Ki Seitzei, Devarim 22:8 & 12. Ma'aka and Tzitzis

brief synopsis:
1. Ma'aka and Tzitzis are in this week's parsha
2. a parenthetical observation (with pictures) about Orthodox Jews whose houses ought to have a ma'aka but who avoid building one.
3. issue: on Shabbos, or any time when doing these mitzvos would be impossible, can you live in a house without a ma'aka or wear a tallis without tzitzis or use keilim that you weren't tovel. i.e., does the impossibility of doing these mitzvos allow you to ignore them by considering the general obligation to be temporarily irrelevant.
4. machlokes rishonim, machlokes how to pasken.
5. the Netziv's explanation of what underlies the machlokes.
This week's parsha mentions two mitzvos several pesukim apart that seem to have nothing in common. The first is the Mitzva of Ma'aka, that requires that we place a fence around the roof of our houses,

כִּי תִבְנֶה בַּיִת חָדָשׁ וְעָשִׂיתָ מַעֲקֶה לְגַגֶּךָ וְלֹא תָשִׂים דָּמִים בְּבֵיתֶךָ כִּי יִפֹּל הַנֹּפֵל מִמֶּנּוּ.

and the second is the Mitzva of Tzitzis,

גְּדִלִים תַּעֲשֶׂה לָּךְ עַל אַרְבַּע כַּנְפוֹת כְּסוּתְךָ אֲשֶׁר תְּכַסֶּה בָּהּ

This discussion will not shed any light on whatever deep connection these two may have, but there is one coincidental commonality that is interesting.

(Before I get into the dvar torah, I want to mention briefly something that has always surprised me: In my neighborhood, there are some houses that have a ma'aka, such as this, which has a ma'aka twice the size necessary: (click on picture to enlarge)

(The standard Ma'aka is ten tefachim -Chazon Ish- no less than around thirty nine inches- high and strong enough to support a person leaning on it. For the Minchas Chinuch's kashe and the Emek Bracha's answer regarding different types of tefach in the shiur of ma'aka and shofar, see http://divreichaim.blogspot.com/2007/08/quality-vs-quantity-shiur-tefach-by.html)
On the other hand, many people who have houses that might require a ma'aka who do not have one. We're talking about houses that have what we call a veranda-- a flat roof that is accessible via a door from the second floor of the house. This is a classic example of the chiyuv de'oraysa of ma'aka. These people asked Rabbanim, and were told, as is the accepted halacha, that if you never use the roof, if you lock the door, then you are not chayav to build a maakah. I say that there is a difference between fulfilling the mitzvah and eliminating the obligation. But halachicly, they are correct.

What if you are given the opportunity to live in a house, and there is an accessible flat roof that requires a ma'aka, but you cannot put a ma'aka up; it is impossible for you to put it up. For example, you simply do not have the money or materials to do it; or there is some legal restrictions; or simply, you want to stay there only Shabbos when building is assur. Let's say that the circumstances are such that we would categorize this as Oneis; circumstances of absolute constraint, compulsion, or coercion. The halacha of Oneis is that we are not held responsible for oneis; annus, Rachmana patrei; one who is compelled is not held responsible. Theoretically, then, one would be allowed to move into this house, because he is an annus regarding his obligation to build a ma'aka, and an annus is free from liability.

The same question can be asked regarding tzitzis. What if you have a four-cornered garment that you would like to wear, but it is impossible for you to put tzitzis on it. Classic example: the tzitzis on your tallis become passul on Shabbos. Can you wear the tallis? Perhaps we can say that there is nothing wrong with wearing a four-cornered garment, but we are obligated to put tzitzis on it. But here, there is no obligation to do so, because you cannot possible put tzitzis on the garment on Shabbos, so you should be able to wear the tallis without tzitzis.

In fact, this question arises in innumerable applications. You can't drink or eat from a utensil that belonged to a gentile that is now owned by a Jew unless it was immersed in a Mikva. What if you are a guest at someone's house, and he is not religious, and he definitely was not toveil his keilim? Or what if you have a kli that you never used until Shabbos, and you want to use it on Shabbos. Since putting keilim in the mikva is prohibited on Shabbos, you are an annus. Can you use these keilim?

In all these cases, there is a fundamental argument against the application of the rule of Oneis, and that is that nobody is making you move into the house, or wear the serape, or drink from that cup. You may be an annus on the associated mitzva, but who asked you to willingly and without duress create circumstances that result in the application of the rule of Oneis? On the other hand, you are allowed to live in houses and wear garments and drink from cups; just that the Torah obligates you to do something additional when you do these things, or before you do these things. Here, the obligation is legally void because of the rule of Oneis, so you currently have no obligation at all. Or, to put it another way: you can't wear a garment without tzitzis because it is a bittul asei, a disregard of a mitzva obligation. Where you can't fulfill the mitzva, you cannot be said to have been mevateil the asei; you were unable to fulfill it.

The natural inclination at this point is to argue that ma'aka is different, because the Torah says "velo sasim damim be'veisecha," do not disregard this mitzva and put blood guilt on your house. But the fact is that Ma'aka is not a general safety rule; there is no requirement of ma'aka on a solid piece of concrete on your property that is very tall and has steps to the surface; ma'aka is only required where there is space under the surface for a dwelling. If so, it seems that the threshold issue is: Is there an obligation to put a ma'aka or isn't there. If there isn't, then my house is no different than that block of concrete which has no obligation at all. Also, see the Rambam mentioned toward the end regarding a bracha on making a ma'aka, which proves the same point.


The opinion of the Mordechai is that you may wear a tallis without tzitzis on Shabbos, based on the rule of Oneis. Theoretically, the same will apply to Ma'aka and tevilas keilim. The Mordechai is cited by the Beis Yosef and the Rama in OC 13 and the Magen Avraham there in SK 8, who says that the idea is also true in the cases of Mezuza and Ma'aka.
HOWEVER, see the Netziv here and in the addenda in the back of the sefer (unless you have the new edition in which, I think, the addenda have been incorporated into the body of the sefer.)
He says that the halacha lemaiseh is that if you can’t make a ma’aka, you can’t live in the house; if you can’t get a hold of a mezuza, you can’t live there; if you can’t make tzitzis, you can not put on the garment, and if you do, it's a bittul asei de'oraysa. (I don't know why he doesn't simply say, regarding Maakah, that you can live there, but you should not use the roof. Maybe he holds you need paratz es petzimav even by a maakah.)

The Mordechai et al hold that the obligation to put tzitzis into the garment only begins after you have put on the garment, and on Shabbos, it is assur to tie the knots that are essential to tzitzis, so you are pattur from the chiyuv of putting in the tzitzis, and you can continue wearing the beged (although there may be an issur d’rabanon, it wouldn’t apply where there is any degree of a kavod habri’os problem in not having the tallis on.)The Netziv says that “asher t’chaseh bah” shows that the chiyuv begins before you put on the beged, and so if there are no tzitzis in it, you cannot put the beged on in the first place, even on Shabbos. Whether the Netziv's reason to argue with the Mordechai applies to Ma'aka and tvilas keilim is debatable. You are welcome to think about it.

Speaking of Ma’akoh: I saw that the Lubavitcher in his Sichos here asks: the Rambam in Hilchos Brachos 11 says that we don’t make a bracha on things that are intended to prevent danger (like mayim achronim.) A few halachos later, the Rambam says that we make a bracha on making a ma’aka, which is an apparent contradiction, because the Torah says clearly that the mitzvah of ma'aka is to prevent accidents from happening/because of the danger! Obviously, there are a whole range of possible answers: difference between deoraysa and derabbanan; danger to self and danger to self and others; present danger and future danger. But the Lubavitcher then brings that the Rambam says in Sefer Hamitzvos that you don’t count a reason for a mitzvah as a separate mitzvah (e.g., lo yarbeh and lo yasur are not separate.)
How would the Rambam know this? Perhaps he's using the Gemorah in Sanhedrin 21a, and holds like R’ Shimon (doresh ta'ama di'kra), who says that an explicit reason means that the mitzvah is untied from the stated reason. But we don’t know if the Rambam holds like R’S or R’Y. Also, someone answers that the Rambam holds you have to put the Ma’aka up before using the house, even if you don’t plan to use the house, unlike mezuza, so there’s a separation between the lo sasim and the mitzvah.

Wikipedia and Judaism

For Torah on this week's parsha, as always, please click on the name of the parsha in the labels column on the right.

I find it sad that fundamental errors about Judaism can be widely accepted as truths. Here's an example: Wikipedia has an article, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exclusivism , which states that:

Religious exclusivism asserts that one religion is true and that all others are in error.

It has two forms:

• Absolute exclusivism asserts that one must be born into the religion to be a true adherent. Historical examples are the religion of Athens during the golden age, Judaism and some forms of Hinduism.

• Relative exclusivism asserts that conversion is mandatory. Examples are Christianity and Islam. (end quote)

Is there anyone among the readers of this blog that thinks there is any truth to this at all? I hope not. To assert that one must be born Jewish to be saved, to be loved by God, to be considered loyal to God, to be eligible for eternal reward, is simply absurd. If, for example, the writer would have included Judaism among the second group (who believe that conversion is mandatory for salvation) I would have said that it was an interesting error, because according to the Rambam a Ger Toshav needs kabala lifnei beis din, a proclamation of faith in the presence of a religious court. It would still be wrong, because even according to the Rambam the presence of the court is only necessary insofar as the din of "ve'chei imach," the obligation to give charity to the Ger Toshav. But to include Judaism in the first group is not only an error: it has to be an intentional lie. Nobody that knows the most elementary facts would make this error.

If so, I have to wonder why a lie is so successful when a simple truth would do as well. Maybe the concept that Judaism is so confident and enlightened amidst a sea of reactionaries would be troubling. Or maybe I'm reading too much into this, and the definition was posted by a fourteen year old ignoramus or an intellectual vandal.

Re'ay, Devarim 14:8, and Pirkei Avos 5:7-8. Expensive Esrogim and Swine Flu

I was just speaking to my middle son in Israel, and he told me that he is fine now, but last week his doctor told him that he and his family had Swine Flu. Baruch Hashem he is over it now.

Just after I found out about this, I was talking to a Rosh Yeshiva that is staying at my house. I don't want to mention his name, but he is one of the most respected Roshei Yeshiva in the world, and a very deliberate and experienced person as well.

He told me that I should look at the Mishna in this week's perek of Pirkei Avos, which says:

ה,ז [ח] שבעה מיני פורענייות, באין על שבעה גופי עבירות: מקצתן מעשרין, ומקצתן שאינן מעשרין--רעב של בצורת בא, מקצתן רעבים ומקצתן שבעים. גמרו שלא לעשר, רעב של מהומה ושל בצורת בא. שלא ליטול חלה, רעב של כליה בא. דבר בא לעולם על מיתות האמורות בתורה שלא נמסרו לבית דין, ועל פירות שביעית. חרב באה לעולם על עינוי הדין, ועל עיוות הדין, ועל המורים בתורה שלא כהלכה. [ט] חיה רעה באה לעולם על שבועת שוא, ועל חילול השם. גלות באה לעולם על עבודה זרה, ועל גילוי עריות, ועל שפיכות דמים, ועל שמיטת הארץ.

ה,ח בארבעה פרקים הדבר מרובה--ברביעית, ובשביעית, ובמוצאי שביעית, ובמוצאי החג שבכל שנה: ברביעית, מפני מעשר עני שבשלישית; בשביעית, מפני מעשר עני שבשישית; במוצאי שביעית, מפני פירות שביעית; במוצאי החג שבכל שנה ושנה, מפני גזל מתנות עניים.

The essence of these mishnayos is that if Klal Yisrael doesn't heed and respect the special rules pertaining to the fruits of the year of Shevi'is, it can result in the divine punishment of Dever. Dever is disease.

Last year was Shevi'is. One of the rules of Shevi'is is that the fruits cannot be marketed in the normal manner. This is the rule of "sechorah be'peiros Shevi'is." There are many ways around this rule, the most famous being the mechanism of Otzar Beis Din. From Rabbi Aron Tendler, writing on the Star K site:
Otzer Bais Din - literally the "Storehouse of Bais Din". This concept works as follows: although the Torah forbids marketing the fruits of the Sabbatical year, sheviis3, it is clearly permitted to eat them. Not only may the owner pick for his own needs, he may also pick fruit for a friend who needs, as long as he does not market the fruit as he normally does. Can I hire someone to go into my friend’s field and pick fruit for me? Certainly! This doesn't violate the laws of shmitta at all, since I'm not buying the fruit; rather I am paying someone for the labor on my behalf. Taken one step further, I can even hire the farmer himself to harvest the fruits for me, and pay him a flat hourly fee for his labor, as long as it is clear that the money paid is for his labor on my behalf, and not a purchase of the fruits, which I am taking for free.

Enter the Otzer Bais Din, as prescribed in a Tosephta. Based on the above principle, the Bais Din approaches a fruit growing farmer and hires him to harvest his own fruit for the public, in exchange for a flat wage. This agreement stipulates that the farmer will transport the fruit to a storehouse rented by the Bais Din, who will distribute the fruit to the public. The Bais Din is then permitted to pass on to the consumer the expense in making these fruits accessible to the public. Consequently, when the consumer picks up this fruit from a Bais Din distribution point, or from an authorized grocer , he isn't paying for the fruit as a consumer; rather, he is simply reimbursing the Bais Din for making the ownerless fruits of shmitta accessible to him. Our farmer has thus been transformed with this arrangement from a purveyor of fruits, forbidden by the Torah during shmitta, to a common laborer earning a wage for his labor, which is permitted during shmitta. (end quote)

Now, when one relies on Otzar Beis din, the price must reflect the unique character of the sale. In past years, Otzar Beis Din esrogim were sold unseen, in a sealed box that didn't let people choose quality and therefore we paid only for labor, which is the same for a good and for a bad esrog. Also, they are supposed to be far, far less expensive.

None of this was done last year. You picked your esrog, and the price was higher than it has ever been in the past. It could be argued that this was an affront and showed disrespect for the entire concept-- a barely if at all legal maneuver that resulted in a a total contradiction of the idea of sheviis. While a wonderful campaign was waged to support the holy farmers who adhered to the letter and spirit of the law of Shmita, the Esrog market was blithely relying on a tissue of hetterim that even if (I don't believe it, though) legal, was completely inappropriate and shameful.

There were individuals in the Esrog business who did adhere to the law of shmitta, and it was very difficult for them. And I certainly understand that not everyone can look at a big pot of money ready for the taking, money that can buy tranquility and respect and a chasan and apartments and so on, and say "No." Won't power is even more rare than will power. People who are adrift at sea have been driven by the torture of thirst to drink the salt water that surrounds them. It's a pity, but that doesn't change the consequences a ki hu zeh.

So; what does this have to do with Swine Flu? If the connection escapes you, the name is conveniently indicative of the metaphysical source of the problem, both Chazer and Chazer Fissel. The expression Chazer Fissel derives from the porcine habit of lying down with feet forward and head downward. This is said to symbolize the fact that a pig has one mark of kashrus,the cloven hooves, but does not chew its cud; it proudly presents its feet, its mark of kashrus, while hiding its mouth, the sign of its true treif nature. In other words, Chazer Fissel means "It may be wearing a shtreimel but it's still just a chazer." In English that would be "Pious pretensions to the contrary, it's still just a pig."

יד,ח וְאֶת הַחֲזִיר כִּי מַפְרִיס פַּרְסָה הוּא וְלֹא גֵרָה טָמֵא הוּא לָכֶם

If you would quibble that Dever is not the flu, you might be right. So it's a dever acher.

Re'ay, Devarim 14:3. Not Torah, Not Politics, Just So. (well, a tiny bit of Torah.)

This post started out have absolutely nothing to do with Divrei Torah, posted just because I thought the people who read this blog might find it interesting. As you will see, this, too, turned out to have a Torah connection.

I plant a garden for my mother shetichyeh. There are a few absolutes; the garden must have dahlias (which, in Lithuania, were called Georginas) and asters, but not zinnias. Zinnias are 'common.' There have to be tomatoes so the great-grandchildren can enjoy picking them. And there has to be rhubarb, for rhubarb and strawberry compot. Beyond that, I have a free (and calloused) hand.

The past two years, I've planted corn, or, in my mother's words, kukuruza. Corn cannot be planted in the single digits. Especially in my case, where the purpose is so that my mother can look at the back yard and see lush greenery reminiscent of the summers of her childhood, I have to plant a good stand of corn. So last year I planted an area of around fifteen by ten, and this year I planted fifteen by thirty feet of corn. I really can't guarantee a crop, what with malevolent squirrels, rabbits, and raccoons, but, at least, a block of corn eight feet tall looks nice waving in the wind, and that is the primary reason it's there.

This year, though, I do have some ears of corn, at least for the moment. If the four-legged vandals realize what I have, they'll rip it apart in a night, but if it lasts a week or so, my grandchildren will have something to pick.

This morning, I noticed that one ear of corn was swollen, and I recognized that it was infected with corn smut. What, you ask, is corn smut? Here's something I found about it:
GourmetSleuth Huitlacoche [wee-tlah-KOH-cheh]
Mexican Corn Truffle Huitlacoche (also spelled cuitlacoche) is a fungus (Ustilago maydis) which grows naturally on ears of corn. The fungus is harvested and treated as a delicacy. The earthy and somewhat smoky fungus is used to flavor quesadillas, tamales, soups and other specialty dishes. (...) Another interesting story told by Ms. Fussell is that of a dinner presented by the James Beard House in New York City in 1989. The purpose was to give Americans a tasting of the corn smut but with a new name “Mexican Truffle”. The menu was created by Josefina Howard of Rosa Mexicano restaurant and included huitlacoche appetizers, soup, crepes, tortilla torte, and even an huitlacoche ice cream.

One slight correction: it does not grow on the corn, it takes over the corn and renders each kernel grotesquely swollen and blackened.

So, this year, I decided to grill it and see what it tasted like. We had, in other words, corn smut for a side dish. I wrapped it in tin foil, put it into hot charcoal in the barbecue, and served it for dinner.

We had a dinner guest, Mrs. Victoria Weisenberg, a friend and colleague of my rebbitzen, who teaches college microbiology and anatomy. She was thrilled to actually see something she had lectured about, less thrilled to be dared to taste it, but after some moments of good, sensible hesitation, she did taste it. My rebbitzen has more seichel than that, so it was just me, Mrs. Weisenberg, and my oldest son. As we put it, we had an warm and congenial dinner, and then we all sat down and enjoyed some smut.

Having partaken, I can tell you that you're not missing anything. Even disregarding an appearance that would fit nicely in a shadowy corner of a painting by Hieronymus Bosch, its taste and texture were utterly insipid, without character, and bland. But, on the plus side, it didn't kill anyone.


The photo above is the piece of the ear that was left over after dinner. The next photo is not mine, just something I found on the net.



And that explains the title of this post, which refers to

יד,ג לֹא תֹאכַל כָּל תּוֹעֵבָה

When I posted this initially, I invited local readers to taste the piece I had left over. But when I checked it a few hours later, it had already begun to melt into primordial ooze. And despite that, the next day, when the woman who helps clean the house came, she saw it on the counter and said "Oh, where did you get that? It is very good." And she took it home to add to her home-made tortillas.

Now, even corn smut can raise interesting questions of halacha. The Bracha on corn is Ha'adama, because it grows from the earth. Plants are autotrophes, photosynthesizing their food from water and simple minerals. The bracha on Fungi, on the other hand, is She'hakol, because they are considered to grow from "the air;" they are heterotrophes, organisms that eat ready-made complex organic food. What about Corn Smut? On the one hand, it clearly is a fungus that grows on corn. On the other hand, since it doesn't develop into an independent entity, as do the fruiting bodies of mushrooms and other fungi, perhaps it remains defined as part of the corn, albeit spongy, swollen and black corn. (The logic is similar to ubar yerech imo; the child, once it is born, is obviously an independent entity. But so long as it is contained within and deriving nutrition from its mother, it is halachicly viewed as a part of her.)

I believe that the latter is correct, but I am not certain. So, in the highly unlikely case that you do eat corn smut, I suggest that you make sure you've already made a hamotzi or both she'hakol and ha'adama. I'm proud to say that this is very likely a question of first impression. We take our satisfactions where we find them.

~

Eikev, Devarim 8:9 Avaneha Barzel

In this week's parsha the passuk says

אֶרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אֲבָנֶיהָ בַרְזֶל

and please see Taanis 4a.

Eikev, Devarim 10:12. Mah Hashem Sho'eil- 100 Brachos a Day

וְעַתָּה, יִשְׂרָאֵל--מָה ה' אלהיך, שֹׁאֵל מֵעִמָּךְ: כִּי אִם-לְיִרְאָה אֶת-ה' אלהיך לָלֶכֶת בְּכָל-דְּרָכָיו, וּלְאַהֲבָה אֹתוֹ, וְלַעֲבֹד אֶת-ה' אלהיך, בְּכָל-לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל-נַפְשֶׁךָ.

Mah Hashem sho’eil mei’imach, what does Hashem ask of you, only to fear Him....

תניא היה רבי מאיר אומר חייב אדם לברך מאה ברכות בכל יום שנאמר (דברים י) ועתה ישראל מה ה' אלהיך שואל מעמך

Menachos 43a– 'mah' is a remez to Mei’ah, (one hundred,) mei’ah brachos bechol yom, that a person should see to it that he says one hundred Brachos every day.

The Baal Haturim (andTosfos there dh Shoeil) explains that this drasha is not just based on the similarity in pronunciation of Mei'ah to Mah, but also on a Gematria, because in the Aht Bash system, mem hei equals yud tzadi, and the gematria of yud tzadi is 100.

But why is this idea alluded to specifically in this passuk? What is the connection between the literal meaning of the passuk, which is that one must develop his Yiras Shamayim, and the idea of mei'ah brachos?

The answer has to be that saying brachos brings to Yir’as Shomayim. Why is this true? Because hakoras hatov is the key to yir’as shomayim, and brachos teach hakoras hatov.

Along the same lines:
The Baal Haturim in 8:6 says the following:

וְשָׁמַרְתָּ אֶת-מִצְו‍ֹת ה' אלהיך לָלֶכֶת בִּדְרָכָיו וּלְיִרְאָה אֹתוֹ.	.
כִּי ה' אלהיך מְבִיאֲךָ אֶל אֶרֶץ טוֹבָה אֶרֶץ נַחֲלֵי מָיִם עֲיָנֹת וּתְהֹמֹת יֹצְאִים בַּבִּקְעָה וּבָהָר.

The first pasuk says you should have yir’ah. Then, "ki ...." What's the Ki about? What is the "because?" He explains that if you learn to recognize that the good things in your life are God's gifts to you, and you will not be kofui tov, this will bring to yir’ah.

Coincidentally, the Ohr Hachaim in this Parsha, in 8:18, uses exactly this idea: the passuk says

וְזָכַרְתָּ אֶת ה' אלהיך כִּי הוּא הַנֹּתֵן לְךָ כֹּחַ לַעֲשׂוֹת חָיִל לְמַעַן הָקִים אֶת בְּרִיתוֹ אֲשֶׁר נִשְׁבַּע לַאֲבֹתֶיךָ כַּיּוֹם הַזֶּה.

The Ohr Hachaim says (free translation):

Be sure to take to heart all the good things you experience, and remember that this all comes from God. This will awaken you to the recognition of your Creator and His constant involvement in your life. The first step in the strategy of the yeitzer hara is to desensitize a person to this, ultimately bringing his destruction. Perhaps this is why the following passuk says

וְהָיָה אִם שְׁכֹחַ תִּשְׁכַּח אֶת ה' אלהיך וְהָלַכְתָּ אַחֲרֵי אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים וַעֲבַדְתָּם וְהִשְׁתַּחֲוִיתָ לָהֶם

because if you forget that Hashem is your benefactor, eventually you will forget God entirely and finally follow other gods, not just in thought, but in deed as well.... Learn from here that remembering God's graciousness to you is a great wall that protects a person's service of God, and its absence invites the Satan to push him down from level to level to his ultimate perdition.

Similarly: the Chovas Halevavos, introduction to Shaar Avodah– avodah is ke’ni’ah (Hach'na'a, recognition of the debt of gratitude,) of the beneficiary to the benefactor.

And to put an exclamation point on this idea, see the Baal Haturim in Vayeilech, 31:16–

וְקָם הָעָם הַזֶּה וְזָנָה אַחֲרֵי אֱלֹהֵי נֵכַר הָאָרֶץ

The Ba'al Haturim points out that there is a tahg, an anomalous crown, on the letter 'kuf' of ve'kam; This, he says, is meramez that they will come to do avoda zarah because they will be mevateil the mitzvah of mei’ah (kuf) brachos bechol yom. The one strong shemira that protects us from falling into the trap of Avoda Zara is the Crown of the Kuf, the mitzva of Mei'ah Brachos.

Elul is around the corner. Elul, the lead-up to and preparatory period for the Ye'mei Hadin, ought to be symbolized by fear, a lion, a frightening thing. But the most famous siman of Elul is "Ani Le'dodi Ve'dodi Li," I am my beloved's, my beloved is mine. That's a broad span, isn't it? What’s the shaichus of love to the yom hadin? The answer is that the key to yir’ah is recognizing Hashem’s love. That’s why Moshe said “mah...” and the Gemora asks, mili zutrisa, etc. Pshat is that Moshe was giving us the key to the treasure. Mah Hashem sho'eil mei'imach? Ki im le'yir'a oso. Be aware of Hashem’s chesed, the opportunity to make a malach of yourself, to do good in this world. Once you learn to do that, once you learn to thank Hashem for the gift of life and all that life entails, and for all the things He does for us, then yir'as shamayim will be 'ki im,' it will be easy to come to yir’as shomayim, it'll be practically inevitable. As my son Harav Mordechai Shlita once said, after Vayosha Hashem es Yisrael, then Vayir'u ha'am es Hashem. Seeing the yeshua brought them to Yiras Shamayim. (Mordechai's pshat was that when you love someone, and certainly when you love them and realize all they have done for you, you are afraid to do something that will hurt them.)

After posting this, I got the following email message:
Nope...sorry..... Don't think so............take a look at the headlines..........XXXXXXXXX arrested in Israel on Tax Fraud..how many Brachos you think he said every day.............Talk is CHEAP.......even Brachos........ONLY actions count...........

He has a point. I welcome your opinions, especially constructive criticism; have I become a pileous monotreme that vents both life and waste from the same portal, and broken my promise to not post superficial platitudes? And if I did, is this because I didn't understand the deeper meaning of the Baal Haturim and the Ohr Hachaim? For the sake of argument, let's assume for a moment that the alleged malefactor is guilty, that the relevant person is an Orthodox Jew who is mekayeim mitzvos assei and lo sa'aseh to any standard that defines Orthodox Jewish behavior, and that his actions express an anti-social and anti-Torah world view. Does his, and the proliferating similar cases, prove that religious behavior doesn't prove holiness? Is there any reliable indicator that a person is doing mitzvos out of yiras shamayim as opposed to simply maintaining a religious lifestyle as the course of least resistance out of habit or indoctrination?

One person suggested an answer connected to the Magen Avraham in OC 1:sk7. The Magen Avraham brings from Rabbeinu Bachay that Chazal's dictum "whosoever recites Ashrei thrice daily is surely a Ben Olam Haba" doesn't mean mere recitation. It means deep meditation on the meaning of the words and the truths they relate. Similarly, he said, there's no benefit from merely reciting the hundred brachos. The benefit comes from awareness of hashgacha pratis and reinforcement of hakaras hatov. Without these elements, it's just, as the letter writer put it, talk, and talk is cheap.

I saw that Rav Sternbuch says this here. He says that it's not a din in saying the Brachos, it's a din in saying the brachos with hakaras hatov and yirah of the Sheim Hashem.  I would add that it's not just the Sheim with Yirah, because then every mention of the Sheim should count. It must be the combination of Yirah and hakaras hatov/ahava that a bracha ought to embody.

מה ה׳ אלקיך (י. יב). מכאן דרשו חז״ל שצריך לברך כל יום מאה ברכות,  (מנחה מג:) והכונה דע״י מה שמרגיל עצמו לברך כל יום מאה פעמים ומזכיר שם ה׳ באימה וביראה, מתעורר האדם לזכור לפני מי הוא עומד, ומשריש בלבו יראת ה׳ והיינו ״מה ה־ אלקיך שואל מעמך כי אם ליראה את ה׳ אלקיך ״ ומכאן שסגולה נפלאה לאיש המעלה ברצותו לירא ולפחד את ה׳ שידקדק לומר מאה ברכות בכונה הראויה, ועי׳ ב״אור החיים״ להלן פ׳ כי תצ א (כב, יג) מה שדרש דרש בהאי קרא לס׳ כי אין עתה אלא לשון תשובה , שראוי לבעל תשובה להשתדל לברך ק׳ ברכות בכל יום, כי עי״ז יתעורר לירא את ה׳ ונמצאת תשובתו שלמה.

But I think there is another answer, and this answer highlights the interesting connection of this vort specifically to this week's parsha.

Ba'alei Mussar say "Adam nivdak be'kal," that you can only tell what a person is like from his attitude towards things that are not considered important. Doing the big things proves nothing. But if you do the little things, the things that you could avoid without your conscience bothering you, that does prove something about your sincerity.

And that is precisely what the first words of this week's parsha teach us: Eikev tishme'un, the mitzvos that adam dash be'akeivav. Mei'ah brachos is a way to generate and maintain yir'as shamayim; but only as long as it is a davar kal. Once it is made into a Mivtza, a Mei'ah Brachos cult, like, with all due respect, the amein society, it will prove nothing and accomplish nothing.

NOTE:
Assuming that Mei'ah Brachos is obligatory, is it a Biblical or Rabbinic mandate? And general information for the inquiring mind.

• According to the Bahag and Rav Shlomo ibn Gabirol, the fact that the Gemara in Menachos (cited above) derives the obligation from the passuk here proves that the mitzva is Biblical in nature.
• The Rambam and Ramban hold that it is mi'derabanan, and the drasha in Menachos is an asmachta (like Shnayim mikra ve'echad Targum hinted at in the word 'Shemos.') This opinion is accepted le'halacha.
• Rabbeinu Bechaye and the Sefer HaManhig write that this was one of the earliest Rabbinical ordinances, (like Kri'as Hatorah Shabbos afternoon,) dating back to the times of Moshe Rabbeinu. However, it was essentially forgotten over time until, in response to a plague in Yerushalayim which was R'L killing 100 Jews a day, (Medrash Rabba Bamidbar [Korach] 18:21) David HaMelech reemphasized the takana. (The Medrash there also associates this with the passuk in II Shmuel 23:1,נְאֻם דָּוִד בֶּן-יִשַׁי, וּנְאֻם הַגֶּבֶר הֻקַם עָל, since עָל is Gematria 100. Others see it in the Passuk in Tehilllim 128:4 הִנֵּה כִי-כֵן יְבֹרַךְ גָּבֶר יְרֵא ה since כִי-כֵן is also gematria 100. )
• Women have no such obligation. Sources: Lechem Mishna 2 Taanis 5 and Reb Shlomo Zalman Aurbach in Halichos Shlomo page 272 based on very different reasons. (Reb Elyashiv and Rav Ovadia Yosef Sheyichyu hold that women should say mei'ah brachos, but this is my blog, and I can be soseim the way I want to.)
• Does the night go with the following or preceding day? This question is too OCD for me* to deal with, like where are you supposed to stop and do Targum by Shnayim Mikra? At each perek, or only at the psuchos, or at the aliyos? Just decide in your mind which makes more sense to you and stick with it.
• The Bach in OC 46 says that this still works as a shmira from sickness and things like that.

*Someone pointed out that this is another example of Adam nivdak be'kal. Thank you very much.
~~~~~~~~~~~~

Land of the Free (Part II)

(This is Part II and follows Part I.)

ונראה שתלמידי ר"ע סבלו מאותו בעיה של "אהבת ממון יותר מדי." ולכן כל אחד דאג להשתכר מתורתו ולא היה מוכן לקיים "מה אני בחינם אף אתם נמי בחנם."(נדרים ל"ז.) ואולי יותר מזה, דאגו שאם השני ילמד את חידושי תורה שלהם, לא יהיה לו שום יתרון לקבל משרה בתלמוד תורה או ברבנות לפני התלמיד שלו. והלשון "עניהם צרה בתורה זה בזה" משמע כך.

וא"כ כבר אין שאילה למה מתו בתקופה שבין פסח לעצרת, דזה זמן ההכנה לקבלת התורה לכל כלל ישראל, כאיש אחד בלב אחד. והם רצו לצמצם קבלת התורה לעצמם. ועוד, כמו שציטט הרה"ג בעל הבלוג הזה

http://havolim.blogspot.com/2009/07/67-veshinantom-levonecho.html

תניא היה ר' מאיר אומר הלומד תורה ואינה מלמדה זה הוא דבר ה' בזה (סנהדרין צ"ט.) ואולם צ"ב מה הבזיון בזה שאינו מלמדו לאחרים. ועי' במהרש"א שם דהיות והלימוד היא ע"י שמיעה, ורק הלימוד לאחרים היא ע"י דיבור, הרי הפסוק דדבר השם בזה - קרי דיבור ה' בזה - מחייב לדבר דבר ה' לאחרים וה"ה מבזה הדיבור החיובית הזה. ועי"ל ע"פ הגמ' שם ע"ב כל המלמד את בן חבירו תורה ... ר' אלעזר אומר כאילו עשאן לדברי תורה... הרי שבזה שממאן ללמד לאחרים מבטל מעשיית דברי תורה , ואין לך בזיון גדול מזה (ועי' בבן יהוידע משפי' בעשיית דברי תורה).

[ולכבוד הרה"ג בעל הבלוג הזה הריני מוסיף נופח משלי על הענין שעיקר תלמוד תורה היא הללמד. והדברים הם מהרה"ג הרי"ד סאלאווייציק גאב"ד דבוסטון שגם הוא היה מטרה לחץ להרבה שנאת חנם ורציחה בהיתר. בהררי קדם ח"ב רנ"ז ע"ב מביא ראייה עצומה לזה ש"מהות החיוב [דתלמוד תורה] הוא ללמד את התורה ולמוסרה לכל ישראל." שהרי בפ"א הל' א' מת"ת כותב הרמב"ם שקטן אביו חייב ללמדו תורה וכו' ובהלכה ב' כותב כשם שחייב אדם ללמד את בנו כך הוא חייב ללמד את בן בנו וכו' ולא רק בנו ובן בנו בלבד אלא מצווה על כל חכם וחכם מישראל ללמד את כל התלמידים אע"פ שאינן בניו. ובהל' ד' כותב ... שכשם שמצוה עליו ללמד את בנו כך הוא מצווה ללמד את עצמו. לא "ללמוד בעצמו" אלא "ללמד את עצמו" ושפתיים יושק...

ועיי"ש שמביא מעשה מהגר"ח שיש קדימה למי שיש בכחו להרביץ תורה עיי"ש]

ונחזור לעניננו שא"כ יש לחדש דבר נורא - שהפירוש של שנאת חנם הינו שנאת החיוב של "מה אני בחנם אף אתם נמי בחנם." ועכשיו מובן מה הקשר בין אהבת ממון יותר מדי לשנאת חינם. וכבר סרה התמיהה שאם היו עוסקים בגמ"ח איך הגיעו לשנאת חנם. וגם יתיישב הקושיא מה היה החטא הנורא בשנאת חנם שגרם לחורבן הבית, שכנראה שמזה הכריח הנצי"ב שהגיעו לרציחה בהיתר שחשבו שמקיימים מצוה בשנאת ובהריגת האחר.

ואולם אם כנים דברינו הרי היו מוכנים לעשות גמ"ח בכל תחום גשמי, אבל החשיבו את התורה כפרנסה שלהם, ולא ששנאו את השני אלא ששנאו את החיוב ללמד לשני תורה בחינם. ובאמת גרם זה לבזיון וביטול תורה נורא. ודי בזה לגרום לחורבן בית מקדשנו.

ידוע לכל בן תורה, ולדאבוני גם להרבה מאלו שמותחים ביקורת על מחנה הבני תורה, המחלוקת הערוכה והארוכה אם מותר לת"ח לקחת תמיכה מהציבור כדי שיוכל ללמוד. כידוע הרמב"ם (פ"ג דת"ת ה"י ובפיהמ"ש אבות פ"ד מ"ה) קורא לזה חלול ה' ובזיון התורה. וכבר יצאו כנגדו התשב"ץ והכ"מ ואולי רוב מנין ובנין של גדולי ישראל. ואחרי השואה הנוראה כמעט שלא היה חולק שלכה"פ היתה הוראת שעה להרבות התלמידים ולתמוך בכוללים כדי לאפשר שמתוך אלף יצא אחד הראוי להוראה (עי' אג"מ יו"ד ח"ב סי' קט"ז) ואולם לענ"ד יש סכנה כרוכה בזה.

שהרי אם מותר ומצוה לקבל תמיכה כדי ללמוד נראה שאין לעשות סחורה מהתורה. ואם אמנם יש לת"ח האפשרות למסור שיעור בשכר יכול להעדיף את זה על מסירות שיעור בחנם. אבל להגיע למצב שאם אין משלמים - וכמובן מחוסר יכולת - אין מלמדים במקום שאין מפסיד עי"ז מפרנסתו - נראה שזה היה חטא תלמידי ר"ע. וכמובן שיש בזה חשבונות רבים כמו התוצאות הצפויות שאנשים שהיו מוכנים לשלם עד עכשיו ידרשו גם הם שיעורים בחינם, וכדומה. ועל דבר המסור ללב נאמר ויראת מא-להיך.

ואם מגיעים למצב של אהבת ממון יותר מדי ושנאת "מה אני בחנם" מובן מאליו שאין תורה כזו מגין ומצלי. והגם שמתוך שלא לשמה בה לשמה, הרי כבר כתב הגר"י סלנטר שזה רק אם מתכוננים להגיע ללשמה. ועיננו ראו ולא זר הרבה שעסקו שלא לשמה ולא רק שלא הגיעו ללשמה אלא שפקרו. ואולי אפשר לאמר שזוהי אחד מהסיבות לחילולי השם שפוקדים אותנו ר"ל חדשים לבקרים - ולא רק ע"י אנשים פוחזים ורקים. ודי לחכי' ברמי' .

ואם רוצים להשתמש באהבת חינם לתקן את השנאת חנם - שכל דור שלא נבנה בהמ"ק בימיו כאילו נחרב בימיו - אז איך שנפרש "שנאת חנם" אין אהבת חינם גדולה מקירוב לבבות ע"י לימוד התורה לחלשים ורחוקים. ומדה כנגד מדה נזכה ל"והשיב לב אבות על בנים ולב בנים על אבותם."

וע"ז באתי על החיתום, אה"ק

(ed: See also Bava Metzia 30b,

דאמר ר' יוחנן לא חרבה ירושלים אלא על שדנו בה דין תורה. אלא דיני דמגיזתא לדיינו? אלא אימא שהעמידו דיניהם על דין תורה ולא עבדו לפנים משורת הדין

and Tosfos there.)