Aharon's Kehuna was Only Possible Because of Elisheva.

The She'iltos in this week's parsha begins with a reminder of the great potential of a good shidduch.  He says that one benefit is the access to an additional source of Zechus Avos, and another is a mother's predominant role in her child's middos and spirituality. 

This is particularly relevant to our parsha because of 6:23, "Aharon married Elisheva bas Aminadav the sister of Nachshon," Rashi brings the Gemara (BB 110a) that derives from this passuk that the mother is the source of a person's middos.

בבא בתרא ק"י. 

אמר רבא: הנושא אשה צריך שיבדוק באחיה, שנאמר: 'ויקח אהרן את אלישבע בת עמינדב אחות נחשון', ממשמע שנאמר 'בת עמינדב' איני יודע שאחות נחשון היא? מה תלמוד לומר 'אחות נחשון'. מכאן, שהנושא אשה צריך שיבדוק באחיה. תנא: רוב בנים דומין לאחי האם

Based on the ibn Ezra, briefly here and at length in Tetzaveh, Rav Shternbuch says that the fact that Aharon was zocheh to Kehuna was in large part because of who he married - and that the negative is true as well: The reason Moshe was not zocheh to any kind of gadlus that goes over with yerusha is because he married someone that was not like Elisheva. 

He brings the ibn Ezra in Teztavah, Shemos 28:1.

ואתה הקרב אליך את אהרן אחיך ואת בניו אתו מתוך בני ישראל לכהנו לי (כ"ח , א)

כתב הראב"ע : וכבר רמזתי לך למה נבחר אהרן להקדישו לשם, בעבור כבוד משפחת נחשון שיהיו הבנים מכפרים על בני ישראל.

Rav Sternbuch expands on the ibn Ezra, and says

טעם זה של הראב"ע יש לפרש כי מרומז הוא בפסוק עצמו. כי לכאורה יתמה הרואה, מה ענין אשתו של אהרן לכאן , וכי מפני שאשתו של אהרן היא אחות נחשון , עדיף אהרן על פני משה רבנו שאשתו היא בת יתרו ברם, הכהונה זכה בה אהרן לדורותיו אחריו , וכל זרעו לעולם כהנים מכהנים בהיכל ה', ומכפרים על בני ישראל. והנה הממלאים את ידם לכהן משפיעים רב טוב וברכה לבית ישראל, כי הכהונה יסודה ממדת החסד, ולכן צריכים הכהנים להיות מצויינים במדה זו. 

אדם יורש את מדותיו מאמו, וכמו שאמרו חז"ל שרוב בנים דומים לאחי האם לכן הכהונה תלויה לא רק באהרן הכהן. אלא גם באשתו, שמעלתה משלימה למעלתו של אהרן הכהן, שיהיו כל זרעם אחריהם ראויים לכבוד הגדול הזה.

זה מה שנרמז בפסוק . "ואתה הקרב אליך את אהרן אחיך ואת בניו אתו", כי לפיכך נבחר אהרן דוקא ולא משה, מפני שגם בניו אתו בכלל בחירת הכהונה, ולכן צריכים הם להיות ראויים גם מצד אמם

When R Sternbuch said that this is alluded to in the passuk itself (מרומז הוא בפסוק עצמו), he's got to be referring to our passuk in 6:23, because that's the only place where it mentions Elisheva and her brother

ויקח אהרן את אלישבע בת עמינדב אחות נחשון לו לאשה ותלד לו את נדב ואת אביהוא את אלעזר ואת איתמר    

and the Ibn Ezra here says

[ו, כג]

ויקח - הזכיר אשת אהרן בעבור כבוד אלעזר והזכיר אחות נחשון בעבור כבוד הכהונה. 

Also, Medrash

ג. 

ד"א "רְאוּ קָרָא ה' בְּשֵׁם בְּצַלְאֵל בֶּן אוּרִי בֶן חוּר" מה ראה להזכיר כאן חור אלא בשעה שביקשו ישראל לעבוד עבודת כוכבים נתן נפשו על הקב"ה ולא הניחן עמדו והרגוהו אמר לו הקב"ה חייך שאני פורע לך משל למלך שמרדו עליו לגיונותיו עמד שר הצבא שלו ונלחם עמהם אמר להם על המלך אתם מורדים עמדו והרגו אותו אמר המלך אילו ממון נתן לא הייתי צריך לפרוע לו עאכ"ו שנפשו נתן עלי מה אני עושה לו אלא כל בנים שיצאו ממנו אני מעמידם דוכסים ואפרכים כך בשעה שעשו ישראל העגל עמד חור ונתן נפשו על הקב"ה אמר לו חייך כל בנים היוצאים ממך אני מגדלם שם טוב בעולם שנאמר "רְאוּ קָרָא ה' בְּשֵׁם בְּצַלְאֵל [וגו'] וַיְמַלֵּא אוֹתוֹ רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים" ולא זה בלבד אלא כל מי שנתעסק במלאכת המשכן נתן בו הקב"ה חכמה ובינה ודעת שנאמר (שמות לו, ח): "ויעשו כל חכם לב" ולא בבני אדם אלא אפי' בבהמה ובחיה שנאמר (שם, א) "חכמה ותבונה בָּהֵמָּה" בְּהֵמָה כתיב שנתנה חכמה באדם ובבהמה ולא נתפרסם מכלם אלא בצלאל הוי "קָרָא ה' בְּשֵׁם בְּצַלְאֵל":

ד. 

וכל השבח הזה מנין לו? משבט יהודה. ומהיכן זכה לכל החכמה הזאת? בזכות מרים שנאמר (שמות א, כא): "ויעש להם בתים" ומה היו הבתים בית הכהונה ובית המלכות יוכבד נטלה כהונה ומלכות אהרן כ"ג משה מלך שנאמר (דברים לג, ה): "ויהי בישורון מלך" ומרים נטלה חכמה שהעמידה בצלאל ויצא ממנו דוד שהיה מלך שנאמר (דה"א ב, יט): "ותלד לו (אפרת) את חור" וכתיב (ש"א יז, יב): "ודוד בן איש אפרתי" שבא מן מרים שנקראת אפרת.

The Medrash seems to be saying that the zechus to have malchus or kehuna was achieved by the family's matriarchs.  Malchus and Kehuna express themselves patrilineally, but they were achieved, they were earned, by women.


For what it's worth, here's my opinion. All the above, even "מהיכן זכה," and even "רוב בנים דומין לאחי האם", does not necessarily mean that Elisheva or Miriam were the source of their descendants' particular type of gadlus. There are too many places that Chazal say that it was Aharon's or Yehuda's qualities that made them who they were. But while the men embodied the qualities that entitled them to be the great progenitors of Kehuna and Malchus, their wives brought the ability to engender in their descendants middos and spirituality that would naturally echo those sublime qualities. The point is that some people have a natural predilection for certain behaviors. Yaakov and Eisav were born different. Some people naturally take to a spiritual and empathetic life, while others do not. The mother alone ensured that the child would have a natural propensity for a matarah elokis.

But I can see that one might disagree with me on this.


The inimitable Ibn Ezra (28:21) says that Moshe Rabbeinu's choice of a woman who was unfit to be the progenitor of malchus or kehuna was sad, but one may not criticize him for doing so. "He was a refugee, who was going to give him a nice Jewish girl?" 
He adds that another reason Moshe Rabbeinu's descendants were not granted gadlus as a yerusha was that Moshe Rabbeinu had to teach Torah to all of Klal Yisrael, and he was too busy to be a father to his own children.

ואתה. בעבור היות משה כהן הכהנים בתחלה. על כן טעם הקרב אליך. וכבר רמזתי לך למה נבחר אהרן להקדישו לשם בעבור כבוד משפחת נחשון. שיהיו הכהנים מכפרים על בני ישראל. ואין לדבר על משה אדוננו כי בורח היה ומי יתן לו עברית. ועוד כי טורח כל ישראל על משה ללמדם המצות ולדון כל דבר קשה.

All of this seems very harsh and seems to denigrate Tziporah. But in fact, Tziporah was an unimaginably great woman. She was referred to as Kushis (Bamidbar 12:1) because of her extraordinary righteousness (MK 16b.) Although the Ibn Ezra famously explains Kushis very differently, there is no reason to say he disagrees with Chazal's presentation of her as a tzadeikes. She willingly took her children and left the safety of her father's house to go with Moshe to Mitzrayim, the Beis Avadim, where he was a wanted man. She was mal Eliezer, or had the milah done, to save him and Moshe Rabbeinu.  I think the ibn Ezra just means to point out that she was not an equal of Elisheva. Elisheva was among the greatest, on the level of Yocheved and Miriam. according to Shmuel in Sotah 11b.

Va'eira, Shemos 6:12. The Heart and the Head

Moshe Rabbeinu asked the Ribono shel Olam, what is the point of talking to Pharaoh?  If the Jews did not listen to me, certainly Pharaoh will not listen to me.
Rebbi Yishmael in the Medrash (Rabbah Breishis 92)tells us that this is one of the ten kal vachomers in Tanach.  These are:

בראשית מד:     הן כסף וגו' השיבנו אליך   ק"ו   ואיך נגנב

שמות ו:     הן בני ישראל לא שמעו אלי   וק"ו   ואיך ישמעני פרעה

 במדבר יב:     ויאמר ה' אל משה ואביה ירוק ירק בפניה    ק"ו   לשכינה י"ד יום

דברים לא:     הן בעודני חי עמכם היום ממרים הייתם    ק"ו   ואף כי אחרי מותי

ירמיהו יב:     כי את רגלים רצתה וילאוך    ק"ו   ואיך תתחרה את הסוסים

שם:     ובארץ שלום אתה בוטח    וק"ו   ואיך תעשה בגאון הירדן

שמואל א כג:     הנה אנחנו פה ביהודה יראים    וק"ו   ואף כי נלך קעילה

משלי יא:     הן צדיק בארץ ישולם    ק"ו   ואף כי רשע וחוטא

אסתר ט:     ויאמר המלך לאסתר המלכה בשושן הבירה וגו'    וק"ו   בשאר מדינות המלך מה עשו

יחזקאל טו:     הנה בהיותו תמים לא יעשה למלאכה    ק"ו   אף כי אש אכלתהו ויחר

 (Obviously there are many more, starting with Breisihis 4:24,כי שבעתים יקם קין ולמך שבעים ושבעה.  The mefarshim there offer numerous explanations about what distinguishes these ten, but מקום הניחו לך להתגדר/להתגדל.)

Reb Elya Lopian, in the Lev Eliahu, addresses the question that everyone asks.  This kal vachomer does not seem to work.  The reason the Bnei Yisroel didn’t listen was (6:9) “מקוצר רוח ומעבודה קשה", because they were exhausted mentally and physically from their demeaning servitude and endless hard labor.  If so, the kal vachomer is not valid, because these problems did not apply to Pharaoh.  He answers that the Bnai Yisroel did accept Moshe Rabbeinu's nevu'ah when he told them about the geula (4:31.)  It was only when things got worse that they lost their faith (6:9)  when they suffered.  This shows that they did accept it intellectually, but that it did not penetrate their hearts.  If so, Moshe’s kal vachomer was good; if this lack of heartfelt faith ended their trust, then Pharaoh, with his wicked heart, certainly would not accept it at all, despite what his intellect would tell him.  When it comes to belief, to conviction, the heart is stronger than the mind.

                Reb Elya brings down a wonderful vort from Reb Yitzhock Blazer: the distance between וידעת היום, and והשבת אל לבבך is far greater than the distance between is far greater than the distance between לא ידעת and ידעת.    My father zatzal, a  talmid of Slabodka in Litteh, used to say this about the passuk in Krias Shma.   והיו הדברים האלה אשר אנכי מצוך היום על לבבך.  The most important thing is that after you hear and understand something intellectually, you must keep it on top of your heart.  Every Jew has a moment that his heart softens, and at that moment, what he knows will penetrate his heart and then he will truly know it.

This brings to mind R Yisroel Salanter’s advice to the person who asked what to learn in the only fifteen minutes he had available, because the point there is that the kotzer ru’ach will be come like earmuffs and blinders, and you won’t see what you otherwise would.  Mussar is the antidote to kotzer ru’ach and avoda kasha.

My son Shlomo sheyichyeh used this in a drasha in January ‘04/Shvat ‘64.  He said
                In Brisk once, a wealthy exporter put all his money into a shipment that was loaded on a boat.  The boat, unfortunately, sank not far from the port, and the man’s family was afraid to tell him the terrible news.  They came to the Beis Halevi, and he told them he would take care of it.  When the man came to the Beis Halevi’s shiur, he opened to the Gemora (Brachos 54) חייב אדם לברך על הרעה כשם שמברך על הטובה.  and repeated it many times, and he asked the man, What's the pshat in this Chazal?" The man asked, rebbi, I don't understand your kashe! The pshat is pashut— that a person has to know that no matter what happens to him, it is the retzon Hashem, and it is meant for his good, so he has to thank Hashem for it.  The Beis Halevi said, well, if you understand this, I have a little story to tell you.  When the man heard what happened, he fainted and didn’t recover for three days.  The Beis Halevi went to visit him, to be mevakeir choli hanefesh. The man asked him, Rebbi, I don't understand. I understand the Mishna Why did I faint? The Beis HaLevi answered him yes, it's true that you understood it fully.  But you understood it in your head, not in your heart.

He then quoted Rabbi Neuman, a Rebbi in Yeshiva of Staten Island, who said that the lesson of tefillin is that the Torah has to go from from your head, to your heart, to your hand.


Just knowing something is not at all the same as full emotional understanding. We have all experienced the difference: This is like when a person tells his best friend, or a father tells a son, close your eyes, lean back, and fall into my arms. Even if you absolutely trust the person behind you, it will be very hard to actually fall and depend on the person to catch you. Only after a few false starts can you convince your body to let go and fall into the other’s arms. It’s not enough that you know— your body has to be convinced.

Rav Eliyahu Dessler (Michtav Mei’Eliahu Vol. 5, on the avoda of Rosh Hashanna.) stresses this difference, which he categorizes as the difference between rational awareness and ‘dveikus’. He says that this journey is the avoda of Rosh Hashanna: if you properly say Malchios, Zichronos, and Shofros, you will come to devykus, which will make teshuva a foregone conclusion. If the dveykus does not lead to remorse and full teshuva for past sins, then your enthusiasm and kavana is just an ephemeral overlay, a delusion.

This applies just as well to negative or destructive beliefs or behaviors. In the Haftorah of Devorim the Navi talks about sins that are Kashanim and sins that are Katola. Both shanim and tola refer to red-dyed wool Despite their similar appearance to an observer, there is an very important difference between them. R’ Meir Simcha says that Shanim is wool that is only dyed on the surface, so teshuva can result in brilliant white like snow, whereas Tola is red through and through, and teshuva can only result in the less pristine white of Tzemer. This illustrates the difference between an act or behavior that is superficial and one that saturates the personality.

The Darash Moshe and the Ramban observe that the Meraglim in Shemos Shlach 13:3, were listed lefi gedulasam, in the order of their spiritual achievements. But strangely, we find that Yehoshua and Kaleiv are in middle of the pack. Despite the apparent superior tzidkus of the others over Yehoshua and Kalev, what mattered in the end, when faced with nisayon, was the depth of conviction, the emotional saturation, the dveikus— the hasheivosa el levavecha.

What really is the difference between yedi’ah of the mind and yedi’ah of the heart? One example: a woman may know absolutely that married women cannot go outdoors with her hair uncovered. But she might sit in mixed company and talk about private matters that concern only her and her husband. Or, strangely enough (and I’m not making this up), swim in a bathing suit at a mixed pool– with a snood covering her head to preserve her standards of modesty. People who never miss davenning in shul can let years go by without one Shmoneh Esrei in which they pour their hearts out to Hashem. What the heck are they doing there? The only possible explanation is that simply knowing something means that you know the thing and nothing more. Knowing it in your heart means that you understand and feel the underlying concept and you have made it a part of your emotional and intellectual essence. When a person has reached that level, then everything he does will subconsciously be checked for consistency with his essential belief.

And how can you tell who is a tzadik misafa v’lachutz and who is a tzadik in his pnimiyus? You can’t. Not only can’t you tell in other people, you can’t even tell in yourself. It’s like courage— you never know what you are until you are tested, as is well illustrated in Stephan Crane's The Red Badge of Courage. Not only can’t you tell, it is almost unknowable; the Torah (and Sefer Iyov) is full of stories of people who were tested, after which Hashem says “Atta yadati” that you are a real ba’al bitachon. Appearances mean little. Only after being put to the test can one know who he is.

When we put on our tefillin, let us remember this important idea, perfectly symbolized by the Shel Rosh on our head, the straps of the shel rosh that go down to our heart, the Shel Yad next to the heart, with the straps that go down to our hands: it is not enough to 'know'. Torah has has to go from your Head to your Heart to your Hands.

Pharaoh's Impenetrable Heart.

Hashem hardened Pharaoh's heart so that he would not do teshuva and release the Bnei Yisrael.  This is stated several times.  In Shemos see 3:19, ואני ידעתי כי לא יתן אתכם מלך מצרים להלך ולא ביד חזקה, in Va'eira see 7:3 ואני אקשה את לב פרעה, and in Bo, 11:1, כי אני הכבדתי את לבו. From the emphasis and the repeated explanation that it was Hashem's desire to show the world how mighty Egypt would be like a plaything to Hashem, one might think that this was a singularity, a event exclusive to that one place and time.  It is not.  The ability to do Teshuva has been taken away from other people as well and continues to be a possibility.

I don't mean to provide excuses for people that want to fool themselves into thinking they can't do teshuva.  This only happens to highly accomplished resha'im.  If  you're not a world-class achiever in something else, you probably aren't a world-class Rasha either.  To emphasize this, here is something from the Brisker Rov, (quoted by Rav Shlomo Wahrman, author of שארית יוסף and Rosh Yeshiva of Hebrew Academy of Nassau County,) in HaPardes year Year 62 number 1, 1987, to the effect that even an Amaleiki can do teshuva.

 שמעתי מהגרי״ז מבריסק דתשובה מועלת גם לעמלקים דהרי בשמואל א׳ פט״ו כתיב לך והחרמת את החטאים את עמלק

 דמבואר דהוא רק בזמן שחוטאים משא״כ כשעושים תשובה דשוב אי״ז חטאים וכדאמרה ברוריא דביתהו דר״מ בברכות (י.) עה׳׳פ יתמו חטאים מי כתיב חוטאים חטאים כתיב וכוי אלא בעי רחמי עלויהו דלהדרו בתשובה ורשעים עוד אינם.

So no matter how bad you are, unless you are worse than an Amaleiki you certainly can do teshuva.  And let's not forget Gittin 57b, 

נעמן גר תושב היה נבוזראדן גר צדק היה מבני בניו של המן למדו תורה בבני ברק מבני בניו של סיסרא למדו תינוקות בירושלים מבני בניו של סנחריב למדו תורה ברבים מאן אינון שמעיה ואבטליון

But there are people who do lose access to Teshuva.  First, the Rambam:   (6 Teshuva 3)

ואפשר שיחטא אדם חטא גדול או חטאים רבים עד שיתן הדין לפני דיין האמת שיהא הפרעון מזה החוטא על חטאים אלו שעשה ברצונו ומדעתו שמונעין ממנו התשובה ואין מניחין לו רשות לשוב מרשעו כדי שימות ויאבד בחטאו שיעשה. הוא שהקב"ה אמר על ידי ישעיהו השמן לב העם הזה וגו'. וכן הוא אומר ויהיו מלעיבים במלאכי האלהים ובוזים דבריו ומתעתעים בנביאיו עד עלות חמת ה' בעמו עד לאין מרפא. כלומר חטאו ברצונם והרבו לפשוע עד שנתחייבו למנוע מהן התשובה שהיא המרפא. לפיכך כתוב בתורה ואני אחזק את לב פרעה. לפי שחטא מעצמו תחלה והרע לישראל הגרים בארצו שנאמר הבה נתחכמה לו. נתן הדין למנוע התשובה ממנו עד שנפרע ממנו. לפיכך חזק הקב"ה את לבו. ולמה היה שולח לו ביד משה ואומר שלח ועשה תשובה וכבר אמר לו הקב"ה אין אתה משלח שנאמר ואתה ועבדיך ידעתי וגו' ואולם בעבור זאת העמדתיך. כדי להודיע לבאי העולם שבזמן שמונע הקב"ה התשובה לחוטא אינו יכול לשוב אלא ימות ברשעו שעשה בתחילה ברצונו. וכן סיחון לפי עונות שהיו לו נתחייב למונעו מן התשובה שנאמר כי הקשה ה' אלהיך את רוחו ואמץ את לבבו. וכן הכנענים לפי תועבותיהן מנע מהן התשובה עד שעשו מלחמה עם ישראל. שנאמר כי מאת ה' היתה לחזק את לבם לקראת המלחמה עם ישראל למען החרימם. וכן ישראל בימי אליהו לפי שהרבו לפשוע מנע מאותן המרבים לפשוע תשובה שנאמר ואתה הסבות את לבם אחורנית כלומר מנעת מהן התשובה. נמצאת אומר שלא גזר האל על פרעה להרע לישראל. ולא על סיחון לחטוא בארצו. ולא על הכנענים להתעיב. ולא על ישראל לעבוד עכו"ם אלא כולן חטאו מעצמן וכולן נתחייבו למנוע מהן התשובה:

מונעין ממנו התשובה ואין מניחין לו רשות לשוב מרשעו.  That means "they withhold Teshuva from him and do not let him turn away from his wickedness."

Then, Reb Yisrael Salanter:

Reb Yisrael Salanter says that in the case of a regular person, Hashem seeks his Teshuva.  But a person might fall to a point where Hashem no longer seeks his Teshuva, and even if he makes tentative steps towards teshuva he will receive no divine assistance.  Then there is the very worst possible level, where not only does he receive no assistance or encouragement, but even if he manages to push himself to try to do teshuva, Hashem makes it impossible for him to follow through.  Teshuva does not exist in this person's world.  (I'm not sure if that means that he can't do Teshuva, or if it means that even if he does Teshuva Shleimah, it will not be accepted.  After all, from Middas Hadin, Teshuva is impossible. 

Finally, I found it interesting that several Achronim (the Nesivos, Rav Bergman, and several others, with approximately the same approach) use this idea to explain the discussion between Reb Meir and Bruria in Brachos 10a.  Reb Meir held that since they were beyond teshuva, there was no point in their living, and they would be better off dead, to avoid further sins, and the world would be better without them.  Bruria taineh'd that the inability, or the loss of siyata dishmaya to do teshuva is an onesh, and for onshim you can be mispallel.  So she told Reb Meir to daven that their onesh of "no access to Teshuva" should be removed, and then maybe they could be mashpia on them to do teshuva.   Or it could be they were arguing about whether they were on level two or three of Reb Yisrael Salanter's chart.  Neither pshat, I'm sorry to say, clicks in the words of Reb Meir or Bruria.  Also, I find it hard to believe that Reb Meir had any way of knowing that they were already on the madreiga of Ein Maspikin, because then the Tzadikim of Yerushalayim who weren't mochi'ach the resha'im (Shabbos 55a) would have the same excuse.  There are those that want to support this pshat by saying that Reb Meir recognized the syndrome from the fact that all his efforts to be mekareiv them, and their being unaffected by the proximity of such an Adam Gadol, so it must be that they are beyond hope.  Sorry, not convinced.   But it's a nice pshat anyway, because even if it's not a valid interpretation of the conversation between Reb Meir and Bruria, the idea that even a person from whom Teshuva has been taken away has hope, the hope that through Tefilla his access to Teshuva will be restored.

NOTE:  in the comments, Reb Micha Berger presents a formidable argument to the effect that it is incorrect to characterize the Kappara of Teshuva as being l'maala miderech hateva.  Please see there, where I cite  Rabbeinu Bachay and the Shla'h (partially cited in the notes in the Kad Hakemach and more fully in my comment) and Reb Micha's response and citations.
Reb Micha has since posted on this question at his Aish Das website, writing, as always, with serious thought and care.
 On that topic, here's a nice video about the human ability to change.

Va'eira, Guest Post by Rabbi Pinches Friedman

On maintaining the purity of Jewish Traditions and the importance of rejecting foreign influence in our cultural and personal lives.                 Link


On the topic of changing our primary self-perception from "Jew" to that of "citizen of our host country", a friend brought me a copy of Life magazine from April 18th, 1938.  The magazine had a few pages about the Jews, with a special focus on the then-current troubles in Europe.  There are pictures of terrified Jews who heard that a pogrom was starting, of elderly men at a seder, of the stores in Germany with each window labeled with a perfectly well centered and calligraphic

 Jude

all rendered as only Life magazine's artists could.

There was a paragraph on one page that caught my attention, a remarkable paragraph.  It's not news to anyone.  Reb Meir Simcha said it, Reb Elchonon said it; and it was true in Spain, and it was true one hundred times before.  It was just strange seeing it in Life magazine.

"Of all the countries of Europe, the Jew loved Germany best.  There, he became more German than the most patriotic Junker.  Jews all over the world reflected this feeling.  In the 19th Century, Germany became the cultural capital of world Jewry."

I always wondered, what's wrong with being a patriot?  Nothing.  On the contrary.  To not have hakaras hatov to the country that sheltered you is despicable.  But we're not talking about hakaras hatov.  We're talking about a level of patriotism that Life magazine found remarkable- more German that the most patriotic Junker.  Chazal tell us that they merited the Geula because they retained the markers of the Jewish People, but I'll bet we'll find a Chazal that says that they were super-loyal Mitzrim before the Avdus started.

Va'eira, Shemos 9:20. Iyov's Silence

I don't want your money.  But like other websites, I am soliciting contributions from you.  This far-from-perfect ma'amar is being posted in the hopes that someone can contribute something to the discussion.  I do, however, want to stress that while I can't offer a black and white explanation, I think that ambiguity and Tzarich Iyun is incomparably better than half-baked mussar that is not oisgehalten in halacha, hashkafa, or reality.

The Egyptians were warned that the plague of Barad was coming, and those that feared Hashem's power brought their livestock in from the fields.  Shemos 9:20- 

הירא את דבר ה' מעבדי פרעה הניס את עבדיו ואת מקנהו אל הבתים.

Targum Yonasan says that the ירא את-דבר יהוה, the ones fearful of Hashem, is a reference to Iyov, Job, who is described in the first passuk in Iyov (איש היה בארץ עוץ איוב שמו והיה האיש ההוא תם וישר וירא אלקים וסר מרע) as a ירא ה. as a  

 אִיוֹב דַהֲוָה דָחִיל מִפִּתְגָמָא דַיְיָ מֵעַבְדוֹי דְפַרְעה כְּנַש יַת עַבְדוֹי וְיַת גֵיתוֹי לְגוֹ בֵיתָא

It's interesting that Iyov makes an appearance in the story of Klal Yisrael's sojourn in Egypt.  But this is not the first time he appears.  

When Pharaoh first discussed the Jewish problem with his advisers, the Gemara (Sotah 11a) says that these advisors were individuals we are familiar with: they were Bilaam, Iyov, and Yisro.  

א"ר חייא בר אבא א"ר סימאי שלשה היו באותה עצה בלעם ואיוב ויתרו בלעם שיעץ נהרג איוב ששתק נידון ביסורין יתרו שברח זכו מבני בניו שישבו בלשכת הגזית 

Bilaam advised subjugating the Jews, and he was later killed.  Iyov was silent, and he suffered terrible afflictions, the subject of Sefer Iyov.  Yisro refused to participate in this ur-Wannsee conference, and he fled, and because of that he was rewarded with descendants who sat in the Sanhedrin.

What, exactly, was Iyov's sin?  He stood by and did not stop a רודף.  Was this a sin of omission or a sin of commission?  Did his silence do nothing, and he was punished for not making an attempt to fight the decision, or did his silence encourage and contribute to the enactment?

In other words, did he have a duty to actively oppose it, and he was punished for failing to do his duty?  Or, or was he punished because his silence was interpreted as assent, or at least as indifference, and his indifference/assent factored into the decision to crush the Jews?

The reason I ask is because if Iyov was a yarei shamayim and a decent man, it's hard to believe that he would have allowed his silence to contribute to suffering.  (The Ben Yehoyada in Sanhedrin does say that Iyov's silence contributed to the enactment)  If, on the other hand, it was just a a matter of not caring, it's still surprising, but I can conceive of the possibility:  A Yarei Shamayim would not have participated, but a Yarei Shamayim might have been indifferent.  They weren't his people.  Every day injustices take place in the world, and we simply don't pay attention.  We could go out and protest.  We could march in the street and yell about the suffering in Tibet or Africa or India.  But we don't.  We have our own people to worry about, and we can't fix the whole world.  The reality is that in life, there are disasters, and we don't lose a moment of sleep over the suffering of strangers on the other side of the world.  So what was the complaint against Iyov?  Why should he have endangered himself on behalf of the Jews?

The Torah gives us certain mitzvos that mandate that we not stand by and watch the perpetration of injustice.  These are the Mitzvos of:

הוכח תוכיח

השבת אבידה

לא תעמד על דם רעך

On the basis of these mitzvos, we have a duty to stand up and fight a danger to a fellow:  as the Rambam says (1 Rotzei'ach 14)

כל היכול להציל ולא הציל עובר על לא תעמוד על דם רעך. וכן הרואה את חבירו טובע בים. או ליסטים באים עליו. או חיה רעה באה עליו. ויכול להצילו הוא בעצמו. או ששכר אחרים להצילו ולא הציל. או ששמע עובדי כוכבים או מוסרים מחשבים עליו רעה או טומנין לו פח ולא גלה אוזן חבירו והודיעו. או שידע בעובד כוכבים או באונס שהוא בא על חבירו ויכול לפייסו בגלל חבירו להסיר מה שבלבו ולא פייסו וכל כיוצא בדברים אלו. העושה אותם עובר על לא תעמוד על דם רעך:

So we have the Gemara (Shabbos 54b) that says

כל מי שאפשר למחות לאנשי ביתו ולא מיחה נתפס על אנשי ביתו באנשי עירו נתפס על אנשי עירו בכל העולם כולו נתפס על כל העולם כולו אמר רב פפא והני דבי ריש גלותא נתפסו על כולי עלמא כי הא דאמר רבי חנינא מאי דכתיב (ישעיהו ג) ה' במשפט יבא עם זקני עמו ושריו אם שרים חטאו זקנים מה חטאו אלא אימא על זקנים שלא מיחו בשרים

that failure to protest where you can make a difference makes you liable for what follows.

Similarly, we find that Aharon was punished for his silence, in Bamidbar 12:1, where the Shach al Hatorah says

ותדבר מרים ואהרן במשה. היל"ל וידברו מרים  ואהרן, אבל אמר ותדבר מרים, כי עיקר  הדבור היה למרים,כי הנשים הם דברניות, ואהרן  הודה לה או החריש ולא מיחה בה, וע״ז נענש הוא ג״כ שנא׳ ויחר אף ה׳ בם .

But let's assume that our din of לא תעמד על דם רעך, our chiyuv to stand up and protest, stems from our din of ערבות, as the Shla'h says (חלק ג, תורה שבכתב, תורת כהנים, פרק דרך חיים תוכחת מוסר, פרשת קדושים, where he says that kal vachomer the chiyuv applies to preventing a man from destroying his neshama by doing aveiros, also in Minchas Chinuch 239:4.)  If so, it's reasonable to assume that the yesod of הוכח תוכיח and השבת אבידה is also the din of ערבות.  Since when did Iyov have a din Arvus with the Jews?  

So I think we are forced to look at this Chazal and say that despite the fact that he had none of the mitzvos listed above and no din of Arvus, there is a duty to oppose injustice, and it was a sin to fail to stand up.  Maybe it's not a din in Beis Din, but there is some kind of fundamental meta-mitzva obligation.   

But what is the extent of this obligation?  From the fact that Yisro ran away, it appears there was danger in opposing the decision.  If there was danger in protesting, what was Iyov's duty?  We, that we have a halacha of (Vayikra 19:16)  לא תעמד על דם רעך, and most likely (See Choshen Mishpat 426 and thousands of Rishonim and Achronim) we're allowed to endanger ourselves to save others, but we're not obligated to endanger ourselves in order to save another person.  So what was wrong with Iyov's silence, if speaking up would have been dangerous?  Let's assume, then, that there was no danger to Iyov.  Why did Yisro run away?  I don't know.  Maybe that was after the majority decided. Or it was a middas chasidus.  But it's most likely there was no danger to Iyov, and he was punished for failing to protest.  To me, it is clear that Iyov suffered for his indifference, for his failure to at least cry out against the injustice, even if he couldn't do anything about it, as the Brisker Rov said.

Here are some suggestions.
1.  It could be that for the average man, there is no din of Arvus outside of what the Torah is mechayeiv.  But when a person is in a position of power, when he is on a consortium of consultants to the government, then he has obligations greater than the man in the street.  You are taking upon yourself responsibilities, and you can't then ignore them.  For a man in that position, silence is a breach of duty.

2.  The Jews were known as rachmanim, bayshanim, and gomlei chasadim, they were a people with a unique bond to the Ribono shel Olam.  Even if indifference to suffering is not a reason for punishment, indifference to the suffering of the Jews is a sign that you don't care about the Ribono shel Olam.  If you have any bond to the Ribono shel Olam, you love the Jews.  So his indifference was a siman- a symptom of a fundamental flaw in your spiritual relationship with the Ribono shel Olam.  As the Sh'lah says, ואמר לא תעמוד שלא יתעכב כיון שהוא רעך בתורה ובמצוות אי נמי לשון שתיקה דמך תחת דמו ונפשך תחת נפשו אם תעמוד על דם רעך.  It's possible that before Mattan Torah, every Tzadik was a ריע with everyone who did mitzvos.  Since Iyov was a tzadik, he was a ריע with the Bnei Yisrael, and the mitzva did apply to him.

3.  The punishment for Iyov's indifference was Hashem's indifference.  The Satan wanted to torture Iyov, and Middah keneged middah, Hashem said nothing, He simply did not interfere. 

4.  That all of our proofs from the mitzvos in the Torah, that it's only based on the din Arvus, הוכח תוכיח השבת אבידה and לא תעמד, and we don't find any such dinim by Bnei Noach, are just wrong.  It's not the dinim that mandates this behavior, it is essential humanity.  Whatever danger there was to Iyov did not justify his silence.  If you see an innocent human being suffering, you should cry out in protest.  If you don't, you're no better than Iyov.   

Va'eira, Shemos 7:19. Gratitude to Inanimate Objects

I posted this as I have it in my notes, and it is a journal of what I thought about this question over several years.

The first three makkos, that involved the Nile and the sand of Egypt, were done by Aharon, not Moshe.

אמר אל אהרן: לפי שהגין היאור על משה כשנשלך לתוכו, לפיכך לא לקה על ידו לא בדם ולא בצפרדעים, ולקה על ידי אהרן:

The reason (Rashi in 7:19 from the Tanchuma 14) is because the Nile had protected Moshe when he was an infant, 

אמר אל אהרן: לא היה העפר כדאי ללקות על ידי משה לפי שהגין עליו כשהרג את המצרי ויטמנהו בחול ולקה על ידי אהרן:

and the earth protected him by hiding the Mitzri that he had killed (Rashi 8:12 from the Tanchuma 14 and Medrash Rabba 10:7,) and therefore they did not "suffer" by his hand.

  

There is a similar idea expressed in the Gemara (BK 93b),  "Don't throw mud into a well from which you've drunk."

 אמר ליה רבא לרבה בר מרי מנא הא מילתא דאמרי אינשי בירא דשתית מיניה לא תשדי ביה קלא א"ל דכתיב (דברים כג) לא תתעב אדומי כי אחיך הוא ולא תתעב מצרי כי גר היית בארצו

It seems that this is expresses a gratitude, a sense of personal indebtedness, hakaras hatov, to these inanimate and insensate objects, which is difficult to understand.  Many say that this is a mussar haskeil to us-if there is hakoras tov to objects, how much more so to people.  This is fine, but does not explain why Moshe Rabbeinu felt this way toward the Nile and the dirt.

Of course, we can talk about how there was a dialogue between Moshe and the Yam by krias yam suf, or between Hashem and the yam when Hashem wanted the Yam to throw out the bodies of the Mitzrim, which shows that the Yam and other inanimates need to be convinced to do things.  But I assume that is all allegorical, and would not explain hakoras tov.  Maybe it helps to talk about the ‘Sar’ shel Yam or of the sand.  Maybe we can use the idea of ‘ein kateigor ne’eso saneigor,’ although here it would be something like ‘ein saneigor ne’eso kateigor.’

My son Moshe sheyichyeh said (Jan 2000/5760) that the Nile and the sand were the way that Hashem manifested his Middas Harachamim, and so to Moshe they were the Yad Hashem.  In other words, the object through which Hashem acts in the world is very similar to the way our own hands do our deeds.  Thus, an object which Hashem used to do his will is like Hashem’s hand.  So the Yam and the sand were, to Moshe, the hands of the Middas Harachamim.

If you want, you can say this a little differently.  You can say that since Hashem had shown His Middas Harachamim through this object, the object is like a davar shebikdusha.  An object that has been used for a mitzva or for kedusha gets chashivus of the mitzva or the kedusha and you have to be machshiv the object, the same is true when an object is used as a means of rachamim, it gets the chashivus of rachamim.  This is similar to kavod Shabbos, for example.  Since Hashem rested on Shabbos and was m’kadeish it, we have to be m’chabeid Shabbos.  It is not Shabbos that we are being m’chabeid, it is the Ribbono Shel Olom that we are being m’chabeid.

When I spoke in Jan 24 ‘04/’64, this is how I said it:

This parsha teaches very interesting lessons about hakoras tov.  First, we find that Moshe was not commanded to execute the first three makkos, because the yam and the sand had saved him, and he could not be the one to cause the to pervert their nature.  How do we understand the idea of Hakoras Tov to an inanimate object?  Second, we find that we cannot be ‘mesa’eiv’ Mitzrim, because they gave us a place to come to when we needed it.  But they enslaved us afterwords, and tried to kill us!

We have to understand that gratitude, the feeling that I have to a person who has done good to me, that I hold him dear in my heart and look forward to an opportunity to return the favor, is logically identical with resentment and vengeance, where someone harms us and we hold resentment in our hearts and look forward to the opportunity to pay him back— with interest.  But Hakoras Tov is a mitzvah, and a fundamental middah (to the extent that Chazal say that a person who is not makir tov will eventually be kofeir betovoso shel Hakodosh Boruch Hu), while the other is called ‘nekomo and netiroh’ and is an issur de’orayso.  The Chinuch (451) explains why one should not take revenge:

משרשי המצוה שידע האדם ויתן אל לבו כי כל אשר יקרהו מטוב ועד רע הוא סיבה שתבוא אליו מאת הש"י, ומיד האדם מיד איש אחיו לא יהיה דבר בלתי רצונו ב"ה, על כן כשיצערהו או יכאיבהו אדם ידע בנפשו כי עונותיו גרמו לו והש"י גזר עליו בכך ולא ישית מחשבותיו לנקום ממנו כי הוא אינו סיבת רעתו כי העון הוא המסבב וכמו שאמר דוד ע"ה הניחו לו ויקלל כי אמר לו ה', תלה הענין בחטאו ולא בשמעי בן גרא

that one should remember that whatever harm comes to him is by Hashem’s will, and the actor is merely a stick in Hashem’s hand, and it makes no sense to be angry at a mere stick.  So what logic will support the the mitzva of gratitude to fellow humans that did good to you, but still preclude being angry and taking revenge from fellow humans that did bad to you?

A possible answer is that when we receive good, we do not say we deserve it, but rather we thank Hashem for an undeserved chessed.  When we receive bad, we know that it is not arbitrary, but instead comes to be memareik for an aveirah.  If so, we must appreciate chessed as a gift, but view harm as the earned result of our own behavior.  Therefore, we thank a ba’al chessed and disregard the ba’al avlah.

Another teretz is that we must emulate Hashem’s middos (and hope that Hashem acts toward us with middah keneged middah), as explained in the Tomer Devorah:  therefore, we look at the good that is done, and are ma’alim ayin from the bad.

When I spoke again in Jan ‘05/Teiveis ‘65, I assayed a possible approach.  

I have wondered elsewhere what the difference is between nekama, which is assur, and hakaras tov, which is vital.  But when you realize that Moshe was makir tov to inanimate objects, you realize that hakoras tov is not gratitude to the other person for choosing to do something good to you, because then it would make no sense here.  It must be a way of expressing hakoras tov to Hashem by being makir tov to the instrument, something like Moshe said.  Or as I added, the same way we are m’chabeid Shabbos because Hashem rested on that day and was m’kadeish it, we are m’chabeid a person or an object that was used by Hashem as a shli’ach of His rachamim.  (Of course, it is only good people that will be used by Hashem to further His middas harachamim, because m’galgelim zchus ahl y’dei zakkai.)  If that’s true, we understand the difference between nekama and hakaras tov.

When I repeated this to my mother Shetichyeh, she made a very nice observation.  Mitzvos are to inculcate middos tovos and adinus.  Hakaras tov is a middah tovah v’adinah, while nekama is the opposite.  This explains why every opportunity to express hakaras tov is valuable, while we avoid nekama wherever possible.  Where nekama is has meaningful significance, such as, perhaps, tzaar haguf, or go’eil hadom, or from a goy, the need to inculcate middos tovos is no longer a factor.  Note that this is not the usual teretz people say, that Moshe’s hakaras tov was meaningless and it was just an exercise in habituation of hakaras hatov.  My mother's vort is different and better, though it might take a moment to see the difference.  Her vort is that this itself was a valuable exercise in creating a midda tova, while the other teretz is that this was an empty gesture used to inculcate the habit of hakaras tov.

In Jan ‘06/Teiveis ‘66, I spoke again, and the way I said it was:

First three makos– how is it shayich hakaras hatov to inanimate objects?

Another kasheh– why isn’t it ASSUR to be makir tov according to the Chinuch?  The same way a man who hits his thumb with a hammer doesn’t curse the hammer, and anyone who attacks the person who harmed him is showing he thinks the person is the cause, when in truth the person is only an instrument, a person who benefits from a matonoh, for example, should remember that mezonosov shel odom k’tzuvim meirosh hashonnoh, and he got absolutely nothing from the apparent benefactor!

Answer on both questions begins with answer on first question.  Hashem uses objects to effect His din of schar v’onesh, of rachamim and din.  An object that is used for tashmishei kedushoh or for a mitzvoh is to’un genizah.  This is because the object represents, and becomes imbued with, the kedushoh or the chashivus mitzvoh.  So we have to be m’chabeid the object.  Similarly, an object that has been used by Hashem to effect his rachamim is TASHMISHEI RACHAMIM.  It therefore calls for honor and respect in its capacity as tashmish rachamim.

If a person benefits another person, the beneficiary must view the benefactor as the means through which Hashem was m’racheim on him, and he has to show gratitude and respect.  The person who benefited him is Hashem’s tashmish rachamim.  But if Hashem is ma’anish someone through the actions of a rasha, the person has to be m’kabeil with ahava, and the person who did the act, the rasha through whom judgment was exacted, is TASHMISHEI DIN.  But there is a difference between being m’kabeil b’ahavoh and commemorating the event.  I don’t think that the whip beis din uses needs geniza.  You don’t celebrate yesurim, but you do celebrate rachamim and yeshu’a and the objects through which they came about.

So we understand why it is assur to take nekama, but it is a mitzva to be makir tov.

We also understand why even inanimate objects have to be respected if they were used to carry out Hashem’s middas Rachamim.

On June 23, 2006, my nephew, Avi Feinstein, was in Chicago, visiting a child he had taken care of at Camp Simcha the year beforelast year, a child of seven with a severe skin problem that caused intense and unremitting itching.  His condition required that Avi shower him and put medicine on him four times a day, and which prevented him, and Avi, from getting any sleep.  Avi decided to visit the child because he was off from Yeshiva for a few days before going to his counselor’s job at a different camp, and the boy had called him almost every day since having him at camp.  I asked him how the parents were m’kabel panim, and he said they were endlessly grateful, and even had offered to pay his airfare, which he declined.  They know about Avi’s brother’s trouble and the challenges Avi had gone through, and that he had to leave Chicago a day early because the camp told him (after he made the ticket) that he had to be there two days before camp started, and so had to pay two hundred dollars extra on the ticket.  They asked him whether he resented how the camp behaved.  He answered, without thinking about how to couch it in less surprising terms, that it wasn’t them who did it, it was Hashem.  What he meant was that whatever we experience in life is what Hashem wants us to experience.  The means of having that experience really are irrelevant, so why would he resent their behavior?  He would have had to have the experience anyway.  I thought this was an excellent application of the idea of “lo sikom.”  

I asked him the kashe, that if he feels that way, why would he ever be makir tov to a person who did a chesed for him?  He answered that by a bad experience, the main reaction is “this needed to happen, and I have to think about why Hashem wants me to experience this.”  Thoughts of nekama against the actor contradict the primary feeling of introspection.  But in the case of a chessed, the feeling you should have is one of gratitude to Hashem.  In that case, feelings of gratitude to the baal chessed do not contradict the proper primary emotion, and so are they are not only appropriate, they reinforce the feeling you should be having.

Note:  
There is a Rif that is relevant to this question, as follows.

The Shittah in BK 92b brings a story about the Rif that can be read to indicate that he, too, felt this sense of gratitude to a place or a thing:

וכתב תלמיד אחד מתלמידי ה״ר יוסף הלוי ז״ל אבן מיגש וז״ל מועתק מלשון ערבי: אמרו בסוף החובל

בירא דשתית מיניה לא תרמי ביה קלא, פירוש: הבור ששתית ממנו לא תשליך בו אבן או דבר אחר, כלומר לא

תזלזל בו ולא תגמול אותו רע אחר שנתהנית ממנו. וזה על דרך משל לשאר הדברים, שמי שבא לאדם ממנו איזו

תועלת או נהנה ממנו אין ראוי לו לעשות שום מעשה שיבא לו נזק ממנו, ובבר הביאו שם בגמרא על ענין זה

משלים ופסוקים מענין מכות מצרים וגלו הסבה שנעשו קצתם על ידי אהרן ע״ה, וסיפר רבינו ז״ל על רבו הריא״ף

 ז״ל שאירע לו ענין זה עם איש אחד ולא רצה לדון אותו כלל כדי שלא ידון אותו במה שיבא לו היזק ממנו ונמנע זה מניעה  גמורה, וזה שהוא ז״ל חלה ונכנס אצל אדם  אחד במרחץ שהיה לו בביתו ונתהנה מהמרחץ הנזכר, אחר כך זימן אותו שישב אצלו עד שיבריא וכבד אותו הרבה ועשה עמו טובה והבריא, ובהמשך הזמן על האיש ההוא מטה ידו וירד מנכסיו ונשבר בערבונות וזולתם ונתחייב לתת ממון לבעלי חובות וירד עד שהוצרך למכור המרחץ הנזכר ולשום אותו לבעלי חובותיו, ואמר רבינו יצחק  ז״ל ״לא אדון ולא אורה במרחץ הזה לא במכר ולא בשומא ולא בשום דבר המתיחד בו לפי שנתהניתי ממנו״.

ואם היה זה בדומם שאין לו הרגשה, כל שכן וקל וחומר בני אדם המרגישים בהיזק ובתועלת שיהיה זה שנוי לעשותו

והעושהו יוצא משורת המוסר ודרך ארץ. ואמר, ואפשר לפרש במה שאמרו לא לידון איניש לא למאן דרחים ליה

ולא למאן דסני ליה, שיהיה סיבת מניעתם ז״ל לדון למאן דרחים לשתי סיבות. האחד שלא יטה לזכותו והשנית שאם

אפשר שיציל את נפשו וידון אותו כפי שורת הדין — היה בזה משלם רעה תחת טובה. ואם היה זה במי שקבל הנאה מבשר ודם — כל שכן וקל וחומר באלוה ית׳, שממנו נשפע הטוב הגמור, שראוי להודות לו הודאה גמורה ולא יעשה מה שיקניטנו ולא מה שהוא שנוי לו. עד כאן לשונו

The reason I read it as if the Rif was showing hakaras hatov to the merchatz is because Reb Moshe in a teshuva rejects the idea that the Rif was showing hakaras hatov to the owner of the merchatz.  He says that it is not hakaras hatov to refuse to judge him in a case of monetary liability.  On the contrary, you're doing him a favor by divesting him of money that he shouldn't have.  Igros CM 10:

הטעם שכתב מטעם בירא דשתית מיניה לא נכון כלל דלחייב למי שתייב ממון ע״פ דין אין זה שום רעה להאדם אלא אדרבה טובה גדולה כמפורש בסנהדרין ז׳ דאזיל מבי דינא שקל גלימא ליזמר וליזיל באורחא, ולעיל מזה בברייתא (דף ו׳) שרבי אמר על ויהי דוד עושה משפט וצדקה אע״פ שלא שילם מתוך ביתו זהו משפט וצדקה משפט לזה שהחזיר לו ממונו

 וצדקה לזה שהוציא גזילה מתה״י׳ ואיך יאמר שהוא כשדיית קלא בבירא דשתי מיניה, אך אולי מדין שוחד החמיר שהוא רק ממדת חסידות וכוי׳ ואין אצלי הספר לעיין בו אבל כפ״מ שהבאת דבריו לא נכון כלל עכ״ל

Va'eira, Shemos 6:6. Sivlos Mitzrayim. The Chidushei HaRi'm and Martin Luther King

I was born in 1952, and I have personally seen the enormous change American society has undergone in the relationship between Caucasians and African Americans.  It is hard to imagine it now, but there was a time when blacks were considered not fully human- many saw them as part animal and part man, placed somewhere on the continuum between ape and human.  The natural thing for a black revolutionary would be to react with violence and anger, as many did.  Martin Luther King was the catalyst of such enormous change, change that in other societies would take centuries, or millennia, and he did it within thirty years and with non-violent methods.  This is a testament both to Dr. King and, Baruch Hashem, to the unique character of American society.

We were discussing at the table something the Chidushei Harim says on this week's parsha (also quoted in Ma'ayana shel Torah), and someone pointed out that Dr. King had made a very similar observation.  (I have a feeling that Abraham Joshua Heschel mentioned it to him, but I certainly can't prove it.  See here.)

The passuk says והוצאתי אתכם מתחת סבלת מצרים, I will take you out from beneath the crushing burden of Mitzrayim.  The word סבלות means burdens.  But it also can mean patience.  Over the years, the Jewish People had developed patience, the patience to tolerate their miserable life in Egypt.  As terrible as their life was, they had learned to cope with their condition, and it was the only life they knew.  They had lost the desire to be autonomous, the desire to breath as free men, the concept that this was not what life should be like.  They had lost any desire to be redeemed, they feared the instability and danger freedom might bring.   Hashem told Moshe to hint to the Jews that the first prerequisite to their salvation was to become impatient; to say "Enough!  This is unacceptable!  I refuse to despair; I will do whatever it takes to become free, despite the danger, despite the fear."  
Rabbi Oizer Alport (author of "Parsha Potpourri", available by writing to oalport@optonline.net) points out that Rav Gedalya Shorr makes a similar point.  Rav Shorr brings a Medrash that prior to Yetzias Mitzaryim, not a single slave had ever escaped from Egypt. One would think this was because of the hermetic efficiency of the Egyptian police state.  But Rav Schorr suggests that it was due less to physical control than to mind control. Mitzrayim had such an effective system of mental debilitation, of convincing the slaves that any other life was more dangerous or less meaningful, that by being good slaves that were accomplishing the greatest good that they were born to do.  It was their Tafkid!  It was a curse of complacency, and Moshe Rabbeinu's first task was to break away this destructive willingness to be subordinated.

In Dr. King's essay, Three Ways of Meeting Oppression, the first paragraphs are as follows:

Oppressed people deal with their oppression in three characteristic ways. One way is acquiescence: the oppressed resign themselves to their doom. They tacitly adjust themselves to oppression and thereby become conditioned to it. In every movement toward freedom some of the oppressed prefer to remain oppressed. Almost 2800 years ago Moses set out to lead the children of Israel from the slavery of Egypt to the freedom of the Promised Land. He soon discovered that slaves do not always welcome their deliverers. They become accustomed to being slaves. They would rather bear those ills they have, as Shakespeare pointed out, than flee to others that they know not of. They prefer the "fleshpots of Egypt" to the ordeals of emancipation.

There is such a thing as the freedom of exhaustion. Some people are so worn down by the yoke of oppression that they give up. A few years ago in the slum areas of Atlanta, a Negro guitarist used to sing almost daily: "Been down so long that down don't bother me." This is the type of negative freedom and resignation that often engulfs the life of the oppressed.

But this is not the way out. To accept passively an unjust system is to cooperate with that system; thereby the oppressed become as evil as the oppressor. Non-cooperation with evil is as much a moral obligation as is cooperation with good. The oppressed must never allow the conscience of the oppressor to slumber. Religion reminds every man that he is his brother's keeper. To accept injustice or segregation passively is to say to the oppressor that his actions are morally right. It is a way of allowing his conscience to fall asleep. At this moment the oppressed fails to be his brother's keeper. So acquiescence-while often the easier way-is not the moral way. It is the way of the coward. The Negro cannot win the respect of his oppressor by acquiescing; he merely increases the oppressor's arrogance and contempt. Acquiescence is interpreted as proof of the Negro's inferiority. The Negro cannot win the respect of the white people of the South or the peoples of the world if he is willing to sell the future of his children for his personal and immediate comfort and safety.

Elsewhere, in an essay titled The Meaning of Non-Violence, he repeats this theme with a slightly different focus:

One method is that of acquiescence there are those individuals who feel that the only way to deal with their oppression is to resign themselves to the fate of oppression. There are those who surrender and find themselves becoming conditioned to things as they are. They feel that it is better to live with these things than to go through the ordeals of changing the old order to the new order. There was a man who lived in one of the Negro communities in Atlanta some years ago; he used to play his guitar and sing various songs, and one day he was heard singing a song that went something like this: "been down so long that down don't bother me." I guess he had achieved a level of freedom-a freedom of exhaustion. He had given up the struggle.

So this is the method of acquiescence- but it is not the way. It may be the easy way at times, but it is not moral way and it is not the courageous way; it is a cowardly way for the individual who adjusts to an evil system, and he must take some of the responsibility for the perpetuation of the unjust system.

Obviously, Dr. King's approach would not have worked in Mitzrayim.  But his moral logic, and its success in the milieu within which he championed it, is undeniable.

Va'eira 6:26. Moshe and Aharon

Rashi says that the Torah sometimes mentions Moshe before Aharon and sometimes reverses the order to teach us that they were Shkulin, of equal weight.  This is impossible.  Moshe was unparalleled.  Obviously, there were some aspects in which they were equal, but that is irrelevant to us.  We are interested in Moshe and Aharon in their roles as teachers and leaders of Klal Yisrael and as intermediaries between the Ribono shel Olam and His people, and in those respects, Moshe was greater.  So we have to find an interpretation of what Rashi is telling us.


I heard this morning something very nice from the Chozeh of Lublin.  He says that it was only because Aharon brought peace to the Jewish People that Moshe was able to experience the level of Ruach Hakodesh that he did.  (See note.)  Moshe alone would not have been Moshe.  In that sense, they were shkulim.


Similarly: R’ Aharon Soloveichikin in “The Warmth and the Light” brings the Rambam in PH that Moshe was the greatest man in history in nevu’ah, in Chochmoh, and in Middos.  So it is impossible that he and Aharon were shkulim. He explains on the basis of a Medrash Shmos 4:27 that brings the possuk in Tehillim 85:11 “Chesed v’emes nifgoshu, tzedek v’sholom noshoku,” that Emes and Tzedek refers to Moshe, and Chesed and Sholom refers to Aharon.  He says that Moshe represents one side of Torah, while Aharon represents the other.  See there for a discussion of why Aharon was chosen to speak to the Jews, while Moshe was to speak to Pharaoh, and the difference between Tzedek and Emes.

When I said this at the table, my just-married-off son Moshe said that this could be pshat in the Gemara (Brachos 32) that reads the passuk in Tehillim 99 to mean that Shmuel was "Shakul" with Moshe and Aharon.  Again, that is not possible.  It might be that while Moshe and Aharon divided the responsibilities of leadership into pastoral and royal, Shmuel's leadership comprised both elements.

Note:
See, e.g., Shemos 19:2 and Rashi, כאיש אחד, בלב אחד, and Sotah 17a, שלום ביניהם שכינה שרויה ביניהם.


Notice:
Now that I've married off my youngest child, Baruch Hashem, things are going to change around here.  I will be moving the divrei Torah to another blog, perhaps another website, this time with my real name.

Va'eira 6:7, Hamotzi and A Cool Hetter

The essential point of this post comprises six paragraphs.  They are all related, but you have to be patient.

The passuk says הַמּוֹצִיא אֶתְכֶם מִתַּחַת סִבְלוֹת מִצְרָיִם, who will take you from the burdens of Mitzrayim.   Since Hashem is talking to Moshe long before they left, the simple meaning of the passuk is that hamotzi is "who is going to take you out."  If so, then, הַמּוֹצִיא would be the wrong word to use in the bracha of Hamotzi, which thanks Hashem for the bread we are eating which He brought forth from the ground, not what He will do in the future.  Nonetheless, the Gemara in Brachos 38a/b says that lehalacha we do say Hamotzi and not Motzi, and we interpret our verse to mean "I will do something that will inspire future generations to remember that I took them out of Mitzrayim."

The gemara there says that someone told Reb Zeira that Reb Z'vid's son was a talmid chacham and an expert in brachos.  Reb Zeira said "send him to me, and I'll decide if he's a talmid chacham."  When the young man came, Reb Zeira gave him bread and told to to eat it.  He said Motzi, not Hamotzi.  Reb Zeira said, "this person you call a baki in brachos?  Everyone knows that Motzi is a good nusach.  If he were a talmid chacham, he should have said Hamotzi, which would be a chiddush in halacha and an interesting pshat in the passuk in Va'eira."  Reb Moshe points out, (and I'm pretty sure he was quoting a Rosh which I can't remember at the moment,) that evidently it was expected that a talmid chacham, in a new place, would choose a non-standard novel nusach of Hamotzi just so that he would have the opportunity to say a shiur and show that he knew how to learn.

It is assur to talk or delay unnecessarily between netilas yadayim and hamotzi.  But the first Magen Avraham in OC 166 brings an opinion (Rabbeinu Tam) that on Shabbos, this problem is not as serious.  The issur hefsek before hamotzi is not like hefsek in davening, where the problem is zilzul, disrespect of the tefilla.  Here, the problem is that you might get involved in something else and distracted, and end up not eating at all.  On Shabbos, when you have a mitzva to eat, and there's a festive table set, there is no such concern, so go ahead and talk.  Actually, he's talking about making kiddush or havdalah before hamotzi, but (as is clear in the Aruch Hashulchan there) the logic pertains just as well to any talking.  We don't hold like that, though, le'halacha.

AND....  It so happens that the Shlah in the first volume toward the end of Kedusha brings from Tshuvos Maharshal that you can talk Divrei Torah between netillas yadayim and hamotzi because you are allowed to interrupt to talk about things that are needed for the meal, and divrei torah are certainly needed at the meal, as Reb Chanina ben Tradyon and Rebbi Shimon say in Avos 3:3-4

רבי חנניא בן תרדיון אומר, שנים שיושבין ואין ביניהן דברי תורה, הרי זה מושב לצים. אבל שנים שיושבין ויש ביניהם דברי תורה, שכינה שרויה ביניהם

רבי שמעון אומר, שלשה שאכלו על שלחן אחד ולא אמרו עליו דברי תורה, כאלו אכלו מזבחי מתים  אבל שלשה שאכלו על שלחן אחד ואמרו עליו דברי תורה, כאלו אכלו משלחנו של מקום ברוך הוא

But no, we don't hold like the Shlah, though, le'halacha.

But what about combining the two heteirim?  If someone wants to talk in learning before hamotzi on Shabbos, he has two svaros to be meikil- the Rabbeinu Tam/Magen Avraham and the Tshuvos Maharshal/Shlah.  Would such a thing be a lechatchila le'halacha? No.  Is it worth doing it just for the shock and awe, and then tell people why you did it, just as Rav Zeira expected Reb Zevid's son to do?  Definitely.  

And it would be perfect for this week's parsha.  Wash, say ahl netilas yadayim, and say a dvar torah before hamotzi.  The Dvar Torah would be to explain that the nusach of Hamotzi is connected to this week's parsha, but at one time, most people said Motzi, not Hamotzi; but Reb Zeira held that a talmid chacham should use the non-standard so he could say a shiur about why he did so and the pshat in the passuk in Va'eira.  So you see that it's good to be somech on daas yachid in the bracha of Hamotzi in order to show a chiddush in Torah.  Normally, we're not allowed to talk before hamotzi, but we are going to follow Reb Zeira's advice and do so because here, there are two reasons why we can be meikil: Shabbos, according to the Magen Avraham/Rabbeinu Tam, and for divrei torah, according to the Shlah/Mahrshal.  Presto!  (For those that feel that I am playing fast and loose with the halacha, please do two things: first, please realize that we're not talking about hilchos mikvaos here; and second, see the second picture in the column on the right.)


Speaking of the dinim of hefsek and this week's parsha:  There's a sefer from the Dubner Maggid on the parshios.  In this week's parsha, he connects Yetzias Mitzrayim to the Rama's din in 119.  The Rama in 119 says that there's less of a problem of smichas geula l'tfila on Shabbos.  Normally, the requirement that we not interrupt is based on the psukim of ya'ancha next to Hashem sfasai tiftach, and since on Shabbos it's not a time of "tefilla to be saved from yom tzara", the psukim don't apply.  The Magid says that on Shabbos we daven for simcha, not to be saved from suffering, and that's pshat in not having a din of tefilla of yom tzara.

So while I wouldn't recommend relying on the Rama regarding geula/tefilla, I do think there's a special mitzva to say a dvar Torah between Netilas Yadayim and Hamotzi on Friday night of Parshas Va'eira. 
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Va'eira. The Mitzrim were an Instrument of G'd's Will

Many Rishonim ask a question on this parsha, and that is, "Why were the Mitzrim punished, if they were merely instruments of Hashem's will, as expressed to Avraham at the Bris bein Habesarim?"  See Rambam 5 Hilchos Teshuva 1 et al. and 6 Hilchos Teshuva 11 and 12, and Raavad there. The Ramban in Lech Lecha also asks the question and says the second answer of the Raaved.

UPDATE: 
After posting this, and as discussed in the comments, I realized that it is incomplete without immediately mentioning two elements:  The Rishonim that say that the petur of Kaasher zamam velo kaasher assa is based on the evidence that what happened fulfilled Hashem's will; and the Ohr Hachayim's discussion of Yosef's statement to his brothers that "Elokim chashava letova."  Please bear these in mind while reading the rest of this.


I don’t understand what the Rambam is asking. First of all, why doesn’t he simply say like Reb Akiva that “Hakol tzafui vehareshu nesuna,” that all is foreseen but man still has free will?  This clearly means that Hashem foresees what will happen, but does not influence mankind's choices.  See Reb Meir Simcha in his pirush on the Rambam here where he has a special Ma’aracha called Hakol Tzafui, toward the end. Second of all, why is the Rambam asking davkeh because of the nevu’ah? Why isn’t it a general question of yedia and bechira? Elah mai, that it is a question specifically because they would have a teretz to excuse them from an onesh because they can say that Hashem had said this would happen. What kind of teretz is that?  Did they hold they had a din of Shor Ha'Itztadin, like the Mishna in Bava Kamma 39a, and like Rav on 40b, that not only is it not chayav missah, but is even kasher as a korban?


I think the pshat is that since this event was clearly retzon Hashem, then anyone who does it is doing a ma'aseh mitzva--albeit a mitzva shelo lishmah. And it is not shayich to be ma’anish a person for doing a mitzva even if his cheshbon was to do an aveira. For example, if a person is chayav an onesh misa from Beis Din, and he runs away and someone, who knows nothing of the court decision, kills him out of hatred in cold blood, that person certainly is not ne’enash; partly because the other is a gavra ketilla, but logically also because he is getting what he deserves.  Even though this is a good pshat, it sure isn’t what the Rambam has in mind.

The Lekach Tov here brings that this is why the first sign to Moshe was the nachash-it was a symbol that Hashem intended that the Mitzrim be like a rod to chastize the Bnei Yisroel, but the Mitzrim had changed from a rod to a snake, and hurt the Bnei Yisroel more than they deserved.

And the Gaon also speaks about this in Bo, Shemos 11:2 where it says “ve’yishalu...klei chesef....” He says: 1. That the main geula was by the Yam, because it was only there that the Mitzrim could be punished for having drowned the children. 2. That even at the Bris Bein Habsorim Hashem told Avrahom “ve'gam es hagoi asher ya’avodu dan Anochi,” and that this meant “if they do more that Hashem was gozer on the Jews. 3. That Yisro, when he said regarding Krias Yam Suf, “ki badavor asher zadu aleihem,” he meant that the mitzrim were more vicious than Hashem had decreed proper for the Jews because of “ze'don libam.”

And, when learning Makkos, I brought up the Ramban mentioned below in the parsha of zomemim on the idea of ‘velo ka’asher asa’, that this is because the fact that beis din punished him shows that he deserved it. I realized that this is the same idea— if the defendant deserved it, then even though the zomemim were resha’im who were unjustly accusing him of something he did not do, because they wanted to hurt him, they are not punished. And the same idea is true by a man that killed beshogeg— the mishnah in Avos that says that what happened was Hashem’s will. Then you have to apply the machlokes and the Ohr Hachayim about whether the act of a rasha carries out or subverts Hashem’s will, because if every rasha’s act carries out Hashem’s will, then according to the Ramban you shouldn’t be able to punish him. This is similar to the idea the Chinuch says about the issur of Nekama: Mitzvah 241 in Parshas Kedoshim, Vayikra 19:18; “A man should know and take to heart that all that happens to him from good to bad is intended to happen to him from Hashem, and from the hand of man...nothing will happen except His will Borch Hu, and so if a person causes him suffering or pain, a man should know in his soul that his sins caused it and Hashem decreed it upon him, and he should not direct his thoughts to revenge from the person because he is not the reason for the bad, rather the sin was the cause.” Of course, the Chinuch agrees that in cases where restitution is allowed, one can pursue restitution. But the idea is that one cannot bear a grudge against a malefactor for the pain he inflicted. This is hard to reconcile with the Ramban, unless you differentiate between injury by the hand of a jew and of a non-jew. But it doesn’t say “lo sikom berei’echa,” does it? And anyway the theology shouldn’t depend on the actor.