Tafkid: Every Person is Born With a Specific Mission תפקיד ויעוד

This idea of Tafkid, תפקיד, or יעוד, has become ubiquitous: that God entrusted every Jew with a specific job to accomplish, placed him in the time and location where he can do that job, and endowed him with the particular talents he needs to do it.  We are told we need to identify our purpose, to find out what we were created to do, to learn what specific task it is with which we were entrusted.  Once we know that, we can focus our energy on accomplishing that task.

This sounds nice.  But as with any idea, one has to be aware that there are several possibilities: 

• it might be self-evident, so obviously true that it doesn't need to be proven;
• it might be an idea that we find in Chazal and which has been recognized for milennia;
• it might be found only in the recent baalei hashkafa;
• it might be New Age Judaism, something to inscribe on your moebius energy bracelet;
• or it might just be wishful thinking.

These five possibilities are not, unfortunately, mutually exclusive.

So, what do you think?  Let me clarify that.  I'm not interested in your opinion.  I want authoritative sources.

Here's what turned up.  There is no order to the sources.  I listed them either as I thought of them or as they were sent in. 

1. The Gaon in his new edition of his pirush on Mishlei, 16:4.  The Gaon says that some nevi'im, like Shmuel, were called "Haro'eh", the seer, because people would come to them and ask them for what specific job they were created לפי שורש נשמתו ולפי טבע גופו, in consonance with the root of their soul and their physical nature.  He also says that when nevua'h ended, this information would be imparted with Ruach Hakodesh.  However, the Gaon says that with the passage of time, our ability to hear what Ruach Hakodesh is telling us has become extremely attenuated.  It is highly unlikely that any of us can know what our true tafkid is.  Therefore, every person should do whatever mitzvos come to hand.

2. Tiferes Yisrael in Avos 4:3 on the Mishna of

אל תהי בז לכל אדם, ואל תהי מפליג לכל דבר, שאין לך אדם שאין לו שעה.

אף שעכשיו לא תראה בו צורך כלל בעולם, מדהוא משולל מכל דעת, ולא עוד אלא

שתראהו ג״כ דוחק עבדי ה' ורודפם, והוא כשחפת בעולם; עכ״פ דע שלא לחנם הניחו הקביה בחיים עדיין, על כרחך שיש בו עכשיו צורך הנעלם ממך, או שיבוא שעה שיהיה צורך בו, ומי יודע מהו הטוב שיתגלגל על ידו, ואל דעות השם'

Brief translation:

(The Mishna says "Do not denigrate any person...because every person has his hour.")  The Tiferes Yisrael says "Even though now you can't imagine of what possible use is such a man, because he is completely lacking sense, and even worse, he persecutes and pursues the servants of Hashem, he is like a disease in human form, even so- know that not for nothing does Hashem let him live; there must be some hidden need for his existence, or the time will come when he is needed.  Who knows what good can come through him?  Hashem is the Master of Wisdom.

3. Netziv: The Netziv is in the end of Parshas Shlach, Bamidbar 15:41, in the parsha of Tzitzis. He says that the passuk ‘velo sasuru acharei levavchem’ means that although Koheles says “ שמח בחור בילדותיך, ... והלך בדרכי לבך ” (rejoice in your youth, young man...and walk in the way of your heart), which means that “אם בא אדם לשאול איזהו דרך ישרה שיבור לו בדרך לימודו או במה להיות זהיר טפי על זה אמר קוהלת והלך בדרכי לבך מה שלבו נמשך אחריו ברור שמזלו חזי שזה ענין לפי כח נפשו” (if a man asks, what is the right path for me in learning or in scrupulousness, Koheles tells him to walk in the way of his heart, what his heart feels drawn to; it is clear that he subcounciously realizes that this type of thing is good for his specific abilities), because a person should choose to dedicate himself with special joy and diligence to a certain derech halimud or a mitzvah that he enjoys.  (Of course, he continues, the Torah warns that he should only choose from among the options that the Torah gives, and he shouldn’t innovate new paths and concepts, as did the mekosheish, even if it’s le'sheim shamayim. This is what the Torah means with “lo sasuru”-- like “vayasuru es Eretz Kna’an.”)

Please note that the Netziv is NOT saying that people were born with specific tasks, just that we were born with unique talents and predilections, and that one should work within that framework in order to succeed. The Netziv is using the concept of “chanoch l’naar ahl pi darko” for choosing a direction in life.

4.  The Satmerer in Vayo’eil Moshe in the beginning of Parshas Nasso says that a person that enjoys a particular mitzvah, and always looks for and finds opportunities to do it, was born for that mitzva. He uses this to explain why Kehas and not the bechor, Gershon, was given the task of carrying the Aron.

5.  Rav Kook: (echoing the Tiferes Yisrael)

אלקי, עד שלא נוצרתי איני כדאי, ועכשיו שנוצרתי כאלו לא נוצרתי. לפני שנוצרתי, כל אותו הזמן הבלתי מוגבל שמעולם עד שנוצרתי, ודאי לא היה דבר בעולם שהי' צריך לי. כי אם הייתי חסר בשביל איזו תכלית והשלמה הייתי נוצר, וכיון שלא נוצרתי עד אותו הזמן הוא אות, שלא הייתי כדאי עד אז להבראות, ולא היה בי צורך כי אם לעת כזאת שנבראתי, מפני שהגיעה השעה שאני צריך למלא איזה דבר להשלמת המציאות. ואילו הייתי מיחד מעשי אל תכלית בריאתי הנני עכשיו כדאי, אבל כיון שאין מעשי מכוונים לטוב התכלית הרי לא הגעתי אל תכלית בריאתי ואיני עדיין כדאי כמו קודם לכן

עולת ראיה ח"ב עמ' שנ"ו.

(Thank you, Micha.  Also, thank you to Rav Pinchas Rubenstein of http://www.lifnim.co.il/content.asp?pageid=97)

Brief translation:
....I was created because the time came for me to fill some need for the perfection of the real world.  If I were to dedicate my efforts toward fulfilling the purpose of my creation, I would be considered "worthy." ....

6.  Reb Tzadok :

אבל באמת כל אחד מישראל הוא מדוגל בדבר אחד על כל ישראל, ובדבר זה הוא בחינת מלך על כל ישראל ... וכל אחד יש לו דבר אחד, שבזה הוא נכתר בכתר על כל ישראל

פרי צדיק ח"ב עמ' 117.

Brief translation:

Every Jew is uniquely qualified in one aspect, superior in that respect to any other person. In that one matter, he is like a king over the Jewish People....

and also, almost identical with the Tiferes Yisrael,-  `

אין לך אדם שאין לו שעה: והיינו, שכל א' מישראל באותו שעה ובאותו עניין הוא הגדול מכל ישראל, וכן חבירו בשעה אחרת. והיינו, מפני שכל א' מישראל יש לו חלק בתורה, אות או חלק מאות, אשר בחוסר אותו האות או חלק ממנו הס"ת פסול 

פרי צדיק ח"ד עמ' 6

Brief translation:

Every Jew has a time and place when he is the only one that can do a necessary task.... this is because every Jew has his own portion in the Torah, he is represented by one of the 600,000 "letters" in the Torah, and without him, the Sefer Torah is passul.

7.  The Sfas Emes in Parshas Korach 5647, (sent in by Chaim B.) quotes his grandfather as having said exactly this idea in the Mishna of Im ein ani li mi li.  See it at the marvelous hebrewbooks.org here

במשנה כל מחלוקת שהיא לש״ש סופה להתקיים זו מחלוקת שמאי והלל ושאינה לשם שמים מחלוקת קרח וכו' וכן הוא בזוה״ק דפליג על שבת שנק׳ שלום ואחיד במחלוקת ע״ש. כי בודאי יש מקום לחילוקי דיעות שנמצא בבנ״י כמ״ש כשם שאין פרצופיהם שוה כן אין דיעותיהם שווה. והענין עפ״י מ״ש אא״ז מו״ר ז'ל על המשנה אם אין אני לי מי לי כי כל אדם נברא לתקן דבר מיוחד שאין אחר יכול לתקן וכן בכל זמן וזמן מיוחד תיקון אחר.עכ״ז כשאני לעצמי מה אני שצריך כל אחד לבטל חלק פרטי שלו אל הכלל ע״כ דפח״ח

Brief translation:
In the mishna (in Avos) "any dispute that is motivated by a desire to do Hashem's work will have a positive result, such as the disputes between Shamai and Hillel, but if the disputants are motivated by self-interest, it will end badly, such as the dispute of Korach etc. .....  Certainly, there is a place for the inevitable differences of opinion among G-d fearing Jews.... As my grandfather said regarding the Mishna "If I am not for myself, who will be for me," that every man was created to correct one specific problem that nobody else can correct, and every moment presents its own particular task.  Still, if I focus only on my personal purpose, what am I?  Because every person needs to subordinate his own share to the community.

8.  Rav Rudderman used to say this pshat in the davening of the Yamim Nora'im.  מעשה איש ופקודתו, Ma'asei Ish Ufekodaso, he said, meant that Hashem compares what each man has done, מעשה איש,  and  פקודתו, his Pekidah, his tafkid.  Unfortunately, for most of us, there is a vast gulf between what we could have and should have done and what we do.


9.  Reb Yosef Ber Soloveichik (quoted by Rabbi Shachter) used to say that (Kiddushin 31b and Yerushalim Pei'ah 1:1) someone said that Reb Tarfon used to do tremendous Kibbud Eim, and the other Tannaim said "Ha! He hasn't even come close to fulfilling the mitzvah!"  It seems that they are denigrating his great sacrifices and efforts.  Rav Yosef Ber explained that when a person fulfills his purpose, Hashem takes him to Gan Eden.  The Tannaim were saying that he has not even a little done what he is capable of doing, so there is good reason for Hashem to let him stay in this world.

10.  Rav Dessler in Michtav Mei'Eliahu II:158 and IV:99 says that everyone was created for a specific purpose and he is preordained with abilities and circumstances and spouse and years of life to effectuate his tafkid.  He uses this to explain the Gemara in Moed Kattan 28 "bani chayi umezoni... b'mazla talya milsa."


So, we have great geonim who do say this idea, and even read it into two mishnayos in Avos, though more in the way of drash than pshat in the Mishna.  The Shiurei Daas probably says something about this too.  According to great unknown, everything I ought to know and don't know is in the Shiurei Daas.  Or maybe its "I ought to know everything in the Shiurei Daas, and I don't."  But I do know there's no such Gemara, and I would be thrilled to find out that it's in some Medrash or Rishon.

Micha and Chaim B - and Yehuda Oppenheimer, a welcome latecomer to our website- brought up very nice points, as follows.

Micha: Given that we are all made unique and Hashem intervenes to give each of us what He feels is appropriate (Hashgacha Pratis for all people), and given that Hakadosh Baruch Hu isn't arbitrary, one is compelled to believe He has a unique purpose for each of us.

Chaim B: When people talk about gilgulim, they either say that they're going around because they need to correct an error they committed in a previous life, or because they didn't do what they were sent to do. If a soul has a specific mission, then it makes sense that it has to keep coming back until its job is done.

Yehuda Oppenheimer:  Reb Moshe in Vaeira, that although Moshe was greater than Aaron, they were שקולים in the sense that שניהם עשו מה שנצטוו ונשלחו - they both completed their individual שליחות.  With that he explains the Gemara of עולם ברור ראית (Bava Basra 10b) that

 אלו שכחם קטן בכשרונותיהם אבל עשו כפי כחם קיימו שליחותם בעוה"ז ולכן הם למעלה 

and
Avos 2:8 explained in Ruach Chaim with this idea. On the Mishna אם למדת תורה הרבה אל תחזיק טובה לעצמך כי לכך נוצרת, Reb Chaim Volozhiner understands it to mean:

אל תאמר כי כבר יצאת ידי חובתך למה שנבראת עבורו ... ואמר "כי לכך נוצרת" כי הנה כל אדם נברא לתקן מה, זה דבר זה וזה דבר אחר 

After all was said and done, I added the following:
From the forensic perspective, I would say that both ideas, universal Hashgacha and gilgulim, plus the absence of earlier sources, point to the Ari z"l. I have a feeling we'll eventually find a reference to the idea in his writings or in the Ramchal. As Alexandre Dumas might say, Cherchez le Arizal.

So now that we've determined that is an idea with strong support among our gedolim, we should take it seriously.  How do we use the idea in our daily lives?

First, as the Gaon pointed out, you have to realize that nobody can know with certainty what his tafkid is.  It's not like we get marching orders from the famalia shel ma'ala.  We're left to try to figure out what we ought to be doing, based on hints and intuition and so on.  I guess this process is part of learning to know yourself, which is valuable in itself.  So it's worth spending some time assessing our abilities and circumstances, and pondering what role we might effectively play in Hashem's plan.

Speculatively, one might say that finding your life's work is like finding your life's mate.  The Gemara in Sotah 2a says that forty days before a child is formed, a voice comes from Heaven and proclaims the appropriate shidduch for that child.  All things being equal, (and despite the Gemara in Moed Kattan 18b about Shema yekadmenu and the Meiri about what zivug sheini means and Ibn Kreskas about hashgacha and hishtadlus,) we believe that the person one marries is the person that was designated for him.  Perhaps the same can be said of the Tafkid: we are obligated to do our best to discover what we were meant to do, and all things being equal, what we focus on is what we were meant to do.  And perhaps it might not be us that does our assignment, but rather a descendant who carries something of us within them.

Second, the idea that each person is created with a tafkid is a consolation to people who are not gifted with natural talents, or who are handicapped; it doesn't matter.  Every person with a spark of self-awareness is created with the opportunity to do something important, we all contribute in some way to the betterment of the world and to the fulfillment of Hashem's plan.  Our only obligation is to play the hand we're dealt as best we can.  No person's achievements can be judged by comparison to others'.  As the Gemara (Erchin 11b) says, Meshorer sheshi'eir bemissa: a Levi whose job it is to guard the doors is not expected to sing, and if he attempts it, it is a mortal sin.  If you're a meshoreir, then sing! If you're a sho'eir, then guard!

Third, if you're convinced that you are uniquely qualified to do a certain job, and someone tries to take it away from you, don't just quietly walk away.  Fight for your destiny!  To silently abdicate your crown you were born to wear is not only shameful, it is a denial of the significance of your entire existence.

~~~~~~~

I found that Reb Chaim Vital in his Hakdama to Shaar Hahakdamos says this idea.  Here it is, three quarters of the way through the hakdama.  Starting with the words "Ki chol hatzadikim vechol ba'ei olam mizera yisrael."  Here's part of it:

וכבר נרמז כ"ז גם בדברי רז"ל במדרשים וכמ"ש בשמות רבה פ' כי תשא וכן במדרש תנחומא בפ' כי תשא ע"פ איפה היית ביסדי ארץ וגם ע"פ ראו קרא ה' בשם בצלאל וכו' כי כל הצדיקים וכל באי עולם מזרע ישראל תלוים בגופו של אדה"ר זה בגופו וזה בראשו וזה באזנו וזה בצוארו וכו' וכן עד"ז כל הנפשות תלויות בנפשו וכל הרוחות ברוחו וכל הנשמות בנשמתו וכמו שגופו של אדה"ר כלול מרמ"ח אברים ושס"ה גודים כן נפשו רוחו ונשמתו גם כלם תלויים בתורה שיש בה רמ"ח מצות עשה ושס"ה מצות לא תעשה אשר ז"ס מ"ש רז"ל א"ל ר' פלוני אבוך במאי הוה זהיר וכו' ואל זה רמזו ז"ל המאמר הזה בשיר השירים במ"ש ועל מה אתיא להאי גופה סרוחה וכו' גם כל העולמות כלם הם בחי' אדם אחד כלול מתרי"ג אברים וגידים וכמו שמצינו כנפי הארץ טבור הארץ עין הארץ לב השמים וכיוצא באלו וכנזכר בפרשת הזהר בריש פרשת תולדות דף קל"ד ע"א וז"ל לית לך כל שייפא ושייפא דקיימא ביה בב"נ דלא הוי לקבליה בריה בעלמא דהא כמה דב"נ איהו מתפליג שייפין וכו' הכי נמי עלמא כל אינן בריין כלהו שייפין שייפין קיימין על אילין וכו' ואל זה רמז מ"ש למעלה למינדע ליה לגופא ולאשתמודע מן איהו וכו' ואמר עוד וחד למנדע ולאסתכלא בהאי עלמא דאיהו ביה ועל מה אתתקן באופן כי האדם צריך להשיג ע"י טרחו בחכמה הזאת עד שידע שורשו ואחיזתו בגוף האדם העליון היכן וכן ברוחו ונפשו ונשמתו וכן אחיזתו במצות התורה בפרטות היכן עיקר אחיזתו ובזה תבין ותשכיל מ"ש חז"ל כל העושה מצוה אחת מטיבין לו ומאריכין ימיו ונוחל את הארץ וכל מי שאינו עושה מצוה אחת אין מטיבין לו ואין מאריכין ימיו וכו'

To my untrained eye, this is much closer to the Netziv's idea than to Reb Tzadok's.   But the Lubavitcher Rebbe in his Likute Sichos (12 Tamuz '14 and 16 Tamuz '12) uses it like the latter.

From the Lubavitcher, briefly:
Sein chelkeinu be'sorasecha (Avos 5:20) means that each person has an insight to Torah that nobody else can reveal, as we see that Moshe Rabbeinu didn't know the things that Reb Akiva taught (Menachos 29a.)
We find that certain Tana'im took particular care to do certain mizvos, in a sense specializing in fulfilling that mitzva as perfectly and fully as possible.  This is because each person has his own unique connection to the Torah and the Mitzvos.
When a person sees that his attempts to do a certain mitzva always are unusually difficult, he should realize that those are the mitzvos he was born to do, and the Yetzer Hara is being moser nefesh to stop him.  (This, by the way, is something the Chasidim often say; I also saw it in the Slonimer's sefer.  The Netziv, on the other hand, says that the way to know what you were born to do is to think about what comes most easily to you.  This sounds like a diametric contradiction, but it's not.  They're both talking about things that you are drawn to do but find difficult to achieve.)

A new citation:  The Chasam Sofer quotes the Rambam as having said a very similar thing in a letter to his son. The Chasam Sofer quotes this Rambam three times that I know of; in his drashos in Parshas Ki Savo, in his introduction to his teshuvos in Yoreh Deiah, and in his pirush on Maseches Gittin. But I haven't found the Rambam inside yet, despite all the databases I have.  In any case, Rabbi Klein cites it in his Mishna Halachos vol 13 #210 as follows:

למאן דלא חזינא קמברכינא ה"ה כבוד האי צורב עוסק בחוקי חורב יחזקאל אלימלך אייזענבערג הי"ו בישיבה הגדולה צאנז נתניה.

דבר אשר נסתבך בענין מה שאמרו ז"ל שצריך לבקש רחמים על החולה שהרי ידוע שיסורין ממרקין עונותיו של אדם א"כ טובה הוא לו מה שיסורין באים עליו וזה הוא גם בכלל להתפלל עליו לרפואה ואולי מוטב שימות קודם זמנו והלא בחנוך כתיב ויתהלך חנוך את האלקים ואיננו כי לקח אותו שלא יתקלקל והביא גם מה שכתב הרמב"ם באגרת דמוטב לו לאדם כשמת צעיר שיקלקל פחות והח"ס הקשה על זה והאריך עוד בזה.

 

הנה ראשונה הנני להעיר שנשתבש מאד ונתקלקל לו יסוד הדברים ונתערבו זה בזה, והלוא מקרא מפורש בתורה שמצוה להתפלל על חולה, ויחל משה מכאן שמצוה להתפלל על החולה עד שיחלה עצמו עליו, ובשמו"ע בברכת רפאינו ועוד והקב"ה מתאוה לתפלתן של צדיקים ומה שכתב בשם אגרת הרמב"ם דמוטב לו לאדם כשמת צעיר והקשה עליו הח"ס וכתב דלא ידע מקומו אמת דיבר דאין מכתב כזה  ולא כתב הרמב"ם כן אלא שכתב הרמב"ם ז"ל אשרי מי שחתם ימיו במהרה כלומר אשרי לו לאדם שהשלים את כל מצותיו ותפקידו בעוה"ז והולך לו למנוחות לעוה"ב כאדם השלם שהשלים על מה שבא לעוה"ז וע"ז הקשה מרן הח"ס דא"כ כשרואין צדיקים מאריכין ימים יש ח"ו מקום לטעות שלא שלמו ימיהם במהרה ואינם צדיקים גמורין ותי' שהקב"ה מניחן בשביל הבנים שיגדלם או בשביל שצריכין לטובת הצבור וזה שאמר והותירך ה' לטובה בפרי בטנך ובזה נראה לישב הצדיק אבד ואין איש שם על לב וגו' כי מפני הרעה נאסף הצדיק ולכאורה אולי מת מפני שבא זמנו למות ולהנ"ל זה אינו שהרי הצדיק זמנו כבר השלים בעודו צעיר לימים ומה שהאריך ימים הוא רק לטובת הכלל שצריכין לו ואם רואים בשמים שאינם כדאי שיחי' עוד מפני הרעה ח"ו יאבד הצדיק מן העולם וז"ש הצדיק אבד ולא שמת דלצדקתו כבר השלים ימיו ועכשיו לדורו הוא דאבד והבן.

  

And another teshuva from Rabbi Klein there #214:

ומיהו אלו אין להם שייכות עם מה שכתב הרמב"ם אשרי מי שחתם ימיו במהרה כי הרמב"ם ז"ל מיירי במי  שיש לו תפקיד מיוחד להשלים את עצמו בהשלמה זו ולמשל מי שנשלח מחוץ למדינתו לרכוש כמה דברים  והוא בזריזות עשה הכל ורכש כל הצריך וגדולה מזו בזמן קצר הרי הוא שמח לחזור לביתו במוקדם האפשר  כל שאין לו עוד שם מה לעשות וכן הוא אם מי שחתם ימיו במהרה שכבר תקן הכל ולא כן אלו שהרי נלקחו  מפני הסכנה להם או החשש שלא יתקלקלו וזה פשוט מאד. 

And here's the Chasam Sofer himself in his pirush to Gittin 55b, talking about the same Rambam:

ידוע מ"ש רמב"ם באגרותיו כי לכל אדם ניתן מדה ופלס מה יתקן בעולמו וכשגמר תיקונו יפטר לעולם הבא ואשרי מי שחתם ימיו מהרה אלו דבריו שם, ואומר אני אשרי הנ"ל נאמר לאפוקי המתעצל ומתרשל אבל מי שגמר תיקונו המחויב ומנדבת לבו רוצה וחפץ לעבוד ה' עוד באחריתו טוב מראשיתו אזי טוב לו חיותו בעולם הזה.

The only Rambam I found that was anywhere near this was what he wrote in a Mussar to his son, which is worth reading for many reasons, as will become clear.

ודע בני כי האדם המסכן בזה העולם השפל הנבזה אין לו מנוחה בו ואשריו למי שחתמו ימיו מהרה בלא טרדת נפשו. ולולי זה החכם הנזכר רבי אברהם אבן עזרא זצ"ל אשר העירני על ענינים רבים ולא ידעתי בהם אלא אחר שחברתי פירוש המשנה והחבור שקראתיו משנה תורה וספר מורה הנבוכים, הייתי מעירך על סודותיו שרמז בחבוריו ובספריו. והשמר לך שלא תטריד שכלך הזך ונפשך היקרה אלא בחבורינו וחבוריו וזולתם שוא ותפל ויכלה הזמן והם לא יכלו. ושמור נפשך מאד מדברי רוב חבורי אנשי צרפת היא פרנצ"ה אשר לא יראה להם שהם מכירים הבורא יתברך אלא בעת אכלם בשר השור שלוק מטובל בחומץ ובשומים והוא טבול הנקרא בלשונם סלס"א ויעלה איד החומץ ועשן השומים אל מוחם ויחשבו אז להשיג בהם הבורא יתברך בכל שעה, ושהוא קרוב בתפילותיהן וצעקותיהן בקראם בתלמוד וזולתו מחבורים ומדברי ראשי ישיבות, גם בשומם הבורא יתברך מדרס לשונם בספרם ובזכרם הבורא ית' בכל שעה באותם הדברים המגשימים הבורא ית' עלוי רב וגדול מדברי הכופרים חלילה לו. ויוציאו ספרי תורה ללא צורך יברכו בהם הקהלות:

It's interesting because it seems to say what Rabbi Klein says was not said by the Rambam, and because of his high regard for the Ibn Ezra, and because of his less respectful opinion of the French Bnei Torah.


March 2018: 

I just saw an article written by Rabbi Jonathan Sacks which discusses, and more importantly, Illustrates, the idea expressed above.  It is to be found here:
http://www.aish.com/tp/i/sacks/476486613.html?s=mm


Vayikra(Leviticus 1-5) 

The Call

It was never my ambition or aspiration to be a rabbi. I went to university to study economics. I then switched to philosophy. I also had a fascination with the great British courtroom lawyers, legendary figures like Marshall Hall, Rufus Isaacs and F. E. Smith. To be sure, relatively late, I had studied for the rabbinate, but that was to become literate in my own Jewish heritage, not to pursue a career.

What changed me, professionally and existentially, was my second major yechidut - face-to-face conversation, - with the Lubavitcher Rebbe, in January 1978. To my surprise, he vetoed all my career options: economist, lawyer, academic, even becoming a rabbi in the United States. My task, he said, was to train rabbis. There were too few people in Britain going into the rabbinate and it was my mission to change that.

What is more, he said, I had to become a congregational rabbi, not as an end in itself but so that my students could come and see how I gave sermons (I can still hear in my mind's ear how he said that word with a marked Russian accent: sirmons). He was also highly specific as to where I was to work: in Jews' College (today, the London School of Jewish Studies), the oldest extant rabbinical seminary in the English-speaking world.

So I did. I became a teacher at the College, and later its Principal. Eventually I became - again after consulting with the Rebbe - Chief Rabbi. For all this I have to thank not only the Rebbe, but also my wife Elaine. She did not sign up for this when we married. It was not even on our horizon. But without her constant support I could not have done any of it.


I tell this story for a reason: to illustrate the difference between a gift and a vocation, between what we are good at and what we are called on to do. These are two very different things. I have known great judges who were also brilliant pianists. Wittgenstein trained as an aeronautical engineer but eventually dedicated his life to philosophy. Ronald Heifetz qualified as a doctor and a musician but instead became the founder of the School of Public Leadership at the John F Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. We can be good at many things, but what gives a life direction and meaning is a sense of mission, of something we are called on to do.

That is the significance of the opening word of today's parsha, that gives its name to the entire book: Vayikra, "He called." Look carefully at the verse and you will see that its construction is odd. Literally translated it reads: "He called to Moses, and God spoke to him from the Tent of Meeting, saying ..." The first phrase seems to be redundant. If we are told that God spoke to Moses, why say in addition, "He called"?

The answer is that God's call to Moses was something prior to and different from what God went on to say. The latter were the details. The former was the summons, the mission - not unlike God's first call to Moses at the burning bush where He invited him to undertake the task that would define his life: leading the people out of exile and slavery to freedom in the Promised Land.

Why this second call? Probably because the book of Vayikra has, on the face of it, nothing to do with Moses. The original name given to it by the sages was Torat Cohanim, "the Law of the Priests"[1] - and Moses was not a priest. That role belonged to his brother Aaron. So it was as if God were saying to Moses: this too is part of your vocation. You are not a priest but you are the vehicle through which I reveal all My laws, including those of the priests.

We tend to take the concept of a vocation - the word itself comes from the Latin for a "call" - for granted as if every culture has such an idea. However, it is not so. The great German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) pointed out that the idea of vocation, so central to the social ethic of Western culture, is essentially "a religious conception, that of a task set by God."[2]

It was born in the Hebrew Bible. Elsewhere there was little communication between the gods and human beings. The idea that God might invite human beings to become His partners and emissaries was revolutionary. Yet that is what Judaism is about.

Jewish history began with God's call to Abraham, to leave his land and family. God called to Moses and the prophets. There is a particularly vivid account in Isaiah's mystical vision in which he saw God enthroned and surrounded by singing angels:

Then I heard the Voice of the Lord saying, "Whom shall I send? And who will go for us?" And I said, "Here am I. Send me!" (Isaiah 6:8)

The most touching account is the story of the young Samuel, dedicated by his mother Hannah to serve God in the sanctuary at Shiloh where he acted as an assistant to Eli the priest. In bed at night he heard a voice calling his name. He assumed it was Eli. He ran to see what he wanted but Eli told him he had not called. This happened a second time and then a third, and by then Eli realised that it was God calling the child. He told Samuel that the next time the Voice called his name, he should reply, 'Speak, Lord, for your servant is listening.' It did not occur to the child that it might be God summoning him to a mission, but it was. Thus began his career as a prophet, judge and anointer of Israel's first two kings, Saul and David (1 Samuel 3).

These were all prophetic calls, and prophecy ended during the Second Temple period. Nonetheless the idea of vocation remains for all those who believe in Divine providence. Each of us is different, therefore we each have unique talents and skills to bring to the world. The fact that I am here, in this place, at this time, with these abilities, is not accidental. There is a task to perform, and God is calling us to it.

The man who did more than anyone to bring this idea back in recent times was Viktor Frankl, the psychotherapist who survived Auschwitz. There in the camp he dedicated himself to giving people the will to live. He did so by getting them to see that their lives were not finished, that they still had a task to perform, and that therefore they had a reason to survive until the war was over.

Frankl insisted that the call came from outside the self. He used to say that the right question was not "What do I want from life?" but "What does life want from me?" He quotes the testimony of one of his students who earlier in life had been hospitalised because of mental illness. He wrote a letter to Frankl containing these words:

But in the darkness, I had acquired a sense of my own unique mission in the world. I knew then, as I know now, that I must have been preserved for some reason, however small; it is something that only I can do, and it is vitally important that I do it ... In the solitary darkness of the "pit" where men had abandoned me, He was there. When I did not know His name, He was there; God was there.[3]

Reading Psalms in the prison to which the KGB had sent him, Natan Sharansky had a similar experience.[4]

Frankl believed that "Every human person constitutes something unique; each situation in life occurs only once. The concrete task of any person is relative to this uniqueness and singularity."[5] The essence of the task, he argued, is that it is self-transcending. It comes from outside the self and challenges us to live beyond mere self-interest. To discover such a task is to find that life - my life - has meaning and purpose.

How do you discover your vocation? The late Michael Novak argued[6] that a calling has four characteristics. First, it is unique to you. Second, you have the talent for it. Third, it is something which, when you do it, gives you a sense of enjoyment and renewed energy. Fourth, do not expect it to reveal itself immediately. You may have to follow many paths that turn out to be false before you find the true one.

Novak quotes Logan Pearsall Smith who said, "The test of a vocation is the love of the drudgery it involves." All real achievement requires backbreaking preparation. The most common estimate is 10,000 hours of deep practice. Are you willing to pay this price? It is no accident that Vayikra begins with a call - because it is a book about sacrifices, and vocation involves sacrifice. We are willing to make sacrifices when we sense that a specific role or task is what we are called on to do.

This is a life-changing idea. For each of us God has a task: work to perform, a kindness to show, a gift to give, love to share, loneliness to ease, pain to heal, or broken lives to help mend. Discerning that task, hearing God's call, is what gives a life meaning and purpose. Where what we want to do meets what needs to be done, that is where God wants us to be.

NOTES:

1. Hence the Latin name Leviticus, meaning, "pertaining to the Levites," i.e. the priestly tribe. 
2. Quoted in Michael Novak, Business as a Calling: work and the examined life, Free Press, 1996, 17.
3. Viktor Frankl, The Unconscious God, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1975, 11.
4. Natan Sharansky, Fear No Evil, New York : Vintage Books, 1989.
5. Viktor Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, Souvenir Press, 1969, 57.

6. Michael Novak, Business as a Calling, Free Press, 1996, 17-40

Bamidbar 3:1-2. A Foster Parent is Like a Natural Parent

The passuk begins by saying "These are the generations of Moshe and Aharon," and then lists only Aharon's children, Nadav and Avihu.  Rashi says that from here we learn that one who teaches another's child Torah "Ke'ilu" it is as if he fathered him.

We find a similar expression in Sanhedrin 19b, where it says that one who raises an orphan in his  home "it is as if he fathered him."  The concept is the same, but Chazal derive the two ideas from different pesukim.

One has to wonder, what does "as if" mean?  Is this a homiletic encomium, or is it a statement of halacha?  Is it meant to be taken at face value?  Do Chazal really mean that if you raise an orphan, or teach a child Torah, that he is your child?

Reb Shlomo Kluger, in his first comment in Even HaEzer, says that this depends on a machlokes between the Drisha and the Taz in Yoreh Dei'ah 242.  The Drisha says that "Ke'ilu," "as if," does not indicate real parity.  It just means that the one has certain aspects of the other.  Therefore, according to the Drisha, one who raises an orphan would not thereby fulfill the mitzva of Pru Urvu, the mitzvah to have children.  The Taz, on the other hand, says that Ke'ilu must be taken seriously, that it means actual halachic parity.  Therefore, says Reb Shlomo Kluger, according to the Taz, one who raises an orphan fulfills the mitzvah of Pru Urvu.  (He says more there; it's worth reading.)  

great unknown, in the first comment below, pointed out an interesting thing- that Reb Shlomo Kluger himself was an orphan raised by the Dubner Magid (which is a nice story, see here.  He did learn by the Dubner- see here- but he was a talmid, not a foster child).  Chaim B notes that Rav Amiel in his Middos Le'cheker Halacha vol. III has a very lengthy disquisition on the permutations of "ke'ilu" and K' in Chazal.  It's available on Hebrewbooks.org.  (Good luck reading it.  Don't expect the same style as Drashos el Ami.  To me it reads like a hybrid of Reb Shimon Shkop's lomdus written in Rav Kook's prose.)

The Taz cannot be taken too far.  Obviously, there is no din erva/prohibition of incest midoraysa with an adopted child.  Ugly and depraved, yes. Incest, no. Incest depends on a biological relationship, and a virtual child is not a biological child.  The din of ke'ilu only applies to the relationship between these two individuals, not to external ramifications of that relationship.  Also, I doubt that Reb Shlomo Kluger would say the Taz holds that one who teaches a child Torah is mekayeim Pru Urvu.  But who knows?  After all, the original Taz said his shittah regarding the obligation to honor and fear a teacher, which he says follows from the Chazal that one who teaches is like a father.

On the other hand, Reb Shlomo Kluger's Taz would certainly hold that the dinim of Arrur Makleh Aviv and Missas Beis Din by Makeh and Mekalel would apply to an adoptive parent if not for Ein onshin min hadin.  But at least there would be an arrur for Makleh.

Teenagers in the 90s had a sarcastic expression, "as if." The phrase conveys the absurdity of something that another person has alleged. As you see, "as if" is a machlokes between the Drisha and the Taz. 

Practical relevance of this issue:

• Many poskim say that there is no issur of yichud with an adopted child because their emotional relationship is that of a parent and a child (Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igros EH 4:64:2, but only so long as the adoptive parent is married; and Rav Eliezer Waldenburg in Tzitz Eliezer 6:40:21, but only if the adoption took place before a girl was 3 and a boy 9 years old.  The osrim are the Chazon Ish, the Steipler, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, and Rav Vosner.  Ask your LOR!) 
• Reb Aharon Soloveichik once said that as a young rav, he was asked who should walk the Chassan to the Chupah- the natural or the adoptive parent.  He said that the adoptive parent should walk him down.  He said that he took a lot of criticism for his advice, but he was steadfast. 
• Similarly, there are poskim that say that when getting an aliyah, or writing a shtar like a kesuva, the adopted child may write "ben [adoptive father's name]".  (Others disagree: see Choshen Mishpat 42 in the Gaon #42.  Reb Moshe in EH I:99 says you should write the biological truth, and if we do not know who his father is, you should write "ben a person whose name is not known, and raised by [adoptive parent's name], although when you read it under the chuppah, you can make concessions to avoid embarrassing the person.  Ask your LOR!)
• This really expands the previous point, but deserves a paragraph of its own.  Micha, in the second comment, points out that calling a child "Ploni ben adoptive father" gets complicated where one is e.g., a Kohen and the other is not, and poskim that generally allow "Ploni ben adoptive father" change their position in such cases.  I don't know why, though.  Unfortunately, there are plenty of people whose fathers were kohanim and who themselves are not kohanim, due to having been the product of a marriage prohibited to a kohen.  Besides the frum ones, I know a fellow named Christopher Cohen, a lawyer.  His mother is not Jewish.
• ➜  I was at a wedding where the biological father was a convert, and his conversion took place after his daughter, the kallah, was born.  This is a classic example of a problem in the kesuva.  You can't write that the kallah is his daughter, because al pi din, they're not related.  On the other hand, he raised her, so you have those poskim that allow writing the foster father's name.  Although as I said most poskim hold not like that, an interesting argument can be made to allow it in this case, where he's the biological father and he raised her.
• By the way, Rav Sherira Gaon says that Abbaya of the Gemara was not really named Abbaya, but Nachmeini, after his grandfather. His father had died before Abbaye was born, and his mother died at child-birth, and he was raised by his uncle Rabbah bar Nachmeini. Rabbah did not want to call his nephew Nachmeini, which was the name of his father; he therefore called him "Abbaya," meaning, "my father." Others say that Abbaya stands for Asher Becha Yerucham Yasom.  Rashi, though, says that Abbaya was his real name, and his uncle called him Nachmeini.  According to Rashi, then, it could be said that Rabbah held that the adoptive parent has certain naming rights.
• But who needs to speculate about Abbaya?  Moshe Rabbeinu was raised by Bisya bas Pharaoh, and it was she that gave him the name by which we know him.  Reb Chaim Shmuelevitz says that the Torah identifies him by his Egyptian name davka to teach us about Hakaras Hatov.  True, in that case she didn't only adopt him, she saved him from death, while most adoptions are not matters of life or death.  But once you start splitting hairs in the sugya of Hakaras Hatov, you are going down a dangerous path.  Even when you help a person in need, the Tanchuma in Shemos by Moshe and Yisro says

 ״בשעה שאמר לי׳ הקב״ה למשה, ועתה לך אשלחך אל פרעה, אמר לי׳

משה, אדון העולם, איני יכול מפני שקבלני יתרו ופתח לי את פתח ביתו

ואני עמו כבן, ומי שהוא פותח פתח לחבירו נפשו הוא חייב לו . . . ולא

עוד, אלא כל הפותח לחבירו חייב בכבודו יותר מאביו ומאמו״

 

When Hashem told Moshe to go down to Pharoah, Moshe said "Master of the world, I can't, because Yisro received me and opened his house to me and I am like a son to him, and if a person opens his house to his fellow, he owes him his life....and furthermore, any person who opens his house to his fellow, he is obligated to honor him more than his own mother and father.
It seems to me that an adoptive parent is a perfect example of this Medrash-- Pasach li es pesach beiso, Ve'ani imo ke'ben...nafsho hu chayav lo.


Moving to another case where Chazal said "Ke'ilu," the Gemara in Menachos 110a says that one who studies the parsha of a korban "it is as if he sacrificed the korban."  Would the Taz say that if a person became obligated to bring a chatas for some inadvertent sin, and then he read and learned the parsha of korban chatas, and then the Beis Hamikdash was rebuilt, that he would not have to bring the Chatas?  And what if you were lazy, and while the Beis Hamikdash was standing you decided to stay home and read the parsha.  Are you pattur?  I would say that this, too, depends on the shittos of the Drisha and the Taz.

The Yad David in Menachos says this question is the subject of the machlokes between Reish Lakish and Rava there.  According to Reish Lakish, learning Torah accomplishes a similar atonement to that of bringing a Korban only during a time when there is no Beis ha'Mikdash and one cannot bring a real Korban. According to Rava, even when the Beis ha'Mikdash is standing, learning Torah atones exactly as if one had brought a Korban.

The Gan Raveh in Parshas Tzav brings the Binyan Ariel who says that when Hashem told Moshe, "Tzav Es Aharon v'Es Banav Leimor Zos Toras ha'Olah" it means that the Kohanim should make sure that they teach the people the rule that whenever they learn the laws of the Korban, it is as if they have offered an Olah, even though telling this to the people will surely decrease the number of Korbanos brought to the Beis ha'Mikdash.  Despite the resulting monetary loss to the Kohanim (who receive the hides of the korban Olah and much of the flesh of other korbanos), the Kohanim were enjoined to let people know about this halacha.

See a nice discussion of the din amira for a korban in the first piece in the Har Tzvi. who addresses the Beis Yosef that says that amira is mechaper "ktzas," and Reb Yishmael ben Elisha in Shabbos 12b (I will bring a chattas shmeinah, mashma that amira wouldn't patter him.)  Also,  I once saw a svara (from Reb Refoel Hamburger, and a similar but slightly different slant from Reb Chaim Ozer's cousin from Omaha, Reb Tzvi Hirsch Grodzinsky in his sefer Likutei Tzvi, about whom Reb Aharon Soloveichick said that the Brisker Rov said that he was considered the bigger lamden of the two,)  that amira doesn't work where there are other aspects of the korban that cannot be fulfilled through amira, such as "Kohanim ochlim ubaalim miskaprim."  Your amira does not make a kohen's achila.  Kind of like the Beis Halevi on Kol Rom.  Also, great unknown pointed out in a private communication that it would not work for a nazir, because amira does duplicate or parallel the Matan Behonos.  Eli in the comments sends us a link to a beautiful piece from the Cheshek Shlomo that deals with this.

A slight digression:  I had this in my journal, but forgot about it until Chaim B reminded me.

The Magen Avraham in Siman 1 says that you should stand when you say the parshas korban, because avoda is be’amidah.  Reb Chaim Kanievsky brings a Yalkut Shimoni in Yirmiah that says that a min asked someone, how can you believe the nevi’im when the navi says that the Kohanim and Leviim will do avodah forever, but you can't deny the reality that the churban stopped the avodah, and he was answered that amiras parsha by Kohanim and Leviim is like hakrava.  The pirush there, which happens to be written by the Magen Avraham, indeed says that when kohanim and leviim say parshas korban it is as if they brought it, which is apparently different from what he himself says in Shulchan Aruch!
    The Chofetz Chaim in his hakdama to his son in law’s Avodas Hakorbonos brings the same medrash and is docheh the raiya that it only applies to kohanim, and says that it is mamash like hakrava no matter who says it.  The son in law brings the same medrash and skips the words kohanim and leviim!  How do you like that!
    But there are also problems with the Yalkut itself.  First of all, this can’t be accepted as our derech, because then only kohanim should be saying the parshas hakorban, which is something weird that nobody has ever said in print.
    Second, R’ Matisyahu Solomon brings from the Chazon Yechezkel that the pshat in “neshalmah parim sfaseinu” is that we bring to ourselves the zchus of the korbanos that were brought at the time of the Beis Hamikdosh.  R’ Solomon connects this to the din of “pokeid avon avos ahl banim...v’oseh chesed l’ohavai...” which teaches that zchus avos comes to descendants that are “ocheiz b’ma’asei avosam.”  Here too, our saying the parshoh of korbanos brings us the zchus of our ancestors’ korbanos.  If we take this mehalach at face value, it is not like the shittah brought by the Magen Avraham that you have to stand during amiras parshas korbanos, and also it is not like the Yalkut that says that the amiras haparsha is like hakrovoh only when a kohen says it.
    However, we can be meyasheiv all these kashes.  There are two dinim: the zchus of amiras haparsha- or the zchus avos we create by saying the parshah- can be either the zchus of the ma’aseh hakrava or the zchus of having a korban brought on your behalf, the rei’ach nicho’ach aspect of the korban.  If you say that the zchus avos is the zchus of their ma’aseh hakravah, that just as they were makriv, it is as if we were makriv, (and not the zchus of the korban,) so this only is legitimate and helpful if the person is a kohen whose avodah is kosher.  But there is also a din that saying the parshah brings the zchus of the rei’ach nicho’ach of the korban, i.e., that it is as if a korban was brought for us, then even a Yisroel will benefit.  And there is no reason to think that one din is more mistavra than the other, and both dinim are true, so a kohen’s amira is as if he was makriv, and a yisroel’s amirah is as if he brought a korban and it was nikrav on his behalf.  (This question might revolve around the Gemara in Nazir and Kiddushin about Shluchi de'Rachmana or Shluchi didan.)
    This is meyasheiv all three kashes: the kashe on the Chofetz Chaim’s son in law (because the Yalkut that limits it to kohanim is the response to the min that said that avodah is boteil, and the proper response is that through the amirah of kohanim the avodah is eternal), the kashe that nobody limits amiras korbonos to kohanim (because although kohanim may have the additional aspect of the zchus of avodah, everyone has the zchus of the kiyum hamitzvah of bringing the korban), and the kashe on the Chazon Yechezkel from the Magen Avraham (because R’ Abramsky is talking about the zchus of the rei’ach nicho’ach, not the zchus of the avodah).   

Another interesting ramification of this discussion: The mitzva of Birkas Kohanim, according to Reb Yaakov Emden, is only de'oraysa when recited after the hakrava of a korban tzibur.  Therefore, he says, the duchening we do today is derabanan.  The Mishna Berura argues, but doesn't address the pasuk that is mashma like RYE.  So Reb Yakov Karliner answers in his Mishkenos Yaakov OC 66 that this is why we say "'ve'se'erav alecha asiroseinu ke'olah u'chi'korban" before duchenning- because our duchening is based on the parity between tefilla and korbanos.  Only because ve'se'erav can we duchen.  (His brother, the Keren Ora, says the same teretz in Maseches Sota in the sugya of birkas kohanim.)

I know about the Baal Hatanya in #37, and I don't want to put it in here, because it is not my mesora.  So please don't send me comments about his pshat in the Gemara in Menachos, thank you.

Next ke'ilu:  Shomeia Ke'oneh.
Rashi  in Sukkah 38b says that one who is in the middle of Shmoneh Esrei when the tzibbur is saying Kaddish or Kedushah should stop and listen quietly, thus answering through Shomeia Ke'oneh. Rabbeinu Tam and the Ri in Tosfos Brachos 21b ask on Rashi that if shomeia is really ke'oneh, then it should have a din hefsek.  (They say that Rashi is wrong ahl pi svara, but "gadol haminhag," so go ahead and do like Rashi anyway.)  Here, too, we see a machlokes as to the extent of Ke'.  (There are many other ways to answer Tosfos' kashe without saying that Rashi holds like the Drisha, though.  Example: The Tzlach in Psachim 56a holds that a whisper is not a hefsek, like in Baruch Shem in Krias Shma.  So even if Rashi holds like the Taz, the ke'oneh would not be worse than a whisper.)


This is getting too long.  Unless you or I can think of a really interesting machlokes about another ke'ilu, that will be it.  Nathan- thanks for mentioning Ke'ilu hu yatza mimitzrayim, but it doesn't say "yotzei," it says "yatza."

But considering that Shavuos is around the corner, here's one good thing to end with.  Kiddushin 30a.

״אמר ריב״ל כל המלמד את בן בנו תורה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו קבלה מהר סיני שנאמר והודעתם לבניך ולבני בניך וסמיך ליה יום אשר עמדת לפני ה׳ אלהיך בחורב

~~~~~~~~

Bechukosai, Vayikra 26:3. Bechukosai Teileichu; Ameilus in Torah: Hard Work and Perseverence

First of all: the dvar Torah is late this week because beside the usual crises and

It's strange, how life works.  Just as I had written that line, wondering whether the various issues that arose this week could be called crises or just the usual ups and downs, my mother shetichyeh slipped and fell a few feet away from me.  Baruch Hashem there was no damage, but it did remind me of the difference between crisis and minor disturbance.

So the real reason I'm writing late is that my wife and I took a few days off and drove to southern Kentucky, where we enjoyed the ice cream at Graeter's in Louisville, toured Mammoth Cave, visited an Australia-oriented petting farm where you mingle with kangaroos, emus, parakeets and lorikeets, and, following "The Bourbon Trail," toured the Jim Beam Distillery. 

Now, when I say the first two birchos hashachar, I have a lot more kavana.

And now, lehavdil bein yom uvein lailah, to the parsha.

Literally translated, אִם בְּחֻקֹּתַי תֵּלֵכוּ is a directive to walk in the path of Torah.  Rashi (from Toras Kohanim,) however, says it means shetih’yu ameilim batorah, that you will work hard and expend all your energy in learning Torah. 

I want to know where in this passuk do we see that "teileichu" means "ameilus". Rashi does demonstrate that the passuk is talking about learning Torah and not only doing the mitzvos.  But that's all that Rashi proves; from Rashi’s proofs you only see that teileichu means limud hatorah, but you don’t see ameilus. Unless this is why the word “chukosai’ is used— that you should see the dinim as chukim, which are almost beyond human understanding, and diligently work to understand them.

Rabbi Dovid Zupnick zatzal told me that the Chofetz Chaim says that the proof is the fact that we are talking about chukim: the definition of ameilus is work that does not produce tangible results, and since chukim are incomprehensible, all the work you do to understand it will produce no real change in your understanding, so it is called ameilus.  I do agree that when I learn Taharos, it feels like ameilus.

In any case, the concept that we are obligated to learn Torah with hard work is found in several places.  There is the Rashi in Shabbos 63a. The Gemora brings the passuk in Mishlei “Orech Yamim biminah, bismola osher vekavod,” and says that for the "mayminim" in Torah, they have arichas yamim plus osher vekavod; "masmilim" only have osher vekavod. Rashi says two pshatim in masmilim; either that they weren’t “yegei’im bo kol tzarkan,” or they learned shelo lishma. So you see that Rashi learns that ikkar limud hatorah has to be with yegiah. And, in Shabbos 88b, the Gemora says that for maiminim Torah is a sam chaim, a life elixir, but for masmilim it is a sam hama'ves, poison, and Rashi says that ma’aminim means “asukim bechol kocham utrudim lada’as soda ke’adom hamishtameish be’yad yemino she’hi ikkar," working with all their strength and obssessed with knowing its secrets, like one who uses his right hand because it is dominant.  But I still don’t see it in the words of this passuk.

Some learn that ‘chukosai’ refers to the shlosh esrei middos shehatorah nidreshes bohem, so teileichu means that you will use the rules of drasha to understand and expand on the Torah Shebichsav. This certainly requires yegiah, because you are developing meaning where it is not obvious, and it needs consistency with kol hatorah kullah.

This is what I once said:
When Hashem told Avraham the mitzva of mila, He said “Ani Keil Shakai, Hishaleich lefanai ve’heyei samim.” Why was this sheim Hashem used here? The mefarshim (Arvei Nachal, Maharal) say that Hashem created the world incrementally, with the briah stepping from lower to higher quality as the briah progressed, but Hashem stopped the briah short of perfection, so that mankind would have the opportunity and duty to bring it to perfection, thus emulating Hashem’s work. The mitzvah of milah is the archetype of this concept, the concept that we are commanded to emulate the Ribbono Shel Olom in his brias ha’olam, which progressed from lower to higher quality.

We see that when Hashem commands us to bring ourselves and the briah to perfection, the Torah uses the term ‘his’haleich lefanai.” This shows that "halicha" does not mean a stroll to mediocrity, but instead it means ameilus to reach perfection. Only concerted and diligent effort can bring perfection. This is the raya that “bechukosai teileichu” means ameilus.  It means that we must strive to bring ourselves to perfection through limud haTorah.

I recently heard a teretz from the Alter of Kelm's son (see similar in Nesivos Shalom).  He says that anyone can learn Torah like any other scholarly pursuit, but such learning is superficial, it is like a scarf he puts on and can easily take off.  Only a person who dedicates himself to learning, who sacrifices his desires because he wants to focus on Torah, only such a person is permeated with Torah, it becomes a part of what he is.  The way you can tell the difference is how they act when they're outside of the Beis Medrash.  The ameil batorah will still look and act like a Ben Torah, while the other one will quickly lose the tzurah and become indistinguishable from every bum in the street.  How a person acts when he walks around is a proof of whether he is dipping his toes in Torah or pickling himself in it.  So when the Torah says bechukosai teileichu, that means that your halicha should illustrate the fact that your learn Torah; people should be able to see from the way you walk around that you are a ben Torah.  Learn Torah in a way that your teileichu is the teileichu of a Ben Torah.  That only comes with Ameilus.

This reminded me of something my father zatzal said.  My father learned in Slabodka.  He told me that the Alter said that he couldn't predict what would come of the talmidim in the yeshiva, whether they would be ye'rei'ei shamayim or not.  But one thing he knew for a fact: nobody that touched the door-knob of the beis medrash of Slabodka would ever have hana'a from olam hazeh. (Kein hano'eh fuhn oilem hazeh veht ehr shein nit hobben.)

His point was that for a person who has immersed himself in Torah, which every talmid of Slabodka did, worldly pleasures would be crass and low and unworthy of attention.  You might enjoy things, but you would never become a hedonist.  You might not be frum, you might abandon the Torah, but your limud hatorah would make an indelible mark; you could never sink to vulgar obsession with physical pleasure.

And another answer, that I just heard from a very nice man who was here collecting money.  He is Rabbi Yisrael David Stern from Bnei Brak.  He is a talmid chacham and has a yeshiva, and while he was in town, he was asked to speak at several yeshivos and kollelim.  This is what he said:

The Rambam in the last Halacha in Hilchos Sechirus, 13 Sechirus 7, says the following:

כדרך שמוזהר בעה"ב שלא יגזול שכר עני ולא יעכבנו כך העני מוזהר שלא יגזול מלאכת בעה"ב ויבטל מעט בכאן ומעט בכאן ומוציא כל היום במרמה אלא חייב לדקדק על עצמו בזמן שהרי הקפידו על ברכה רביעית של ברכת המזון שלא יברך אותה. וכן חייב לעבוד בכל כחו שהרי יעקב הצדיק אמר כי בכל כחי עבדתי את אביכן. לפיכך נטל שכר זאת אף בעולם הזה שנאמר ויפרץ האיש מאד מאד:

Just as the employer is warned to not cheat his employee or withhold his salary, so too the employee is warned to not cheat his employer by wasting a little time here or there....instead, he is obligated to be meticulous with every moment.  Chazal (Brachos 17a) tell us that the laborer cannot say the fourth blessing of Birkas Hamazon because his time belongs to his employer.  And he must work with all his strength, as we find that the Tzadik Yaakov said that he worked for Lavan with all his strength.  This is why Yaakov received reward even in this world, as it says, and the man was mightily successful.  

From this Rambam we see that although there is no guarantee that one's efforts will be successful, if a laborer works with all his strength, he will be rewarded in this world.  If so, we can say that Rashi is using the same idea.  Although Reb Yaakovs rule (Kiddushin 39b) is thatשכר מצות בהאי עלמא ליכא, the reward for good deeds is not given in this world but only in the world to come, this does not apply when a person is an ameil, when he does his work with all his strength.  This is why Rashi says that the rewards of Bechukosai are for ameilus: mere fulfillment of the mitzvos does not bring the blessings enumerated in Parshas Bechukosai.  Only ameilus overcomes the general rule of     שכר מצות בהאי עלמא ליכא.

(Just for shleimus, please note that the Maharsha also asks this question- How the parsha can promise earthly reward for tzidkus according to Reb Yaakov?  The Maharsha answers that Reb Yaakov's rule is only for a yachid.  A tzibur gets schar in this world too.  If you think about it, you'll realize that the Mahrsha is not just right, he's absolutely and inescapably right.)

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Lag B'omer Celebrations

Lag B'Omer is one of the highlights of the year.  It is celebrated in a unique manner- many people make bonfires and shoot arrows and dance and sing.  Celebrations are wonderful, and I certainly say that in our long and bitter galus, we could use more such days to chase away the gloom and doom that weighs heavily on our shoulders.

But Lag B'Omer is an odd day to celebrate, I think.  Yes, the talmidim of Rebbi Akiva stopped dying on that day.  The reason they stopped dying is because every last one of them was dead.  There was nobody left to die.  This we celebrate?  The  famous talmidim of Rebbi Akiva that we know of were those that he taught after all the others had died.

As for the "Hilula of Rav Shimon bar Yochai" that is mentioned in the Zohar- that, too, is difficult to understand.  If it is the yahrtzeit of Rav Shimon bar Yochai, the day of the death of a tzadik is not the time to make a party.  On the contrary; there are many Gemaros that say that one should fast and mourn on the anniversary of a Tzadik's death:  the suggested fast days we know of are the seventh of Adar, for Moshe Rabbeinu, Rosh Chodesh Nissan for Nadav and Avihu, the tenth of Nissan for Miriam, and so on.  So why are we celebrating on the day of Rav Shimon bar Yochai's death?

The Zohar that calls it a "hilula" means something else entirely.  Although the day of a tzadik's death is a day of Middas Hadin, a day of sadness and introspection for the treasure we lost, that is only on Earth.  In Shamayim, it is a day of rejoicing, like a day a Kallah is brought to her Chassan.  In Shamayim, it's a Yom Tov, a mo'eid of Hillula.  On Earth, among the living, it may be a mo'ed, but it's a mo'eid like Tisha Ba'av.

I understand that what I've written seems disingenuous, and seems to denigrate a holy minhag that has existed perhaps for millennia, certainly for hundreds of years.   As for what I said about their not dying anymore because they were all dead, well, it's no different than the fifteenth of Av, when the generation of the Midbar stopped dying because they, too, were all dead, but we celebrate the end of the gzeira ra'ah.  Also, at least Rebbi Akiva remained alive, and he ultimately managed to teach his Torah to other talmidim.  As for Rav Shimon bar Yochai's death being a sad loss for mankind, but we are all told that on the day of his death he revealed many secrets of Toras Hanistar to us, so it's like the day of Mattan Torah of Toras Nistar.

(UPDATE: A comment came in in May of 2018/Iyar 5778 pointing out that the Gemara BB 121a and as explained by the Rashbam says that the fifteenth of Av is celebrated not because the dor hamidbar finished dying, but because the Dibbur returned to Moshe Rabbeinu.  (If not for the Rashbam, the Gemara might be read to mean that the tamu is the reason and the dibbur is a siman of the simcha, evidence that the matzav of nezifah had ended with the death of the last of the dor hamidbar and simcha had returned.)

רב רב דימי בר יוסף אמר רב נחמן יום שכלו בו מתי מדבר דאמר מר עד שלא כלו מתי מדבר לאלא היה דיבור עם משה שנאמר ויהי כאשר תמו כל אנשי המלחמה למות מקרב העם וסמיך ליה וידבר ה' אלי לאמר אלי היה הדיבור 

Rashbam

שכלו בו מתי מדבר. במדרש איכה יום שבטל בו החפר דאמר ר' לוי כל ערב תשעה באב היה כרוז יוצא הכל יצאו לחפור חפרין וישנין בהן ובשחרית הכרוז יוצא יבדלו החיים מן המתים והיו בודקין אותן ונמצאו ט"ו אלף ופרוטרוט חסרין בכל שנה וכך עשו מ' שנה יום לשנה יום לשנה הרי מ' שנה בשנה אחרונה עשו כן בדקו עצמן ונמצאו שלמים אמרו שמא טעינו בחשבון וכן בי' בו וכן בי"א וכן בי"ב וכן בי"ג ובי"ד עד דאיתמלי סיהרא כיון דאיתמלי סיהרא אמרו ביטל הקב"ה אותה גזירה קשה מעלינו ועשו משתה ושמחה ויו"ט: דאמר מר כו'. ולכך עשו ימי משתה ושמחה על הדיבור שחזר למשה: לא היה דיבור עם משה. פה אל פה כבתחלה אבל אם הוצרכו לדיבור כגון במעשה דקרח שהיה אחר מעשה המרגלים היה מדבר על ידי מלאך או באורים ותומים אי נמי לא היה מדבר עמו אלא על ידי צורך מעשה הצריך להם: אלי היה הדיבור. דמצי למכתב ויאמר ה' אלי כדכתיב לעיל ויאמר ה' אלי אל תצר את מואב אי נמי מדסמכו לויהי כאשר תמו קדריש הכי ולא ממשמעותא דקרא אלא מייתורא דויהי כאשר תמו דקרא יתירא הוא: )

That being the case, one might propose that the celebration of Lag Ba'omer as well is not because there was nobody left to die. It is because with the end of the gzeirah, Reb Akiva was able to begin the mesora of Torah to Klal Yisrael again, similar to the return of the dibbur to Moshe Rabbeinu.)

In defense of my seemingly "haskoolisheh" post, I would like to point out that nothing that I've written originated with me.  Everything I wrote is lifted- almost verbatim- from (second paragraph) the Pri Chadash in OC 493:2, and (paragraphs three and four) from the Chasam Sofer in Parsha Emor.  They are the ones who disapproved of the party atmosphere of Lag Ba'omer and the mass gathering in Tzfas, not me.

The Chasam Sofer's words were written in a eulogy he delivered upon hearing of the disastrous Earthquake of the Galilee that occurred on Sunday January 1, 1837- 24 Teves, 5997.  That earthquake hit Tveria and Shchem and destroyed most of the Jewish section of Tzfas, leaving thousands of Jews dead; adding insult to injury, it barely touched the Arab section.  The Jewish community of Tzfas, destitute even before the earthquake, was decimated, dislocated, and plagued by injury, infection, and disease.  The Chasam Sofer suggests that this was divine punishment visited upon us for ignoring Yerushalayim.  He says that for around one hundred years prior to that date, nobody wanted to live in Yerushalayim, but instead everyone went to Tzfas to be in the proximity of Rav Shimon bar Yochai's grave.  He says this was a terrible insult to Yerushalayim, the Gate of Heaven, the source of all Kedusha.  He brings from the Ya'avetz that even now there is a mitzvah of Aliya le'Regel, (though I haven't found the teshuva he's referring to,)  and we, as a people, were punished for insulting the kedusha and centrality of Yerushalayim.

Eli, in the comments, notes that "it was also found (in the Cairo Genizah) that in the times of the early Geonim, Iyar 18th was considered the yahrzeit of Yehoshua Bin-Nun, and, accordingly, a fast day."  The Chasam Sofer in the above hesped says that Yehoshua bin Nun's yahrtzeit is the twenty sixth of Nissan, though.

So, if your Rosh Yeshiva tells you that you can't go dance in Miron because it's bittul Torah and hollelus, at least you know that while your Rosh Yeshiva won't win any popularity contests, he'll be unpopular together with the Pri Chadash, the Chasam Sofer, and the Geonim.

But in the end I have to admit that Lag B'Omer, whether it really has any intrinsic deep meaning or it's just fun, is certainly a good and healthy way to enjoy the achdus and spiritual aspirations of Klal Yisrael.  Like many other good minhagim, you get out of it what you imbue into it.  As George Bernard Shaw wrote,

I don't believe in circumstances. The people who get on in this world are the people who get up and look for the circumstances they want, and, if they can't find them, make them.

Le'shana haba'ah be'Uman!

Thank you DixieYid for the photograph.

UPDATE MAY 2014

Someone sent in a valuable yediyah from the Rama MiFano in his Mayan Ganim.  He says that the Gzeira of death on Reb Akiva's talmidim included him.  It was on Lag Ba'Omer that it became clear that the Gzeira against Reb Akiva was rescinded.  In that case, Lag Ba'omer is indeed precisely like Tes Vov b'Av.  

Achrei Mos, Vayikra 18:5. וָחַי בָּהֶם, Vachai Bahem: The Obligation to Preserve Life Countermands Other Religious Obligations

וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֶת חֻקֹּתַי וְאֶת מִשְׁפָּטַי אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשֶׂה אֹתָם הָאָדָם וָחַי בָּהֶם  אֲנִי ה
Observe my ordinances and laws, that man shall do them and live; I am Hashem.

The Gemara in Yoma 85 says that the words "vachai bahem" in this passuk teach that the obligation to preserve human life overrides the obligation to observe other Mitzvos.  If the only way to preserve life is to transgress a religious prohibition, the preservation of life is dominant.

This is true for almost all the aveiros in the Torah.  A man who is starving should eat treif food; a man whose life is endangered should be mechallel Shabbos to protect himself.  But there are three exceptions (Pesachim 25 and Sanhedrin 74a):  Avodah Zarah, Gilui Arayos, and Shfichas Damim.  If a person is given a choice- worship this idol or we will kill you; engage in an illicit sexual relationship or we will kill you; kill that other man or we will kill you, one must submit to martyrdom rather than do the prohibited act. 

The Chasam Sofer points out an odd thing.  The source for the rule that life outweighs other religious considerations is our passuk, Vachai Bahem.  This passuk introduces the parsha of Arayos, of forbidden sexual relationships.  Why is it that this almost-universal rule of Vechai Bahem, the rule of Ya'avor ve'ahl yei'hareig, is taught in the introduction to the parsha of Arayos, when Arayos is one of the three rare exceptions to the rule?  Ve'chai Bahem could have been stated in 98% of the Torah in a context where it applies.  Why was it incongruously stated here, where it does not?

The Chasam Sofer does not answer his question: he says "mitzvah le'yasheiv," it would be a mitzvah to explain it.

It's mitzvah time!

First of all, I want to point out that Tosfos, I think, noticed this oddity.  Tosfos in Sanhedrin 60a, d'h חקתי דהשתא, says that despite the contiguity to the parsha of Arayos, the words וָחַי בָּהֶם in this passuk are not talking about Arayos but rather about the 613 Mitzvos of the Torah.  Tosfos does not say what it is about those words that made  him say that, so it's not absolutely clear that Tosfos means what the Chasam Sofer means.  It is possible that Tosfos might just be saying that the idea of vechai bahem is so broad a concept, that it must be referring equally to all the taryag because all the taryag bring life, and it has not specific association with any one parsha.  But it is more probable that Tosfos means the din of pikuach nefesh, that the fact that din of pikuach nefesh that is learned from וָחַי בָּהֶם does not apply to Arayos is proof that this passuk is talking about the whole Torah and not about Arayos. 

Reb Meir Simcha here in his Meshech Chochma talks about this passuk and the Tosfos, and he says that Tosfos means the din of Pikuach Nefesh, the Chasam Sofer's point.  This is no taina on the Chasam Sofer, for two reasons.  1. He probably learned Tosfos not like Reb Meir Simcha, but instead like the first pshat I said above, and 2. as I said before, even when we accept that the passuk is not talking about Arayos, it's odd that it's in the introduction to Arayos. 

In any case, Reb Meir Simcha initially suggests that the din of vechai bahem / yaavor ve'ahl yeihareig does apply to Arayos in cases of lo sikrevu legalos erva, i.e., Clintonesque contact without znus mamash, where it's only a lahv.  However, Reb Meir Simcha points out, this is not true according to the Rambam, who holds that even abizraihu of AZ GA and ShD is yeihareig, even tiny issurim of arayos are yeihareig ve'al yaavor, as stated in the Gaon in YD 157 (and, if I remember correctly, as discussed at length in the intro to Sefer Hamitzvos).   But then he says that according to Reb Meir, in Sanhedrin 59a, that even a Goy that is osek batorah is like a kohen gadol, and Reb Meir bases it on our passuk- Ha'adam vechai bahem- not Yisrael, but any Adam- then we can say that since Goyim are not chayav in Kiddush Hashem (Sanhedrin 74b), if they would have a case of oneis by arayos, their halacha would be ya'avor.  I'm not sure why he says this only in Reb Meir.  The din that pikuach nefesh is doche the seven mitzvos Bnei Noach, I assume, is agreed to by everyone, so it's not only Reb Meir that holds that vechai bahem also goes on Goyim. 

So: Reb Meir Simcha's teretz on the Chasam Sofer's question is: only for Jews, who have a mitzvas Kiddush Hashem, do we limit Vechai Bahem from applying to arayos.  For Goyim, who do not have a mitzvas kiddush Hashem, the general petur of Vechai Bahem applies even in cases of Arayos (and Avodah Zara, but not Retzicha, as Reb Meir Simcha says in the Ohr Sameiach, 5 Yesodei Hatorah 6.)  So we can say that the passuk is in the parsha of Arayos because Goyim are also metzuva on Arayos, and for Goyim, Vechai Bahem is docheh even issur Arayos.

So we have Reb Meir Simcha's answer, two tentative approaches of my own, Chaim B's teretz, and a drush teretz:

1. Reb Meir Simcha in the Meshech Chochma: These words apply to non-Jews as well as Jews, and although we, Jews, cannot apply them to the three chamuros because of our Mitzva of Kiddush Hashem, Goyim do not have a mitzva of Kiddush Hashem, and so for Goyim, the וָחַי בָּהֶם dispensation does apply to Arayos and Avoda Zara.

2. My first tentative teretz: That Vechai Bahem does apply to Arayos.  If one would be weak and would choose to do the aveira and save his life, he would not be chayav missa, as almost all the rishonim (Tosfos, Ran, Ramban, Rambam in Yesodei Hatorah) say in the sugya of Abaya and Rava on mei'ahava umei'yira.  Why would he not be chayav missa?  Because Vechai Bahem removes the chiyuv missa, even if it remains assur.

3.  My second tentative teretz:  The Mishna Sanhedrin 73a says that if we see a man running after a person to kill him or running after an erva for an illicit sexual act, we kill the pursuer, the rodef.  The Rif at the very end of Eilu Ovrim in Pesachim says that you can kill a rodef even on Yom Kippur or Shabbos, although wounding, to say nothing of killing, any living thing is an issur de'oraysa.  The Mishneh Lemelech at the very end of Hilchos Shabbos, 24:7 brings this Rif; he says that while the Rif makes it clear that you can kill a murder rodef on Shabbos, what about killing an arayos rodef on Shabbos?  He doesn't state a final opinion.  I would say that we would be mattir chillul shabbos to kill an arayos rodef on the basis of vechai bahem.  This would explain what it's doing in this parsha.  (But I don't get the Mishneh Lemelech.  If you can kill a murder rodef on Shabbos, that's because of the din of pikuach nefesh.  Why would arayos rodef be different?  What happened to "kaasher yakum ish ahl rei'eihu urtzacho nefesh kein hadavar hazeh?)

4.  See the comments; Chaim B shtells tzu Reb Elchanan's pshat in Tosfos in Kovetz He'aros #48.  He pulled the rug out from under me on this.  I should have thought of what he said, but that's the breaks.  Here's what Chaim wrote:
R' Elchanan explains that Tosfos holds that pikuach nefesh is not nidche because of the big 3. Pikuach nefesh (or v'chai bahem) still applies, but it clashes with the chiyuv to be moseir nefesh. Net result is shev v'al ta'aseh.

 5.  I copied this from HaRav Yissachar Frand, because he writes better than I do.
A cursory examination of this pasuk would seem to indicate that the Torah is telling us that human life is more precious than keeping the mitzvos. Therefore, if you have a choice between observing Shabbos or staying alive, your life is more valuable than the mitzva. We would conclude that there is a general rule: life is more important than the mitzvos, with just three exceptions.
 Rav Moshe Feinstein Zt"l, in his sefer "Igros Moshe," writes  that this common understanding of the pasuk is incorrect. That is not what the pasuk is saying. The true explanation is as basic as a Targum Onkelos.
The Targum Onkelos translates this pasuk as: "and you should live through them in the World to Come." In other words, the pasuk is not telling us to stay alive and neglect the mitzvos, because life is more precious than mitzvos. The pasuk is telling us that the most precious thing in life is keeping mitzvos, because they bring us to olam haba, the World to Come.
Therefore, if I have a choice between observing the Shabbos or being murdered, the Torah says, "live!" Why? Not because life, for its own sake, is more precious than G-d's Commandments. Rather, life is precious because you can do those Commandments! Therefore, perform work on this Shabbos so you can keep so many more Shabbasos in the future. Eat chometz on Pesach. Why? So you can go on and do more mitzvos, and be worthy of life in the world to come.
This is an entirely different perspective. Life is not valuable just for the sake of life itself, without a purpose. Life is not valuable simply in order for a person to work, do errands and go to ball games. That is not what makes life worth living! What does make life worth living? "V'chai bahem" - "l'chayei alma" [in the world to come]. Life that leads to this goal is worth living. The Torah is instructing us to violate the Shabbos and to eat chometz [leaven] on Pesach. Why? The reason is because a human life is valuable because it can do so many more mitzvos in this world. Therefore, violate the Shabbos once so that you can observe Shabbos many more times. (end quote)

Based on this approach, the answer to the question is that Vachai Bahem is in fact universal.  The application of Vachai Bahem, however, varies.  In most cases, the application of vachai bahem results in overturning the issur in order to live.  In some cases, though, the application of vachai bahem results in giving up one's physical life, because doing the issur would cause terrible damage to the eternal life of the soul.

The Torah davka put the din of vechai bahem here to teach us that sometimes, vechai bahem means that we have to give up our lives.

Metzora, Vayikra 14:46-7. Tefillin Wearer and Tefillin Carrier: Who Goes First?

An accepted rule: If two people come to a doorway, and one of them is a Kohen, the Kohen should enter first, because we must show respect and honor for the high kedusha of Kohanim, and precedence shows respect.  Similarly, if one is a talmid chacham, the chacham enters first.  If two people come to a doorway, and one of them is carrying tefillin, the person carrying the tefillin enters first, because in this way we honor the kedusha of the tefillin.  What if one person is carrying tefillin, and one man is wearing tefillin?  Who should enter first? Simple logic would tell you there should be no difference between the two, or if there is a difference, we should show honor to the tefillin that are being worn, since not only are they holy, but they are being used to fulfill a mitzva, they are engaged in the specific function for which they were written, which ought to increase their holiness.

If that were true, would I be writing this?

The Beis HaLeivi and Reb Yaakov Kaminetzky are quoted as saying that the person carrying tefillin goes in front of the person wearing tefillin.  They prove this from this week's parsha, Parshas Metzora.

Passuk 14:46:
וְהַבָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת כָּל יְמֵי הִסְגִּיר אֹתוֹ יִטְמָא עַד הָעָרֶב.
From here we learn that anything susceptible to Tumah, whether it is a person or a utensil or clothing, which enters a house that had been declared tamei under the law of Tzaraas, becomes tamei immediately.

Passuk 14:47:
  וְהַשֹּׁכֵב בַּבַּיִת יְכַבֵּס אֶת בְּגָדָיו וְהָאֹכֵל בַּבַּיִת יְכַבֵּס אֶת בְּגָדָיו.
From here Chazal learn that clothing that enters the house while worn by a person is tamei only after it remained in the house long enough for a person to eat four beitzim of bread- kdei achilas pras, at least three minutes.

So the rule, as stated here in the Toras Kohanim, and the Mishna in Nega'im 13:9, is as follows:
If one enters a house that has Tzaraas while carrying a hat in his hand, he and the hat are immediately tamei.  If, however, one enters the house wearing the hat, he is tamei immediately, but his hat is only tamei if he and it remain in the house for three minutes.

Rashi in Eiruvin 4a explains that in the latter case, the clothing is considered tafeil, secondary, to its wearer, and so we cannot view them as having "come" into the house.  The man came into the house; his clothing is there only because he is there.  Tosfos in Chulin 71b explains that the clothing becoming tamei a few minutes later is a secondary and delayed effect of the tumah of the wearer.  As Tosfos says, the Tumah comes to the clothing only through the tumah of the wearer; evidently, the clothing are not really in the house at all, they are not called בָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת; and their tumah is only because a man who is in a Tumah house is wearing them for an extended period.

On the basis of this Rashi and Tosfos, say the Beis HaLeivi and Reb Yaakov, we must say that if one carries tefillin, the tefillin are entering the room, and they should enter the room first.  Where one is wearing the tefillin, the tefillin are not viewed as entering the room, they are not בָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת; the person enters the room, and the tefillin happen to be there.  An item that is secondary to its wearer is not viewed independently, and therefore we cannot say that the tefillin entered the room.  Since they are not "entering the room", they are not in the equation of "who should enter first."

The problem I have with this rule is that the Toras Kohanim here says that the rule that the tumah of the worn clothing is delayed is a kula, a leniency, based on passuk 47, not a din in tafel.  That without the passuk we would think the clothing is tamei immediately because it is "ba el habayis," but the passuk tells us a kula that they need she'hiyah.

 כל כבוס בגדים שבתורה להחמיר וזה להקל

Worse, Tosfos Chulin 71b D"H למאי brings another Toras Kohanim that says that this din applies only to a Jew wearing clothing.

ועוד הקשה רבינו אפרים דבתורת כהנים ממעט בהמה וכותי דלא בעו שהייה בכלים שהן לבושים מוכבס בגדיו המטמא בגדים מציל בבית המנוגע כותי ובהמה שאינם מטמאים בגדים אינם מצילים בבית המנוגע

Secondly, the Toras Kohanim brought by Tosfos Chulin 71b D"H למאי, and the Rambam in 16 Tumas Tzaraas 6-7 says that this rule is only true where a Jew, who is susceptible to tuma, wears the clothing.  If a gentile or an animal in clothing would walk into this  house, they, of course, would remain non-tamei, but the clothing they are wearing would be tamei immediately.

Tosfos - 

ועוד הקשה רבינו אפרים דבתורת כהנים ממעט בהמה וכותי דלא בעו שהייה בכלים שהן לבושים מוכבס בגדיו המטמא בגדים מציל בבית המנוגע כותי ובהמה שאינם מטמאים בגדים אינם מצילים בבית המנוגע

More importantly, the Rambam characterizes this din as a din that the person is "matzil" his beged, not a din of bittul.

מי שנכנס לבית מנוגע וכליו על כתפיו וסנדלו וטבעתו בכפיו הוא והן טמאין מיד שאינו מציל מלטמא מיד אלא כלים שהוא לבוש בהן

Tosfos in Chulin does ask the second question, but he doesn't really answer it.  He also asks, it says in the Toras Kohanim that if one would put his ringed finger into the window of the house, the ring would become tamei after kdei achilas pras.  He asks, if the tumah comes to the worn object only through the man's tumah, in this case, where the man is not tamei at all, the ring should never become tamei.  Tosfos says that maybe this tumah is only derabanan.

So, it appears that the Tosfos, which is the basis of the Griz and Reb Yaakov, is very difficult, and resorts to dochek answers to explain bigdei akum and posheit yado lechalon.

And more importantly, even according to Tosfos, the concept of Tafel only applies where the person can become tamei.  The becomes a factor where a person that cannot become tamei walks into the house while wearing clothes- a gentile. Only in a case where the wearer can become tamei, the tumah only effects his clothing through him.  Where he cannot become tamei, the clothing immediately become tamei as well.  This is not at all a proof that clothing is secondary to a person, or that the clothing is not considered to have entered the house, it's a din that as far as tumah is concerned a person who can become tamei renders his clothing tafel.  This is also clear in the Rash in Nega'im 13:9.  This has nothing to do with tefillin.  The din of the tefillin going in first has nothing to do with the person, and a person in a shul is no different than an akum or an animal in a house of Tumah.  Also, it seems that according to them, it would be muttar to wear tefillin into a bathroom, so long as  you don't stay there for more than k'dei achlas pras.

Furthermore, according to them, the Gemara in Makkos 22b is difficult:

אמר רבא כמה טפשאי שאר אינשי דקיימי מקמי ספר תורה ולא קיימי מקמי גברא רבה

On the basis of their svara, the behavior of those people is not tipshus, it is an excellent lomdus.

I find the connection to tefillin extremely hard to understand.

(In order to avoid false starts on teirutzim it is important to know that keilim that were in the house before it was declared tamei, that remained there, are tamei immediately.  There is no requirement of "coming into the house" for becoming tamei.  Simply being there is enough to make them tamei without delay.  See Shavuos 17b.)

In the same Toras Kohanim, there is a machlokes Reb Yehuda and the Rabanan (mentioned briefly in Tosfos in Chulin.)  If a person stood outside the house and put his hand into the house through a window, and he has a ring on his hand, the man does not become tamei at all.  When does the ring become tamei?  The Rabanan say it only becomes tamei after KAPras.  Rav Yehuda says it is tamei immediately.  The Rabanan asked Reb Yehuda, why should it become tamei right away? Even if the man walked into the house wearing the ring, where he himself becomes tamei, the tumah of the ring is delayed: certainly, kal vachomer, the tumah of the ring should be delayed when the wearer is not tamei at all?  Reb Yehuda answered that this is clearly false, because when a gentile wears a ring into the house, and the gentile cannot become tamei, the ring is tamei immediately.  We see, says Reb Yehuda, that it is the fact that the wearer becomes tamei that delays the tumah of his ring.

Everyone agrees that keilim sitting in a house are tamei immediately; and that keilim that independently come into a house are tamei immediately. Everyone agrees that keilim worn into a house by a Jew have a delayed tumah, whereas if worn by a gentile they are tamei immediately. The machlokes is where you stuck your gloved or ringed hand into the house; Reb Yehuda, immediate. Rabbanan, delayed.

We pasken, as seen in the Rambam, like the Rabanan.  But what is the machlokes about?  Obviously, they are arguing about the nature of the delay of tumah where a garment in worn into a house.  But what is the machlokes?

It seems to me that the machlokes is related to the Gemara in Shabbos 5a, אגוז בכלי וכלי צף ע״ג מים.  See Tosfos there d'h Egoz and Shabbos 11a d'h Lo.

The pshat is this:
The din tumah by nigei batim is not ohel.  If it were ohel, everything would become tamei immediately.  The din tumah is that a bayis hamenugah is metamei things whose kviyus makom is in the house.  An object whose makom is on a person, even if they are in the house, don't become tamei immediately, they only become tamei because they're on a person whose makom is in the house.  This is only true by a Yisrael, because his chashivus as an equal to us means that he is the ikkar, and the clothing are seen as batel to him, not having an independent kviyus in the house.  But by Akum and Be'heima, it is irrelevant to us that the beged is being used by someone or something.  As far as we're concerned, the same way the person's makom is in the house, the beged's makom is in the house as well. This is what Rashi and Tosfos mean by "Tafel."


Rebbi Yehuda, on the other hand, holds that it is the fact that the wearer is susceptible to Tumah that causes the delay of tumah of what he is wearing.  We don't pasken like Rebbi Yehuda.

In any case, this is a unique halacha involving tzaraas which is only metamei something whose makom is in the house.  We find no such halacha by other tumos, such as Tumas Ohel; in the case of Tumas Ohel, it doesn't make a difference whether a glove is carried or worn into the house.  Therefore, this unique halacha by nigei batim has Z  E  R  O shaichus to being mechabed by tefillin.

The Beis HaLeivi and Reb  Yakov, on the other hand, hold that the special din by nigei batim of  בָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת is what causes the distinction between wearing and carrying.  Therefore, in any case where there's a din of בָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת, the corollaries will apply.  By kavod when entering a room, the idea is also בָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת, and therefore the same idea will apply.  My tzad is that it's not a din directly in בָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת; it's just that בָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת creates a rule of kvius makom.  Kvius makom is not relevant to kibud.

Having posted this, I learned several things.  1. There is Set A, people who read long and complicated divrei Torah in Torah Journals.  2. There is Set B, people who read divrei Torah on the web.  3.  Intersection(A,B)  is miniscule. 4. If I want a shakla vetarya with chaveirim who read the posts, I better stick to either hashkafa or short divrei Torah.

Additionally, I'm sticking in something from Rav Sternbuch in Titzaveh 28:38, whose connection should be obvious.

והיה על מצחו תמיד כ"ח ל"ח 

במסכת יומא ז' ע"ב למדו מפסוק זה כי הכהן הלובש את הצפן אסור לו להסיח דעתו ממנו והוסיפו עוד ללמוד בק"ו מצען לתפילין מה צקו שאין בו אלא אזכרה אחת אמרה תורה על מצחו תמיד שלא יסיח דעתו ממנו תפלין שיש בהן אזכרות הרבה שהציץ אין בו אלא שם אחד ואלו יש בהם אחד ועשרים שם של יו"ד ה"א בשל ראש וכמותן בשל יד רמב"ם על אחת כמה וכמה ובתוס' שם הקשו דהא הק"ו הוא ק"ו פריכא דמה לציץ שכן השם בגלוי מה שאין כן תפלין שהאזכרות מתופין בעור ומכח קושיא זו הסיקו התוספות שאין הק"ו ק"ו גמור מדאורייתא אלא סברא היא לחכמים לתקן שאסור להסיח דעת מתפלין מכח ק"ו זה.

ולדעת הראשונים הסוברים שאיסור היסח הדעת בתפלין הוא מדאורייתא , נראה לבאר דפליגי על התוס' בסברת איסור היסח הדעת , ומשום הכי לא קשיא להו קושית התוס ' . דמהתוס' מוכח דפירשו דאיסור היסח הדעת הוא שמסיח את דעתו ממה שהוא כעת נושא עליו את האזכרות , דמי שנושא עליו אזכרה , מחמת קדושתה של האזכרה חייב הוא שלא להסיח דעתו ממנה . ולכן הקשו התוס' שפיר , דיש לחלק בין אזכרה מגולה לאזכרה מחופה . אולם הראשונים דפליגי יש לפרש בדעתם שאין האיסור מחמת נשיאת הציץ , אלא דע"י שלבוש בציץ חלה בו בעצמו קדושה , והאיסור הוא שלא להסיח דעתו מקדושתו שלו עצמו . ולהכי לא קשיא לדידהו כלל קושיית התוס' , דאיזה סברא היא לחלק בין אזכרה מגולה לאזכרה מחופה , דגם כשהאזכרות מחופות שפיר מקדשות את האדם הלובשן.

ויש להביא ראיה לדעת הראשונים דפליגי על התוס' , דהא איסור היסח הדעת בציץ ובתפלין אינו אלא כשלובשם כדינם , הציץ על מצחו והתפלין בזרועו ובראשו , אבל אם אוחזם בידו , בודאי אין איסור היסח הדעת כלל . ואי יסוד איסור היסח הדעת הוא מחמת נשיאת האזכרות , וכמו שביארנו דהכי מוכח מקושיית התוס' , מאי נפ"מ איכא בין נושאן כמצותן או כידו . אמנם כדעת הראשונים החולקים על התוס' , יתבאר היטב , וכנ"ל.

והנה דעת רבנו יונה (עי' בשאג" א סי ' ל"ט) שאיסור היסח הדעת מתפלין הוא בשחוק וקלות ראש דוקא , אבל אם אינו עוסק בשחוק וקלות ראש , אע "פ שאין בתפלין בדעתו ומחשבתו , אינו עוכר כאיסור . וצ "ל שדעת רבנו יונה הוא כדעת התוס' דהק"ו אינו אלא מדרבנן , והם לא החמירו לאסור רק בשחוק וקלות ראש . אבל לשטות הראשונים רס "ל דהק "ו הוא מדאורייתא , אסור לו להסיח דעתו מהתפלין כלל (עיי"ש בשאג" א שהביא שכן דעת הרמב"ם והרמב"ן)