"ה שם אתה מוצא ענותנותו כו' מן הכתובים שנאמר (תהלים סח ה) סולו לרוכב בערבות ביה שמו, ר"ל שבחוהו ביה שמו כי עם היותו רוכב בערבות גבוה מכל אע"פ כן יה שמו, שהם האותיות הקטנים במספר והתיבה רק בעלת שני אותיות דהיינו המועט בצירוף האותיות וכל זה מופת על ענותנותו ית.

So, there are two aspects of anivus:

Awareness and hyper-criticism of one's own flaws, irrespective of whether you are ahead or behind others.

Appreciation and respect for others, irrespective of their flaws and humble state.

The idea of appreciation and respect for others is how the Netziv in our parsha explains Anivus by the Ribono shel Olam as well.  

I'm putting in a piece from the Gemara in Sotah 5a, for several reasons.  It talks about the repugnance of Ga'ava and the beauty of humility, and because it reiterates the idea of Hashem's middah of Anivus, but mostly because of the wonderful line about B'shamta if you do and B'shamta if you don't, which the Rambam brings in his pirush to Avos (4:4), and which we discuss more fully vis a vis the Ma'apilim, here.

א"ר אלעזר כל אדם שיש בו גסות הרוח ראוי לגדעו כאשירה כתיב הכא (ישעיהו י) ורמי הקומה גדועים וכתיב התם (דברים ז) ואשיריהם תגדעון וא"ר אלעזר כל אדם שיש בו גסות הרוח אין עפרו ננער שנא' (ישעיהו כו) הקיצו ורננו שכני עפר שכבי בעפר לא נאמר אלא שכני עפר מי שנעשה שכן לעפר בחייו ואמר ר' אלעזר כל אדם שיש בו גסות הרוח שכינה מיללת עליו שנאמר (תהילים קלח) וגבוה ממרחק יידע דרש רב עוירא ואיתימא רבי אלעזר בא וראה שלא כמדת הקב"ה מדת בשר ודם מדת בשר ודם גבוה רואה את הגבוה ואין גבוה רואה את השפל אבל מדת הקב"ה אינו כן הוא גבוה ורואה את השפל שנא' (תהילים קלח) כי רם ה' ושפל יראה אמר רב חסדא ואיתימא מר עוקבא כל אדם שיש בו גסות הרוח אמר הקב"ה אין אני והוא יכולין לדור בעולם שנא' (תהילים קא) מלשני בסתר רעהו אותו אצמית גבה עינים ורחב לבב אותו לא אוכל אל תקרי אותו אלא אתו לא אוכל איכא דמתני לה אמספרי לשון הרע שנא' מלשני בסתר רעהו אותו אצמית א"ר אלכסנדרי כל אדם שיש בו גסות הרוח אפילו רוח קימעא עוכרתו שנאמר (ישעיהו נז) והרשעים כים נגרש ומה ים שיש בו כמה רביעיות רוח קימעא עוכרתו אדם שאין בו אלא רביעית אחת עאכ"ו א"ר חייא בר אשי אמר רב ת"ח צריך שיהא בו אחד משמונה בשמינית א"ר הונא בריה דרב יהושע ומעטרא ליה כי סאסא לשבולתא אמר רבא בשמתא דאית ביה ובשמתא דלית ביה א"ר נחמן בר יצחק לא מינה ולא מקצתה מי זוטר דכתיב ביה (משלי טז) תועבת ה' כל גבה לב

II

Kli Yakar: Tzitzis- tcheiles like sea, like sky, like kisei hakavod- from Yalkut Shimoni in Haazinu:  The turbulent, restless sea always tries to break the rules and inundate the earth, but Hashem stops it.  The placid sky goes about its work with calm determination.  Same idea here- yiras onesh and ahava.  First, like Sea, which stays in bounds because of fear of Hashem's judgment.  Then like Sky, which does its work because it is the right thing to do.  Then you can come to the kisei hakavod.


III
Kli Yakar: Yom LeShana, a day for each year; in that this refers to the punishment for the Meraglim, it should be written the opposite way, Shana le'yom.  He explains that the term has a dual meaning.  Of course it means they were sentenced to wander in the desert for forty years (minus fifteen days, as explained here), one year for each day of the willful blindness of the Meraglim.  But “yom” also refers to Tisha Ba’av.  There will be one day every year that you re-experience the tzaros that resulted from what you have done here.

Postscript.
There was a man named William Temple, a Bishop of the Church of England, who happened to be a Judeophile and friend of Chief Rabbi Hertz.  He once said an interesting thing:
Humility does not mean thinking less of yourself than of other people, nor does it mean having a low opinion of your own gifts.  It means freedom from thinking about yourself at all.  

Since I wrote about humility, and that many people misunderstand it, I have to write the famous mussar joke about anivus.  A new bachur comes into Navoradok and sits down to learn mussar with hispa'alus, and begins to cry and moan "oy, I am nobody, I am nothing...."  An older bachur nudges his friend, and says "Look who thinks he's nobody."

And let us remember Winston Churchill's instructive observation, if only to eschew it.  Churchill once said "Yes, Man is but a worm, but I think that perhaps I am a glow-worm."



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