Vayechi, 50:20 and the Haftarah. Revenge

Dovid Hamelech told Shlomo that he should take revenge from, in particular, Shimi ben Geiroh. R’ Chaim Shmuelevitz in his Sichos Mussar, Maamar 27, page 113, title “Nekama,” points out that it is surprising that David Hamelech decided that his last words, his tzava’a to his son Shlomo, should be such words. That the eponymous father of the line of royalty in Klal Yisrael, Malchus Beis David, who wrote Tehillim, whose every word bespeaks a supernal spirituality, should demand revenge seems extremely out of character.

He answers that this is not the revenge that naturally dwells in the human heart, which, he brings, the Mesillas Yeshorim describes as “sweeter than honey, but assur.” This is a different type of revenge which we find is not limited to punishing evil-doers, but whose goal is the “balancing of the scales.” He says that this type of revenge is done so that the chillul Hashem created when wickedness goes unpunished is reversed. Similarly, when goodness has gone unrewarded, ‘nekama’ can be the apt term to describe the reward given to the doer of good. Dovid wanted to reverse the chillul Hashem created when Shim’i ben Geiroh got away with a wicked act, but it was nothing personal.

(By the way, note that in the Parshah we also find the theme of nekamah– Yosef’s brothers were afraid that he would want to take nekamah, so they made up a story about Yaakov sending a message to Yosef that he should forgive them.)

When I said this drasha in Shul, I said I didn’t understand it. While I understand that you can view revenge as a way to balance the scale, it is strange to say that if done for personal satisfaction it is a grave sin, but if done l’sheim shomayim it’s a great mitzvah. Also, the natural human motive to take revenge is so powerful that it is next to impossible to say that it is assur until you purge yourself of emotion and take revenge l’sheim shomayim– it is like asking a human being to grow wings and fly.

One member of the tzibur said that David Hamelech had the right to do this because of k’vod malchus; in fact, R’ Shmuelevitz anticipates this explanation and rejects it, but his rejection seems weak to me.

Anyway, I said there is a proof to the vort from what Yosef told his brothers. He said, I’m not taking revenge, because although you intended bad, Hashem turned it/intended it for the good. How does that excuse the brothers? Their sin was their evil intention, and that is unaffected by the result. The answer is that since the only hetter for revenge is to reverse a chillul Hashem by punishing evil-doers whose aveirah created a chillul Hashem, that does not apply here. Normally an aveira does create chillul Hashem, because it is contrary to the retzon Hashem. But here, although the act was an aveira, it was so clearly an instrument of retzon Hashem, that the chillul already became a kiddush Hashem, so there is no reason for nekamah.

General info about the din of “lo sikom.”

UPDATE MAY 2012:
I came across this very well done overview of the din of Nekama by Rabbi Yaacov Haber, but I'm leaving what I wrote; it's worth reading both.

The basic issur passuk is in Parshas K'doshim, Vayikro 19:18.

The Gemorah in Yoma 23a says Kol talmid chochom she’eino nokeim v’noteir k’nochosh eino talmid chochom. Gemorah asks, what about the issur? Answers, that’s only in money matters, like the story about the grudge against a stingy neighbor. But in personal pain, that is, disgrace or injury, it is muttar. Gemorah asks, but what about “hane’elovim v’einom olvim...” which praises those who disregard personal affront? Answers, you don’t do anything, but you hold the feelings in your heart; Rashi– and if someone else takes revenge, you remain silent. Gemorah asks, but “hama’avir ahl middosov mochlin lo kol avonosov”, which indicates that forebearance is praiseworthy? Answers, that just means that if the offender asks mechila, you are mocheil. But if he doesn’t ask to be forgiven, you are entitled to remember and resent his offense.

Lutzker Rov in Kedoshim– k’nochosh means without personal enjoyment.

R’ Bloch in P’ninei Da’as– “im lo y’fayeis lo, ohz yachzik regesh hanekamahh b’libo.”

According to Sefer Ye'reim, #197, there is no prohibition against nekamah in cases where one has been physically or verbally abused by another (tza'ara d'gufa), .

According to Rambam - Hilchos De'os 7:7, (I saw in the Likutim in the Frankel Rambam he brings a Shut Maharshag that says that the issur is only when the other refused to do a favor for you. But if the other did an “ovel” to you, it is muttar to take nekamah, and he brings a rayo from David and Shim’i. His rayo from David is, to put it mildly, weak: a melech is different, it was through his son, it was through a ruse, and plenty more) and Chinuch #241, it is forbidden to take n'kama even for severe provocations of tsa'ara d'gufa. See the Minchas Chinuch and meforshim there for mar’ei m’komos on the several l’shonos in the Gemorah and the nos’ei keilim in the Rambam. (Strangely, the Chinuch illustrates his point that a person should attribute suffering to Hashem’s will with reference to David Hamelech’s statement after Shim’i cursed him– leave him alone because it is from Hashem that this has happened. It’s strange because we see that David Hamelech sought retribution in his tzava’ah.

The Radak says that what he meant was that he knew that Shim’i was still a moreid b’malchus, and he wanted Shlomo to ferret out that subversive stance and have him killed, which is what happened in the end.)

The Chafetz Chaim (p’sicha to Hilchos Lashon Horoh, Be'er Mayim Chayim #8) paskens that one should follow this latter view based on the principle of "sofek de'oraisa l'chumra". However, the Chafetz Chaim further notes that even in extremes of tza'ara d'gufa, the issur of n'kama would only apply at a later time once passions have cooled and the avenger premeditates n'kama. To respond instinctively and spontaneously to a physical or verbal attack would undoubtedly be permitted according to all opinions. As support for this distinction, he cites the Sefer Ha-Chinuch who, in another context (#338), likens this situation to that of a rodef in which the nirdaf may use all tools at his disposal in self-defense to ward-off attack. I wonder if he would also be mattir nekamah as a deterrent. (The Sefer Ha- Chinuch emphasizes, however, that the preferred verbal defense should be one which diffuses tensions and preserves the dignity of the victim without drawing him into a cycle of rage.)

The Ramban in Kedoshim notes that one may take nekamah for dinei nefoshos, referring, I assume, to the din of go’eil hadahm. I suppose that’s because it is viewed as an injury to the relative, like monetary loss, which can be satisfied (that being the nature of people) through inflicting similar loss upon the malefactor.

So, for the time being, since this is not brought in Shulchan Oruch, but only by the CC in the psicha to Hilchos Loshon Horoh, we lack the most basic definition of the issur and, it goes without saying, the halocho l’maiseh.

Despair, Teshuvah, and Hope.

Sometimes, a person is convinced that he is so sinful that teshuva won’t help. This state of despair can mean one of two things. One: that he is, indeed, worthless, or Two: that he is not.
Let's say he is indeed an irredeemable rasha. Well, that’s not a exemption from doing avodas Hashem. It can even be liberating– you don’t have to bother trying to repair what you’ve done wrong, but there’s no reason not to do whatever good you can, bein odom lechaveiro or lamokom, in the time you have. But most likely the possibility of proper t’shuva still exists, but he is denying it– it’s an avoidance mechanism–because he doesn’t want to give up his irresponsible way of life.

(We lie to ourselves all the time. I am reminded of this whenever someone dies, and a relative says "If only I had taken the opportunity to call them more often, take care of them better, kiss them, tell them I love them, sit and learn from them......" on and on. What this really means is that the person knew, deep in his heart. that he could have been doing this all along, but decided he didn't want to. Only when the relative is safely dead can he say "If I had been more thoughtful I would have done a, b, c...." No. You're lying to yourself. You didn't get wiser because the other person died. You never wanted to do these things and you never would have done these things.)

Someone pointed out to me that Reuven’s teshuva did not regain for him what could have been his. His malchus and kehuna were irretrievably gone– pachaz kamayim, ahl tosar. Period. Similarly, Adam’s delayed teshuva did not get him back into gan eden, the dohr hamidbar did teshuva for the chet hameraglim and the chet ha’eigel, but the gzeiras hamidbar stood; and Shaul did teshuva for his chet with Amaleik but lost his malchus anyway, and so on. So Acher might have been right about the futility of his attempting teshuva.

On the other hand, we find that Menashe’s teshuva did enable him to retain his malchus-- and his aveiros were much more serious than most of the aforementioned.

As a consolation, the Chasam Sofer here does say that "yeser se'eis ve'yeser oz" means that Reuven's position as King of Baalei Teshuva is greater than his previous status as progenitor of Malchus and Kehuna, because bemakom....

Things to consider on this topic:

I think that one of the factors here is that if before teshuva the person’s rights/position were given to someone else, or a set of circumstances was set into motion, it is not revoked. You can’t be sho’eil on hefker once someone else has taken the object, and you can't be shoeil on hekdesh once the Kohen has the korban/trumah.

Not regaining previous entitlements is not the same as not being forgiven.

When you look at Reuven’s case, you also have to see the obvious contrast with Yehuda, whose teshuva seems to have regained him whatever he had previously lost. Adam's teshuva did not help, but Kayin's did. We know that it is possible to completely abandon a particular chet without changing the middah that caused it (Prishus/Nekius). Maybe the difference is whether there was just charatah/azivas hachet or also the actual changing of the middah that caused the chet.

In parshas Vayechi, in Breishis 49:4, on Pachaz kamayim, Reb Elya Lopian says that the loss of malchus and kehuna was not an onesh for the chillul yetzu’ei aviv; as Rashi points out, pachaz here is a noun, not a verb, so the accent is at the beginning. The chilul showed how he allowed his middah of 'pachaz' to come out, and the middah is the reason he could not have malchus or kehunah. He adds, you can’t say it was a real punishment, because the Torah and Chazal stress how Reuven did teshuva. It must be that it was not an onesh, but rather a necessary result of the fact of the middah ra’ah that was inconsistent with kehunah and malchus.

He brings a Chofetz Chayim that says that laundering clothes can take out stains, but it doesn’t sew on new buttons. The idea is that teshuva is a good thing, and it does remove the p’gam of the aveiroh, but there might be a middoh ra’ah that has to be removed, and teshuva is not going to remove a middah ra’ah. That takes a lot of separate work.

I saw the magi’ah in the Shelah in the later section on Teshuva, toward the end of the sefer, that says (with my additions) that a person should be careful not to treat symptoms, but to find and cure the underlying cause, both in the case of health problems and spiritual problems. A person goes to the doctor with a rash, or a cough. The doctor might look at the rash, and say, yes, you have a rash, and prescribe a lotion, or prescribe a cough suppressant for the cough. This is foolish, because he is only treating the symptom. A better doctor will look further, and determine what is causing the rash or the cough, what the underlying problem is. A wiser doctor would not rest at that point. He would try to investigate and to find out why this person caught this illness. Maybe he has mold in the walls of his house. Maybe he has a friend who is a carrier, from whom he caught the disease. He might find the source of the fungus, or a reservoir of bacteria. And even worse— the patient might have systemic condition of depressed immunity— that he catches what others would shrug off easily. In the context of teshuva, this would be called a lack of character. The lesson is that the same way a good doctor will treat the symptom, the underlying cause, and the weakened immunity, a baal teshuvah must treat the act of sin, the underlying taivah, and the failure of yiras shamayim and bitachon.

See the Tanchuma on the passuk by Reuven that says on the word “alah” at the end of the passuk: “Alah— tehei meruchak ad sheyavo Moshe shekasuv bo ‘Umoshe alah el ha’Elokim’ v’karevcha v’yomar ‘Yechi Reuven ve’al yamus.” What is the shaychus of Reuven’s kappara to Moshe’s kabbalas haTorah? The answer (from Harav Morgenstern of Beis Medrosh LaTorah) is this:

Chazal say that Hashem said “barasi yetzer hara, barasi Torah tavlin.” Until matan Torah, teshuva removed the pegam of a chet, but did nothing for the underlying middah. Therefore, despite Reuven’s teshuva, the middah megunah remained a middah megunah. But tavlin is a spice, which changes a food’s flavor and makes it taste better. Torah enables a person to change his middah ra’ah and make it into a middah that serves Hashem. After matan Torah, the middah of the shevet of Reuven that prevented them from reaching their potential became responsive to change and improvement, it became a potential tool for avodas Hashem, in the sense of ‘bishtei yetzirecha.’

It’s worth thinking about this— first, teshuva that doesn’t address the underlying problem may be teshuva, but it doesn’t really solve anything, as the Mesillas Yeshorim says. Second, obviously, just learning doesn’t do a thing for a person’s middos ra’os. There has to be an intention and an effort to change through the limud haTorah.