Breishis: Shabbos Faxes and Phone Calls

Earlier Posts on Beresishis:

Spiritual/Emotional Divine Communion and Contemplating the Beauty of Nature

Beautification of Mitzvos and Conspicuous Virtue

The Nachash was First in a Series of Four

Parshas Bereishis includes the concept of Shabbos.  The onset and conclusion of Shabbos are local, and sweep across the globe from east to west along with the setting of the Sun on Friday and Saturday.  Similarly, the dates being different on the two sides of the international dateline means that if there were a north-south street in Anchorage, Alaska, when it would be Friday morning on the east side of the street, it would be Shabbos morning on the west side.  (Anchorage, and a mid-continental dateline, are cited here only for purpose of illustration, not as an assertion of normative halacha.)

One of my great Shabbos pleasures is hearing from my children in Israel. Sometimes we are lucky enough to be eating our seuda at the table, and sometimes I am preparing my shiur in the dining room, and the phone rings, the answering machine turns on, and we hear the voices of our beloved children in Yerushalayim, saying something like this: "Good Shabbos, Mommy and Daddy! I hope you're able to hear me. Shabbos was beautiful here, I spoke at the meal in the Yeshiva, I walked to the Kosel and didn't get arrested, we had a great Chumash shiur at Shalosh Seudos, and we're looking forward to hearing from you soon."

Obviously, my kids are calling from Yerushalayim long after their Shabbos is over, and we are hearing them while it is still Shabbos for us in America. Part of our oneg shabbos is watching the consternation on the faces of our guests, who begin to wonder that if this is how we keep Shabbos, who knows if the food in our house is kosher. So I let them wonder for a while, and then I explain why I hold this is muttar. But is it muttar? Are we allowed to hear the message on Shabbos?  Are my kids allowed to call us when it's after Shabbos for them but still Shabbos in America?

Basically, these are the issues: (Remember what I said about relying on anonymous halacha opinions you find on the Internet: see my profile in "About Me".)

1. Even though we do not require Shvisas Keilim, and so we are allowed to begin a melacha process before Shabbos that continues automatically on Shabbos, we are not allowed to do so in the case of Avsha Milsa, where the melacha creates a noise that is heard on Shabbos (OC 252:5, Rama). Would this not prohibit us from leaving the answering machine on where the entire purpose of leaving it on is so that calls will generate noise on Shabbos? Or may we do so because we are merely leaving the machines on; but it is not us who will be generating that noise-- it is no different than allowing a non-Jew to come on to my property and to use my keilim on Shabbos.

2. Obviously, the telephone call is for our benefit. If so, does this fall into the category of "Akum she'asa melacha bishvil Yisrael," in which case it is prohibited, (under the rubric of "amira le'akum," either because of  שליחות or   דבר דבר)  to benefit from the melacha until after Shabbos is over and bichdei she'ya'aseh (unless it was done by the akum for his own benefit and our benefit is secondary)? Or is amira le'akum limited to cases where someone or something is doing the melacha during Shabbos. Here, nobody is doing anything on Shabbos.

3. Is is muttar for a person for whom Shabbos is over to directly cause a melacha to be done in a part of the world where it is still Shabbos? Perhaps this is real chillul Shabbos, because he is actually doing melacha where it is still Shabbos-- he is being מחלל the אות of Shabbos, he is profaning the sign of Shabbos where the melacha is being done? Or is the idea of Shabbos a matter of personal conduct, and limited to the individual for whom it is Shabbos where he is?
This question can be much more serious than phone calls and faxes; what about the 'Shain Machine'?
The Shain Machine was invented by Rabbi Yehuda Shain to avoid Bishul Akum problems in factories. This is a mechanism which allows a mashgiach to call the factory and enter a code on the telephone which will ignite a fire at the factory, such that the fire cannot be turned on by anyone but the mashgiach, although workers at the factory can turn it off.
So, can a mashgiach, for whom it is Friday morning, turn on a fire in a factory in China when it is Shabbos in China? Can an Israeli, for whom it is long after Shabbat, turn on a fire in a (non-Jewish-owned) factory in Los Angeles, where they are holding by Mizmor Shir Leyom Hashabbos in pesukei dezimra?
The question also arises regarding sending email.  But it's hard to believe that rearranging a few electrons in the local server really raises any real chilul Shabbos issues.  אש שחורה על גבי אש לבנה on the screen may be kesiva, but not in the server.

There are exactly three approaches among the poskim.
1. It is absolutely 100% muttar lechatchila. (Rabbi Hershel Shachter, for all practical purposes, and Rabbi Yisroel Belsky- who says that Reb Akiva Eiger's teshuva 159 is irrelevant, and he's right- in Daf Kashrus volume 13 no. 9, June 2005, Rav Neuwirth in שמירת שבת כהלכתו 31:26 from Rav Scheinberg, and Me)
2. It is most likely assur Mi'Deoraysa. (I can't say until I verify his opinion and get his permission to quote him UPDATE OCTOBER 2011:  I had heard this in the name of Reb Dovid Feinstein.  I asked him last week, and he said that he holds it is muttar, period.  The person that quoted him to me was diametrically wrong.)
3. It is assur Mi'Derabanan, but only where the recipient is a Jew, based on Issue #2. (Rav Meir Bransdorfer of the Eida Chareidis in מבקשי תורה תשרי תשנ'ד כרך ב who brings the Radvaz in 1:76 to be mattir Issue #3 but assers on the basis of Issue #2 where the recipient is a Jew, citing the שו'ע הרב רס'ג בקונטרס אחרון אות ח. Lefi aniyus da'ati, the Radvaz is a very weak comparison, and the connection to the Shulchan Aruch Harav is very debatable.)

Now, this is not the only case where the opinions are diametrically opposed. (Another example is where you want to re-hang a picture that fell down on Shabbos, which the Mishna Berura is mattir, and the Chazon Ish holds it's assur mi'deoraysa. Also, the Tefilla Lishlom HaMedinah.) But here, the basic philosophy of Shabbos comes into play, which, to me, makes it more interesting. Furthermore, it is very hard to come up with a strong tzushtell in Shas, so the question is, in many cases, left to "יראה לי."

Another halacha that might involve some of the same issues:
What about Chametz in the US when you are in Israel, or vice versa? If you have Chametz in Israel, can you sell it when it's Pesach in Israel but not in the US where you are? What if you're in Israel: can you buy it back from the goy when it's after Pesach in Israel but still Pesach where the Chametz is? (I actually once had a shayla like this: someone from New York called erev Pesach and said he had forgotten to sell his chametz, and it was after noon already, when you can no longer sell the chametz. We told him he was up the creek, and he would have to pour all his expensive schnapps down the drain. He, being a Manhattan lawyer with a keen eye for a loophole, then asked whether he could still call a rov in Los Angeles, where it was still early morning, to sell his chametz. We (meaning me as interlocutor for Reb Dovid Feinstein) told him no. But that's not exactly what we're discussing here.)
If my use of the word might didn't make it clear, I know that it would be easy to propose possible distinctions between the issues of Chametz and Shabbos: if it's called issura bala before Pesach, if shelcha is a mi'ut, etc.  But without rayos, it's just speculation.
An interesting thing on this question is the tentativeness of the poskim: among the respectable authorities, almost nobody takes a firm stand on the issue of chametz.  See, e.g., Teshuvos Igros Moshe OC IV 95, last paragraph, where he says that you have to be machmir both ways-- mei'ikar hadin.  And see Oneg Yomtov 36, who brings "קצת ראיה" that the loaction of the Chametz is all that matters.  As Great Unknown points out in the comments, the Oneg Yomtov's raya is based on an assumption that Chazal would have mentioned the case of different time zones if it would yield any interesting halachic ramifications.  Rav Shternbuch, in his Mo'adim Uzemanim at the beginning of Mechiras Chametz, disagrees with the Oneg Yomtov, and holds that all that matters is the location of the owner.  As for the Oneg Yomtov's proof, he says that Chazal would not have proposed such a pshat as a legitimate interpretation of the intent of the author of the Mishnah, and so they ignored it, just as Great Unknown suggested.

Similar questions:
1.  Shevisas Be'hemto.  What if you and your animal are in different time zones-- it is Shabbos for you, but not where your animal is, or vice versa?
2. Oso ve'es Beno.  What if the two are shechted on the same day from your perspective, but they were in different days where they were shechted?  Reb Meir Simcha in Parshas Emor 22:28 says that your perspective doesn't matter.  If the mother was shechted where it was day, but it is already night where you are, you can shecht the offspring now, even though it is still the same day, from your perspective, as the shechitas ha'eim.  Then he says a most remarkable chiddush-- that in that case, since it is muttar to shecht the offspring that is in a different calendar day, one may even shecht another offspring that shares the calendar day with the mother.
3.  Chadash.  After the Churban Beis Hamikdash, it is not the offering of the Minchas Ha'omer that is mattir Chadash, it is the break of dawn on the sixteenth of Nissan that is mattir Chadash.  So, here's the question:  After Hei'ir Pnei Mizrach in Yerushalayim, which is mattir Chadash locally, what is the status of Chadash over in Los Angeles?  In some places, it's not even the sixteenth of Nissan yet, to say nothing of dawn on the sixteenth.  So is Chadash muttar or assur there?  Rav Tzvi Kaplan, Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshivas Kodshim in Yerushalayim, and son in law of Harav Michel Feinstein ztzl, says he asked this question to Reb Chaim Kanievsky.  Reb Chaim Kanievsky told him that as soon as it is Hei'ir Pnei Mizrach in Yerushalyim, all Chadash in the world becomes muttar.  Reb Tzvi was so shocked by this that he forgot the other questions he had prepared.  The reason he was shocked is because the Brisker Rov says that even Hakravas Ha'omer is not mattir Chadash in places where it's not daytime of the sixteenth yet, because hakravas ha'omer is only mattir on the day of the sixteenth.  This is diametrically opposed to what Reb Chaim Kanievsky said.
4.  Keilim that are koneh sh'visa.  Here's the case: we pasken (OC 397:8) that objects are limited to the techum of their owner.  If the owner of an object is outside the techum, you can't move the object daled amos, even in the house.  For example: My son is in Israel, I'm in the U.S., it's Shabbos, I can't borrow and wear his tie or sweater.  This is the factual Halacha.  But perhaps that is only true if it's Shabbos where the owner is.  If it's after Shabbos in Israel, maybe there's no din that his keilim are limited to any particular techum.



(to be continued. If you have an informed opinion or a makor, send it now.)

Sukkos and Chanuka

I like to think that the end of one Yomtov is the time to start looking forward to the next one. Now that Sukkos is over, and MarCheshvan is about to begin, there's a long, empty time until the next Yomtov. But at the Ne'ilas Hachag of Simchas Torah, I heard a very nice dvar Torah from a young man, Joey Nussbaum, and it bears repeating both because of the connection between Sukkos and Chanuka and because of the explanation it provides to a perplexing Gemara in Shabbos.

We all know the Beis Yosef's question about why we celebrate eight days, when the miraculous long-burning oil only lasted seven days more than it normally would. The Aruch Hashulchan addresses this question in OC 670:5. He brings from the Sefer Chashmona'i that in the year before Matisyahu's rebellion, Antiochus had prevented the korban celebration of Sukkos and Shemini Atzeres. Therefore, when the Jews were able to re-inaugurate the Beis Hamikdash, they intentionally celebrated for eight days, in order to show that they were making up for the lost days of Sukkos and Shemini Atzeres. The eight days of burning, then, were simply a heavenly ratification of their decision to establish this eight day holiday. (This is actually made clear in the Megillas Chashmona'im.)

With this we can finally understand what Shammai means by saying that we should start with eight candles and go down one every day just as was done with the bulls that are brought on Sukkos. Everyone reading the Gemara is puzzled by this association, because this reverse progression is unique to Sukkos, and why would Chanuka davka reflect the singular rules of Sukkos? But now we understand that Chanuka was viewed as a stand-in, as a commemoration, of the Sukkos holiday and korbanos that they had been prevented from bringing.

This also explains why we find dinim of hiddur on Chanuka that we generally don't find in other dinim. The reason is, again, because Chanuka is, to some extent, a quasi-Sukkos, and Sukkos is a holiday when hiddur on the esrog and all the minim is stressed to an unusual extent.

Micha Berger of http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2006/11/chayei-sarah-kibbush-and-chizuq.shtml commented that he heard this association from Rav Aharon Soloveichik in 1993, and expanded on it with something else he heard from him. What follows is from Micha's website, Aspaqlaria, at the above link.

R. Chaim Soloveitchik holds that there is a distinct difference between the sanctity of Eretz Yisroel that came with the first commonwealth and that of the second.

The first Temple did not create a permanent qedushah (holiness). The reason given is “that which was acquired through conquering is lost through conquering. The First Commonwealth built on land acquired in the wars of the days of Yehoshua and the Shoftim (Judges), was itself conquered.

The Second Commonwealth was “merely” an immigration of a group of Jews who decided to live in the land as Jews. It is predicated on the mitzvos done there, the education of children raised there. That kind of sanctity can not be undone. “Qidshah lisha’atah viqidshah le’asid lavo – it was sanctified for its time and sanctified for all time to come”. Even today, Har Habayis (the Temple Mount) has the sanctity of the Temple.

R. Aharon understands his grandfather’s words in the light of this distinction. The first commonwealth was founded on kibbush. It therefore had an inherently inferior qedushah. The second commonwealth was built by chazaqah. When Hashem tells Zecharia, “Not by force and not by might but by My spirit”, He is saying that the second Temple should be build on chazaqah, not kibbush, to lead to a permanent sanctification. “Neqeivah tesoveiv gever.”

Rav Aharon Soloveitchik notes Chanukah’s connection to Sukkos. According to Seifer haMakabiim, on the first Chanukah people who had just missed being oleh regel, going up to the beis hamiqdash, with their esrog and lulav, did so then at their first opportunity. Beis Shammai taught that one should light 8 lights the first night of Chanukah, 7 the second, learning from the 70 bulls offered for the mussaf on Sukkos, which also declined in number each day: 14 the first day, 13 the second, etc… Rav Yosi bar Avin or R’ Yosi bar Zevida explains that Beis Shammai are emphasizing the link between Chanukah and Sukkos. (We follow Beis Hillel, and teach that the ideal is to increase as the holiday progresses. They do not deny the connection; but rather Beis Hillel asserts an overriding halachic principle — that we increase in holiness over time.)

The concept of being a geir vetoshav is at the center of the similarity between the two holidays. Sukkos is a time when the toshav leaves his home to experience geirus in the Sukkah. Chanukah is also about the ger’s Chazaqah, the rededication of the second Beis haMiqdash. Not about winning the war – the war wouldn’t be over for years – but about being able to live in Israel as Jews, with access to the beis hamiqdash.

Simchas Torah: A video of Maranan Reb Leib Bakst and Reb Shmuel Birnbaum ztz'l

A little tete a tete on the sugya in Kesuvos 19-- Palginan by Mah li leshakeir in Kiyum Shtaros.

As a young man, I was once disappointed that Reb Leib didn't want to talk to me about Reb Akiva Eiger and the Nesivos on whether Misasek on Shabbos is just a petur korban or bichlal not a ma'aseh issur; maybe I should be grateful.

Notice that the others at the table know better than to put their heads between these two lions. They had probably been arguing about the sugya for sixty years, and I'll bet you dollars to doughnuts that they're still arguing about it right now.
~~~~

Yalkut Shimoni at the End of Iyov and Sukkos

התמלא בשכות עורו. אמר רבה בר בר חנה עתיד הקב"ה לעשות סוכה לצדיקים לע"ל (כתוב בישעיה רמז תק"ג). אמר ר' לוי כל מי שמקיים מצות סוכה בעולם הזה אף הקב"ה מושיבו בסוכתו של לויתן לעתיד לבא שנאמר התמלא בשכות עורו וגו', את מוצא בשעה שבאו יסורין על איוב היה עומד וקורא תגר אחר מדת הדין שנאמר מי יתן ידעתי ואמצאהו אדעה מלים יענני, אמר לו הקב"ה איוב מה אתה עומד ואומר מי יתן ידעתי ואמצאהו הרי עורו של לויתן שאני עתיד לעשות לצדיקים לעתיד לבא אם חסר אני מטלית אחת ממנו יש לך למלאת שנאמר התמלא בשכות עורו, וא"ת עורו של לויתן אינו דבר משובח, א"ר פנחס הכהן בר חייא ור' ירמיה בש"ר שמואל בר רב יצחק פספסי הרוחות שלו מכהות גלגל חמה שנאמר האומר לחרס ולא יזרח. ירפד חרוץ עלי טיט, אין לך מזוהם של דג אלא מקום רפידתו, ומקום רפידתו של לויתן יפה של זהב לכך נאמר ירפד חרוץ עלי טיט. ד"א האומר לחרס ולא יזרח מקום רפידתו חרוץ הוא זהב שנאמר ירפד חרוץ עלי טיט.

.

This is from the Yalkut Shimoni toward the end of Iyov. The reason I posted it is this: The fortieth perek of Iyov, where Hashem responds to Iyov's bewildered complaint, has a surprising number of (40:21-22, and 40:31) apparent references to Sukkos. Some mefarshim have translated these words to mean very different things, (e.g., 'Tzalzel' either meaning 'shade' or 'a fish-processing knife'). Thus, התמלא בשכות עורו can mean "Can you riddle his skin with barbs," meaning "Would you, Iyov, dare to lay a hand on the Leviathan?". But others read it as meaning "Will you complete the Sukkah with (the Leviathan's) hide?"

The Yalkut (40:31) takes the latter approach, and says that the pesukim allude to the following dialogue between Hashem and Iyov.

I'll try to translate.

"Will you finish the Sukkah with the Leviathan's hide?" Rabbah bar bar Channa said: in the future, Hashem will make Sukkos for the Tzadikim. Rav Levi said, whoever fulfills the mitzva of Sukka in this world, Hashem will settle him in a Sukka made of the hide of the Leviathan in the coming future, as it says "Will you finish the Sukkah with the Leviathan's hide."
You find that when suffering came upon Iyov, he complained about his strict punishment and said "If only I could know, if only I could find Him, I would like to know what words He could use to explain what is happening to me!" Hashem answered, "You say you want to know? Look: I will one day make a Sukka from the hide of the Leviathan; if it will be missing one side, will you complete it? If you say 'with the skin of the Leviathan,' is that not praiseworthy?
Rav Pinchas... and Rav Yirmiah... say, the corners of his sides dim the orbit of the Sun... there is no more foul part of a fish than its bottom; the bottom of the Levyasan is as beautiful as gold."

(end of Yalkut)

I can't tell you what this mysterious Yalkut means. But I do know the following:
1. It has something to do with Sukkos.
2. Hashem comforted the tragedy-beset Iyov by showing a connection between the suffering of the righteous in this world and the fact that a Sukka is kosher even when missing one entire wall.
3. It says that only Hashem can complete the fourth side of a sukka made from the hide of the Leviathan.

This may be one of the many medrashim that is so hopelessly obscure as to remain hefker to whatever pshat people want to impute to it. But I am hoping to get a clear and convincing pshat before yomtov is over. I know that Reb Aharon Soloveichik has a pshat in the Yalkut. I have to think about it before posting it.

Chaim B of DivreiChaim.blogspot.com referred me to Reb Tzadok, who says (see comments; it's on page 244 of the hebrewbooks.org volume I) that the idea of Sukkas Oro Shel Liviyasan means that tzadikim, having overcome the Yetzer Hara in this world, will be seated in a sukka made from an animal that represents untrammeled physicality and driving desire, (the Liviyasan being a combination of the Nachash and Dagim, which profligately engage in pirya verivya,) and that this animal was the source of Adam and Chava's "kosnos ohr." Thank you, Chaim. But Reb Tzadok's pshat does not address the connection to Iyov.

See further in the comments for a pshat from the Yismach Moshe that does specifically talk about this Medrash. I'm still hoping for more kipshuto.

Thanks to the wonders of the internet, I received a pshat from the author of the earlier post (on Meva'eit), who said the following:

Sukka is known to represent Hashem's protection and Hashgacha (e.g. Erchin 32b ואגין זכותא עלייהו כי סוכה, and the interchange of Shomer Amo Yisrael Laad <-> Hapores Sukkat Shalom).

Sukka tells us that it is just so that one could be in a place where the 4th wall is missing, the 3rd is only tephach, and the other two are some combination of God, Lavud & Dophen Akumma. Yet, it is a kosher Sukka.(Note: The writer is referring to the halacha that a sukka does not need four walls. A Sukka is halachically adequate if it has two 'whole' walls, a third wall that is a few inches long, and no fourth wall at all. Even the two 'whole' walls don't have to be whole: they can be perforated and short and afford no privacy or protection.)

We often look around and see holes in this protection shield. Iyyov feels he was left out there, no Mechitzos, no protection around. But, when he would see the full picture, the full Sukka, it should become clear that what looked like nothing around was in fact part of the bigger Sukkat Livyatan. Would he then dare to "fix" it?

And now I understand what I had heard in the name of Reb Aharon Soloveichik. I was missing some minor elements of what Reb Aharon said, but having seen this pshat, it is clear to me that this is precisely what Reb Aharon meant.

The Sukka represents Hashem's protection, the Hashgacha Pratis of Klal Yisrael. But the Sukka, ironically, is the merest scrap of a house-- not only is the roof barely functional, but the walls are merely ideas or symbols of walls, more absent than present. The mussar haskeil is that davka this Sukka teaches us that Hashem's inexorable hashgacha, the hashgacha that makes us indestructible, seems to be so fragile, it's barely there, but is no less real for that. As Reb Aharon said, the Mechitza that is there ahl pi din (tzuras hapesach, pi tikra, omeid meruba ahl haparutz, lavud, dofen akuma, Gud Asik, Pasei Bira'os, and all the dinim we use to create mechitzos, as Reb Eli mentioned) can be more real than a physical mechitza. Similarly, the deficiencies and deprivations we perceive in our life experience are often only epiphenomena; the deeper reality of the richness of a Torah life is truer than that which our limited perception can comprehend.

Yasher Kochachem to Rabbanim and Doctoirim Gary S, Chaim B, and Eli E!

I later saw that the Aruch Laner mentions this medrash too: 

Aruch Laner explains that by showing Iyov the halacha that a sukkah is composed of only three walls, of which the third may be only a tefach, Hashem demonstrated that this world's existence is temporary, as it serves as a portal of passage to the eternal world of the souls in the World-to-Come.  If a person 's lot is one of suffering, he need  not feel that he has been deprived of his deserved comfort and tranquility.  In fact, this state of difficulty should provide hope that his true reward will be eternal.   

UPDATED A Guest Post: אינו מתכוין וכוונה מתנגדת ביו'הכ

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Our Guest Poster is a Musmach, a Talmid Chacham of rare achievement and a professor of Physics and Astronomy.  He prefers to remain unnamed

בהלכות תשובה ריש פ"א פסק הרמב"ם: "וכן בעלי חטאות ואשמות בעת שמביאין קרבנותיהם על שגגתן או על זדונן אין מתכפר להן בקרבנם עד שיעשו תשובה ויתוודו וידוי דברים שנאמר והתוודה אשר חטא עליה". נמצא שהתשובה על כל פרטיה וכן הוידוי מעכבים כפרת החטאת והאשם.

אך בפ"ג משגגות הל"י כתב: "אין יום הכיפורים ולא החטאת ולא האשם מכפרין, אלא על השבים המאמינים בכפרתן אבל המבעט בהם, אינם מכפרין לו. כיצד היה מבעט והביא חטאתו או אשמו והוא אומר או מחשב בליבו שאין אלו מכפרין אף על פי שקרבו כמצותן לא נתכפר לו וכשיחזור בתשובה מבעיטתו צריך להביא חטאתו ואשמו", וכאן מפורש שרק המבעט בכפרה לגמרי אין הקרבן עולה לו וצריך קרבן נוסף, אבל מי שמאמין ורוצה בכפרה אלא שעדיין לא שב מחטאו, וכגון שלא קבל עליו להבא בקבלה גמורה עד שיעיד עליו יודע תעלומות וכו', עלה לו הקרבן[1].

הכס"מ בהלכות תשובה שם כתב שמקורו של הרמב"ם הוא מהפסוק "והתודה" שמצריך וידוי (וממילא גם תשובה) עם הקרבן. מקור זה כתב הרמב"ם עצמו בהלכה שם. עוד הוסיף הכס"מ שדברים אלה מפורשים בברייתא בשבועות י"ג. שמניחה כדבר פשוט שחטאת ואשם אין מכפרים אלא לשבים – "דתניא יכול יהא יוה"כ מכפר על שבים ועל שאינן שבים ודין הוא הואיל וחטאת ואשם מכפרין ויום הכפורים מכפר מה חטאת ואשם אין מכפרין אלא על השבים אף יוה"כ אין מכפר אלא על השבים".

מקור שני זה תמוה, שהרי בכריתות ז. פירשה הגמרא את אותה הברייתא במסקנא "אלא, שבין -- דאמר יכפר עלי חטאתי, שאין שבין -- דאמר לא תכפר עלי חטאתי", ואם כן משמעות דברי הברייתא אינה אלא שהאומר לא תכפר עלי חטאתי אינו מתכפר, ואין זה נוגע למי שלא עשה תשובה, והן הן דברי הרמב"ם בשגגות.

לישב סתירת דברי הרמב"ם אפשר לומר שבהלכות שגגות מדובר בעיכוב בכפרת הקרבן עצמו, וזה הוא רק במבעט שהוא כמי שהביא קרבן שלא לרצונו ופסול, אבל כל שאינו מבעט הקרבן כשר, עולה לו ומכפר. אלא שאין כפרת הקרבן לבדה מספקת בלא התשובה והוידוי שעמו. על כן, מי שהביא חטאת בלא תשובה עלתה לו וצריך לשוב ולהתוודות כדי לגמור הכפרה, וזהו שכתב הר"מ בהלכות תשובה.

אם נכונים הדברים, יש ללמוד מכאן גם לענין יום הכיפורים. ממשיך שם הר"מ בשגגות "וכן המבעט ביום הכיפורים אין יום הכיפורים מכפר עליו לפיכך אם נתחייב באשם תלוי ועבר עליו יום הכיפורים והוא מבעט בו הרי זה לא נתכפר לו וכשיחזור בתשובה אחר יום הכיפורים חייב להביא כל אשם תלוי שהיה חייב בו". ושוב קשה, הרי בהלכות תשובה פסק הרמב"ם דלא כרבי, "ועצמו של יום הכיפורים מכפר לשבים שנאמר כי ביום הזה יכפר עליכם" משמע אם לא שב בתשובה לפרטיה לא נתכפר, ולא די בכך שאינו מבעט.

ולנ"ל יש לומר שגם ביוה"כ שונה דין מבעט ממי שלא שב. כשם שבקרבן המבעט בכפרתו כמי שלא הקריב וצריך לחזור ולהקריב, כך ביוה"כ (לדידן דקיי"ל דלא כרבי) המבעט בכפרתו כמי שלא עבר עליו יוה"כ כלל. אבל מי שלא שב אך מאמין ורוצה בכפרת יוה"כ מתכפר בו, אלא שאין די בכפרה זו לכפר לגמרי ועדיין מוטל עליו לשוב ולהתודות כדי לגמור הכפרה, ולכאורה נראה שאינו צריך יום-כיפור נוסף אחר ששב והתוודה, כשם שחייבי חטאות ואשמות אינם צריכים קרבן נוסף[2].

עדיין יש לדון מה המקור לפסק זה, אך אין כאן מקומו.

רובא דעלמא אינם זוכים לעשות תשובה גמורה בכל שנה ושנה (לפחות לפי הרמב"ם[3]). ולכאורה כיוון דנקטינן דלא כרבי מה להם וליום הכיפורים? ולהנ"ל ניחא קצת.

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[1] בספר המפתח של פרנקל מצאתי רק אחד המתיחס לשאלה זו [שו"ת ארץ צבי (פרומר) ח"ב, הגהות על אבנ"ז קכ"ה] אך לא הבנתי תירוצו.

[2] וזה כנראה דלא כתוספות ישנים יומא פה: שכתבו שגם לרבי אין יוה"כ מכפר לגמרי בלא תשובה.

[3] יש כמה ראיות שלשאר ראשונים כל שמתחרט כבר נחשב שב, אבל לרמב"ם לכאורה כל עוד שאין כאן קבלה גמורה להבא שיעיד עליו וכו' לא בא לכלל תשובה.

After posting this, the author wrote to let me know that he disagreed with my title for his post, as will become apparent in the following copy of his letters. I highly recommend that if anyone is doing work on Mitzvos Tzrichos Kavana that he read these letters and see the Mar'ei Mekomos.

The connection you made in the title is interesting. I think it's incorrect but I have to think why. Few random initial objections are:

Probably you agree that the need for Tshuva in Y"K has nothing to do with מצוות צריכות כוונה. (Kapara of Y"K is not a Mitzvah, so why would it need כוונה anyway; moreover כוונה everywhere else is just to be יוצא; this is not the same as Tshuva). Thus I don't accept the equation between אינו מתכוון and אינו שב.

The link you made to מצוות צריכות כוונה is probably only as far as כוונה הפכית may nullify a Mitzvah, which could be the same idea as מבעט. Still, I think this is not the same (if only for the fact כוונה הפכית is Machlokes Rishonim, while מבעט is Machlokes in Gmara and maybe Tanaim), but I have to figure out better why is that so.



One difference coming to mind is the question of כוונה הפכית במצוות שהן מכשירין.
Even if we consider מבעט as כוונה הפכית, one must agree that what we talk about here has nothing to do with לצאת ידי חובת מצווה but rather with attaining כפרה, i.e. it's a מכשיר.

This is discussed in length in various Achronim, some say it's the same as regular Mitzvos, e.g. Maharshal says Shchita with כוונה הפכית is invalid. However, some disagree, e.g. Radbaz. Lengthy discussions see, e.g. Melo HaRo'im http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=33736&st=&pgnum=236 Oneg Yom Tov Y"D #57 http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=1104&st=&pgnum=175 and Sdei-Chemed http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=14145&st=&pgnum=131 .

Moreover, even if we accept the former and agree that כוונה הפכית works even for מכשירין, one may argue that this only works as far as the הכשר is achieved through a מצוה (like Shchita, Halitza or Tvila), and depends to some extent on human action. Here we deal with כפרה that is ממילא and has nothing to do to anything the person does, why would his כונה matter at all?

Finally, Rashi in Krisus there explains that the premise that אין מכפרין אלא לשבין follows from לרצונו. That is, there is a special דין רצון in Kodshim, which then can be argued to cover not only רצון for the הקרבה but also for כפרה.

Based on the above, the Machlokes re: מבעט can be worked out either way. Whatever we hold regarding כוונה הפכית, one can still say this is not relevant for מכשיר דאתי ממילא and therefore the issue there has to do with לרצונו.

However, it is true that many Achronim explain that Rabenu Shmuel who says that כוונה הפכית works even if מצוות צריכות כוונה holds that the Mitzvah is complete even without כוונה but nevertheless one cannot be accredited against his will (this is the common Teiruz to the Turey-Even, attributed to R. Shlomo Heyman, found also in Kovetz Shiurim, Hazon-Ish, etc). This logic could be extended to מבעט too, but not necessarily so.



While being focused on trying to prove myself right, I didn't realize what most bothered me with the title -
I now think the main problem I have with it is that it distracts the reader from (what I consider) the main
novelty here - that even according to רבנן דרבי Y"K is still מכפר with no תשובה, contrary to the common
understanding. What do you think?

Mar'ei Mekomos:
Kovetz Shiurim 33.
Chazon Ish OC 29:10: http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=14336&st=&pgnum=90
R. Shlomo Heyman: http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=3281&st=&pgnum=8
They each have their own version and style, but basically say the same.
I'm quite sure there are more, but I don't remember the names so I can't look them up.
It's interesting how for generations the common wisdom was to explain in one way (here, something along the lines of סתמא לשמה), then all of the sudden many come up with another idea.
I've seen many other examples of this. Either these are manifestains of zeitgeist, or else this idea was part of the ישיבישע רייד and was somehow adopted by many (but Chazon Ish ???)

BTW, see Chazon Ish comment at the end there - how does this work for מבעט?

More to the point, while looking around I found this (Amudei Ohr#28, who directly connects kavana misnagedes to meva'eit on Yom Kippur): http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=1501&st=&pgnum=57

So, can we agree on the bottom line: the link מבעט-מכוון שלא לצאת is possible but not necessary ?

[Your ראיה from משתלח is very nice indeed! (Note: I had mentioned that the Rambam in the beginning of Hilchos Teshuva says that a מבעט in Sa'ir Hamishtalei'ach is miskaper on 'kalos' but not on 'chamuros.')
1. what about מבעט in other קרבנות צבור I don't know where to look.
2. could that be Machlokes Rabbi and Rabanan - whether Y"K as מכפר is individual or communal? IIRC, there is a long discussion on כפרת היחיד וכפרת הציבור in R. Soloveichik's על התשובה]

(Note: my son spoke on Yomtov and used a great many of these mar'ei mekomos; and he made an interesting point. Rashi in Sukkah 26a, which is the basis of the Magen Avraham/Mishna Berura in 38, says that Osek be'Mitzvah is only pattur min hamitzvah when the primary motivation for his ma'aseh mitzvah is to be mekayeim the mitzvah. If his main motivation is to make money, then he has no petur of osek be'mitzvah.  

(Note: my son spoke on Yomtov and used a great many of these mar'ei mekomos; and he made an interesting point. Rashi in Sukkah 26a, which is the basis of the Magen Avraham/Mishna Berura in 38, says that Osek be'Mitzvah is only pattur min hamitzvah when the primary motivation for his ma'aseh mitzvah is to be mekayeim the mitzvah. If his main motivation is to make money, then he has no petur of osek be'mitzvah. It is obvious that this mixing of the concept of motive and intent that we find in the definition of oseik bemitzvah would not apply to the definition of "kavana" as needed to satisfy the Mechaber's opinion (see Sdei Chemed) that lehalacha Mitzvos tzrichos kavana.

Rabbi Pesach Oratz ZT'L

Birkas Tanchumin to the Oratz family on the untimely loss of Harav Pesach Oratz, zeicher tzadik livracha, on erev Rosh Hashanna.



Rabbi Pesach Oratz was a much loved teacher of Tanach, who left behind many hundreds of talmidim and talmidos to whom he imparted a a lasting love of, and a desire to strive for deeper understanding of, limud hatorah. (see, e.g., http://www.yucommentator.com/2.2843/it-and-not-about-it-1.299219)



Rabbi Oratz's legacy continues to walk the Earth in the persons of his proudest achievement, children who manifest in their own lives his mesora of ahavas hatorah, kiruv levavos, and seiver panim yafos.



The family is not sitting shiva anymore, because Rosh Hashanna was mafsik, but condolences can be sent to

945 East 7th St

Brooklyn, NY 11230

Tel: 718-258-3171

המקום ינחם אתכם בתוך אבלי ציון וירושלים



Rabbi Yitzchak Oratz shlita sent a few beautiful and inspiring stories about his father. I am copying them to the post so that more people can learn from his legacy.

My father taught Torah to thousands of Talmidim & Talmidos in numerous venues. Most recently in Stern College and Shulamis High School, where he primarily taught various classes in Tanach -- but has been teaching in numerous places for close to six decades. From Kiruv in JSS, NCSY, Torah Institute where there are dozens of familes of Shomrei Mitzvah today because of his influence, to Gemara classes to adults in Flatbush, Queens and elsewhere,to teaching at Esther Shoenfeld Bais Yaakov, Summers at Camp Morasha and the Morasha kollel, Night Seminaries, guests lectures and much more. He taught Talmidim & Talmidos, old & young, Gemara & Tanach, in a perfect Yiddish (Chasidish or Litvish), a Modern Hebrew, or a flawless English. He was simply a melamed Torah in its purest form. I rarely go anywhere where I don't meet someone who was his talmid.



Growing up on the lower East Side of NY he also had the zechus to interact with great gedoley Yisrael such as Rav Moshe Feinstein, Rav Henkin, Kapishnitser Rebbe ZT"L. He also had to do with the Ponovhizer Rav, various Amshinover Rebbes, Rav Dovid Lifshitz, the Lomzher Rav, Rav Zeidel Epstein, Rav YD Soloveitchik, Rav Mendel Zaks, ZT"L -- some of who were his Rabbeim.



Decades after it occurred he would relish telling over fascinating stories and interactions that he had with them -- remembering the details & the exact words & expressions they used.

Just one example of a story my father Rav Pesach Oratz hk"m had with Rav Moshe ZTVK"L.



My father was sitting & talking to Rav Moshe. Rav Moshe had his back to a full bookcase of Seforim & was facing my father. My father mentioned a sevara & Rav Moshe says "yeh, das iz a b'feirishi Rashba in Yevamais" (my father did Rav Moshe's accent perfectly). While saying this, Rav Moshe while still looking directly at my father sticks his hand behind him to the bookcase, without looking or turning around, pulls out a Rashba on Yevamos, puts his finger on a place, pulls it in front him & flips it open, all without looking(!!), and begins reading the Rashba flawlessly & seamlessly without having to look even a second for the place. My father sat there stunned and with his mouth open not believing.



This is the type of story he loved to share & retell. He loved Gedoley Yisrael.



Even more important is the hadracha he gave based on Gedoley Yisrael. During that same conversation Rav Moshe gave my father advice quoting a certain ma'amar Chazal. My father wanted to clarify or question & said "aber far vas etc." Rav Moshe immediately interjected & said "nein, oib Chazal zaggen azai is es azai". My father took that Mussar haskil on the Chashivus of a maamar Chazal with him the rest of his life.

(Just to clarify, my father wasn't CH"V doubting the Chazal, he just wanted to clarify -- but he learned from Rav Moshe the chashivus of a maamar Chazal & the choymer we take their words.)

If anyone has any Divrei Torah, stories, or memories of my father or how he influenced their life -- please send to RPOmemories@gmail.com.



It would be especially appreciated because the family really didn't get to sit Shiva because of Rosh Hashanna.



Thank you.



Yitzi Oratz



Update- October 1, 2009:

I received the following email.

I didn't know Rav Pesach Oratz zt"l at all, however I was very close friends with Meir Oratz of Yeshivas Mir in Jerusalem and I was מקבל on myself to learn משניות מס' טהרות לע"נ ר' פסח זעליג בן ר' ישעי' זאב, תנצבה.



Gut Yuntiff,

Reb Chaim HaQoton

The Chumros of the Aseres Yemei Teshuva

Chazal say (sotah 2a) that it is as 'difficult', so to speak, for the Ribono shel Olam, to successfully match a chasan and a kallah as it was to split the Red Sea at the time of Yetzias Mitzrayim. Similarly, there is a Gemara (Pesachim 118) that says that it is as 'hard' for Hashem to provide a parnassa for a man as it was to split the Red Sea. How are we to understand these puzzling Gemaros?

It's hard to know what constitutes "difficulty" for the Ribono shel Olam. But Chazal do tell us that a conflict arose as Klal Yisrael left Mitzrayim. When Hashem told the sea to split, the sea, or the malach that represented the sea, refused, because Halalu ovdei avoda zara, vehalalu ovdei avoda zara-- this group worships idols and that group worships idols. In other words, the sea protested and said "Yes, when I was created, I was created on the condition that when this time will come, I will suspend natural law and allow the fleeing Jews to cross me, and then inundate the pursuing Egyptians. But where are the Jews? I see no difference between the two groups. Both look like idolaters. Why should I save the lives of one group and drown the other, when they are basically indistinguishable? They all look like Mitzrim to me." But Hashem said that while the difference might be only incipient and vestigial, nonetheless, there was a difference, and Hashem insisted that the Red Sea split.

When a young couple goes out, they are on their best behavior; they dress, eat, and talk with a constant awareness that they have to make a good impression, that they cannot disappoint the person who has committed their lives to them. A few years later, the perspective has entirely shifted. The spouse is taken for granted, children and profession are the foremost if not the only concerns, and so forth. This is not the Chasan and Kallah of a few years ago. That the relationship built on entirely different personnae survives is a miracle- a miracle akin to the splitting of the sea.

When we daven on Yom Kippur, we stand there in our kittels, we don't eat, we don't engage in unnecessary talk, we spend twenty four hours like pure angels, and we ask Hashem to please, please, give us a tranquil life and financial success so we can do chesed, and so we can learn and support those who learn. So Hashem looks down and sees us behaving in the holy manner that we were born to achieve, and Hashem brings the malach of bracha and parnasa and hatzlacha and says "Look, see this beautiful, holy man? I want you to bring him all the blessings he is asking for." A few weeks later, the malach is summoned to do his work, and he comes down to the world, and he looks at the man, and the malach says to himself, "Who is this guy? This isn't the person Hashem showed me on Yom Kippur, the tzadik with an angelic countenance whose pure tefillos and desire to serve Hashem brought tears to my eyes! This guy I see in front of me blew off his chavrusa because he got araingetohn into fantasy football on his stupid computer. There is no way this is the same person." And the malach goes home.

The Mechaber in OC 603 says that during the Aseres Ye'mei Teshuva, everyone should try to avoid Pas Palter, and should be machmir on things that he normally would not be. This is certainly a meritorious thing, and any builder will tell you that when you lay the foundation, you have to be hyper-meticulous, because the most trivial, initially invisible deviation will set in place a trajectory that, after you build ten stories, will cause a disasterous collapse. The Aseres Ye'mei Teshuva are the year's foundation, and nothing is 'inconsequential": we need to set the foundation of the year into place without even the most minor flaw.

But let's try to remember that after Yom Kippur, when the real world reasserts itself, when petty concerns seem momentous, when Sukkos duties demand our attention, that we need to retain enough of the Aseres Ye'mei Teshuva so that when the malach comes down with the bracha, at least he'll find some resemblance to the person Hashem pointed out to him on Yom Kippur.