You know the story about a passenger on a boat that was drilling a hole in the floor of his cabin. His fellow passengers grabbed him and took his drill away. Angrily, he said, "You troublemakers, why are mixing into my affairs? It's my cabin!"
Yes, it's true that a breech threatens us all, not just the people who are doing the breaching. But the interdependence and mutual responsibility of the members of Klal Yisrael can sometimes seem to be a pain in the neck. I would guess that it actually benefits us all, as we see that even Moshe Rabbeinu's high madreiga of nevu'ah stemmed from his position as leader of Klal Yisrael, so it seems that we all are elevated by this arvus. But sometimes, our individual responsibility for others' behavior results in very unpleasant things such as the hafganot in Yerushalayim (assuming that they stem from real anger about chillul shabbos and are not just an assertion of political power and entitlement).
Anyway, this week's parsha relates to this topic in two ways.
25:11. Velo Chilisi. The Shai Latorah here brings rayos and quotes anonymous rishonim that an individual’s sin can provoke punishment upon the entire community. Examples: Zimri and the fact that if not for Pinchos, there might have been a ‘chilisi.’ Beshalach 16:19– there were warned to not leave Mahn overnight. Two people did, and Hashem said “Ahd ana mei’antem.” Yehoshua 7– Achan was the only man who took from the shallal, and because of his sin, thirty six people died at the next battle, and Hashem said it was because “vegam lakchu be’keileihem.” He asks, but why then, by Korah, did Moshe argue “ha’ish echad yecheta ve’ahl kol ha’eidah tiktzof?”? He brings from Reb Dovid Soloveichik that Korach had a din “nivdal,” as Moshe had told him and his people “hibadlu mitoch ha’eidah.”
It's a drash, not a lomdishe shiur, so I wouldn't expect him to bring contrary rayos, but there are plenty of mekoros that guilt is personal except in the case of widespread and openly notorious behavior. But anyway, the point is that Reb Dovid Soloveichik said it.
25:12. Brisi Sholom. Everybody and his uncle talk about the apparent conflict between the act and the reward; some ask that a medal for an act should reflect the act, others say that it has to stem from the act and it doesn’t here.
First: Rav Shamshon Refoel Hirsch on Parshas Pinchos says that peace - shalom - isn't quiet or appeasement, but rather the restoration of rights, human and divine, and the creation of harmony between Hashem and His creation. Once again, like the Chasam Sofer's observation that Verav Shalom is the gematria of Machlokes.
Second: Harav Avraham Lawrence told me that he once heard an interesting vort. Rashi here says “bedin hu she’yitol scharo.” But we hold schar mitzvah b’hai alma leka!
That answer is that even if we hold schar mitzvah b’hai alma leka, there is one schar that is guaranteed, and that is “mitzvah goreres mitzvah.” But here, Hashem did not want that to happen, because even if Pinchos’ kana’us was a wonderful thing and a great mitzvah, it would not be good if kana’us was ‘goreir’ more kana’us, and being a kana'i is like going for a ride on tiger; sometimes you come back on it, sometimes in it. So in order to avoid that, Hashem rescinded deferral of schar through the usual ‘goreres’ protocol, and went directly to schar. This is what “bedin hu she’yitol scharo” means.
So: the point of these two ideas in Parshas Pinchas is that sometimes, we have to mix into other peoples' business, if not out of altruism, then out of self-interest, or, as anthropologists like to say, out of selfish altruism. Second, necessary and ultimate good, maybe, but still ugly and dangerous.
Earlier posts on Pinchas:
Flexibility in Psak and Eilu Ve'eilu
http://havolim.blogspot.com/2008/07/mattos-bamidbar-2815-seir-izim-echad.html
A Kohen with Blood on His Hands
http://havolim.blogspot.com/2007/07/pinchos-bamidbor-2513-bris-kehunas-olam.html
~
Tuesday, July 7, 2009
Monday, July 6, 2009
Reb Moshe; A Story About Gadlus
Every once in a while, the street gets aroused about some psak of Reb Moshe's, and I think it's worth recalling just what he was. Im rishonim ke'malachim, anu ki'bnei adam. Im rishonim ki'bnei adam, anu...ke'stam chamorim. (Shabbos 112b)
If one has never studied the Chazon Ish, it is difficult to comprehend the depth of his encyclopedic knowledge. He writes on every Torah topic, from Netillas Yadayim to Choshen Mishpat to Taharos. His diagrams for hilchos Kiddush Hachodesh and Mezuza and Eiruvin are famously daunting. Often, when you read his words, you realize that the gemara can be understood on an level entirely different than you had apprehended, evidence that great height and great depth and great breadth can co-exist. His creative and insightful integration of the entire Shas and commentaries are like a shower of cold water on a hot day. As the Netziv said about learning Reb Akiva Eiger, you feel you should be standing up when you learn from his sefarim.
Reb Moshe was in Eretz Yisrael once, and Reb Beinish Finkel, the Rosh Yeshiva of the Mir, visited him. My mechutan is a cousin of Reb Beinish's, and he talked to Reb Beinish soon afterwards. First, let me point out that Reb Beinish, besides being very close with all the Gedolei Eretz Yisrael, was the nephew of the Chazon Ish, having married the daughter of Reb Shmuel Greineman, the Chazon Ish's brother-in-law (Rebbitzen Greineman was the Chazon Ish's sister,) and he learned with him for seven years before he became Rosh Yeshiva. (At that time, he was a guard at an ice factory in Bnei Brak, and he stayed in the factory all night, and he would spend the entire day with the Chazon Ish.)
Reb Beinish said that in the time he was sitting with Reb Moshe, ten she'eilos came in, from all the Miktzo'os hatorah, involving the most disparate topics. He said that Reb Moshe answered every question immediately and thoroughly, as if he had just that moment finished learning the relevant subject. Reb Beinish's words were "Dos hob ich kein mohl nisht ge'zehn." Someone asked him, "Afilu bah der Fetter????" He answered "Afilu bah der Fetter." This I have never seen, even by Uncle.
And a similar story:
Reb Tzvi Hirsch Meisels, the Veitzener Rav, lived in Chicago when I was a child. He was once at my parents' house for a parlor meeting on behalf of, I think, Chinuch Atzmai. As he sat at the table, there was talking among the honored guests, and Rabbi Meisels mentioned that he had just come back from New York, where he sat on a Beis Din with Reb Moshe, adjudicating a question concerning a certain large organization in New York. He said that he spent weeks with Reb Moshe, and he could guarantee that there is not one se'if in the four parts of Shulchan Aruch that Reb Moshe does not have at his fingertips. A young man who was listening interjected, foolishly, "How can that be? (He) heard in the name of the Chazon Ish that in our days, there is nobody that remembers every se'if in Shulchan Aruch!" Rabbi Meisels responded "Nu, there are two possible answers to the kashe. To be mekayeim the words of the Chazon Ish, maybe there is a se'if that Reb Moshe doesn't remember; but when he needs it, he remembers it. Or, the Chazon Ish just didn't know Reb Moshe."
And a story from Reb Moshe's nephew, Reb Michoel Feinstein ztzal of Bnei Brak, who was married to the Brisker Rov's daughter, Rebbitzen Lifsheh. According to Reb Michoel's son in law, Rav Tzvi Kaplan of Yeshivas Kodshim in Yerushalayim, Reb Michoel said many, many times that "the uncle (RebMoshe) is greater than the shver (the Brisker Rov)." One time, Rebbitzen Lifsheh came in and overheard him saying it, and she said, "Greater? Greater? Maybe maybe in Bekius, but in 'lernen?' Never!"
And the funny thing is, that reading Reb Moshe's teshuvos or dibros, one feels, occasionally, that it is not that extraordinary, that the ideas are not as spectacular as in the more Yeshivishe achronim, that the bekius is not that unusual. I often felt that Reb Moshe's style and content are reminiscent of the Pnei Yehoshua. But we all know of contemporaries who have said that Reb Moshe was a nice Russian Rov, but no more than that. Who am I to say who is right and who is wrong? But, and with all due respect, I wonder, why was I moved write about this topic after hearing Parshas Korach?
If one has never studied the Chazon Ish, it is difficult to comprehend the depth of his encyclopedic knowledge. He writes on every Torah topic, from Netillas Yadayim to Choshen Mishpat to Taharos. His diagrams for hilchos Kiddush Hachodesh and Mezuza and Eiruvin are famously daunting. Often, when you read his words, you realize that the gemara can be understood on an level entirely different than you had apprehended, evidence that great height and great depth and great breadth can co-exist. His creative and insightful integration of the entire Shas and commentaries are like a shower of cold water on a hot day. As the Netziv said about learning Reb Akiva Eiger, you feel you should be standing up when you learn from his sefarim.
Reb Moshe was in Eretz Yisrael once, and Reb Beinish Finkel, the Rosh Yeshiva of the Mir, visited him. My mechutan is a cousin of Reb Beinish's, and he talked to Reb Beinish soon afterwards. First, let me point out that Reb Beinish, besides being very close with all the Gedolei Eretz Yisrael, was the nephew of the Chazon Ish, having married the daughter of Reb Shmuel Greineman, the Chazon Ish's brother-in-law (Rebbitzen Greineman was the Chazon Ish's sister,) and he learned with him for seven years before he became Rosh Yeshiva. (At that time, he was a guard at an ice factory in Bnei Brak, and he stayed in the factory all night, and he would spend the entire day with the Chazon Ish.)
Reb Beinish said that in the time he was sitting with Reb Moshe, ten she'eilos came in, from all the Miktzo'os hatorah, involving the most disparate topics. He said that Reb Moshe answered every question immediately and thoroughly, as if he had just that moment finished learning the relevant subject. Reb Beinish's words were "Dos hob ich kein mohl nisht ge'zehn." Someone asked him, "Afilu bah der Fetter????" He answered "Afilu bah der Fetter." This I have never seen, even by Uncle.
And a similar story:
Reb Tzvi Hirsch Meisels, the Veitzener Rav, lived in Chicago when I was a child. He was once at my parents' house for a parlor meeting on behalf of, I think, Chinuch Atzmai. As he sat at the table, there was talking among the honored guests, and Rabbi Meisels mentioned that he had just come back from New York, where he sat on a Beis Din with Reb Moshe, adjudicating a question concerning a certain large organization in New York. He said that he spent weeks with Reb Moshe, and he could guarantee that there is not one se'if in the four parts of Shulchan Aruch that Reb Moshe does not have at his fingertips. A young man who was listening interjected, foolishly, "How can that be? (He) heard in the name of the Chazon Ish that in our days, there is nobody that remembers every se'if in Shulchan Aruch!" Rabbi Meisels responded "Nu, there are two possible answers to the kashe. To be mekayeim the words of the Chazon Ish, maybe there is a se'if that Reb Moshe doesn't remember; but when he needs it, he remembers it. Or, the Chazon Ish just didn't know Reb Moshe."
And a story from Reb Moshe's nephew, Reb Michoel Feinstein ztzal of Bnei Brak, who was married to the Brisker Rov's daughter, Rebbitzen Lifsheh. According to Reb Michoel's son in law, Rav Tzvi Kaplan of Yeshivas Kodshim in Yerushalayim, Reb Michoel said many, many times that "the uncle (RebMoshe) is greater than the shver (the Brisker Rov)." One time, Rebbitzen Lifsheh came in and overheard him saying it, and she said, "Greater? Greater? Maybe maybe in Bekius, but in 'lernen?' Never!"
And the funny thing is, that reading Reb Moshe's teshuvos or dibros, one feels, occasionally, that it is not that extraordinary, that the ideas are not as spectacular as in the more Yeshivishe achronim, that the bekius is not that unusual. I often felt that Reb Moshe's style and content are reminiscent of the Pnei Yehoshua. But we all know of contemporaries who have said that Reb Moshe was a nice Russian Rov, but no more than that. Who am I to say who is right and who is wrong? But, and with all due respect, I wonder, why was I moved write about this topic after hearing Parshas Korach?
Wednesday, July 1, 2009
Walking the Chasan and Kallah to the Chuppah
One of the issues that can arise during wedding planning is the question of the Unterfeuhrers, or the Shushvinim. That is, who should walk the chasan and kallah to the chupah-- fathers with the chassan and mothers with the kallah, or parents with each. As Reb Yakov Kaminetzky said, his minhag is to do whatever the mechutanim want. This was not because Reb Yakov was a foundling with no family traditions. He was certainly not. But his predominant family tradition was to have seichel and not make a fuss about trivial things.
That's fine for Reb Yakov. For most men, the minhag is to do what their wives tell them to do. This is a subset of Reb Yakov's minhag. But what about the rest of us, who live to argue about such things? What is the 'right' thing to do?
This question often evokes strong feelings. Speaking from experience, walking your child to the chuppah is one of the greatest moments of our time on Earth, on the order of sandeka'us for a grandchild, when you see, in your mind's eye, your father holding you, his father holding him, the unbroken chain of your ancestors all the way back to Avraham Avinu all doing the same for their children. So while it's easy to scoff at the fights that we often see, one must be cognizant of the strong emotions involved.
1. Brachos 61, Eiruvin 18b, Hashem was the Shushvin of Adam Harishon, which included walking him to the chuppah and to the yichud room afterwards (Hanesu'in Ke'hilchaso 12:14.)
2. Medrash Rabba Breishis 88, that Micha'el and Gavri'el escorted Adam to his chuppah. Doesn't address whether to go f/f (father/father) or f/m, because malachim have no gender as far as I know, but it's a makor for the idea of walking the chasan to the chupah.
3. Rama YD 391:3 (it's in Yoreh Dei'ah because he discusses whether an aveil can be a shushvin) says you go f/f with the Chassan, mother/mother with the Kallah, and that this is "our minhag," and this is quoted verbatim by the Aruch Hashulchan there.
4. Zohar Breishis 2:22 says father/mother for each, not like the Rama.
5. In Reb Moshe Feinstein's family, the minhag was f/m. The Satmerer is quoted as having said that if both sides have the f/f minhag, it is prohibited to change it to f/m. If, however, one side has the minhag of f/m, it is permissible. See also Mishneh Halachos 9 #287 and Da'as Sofer 2 #25.
5. Many don't walk a child to the chuppah if their original marriage ended, whether due to death or divorce (She'arim Metzuyanim Be'halacha147 note 12). This is because people are careful about simanim- omens and portents- at a wedding. For example, many chasanim (See Sperber's Minhagei Yisrael vol. 8 page 71 note 11) don't knot the tie they wear under the chuppah because untying it later would be inauspicious. (However, it has become common for divorced parents to walk their child to the Chuppah. Usually, one or both parents will not be happy about it, but most often they can be convinced to deal with reality for the sixty seconds that it takes. The fact remains that they are both his parents, and their divorce does not change that fact; it also doesn't change the fact that the child in entitled to have both his parents walking with him.) My parents and Reb Chaim and Rebbitzen Freida Stein were in Samarkhand during the war, and after the war ended and people started to get married, my parents and the Steins agreed that whoever would get married first would bagleit the other couple to the chuppah, even though Reb Chaim's father in law, Uzder Rov, was still alive, because his first wife had died and he had remarried, and a remarried parent wasn't an unterfirer.
6. If the kallah's mother is visibly pregnant, She'arim Metzuyanim Be'halacha says she should not walk her daughter to the chuppah. (147 note 12, because of Ayin Hara, I suppose like a father and son getting consecutive aliyos)
7. Although the Rama is mattir, if the parents are r'l avelim, a rav must be consulted, because in our time music is played as they walk towards the chuppah, as the Aruch Hashulchan points out. Also, one should be aware that the Taz in 393 sk 4 is mattir even within shloshim for aveilim for relatives other than parents.
8. If you and the mechutanim cannot come to an agreement, because they want f/f and you want f/m, then add a pre-red-carpet walk; do father/mother as you walk from the prep room to the chuppah room, and when you are about to enter the chuppah hall, change partners and continue the walk re-organized. And if you can't come to a mature agreement about this, then brace yourself for knock down, drag out fights about naming babies, where the kids will be for yomtov, and where they're going to live.
Yasher Koach to Rabbi Henoch Plotnik of Chicago for many of the m'ms
That's fine for Reb Yakov. For most men, the minhag is to do what their wives tell them to do. This is a subset of Reb Yakov's minhag. But what about the rest of us, who live to argue about such things? What is the 'right' thing to do?
This question often evokes strong feelings. Speaking from experience, walking your child to the chuppah is one of the greatest moments of our time on Earth, on the order of sandeka'us for a grandchild, when you see, in your mind's eye, your father holding you, his father holding him, the unbroken chain of your ancestors all the way back to Avraham Avinu all doing the same for their children. So while it's easy to scoff at the fights that we often see, one must be cognizant of the strong emotions involved.
1. Brachos 61, Eiruvin 18b, Hashem was the Shushvin of Adam Harishon, which included walking him to the chuppah and to the yichud room afterwards (Hanesu'in Ke'hilchaso 12:14.)
2. Medrash Rabba Breishis 88, that Micha'el and Gavri'el escorted Adam to his chuppah. Doesn't address whether to go f/f (father/father) or f/m, because malachim have no gender as far as I know, but it's a makor for the idea of walking the chasan to the chupah.
3. Rama YD 391:3 (it's in Yoreh Dei'ah because he discusses whether an aveil can be a shushvin) says you go f/f with the Chassan, mother/mother with the Kallah, and that this is "our minhag," and this is quoted verbatim by the Aruch Hashulchan there.
4. Zohar Breishis 2:22 says father/mother for each, not like the Rama.
5. In Reb Moshe Feinstein's family, the minhag was f/m. The Satmerer is quoted as having said that if both sides have the f/f minhag, it is prohibited to change it to f/m. If, however, one side has the minhag of f/m, it is permissible. See also Mishneh Halachos 9 #287 and Da'as Sofer 2 #25.
5. Many don't walk a child to the chuppah if their original marriage ended, whether due to death or divorce (She'arim Metzuyanim Be'halacha147 note 12). This is because people are careful about simanim- omens and portents- at a wedding. For example, many chasanim (See Sperber's Minhagei Yisrael vol. 8 page 71 note 11) don't knot the tie they wear under the chuppah because untying it later would be inauspicious. (However, it has become common for divorced parents to walk their child to the Chuppah. Usually, one or both parents will not be happy about it, but most often they can be convinced to deal with reality for the sixty seconds that it takes. The fact remains that they are both his parents, and their divorce does not change that fact; it also doesn't change the fact that the child in entitled to have both his parents walking with him.) My parents and Reb Chaim and Rebbitzen Freida Stein were in Samarkhand during the war, and after the war ended and people started to get married, my parents and the Steins agreed that whoever would get married first would bagleit the other couple to the chuppah, even though Reb Chaim's father in law, Uzder Rov, was still alive, because his first wife had died and he had remarried, and a remarried parent wasn't an unterfirer.
6. If the kallah's mother is visibly pregnant, She'arim Metzuyanim Be'halacha says she should not walk her daughter to the chuppah. (147 note 12, because of Ayin Hara, I suppose like a father and son getting consecutive aliyos)
7. Although the Rama is mattir, if the parents are r'l avelim, a rav must be consulted, because in our time music is played as they walk towards the chuppah, as the Aruch Hashulchan points out. Also, one should be aware that the Taz in 393 sk 4 is mattir even within shloshim for aveilim for relatives other than parents.
8. If you and the mechutanim cannot come to an agreement, because they want f/f and you want f/m, then add a pre-red-carpet walk; do father/mother as you walk from the prep room to the chuppah room, and when you are about to enter the chuppah hall, change partners and continue the walk re-organized. And if you can't come to a mature agreement about this, then brace yourself for knock down, drag out fights about naming babies, where the kids will be for yomtov, and where they're going to live.
Yasher Koach to Rabbi Henoch Plotnik of Chicago for many of the m'ms
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Advice to People Making Brachos under the Chuppah
The Ritva in Kesuvos (7b d'h Venahagu) says that the brachos under the chuppa are like kiddush Friday night, and this is why they are made over a cup of wine. Thus, the idea of the wine is akin to giving a toast to fete an honoree or an occassion. That being the case, my habit is that when I get one of the last two brachos under the chuppah, I make sure that when I say the words Chassan and Kallah at the end of the brachos, I look at the Chassan and the Kallah, respectively, and raise the glass to them. Just make sure you don't mix up the ends of the last two brachos: Samei'ach ends with "Chassan ve'challah," while Asher Bara ends with "Chassan Im ha'Kallah. (It does make a difference. Rashi (Kesuvos 8a d'h Mesamei'ach) says that the sixth bracha is a blessing that the chassan and kallah should have lives of success and fulfillment, while the seventh and last bracha praises Hashem for granting mankind, and specifically this bride and groom, the wonderful opportunity to create a loving and joyous marital bond. It's very romantic.)
Now, in Shulchan Aruch OC 184:4 and OC 271, it says that when you make a bracha on wine after bentching, or when you make kiddush on wine, you should look at the cup of wine during the bracha. But this is where you made a borei pri hagafen, and so it is important that you not be distracted (meisi'ach da'as) from the words and purpose of the bracha. Here, on the other hand, certainly according to the Ritva, logic dictates that where the object of the bracha is the young couple, you should be looking at them, not the wine. But besides that, I find that, at least in the case of Chassanim whose rational faculties are functioning to some extent, they appreciate it, and it gives emotional import to what otherwise might be seen as a droning halachic formalism. Just don't make it into a circus by lifting the cup three tefachim or the kallah's veil so you can have more kavanah on the cheftzah shel mitzvah. We're fohrt not Irish. A glance and a little gesture are just as meaningful.
And since I'm giving advice to Rabbi and honorees, here are some halachos that are not as well known as they should be:
Until when can you say the Sheva Brachos? Until seven days have passed. Day one is the day of the Chuppah, even if the Chuppa is five minutes before Shkiah.
Furthermore, Sheva Brachos depends on when you're saying the Sheva Brachos. If you bentch after the seventh day is over, you do not make the brachos. It is possible that if the last day was Shabbos, extending the Shabbos also extends the simcha of the seven days of nisuin, but most people don't hold like that. Still, if your wife is going to kill you for speaking too long and ruining the whole Sheva Brachos, you can rely on the meikilim. (Pischei Teshuva EH 62, Shevet Halevi 1:39.)
Now, in Shulchan Aruch OC 184:4 and OC 271, it says that when you make a bracha on wine after bentching, or when you make kiddush on wine, you should look at the cup of wine during the bracha. But this is where you made a borei pri hagafen, and so it is important that you not be distracted (meisi'ach da'as) from the words and purpose of the bracha. Here, on the other hand, certainly according to the Ritva, logic dictates that where the object of the bracha is the young couple, you should be looking at them, not the wine. But besides that, I find that, at least in the case of Chassanim whose rational faculties are functioning to some extent, they appreciate it, and it gives emotional import to what otherwise might be seen as a droning halachic formalism. Just don't make it into a circus by lifting the cup three tefachim or the kallah's veil so you can have more kavanah on the cheftzah shel mitzvah. We're fohrt not Irish. A glance and a little gesture are just as meaningful.
And since I'm giving advice to Rabbi and honorees, here are some halachos that are not as well known as they should be:
Until when can you say the Sheva Brachos? Until seven days have passed. Day one is the day of the Chuppah, even if the Chuppa is five minutes before Shkiah.
Furthermore, Sheva Brachos depends on when you're saying the Sheva Brachos. If you bentch after the seventh day is over, you do not make the brachos. It is possible that if the last day was Shabbos, extending the Shabbos also extends the simcha of the seven days of nisuin, but most people don't hold like that. Still, if your wife is going to kill you for speaking too long and ruining the whole Sheva Brachos, you can rely on the meikilim. (Pischei Teshuva EH 62, Shevet Halevi 1:39.)
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
Achdus II: Resolution. What Achdus Really Means
In the last post, I discussed the ubiquitous and cloying nostrum of Achdus. I proposed that the way the term is used currently it has become so broad and inclusive as to be absurd; we cannot love people we despise, and we can't be buddies with people whose religious, ethical, and personal behaviors and beliefs are repugnant, and we don't want to be infected by such persons' lifestyles and behaviors. That said, there is no question that Achdus is a worthy, indeed vitally important goal, as indicated in Perek Hanizakin. But just as "Anivus" implies one thing but really means something very different, so, too, "Achdus" does not necessarily mean what it is often thought to mean. In order to pursue the goal of Achdus, we have to have a realistic and honest and rational idea of what, exactly, we are pursuing.
Below you will find two sections. The first consists of several comments sent in by readers, which I found helpful. Following that, you will find my proposed resolution of this question.
Selected Comments and ideas that accrued in this discussion, for all of which I thank you:
I Why does achdus have to mean social mixing and true respect? When the old yerushalmi yid trying to buy a dirah for his youngest daughter knocks on my door and I listen to his problems and give him a few dollars, I feel some degree of achdus with him even though we have little shared interests and diametrically opposed ideas. When I see an Modern Orthodox couple, stuck with a child in Mount Sinai hospital for shabbos, enjoying the kugels and cakes provided by Satmar bikkur cholim I have a sense of seeing true achdus.
Achdus, as cliched as it sounds, means treating every Jew as I would my brother. I can (and do) disagree with almost everything my brother says but I would do anything for him and vice versa.
II One of the most commented-upon cases of achdus was the chever atzabim in the time of Achav - which, applying your hypothesis, was made possible by the avodah zarah attitude of tolerance. That tolerance even embraced Ovadiah hiding the true nevi'im. Imagine the converse: how much tolerance a chareidi society would show for someone protecting nevi'ei haba'al.
I once heard in the name of the Chasam Sofer that the gematria of Verav Shalom is the same as Machlokes. It actually works out precisely.
Sholom Rav le'Ohavei Torasecha, indeed.
III I would suggest that in light of Jewish history of the last several millenia perhaps we could define it as uniformity of purpose. Thus Satmar and Zionist messianists do display achdus as their common goal is the establishment of a Torah based religious community despite differing definitions and visions of that community.
IV I have been curious for a long time as to how is it that we say that it was the lack of achdus that caused the 2nd churban (well sinas chinam) and the big 3 were the cause of the 1st churban. After all, there seemed to be no shortage of the big 3 during the bayis sheni as evidenced by the existence of the Baryonim, Misyavnim et al and the first bayis we had 2 separate kingdoms which regularly fought one another in addition to their proclivity toward murder, theft and idolatry.
V Shared destiny, shared basic philosophy (rachmanim, bayshanim gomlei chasadim) despite wide divergence, mystical one-ness (areivus), love at arm's length with occasional aliyah laregel convocation, spiritual connection as evidenced by a guaranteed share in olam haba, shared methodology in seeking answers.
This is how I understand it.
The great sin of the Bayis Sheini was Sinas Chinam. Chinam Davka! Of course there are justifications for hating a fellow Jew. But you have to have clear and valid reasons for hating him. If your reasons are not legally defensible, you will transgress the Mitzva De'Oraysa of Ve'ahavta, the Lahv of Lo sisna es achicha bilvavecha (as is clear in Pesachim 113b, the issur applies even where you tell him you hate him, lahv davka bilvavecha), and the din of being Dan es kol adam le'kaf zechus. What, then, is a valid reason to hate a fellow Jew?
Chazal talk of the word "sonei" in the Torah, in the parshios of "ha'achas senu'ah" and "chamor sona'acha." In both cases, Chazal (Pesachim 113b, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak,) tell us that it refers to a Jew who is an avaryan, whom you have good reason to hate. In fact, then it would be a mitzva to hate him (Shulchan Aruch CM 34, Rambam 13 Rotzei'ach 14 and 5 Avodah Zara 4-- "lo soveh lo" by a Meisis, which the Rambam learns to mean "don't be his Oheiv.") But, and this is important, remember the magnificent Tosfos in Psachim 113b. Tosfos asks, if Sona'acha refers to a person whom the Torah requires that you hate, why does the Gemara in Bava Metzia say "Oheiv lifrok ve'sonei lit'on, mitzva be'sonei lit'on, ke'dei lakuf es yitzro:" but if you are supposed to hate him, what does lakuf es yitzro mean? Tosfos answers that we are talking about a three-step process here. 1: you hate him, and that's fine, but he sees you hate him, and "kamayim hapanim lapanim," and so 2. he hates you too, and, reacting to his hatred of you, 3. you hate him even more than the "shiur" of hatred that is legitimate. This, Tosfos says, is the work of the Yetzer Hara, and it is a mitzva to help the bad guy just to break your excessive hatred. So even when there is a mitzva to hate him, there is a shiur. The Rambam mentioned above, in 13 Rotzei'ach, also holds like Tosfos, since he writes the din of Lakuf es Yitzro in immediate contiguity to the mitzva of hating an avaryan that refuses to do teshuva. Or, as Artscroll loves to say, he juxtaposes them.
But the great and inadequately examined question is: What is the shiur? I don't recall seeing this discussed in the Steipler's Shiurin shel Torah. Are there different shiurim in Sin'ah? Are there different kinds of sin'ah? I would suggest that, as said in a comment, that the shiur is the amount you would hate your brother if he was an avaryan. I'm not a therapist, so I can't quantify what that means; but it is something that bears consideration. If someone's brother was a criminal, would he not love him? If someone's brother was a traitor, or had done to'eivos, disgusting things, I think the normal reaction would be to try to help him change. You wouldn't want to spend time with him socially, but you would try to help him, or at least wish he could be helped to redeem himself. This is pshat in the passuk that says "lo sisna es achicha bilvavecha." The Torah is teaching that the reason you should eschew hatred is because he is your brother; even when there is a din of sin'ah, you have to realize that you are hating your brother, and it should pain you to have come to such a state. (From Rav Ephraim Greenblatt; Rivevos Ephraim OC 2:198.)
So; the sin of sin'as chinam is a predisposition to indifference or dislike of a fellow Jew. If you have a valid justification for hatred, it is not a sin; by the Bayis Rishon, the division of Klal Yisrael was, I imagine, justified by some halachic logic, though evidently it turned out to be inadequate. According to their analyses, they were fulfilling the dictum of Chazal in Avos DeRav Nassan, end of Perek 16. The fact that what they did seems, to us, indefensible, may be because the winners wrote the history books; that is, the Aseres Hashvatim may have had a mesora in Torah and Halacha that died with them, and which has no vestige in our halacha. (Just for fun, if you wouold gather the oddest shittos of Da'as Yachid in the Shas that we have, both in dinim De'oraysa and dinim De'rabanan, from Rebbi Eliezer to Rav Preida and Rav Chidka, and imagine a Jewish world in which they were accepted as normative halacha, it wouldn't look at all like Judaism as we know it.)
Never confuse Unity for Uniformity. If the other person has a legitimate halachic basis for his crazy shittah, then you have no defensible reason to hate him. According to his mesorah, according to his sincere interpretation of the Torah, his shittah has validity. Is eilu ve'eilu elastic enough to cover Mossad Harav and Satmer? Yes, it is, if only in the sense that both seek the truth through a sincere investigation of our Torah, based on the 13 Ikrim and the 13 Middos She'hatorah Nidreshes Bahem. And that is enough, as indicated in the Rambam in Cheilek which I bring toward the end of this post. So you can't hate him-- but you certainly can, and should, fight him, as Beis Shamai fought Beis Hillel, as Shaul fought David, as the enemies of David fought him, as Yeravam and Rechavam fought, and the fight might be violent. Machlokes is characteristic of the Human condition, and is an inevitable and perhaps even necessary part of being a partisan of your derech of avodas Hashem. But while you fight, you have to remember that the other person is entitled to his opinion. You fight, you try to win, you can despise the shittah he espouses. But you have to remember that he is entitled to that shittah. David Hamelech almost never spoke of Shaul with anything but the greatest respect-- except one time, (Shmuel II:22- Mikaf kol oyvav umi'kaf Shaul) and Hashem rebuked him for that one slip (Shigayon leDavid ahl divrei Kush ben Yemini, and see Moed Kattan 16b). And, you will enjoy the Abarbanel's remarkable interpretation of this passuk, that accents the requirement that a Jew respect and love a fellow Jew, even his mortal enemy.
As one commenter tells us, the Chasam Sofer pointed out that the gematriya of "verav shalom" is the same as that of "machlokes."
The Mitzva of Achdus is an outgrowth of the concept of Areivus. Areivus stems from the words "Kol Yisrael Areivim Zeh Bazeh," although it's usually quoted zeh lazeh. It doesn't matter; the idea is correct no matter whether you say bazeh or lazeh. The word Areivim means commingled, and is similar to the word Areiv as in Arvus, the co-signer of a loan who accepts personal responsibility for the borrower's liability.
The Yerushalmi says that if a fellow Jew has not fulfilled his mitzvah, you can be motzi him with a bracha, because so long as he hasn't done the mitzva, you haven't fulfilled the mitzva completely either, and YOU are a bar chiyuva. Areivus is not only a din in mitzvos. It is a description of our essential reality; Klal Yisrael is intimately intraconnected, and the chesronos of one are the chesronos of all, just as the zechusim of each of us are shared. This is why it is better to daven on Yamim Nora'im with a minyan, because as a group, we share the group's special kesher with Hashem. Matan Torah required that absolute areivus-- Vayichan Yisrael. When you daven with a minyan, your tefilla is heard far above where it would be heard if you davened yourself.
We share our fate. The actions of each effects the other. There is no point in isolating another person or group, because their behavior reflects upon us no matter how we would like to ignore it. Hashem looks upon us as one nation, and our antipathy towards those we dislike does not mitigate or ameliorate that shared judgment.
Our actions stem from a shared history and, hard as it may be to believe, some degree of shared philosophy.
We are all parts of the same body, and you can't despise a part of your own body. If it threatens your life, or it causes terrible pain, you might have to remove it. But amputation is a painful and tragic last resort.
The Gemara in Chagiga 26a says that although during most of the year restrictions on contact with ignorant people were in place, most of these restrictions were lifted on the Shalosh Regalim. The Gemara darshens a passuk of Kol Yisrael chaverim-- on Yomtov, we must act as if all Jews are Chaverim, i.e., respected and scholarly members of our community. As soon as Yomtov was over, though, the real Chaverim were tovel to remove any tumah they may have gotten from the unlearned. And beyond Amei Ha'aretz-- during the year, there were numerous social restrictions that separated various groups of Jews: Bigdei ochlei chulin al taharas truma are medras le'ochlei chulin al taharas hakodesh. You'd want to stay out of arm's length! But for Yomtov, at least, as hard as it must have been for the Prushim, any concern of this tumah was to be disregarded. The vitally important awareness of interconnectedness mandates a kula in Tahara.
As I mentioned above, one of the great questions is what the rishonim mean by saying that despite the mitzva to hate an avaryan, there is still a din of kedei lakuf es yitzro. There is one more question that has elicited a great deal of discussion, and that is the following:
I mentioned the Rambam in Rotzei'ach that says that the mitzva to hate an avaryan applies to one who has been seen to do an aveira be'meizid. However, in his Pirush Hamishnayos in Chelek, Sanhedrin perek 10, in his discussion of the last of the 13 Ikrim, he says the following:
"When a person believes all of these Foundations... he enters into Klal Yisrael and it is a mitzva to love him and to have mercy on him...even if he has done any number of sins because he was driven by his Yetzer Hara and his lust and his vulgar desires; he will be punished...but he has a share in Olam Haba...but if a person has "niskalkeil" one of these Foundations, ...he is separated from the Klal...and is a Min...and it is a mitzva to hate him...and upon him says the passuk (Tehillim 139) Halo mi'san'echa Hashem esna."
As Rabbi Shragie Neuberger once said, once he found that the Rambam said anything about a given subject, he was confident that he could say a lomdishe drasha on that topic. The Rambam never said anything without immediately creating an entire spectrum of bewilderments. This Rambam is a good example.
1. He contradicts his halacha in Rotzei'ach regarding hating an avaryan.
2. He implies that "yeish lo chelek le'olam haba" and the mitzva of "ve'ahavta" are a tautology, that they are intimately related, that either both applicable or neither is. Why would the underlying logic of one be the same as for the other?
3. What does he mean by Niskalkel? An innocent error? Of course, nebach an apikores is also an apikores. But here, he implies that you can't even say nebach.
General Postscripts:
1. For any Lubavitchers that are reading this: The Tanya (32) says that even when one must hate an oveir aveiros, that only means that you hate the bad in him, but you must also love the good in him, while hatred for Kofrim is absolute-- "tachlis sin'a si'nei'sim." There are those that use this to distinguish between the Rambam in the Yad and in the Pirush Hamishnayos, but to me, it's just wishful thinking.
2. The Yerei'im in 39 says that the sin'a to an oveir aveiros who doesn't respond to tochacha is not "sin'as haleiv, ella sin'a hanir'is le'einayim," and he shtells tzu the Gemara in Pesachim. Also used to be meyasheiv the Rambam, also bubbeh maises.
3. For a thorough discussion of to whom the mitzva of leha'chayoso applies, and the connection with the word "achicha," and whether there is a difference between doing an aveira once of repeatedly and le'tei'avon, and whether there is an in between madriega of "not hating and no chiyuv to support but allowed to support," which would be like "lo moridin aval im ratza, ma'aleh," see the Shach and the Taz in YD beginning of 251.
To be continued.
Below you will find two sections. The first consists of several comments sent in by readers, which I found helpful. Following that, you will find my proposed resolution of this question.
Section I
Selected Comments and ideas that accrued in this discussion, for all of which I thank you:
I Why does achdus have to mean social mixing and true respect? When the old yerushalmi yid trying to buy a dirah for his youngest daughter knocks on my door and I listen to his problems and give him a few dollars, I feel some degree of achdus with him even though we have little shared interests and diametrically opposed ideas. When I see an Modern Orthodox couple, stuck with a child in Mount Sinai hospital for shabbos, enjoying the kugels and cakes provided by Satmar bikkur cholim I have a sense of seeing true achdus.
Achdus, as cliched as it sounds, means treating every Jew as I would my brother. I can (and do) disagree with almost everything my brother says but I would do anything for him and vice versa.
II One of the most commented-upon cases of achdus was the chever atzabim in the time of Achav - which, applying your hypothesis, was made possible by the avodah zarah attitude of tolerance. That tolerance even embraced Ovadiah hiding the true nevi'im. Imagine the converse: how much tolerance a chareidi society would show for someone protecting nevi'ei haba'al.
I once heard in the name of the Chasam Sofer that the gematria of Verav Shalom is the same as Machlokes. It actually works out precisely.
Sholom Rav le'Ohavei Torasecha, indeed.
III I would suggest that in light of Jewish history of the last several millenia perhaps we could define it as uniformity of purpose. Thus Satmar and Zionist messianists do display achdus as their common goal is the establishment of a Torah based religious community despite differing definitions and visions of that community.
IV I have been curious for a long time as to how is it that we say that it was the lack of achdus that caused the 2nd churban (well sinas chinam) and the big 3 were the cause of the 1st churban. After all, there seemed to be no shortage of the big 3 during the bayis sheni as evidenced by the existence of the Baryonim, Misyavnim et al and the first bayis we had 2 separate kingdoms which regularly fought one another in addition to their proclivity toward murder, theft and idolatry.
V Shared destiny, shared basic philosophy (rachmanim, bayshanim gomlei chasadim) despite wide divergence, mystical one-ness (areivus), love at arm's length with occasional aliyah laregel convocation, spiritual connection as evidenced by a guaranteed share in olam haba, shared methodology in seeking answers.
Section II:
What Achdus Means and What Achdus Requires.
This is how I understand it.
The great sin of the Bayis Sheini was Sinas Chinam. Chinam Davka! Of course there are justifications for hating a fellow Jew. But you have to have clear and valid reasons for hating him. If your reasons are not legally defensible, you will transgress the Mitzva De'Oraysa of Ve'ahavta, the Lahv of Lo sisna es achicha bilvavecha (as is clear in Pesachim 113b, the issur applies even where you tell him you hate him, lahv davka bilvavecha), and the din of being Dan es kol adam le'kaf zechus. What, then, is a valid reason to hate a fellow Jew?
Chazal talk of the word "sonei" in the Torah, in the parshios of "ha'achas senu'ah" and "chamor sona'acha." In both cases, Chazal (Pesachim 113b, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak,) tell us that it refers to a Jew who is an avaryan, whom you have good reason to hate. In fact, then it would be a mitzva to hate him (Shulchan Aruch CM 34, Rambam 13 Rotzei'ach 14 and 5 Avodah Zara 4-- "lo soveh lo" by a Meisis, which the Rambam learns to mean "don't be his Oheiv.") But, and this is important, remember the magnificent Tosfos in Psachim 113b. Tosfos asks, if Sona'acha refers to a person whom the Torah requires that you hate, why does the Gemara in Bava Metzia say "Oheiv lifrok ve'sonei lit'on, mitzva be'sonei lit'on, ke'dei lakuf es yitzro:" but if you are supposed to hate him, what does lakuf es yitzro mean? Tosfos answers that we are talking about a three-step process here. 1: you hate him, and that's fine, but he sees you hate him, and "kamayim hapanim lapanim," and so 2. he hates you too, and, reacting to his hatred of you, 3. you hate him even more than the "shiur" of hatred that is legitimate. This, Tosfos says, is the work of the Yetzer Hara, and it is a mitzva to help the bad guy just to break your excessive hatred. So even when there is a mitzva to hate him, there is a shiur. The Rambam mentioned above, in 13 Rotzei'ach, also holds like Tosfos, since he writes the din of Lakuf es Yitzro in immediate contiguity to the mitzva of hating an avaryan that refuses to do teshuva. Or, as Artscroll loves to say, he juxtaposes them.
But the great and inadequately examined question is: What is the shiur? I don't recall seeing this discussed in the Steipler's Shiurin shel Torah. Are there different shiurim in Sin'ah? Are there different kinds of sin'ah? I would suggest that, as said in a comment, that the shiur is the amount you would hate your brother if he was an avaryan. I'm not a therapist, so I can't quantify what that means; but it is something that bears consideration. If someone's brother was a criminal, would he not love him? If someone's brother was a traitor, or had done to'eivos, disgusting things, I think the normal reaction would be to try to help him change. You wouldn't want to spend time with him socially, but you would try to help him, or at least wish he could be helped to redeem himself. This is pshat in the passuk that says "lo sisna es achicha bilvavecha." The Torah is teaching that the reason you should eschew hatred is because he is your brother; even when there is a din of sin'ah, you have to realize that you are hating your brother, and it should pain you to have come to such a state. (From Rav Ephraim Greenblatt; Rivevos Ephraim OC 2:198.)
So; the sin of sin'as chinam is a predisposition to indifference or dislike of a fellow Jew. If you have a valid justification for hatred, it is not a sin; by the Bayis Rishon, the division of Klal Yisrael was, I imagine, justified by some halachic logic, though evidently it turned out to be inadequate. According to their analyses, they were fulfilling the dictum of Chazal in Avos DeRav Nassan, end of Perek 16. The fact that what they did seems, to us, indefensible, may be because the winners wrote the history books; that is, the Aseres Hashvatim may have had a mesora in Torah and Halacha that died with them, and which has no vestige in our halacha. (Just for fun, if you wouold gather the oddest shittos of Da'as Yachid in the Shas that we have, both in dinim De'oraysa and dinim De'rabanan, from Rebbi Eliezer to Rav Preida and Rav Chidka, and imagine a Jewish world in which they were accepted as normative halacha, it wouldn't look at all like Judaism as we know it.)
Never confuse Unity for Uniformity. If the other person has a legitimate halachic basis for his crazy shittah, then you have no defensible reason to hate him. According to his mesorah, according to his sincere interpretation of the Torah, his shittah has validity. Is eilu ve'eilu elastic enough to cover Mossad Harav and Satmer? Yes, it is, if only in the sense that both seek the truth through a sincere investigation of our Torah, based on the 13 Ikrim and the 13 Middos She'hatorah Nidreshes Bahem. And that is enough, as indicated in the Rambam in Cheilek which I bring toward the end of this post. So you can't hate him-- but you certainly can, and should, fight him, as Beis Shamai fought Beis Hillel, as Shaul fought David, as the enemies of David fought him, as Yeravam and Rechavam fought, and the fight might be violent. Machlokes is characteristic of the Human condition, and is an inevitable and perhaps even necessary part of being a partisan of your derech of avodas Hashem. But while you fight, you have to remember that the other person is entitled to his opinion. You fight, you try to win, you can despise the shittah he espouses. But you have to remember that he is entitled to that shittah. David Hamelech almost never spoke of Shaul with anything but the greatest respect-- except one time, (Shmuel II:22- Mikaf kol oyvav umi'kaf Shaul) and Hashem rebuked him for that one slip (Shigayon leDavid ahl divrei Kush ben Yemini, and see Moed Kattan 16b). And, you will enjoy the Abarbanel's remarkable interpretation of this passuk, that accents the requirement that a Jew respect and love a fellow Jew, even his mortal enemy.
As one commenter tells us, the Chasam Sofer pointed out that the gematriya of "verav shalom" is the same as that of "machlokes."
The Mitzva of Achdus is an outgrowth of the concept of Areivus. Areivus stems from the words "Kol Yisrael Areivim Zeh Bazeh," although it's usually quoted zeh lazeh. It doesn't matter; the idea is correct no matter whether you say bazeh or lazeh. The word Areivim means commingled, and is similar to the word Areiv as in Arvus, the co-signer of a loan who accepts personal responsibility for the borrower's liability.
The Yerushalmi says that if a fellow Jew has not fulfilled his mitzvah, you can be motzi him with a bracha, because so long as he hasn't done the mitzva, you haven't fulfilled the mitzva completely either, and YOU are a bar chiyuva. Areivus is not only a din in mitzvos. It is a description of our essential reality; Klal Yisrael is intimately intraconnected, and the chesronos of one are the chesronos of all, just as the zechusim of each of us are shared. This is why it is better to daven on Yamim Nora'im with a minyan, because as a group, we share the group's special kesher with Hashem. Matan Torah required that absolute areivus-- Vayichan Yisrael. When you daven with a minyan, your tefilla is heard far above where it would be heard if you davened yourself.
We share our fate. The actions of each effects the other. There is no point in isolating another person or group, because their behavior reflects upon us no matter how we would like to ignore it. Hashem looks upon us as one nation, and our antipathy towards those we dislike does not mitigate or ameliorate that shared judgment.
Our actions stem from a shared history and, hard as it may be to believe, some degree of shared philosophy.
We are all parts of the same body, and you can't despise a part of your own body. If it threatens your life, or it causes terrible pain, you might have to remove it. But amputation is a painful and tragic last resort.
The Gemara in Chagiga 26a says that although during most of the year restrictions on contact with ignorant people were in place, most of these restrictions were lifted on the Shalosh Regalim. The Gemara darshens a passuk of Kol Yisrael chaverim-- on Yomtov, we must act as if all Jews are Chaverim, i.e., respected and scholarly members of our community. As soon as Yomtov was over, though, the real Chaverim were tovel to remove any tumah they may have gotten from the unlearned. And beyond Amei Ha'aretz-- during the year, there were numerous social restrictions that separated various groups of Jews: Bigdei ochlei chulin al taharas truma are medras le'ochlei chulin al taharas hakodesh. You'd want to stay out of arm's length! But for Yomtov, at least, as hard as it must have been for the Prushim, any concern of this tumah was to be disregarded. The vitally important awareness of interconnectedness mandates a kula in Tahara.
As I mentioned above, one of the great questions is what the rishonim mean by saying that despite the mitzva to hate an avaryan, there is still a din of kedei lakuf es yitzro. There is one more question that has elicited a great deal of discussion, and that is the following:
I mentioned the Rambam in Rotzei'ach that says that the mitzva to hate an avaryan applies to one who has been seen to do an aveira be'meizid. However, in his Pirush Hamishnayos in Chelek, Sanhedrin perek 10, in his discussion of the last of the 13 Ikrim, he says the following:
"When a person believes all of these Foundations... he enters into Klal Yisrael and it is a mitzva to love him and to have mercy on him...even if he has done any number of sins because he was driven by his Yetzer Hara and his lust and his vulgar desires; he will be punished...but he has a share in Olam Haba...but if a person has "niskalkeil" one of these Foundations, ...he is separated from the Klal...and is a Min...and it is a mitzva to hate him...and upon him says the passuk (Tehillim 139) Halo mi'san'echa Hashem esna."
As Rabbi Shragie Neuberger once said, once he found that the Rambam said anything about a given subject, he was confident that he could say a lomdishe drasha on that topic. The Rambam never said anything without immediately creating an entire spectrum of bewilderments. This Rambam is a good example.
1. He contradicts his halacha in Rotzei'ach regarding hating an avaryan.
2. He implies that "yeish lo chelek le'olam haba" and the mitzva of "ve'ahavta" are a tautology, that they are intimately related, that either both applicable or neither is. Why would the underlying logic of one be the same as for the other?
3. What does he mean by Niskalkel? An innocent error? Of course, nebach an apikores is also an apikores. But here, he implies that you can't even say nebach.
General Postscripts:
1. For any Lubavitchers that are reading this: The Tanya (32) says that even when one must hate an oveir aveiros, that only means that you hate the bad in him, but you must also love the good in him, while hatred for Kofrim is absolute-- "tachlis sin'a si'nei'sim." There are those that use this to distinguish between the Rambam in the Yad and in the Pirush Hamishnayos, but to me, it's just wishful thinking.
2. The Yerei'im in 39 says that the sin'a to an oveir aveiros who doesn't respond to tochacha is not "sin'as haleiv, ella sin'a hanir'is le'einayim," and he shtells tzu the Gemara in Pesachim. Also used to be meyasheiv the Rambam, also bubbeh maises.
3. For a thorough discussion of to whom the mitzva of leha'chayoso applies, and the connection with the word "achicha," and whether there is a difference between doing an aveira once of repeatedly and le'tei'avon, and whether there is an in between madriega of "not hating and no chiyuv to support but allowed to support," which would be like "lo moridin aval im ratza, ma'aleh," see the Shach and the Taz in YD beginning of 251.
To be continued.
Monday, June 22, 2009
Korach, Bamidbar 16:1. Achdus I: All You Need is Love, and Other Symptoms of Dementia
Korach incited his followers with the motto "Kol ha'eida kulam kedoshim! Madu'a tisnas'u ahl kehal Hashem?" All the people are holy, and the Shechina dwells within every man equally. What right, Moshe, do you have to create artificial distinctions among the people of God? What right do you have to claim elevated status for yourself and for your relatives?
Rav Kook in his (posthumously printed in 1938 by what seems to be the predecessor of the Mossad HaRav Kook, edited by the Nazir, R’ David Kohen,) Oros Hakodesh, pages 453 and 454, that it is necessary for groups or individuals that have specific talents or roles to be separate in order to allow them to develop their peculiar talent, and that the claim that the mob-movements make that all people must be equal destroys the possibility for the development of spiritual or elevated characteristics: his words— “Sitra achra shari be'chibura ve'siyem be'piruda, ve'sitra dekedusha shari be'piruda ve'siyem be'chibura, ve'sham gufei ikri shalom.” Translation: The 'devil' begins with union and ends with division; holiness begins with division and ends with union, and in that itself is the essence of Shalom. (After years of not knowing the source, Bezalel Naor, an acquaintance from Ner Israel and a renowned scholar of Rav Kook's writings, kindly emailed me that it comes from Zohar II, 95a. This is in the Vilna/Mossad Kook edition. However, it is not used there for the purpose R’ Kook uses it– it just talks about some kind of nochosh and says that “shori b’chiburoh v’siyeim b’pirudoh.”) Applied to the context of Korach: Korach created pirud through what was, ostensibly, a demand for achdus (by saying that everyone is the same and nobody is entitled to a higher position or responsibility) while tzadikim create achdus through pirud, i.e., separation of individuals or groups that have specific talents.
This appears, at first glance, to be a rationalization, or an Orwellian twist of language; but recall the terror that followed the French Revolution (whose motto, "Liberté, égalité, fraternité," "Liberty, Equality, Brotherhood," has been retained by the modern French Republic), and the Maoist Cultural Revolution of 66-76, which persecuted Chinese teachers and intellectuals and “bourgeois values” and enforced Mao’s cult of personality, claiming that the only information necessary was the Red Book and party loyalty, and which had anyone with demonstrated intellectual or cultural achievement sent to re-indoctrination camps and then to manual labor. This quickly turned violent, and the purges that followed resulted in many deaths and economic disruption. Both the French and the Chinese violence asserted a philosophical basis of egalitarianism. On the other hand, the American Revolution also made the fundamental assertion that all men are created equal. The difference is that the evil lies in mandating and enforcing equality, as opposed to the philosophy of encouraging differences; because one man, and thus government as a whole which is only an expression of and for the benefit of men, lacks the authority to control men.
Another observation about Rav Kook's thought: We are constantly deluged with talk about Achdus. Achdus, Achdus, Achdus. Love your fellow Jew, invite him over, have you children play together, respect his way of life. This is baloney. Here's what I think.
Say your daughter goes out with boys to R rated movies, and your neighbor's daughter goes to Beis Yakov, they don't have a TV, and she would blush simply being in the same room as a boy. So, do you think they ought to hang around together? Your daughter would feel she is being belittled and disrespected, your neighbor would not want his daughter influenced by your daughter, and you would both be right. But what, you say, about children young enough to be sexually innocent? Well, would you like your child, in whom you have inculcated literal belief in the words of Chazal, to hear a playmate say that the story of Adam and Noach and the Mabul and the senescent motherhood of Sarah are just made-up stories, fairy tales chas veshalom? So, the kids shouldn't play together. How do you think the families are going to get along if parents keep their kids away from the neighbors? Antipathy is a concomitant of enforced separation.
As far as adults are concerned, let's focus on the facts, not the delusion, and the fact is that the Jews are hopelessly splintered. Does anyone really think that Satmar and Mercaz Harav have much in common? I'm not talking about Neturei Karta. Everyone hates them, and with good reason. Traitors earn hatred, no matter how well-meaning they might be. But Satmar is a functional group with a long history and a heritage of talmidei chachamim. Do members of the two sects/groups/camps have anything to do with each other? Would they feel comfortable walking into the others' shul to daven? And what about the Satmar Dayan in Antwerp who publicly and vociferously railed against a community-wide tehillim gathering for the safety of the soldiers of Tzahal during the Gaza war? And, speaking of the Satmarers, it is not easy to like a group that proclaims that Zionism and the movement to found the State of Israel was the proximate cause of the Holocaust. Did the endless cycle of Inquisitions and pogroms escape their attention?
This is not a new problem. Our history tells us of men who were great scholars and talmidei chachamim whose behavior was horrifying. Think about what the Shvatim wanted to happen to Yosef. Think about Shimi ben Geira and Avner, about other tzadikim gemurim, as the Chassam Sofer says in Parshas Shmos, who murdered Jews because they paskened that this was the halacha, but who, we are told, were wrong. Of course, who are we to judge? We are not even chamorim compared to these great men. Even Korach, compared to us, was a malach. Remember what Menasheh said to Rav Ashi in a dream, as brought in Sanhedrin 102b?
But all that does not matter at all. The point I'm making is this; you can have a great talmid chacham, a great tzadik, even what the Chasam Sofer calls a tzadik gamur. And this person is capable of paskening that someone is chayav misah: he is capable of personally killing a person; and we, the rest of Klal Yisrael, the ones who follow other poskim, hold that they are wrong. That means that there can be a tzadik gamur on one side who holds that we should go out and kill a certain Jew, and other poskim hold that whoever kills that Jew is a Rotzei'ach and is chayav missah. So what you have is a tzadik gamur and talmid chacham who is, by the hashkafos of others, a rotzei'ach. Rotzei'ach is not a morally neutral term. He is a murderer.
So if being a talmid chacham is not proof against being a murderer, what kind of a farce is it to say that Klal Yisrael has to aspire to achdus. This is not an exercise. It is a very good question. When there is nothing in the sincere study of Torah and the honest adherence to our mesorah that prevents the rise of diametrically opposed and absolutely incompatible groups, what do we mean when we say we need achdus? What on earth does achdus mean when the numerous ambiguities of the Torah naturally and inevitably result such radical division that drive us at each others' throats? And these ambiguities do not stem from our failure to adequately study the Torah. The ambiguity is an inherent and intended characteristic of the Torah. See Bava Metzia 88b, where there was an argument between God and the Heavenly Academy regarding a certain halacha, and they decided to bring Rabbah bar Reb Channa to make the decision.
Don't tell me that such extreme polarization is rare. It isn't. It happens all the time and every day.
So what is this constant talk about achdus? Are we so naive that we think it's possible, or, as is more likely, are we just saying it even though we know, in our hearts, that it's impossible? Are we just going through the motions because we think that it's a religious obligation to hahk a tshainik about achdus? I think that when people talk about brotherhood, they mean that a Chaim Berlin family in Flatbush can learn to get along with a Chafetz Chaim family in the Five Towns! Yes, we can do it!
The only difference is that we have THREE National Brotherhood Weeks. See Chagiga 26a, Vayei'asef...chaverim, and the mishnayos there.
At best, we can stay as far away as possible but recognize that the other is nebach entitled to his opinion, criminally stupid as it may be, or level of observance, ridiculously lax/fanatic as it may be. If they need help, offer to help. Greet them with a show of respect, even if you think that their stubborn backwardness is the reason mashiach has not yet come. But social mixing and true respect? Absurd.
As far as I can tell, achdus, to the extent that it is possible at all, is only possible in a secular democracy with strict division between religion and the state. This bifurcation, hopefully, carries over to social interaction. Obviously, this is not a guarantee of peace. Conflict about the form and direction and purpose of government can be as bloody as religious wars, as evidenced by most of the wars of the twentieth century, both hot and cold. But it seems to me that this kind of arrangement holds the most promise, while religion is fundamentally exclusivist and incompatible with compromise and mutual respect.
~
Rav Kook in his (posthumously printed in 1938 by what seems to be the predecessor of the Mossad HaRav Kook, edited by the Nazir, R’ David Kohen,) Oros Hakodesh, pages 453 and 454, that it is necessary for groups or individuals that have specific talents or roles to be separate in order to allow them to develop their peculiar talent, and that the claim that the mob-movements make that all people must be equal destroys the possibility for the development of spiritual or elevated characteristics: his words— “Sitra achra shari be'chibura ve'siyem be'piruda, ve'sitra dekedusha shari be'piruda ve'siyem be'chibura, ve'sham gufei ikri shalom.” Translation: The 'devil' begins with union and ends with division; holiness begins with division and ends with union, and in that itself is the essence of Shalom. (After years of not knowing the source, Bezalel Naor, an acquaintance from Ner Israel and a renowned scholar of Rav Kook's writings, kindly emailed me that it comes from Zohar II, 95a. This is in the Vilna/Mossad Kook edition. However, it is not used there for the purpose R’ Kook uses it– it just talks about some kind of nochosh and says that “shori b’chiburoh v’siyeim b’pirudoh.”) Applied to the context of Korach: Korach created pirud through what was, ostensibly, a demand for achdus (by saying that everyone is the same and nobody is entitled to a higher position or responsibility) while tzadikim create achdus through pirud, i.e., separation of individuals or groups that have specific talents.
This appears, at first glance, to be a rationalization, or an Orwellian twist of language; but recall the terror that followed the French Revolution (whose motto, "Liberté, égalité, fraternité," "Liberty, Equality, Brotherhood," has been retained by the modern French Republic), and the Maoist Cultural Revolution of 66-76, which persecuted Chinese teachers and intellectuals and “bourgeois values” and enforced Mao’s cult of personality, claiming that the only information necessary was the Red Book and party loyalty, and which had anyone with demonstrated intellectual or cultural achievement sent to re-indoctrination camps and then to manual labor. This quickly turned violent, and the purges that followed resulted in many deaths and economic disruption. Both the French and the Chinese violence asserted a philosophical basis of egalitarianism. On the other hand, the American Revolution also made the fundamental assertion that all men are created equal. The difference is that the evil lies in mandating and enforcing equality, as opposed to the philosophy of encouraging differences; because one man, and thus government as a whole which is only an expression of and for the benefit of men, lacks the authority to control men.
Another observation about Rav Kook's thought: We are constantly deluged with talk about Achdus. Achdus, Achdus, Achdus. Love your fellow Jew, invite him over, have you children play together, respect his way of life. This is baloney. Here's what I think.
Say your daughter goes out with boys to R rated movies, and your neighbor's daughter goes to Beis Yakov, they don't have a TV, and she would blush simply being in the same room as a boy. So, do you think they ought to hang around together? Your daughter would feel she is being belittled and disrespected, your neighbor would not want his daughter influenced by your daughter, and you would both be right. But what, you say, about children young enough to be sexually innocent? Well, would you like your child, in whom you have inculcated literal belief in the words of Chazal, to hear a playmate say that the story of Adam and Noach and the Mabul and the senescent motherhood of Sarah are just made-up stories, fairy tales chas veshalom? So, the kids shouldn't play together. How do you think the families are going to get along if parents keep their kids away from the neighbors? Antipathy is a concomitant of enforced separation.
As far as adults are concerned, let's focus on the facts, not the delusion, and the fact is that the Jews are hopelessly splintered. Does anyone really think that Satmar and Mercaz Harav have much in common? I'm not talking about Neturei Karta. Everyone hates them, and with good reason. Traitors earn hatred, no matter how well-meaning they might be. But Satmar is a functional group with a long history and a heritage of talmidei chachamim. Do members of the two sects/groups/camps have anything to do with each other? Would they feel comfortable walking into the others' shul to daven? And what about the Satmar Dayan in Antwerp who publicly and vociferously railed against a community-wide tehillim gathering for the safety of the soldiers of Tzahal during the Gaza war? And, speaking of the Satmarers, it is not easy to like a group that proclaims that Zionism and the movement to found the State of Israel was the proximate cause of the Holocaust. Did the endless cycle of Inquisitions and pogroms escape their attention?
This is not a new problem. Our history tells us of men who were great scholars and talmidei chachamim whose behavior was horrifying. Think about what the Shvatim wanted to happen to Yosef. Think about Shimi ben Geira and Avner, about other tzadikim gemurim, as the Chassam Sofer says in Parshas Shmos, who murdered Jews because they paskened that this was the halacha, but who, we are told, were wrong. Of course, who are we to judge? We are not even chamorim compared to these great men. Even Korach, compared to us, was a malach. Remember what Menasheh said to Rav Ashi in a dream, as brought in Sanhedrin 102b?
But all that does not matter at all. The point I'm making is this; you can have a great talmid chacham, a great tzadik, even what the Chasam Sofer calls a tzadik gamur. And this person is capable of paskening that someone is chayav misah: he is capable of personally killing a person; and we, the rest of Klal Yisrael, the ones who follow other poskim, hold that they are wrong. That means that there can be a tzadik gamur on one side who holds that we should go out and kill a certain Jew, and other poskim hold that whoever kills that Jew is a Rotzei'ach and is chayav missah. So what you have is a tzadik gamur and talmid chacham who is, by the hashkafos of others, a rotzei'ach. Rotzei'ach is not a morally neutral term. He is a murderer.
So if being a talmid chacham is not proof against being a murderer, what kind of a farce is it to say that Klal Yisrael has to aspire to achdus. This is not an exercise. It is a very good question. When there is nothing in the sincere study of Torah and the honest adherence to our mesorah that prevents the rise of diametrically opposed and absolutely incompatible groups, what do we mean when we say we need achdus? What on earth does achdus mean when the numerous ambiguities of the Torah naturally and inevitably result such radical division that drive us at each others' throats? And these ambiguities do not stem from our failure to adequately study the Torah. The ambiguity is an inherent and intended characteristic of the Torah. See Bava Metzia 88b, where there was an argument between God and the Heavenly Academy regarding a certain halacha, and they decided to bring Rabbah bar Reb Channa to make the decision.
Don't tell me that such extreme polarization is rare. It isn't. It happens all the time and every day.
So what is this constant talk about achdus? Are we so naive that we think it's possible, or, as is more likely, are we just saying it even though we know, in our hearts, that it's impossible? Are we just going through the motions because we think that it's a religious obligation to hahk a tshainik about achdus? I think that when people talk about brotherhood, they mean that a Chaim Berlin family in Flatbush can learn to get along with a Chafetz Chaim family in the Five Towns! Yes, we can do it!
The only difference is that we have THREE National Brotherhood Weeks. See Chagiga 26a, Vayei'asef...chaverim, and the mishnayos there.
At best, we can stay as far away as possible but recognize that the other is nebach entitled to his opinion, criminally stupid as it may be, or level of observance, ridiculously lax/fanatic as it may be. If they need help, offer to help. Greet them with a show of respect, even if you think that their stubborn backwardness is the reason mashiach has not yet come. But social mixing and true respect? Absurd.
As far as I can tell, achdus, to the extent that it is possible at all, is only possible in a secular democracy with strict division between religion and the state. This bifurcation, hopefully, carries over to social interaction. Obviously, this is not a guarantee of peace. Conflict about the form and direction and purpose of government can be as bloody as religious wars, as evidenced by most of the wars of the twentieth century, both hot and cold. But it seems to me that this kind of arrangement holds the most promise, while religion is fundamentally exclusivist and incompatible with compromise and mutual respect.
~
Thursday, June 18, 2009
Shlach and Kavod Hatorah
In scholarly journals, the first citation of an individual's name is complete: Mr./Dr./Professor/Rabbi/Cantor Ploni Baumvulshpinner. Thereafter, the citation is only to the surname-- Baumvulshpinner. Some Modern Orthodox scholarly journals adhere to this protocol as well, which is why we often see citations to Karelitz, Soloveitchik, Kotler, Kamenetsky, and Feinstein.
I have always found this unpleasant, certainly not kevod hatorah, perhaps even bizayon hatorah. Yes, it is the standard form of citation in scholarly papers and journals, but I felt that because in our tradition one always refers to an Adam Gadol by his given name and with an honorific (Sanhedrin 82a and 100a and the Margalios Hayam on Sanhedrin 102a; Bamidbar Rabba 18:7; Shemos Rabba 52:2; Shmuel I:20; Sotah 35a* ), to not do so was just another example of a mah yafiskideh aping (aping: shameless mimicry, often with absurd result; Yiddish- Nochmachen vi a malpeh) of foreign manners and mores. Like saying imitatio dei instead of ve'halachta bidrachav.
BUT, eventually I realized how jejune and provincial a criticism this is. In this week's parsha we actually find that Moshe Rabbeinu's own brother in law, one of his greatest disciples, does exactly this: see Rashi in Bamidbar 13:30. From here we see that this form of referring to Gedolei Yisrael has an ancient provenance among the Jews.
*Mar'ei me'komos credit to Beis Aharon from R. Aharon Maggid, NY tof shin choph zayin, vol 4 p. 265.
Here is another example: The leader of the Shevet of Shimon, also refers to Moshe Rabbeinu by his last name: The Gemara in Sanhedrin 82a says that Zimri ben Salu, the Nasi of the tribe of Shimon. and no doubt an honorable man, called Moshe Rabbeinu "Ben Amram."
~
Coincidentally, Rabbi Yitchok Adlerstein just posted an article on a similar topic: the monstrous and, ultimately, sterile Chimera created by the application the methodology and attitudes of modern scholarly analysis to issues of Hashkafa and halacha.
http://www.cross-currents.com/archives/2009/06/19/conversion-standards-hockey-bats-and-the-academic-approach-to-halacha/
~
And for you horror buffs-- for a skin-crawling experience, here's a download of a recent article that illustrates the problem of iconoclasts masking as preservationists- ironically, Kalev's strategy employed in pursuit of exactly the opposite result.
http://www.bmj.org.il/pdf/books/Sperber_ln.pdf
His basic thesis is that Rashi, nebach neither a historian nor a scholar of Greek or Latin, didn't understand the Gemara, the Amora'im didn't understand the Tana'im, and the Tana'im didn't have clue as to the sociological mileu of the Dor Hamidbar and therefore misunderstood Moshe Rabbeinu, and really, Hashem also probably didn't really mean a lot of what He said literally, so in the name of intellectual honesty we, the enlightened, really ought to toss 90% of the mesora in favor of scientific analysis of what happened on Har Sinai, and the fact that we don't is only out of bemused loyalty to Klal Yisrael's quaint habits. I, on the other hand, think that the idea that interpretation and application of a religion is best left to its most loyal practitioners is so elementary that even a sheigitz like Augustine understood it-- "Securus judicat orbis terrarum". The determination of truth by the people as a whole can be trusted. Or, as GB Shaw once said, there is such a thing as a fundamental rectitude that can bear any quantity of superficial aberrations.
More seriously, for examples of the use of only the family name to belittle someone, see Taanis 3a and Sanhedrin 41b, where it is clear that a young student was referred to by his father's name, and after semicha or other gaining of higher status, the personal name was used.
~
I have always found this unpleasant, certainly not kevod hatorah, perhaps even bizayon hatorah. Yes, it is the standard form of citation in scholarly papers and journals, but I felt that because in our tradition one always refers to an Adam Gadol by his given name and with an honorific (Sanhedrin 82a and 100a and the Margalios Hayam on Sanhedrin 102a; Bamidbar Rabba 18:7; Shemos Rabba 52:2; Shmuel I:20; Sotah 35a* ), to not do so was just another example of a mah yafiskideh aping (aping: shameless mimicry, often with absurd result; Yiddish- Nochmachen vi a malpeh) of foreign manners and mores. Like saying imitatio dei instead of ve'halachta bidrachav.
BUT, eventually I realized how jejune and provincial a criticism this is. In this week's parsha we actually find that Moshe Rabbeinu's own brother in law, one of his greatest disciples, does exactly this: see Rashi in Bamidbar 13:30. From here we see that this form of referring to Gedolei Yisrael has an ancient provenance among the Jews.
*Mar'ei me'komos credit to Beis Aharon from R. Aharon Maggid, NY tof shin choph zayin, vol 4 p. 265.
Here is another example: The leader of the Shevet of Shimon, also refers to Moshe Rabbeinu by his last name: The Gemara in Sanhedrin 82a says that Zimri ben Salu, the Nasi of the tribe of Shimon. and no doubt an honorable man, called Moshe Rabbeinu "Ben Amram."
~
Coincidentally, Rabbi Yitchok Adlerstein just posted an article on a similar topic: the monstrous and, ultimately, sterile Chimera created by the application the methodology and attitudes of modern scholarly analysis to issues of Hashkafa and halacha.
http://www.cross-currents.com/archives/2009/06/19/conversion-standards-hockey-bats-and-the-academic-approach-to-halacha/
~
And for you horror buffs-- for a skin-crawling experience, here's a download of a recent article that illustrates the problem of iconoclasts masking as preservationists- ironically, Kalev's strategy employed in pursuit of exactly the opposite result.
http://www.bmj.org.il/pdf/books/Sperber_ln.pdf
His basic thesis is that Rashi, nebach neither a historian nor a scholar of Greek or Latin, didn't understand the Gemara, the Amora'im didn't understand the Tana'im, and the Tana'im didn't have clue as to the sociological mileu of the Dor Hamidbar and therefore misunderstood Moshe Rabbeinu, and really, Hashem also probably didn't really mean a lot of what He said literally, so in the name of intellectual honesty we, the enlightened, really ought to toss 90% of the mesora in favor of scientific analysis of what happened on Har Sinai, and the fact that we don't is only out of bemused loyalty to Klal Yisrael's quaint habits. I, on the other hand, think that the idea that interpretation and application of a religion is best left to its most loyal practitioners is so elementary that even a sheigitz like Augustine understood it-- "Securus judicat orbis terrarum". The determination of truth by the people as a whole can be trusted. Or, as GB Shaw once said, there is such a thing as a fundamental rectitude that can bear any quantity of superficial aberrations.
More seriously, for examples of the use of only the family name to belittle someone, see Taanis 3a and Sanhedrin 41b, where it is clear that a young student was referred to by his father's name, and after semicha or other gaining of higher status, the personal name was used.
~
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