Ki Savo: Devarim 27:18. Arur Mashgeh Iveir Baderech and Harmless Misrepresentation

As all my posts, this has been edited and updated.  This is why some of the comments might not make sense.

Hypothetical:

You hold that Chalav Yisrael is not necessary, relying on the psak of Reb Moshe Feinstein and the Chazon Ish and many other poskim.  You have a guest in the house who does not hold like these poskim, who scrupulously avoids what we call Chalav Stam.  This guest wouldn't eat food cooked in a pot that had been used for Chalav Stam.

You've run out of Chalav Yisrael.  It is difficult to procure a new bottle.  You think to yourself, hmmm, I still have the empty bottle of Chalav Yisrael.  Maybe I'll just pour the Safeway Supermarket milk, that has a hechsher but is not Chalav Yisrael, into the Chalav Yisrael bottle.  Presto! Chalav Yisrael!

This is clearly prohibited.  By putting the milk into a container labeled Chalav Yisrael, I am goneiv da'as, I am intentionally misleading my guest.  So let's refine the hypothetical.

In my city, all we get is Lubavitcher Shechita.  My friends, Lubavitchers, only eat Lubavitcher Shechita.  I go to Costco, and, as occasionally happens, they're selling kosher meat, but it's Alle, Satmerer Shechita.  I invite my Lubavitcher friends to supper.  They don't ask any questions, because all the meat in the city is fine.  They know nothing about the anomalous Costco sale.  Can I serve them the Satmerer Shechita?  They certainly wouldn't eat it if they knew.  Do I have to tell them?  From my halachic perspective, I am not causing them to "stumble," because the meat is 100% kosher. I am not causing them any harm, and I am not causing them to do anything wrong.  Why should I care that my guests hold that it's assur? Perhaps it's akin to a person that has some irrational phobia about a food, and I put it into the meatloaf without telling him.  Or if he knew that I dropped something on the floor and then thoroughly washed it, he would never eat it.  So I don't tell him, and no harm is done.  Shelo befanav michzi chazya (Chulin 71a)!  The fact that he has an irrational dislike for a food is meaningless to me, and if he eats it, of no consequence to him. 

I'm not talking about parties that have a special relationship of trust.  I'm talking about independent parties.


To put it more carefully, here are the questions.
Without verbal misrepresentation, but where the other person does not think to ask about what I am giving him:
Can I give him something I hold is muttar if he holds it's assur.
Does it matter if it is an issur deoraysa or derabanan.
Does it matter if the other person agrees it's muttar but as a personal chumra never eats what I'm giving him.

Many readers will react negatively to the question.  What kind of person would do such a thing!!!  Shame on you for even asking!  My Chashuveh Rebbitzen said a profound truth.  What happened to Hillel's rule (Shabbos 31a)?  D'alach sani, lechavrach lo sa'avid.  If the tables were turned, it certainly would be sani li.  I would not just be disappointed, I would be very upset to learn what had happened.  Hillel says that the yesod of the whole Torah is that it is wrong for me to disregard my friend's expectations.   So this is not just unethical: according to Hillel, it is an affront to the foundation of the Torah.

But that's what Torah is all about.  We need to know exactly if and why it's assur, whether it's an issur or a minhag chasidus.  There are enormous practical differences.  If you're under stress, if you realize there's a problem, and being forthright would result in monetary loss or terrible embarrassment, then the identification of the problem will make the evaluation of the right path clearer.  If we're talking about an issur de'oraysa of lifnei iver, then too bad for you.  If it's a matter of impropriety, then you have to weigh the cost to you and to your guest.

Issues:
Is this muttar or assur?
If it is muttar, is it moral or immoral?  Yes, of course, it sounds terrible.  But is it truly unethical?
If it is unethical, is it reprehensible or merely improper?
If it is assur, is it assur under lifnei iver, or arur mashgeh, or gonev da'as?

(By the way, in the specific Chalav Yisrael case there's another cure.  If there's a little milk left over in the Chalav Yisrael container, you can pour in the other milk slowly and rely on Kama Kama Bateil.  For you, there's obviously no problem of ein mevatlin issur lechatchila.  Of course, there might be a min be'mino lo bateil problem for you, according to the Ran in Nedarim.  But for your guest, that won't be a problem since he holds the new milk is assur.)

When I moved into this house twenty four years ago, my son wandered over to the neighbor, and she offered him a piece of gum.  He asked her, is it kosher?  She answered "It's kosher enough."  Baruch Hashem, my son, who, when even younger, ate a dead wasp off a windowsill in shul on a dare, brought it home and asked me if he could eat it.  Of course, it was chazir treif.  Wrigley, as a representative wrote to me around twenty years ago, sometimes uses emulsifiers that are derived from animal fat.  I've never been able to find out whether this woman is a non-Jew married to a Jew, or a totally assimilated Jew, but you don't have to be Jewish to be a mechasheifa.

I was upset by her callous indifference to our religious beliefs.  But our first hypothetical is different.  Even if it's assur, it's an issur derabanan, and it could be argued (Nesivos 234:3) that a person that does an issur derabanan inadvertently is totally blameless, so I've done him no harm at all.  And in the second hypo, his insistence on Lubavitcher shechita is a chumra be'alma, not an issur.  Unlike my shikseh neighbor, I have respected poskim that are telling me that it's muttar ahl pi dinei Torah.  Why should I be concerned that his poskim asser for him? And she lied.  In the hypo, nobody is lying.

Sources:
Gemaros:
Yevamos 14b, Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel on Tzaras Erva, Lo Nim'ne'u
Chulin 111b, Rebbi Elazar hava ka'im
Sukka 10b, Reb Chisda

It is best to look at the Gemaros inside, because doing so will help you form your own opinion.  I think each and every one of them is important in thinking about this question.  In any case, here's the last half of the discussion.

    I think the most important makor for this question is in Chulin 111,  but the richest source of marei mekomos is the Gemara in Yevamos.  Because Harav Aharon Jofen's notes on the Ritva on 14b 118-122 bring down everything that has every been said on the topic- but, strangely, not the Gemara in Sukkah.

    Yevamos 14b, Beis Shammai held that the co-wife of an erva is included in the parsha of yibum.  Therefore, Beis Shammi allowed such a yevama to marry her late husband’s brother.  Beis Hillel holds that such a marriage is absolutely prohibited, and the offspring of such a yibum would be a mamzer.  The result of this disagreement is that there were people in the Beis Shammai neighborhoods that were kasher according to Beis Shammai but Mamzeirim according to Beis Hillel.  The Gemara says that Beis Shammai used to tell Beis Hillel about all such children so that they could avoid marrying them.  This indicates that where you hold something is muttar, but another person holds it is an issur deoraysa, it is proper to tell them about it.  On the other hand, it is possible that Beis Shammai only told Beis Hillel about the problematic children because if they didn't, Beis Hillel would not marry any children from Beis Shammai at all, out of concern that they might be a result of such a union and passul.

    The Ritva in Yevamos says that where I hold it's muttar, and the other holds it's assur midorasa, there’s a din of Lifnei Iveir to personally hand him the food.  But (see there note 118 from Harav Aharon Jofen)  the Pri Chadash OC 496 Issur Ve'hetter #23 says that it's  not lifnei iver, but it's ugly.  In fact, the Ritva in Sukka 10b himself brings the shitta that it's muttar, and then says that first of all, it's assur and even if you hold that it's not lifnei iveir, it's an ugly thing to do. He says that in Sukka, it was because the circumstances were obvious to the guests. The Ran in Yevamos holds there cannot be lifnei iveir if you hold it’s not assur.

    The Meiri there says it is not obligatory to inform the guest, and therefore the guest can only rely on being told where the host is muchzak bechasidus, he is known to be a particularly honest and upright person.


 The Mordechai in Yevamos, and the Ohr Zaru’ah in siman 603, and others, all brought in Rama YD 119:7, say that it is the hosts responsibility to inform the guest, and that the guest can rely on the host’s being forthright with him.

But all these are discussing a case of a machlokes whether something is assur midoraysa or muttar.  The hypothetical involves a case of issur derabanan.  Certainly it would be a different matter if it involved a 'chumra be'alma.'


    The Aruch Hashulchan in the recently printed volume on Nedarim, discusses this briefly in 214:34.  He just states that if A holds something is muttar, and B holds it’s assur, A may not serve it to B.


    The Ksav Sofer in his teshuvos OC 64 , based on the Sha'ar Ha'melech (Hilchos Ishus 7:12) writes that if one person holds that a certain practice is prohibited and he helps another person who maintains that the practice is permitted to do that act, he is over on "Lifnei Iver."  Therefore, in the case of a person who holds that smoking on Yomtov (or the entire year) is assur, he may not buy cigarettes for another person because of lo saamod ahl dahm rei’echa, and on Yomtov he must treat cigarettes as Muktzah. If, however, you hold lehalacha that smoking is muttar, but you personally prefer to be machmir, then he may light a cigarette for someone else who smokes the whole year and on yomtov too.  It would seem to me that the Ksav Sofer’s logic would apply in the converse case, where you are meikil and the other person has a personal chumra, that you would be allowed to give him the thing that you hold is muttar.

So, although the Ksav Sofer might imply the contrary, for all practical purposes the question has been decided by the Rama in YD 119.  The host is obligated to inform the guest, even if it involves only the guest's chumra.  If he doesn’t, then he’s a lowlife, but the Rama holds he's not oveir on lifnei iver.

Eli points out that the Shach there, SK 20, seems to hold like the Maharlbach that there is a real possibility of lifnei iveir where the guest holds it's an issur gamur.

I was thinking that our passuk might apply to him.  Mashgeh Iveir would seem to apply to any breach of trust, even where the ‘iveir’ simply assumes the other person will take his personal standards and desires into consideration.  And the word 'derech' (Brachos 10a) usually means an optional activity, not something connected to mitzvos and issurim, and Chazal apply this din to "eitza she'eina hogenes lo,' advice that is not good for him.  But after more thought, I doubt it.  First of all, 'Arur' is a pretty heavy punishment for a minor infraction.  Second, Mashgeh sounds more active than our hypothetical.  And third, unlike makleh aviv, where Reb Meir Simcha says it means showing disrespect even where the parent is mochel, nobody uses this passuk to say my pshat.

UPDATE NISSAN '72:   I just saw the Chazon Ish in Krisos 12b, (DH Sham Lo Amra) regarding a person who knows something is muttar, and two witnesses testify it is assur: the Gemara there says, according to one pshat in Rashi, that he may eat it in private.  The Chazon Ish adds that he may not give it to others.

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Ki Seitzei, Devarim 24:16. Punishment of the Son for the Father's Sin; וּבָנִים לֹא-יוּמְתוּ עַל-אָבוֹת

We all know about Zechus Avos.  Is there such a thing as Chov Avos?

The Gemara in Sanhedrin 27b (and Brachos 7a) asks, why does our passuk need to tell us that a son cannot be put to death for his father's sin, when we already were told "Ish b'cheto yumas," a man will die for his own sin?  The Gemara answers that our passuk is talking about court testimony- that close relatives cannot testify against each other.  But then the Gemara asks, is our inference that a son is not punished for a father's sin correct?  But it says ""Pokeid avon avos al banim," that Hashem remembers a father's sin upon his children!  The Gemara answers that "Pokeid" is only when the children embrace their father's sin.  This is why that passuk says pokeid...l'sone'oi, to those that hate me.  Then the Gemara asks, but in Vayikra it says וְכָשְׁלוּ אִישׁ-בְּאָחִיו, that a man will fall because of his brother's sin?  The Gemara answers that this is because he failed to protest and prevent the sin; his failure to protest makes him an enabler, and Hashem punishes for aiding and abetting sinful behavior.


Interestingly, the Gemara in Makkos 24a says that Yechezkel "nullified" Moshe Rabbinu's declaration.  Moshe said Pokeid avon avos al banim, and Yechezkel said

בֵּן-פָּרִיץ, שֹׁפֵךְ דָּם....כִּי גַם אֶל-הֶהָרִים אָכַל, וְאֶת-אֵשֶׁת רֵעֵהוּ טִמֵּא.  יב עָנִי וְאֶבְיוֹן, הוֹנָה--גְּזֵלוֹת גָּזָל, חֲבֹל לֹא יָשִׁיב; וְאֶל-הַגִּלּוּלִים נָשָׂא עֵינָיו, תּוֹעֵבָה עָשָׂה.....  יד וְהִנֵּה, הוֹלִיד בֵּן, וַיַּרְא, אֶת-כָּל-חַטֹּאת אָבִיו אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה; וַיִּרְאֶה, וְלֹא יַעֲשֶׂה כָּהֵן.  טו עַל-הֶהָרִים, לֹא אָכָל, וְעֵינָיו לֹא נָשָׂא, אֶל-גִּלּוּלֵי בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל; אֶת-אֵשֶׁת רֵעֵהוּ, לֹא טִמֵּא.  טז וְאִישׁ, לֹא הוֹנָה--חֲבֹל לֹא חָבָל, וּגְזֵלָה לֹא גָזָל; לַחְמוֹ לְרָעֵב נָתָן, וְעֵרוֹם כִּסָּה-בָגֶד.  יז מֵעָנִי הֵשִׁיב יָדוֹ, נֶשֶׁךְ וְתַרְבִּית לֹא לָקָח--מִשְׁפָּטַי עָשָׂה, בְּחֻקּוֹתַי הָלָךְ:  הוּא, לֹא יָמוּת בַּעֲו‍ֹן אָבִיו--חָיֹה יִחְיֶה.  יח אָבִיו כִּי-עָשַׁק עֹשֶׁק, גָּזַל גֵּזֶל אָח, וַאֲשֶׁר לֹא-טוֹב עָשָׂה, בְּתוֹךְ עַמָּיו; וְהִנֵּה-מֵת, בַּעֲו‍ֹנוֹ.  יט וַאֲמַרְתֶּם, מַדֻּעַ לֹא-נָשָׂא הַבֵּן בַּעֲו‍ֹן הָאָב; וְהַבֵּן מִשְׁפָּט וּצְדָקָה עָשָׂה, אֵת כָּל-חֻקּוֹתַי שָׁמַר וַיַּעֲשֶׂה אֹתָם--חָיֹה יִחְיֶה.  כ הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַחֹטֵאת, הִיא תָמוּת:  בֵּן לֹא-יִשָּׂא בַּעֲו‍ֹן הָאָב, וְאָב לֹא יִשָּׂא בַּעֲו‍ֹן הַבֵּן--צִדְקַת הַצַּדִּיק עָלָיו תִּהְיֶה, וְרִשְׁעַת רשע (הָרָשָׁע) עָלָיו תִּהְיֶה. 

which says that if a wicked man has a righteous son, the wicked father will be punished and the righteous son will live.  Whatever the Gemara means by saying that Yechezkel "nullified" Moshe's decree, there clearly is some tension between the two concepts.  The Maharsha takes the Gemara literally, that Yechezkel, as a navi, made a declaration that Hashem fulfilled, though it was contrary to the middas hadin expressed in the Torah.  The Aruch Laner cannot accept this, and says that Yechezkel only explained what Moshe Rabbeinu meant, that Moshe only was talking about a son that embraces his father's wickedness.  The Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim I:44 can be seen as another way of reading the Gemara: the Rambam says that a wicked son is punished for the father's sins only in the case of a community that worshiped Avoda Zara, not individuals.  Yechezkel's peers eliminated the ancient inclination of Avoda Zara, and as a result, the central application of pokeid no longer applied.

So whether from the passuk in our parsha, or from Yechezkel's words, the bottom line is that a righteous son does not suffer from the sins of his father.

Indeed, the Gemara in Brachos 7 asks why some tzadikim suffer.  The Gemara suggests that they suffer because of their father's or grandfather's sins.  But the Gemara rejects this pshat, because of the conclusion of the Gemara in Sanhedrin we brought above.

There are exceptions to this rule, though.  The Gemara in Shevuos 39a says that when a person swears falsely, his family and the entire world suffer as a result, and the Gemara in Kiddushin 13a says the same about Arayos.

But considering the general rule, the question we have to answer is this: the children of Eli Hakohen sinned, and they were punished with the terrible curse that all their descendants would die young.  In fact, Abaya and Rava were among their descendants, and (Rosh Hashanna 18a) Rava lived to forty only because of his exceptional diligence in Torah, and Abaya lived to sixty because in addition to limud hatorah, he was also exceptionally involved in the mitzva of Tzedaka.   How can it be that these tzadikim were punished for their ancestor's sins?  How does the Gemara deal with this problem?  And what about the sin of the Egel Hazahav, which continues to plague us?  (I don't ask about the sin of Adam, because one cannot ask questions from a parsha that is beyond our understanding.).

Of course, you can just say like the Ibn Ezra and the Rashbam on the passuk here in Ki Seitzei.  They disregard the Gemara in Sanhedrin and Brachos and say that the rule of Lo Yumsu is only for earthly courts.  The heavenly court does punish children for their fathers' sins.  The Levush uses this approach to explain the bracha at the Bar Mitzva "Sheptarani mei'onsho shel zeh."  The father is relieved that now that his son is responsible for himself, the father's sins will no longer hurt his child.  But from the Gemaros we quoted above, this may be true for minor children, but not adult children, and we are constrained to take the Gemaros we have at face value and deal with the Gemara's approach, which leaves us perplexed.

The Chida in his Pesach Einayim in Sanhedrin has a nice escape hatch.  He says that the Gemara in Sanhedrin only applies to children that are born after the father sins.  But children that have not yet been born at the time the father sins certainly can be punished for their fathers' sins.

(And here's a gratuitous comment that will cause feminists to gnash their teeth.  We say a bracha at a Bar Mitzva "she'ptarani mei'onsho shel zeh."  The Levush says that the reason for the bracha is the father's relief that although minor children can be punished for their fathers' sins, adult children are independent.  The father is relieved that he will no longer hurt his son by his personal failings.  The Pri Megadim in OC 222:5, Eshel Avraham, says that only the father says this bracha, but the mother does not.  He explains that the rule of Pokeid avon avos, that the father's sin is visited on his innocent minor children, is only the father's sins, not the mother's. Perhaps this would not be so troublesome, but the next step definitely will be.  If Chov Avos is only that of the father, then would it not be concomitant that Zechus Avos is only that of the fathers, and not of the mothers?  To tell the truth, that bothers even me.)

Another problem is that idea of visiting the sins of the father on the children when they are ocheiz b'maasei avoseihen, when they embrace their father's evil behavior, seems inconsistent with the idea of tinok she'nishbeh.  A child that is raised unaware of mitzvos is considered an ahnus.  He is not liable for the sins he does because he had no way of knowing right from wrong.  Is this not applicable to a child that embraces his father's evil ways?  According to the Gemara in Sanhedrin, a sinful child of a righteous man is punished for his own sins, but a sinful child of a sinful man is punished not only for his own sins, but also for the sins of his father.  The opposite should be true!  The latter is an ahnus, while the former is a meizid gamur.  Why are we more severe on the ahnus than on the meizid?

It's interesting that the expression used for punishment is the same as that used for collecting debts- nifra mimenu.  You have to wonder whether the laws of inherited debt can shed any light on this discussion.

The basic rule is that personal debt is not heritable, but land that is encumbered by a lien remains encumbered in the hands of the heir.  If one designates movable property as collateral, then even in the hands of the heir the movable property will be subject to that lien.  This is the difference between shibud nechasim and shibud haguf.  Shibud nechasim, the encumbrance of property, runs with the land.  The shibud haguf, the personal liability, is specific to the original party.

(Even though no heir has any legal obligation to pay unsecured debts of the legator, a son has a mitzva of Kibbud Av to pay those debts, in order to remove the stigma of default, of the father's failure to pay his debt.)

Reb Chaim Volozhiner, in his introduction to his Ruach Chaim on Avos and there in perek 5 says that most of the time, what we call "punishment" is not sent by Hashem.  Punishment stems from two things: sometimes, it is the natural consequence of the flaw in the soul that was generated by the sin, and sometimes the sin itself causes suffering.

Perhaps we can say that the same applies here.  A flaw in a soul might be heritable.  The sin itself is not heritable.  The flaw in the soul runs with the soul.  The sin itself is exclusive to the sinner.  Only when the heir reinforces that ancestral sin does it take residence within him- it is machzeres ahl achsanya shelo.  The descendants of the sons of Eli suffered from the spiritual flaw engendered by their progenitor, and the consequence of that flaw was a truncated life.  Beyond that, an ancestor's sin that is repeated by a descendant becomes especially entrenched in his personna, and thereby causes even more trouble than usual.

Pursuant to a discussion in the comments, there is an interesting discussion in Shulchan Aruch along the same lines. 

The Rama in YD 334:6 says that a court may punish a person who has been placed in Nidui/Cherem by expelling his children from school and his wife from the shul until the person accepts the authority of the court.  His source is the Nimukei Yosef Bava Kama in Hagozeil Umaachil, 39b in the Rif pages, quoting Rav Paltui Gaon.  The Taz brings from the Yam Shel Shlomo that "Chalila to do such a thing!  The whole world stands on the Hevel Pihem shel Tinokos shel beis rabban!  And what right do we have to expel his wife?  If he sinned, what did she do wrong?"  The Taz says that the Gaon only was referring to minor children, and the Gaon neer would apply his rule to children above bar mitzva, or a spouse.  The Aruch Hashulchan says that the rule of the Gaon applies only where Beis Din sees that the additional pressure on the father will make him bend to the court to protect his family, but not as a punishment on the others per se. 

So, the bottom line is this; the consequences of your behavior are not limited to their effect on you.  What you do ripples through your descendants in a Lamarckian cascade.  Even if you've given up on yourself, remember that your failures hurt your children almost as much as they do you.

UPDATE:
I just saw that Reb Meir Simcha in this parsha, in 21:22, talks about the concept of avon avos al banim.  It goes without saying that it's kedai to see inside, but here's what I got with a weak OCR, so use  your imagination.

וכי יהיה באיש חטא משפט מות והומת ותלית אותו וכר. הפירוש דאיתא בספרי פ׳ שלר עונה בה לפי שנאמר פוקד עון אבות על בנים יכול אף בזה כן ת״ל עינה בה ולא בזרעה׳ פירו: כי הזרע אינו מתיחס אחריו לפי שנאמר הכרר תכרת׳ וגכרת החבל לגמרי׳ והוה כמו זרע הבא מ הגכרי׳ לכן נתמרקה עונו בו ולא בזרעו׳ משאינ בשאר עונות שזרעו מתייחס אחריו וברא מזכה

 אבא׳ לכן פוקד עוט של אב בשאוחזין מעשיה בידיהן. וזה שאמר וכי יהיה באיש חטא משפט מות פי׳ שלא יהיה החטא רק באיש לא בזרעו׳ וזה חטי של מגדף ועעיז שבהן כתיב עונה בה לא בזרעה בזה ותלית אותו על עץ׳ אבל בשאר החטאים לא והיא כתכמיס דאיגן גתלין רק מגדף ועעיז. ולדעת ר אליע׳ר פירושו וכי יהיה באיש חטא מימ׳ דייקי' באיש צריך להיות החטא שעליו נשפט למות׳ אבל תטא שלא נשפט עליו למות רק כדי שלא יעשה כמו הרודף אתרי נערה המארוסה שאין תטא בו רק שלא יחטא בזה אינו נתלה׳ ודיקא באיש הא בן שהוא סורר ומורה שגהרג ע״ש סופו שאס רצה, אביו לחחיל מוחל ובכ״ז הוא נתלה. עיין סנהדר׳ מ'ה מ'ו ודוק.

Mattos, Bamidbar 30:16: Causing Others to Sin. And The Converse; A Salute to Lubavitch PR

וְאִם-הָפֵר יָפֵר אֹתָם אַחֲרֵי שָׁמְעוֹ וְנָשָׂא אֶת-עֲו‍ֹנָהּ
And if he will erase/revoke her oath after hearing it, he will bear her sin.
The Sifri, brought by Rashi, explains that a husband has the right to revoke his wife's oaths, but only if he does not validate them first.  Once he validated her oath, any subsequent revocation is ineffective, and the oath stands.  The passuk is talking about the following case:  A husband had, unbeknownst to his wife, validated her oath.  He later told her that he revokes her oath.  Trusting her husband, she blithely transgressed her oath.  In this case, the husband bears the sin of transgressing an oath.  Rashi's words (from the Sifrei) are
אחרי שמעו: אחרי ששמע וקיים, שאמר אפשי בו, וחזר והפר לה אפילו בו ביום
After having heard them: After he heard and upheld [them], by saying,“I approve of it” and then he (spuriously and duplicitously) retracted and revoked it, even on that very day. 

ונשא את עונה: הוא נכנס תחתיה. למדנו מכאן שהגורם תקלה לחבירו הוא נכנס תחתיו לכל עונשין
He shall bear her iniquity: He takes her place. We learn from here that if someone causes his fellow to stumble, he bears his punishments in his place. 


We are familiar with the halacha of Lifnei Iveir, that we are not to place a stumbling block in the path of a person, that we are fobidden to enable a person to commit an aveira. Our passuk, however, is no mere reiteration of Lifnei Iveir. The consequence of Lifnei Iveir is that the transgressor of Lifnei Iveir is punished for his transgression.  (He doesn’t get actual malkos for Lifnei Iveir, because it’s too general of a prohibition, but he is guilty of a malkos-level sin—it’s a chiyuv malkos without actual malkos.) The consequence of our passuk is that the villain- in addition to the chiyuv malkos- gets whatever the innocent person would have gotten had he/she done the sin intentionally.   Here, where the punishment of transgressing an oath is far more serious than that of a regular biblical prohibition, the husband suffers the extremely serious punishment of transgressing an oath.  If you're machshil a person on a lav, you have two lavim: Lifnei Iver and the lav the other was oiver.  A person that's machshil on chayvei krisos gets the lav of Lifnei Iver and is also chayav kareis.

Why is this law stated specifically in the context of the laws of oaths?  If this is a universal rule, it should have been stated generically, as was Lifnei Iveir- a michshol, any stumbling block.  What is the connection to nedarim?

The first thing that comes to mind is the unique status the husband has here.  While in dinim of issur and hetter a solitary witness is trusted, this only true where the doubt is whether an object is muttar or assur.  But if is'chazik issura, where the issur existed and the question is whether the issur had been removed, a solitary witness is not trusted.  Why, then, can the wife trust her husband?  Why doesn't he need proof that he had not validated her neder before he was meifir?  After all, it was ischazik issura!  And don't tell me that when he is meifir it's retroactive, because first of all, that doesn't take off the ischazik right now, and secondly, only the Rambam holds that it's retroactive by a husband's hafara.  The answer is that it is Beyado: he had, at one point, the power in his hands to validate or revoke the neder.  Beyado gives him greater legal credibility, like by niddah. 

But more than that:  The fact that the Torah gives him the right to revoke not only implies that his word can be trusted.  The Torah is specifically telling the wife that she should trust him.

So, it seems to me that the Sifrei's rule has limited application.  Merely trusting an eid echad does not necessarily transfer liability from actor to inducer.  If the eid echad is lying, then the actor was wrong in trusting him, and it is a shogeg.  The inducer would transgress lifnei iver and nothing more.  Only here, where the Torah explicitly says that the wife should trust her husband, would the punishment for her acts be transferred to her husband.  This is even stronger than two witnesses (see Noda Be'Yehuda YD II 96); here, the Torah gives him ba'alus and ne'emanus on her nedarim and says she should trust him when he says he was meifir.

The Rambam in 10 Kilayim 1 says that a person who dresses another in a garment that contains Shatnez gets Malkos; not because of lifnei iveir, which is too broad a lahv, but for the actual lahv of Shatnez.  The Nosei Keilim say that the Rambam learned Lo silbash=Lo salbish where the wearer is shogeg.  But the Oneg Yomtov YD 96 says that the Rambam is basing his rule on the concept of Shliach lidvar aveira.  The Oneg Yomtov then deals with issues of "vechi zeh chotei ve'zeh mischayeiv," from Kiddushin 43, and the Shach in CM 348:6 that paskens not like Tosfos Bava Kamma 79 who holds that by a shliach shogeg, yeish shliach lidvar aveira.) But with our derech in the Sifrei, we can say that the Rambam was working with the Chiddush of Nedarim; where you are the cause of the aveira beshogeg- not just that you were machshil, you were mamash the cause, like the difference between grama and garmi, although this is not really a garmi- you take the place of the victim.  The Torah told the woman she should trust her husband; if he is machshil her, he is being malbish her the kilayim, and he stands in her place.  (This is not only mine.  I've seen it in several achronim, though I think I might be saying it a little better.)

With this, we understand why this halacha was stated in the parsha of Nedarim.  The parsha of Nedarim teaches us a continuum of liability.  Where the husband revoked the wife's neder, and she didn't know that the neder was no longer operative, and she transgressed what she thought was a live neder, the Torah says "ve'Hashem yislach lah," that she needs slicha for doing what she thought was assur, even if it actually was muttar.  On the other end of the spectrum, if a woman was tricked into thinking that what she was doing was muttar, but it was actually assur, she is considered blameless and her husband bears the sin as if he had done it be'meizid.

I just saw the Chasam Sofer on the parsha, who, I am happy to say, makes several of my points.  He begins by saying that if this is a general rule, why is it stated davka in the parsha of nedarim.  He answers with the Rambam that the Ran brings in Nedarim 15a (wrongly cited as 14 in my Chasam Sofer).  The Ran DH Halcha Asura brings the Rambam in 10 Nedarim 12 that if Reuven assers his object to Shimon, and then Reuven gives the object to Shimon to eat, Reuven is over Bal Yacheil.  The Ran, and everyone else, argues with the Rambam (See Kli Chemda, this week's parsha, toward the end of the first #8, p. 259, DH Ubechidusheinu).  But the point is that according to the Rambam, the noder is over on Bal Yacheil even if he gave the food to the mudar and the mudar ate it.  And, he says, from the fact that a husband can be sho'el on his hakama, we see that hakama is a kind of neder, as if , in a manner of speaking, the husband made his wife's neder.  So, he says, since the husband who is me'kayeim is called the noder, if he gives it to her to eat, he's over on ba'al yachel.  Strangely, though, the Chasam Sofer ends by saying that this would be true even if she knew he was mekayeim.  If that's true, then he's not saying pshat in the Sifrei, because the Sifrei is talking about a case where the wife didn't know he was mekayeim.

And, thank you Eli, I looked at the Kli Chemda #5 (p 276) on this passuk.  1.  He brings the Ramban here that there are two chiddushim in the Sifrei: A. that the woman is not only pattur, she's not even a shogeges: She's like an anusa.  B. That the husband is like a person who made a neder and transgressed it.  2. He brings the Rambam in Kilayim that I brought above, and another Rambam that a person that is metamei an unwitting Kohen is chayav malkos for his tumah.  3. He is mechavein to the Oneg Yomtov (he didn't see the Oneg Yomtov, obviously) about Shliach lidvar aveira, and 4. ends up saying that the Rambam's rule applies to all aveiros that are inherently sins, as opposed to sins that have a component of intent.  You have to see it inside.

So, Chaim B argued that to so drastically limit Rashi/Sifrei to specific cases undermines the whole point of the mussar haskeil.  I agree with Chaim, and I say that pashut pshat in Rashi is that this is a broad concept.  After all, the lashon is "hagorem takala lechaveiro," not "hamadir" lechaveiro. .  How broad, though, is debatable.  Even in Rashi, certainly in the Rambam, this is not a yesod in kol hatorah kulah.



Having spoken about the result of causing others to sin, here's a video from Lubavitch Cape Town.  Their work is to bring people to Yiddishkeit.  My father zatzal told me that after World War II, many Jews were trapped in the Soviet Union.  If a person needed a bris millah, or kosher meat, or a kesuva, there was one option, and only one: find a Lubavitcher.   As far as the Aguda, Mizrachi, Satmar, and Hebrew Union College were involved, you would remain an Arel eating neveilos in the house with a woman you weren't married to.  I am not criticizing those groups, chalila.  Organizational Groups are only representatives of the many individuals, and they were busy surviving and building a foundation of Torah life after the war.  But the fact remains that Lubavitch took on both jobs and handled them well.  Only Lubavitch.  Whether you like their theology or not, you have to salute their unquenchable enthusiasm and mesirus nefesh, and the myriad chasadim they have done for so many abandoned Jews.  It seems to me that if you kill an animal because of takala vekalon, then kal vachomer you're chayav to be makir tov for such gemillus chasadim.




Background to the video:  here and here.

Pinchas: From the Shvilei Pinchas: The Connection Between the Parsha and the Three Weeks

This is a translation done by a dear friend, Rav Dr. Baruch Fox.  Reb Baruch applies the same well-honed skillset to hashkafa and machshava as he does to clinical diagnosis and surgery, and his translations contain a good deal of his own perspective.

We Read About Pinchas Who Is Eliyahu During the Three Weeks To Persuade Him to Come and Herald the Redemption

This coming shabbos, we read parshas Pinchas. In a normal, non-leap year, parshas Pinchas always falls during the first of the “three weeks,” between the seventeenth of Tamuz and the ninth of Av. During these three weeks, it is incumbent upon all Jews to mourn and lament the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash and to daven for the final and complete redemption. Seeing as these things do not occur by mere coincidence, there is, obviously, an intimate connection between parshas Pinchas and the “three weeks.”


Concerning this fact, the holy, Opter Rav, zy”a, writes in “Ohev Yisroel” that since all of the moadim are mentioned in this parsha, it was instituted to read parshas Pinchas during the “three weeks.” By so doing, we reinforce our hopes that these days, too, will soon be transformed into days of rejoicing and happiness as predicted by the prophet (Zechariah 8,19): "כה אמר ה' צבאות צום הרביעי וצום החמישי וצום השביעי וצום העשירי יהיה לבית יהודה לששון ולשמחה ולמועדים טובים והאמת והשלום אהבו".

This connection between parshas Pinchas and the “three weeks” ties in beautifully with the opening verses of the parsha: "וידבר ה' אל משה לאמר, פינחס בן אלעזר בן אהרן הכהן השיב את חמתי מעל בני ישראל, בקנאו את קנאתי בתוכם ולא כליתי את בני ישראל בקנאתי, לכן אמור הנני נותן לו את בריתי שלום"—Pinchas’ zealous actions spared Yisroel from Hashem’s wrath; as a reward, Hashem gives him His covenant of peace.

The Targum Yonatan explains: "את בריתי שלום, האנא גזר ליה ית קימי שלם, ואעבדיניה מלאך קיים ויחי לעלמא, למבשרא גאולתא בסוף יומיא"—the covenant of peace took the form of Pinchas being made into an angel, living forever and announcing the redemption in the end of days. This matter is presented at greater length in the Midrash (Yalkut Shimoni here):

"לכן אמור הנני נותן לו את בריתי שלום - אמר רבי שמעון בן לקיש, פנחס הוא אליהו, אמר לו הקב"ה, אתה נתת שלום בין ישראל וביני בעולם הזה, אף לעתיד לבא אתה הוא שעתיד ליתן שלום ביני לבין בני, שנאמר (מלאכי ג כג) הנה אנכי שולח לכם את אליהו הנביא לפני בוא יום ה' וגו' והשיב לב אבות על בנים".

The yalkut adds an important detail for us—Pinchas and Eliyahu hanavi are one and the same; just as he facilitated shalom, peace, between the Almighty and Yisroel at that time, so, too, he will serve this function once again in the future.

The rationale for reading parshas Pinchas at the onset of the “three weeks” is now more evident. At a time of mourning over the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash and Yisroel’s extended golus, it provides tremendous chizuk to recall the merit of Pinchas, Eliyahu, who willingly put his life on the line for the honor of the Almighty and in order to protect Yisroel from annihilation. We also intend to persuade him to fulfill that which Hashem promised him: "הנני נותן לו את בריתי שלום"—that he will appear to herald the redemption, swiftly, in our days, Amen.

The Purpose of Creation Is that Man Should Dwell in Both Worlds

Now, that we have established that we wish to invoke the merit of Pinchas, who is Eliyahu, and to hasten the arrival of the final redemption, let us take a closer look at the promise Hashem made to Pinchas. We have introduced the commentary of the Targum Yonatan that this promise conveys the fact that Pinchas will live forever and that he will be the messenger announcing the future redemption. This requires further clarification. The possuk alludes to the fact that he will facilitate “shalom” between Yisroel and their Father in Heaven; however, where do we find an allusion to the fact that he will live forever without dying?

Let us proceed by presenting an important principle gleaned from the holy teachings of the Ohr HaChaim hakadosh (Bereishis 3,14) which he expands upon (beginning of Bechukotai) in one of his forty-two elucidations (#20) of the possuk (Vayikra 26,3): "אם בחוקותי תלכו". Here are his elegant words:

"כשברא ה' אדם הראשון בעולם הזה לא בראו לשבת בעולם הזה לעולמי עד כשלא יחטא, שאם כן אדרבה ירידה היא לו ושפלות היא, כי תכלית המקווה הוא בעולם העליון ששמה יקצור אשר זרע, אלא היתה הכוונה כי עלה יעלה לשמים ולאוצרות החיים בעת אשר יחפוץ, ויהיה כמי שדר בבית ועליה על גבה, וכשירצה לעלות ולהשתעשע יעלה, כמו שמצינו שעלה אליהו בסערה השמימה (מלכים ב ב יא), ועל ידי החטא הוצרך להפשיט עורו מעליו ויניח הגוף בעולם הזה".

Hashem did not create man to dwell solely down below in this world; that would have been demeaning and would have constituted a spiritual decline for man. Rather, the intent was that man could reap the benefits of both worlds; for, his ultimate purpose and rewards lie in the world above. The situation would have been analogous to a person whose house contains a ground level with a second story above it; he would have had the freedom to climb to the second level and enjoy its treasures at will. This was, indeed, the situation witnessed with Eliyahu, who ascended to heaven in a blaze of fire; however, due to man’s sin, he was forced to relinquish this ability and freedom, and remains confined to his earthly body.

It occurred to me to elaborate upon the tremendous benefit it would be for man to be able to dwell in both worlds, like one who lives in a two-story house. The Agra D’Kallah (parshas Behaalotcha) presents the words of the Maggid of Mezritsch, zy”a, on the possuk (Bamidbar 10,2): "עשה לך שתי חצוצרות כסף" - "עשה לך שתי חצאי צורות שיהיו נכספים זה לזה"—rather than “make for yourself two silver trumpets,” he interprets this as saying “ make for yourself two half-forms (a play on the Hebrew word for trumpets) that will long (a play on the Hebrew word for silver) for one another.”

The Agra D’Kalla explains the Maggid’s message as follows: "על כן תקרא הנשמה שתי חצאי צורות, חציה למעלה וחציה למטה... וזה עשה לך שתי חצוצרות, היינו השתי חצאי צורות, כסף שיהיו משתוקקים זה לזה, זה לקבל וזה להשפיע ויהיה מלכות שמים שלימה, והכל על ידי קיום המצוות". Our holy sources have taught us that the neshomeh came down from on high to clothe itself in a physical form; nevertheless, the essence of the neshomeh remains above in the heavens. So, the neshomeh encompasses two half-forms—one residing above, while the other resides below. The intent is that they long for one another and operate together to achieve the fulfillment of the sovereignty of Heaven—one receives while the other provides the spiritual influence and bounty.

The Two Parts of the Neshomeh Illuminate One Another

Upon closer examination, we find that each of these two partners, these two half-forms of the neshomeh, possess an advantage and a disadvantage. The heavenly half-form always remains pure and untainted by the sins of the body; however, it is unable to perform mitzvos, since it lacks the bodily limbs. On the other hand, the half-form of the neshomeh that is clothed by a physical body, possesses the luxury of being able to engage in Torah study and to perform mitzvos; yet, it suffers the blemishes and disgrace that result when the body sins.

This, then, is the meaning of the homiletic interpretation: “make for yourself two half-forms that long for one another.” If the bodily half-form serves Hashem honorably and enhances its spirituality and kedushah, the two half-forms will long to unite and illuminate one another. The lower form will illuminate the form above with the Torah and mitzvos acquired with its physical tools; while the heavenly form, will illuminate the earthbound form with the brilliance and splendor it is exposed to above. However, if the bodily neshomeh is tainted by sins, a barrier will develop between the two parts of the neshomeh. The essence of the neshomeh above longs to remain pure and unsullied by the sins of the body below; therefore, it will shun any relationship with its sullied partner below.

We now understand the potential benefits of being able to live in both worlds—like one who lives in a two-story house. The two halves of the neshomeh, living in their respective universes, would be free to interact at will and share in each other’s light. Unfortunately, the sin of the tree of knowledge created a fatal separation between these two entities. Although, they long to illuminate and unite with one another, their relationship has become a distant one. As things stand, the two half-forms of the neshomeh are only able to unite fully by means of death—when the earthbound neshomeh leaves its body and reunites with the essential neshomeh above.

Eliyahu Dwells in Both Worlds

Looking back now at the words of the Ohr HaChaim quoted above, we find, that in his view, Eliyahu hanavi merited this lofty ability—to dwell in both worlds like one who lives in a two-story house.

This understanding ties in wonderfully with the following Midrash: "אם יאמר לך אדם, [אפשר] שאלו לא חטא אדם הראשון ואכל מאותו העץ היה חי וקים לעולם, אמור לו אתה, כבר היה אליהו שלא חטא והוא חי וקים לעולם"—if someone says to you, had Adom harishon not sinned by eating from that tree, he would have been able to live forever; you should respond that, in fact, there was Eliyahu, who did not sin, and he does live on for all eternity. We learn from here, that Eliyahu hanavi is living testimony that had Adom harishon not partaken of the tree of knowledge, he would have lived forever. Based on what we have already established, Eliyahu does, indeed, dwell in both worlds and comes and goes as he pleases—akin to Adom harishon before the sin.

We can take this a step further, based on a teaching in the Zohar hakadosh (Vayakhel 197.) that Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai expounded on the possuk (Mishlei 30,4): "מי עלה שמים וירד"—who ascended to heaven and then came back down—is referring to Eliyahu. Nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai questions the logistics of Eliyahu’s coming and going, seeing as heaven does not tolerate even the tiniest amount of physicality.

RaShbY explains, therefore, that when Eliyahu goes up to heaven, he divests himself of his bodily clothing and leaves it in a designated place between heaven and earth; he then adorns himself in a spiritual attire so that he may ascend and comingle with the malachim. Conversely, when he returns to this world on a Heavenly mission, he divests himself of his spiritual attire, between heaven and earth, and he reclaims his pure, physical body so that he can comingle with human beings. This is the meaning of the statement: "מי עלה שמים וירד" - זה אליהו—no man other than Eliyahu has ascended to heaven in the form of an angel and then returned to earth in human form.

Once again, we have found clear evidence that Eliyahu dwells in both worlds and possesses both spiritual and physical attires which he dons as necessary and as is appropriate. This is truly akin to the state of Adom harishon before the sin who lived in both worlds—like someone living in a two-story house.

This, now, provides us with an answer to one of our original questions: where do we find in the Holy One’s promise to Pinchas—“Behold! I give him My covenant of peace”—an allusion to the fact that he will live on forever? The sin of the tree of knowledge created a separation and barrier between the two parts of the neshomeh; however, Pinchas, who is Eliyahu, merited to receive the covenant of peace from the Holy One, the unique ability to make peace and reunite the two half-forms of the neshomeh. By living in both worlds, able to go upstairs and downstairs at will like someone living in a two-story house, he is living in a state of Adom harishon before the sin; this is our clear proof that his existence is eternal.

He Shall Restore the Heart of Fathers to Children and the Heart of Children to Their Fathers

Continuing on this path, let us now try to understand how the promise: “Behold! I give him My covenant of peace,” also conveys the message that Pinchas, who is Eliyahu, will merit to herald the future redemption to Yisroel. We will begin by explaining what we have learned in the Mishnah (Ediyot 8,7):

"אמר רבי יהושע, מקובל אני מרבן יוחנן בן זכאי ששמע מרבו ורבו מרבו, הלכה למשה מסיני שאין אליהו בא לטמא ולטהר לרחק ולקרב, אלא לרחק המקורבין בזרוע ולקרב המרחקין בזרוע".

It was transmitted to Moshe at Sinai that Eliyahu will not come to clarify matters of tumah and taharah, impurity and purity, but, rather, to distance those that were not meant to come close and to reunite those that have become distant.

The Arizal teaches us an important principle (Sefer HaLikutim, Haazinu) concerning the future redemption; that redemption is dependent upon rectifying the sin of Adom harishon. This also explains why the decree of death will no longer be in effect, because the world will return to the state of Adom harishon before the sin.

It is easy to understand, now, why Hashem specifically chose Eliyahu hanavi to herald the future redemption to Yisroel, as it is written in the words of the prophet (Malachi 3,23): "הנה אנכי שולח לכם את אליהו הנביא לפני בוא יום ה' הגדול והנורא, והשיב לב אבות על בנים ולב בנים על אבותם"—“Behold, I send you Eliyahu hanavi, before the great and awesome day of Hashem; he shall restore the heart of fathers to children and the heart of children to their fathers.” Who better than Eliyahu hanavi—who merited to dwell in both worlds like someone living in a two-story house—to have the power and kedushah to positively influence Yisroel to also merit this two-world existence?!

We can now interpret the possuk as follows: the purpose of sending Eliyahu hanavi before the day of redemption is because “he shall restore the heart of fathers to children and the heart of children to their fathers”—“fathers” refers to the essential neshomehs that remained in heaven; whereas, the “children” represent the offshoots of the neshomehs that descended to this world in order to take on a bodily form. When Eliyahu arrives to announce the redemption: “he shall restore the heart of fathers to children”—by uniting the essential neshomehs, the fathers, with their offshoots, the children, who will provide the latter with their heavenly illumination—“and the heart of children to their fathers”—the offshoots of the neshomehs, the children, will illuminate the essential neshomehs, their fathers, with the light of their Torah and mitzvos.

We can now return to explain the Mishnah: It was transmitted to Moshe at Sinai that Eliyahu will not come to clarify matters of tumah and taharah, impurity and purity, but, rather, to distance those that were not meant to come close and to reunite those that have become distant. We can interpret this as reference to the sin of the tree of knowledge which was due in great part to the serpent becoming too close with Chava, i.e. those that were meant to remain at a distance came too close.

The Gemorah explains (Shabbos 146.): "שבשעה שבא נחש על חוה הטיל בה זוהמא"—this undesirable and inappropriate relationship between the serpent and Chava left a perverse stain that resulted in distancing those that were meant to remain close and in touch, i.e. the essential neshomeh above was forced to distance itself from its counterpart below, and Adom harishon was no longer able to dwell in both worlds like living in a two-story house.

The Mishnah teaches that Eliyahu will come and restore the proper order. In other words, he will reestablish the appropriate distance between the serpent and mankind—thus, rescinding the decree of death—and will help reunite the two parts of the neshomeh that became distant from one another due to the deceitful serpent. This was all part of Hashem’s promise to Pinchas: "הנני נותן לו את בריתי שלום"—Behold! I give him My covenant of peace—he will merit to bring peace to Yisroel and reunite the two parts of the neshomeh when he arrives to herald the future redemption. This will represent the fulfillment of the possuk: "והשיב לב אבות על בנים ולב בנים על אבותם"—“he shall restore the heart of the fathers to the children and the heart of the children to their fathers”—swiftly, in our days, Amen.

Chukas. Amram and Yocheved's Children, Whiskey, Worms, and Snakes

From the archive:


This week's post has two parts.  The first part discusses Amram and Yocheved's family.  The second part discusses the issur of Whiskey that was owned by a Jew on Pesach, and the issur of fish that contain Anisakis parasites.

PART I

Taanis 9a:  The "moving well" that provided water for the Jews in the desert was in the merit of Miriam; the clouds that protected them, in the merit of Aharon; and the Manna in the merit of Moshe. Miriam died, and the well disappeared, but it returned in the merit of the two remaining brothers.  Aron died, the clouds disappeared, but they returned in the merit of Moshe.  Moshe died, and all three disappeared, never to return to that generation.

ר' יוסי בר' יהודה אומר שלשה פרנסים טובים עמדו לישראל אלו הן משה ואהרן ומרים וג' מתנות טובות ניתנו על ידם ואלו הן באר וענן ומן באר בזכות מרים עמוד ענן בזכות אהרן מן בזכות משה מתה מרים נסתלק הבאר שנאמר (במדבר כ) ותמת שם מרים וכתיב בתריה ולא היה מים לעדה וחזרה בזכות שניהן מת אהרן נסתלקו ענני כבוד שנאמר (במדבר כא) וישמע הכנעני מלך ערד מה שמועה שמע שמע שמת אהרן ונסתלקו ענני כבוד וכסבור ניתנה לו רשות להלחם בישראל והיינו דכתיב (במדבר כ) ויראו כל העדה כי גוע אהרן אמר ר' אבהו אל תקרי ויראו אלא וייראו כדדריש ר"ל דאר"ל כי משמש בארבע לשונות אי דלמא אלא דהא חזרו שניהם בזכות משה מת משה נסתלקו כולן שנאמר (זכריה יא) ואכחיד את שלשת הרועים בירח אחד וכי בירח אחד מתו והלא מרים מתה בניסן ואהרן באב ומשה באדר אלא מלמד שנתבטלו ג' מתנות טובות שנתנו על ידן ונסתלקו כולן בירח אחד

Korach accused Moshe Rabbeinu of unilaterally allocating power and glory to himself and to his own family,  I hate to ask a question that might seem reminiscent of Korach's, but my question is actually very different.  I was wondering.  How is it that these three people, Moshe, Aharon, and Miriam, two brothers and a sister, were the ones in whose zechus the three staffs of life in the Midbar existed?  Yes, of course we know that Moshe Rabbeinu was unique.  But were there no others in that generation that equaled Aharon or Miriam?  Why, when Hashem told Moshe that he would be the instrument of Yetzias Mitzrayim, and Moshe tried to decline, did Moshe suggest that Aharon be chosen?  Why was Aharon the automatic alternative to Moshe Rabbeinu?  Was there nobody more qualified, or equally qualified?  Evidently, there were not. 

Obviously, the fact that Aharon and Miriam were singled out proves that they were uniquely qualified; that they, and they alone, were worthy to be Moshe Rabbeinu's peers.  As Rashi says in Shmos 4:10, Aharon was a navi for a long time in Mitzrayim before Moshe Rabbeinu was chosen by Hashem.  Miriam also was a nevi'ah, who said that the savior of Klal Yisrael would be born to her parents.  So the question is, how did it happen that the three greatest people of the generation were siblings?      Why did this greatness strike one family three times?

This is not a statistical anomaly, that the three greatest people of the generation just so happened to be brothers and sisters. Obviously, there was something about the family that generated these great people.  What special quality was it that manifested itself in these three great scions?  And in what respect were they so different?

As proof that the question is valid, see Yoma 47a.  There was a woman, Kimchis, who had seven sons that were Kohanim Gedolim.  The Gedolim of the time asked her what was it that she had done that manifested itself in having such great children, and she answered that she was very modest even when at home.  So the fact that Chazal asked her what she had done to merit such great children proves that this is a question that is worth asking.  And, by the way, the answer was not a generic "I was very holy."  Apparently, general holiness is not a good answer.  Chazal, and Kimchis, knew that there was some specific trait that laid the foundation of her great children.

Is it because Yishai, their father, was so holy?  He is (Bava Basra 17a) among the four people who died only because of the decree of human mortality, not because of any sin.  But what of the other three on the list?   The four are Binyamin, Amram, Yishai, and Kil'av.  OK, Yishai had chosheveh sons.  What do we know about the children of Binyamin?  Nothing, other than that were ten of them:  Bela, Becher, Ashbel, Geira, Naaman, Eichi, Rosh, Mupim, Chupim, and Ard.  But do we find that they were supremely gifted?  Were they unusually accomplished?  Not that I know.  And Kil'av?  We know zero about him, other than the fact that he didn't try to kill his father or seize the malchus.  In fact, the Chasam Sofer says that the reason we know so very little about these four great people is because they preserved their perfection by not engaging in everyday life with the community, which is not what the Ribono shel Olam wants (though obviously it's not a sin.)

I don't think we're looking for a superior trait, as the Gemara says about Kimchis, that she was unusually modest.  I think we're looking for something singular, something unique to Amram and/or Yocheved. 

I saw an interesting comment in a sefer called Ein Yaakov (from Reb Yaakov Karliner, author of Mishkenos Yaakov, who, if you don't recognize his Mishkenos Yaakov happens to be the Keren Orah's brother), here.  He brings from the Daas Zkainim in Parshas Pinchas on the passuk

וְשֵׁם אֵשֶׁת עַמְרָם יוֹכֶבֶד בַּת-לֵוִי אֲשֶׁר יָלְדָה אֹתָהּ לְלֵוִי בְּמִצְרָיִם וַתֵּלֶד לְעַמְרָם אֶת-אַהֲרֹן וְאֶת-מֹשֶׁה וְאֵת מִרְיָם אֲחֹתָם.

that Levi's wife's name was Ossah (despite the Mapik Hei,) and that is why it says Asher yaldah ossa le'levi be'Mitzrayim.  He explains that the name Ossah showed that this woman was an Os, Os Hashem, she was seen as an amazingly great woman.  Similarly, the name of Yocheved means she was honored with Godly gifts, kah kavod.  The passuk in Pinchas stresses the names of the mother and grandmother of Moshe, Aharon, and Miriam, to let us know that their singular gadlus stemmed from these great women.

But that doesn't really answer the question.  Great mother and grandmother.  And a great father too, no doubt.  But were they unique?  And in exactly what way were they so great?

Here's a pshat that directly addresses the question.  The answer given by the Mesilos Chaim, who develops something the Sforno said.  The Mesilos Chaim was written by Rav Chaim Elazary; he calls it a Mussar-oriented sefer of Drush:  here's his bio, with information from Reb Manny Saltiel here, with corrections and additions from a letter I received from Rabbi Elazary's grandson- whose son is named Chaim.

Rav Chaim Moshe Reuven Elazary was a student of the Slobodkeh Yeshiva, first in Europe and then in Chevron. He was in Chevron at the time of the massacre in 1929 (was saved by an Arab).  Rav Elazary's brothers, Rav Betzalel and Rav Yisrael, were among those murdered in the 1929 Chevron massacre.  He went to Yerushlayim with the rest of the yeshiva, got married in 1932 (the woman he married was born in the US, but went to Palestine in 1931 to look for a shidduch from the Chevron yeshiva), moved to the Bronx in 1936.  He began his rabbinic career there, and also taught at a yeshiva in Brooklyn.  He succeeded his father-in-law, Rav Ephraim Pelcovitz, as rabbi of Congregation Agudas Achim in Canton, Ohio in 1938 or 39.   (His father had been in Canton since 1914, and in 1929 moved to Bridgeport, Connecticut.) In 1972, Rav Elazary settled in Petach Tikva. He left numerous published and unpublished works and articles, many of them exhibiting the influence of Rav Nosson Zvi Finkel, the Alter of Slobodka.   

I'm copying his drasha from here on hebrewbooks.org, and I don't have the time or patience to fix the OCR and format errors.  Figure it out yourself. 

אלה ראשי בית אבתם וגוי  (Shemos, 6:14)

כתב הספורנו  ״בדין מנה את אלה שרים על ישראל, כי הם היו נכבדים מכל האומה, וזה, כי ראובן בכור ישראל ולא היו מצאצאיו אנשים ראוים להקרא בשם זולתי בניו הנזכר, שהיו מכלל ע׳ נפש שכבר מתו וכר, וכך היה מבני שמעון. אבל לוי שהאריך ימים על כולם גדל גם את בני בניו להבין ולהורות, וכן קהת ועמרם, באופן שיצאו מהם משה ואהרן ומרים״, הרי איפוא, שמה גרם להם לבני עמרם שיהיו נכבדים מכל האומה, זה שהיו קרובים יותר אל אבותיהם. ושורשו של דבר הוא,שהואיל ולפי התהליך הטבעי הדורות הולכים ומתמעטים. עד שחדל בדורותיהם כבר קבעו את הכלל *אם ראשונים בני מלאכים אנו בני אנשים ואם ראשונים בני אנשים אנו כחמורים״ וכוי (שבת קי׳׳ב, ע״ב) לפיכך כבל שמרבה האדם להכיר את הדורות הקודמים לו הריהו זוכה ממילא גם לראות מדרגות יותר נשגבות בפרישות וקדושה. וכמובן שעובדה זו מטביעה דושם על הנוכו והתנהגותו. משום כך, אי שהאריך ימים יתר על כל השבטים ובני בניו גדלו על ברכיו, בנגוד לאהיו שלא הספיקו לגדל אלא את בניהם בלבד, זכה עמרם בן בנו להעמיד את מנהיגי ישראל, משה, אהרן ומרים

The gist of his answer is that Levi outlived all his brothers, and raised his grandchildren, among whom was Amram.  It was this exposure to and education by this great man from an earlier generation that resulted in Amram raising his three great children, the leaders of their generation.  Our spiritual gifts, our relationship with Hashem, are rooted in our great ancestors.  Amram was raised to adulthood and educated by the last surviving son of Yaakov; he became, in a sense, the repository of the gadlus of Yaakov; and he gave over that heritage to his children.  .

Please note a very cool thing: The essence of this answer is very similar to the answer suggested by Anonymous, the first commenter:

Maybe it has to do with the fact that Amram married his aunt who was much older than he, for starters. This trait demonstrated by Amram of not using age as a factor when picking his wife merited the zechus of having such special children. Also considering that Yocheved was a daughter of Levi meant that the inherent kedusha of one of the original Shivtei Yisroel was present in his granchildren at yetzias Mitzrayim not diluted by further space between the doros. Yocheved saw the way Levi ran his household and passed it down directly to her children without dilution of time.
This shows the power of the influence of parents and grandparents on children, and the powerful effect they can have for good or bad.

Rabbi Elazary discusses Amram's close connection with the previous generations, and Anonymous mentioned the fact that Yocheved, having been born 'bein hachomos,' was not only a living memory of the generation of the twelve shvatim, she was an actual remnant of that generation- a connection even stronger than that of Amram!  The two teirutzim work together much more effectively than each one alone: after all, Yocheved was not unique, there was also Serach bas Asher; Amram was not unique, there were all the other grandchildren of Levi.  BUT!  This family was unique in that both parents, both Amram and Yocheved, were raised and educated by Levi himself.  Coincidentally, or not coincidentally, Mr. Anonymous was raised fifty years later than and fifty miles north of Rabbi Elazary's rabbanus.

To better understand this teretz, another point is important.
R’ Chaim Shmuelevitz says (Sichos Mussar, #40, pages 169-170) that when Chazal say "Ke'Shmuel bedoro kach Yiftach be'doro," the pshat is not that we have no choice because the earlier gedolim are not available. The pshat in tosfos in R”h that says “ein lecha shofeit she’hayah b’yamecha” is he is the right one for you. Then he brings from Koheles Rabbah 1:4:4 that if Aharon lived in the time of Yehoyadah and Tzadok, they would have been greater than Aharon– because for that generation Yehoyadah would have been more fitting. Then he brings the story of Choni in Taynis 23a, and asks, why didn’t Choni show them his gadlus in Torah? The answer is that his pshotim and teirutzim would not have made sense to them. (ahd kahn R' Shmuelevitz.)

The superior leaders are those who incorporate the spiritual level of the previous generation in a form and a language that is intelligible to the new generation. Yes, the Navi Shmuel himself would have been a failure as a leaderin the generation of Yiftach; but a man of Shmuel's stature, who could understand the people of Yiftach's generation, and could talk to them in their language, would have been the greatest possible leader.
An excellentcomment from Rav Yehudah  Oppenheimer. -The Rambam in his Hakdama goes through the 40 doros from Moshe until Rav Ashi. After Hillel goes Reb Yochanan Ben Zakai, despite the fact that he was the smallest of Hillel's Talmidim. Perhaps the greater ones were unable to bring the Torah down to the level of the next dor.

Another connection to this week's parsha:  In the war against Og, the king of Bashan, it says that Moshe Rabbeinu was afraid.  Rashi explains that he was afraid that Og had a zechus, as it says "Vayavo hapalit," that the refugee from the battle came to Avraham to tell him that his nephew, Lot, had been captured.  The simple meaning of the Rashi is that Og had done a favor for Avraham, and this was a zechus.  But Chazal do say that Og's intention was to kill Avraham, or to have Avraham die in the battle he would join, so that Og could take Sarah for a wife.  Some favor!  What kind of zechus is this?  But we can say pshat a little different (based on the Gemara in Chagiga 5a about the zechus of seeing tzadikim.)  Og was the last man on earth that saw Avraham Avinu.  That alone was a fantastic zechus.  It was this zechus that frightened Moshe Rabbeinu.  Similarly, the Gemara in Bava Basra 121b says that seven people spanned all of history: Adam was seen by Mesuselach, who was seen by Shem, who was seen by Yaakov, who was seen by Amram, who was seen by Achiyah Hashiloni, who was seen by Eliahu, who is still alive.  Amram was the last man to have seen Yaakov, and that is a great zechus.

Tangentially, I say that having such great parents certainly can lead to extraordinary achievement, with a caveat.  Obviously, there are no guarantees.  Amram was not the only grandchild that Levi raised, and Moshe, Aharon and Miriam were not his only great-grandchildren; but they apparently absorbed the lessons better than the others.  It is not easy for a young tree to grow in the shade of a great oak; the ones that attempt to grow on their own and outdo the towering oak remain stunted and resentful.  The smart ones graft their root system into that of the great oak from which they descended, and not only are they not stunted by their great predecessor, they are doubly well-rooted and doubly well-nourished.


PART II
Since I mentioned the Mishkenos Yaakov:
There has been an uncontroverted declaration by the umbrella organization comprising the heads of all the respected Hashgacha organizations in the United States to this effect:  Since whiskey that was owned by a Jew on Pesach is assur, the products of any whisky companies and distributers that are Jewish and who don't sell their Chametz, are forever assur.  This includes Pappy Van Winkle since 2003. 

I am not a drinker, so I don't personally care about this tempest.  But as Pastor Niemöller said, "They came first for the Romaine lettuce, and I didn't speak up because you can check Romaine lettuce once a year, no big deal.  Then they came for the brocolli, and I didn't speak up because I can do without brocolli.  Then they came for the strawberries, and I didn't speak up because I can eat frozen strawberries.  Then they came for water, and I didn't speak up because there's always whiskey.  But then they came for the whiskey, and my throat was too dry to speak up."

So I'll have you know that while we must all respect and follow our poskim and Hashgacha organizations, there are very chashuveh poskim that hold like the Mishkenos Yaakov in YD 34, that learns in the Rivash that Zei'ah is not really assur outside the case of Yayin, and even though the Mishkenos Yaakov is machmir unless its a hefsed merubah, there are very chashuveh poskim that apply his hetter to all cases of whiskey that is Chametz she'avar alav hapesach, because the Torah requires a limud to prohibit ta'aroves on Pesach itself.

I'm not telling you who the matirim are, because the vast majority of past and current poskim hold that whiskey is prohibited if avar alav hapesach.  Also, it's important to follow our community leaders and support our Hashgacha organizations, which benefit us in so many ways.  I'm certainly not belittling the great poskim who hold that this is problematic.  But it's important to know that America was not discovered yesterday, and that earlier poskim were perfectly aware of the issue - and were mattir. 

Same thing with the anisakis business.  As Rabbi Belsky said, there is a mesora to be mattir in all cases, and the earlier poskim were well aware of the issues, and were mattir based on the invisibility of the parasites when ingested by the kosher fish.

Let's put it this way:  if you are machmir on whiskey and wild salmon without direct instruction from your poseik, you are transgressing a serious issur- not the issur of chametz and shratzim, but instead the issur of Poretz Geder through zilzul talmidei chachamim.  What do Chazal say about Poretz Geder?  And with that, we bring this post back to this week's parsha, which talks of the plague of poisonous snakes-

Poretz Geder Yishchenu Nachash.  (Koheles 10:8, as applied in Shulchan Aruch OC 410:11.)

~~ ~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~ ~~~~

Korach, Bamidbar 17:5. Good Tzara'as, Bad Tzara'as

As always, readers are invited to send me something good they've said.  Three requirements:
1. Originality in whole or in part.

2. Consistency with the style of this website, which means it can be pshat, remez, drush, lomdus, or narishkeit, but I have to like it.

3. That the person who sends it would not be offended by rejection.

~~~~~~~~~~~

Synopsis:  Although Tzara'as is a spiritual disease, its symptoms symbolize brilliance and superiority.

Rashi in 17:5 says that one who disputes the status of the Kohanim deserves to be stricken with Tzara'as, just as Moshe Rabbeinu's hand was covered with Tzara'as when he doubted the faith of Klal Yisrael in Mitzrayim.

In Sanhedrin 101b, there is a very strange Gemara.

תנו רבנן שלשה ניבטו ולא ראו ואלו הן נבט ואחיתופל ואיצטגניני פרעה נבט ראה אש שיוצאת מאמתו הוא סבר איהו מליך ולא היא ירבעם הוא דנפק מיניה אחיתופל ראה צרעת שזרחה לו על אמתו הוא סבר איהו מלך ולא היא בת שבע בתו הוא דנפקא מינה שלמה איצטגניני פרעה דאמר רבי חמא ברבי חנינא מאי דכתיב (במדבר כ) המה מי מריבה המה שראו איצטגניני פרעה וטעו ראו שמושיען של ישראל במים הוא לוקה אמר (שמות א) כל הבן הילוד היאורה תשליכוהו והן לא ידעו שעל עסקי מי מריבה לוקה

The Gemara says that Achitophel, among others, saw a vision, and the vision had truth to it, but he misunderstood what he saw.  He saw, in a dream, that his male organ developed Tzara'as, and he understood this to mean that he would become king.  He was wrong, though.  Although it did certainly mean that royalty would come from him, it was actually only through his granddaughter, Bas Sheva, (Bas Sheva's father, Eliam, was Achitophel's son,) and his great-grandson, Shlomo, that he was connected to royalty.

This Gemara is very strange.  A normal man that dreamed that his genital organ became diseased with Tzara'as would not wake up convinced that he would be king.  He would wake up

in wide-eyed horror.  It's a nightmare, not a besura tova.  But Achitophel was right!  It was a besura tova!  The dream truly meant that royalty was destined for him, though only through his grandchildren.  What on earth does Tzara'as have to do with gaining royalty?  I saw pshatim in this Gemara, and I'm not bowled over by any of them.  And I'm not interested in Freud's analysis of opposites in his Interpretation of Dreams, and neither were Ravina or Rav Ashi, and neither was Achitophel, thank you.

I believe that our error stems from the assumption that Tzaraas is a stigma, a mark of disgrace and disease.  It may be, however, that Tzaraas, being a bright white mark, is actually a sign of eminence, of superiority.  The word for the brightest of the marks is "Ahz ka'sheleg," a shocking white.  The word "ahz" means brazen; but that's only when applied to a human being.  But when applied to Hashem, it is a praise: Az venora.  A ba'al lashon hara has a superiority complex: he's convinced that only he matters, and that nobody else matters, and he maligns others in order to support his delusion- "I'm better than you because you're worse than me."  The fact that Tzaraas results in expulsion and isolation and tuma is only true where it signifies that the person claimed to be a great man, but he actually is not.  The mark of Tzaraas would then mean that he wrongfully tried to wear the crown of greatness when in fact he is the opposite, that he thinks that he is a great philanthropist but in fact is a stingy and hateful person, or that he's convinced that he is more important than anyone else, while in fact he is no better than others.  In other words, Tzara'as is a gruesome irony: it is an ironic symbol of his delusion.  In the ancient world, it was common to disgrace a condemned political prisoner by placing a symbol of what he attempted to achieve on him- for example, a crude crown.  Tzara'as is a disease and a stigma, but only because it occurs to highlight the disgraceful incongruity of the person's delusional self-image.

If, however, the mark appears on a person who is truly a good and great man, a man who is not a baal lashon hara or stinginess, then on the contrary, it might be a symbol of royalty.  

Let's put it slightly differently: There are two dinim in Tzara'as.  There's the symptom and the disease, the siman and the siba.  The underlying disease is horrible, but the symptom of the disease, the bright white mark, is not.  It's like fever.  Fever itself, unless its above 105 F/40.5 C when it cooks your brains, is not necessarily a bad thing.  The problem is only when the fever indicates that some internal process, an infection or a reaction, is ravaging the body.  While Tzara'as is a disease, that's only in the actual experience of Tzara'as.  But in a dream, the primary symbolism of Tzara'as is a mark of superiority, not an ironic mockery.  If you only see the siman, the symptom, it means something very different.

Achitophel, as we know, was a very great man.  He was among our greatest Talmidei Chachamim, and the Navi says that asking Achitophel for for advice was like asking Hashem Himself.  He believed, and he was correct in his belief, that the Tzaraas that he saw in his dream was a sign that he was destined for royalty.

Similarly, anyone that denies the high status granted to the Kohanim is claiming that he is equally entitled to that high status, that he is as good as they are, as Korach did.  Such a person is marked with Tzara'as- the metaphysical disease that manifests with the appearance of the bright white badge of superiority.

Chaim B. points out that this approach helps us to understand Chazal's statement in Yevamos 47b "קשים גרים לישראל כספחת" converts are as hard for Klal Yisrael as Sapachas, a form of Tzara'as.  The rishonim interpret this statement in diametrically different ways.  On the basis of the Gemara in Sanhedrin 102b, and according to our approach, a sapachas indeed is something that can be interpreted in diametrically different ways; either that some geirim bring cultural traits from before their Geirus, which is bad, or that they outshine us in their brave dedication to the Torah, and shame us by comparison.  This is a perfect analogy to our interpretation of the mark of Tzara'as.

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Shlach, Bamidbar 14:34. Yom Le'Shana- A Year of Exile for each Day.

great unknown once told me a vort, which he heard in Ner Israel when it was still on Garrison Boulevard, which means many, many years ago.  I have since seen it attributed to Reb Eizikel Charif.

It says here that the punishment was “yom leshana,” a year of wandering in the desert for each day that the spies were in the Land of Israel  (14:34).  The Meraglim were in Israel forty days, so they were doomed to wander in the desert for forty years.  (Rashi in 14:33 explains that even though the Meraglim event was in year 2, the 40 was counted from the Eigel, in year one, and the partial year after the Eigel counted as year one.) Now, Klal Yisrael left Mitzrayim on the 15th of Nissan, and went into Eretz Yisroel on the 10th of Nissan, which means that they weren’t in the desert a whole 40 years, but were given 4 days off. Also, even if they had gone straight from Mitzrayim to Eretz Yisroel, it would have taken them 11 days, so those eleven days have to be subtracted.  The net result is that they got 15 days off of the forty year sentence.  Why?

The passuk in 13:3, talking about the Meraglim as they began their mission, describes them as "Anashim."  Rashi says that Anashim in Tanach expresses chashivus, social prominence and spiritual eminence.  Considering what soon transpired, this is a surprising way to describe the Meraglim.  Rashi, therefore, explains that Be'osa Sha'a, kesheirim hayu- at that hour, the first hour of their mission, they were kasher, they were upstanding and good. 

And with this, he said, we can answer the question:  If the punishment was “yom lashana”, 24 hours equals 12 months, two hours equals one month, and one hour equals half a month.  Since “be’osah sha’ah kesheirim hayu,” that one hour’s worth, fifteen days, was subtracted.

Who, you wonder, was Reb Eizikel, or Isaac'l, Charif?  My father Zatzal, who spent the majority of the waking hours of his life either learning or helping Talmidei Chachamim, loved to say things he heard in Reb Aizikel's name.  (Charif is pronounced with a patach, not a kametz, and it's mi'le'eil, not like the hot pepper sauce.  Cha' rif.)  The problem is that there were two people that were called that.

• There was the Rav of Pietrekov.  His name was Yitzchak Charif.  You can see a little sefer of his ksavim here, printed by his grandson in 1940, and, according to the grandson's introduction, having been written around one hundred years before he printed it.  The copy linked to was photographed from the Lubavitcher library; also see the haskama from Rav Sonnenfeld, (in which he refers to the author as Reb Yitzchak'l Charif) next to Rav Kook's haskama.  It reminded me that Rav Kook's kever on Har Hamenuchos is right next to or one away from that of Amram Bloi, not that chas veshalom I'm comparing any two people in this paragraph to each other.
• And there was this Reb Izele Charif, whose family name wasn't Charif, but the adjective was so appropriate that it became his name anyway:  (From Shlomo Katz's Hamaayan on Torah.org) R' Yehoshua Isaac Shapiro z"l
  ("Reb Eizel Charif") R' Eizel was born in 1801 in Glubki, near Vilna, and his first teacher was his father, R' Yechiel. R' Eizel was a child prodigy whose genius was recognized by the age of seven, and he was soon nicknamed, "The Iron Head" (presumably because he never forgot what he learned). He later earned the nickname "Charif" / "The Sharp One," although he claimed, in his humility, that it was only an acronym of "Chatan Reb Yitzchak Fein" / "son-in-law of R' Yitzchak Fein."
  
  At one point, R' Eizel was a disciple of the chassidic rebbe, R' Aharon of Staroselya (a leading disciple of Chabad's founder, R' Shneur Zalman), but he later became a critic of chassidut. He also studied in the famed Blumke's kloiz in Minsk, where, it is said, he used to review the entire Talmud every month. In 1832, R' Eizel was appointed rosh yeshiva and darshan / preacher in Minsk's Kloiz Chevra Kadisha.
  
  R' Eizel received semichah / ordination from R' Abale, the av bet din / chief rabbinical judge of Vilna, and through the latter's recommendation was appointed a dayan / rabbinical judge in Kalvaria, Lithuania. After 1839, he held rabbinic positions in Kutna and Tiktin.
  In 1853, R' Eizel was appointed rabbi of Slonim, the town with which he his associated for posterity. In every town where he served, R' Eizel somehow found time, despite his superhuman schedule of learning and writing, to engage in numerous communal and charitable activities. In addition, many dinei Torah / legal disputes were brought to R' Eizel for resolution, and he was one of the three judges appointed to rule on the dispute involving the leadership of the Volozhin Yeshiva.
  R' Eizel's nickname, "Charif," alludes in part to his sharp sense of humor, which he readily used to humble those who he felt needed humbling and to criticize those whose scholarship was not up to par with the standard that he expected of Torah leaders. (Chassidic rebbes were frequent subjects of his witticisms.) In particular, R' Eizel was adept at making puns or plays on the words of verses and Talmudic statements.
  R' Eizel died in 1873, leaving 11 works including Emek Yehoshua, Nachalat Yehoshua and a commentary on the Jerusalem Talmud, Noam Yerushalmi. Many of his derashot are in the style of the 18th century Parashat Derachim, explaining midrashic stories and actions of biblical figures in halachic terms. All exhibit a wide-ranging knowledge of halachah, midrash and Tanach. 

     I once had the pleasure of hosting the Gadol Batorah Rabbi Yankel Drillman.  He told me another thing from Reb Aizikel.  Someone brought Reb Aizekel a sefer for a haskama, and he refused.  The shliach kept insisting, and said, "But this Rebbe and that Rebbe gave me haskamos, why won’t you?"  Reb Aizikel answered, as a Litvak would, that “Onu maskimim, ve’heim maskimim.  Onu maskimim ledivrei torah, ve’heim maskimim lidvorim be'teilim."

If  you have something from Reb Aizikel, I would love to hear it.

Another story about a haskama.  Late one night, Reb Eizekel's rebbetzin heard him pacing back and forth, muttering under his breath.  She went into the room, and heard that he was saying "Besser unter der barg! Besser unter der barg!"  "Reb Eizekel," she said, "what do you mean by that?"  He answered "Reb Ploni left me a sefer because he wanted a haskama from me.  I went through his sefer, and I remembered that when Hashem picked up the mountain and told Bnei Yisrael that if they accept the Torah, then fine, but if they don't, He will drop the mountain on them and they would be buried there.  And I say, if this is the Torah, then Besser unter der barg!"
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