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Tuesday, August 23, 2011

Re'ey, Devarim 12:3-4. Erasing Hashem's Written Name

 It is assur to erase or obliterate any of the seven primary names we use for Hashem.  This halacha is stated in YD 176:8, and in the Rambam 6 Yesodei Hatorah 1.  The words of the Rambam are:

כל המאבד שם מן השמות הקדושים הטהורים שנקרא בהן הקדוש ברוך הוא, לוקה מן התורה--שהרי הוא אומר בעבודה זרה, ואיבדתם את שמם . . . לא תעשון כן לה' אלוקיכם

The source of the issur is the passuk in our parsha, "you shall destroy their names (of the pagan gods); you shall not do so to Hashem your G-d."

My son, a Rov and Rosh Kollel, mentioned that one of the members of his community is a jeweler who has for many years bought and sold scrap gold.  Several years ago, he asked whether there was a problem melting down those pieces that have Hashem's name on them.  My son told him doing so might be assur on the basis of our passuk.  Since then, he has accumulated a significant amount of gold that he cannot melt down.  On the one hand, it has quadrupled in value since he acquired it.  On the other hand, if he cannot melt it down, it is of no value to him at all.  Assuming these shaimos have kedusha, he does not have the option of recycling the pieces into new jewelry that incorporates the old pieces, because the Kedushas Hashem precludes such use.  We don't use Hashem's name as an ornament.  (I once saw a non-Jewish man- nice looking fellow, with a wife and two blond kids- at a highway rest stop in Kentucky, with a tattoo of the YKVK on his inner forearm in giant blue letters, from wrist to elbow.  He didn't even know what the names of the letters were, only that this is how the Jews write G-d's name.  It could have been worse.)

My son did not state for a fact that it was assur, only that it might be assur.  He had not yet made a careful analysis of the sugya, and in any case such a question ought to be addressed by a widely recognized and experienced posek of the highest caliber.  Under the circumstances of a possible issur de'oraysa, caution is not only prudent but legally required.  (Note, also, that Reb Moshe says in a teshuva that this issur is uniquely strict in that it is not mitigated by a countervailing Assei: we do not say Assei docheh lo saaseh by lo saasun kein.)

This question raises three issues that need to be examined sequentially.
1. Assuming that erasing is assur, is Grama (indirect destruction) muttar.
2. If the person who made the name was unaware of its meaning, is it assur to erase it.
3. Assuming that a name written without awareness is muttar to erase, and assuming that most are written by non-speakers of Hebrew and are therefore muttar to melt down, but some were written knowingly, do we go bassar Rove, do we rely on the majority to allow melting all of them.

Issue one: Grama

Assuming it is assur to erase the word, is it muttar to do so indirectly, by means of a Grama?  The Aruch Hashulchan decides that Gramma is not an option.  The following is the relevant section of the Aruch Hashulchan  (276:36-7):

סעיף לו

ודע דבשבת (קכ ב) אמרינן דגרמא במחיקת השם מותר, מדכתיב: "לא תעשון כן לה' אלקיכם" – עשייה הוא דאסור, הא גרמא – שרי. ולכן אם היה שם כתוב על בשרו, ונזדמנה לו טבילה של מצוה – יורד וטובל אף על פי שהשם יתמחק, עיין שם. והרמב"ם הביא זה בפרק ששי מיסודי התורה, עיין שם.
ותמיהני על הטור ושולחן ערוך שלא הביאו דין זה בשום מקום, והרי אין מי שחולק על זה? ויראה לי דהדין עמם, דהך דינא לא משכחת לה רק בהדין הנזכר, ודבר זה לא שכיח כלל. אבל בעניין אחר לא משכחת לה, דזהו וודאי לגרום הגרמא, כגון להעמיד מים סמוך לה כדי שתשפוך על השם ותמחקנו – פשיטא שאסור, דזהו גופה עשייה גמורה היא. ולכן גם הש"ס לא צייר דין זה רק בטבילה, כמו שכתבתי.

(I want to point out that this mehalach of the Aruch Hashulchan forms the basis of Reb Moshe's teshuva, which was argued against by many, in OC 4 8:2.  Not that Reb Moshe needs support against the individuals that argued with him, but there it is anyway.)

סעיף לז

ולפי זה ברירא לי במקום שיש טעות ואי אפשר למחוק השם לפי הדינים שנתבארו – אסור גם לעשות גרמא להמחיקה. וכתבתי זה לפי שראיתי לגדול אחד שהתיר לעשות גרמא למחיקת השם (עיין פתחי תשובה סעיף קטן י"ט בשם הב"א). ולדעתי איסור גדול הוא, וחלילה לעשות כן.
ומצאתי לגדול אחד שעמד על השמטת הטור ושולחן ערוך דין זה, וכתב משום דאמרינן במגילה (כו ב):
ספר תורה שבלה – נותנין אותה בכלי חרס, וקוברין אותו אצל תלמיד חכם.
ומדלא התירו רק בכלי חרס למען יעמוד ימים רבים, ולא התירו בלא זה שהיה נמחק מיד – שמע מינה דלית הלכתא כהך דשבת, וגרמא נמי אסור (נודע ביהודה תנינא, חלק אורח חיים, סימן י"ז "מבנו").
ודברים תמוהים הם, שהרי הרמב"ם פסקם להשני דינים, ומבואר להדיא שאין סותרין זה את זה. ולפי מה שכתבתי לא קשיא כלל. ולכן בלא כלי חרס – הרי הוא עושה הגרמא, ואסור כמו שכתבתי.

See the comments regarding the teshuva he brings from the Noda B'Yehuda's son and the numerous problems with that teshuva.  My dear friend and Rebbi, Rabbi Moshe Brown, in his sefer Maadanei Moshe, on page 263, also distinguishes, as does Eli in the comments, between a Sefer Torah and other sheimos.


Issue Two: What makes a name a Name?

Certainly, if a Jeweler had hand-made this jewelry, and he knew what he was writing, there would be an insuperable problem.  The question is in a case where the jewelry was stamped out or otherwise fabricated by a person that had no idea what the letters mean, and for whom the jewelry had no more significance than a random design.  I don't know this for a fact, but I am assuming that the final step of the manufacture of most jewelry of this sort is done in China or India, or in any case by people who have no idea at all what they are doing.


There is a Tashbeitz brought by the Beis Yosef that indicates we are meikil in such a case. תשב"ץ ח"א קעז; סמ"ק ק"ס, הובאו בב"י בד"ה רעו, ט

However, the Shach in 276:12 says that one may only apply this hetter when doing so enables you to fix a sefer torah (under the logic of net benefit, that mekalkel al menas l'saken is called a tikun), implying that it would be assur for mere monetary benefit.  (I believe that this logic underlies the Aruch Hashulchan's argument as brought above.)

But I found that the Noda B'Yehuda YD II 180 is mattir be'feirush in precisely such a case, because the person who did the stamping knew nothing about what the letters meant.   Also, the Chazon Ish (YD 162:3) says that where the person did not even know that he was writing a name, and certainly did not know he was writing Hashem's name, it is muttar to erase it.  The Satmerer Rov was also mattir in a pre-war letter printed in the Satmerer journal Olas Hachodesh of Chodesh Av Tof Shim Mem beginning on page 529.

Yes, some poskim disagree with the Noda B'Yehuda, but since I'm not paskening for anyone here, I can tell you that in my opinion they don't really matter.  The svara is pashut- it's no different than the letters אל; if you wrote it to mean "to," you certainly can erase it.  Harav Chaim Medini didn't have any problem with the שדי in his שדי חמד.  (A lamden might argue that those cases are different because they gave the words a different meaning, whereas in our case, it was Stam, neutral, and maybe neutral is more of a problem.  I don't agree with that, and why I don't agree is a whole different discussion, involving the Machane Efraim's hagahos on the Tur about how a Sheim acquires kedusha- awareness or intent, and the Raavad brought in the Ran in Nedarim that says that the Kedusha of a Sheim is a davar hanadur, and the Kli Chemda in this week's parsha that says that according to the Raavad, you can be shoeil on the Kedusha of a Sheim, but the teshuvos at the end of the Avnei Miluim #18 says that being shoeil on the kedusha of a sheimis just as bad as mechikah, and the Asvan De'Oraysa #15 (P 27b) that argues on the Avnei Miluim.  In any case, if you say that according to the Raavad you can be sho'eil, that means that Stam is zero, because she'eila won't make it kavana misnagedes.)

Also, I happened to speak to Reb Shmuel Kaminetsky about this the other day, and he stated his strong agreement with the Chazon Ish, although he said the hetter would not apply by pesukim from Tanach (like the hundred Shekel note).  This was before I saw the Noda B'Yehuda, and I thought the Chazon Ish was a sole mattir.

I later saw that Reb Shmuel's distinction was made by Reb Moshe in OC 4 8:1, by the Achiezer 2 48:2, and others, as I mention in the comments. 

Issue Three: Rove

Assuming that an unwittingly written Sheim is not Sheimos, what if some of these pieces of jewelry were made by individuals who knew they were writing G-d's name, but most were written without knowledge?  Can we rely on the Rove and melt the whole bunch down?  Although in general we go bassar rove, that may not be the case by a davar chashuv or by issurei hanaah.

I would respond that while this would be a problem in Taaroves, it is not a problem in cases of Kol Deparish.  My son said even a better reason it's not a problem:  because a Sheim is not assur b'hanaah.  I had postulated it was assur b'hanaa because the Gemara says that a utensil that has Hashem's name on it is assur to use, which , to me, sounded like issur hanaah.  But he said that It's just assur to use it because of zilzul.  That is not the same as something which is inherently assur b'hanaah, and there's no reason to think it's not batteil b'rov.

I know that this too brief.  If I have time I'll expand it.  But the bottom line is that if it's unwittin', it can be unwritten.

Dear Eli has sent me a very valuable mar'eh makom, as follows:

Following the footsteps of R. Akiva (Kerisus 15):

I came across Chavos Yair (http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=857&st=&pgnum=44 middle of left col. brought by Mishna Berura OC 334,52) which is relevant to your discussion:

"ולפי זה במטבעות שנטבעין במדינות שוודין בשם של ד' אותיות היה צ"ע, ומ"מ נראה שמותרים הם כי נטבעו להוציאם והוה ליה ככתיבת השם בפירוש לשם חול"

So, even though the manufacturer knows the letters mean a Sheim, still it's considered Chol when done with the purpose of Chol usage.

I was surprised to learn 17th century Swedish coins had Shem of daled osios. Here is one such coin:
located here.


Post Script:
Circumstances under which Mechika would be allowed.

The Chasam Sofer in the last volume of the Teshuvos (#8) was asked about a case where a Rasha attached a Sheim Hashem to a place where it would disgrace the sheim.  He paskens that the issur is to cause disgrace by erasing; therefore, where erasing would prevent a greater disgrace, it is muttar to erase it.  See here.
The awesome aspect of this teshuva is the very end, where he says that you can't have a child do it, because without intent to prevent disgrace, the act of erasure is inherently disgraceful.  Since the intent of a child is not recognized by the halacha, his erasure would be an erasure without intent of preventing disgrace, which would be an issur de'oraysa.

Monday, August 22, 2011

Shelo Asani Ishah. An honest and articulate analysis by Rabbi Aryeh Frimer.

The Bracha of Shelo Asani Isha has elicited a range of reactions even among the Orthodox.  While it is obvious that the bracha refers to the male's obligation of more mitvos, its negative phrasing and its placement after goy and aved can be perceived as dismissive and belittling, and can make it uncomfortable to be in shul when an isha chashuva is behind the mechitza.


I saw this posted on another website, signed Rabbi Aryeh Frimer.  I cannot vouch for the authenticity of its authorship, but it conforms with his high standard of discourse, as I have personally experienced, for example, when he attended my daf yomi either fourteen or twenty one years ago.   Rabbi Frimer has written extensively on issues of Women and Tefilla, and I had the privilege of pointing out to him the Rosh in Brachos (seventh perek siman 20 and see Ma'adanei Yomtov if you can't figure it out yourself) that ties tziruf to a minyan to Bris Mila. UPDATE: Rabbi Dr. Frimer verified his authorship by personal communication.


I would like to make it clear that there is no doubt as to the authenticity of the text of the benediction she-lo asani isha─since it appears thrice in Rabbinic literature: in the Tosefta, the Talmud Bavli and the Yerushalmi. (B.T. Menahot 43b; J.T. Berakhot 9:1; and Tosefta Berakhot 6:18) Both the Tosefta and the Yerushalmi make it clear that the benediction is related strictly to men’s greater obligation in commandments. As is well known, women are generally freed from mitsvot asei she-ha-zeman gramman (time-determined positive commandments), which include, inter alia: sukka, lulav, shofar, tefillin and tsitsit. (See: Mishna Kiddushin 1:7; Tosefta Kiddushin 1:10; Talmud Kiddushin 29a, and Kiddushin 33b and ff) Reams have been written to explain the import of these benedictions and why they are in the negative. (“Birkot haShahar,” Encyclopedia Talmudit, IV, p. 371ff; Joseph Tabory, “The Benediction of Self-Identity and The Changing Status of Women and of Orthodoxy,” Kenishta, 1 (2001), pp. 107-138). I would like, however, to cite the comments of R. Reuven Margaliyyot (Nitsotsei Or, Menahot 43b, s.v. Rabbi Meir Omer), which I personally find very satisfying.
…A woman is not punished if she does not fulfill time-determined positive commandments, and her share in the World to Come is like that of a man. Hence, there might well be room for a male Jew to think that it might have been better had he been born a woman, for then he would have been freed from the yoke of these commandments. Hence, [the Rabbis] established that each male should make a daily declaration that these mitsvot are not a burden.
A similar approach appears in the writings of the 18th Century Talmudist R. Samuel Eidels (Maharsha Hiddushei Aggadot, Menahot 43b. See also Chabakuk Elisha, “Shelo Asani Isha,” A Simple Jew Blog, September 12, 2008, available online at: http://tinyurl.com/343e2g5) who writes:
…[A male makes this benediction because the role] of a man and a woman are each lenient on the one hand and stringent on the other. For if they are righteous, the reward of the male is greater, because he is commanded in more mitsvot than a woman. However, if they are not righteous, the man’s punishment is greater than a woman’s.
These scholars note that one who has greater obligation has greater potential for reward, but also for greater possible punishment should he or she not do as required. Thus, a man who doesn’t put on tefillin or sit in the Sukka is punished for bittul aseh─for not fulfilling the positive commandment he was bidden to obey. Hence, the Rabbis ordained that each day, each of us acknowledge that, mutatis mutandis, the Creator could have made us a non-Jew, or a slave, or a woman with fewer obligations, but also fewer risks. Yet, the Almighty chose not to. By reciting the daily identity berakhot “sheLo asani goy; sheLo asani aved; sheLo asani isha” each of us accepts upon ourselves the spiritual/religious role that we have been given. The “she-lo” is to be understood as “Who has not,” a sober acknowledgement and acceptance of a spiritual role, not a celebrative “because He has not.”
R. Nissim Alpert suggests a insightful rationale as to why these berakhot are formulated in the negative. Hazal wanted to communicate to us that the Creator only gives us the opportunity – He defines who we are not; it is up to us to define who we are and maximize our positive potential. (R. Joel Rich, personal communication (January 2011); see also comments to http://tinyurl.com/6l3ojup) Interestingly, the same idea appears in the writings of 19th century R. Zadok haKohen (R. Zaddok haKohen Rabinowitz of Lublin, Pri Tsaddik, vaYikra, Parashat Emor, sec. 7, s.v. “veAhar kakh.”).
And the reason one should not recite “who has made me an Israelite” is that man functions with freedom of choice, and one can be called an Israelite only if he chooses properly. And who can be sure that he/she will chose correctly? Hence, we can only recite the benedictions “who has not made me a non-Jew or a slave.” But, nevertheless, one has the choice to chose [whether to do these mitsvot] because he is not a non-Jew or a slave. The same is true for “who has not made me a woman” – it is in his choice to fulfill or not fulfill those mitsvot that stem from men’s greater mitsva obligation.
Many have waved this all off as “apologetics”. I guess one man’s apologetics is another’s honest explanation. The only authoritative guideline is the one given us by the Tosefta and the Yerushalmi─namely, that this bendiction relates to the fewer number of specific mitsvot in which women are obligated. Rabbi Kanefsky has chosen to interpret the berakha in a way which creates a problem and casts aspersions on Hazal. To my mind, it is far better to understand it so no problem begins!
The Berakhot are not Triumphal thanks – more like the acknowledgement of Barukh Dayan haEmet!

Aryeh Frimer

The remarks that came in have turned out to just as important as the original post and are herewith incorporated. 

Daniel's comment:

I don't understand why it's not crystal clear that the Torah holds a man's existence is greater than that of a woman's from the following:

a) Horayot 3:7 האיש קודם לאישה להחיות, ולהשיב אבידה.

b) the parashiot of Arachin

among a host of other related examples... 


Devorah's comment:

I think the Torah holds that a woman's existence is greater than that of a man, and the blessing "Shelo asani ishah" was wisely added as a feelgood moment for males, to give them the impression that they are indeed fortunate and in control... when any thinking person knows that it's really a smart woman who guides her man along the right path...


great unknown's comment:

a) Daniel: not "a man's existence is greater", but rather, a man's potential to do mitzvot is greater.

Arachin is not related to spiritual issues but to practical value to society. Until the past hundred years, muscle power was a critical item of capital, in many ways more valued than intellectual capital.
Similarly, the fact that a woman was confined to the house to a large extent.
The fairness of this home confinement is already discussed in Eruvin.

b) Devorah, I am convinced that you are correct. I have told many of my students that their tefillot would improve if they had kavana that they were dovening to a Female concept, k'veyachol. After, isn't that what the Shechina is?

Note also that the women in the midbar did not sin at the eigel or the meraglim [there is a question about the latter].

c) The approach presented here answers a major question. If I make a birchat hodo'ah on something, I make it once, and that's it. One shehechiyanu per item, one birchat hagomel, etc.
So why repeat the birchot hashachar daily?

Granted, most of them are indeed renewed hoda'ah every morning, because not everybody who goes to sleep with flexibility and vision wakes up the same way, R"L. But - absent the tender ministrations of a surgeon, if I go to sleep male, I expect to wake up a male [ignoring Kafka]. Similarly, a Jew will not wake up a goy. So why a new brocho every morning.

Based on this post, the bracha is not a birchat hanehenin or birchat hoda'ah, but rather a kabolas ol malchus shamayim in the precise measure it was given to me, and this is necessarily renewed every morning - comp. Krias Shma.

Which begs the question why not twice daily? To which I refer the interested reader to the hakdama of the Eglai Tal in the name of the Kotzker. While the entire hakdama is worth the investment of time and thought, this particular segment is near the end.


(Anonymous compiled several maxims that evince respect and honor for women.)



Tali's comment:

I was under the impression the blessing had more to do with female biology.

For example, every woman dislikes everything to do with menstruation, but understands that it is necessary for the female reproductive system.

Likewise, even "easy" pregnancies and "easy" births are inconvenient and uncomfortable at best. (Although I won't deny the specialness of knowing of and bonding with a little soul growing inside of you; I do feel privileged - but not every woman experiences even that.) At worst, pregnancy and birth are traumatic and even deadly.

Men can reproduce without discomfort and suffering, and without endangering their lives. Isn't that reason enough to bless God for not having made them a woman?


The next paragraph is from a post I put up a long, long time ago discussing the form of Kidushin.
Despite the language of Shelo asani Isha, despite the petur of zman grama, and despite the fact that divorce is done unilaterally, anyone impartially and thoroughly reading the whole of Rabbinic literature will know that (the claim that Chazal view women as chattel) is nonsense. If one finds the endless stories in Tanach and in the Gemara insufficient to demonstrate the domestic parity of husband and wife, the reaction is most likely symptomatic of a desire to rationalize one’s disrespect for Chazal by demeaning them and dismissing them as as primitives. But, in any case, there is the Gemara in Gittin 39b. If the Gemara isn’t clear enough, see Rashi there DH "Ve’ka daykis Minah.” This Gemara and Rashi state unequivocally that the idea of ownership is utterly foreign to our concept of marriage.  All the rules that a woman’s income go to her husband are for her benefit, in that they come with equivalent and counter-balancing obligations on the part of the husband. Furthermore, any woman that wants to remain independent during marriage has the unfettered ability to negotiate that right prior to the marriage. If the husband does not make it clear to his wife before marriage that he retains the right to plural marriage, he has no such right. According to most poskim, a woman may unilaterally declare her financial independence during the marriage even absent prenuptial agreement. Furthermore, the Torah obligations of spouses weigh heavily on the husband and barely on the wife at all. The Torah obligation of a husband is to provide “she’eir, kesus, and ona,” meaning room, board, clothing, and marital relations. A wife’s obligation is to live in the city her husband chooses, and to not unreasonably refuse marital relations.


And finally:  For an informed and intelligent dialogue on this question, see the Avodah Digest here.  Among the many worthy ideas there, this from Reb Micha Berger is perfect to bring this post to a close:
Life is too complex to be reduced to one axis and one ranking system.

Most aspects of the human condition have multiple ways of being measured.

E.g. A mal'akh is more qadosh than a person, as it is entirely set

aside to do Retzon haBorei (the definition of qedushah), but a person

is betzelem E-lokim and a mal'akh is not.



Having more mitzvos means having more opportunities to refine oneself,

get sekhar, etc... But also more opportunities to mess up. It means that

men are playing a higher stakes game.



However, our mean is less holy than that of women. (Compare who brought

gold to the eigel, vs who donated gold to the mishkan. Or the Maharal

on Shemos 19:3.) Men have more opportunity to rise (or fall), but still,

we start at a lower point.



So, men thank G-d for the extra mitzvos, and women thank G-d for

being made closer to His ultimate Will.



Each has its positives, and both could see their glasses as half full.

Monday, August 15, 2011

Eikev, Devarim 9:15. And Moshe turned and descended from the mountain. Interesting Twists on the Turn.

וָאֵפֶן וָאֵרֵד מִן-הָהָר,   "And I (Moshe) turned and came down from the mountain."  What does it mean, he turned?  Does it add to the narrative, or to the Halacha?  This sounds like a tiny question, but there are some interesting things said about it.

Synopsis:
When Moshe left Har Sinai, it says Vayifen, he turned and went down.
The halacha is that when you leave a holy thing or person you should not turn your back on it, but instead should walk out backwards.  
Applications of this halacha.
Leaving a Shul, walking down from the Aron Kodesh,  leaving a rebbi, what Reb Meir Simcha says about duchenning, and Rav Hutner's subtle hint.
If so, why did Moshe turn his back?
Various answers.
An alternative interpretation from Rabbeinu Chananel and Ibn Shuib and the Alshich.


The Mishna in Yoma says that the Kohen Gadol would walk backwards out of the Kodesh Kadoshim, facing inwards towards the Aron as when he walked in.  The Gemara (53a) goes like this:
יצא ובא לו דרך כניסתו:  מנא הני מילי? א"ר שמואל בר נחמני א"ר יונתן אמר קרא (דברי הימים ב א) ויבא שלמה לבמה אשר בגבעון ירושלים. וכי מה ענין גבעון אצל ירושלים? אלא מקיש יציאתו מגבעון לירושלים לביאתו מירושלים לגבעון: מה ביאתו מירושלים לגבעון פניו כלפי במה כדרך ביאתו, אף יציאתו מגבעון לירושלים פניו כלפי במה כדרך ביאתו.

וכן כהנים בעבודתן ולוים בדוכנן וישראל במעמדן: כשהן נפטרין לא היו מחזירין פניהן והולכין, אלא מצדדין פניהן והולכין

וכן תלמיד הנפטר מרבו לא יחזיר פניו וילך, אלא מצדד פניו והולך

כי הא דר' אלעזר כד הוה מיפטר מיניה דר' יוחנן, כד הוה בעי ר' יוחנן לסגויי הוה גחין. קאי ר' אלעזר אדוכתיה עד דהוה מיכסי ר' יוחנן מיניה. וכד הוה בעי ר' אלעזר לסגויי, הוה קא אזיל לאחוריה עד דמכסי מיניה דרבי יוחנן.

רבא כד הוה מיפטר מיניה דרב יוסף הוה אזיל לאחוריה עד דמנגפן כרעיה ומתווסן אסקופתא דבי רב יוסף דמא. אמרו ליה לרב יוסף הכי עביד רבא! אמר ליה יהא רעוא דתרום רישך אכולה כרכא

The idea is that one who leaves a makom kadosh or his Rebbi must not turn his back, because turning the back is disrespectful.  Instead, he should leave while facing sideways, or, better, walk out backwards, as Rava did when leaving R’ Yosef.  great unknown pointed out that the Gemara is also telling us that although Reb Yosef was blind, and did not know that Rava was walking out backwards until someone told him, the obligation is the same.  The chiyuv to be mechabeid applies even when the person you're being mechabeid doesn't know what you're doing.

This is brought in the Rambam in 7 Beis Habechira 4 regarding the Beis Hamikdash and 5 Talmud Torah 6 regarding one's Rebbi:

כל שהשלים עבודה ונסתלק לו אינו יוצא ואחוריו להיכל אלא מהלך אחורנית מעט מעט ומהלך בנחת על צדו עד שיצא מן העזרה. וכן אנשי משמר ואנשי מעמד ולוים מדוכנן כך הם יוצאין מן המקדש כמי שפוסע אחר תפלה לאחוריו. כל זה ליראה מן המקדש

וכשיפטר מרבו לא יחזור לו לאחוריו אלא נרתע לאחוריו ופניו כנגד פניו

and in the Aruch HaShulchan YD 242:43, where it says
לא יחזור לאחוריו כנגד רבו כדרך ההולכים מהבית, אלא ילך לאחוריו ופניו כנגד רבו, כדרך שיורדין מארון הקודש
Note that the Aruch Hashulchan mentions walking backwards when going down from the Aron Kodesh.

As for walking out of shul, the Mechaber does not say that this is necessary,  but the Magen Avraham (end of 132, alluded to but not brought explicitly by the Mishna Berura SK 18) says that the same does apply to one who is walking out of a shul or walking away from the Aron Kodesh platform.  כשיצא מבית הכנסת לא יצא ואחוריו להיכל אלא יצדד וכן בירידתו מהתיבה.    (Walking backward out of shul is not common in the Litvishe community and I did not see this by my Roshei Yeshiva.  I have seen it mostly among Sefaradim.  Chasidim also do this when leaving a Rebbe, and theoretically it applies to Litvaks too.  Rav Hutner, I'm told, had a buzzer on his desk that unlocked the door, and when someone left him, he wouldn't unlock the door until the person realized that he was supposed to walk out backwards and turned to face Rav Hutner.)

Another example:  After Kohanim say Birkas Kohanim, they say
  עשינו מה שגזרת עלינו עשה עמנו מה שהבטחתנו השקיפה ממעון קדשך מן השמים וברך את עמך את ישראל
This is a surprising expression, isn't it?  Hashem, we did that which You decreed upon us, now You, too, do as You promised and bless your people, Klal Yisrael.  The expression "what you decreed upon us," מה שגזרת עלינו,makes it sound like it they had been ordered to do a difficult or unpleasant task.  What's so hard about blessing Klal Yisrael?  So Reb Meir Simcha (14:Tefilla 12) explains

לפי מה שמצאנו בסוף סוכה שבבית שני היו אומרין אבותינו היו פניהם כו' ואחוריהם למערב ואנו כו' ועינינו כו' וכאן אמר הגמרא לעולם תהי' אימת הציבור עליך שהרי כהנים פניהם כלפי העם ואחוריהם כלפי כו' לכן אמר כד מהדרי אפייהו מצבורא, אומרים רבש"ע עשינו מה שגזרת עלינו שאנו עשינו זה בהכרח לפי שגזרת עלינו.
that for the Kohanim to turn their backs on the Aron Kodesh is disrespectful and inappropriate, but the exigencies of Birkas Kohanim and Kvod Hatzibbur require that they do so.  Therefore, after they finish duchenning, they state their reason for having turned their backs on the Aron, that blessing Klal Yisrael is vitally important, and they ask that Hashem give effect to the bracha.


Getting back to our parsha:
If it is disrespectful to turn one's back when leaving a holy place or person, and it is a Torah value to avoid doing so, asks Rabbeinu Bachay, why does it say that Moshe turned away and walked down from Har Sinai?  Rabbeinu Bachaya says that he turned away because he had to run down to see what was going on with the Eigel, and at times like that, every moment counts, and one should not spend the time on protocol.

A possible problem with Rabbeinu Bachay's answer is that the Torah uses the same expression regarding the second luchos in this parshah as well, in 10:5, and there was no eigel the second time. 

One would naturally suggest a simple answer, that as soon as Moshe received the Luchos, Har Sinai no longer had any kedusha.  Its kedusha, as expressed in the din of Hagbala, ended immediately upon Moshe's descent.  But this is not correct.  Rashi in Beitza 5b D'H Michdi and Rashi in Taanis 21b DH El Mul.  True, the Gemara in Yoma 4b implies the opposite, but Tosfos Yeshanim there explains that the Shechina remained there until the Mishkan was built but that it was somewhat attenuated.

The Yalkut Shimoni brings a Medrash that Vayifen means he turned to the side, not that he turned away.  Dr. MZ pointed out that we find vayifen used that way by Moshe and the Mitzri.  Of course you might argue, as did LW, esq., that the fact that the Torah had to modify it by the Mitzri implies that an unmodified vayifen means to turn away, not turn to the side.  I think that looking for linguistic proofs is futile, because it can say וַיִּפֶן בִּנְיָמִן אַחֲרָיו, (Shoftim 20:40), and it can say  וַיִּפֶן כֹּה וָכֹה (Shemos 2:12.) Also, why did the Torah have to mention his turning at all?  Just say that he left and went down to the people without saying vayifen.  There's got to be some chiddush or some mussar haskeil in Vayifen.

The Netziv here and in Ki Sisa, Shimos 32:15, says that of course Moshe didn’t turn his back.  But since he was carrying the luchos and walking down a mountainside, he was afraid he would fall down if he walked backwards, as happened to Rava in the last part of the Gemora in Yoma I quoted above, to the effect that he was full of bruises.  So the Netziv learns that although Moshe did walk down backwards, the word Vayifen here means that he turned to the side to make sure he wouldn't fall over something behind him.

I mentioned to my shiur that the Rogotchover asks why in 9:15 it says that Moshe was carrying the Luchos in his hands (וָאֵפֶן וָאֵרֵד מִן הָהָר וְהָהָר בֹּעֵר בָּאֵשׁ וּשְׁנֵי לוּחֹת הַבְּרִית עַל שְׁתֵּי יָדָי), while in 10:5 it does not say that Moshe went down with the luchos in his hands (וָאֵפֶן וָאֵרֵד מִן הָהָר וָאָשִׂם אֶת הַלֻּחֹת בָּאָרוֹן אֲשֶׁר עָשִׂיתִי וַיִּהְיוּ שָׁם כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוַּנִי), and he answers that in 10:5 it's talking about the second Luchos, and the second Luchos were given to Moshe Rabbeinu on Yom Kippur, and Moshe couldn’t carry the luchos down, since Har Sinai, a teil hamislakeit, was a reshus hayachid, and the machaneh was a reshus harabbim.  (Yes, there is a good question about chai nosei es atzmo, but no better a question than Masa Bnei Kehas).  If so, there would be no reason for the Netziv's “vayifen” in 10:5.  The kashe was just for fun, because the Rogotchover and the Netziv are learning completely different pshatim.

UPDATE:
This just in:
First let me tell you the back story. When I discussed this with my son in law, he said that it's possible that ואפן means that he remained facing the Ribono shel Olam.  I firmly disagreed, and said that if that's true, then Klal Yisrael must have walked backwards in the Midbar, because it says פְּנוּ וּסְעוּ לָכֶם.  Furthermore, I said, if that's what it means here, why does the Gemara in Yoma 53 have to derive a convoluted proof for walking backwards from the passuk by Shlomo Hamelech, when it is befeirush by Mattan Torah.  The best thing I said was that such a pshat is  מגלה תורה בפנים שלא כהלכה.  (That line doesn't say what you think it says.  You have to say it out loud in order to appreciate it.)

And then, Eli sent me a mareh makom to Rabbeinu Chananel and Ibn Shu'ib (last paragraph on the first page and the following paragraph on the next page), who say exactly what my son in law suggested.  The Ibn Shuib is here on page 20 in the right column, or here.  And worse yet, they say that it is a drasha- not just that this is pshat, but מלמד that he walked backwards.  Bishlema if they just said that's pshat, I would say that only after we learn the concept of kavod from the passuk by Shlomo Hamelech do we understand that when it says Vayifen by Moshe, it must mean that he faced Hashem while leaving.  But they say מלמד, that you learn from here, that it's a drasha.  This is incompatible with our Gemara in Yoma.  If this is a drasha, it's a better drasha than the passuk by Shlomo Hamelech and the Gemara should have brought this passuk.  I'm not asking this as a kashe.  It's not the first time one of the mefarshei hatorah says different than a Gemara.  I'm just pointing out that this pshat is definitely not how our Gemara learned, so it does not answer our basic question. 

(Rabbeinu Yehoshua Ibn Shuib is a talmid of the Rashba and the rebbi of the Tzeida Laderech and one of the early mekubalim.  Drashos al Hatorah  is the sefer he is best known for.)

Having seen these mefarshim, I followed up on my son in law's claim that the Targum Yonasan says this, too.  I looked at Shemos 32:25, and the Targum Yonasan says ואתפני ונחת משה מן טוורא, which is just another way of saying pana, which proves nothing.  But here, the Targum Yonasan says וכוונית ונחתית מן טוורא.  I don't know what he changed pshat in pana from Shemos to Devarim, and I don't know if he means to say anything special with וכוונית.

Then he mentioned that he believed that the Alshich says the same thing, and he's 100% right.  The Alshich is in Ki Sisa, here.  He says that
the Medrash Rabba in Shemos perek 12 says this is the pshat in the Vayifen from Pharaoh in Parshas Bo, but it is not in our Medrashim.   Eli points out that the Alshich was preceeded by the Ibn Ezra who brings this from a R' Yeshua in Shemos 10:6.  Eli says that the word on the street is that this R' Yeshua was a Karaite.  Nevertheless, the Ibn Ezra does quote him.
In any case, as I said, these pirushim are contrary to Shas Bavli, and so have no effect on the discussion above.  שבעים תורות לפנים.





UPDATE 2015
I just saw that the Brisker Rov talks about this in the Shai LaTorah II Ki Sisa, Shemos 32:15.  Here's a photo:






Sunday, August 14, 2011

Eikev, Devarim 10:17. The Problem of Describing G-d. הַגָּדֹל הַגִּבֹּר וְהַנּוֹרָא

This was first written in 07.  I recently re-read it, and found it to be unclear.  I've edited and revised it and erased the original version.  Before beginning, I want to excuse myself for addressing this matter; the Rambam in the Moreh (1:57-59, e.g., here.) has very strong words about describing the Ribono shel Olam.  I only continue because of an issue that I think needs addressing.  See also the Gaon's words on the topic, here.



Yoma 69— the Anshei Knesses Hagedolah were given the honorific “Hagedolah” because ‘hecheziru atara liyoshna’, they brought the crown back to its glory. As the destruction of the first Beis Hamikdash drew closer, and the people of God were subjected to increasingly harsh and painful experiences, the Navi Yirmiahu removed the word ‘nora,’ awesome, from the description of Hashem in our prayers. He said, "Strangers are crowing in His sanctuary.  Where are His awe inspiring acts?"  Later, when the Jews were exiled, Daniel took off ‘gibor’. He said, "Where are Hashem’s great powers? How can we describe Him with terms that are contradicted by our daily experience?"  But the Anshei Knesses Hagdolah came later and said "On the contrary! His gevura is his arichus appaiyim, his patience, to the resha’im, and his morah is what maintains our existence despite the mortal hatred of the nations among whom we are interspersed."

אמר רבי יהושע בן לוי למה נקרא שמן אנשי כנסת הגדולה שהחזירו עטרה ליושנה אתא משה אמר (דברים י) האל הגדול הגבור והנורא אתא ירמיה ואמר נכרים מקרקרין בהיכלו איה נוראותיו לא אמר נורא אתא דניאל אמר נכרים משתעבדים בבניו איה גבורותיו לא אמר גבור אתו אינהו ואמרו אדרבה זו היא גבורת גבורתו שכובש את יצרו שנותן ארך אפים לרשעים ואלו הן נוראותיו שאלמלא מוראו של הקב"ה היאך אומה אחת יכולה להתקיים בין האומות ורבנן היכי עבדי הכי ועקרי תקנתא דתקין משה אמר רבי אלעזר מתוך שיודעין בהקב"ה שאמתי הוא לפיכך לא כיזבו בו:  

The idea here is that we cannot describe the actual ‘character’ of Hashem, but instead only describe the 'characteristics' that we observe through His actions in our world.  This is what is stated in ‘An'im Zemiros’ (from Reb Yehuda Hachasid or an approximate contemporary), that ‘דימו אותך ולא כפי ישך וישווך לפי מעשיך.’ / "They likened You, but not as You really are.  They tried to describe you according to Your deeds."  What we say about Hashem is, first of all, only a mashal, and second of all, only what we perceive through His behavior. The Rambam says “Kol hate’arim she’anu omrim al Hashem Yisbarach ein hakavana al te’arim atzmi’im chas veshalom rak al te’arei hape’ulos.” If we do not see a certain trait in Hashem’s relationship with this world, we cannot honestly describe Him with terms that are inconsistent with what we perceive.

An example of this: the Gemara (Shabbos 88a) says,
א"ר חמא ברבי חנינא מ"ד (שיר השירים ב) כתפוח בעצי היער וגו' למה נמשלו ישראל לתפוח לומר לך מה תפוח זה פריו קודם לעליו אף ישראל הקדימו נעשה לנשמע  
The passuk in Shir Hashirim says, Like an apple tree amidst the trees of the forest, so is my beloved among the girls.  Why is Klal Yisrael called an apple tree?  Just as an apple tree is full o ffruit before its leaves are developed, so too the Jewish people said "We will do!" before they heard what they were accepting on themselves. 

Rabbeinu Tam asks there, that in that passuk in Shir Hashirim, it is not Klal Yisrael being compared to a Tapuach, but rather Hashem! So why does the Gemara say “Why is Klal Yisroel like the Tapu’ach?” It is not us being described, it is Hashem! The Anaf Yosef in the Ein Yakov brings down the Nefesh Hachaim that answers that if Klal Yisrael perceived and compared Hashem to ‘tapuach’, this is definitely because Klal Yisrael is comparable and their behavior is similar to ‘tapuach’, because “kederech she’anachnu misra’im lefanav yisbarach, kach hu yisbarach shemo ba lei’ra’os el ha’olamos al zeh ha’hadraga vehashiur mamash.” From this vort you see a two very important concepts: Hashem appears to us in a fashion that reflects our behavior; and that what we call His Semblance is just one of the ways that He communicates with us through His behavior. Since this is His manner of communication, it follows the rule of Middah keneged Middah.

To see R Chaim Volozhener inside, see his pirush on Shir Hashirim there, and also in a hagaha in Nefesh Hachaim 1:9, and see there 1:7. See also a very similar approach in the Alshich on Shemos 34:6, where he discusses the Bris of the thirteen Middos.
Also, see the Netziv in Shemos 3:14, where Hashem told Moshe “Ehyeh asher Ehyeh.” The Netziv explains that Hashem meant that the Geula will take place, but the manner of its occurrence is not clear yet, because it depends on the ko’ach of the m’kablim: “Ehyeh misnaheig b’p’ulasi k’fi asher ehyeh b’ko’ach Yisrael asher yitnu li.”

In reading the above, you will have noticed that the Gemara about the Anshei Knesses Hagdola and the words of Rav Chaim Volozhiner seem to be totally and absolutely incompatible.  How can we say that it is impossible to describe the essence of the Ribono shel Olam, and that our descriptions only interpret the characteristics we observe, when those characteristics are a reflection of our behavior?  If what we observe reflects our own behavior, how can we describe Hashem on the basis of what we observe?  If Hashem speaks to us through our own reflection in a mirror, then what we are observing is, in the final analysis, us, not Hashem.  What we are describing is ourselves!

I imagine that the answer is that we do not create our God, or change His traits, or even His essential relationship with our world, with our behavior. It is only the superficial manner of their expression in the physical world, and our ability to perceive the Middos, that changes according to our behavior. The point of the Gemora about the Anshei Knesses Hagedola is that although Hashem's middos appear to change as they reflect our behavior, if one is truly conscious and aware, he will be able to perceive the essential characteristics of Hashem despite the fog and confusion of the ostensible. The Nefesh Hachaim serves to explain why Yirmia'hu and Daniel held that we are constrained to limit our description of Hashem to how we understand His interaction with the world; if hester panim means that we misunderstand what is going on, we must accept the ostensible as the only way we are entitled to describe Him. It was only through the Anshei Knesses Hagedolah's teachings that we, as a nation, were taught to understand the truth behind the reality. Only once we understood that truth could we go back to describing Hashem in the terms used in this parshah.



(We mentioned the Anshei Knesses Hagedola.  Speaking of the Knesses Hagdola, the passuk here in 8:10 mentions the din of birkas hamazon, ve'achalta vesavata. The Knesses Hagdola’s shittah, (UPDATE:  This Knesses Hagedola has nothing to do with the Anshei Knesses Hagedola.  This one is a seventeenth century author, Harav Chaim Benbenishti, who is one of the great poskim of Klal Yisrael.   I only put this here because Birkas Hamazon is in the parsha as well, and the tzushtell made me smile.)  which is also the shitta of the Pri Megadim brought in the Mishna Berura 210, is that an achila of a kezayis in more than an achilas prass is mitztaref and is mechayev bentching midoraiso– but only if he is savai’a. (Chaim B pointed out that the Minchas Chinuch, and most poskim, hold you need both kezayis toch kedei achilas pras plus Sevi'a..  I point out that the Chasam Sofer in the Tshuvos OC 49 says "karov le'vadai" that in the time that bracha was in the food, and a person would be savei'a with less than a kezayis, then he would be chayav to bentch mid'oraysa.  Also, Reb Moseh in OC 1:76 says absolutely not; you definitely need a kezayis.)  On the other hand, it seems to me that if one would do so on Yom Kippur, he would not be chayav koreis. (Again, Chaim B. said that since Yom Kippur is not a din of Achila, it's a din of Inui, it has nothing to do with achilas pras, and that's why the shiur is kekosves hagas.  I disagree with him; not all inuyim are assur midoraysa.  Chazal understood that inuy deorasyas means not eating or drinking, and eating means kezayis toch kdei achilas pras.  If Chaim B were right, our hanhaga of feeding cholim on Yom Kippur not kedei achilas pras would be futile and meaningless.  Even Reb Chaim Brisker (Griz 2 Shvisas Asor 8) that holds that a choleh has not reason to avoid TKAP and may eat without any constraints on Yom Kippur, he agrees that the din of TKAP does apply to someone who is not deathly ill but must eat to prevent becoming ill.)  So, (assuming I'm right and Chaim B is wrong,) strangely enough, if one would eat a kezayis of bread on Yom Kippur but not toch kedei achilas peras, and he was savei’a, he would be pottur as far as Yom Kippur, but he would have to bentch mid’oraysa.  UPDATE:  I've been thinking about this, and I decided it's too strange to be true.  I've decided that the Knesses Hagdola would hold that svi'a without TKAP would be chayav on Yom Kippur just like it's chayav in Birkas Hamazon de'oraysa.)

Friday, August 12, 2011

Va'eschanan, Devarim 6:13. Honoring Hashem and Talmidei Chachamim

"את ה' אלוקיך תירא"  tells us that we must fear Hashem, and that our behavior must reflect that fear.  For example, the Mishna Berura in 215:20 says that because of this passuk, one who casually enunciates Hashem's name, one who says Hashem's name in a manner that evinces a lack of fear and awe of Hashem, transgresses an issur De'Oraysa.   (I mention this to anticipate the argument that the passuk only discusses the emotion, and that an act is merely a symptom of a lack of fear.  From here we see that the passuk (as a whole) addresses equally heart, mind, and action.)

This passuk is the subject of a famous difference of opinion between Shimon (or Nechemiah) Ha'Amsoni and Rebbi Akiva.  This is in several places in Shas, and the first in Kiddushin 57a.

שמעון העמסוני ואמרי לה נחמיה העמסוני היה דורש כל אתין שבתורה כיון שהגיע (דברים ו) לאת ה' אלהיך תירא פירש אמרו לו תלמידיו רבי כל אתין שדרשת מה תהא עליהם אמר להם כשם שקבלתי שכר על הדרישה כך קבלתי על הפרישה עד שבא רבי עקיבא ולימד את ה' אלהיך תירא לרבות תלמידי חכמים

Shimon the Amsoni made a career of interpreting the word "Es" as a term that expands the explicit terms of the passuk.  For example:  We are all familiar with the rule that Tevilla requires that our hair be in the mikva as well as our body.  This is not explicit anywhere in the Torah.  However, the Gemara (Eiruvin 4a) says 
שערו נמי דאורייתא הוא דתניא ורחץ את כל בשרו את הטפל לבשרו וזהו שער
that from the words "Es b'saro" we learn that not only does his body, his Basar, require tevilla, but even that which is secondary to his body, namely his hair, requires Tevilla as well.
 But when he came to Parshas Va'eschanan, and he saw our passuk, he abandoned his thesis that "Es" expands the passuk.  Rashi explains that Reb Yishmael thought, מה ארבה לירא עמו?  What can I possibly include in fear of G-d?   There is nothing that can possibly be compared to the fear of Hashem!    His talmidim asked him, Rebbi, what of all the drashos you've taught us?  He answered, just as I was rewarded for interpreting, so too shall I be rewarded for relinquishing.  But then (in the next generation) came Reb Akiva and interpreted that our passuk teaches us to fear talmidei chachamim.

Reading the Gemara immediately elicits some obvious and important questions.  What did Reb Akiva know that Reb Yishmael did not?  Or, alternatively, what is the machlokes between Reb Yishmael and Reb Akiva?  And more interesting, what did Reb Yishmael do with the many, many instances prior to this passuk that use the word "Es" with Hashem's name?  In fact, right in our parsha, eleven psukim before, the passuk says לְמַעַן תִּירָא אֶת ה' אֱלֹקיךָ.  What did he do with that "Es" that he couldn't do with this one?

Rabbi Shain, a Rebbi in Yeshiva of Staten Island, in his excellent sefer "Birkas Ish" (in Parshas Miketz), shows us a clear answer to this question that ironically answers nothing at all.

We find, he says, that Onkelos translates אֶת in several ways.  In Breishis 37:2 by הָיָה רֹעֶה אֶת אֶחָיו בַּצֹּאן, וְהוּא נַעַר אֶת בְּנֵי בִלְהָה וְאֶת בְּנֵי זִלְפָּה he translates both Eses to mean עם, with.  In Shemos 9:29, he translates ויאמר אליו משה כצאתי את העיר as from/מן.  Of course, most of the time Onkelos translates את as ית.    It is clear that when את  has a function in the passuk, Reb Yishmael doesn't darshen it as a ribui at all.  It is only the את that means ית that Reb Yishmael darshens as a ribui.

In the context of Hashem's name, he notes that in Breishis 44:18, Yosef said to his brothers .אֶת הָאֱלֹקים אֲנִי יָרֵא; In Shemos 1:17 it says וַתִּירֶאןָ הַמְיַלְּדֹת אֶת הָאֱלֹקים; and in Shemos 14:31 it says וַיִּירְאוּ הָעָם אֶת .  Examining these cases, we find that in every iteration of   "את השם", Onkelos translates it either as מן קדם השם or קדם השם.  The first and last time that Onkelos translates it differently is "את השם", where he translates it to mean ית השם.

So this definitely answers the question.  It is only את that means ית that Reb Yishmael darshens as a ribui.  Even the  קדם and מן קדם have a function in pshat in the passuk.  The one and only time that את means ית in the context of Hashem's name is our passuk, which Reb Yishmael would have had to darshen as a ribui.

The question remains, what is the difference in this passuk from every other similar passuk that made Onkelos translate it to mean ית and not מן קדם or קדם.

Now:
Reb Yonah Valler, in his Kanfei Yona in this week's parsha, says that he understands the Machlokes between Reb Akiva and שמעון העמסוני as similar to the machlokes between the Rambam and the Geonim on chatzitza of hair.  We mentioned above that from the words ורחץ את כל בשרו we learn that when you go to the mikva, you are required to be tovel your hair as well as the rest of your body.  Thus, dirt or knots in the hair that prevent contact with the water raise a  Chatzitza issue.

Generally, the rule of Chatzitza is that רובו ומקפיד, something that covers a majority of the object, and the person doesn't want it there, it is a chatzitza mid'oraysa.  How do we define majority of the surface of a person?  The Rambam holds that we add the surface area of the hair to that of the body, and a majority of that sum is called a majority.  The Geonim hold that the hair is viewed separately, and if a majority of the hair is covered, even though it's a tiny minority of hair plus body, it is a chatzitza de'oraysa.  (We pasken like the Geonim.)

The Ran in the Rif's hilchos Niddah explains the machlokes like this:
The Geonim hold that since we darshen Es to mean hair, it's like two pesukim:  an explicit passuk for "body" and an implicit one for "hair".  Therefore they hold that if the majority of the hair is covered, it's a chatzitza.  The Rambam holds that even after the drasha, all we know is that the hair is counted as appurtenant to the body, so we add the surface of both to determine if the chatzitza covers a majority.

Thus, he says, if you say like the Rambam that the Ribui of Es to add another implicit but coequal and equivalent element, there's no way that we can include talmidei chachamim in our passuk.  Talmidei Chachamim are not coequal with the Ribono shel Olam.  This is the shitta of שמעון העמסוני.  If, however, you say like the Geonim, that the ribui of Es only says that along with A you have to also consider B, then there's nothing wrong with saying that Es by Hashem includes Talmidei Chachamim.  This is the shitta of Reb Akiva.

He adds that this explains why the Rambam in Shoresh II in Mitzvos brings that the Bahag holds that the fear of Talmidei Chachamim is counted as a mitzva separate from fear of Hashem.  The Rambam argues and says that it is appurtenant, not coequal.  This, of course, is the Rambam leshitaso by tevilla of hair.  Es is only appurtenant, not coequal.

So now, let's get back to our question.  שמעון העמסוני knew of our passuk when he started darshening the word Es back in Breishis, and it apparently never bothered him.  What changed?  There can only be two explanations:  That he used to think it meant מן קדם, so you don't have to darshen it as a ribui at all, or that he always knew it meant ית and that it was a ribui, but he used to hold like Reb Akiva that it means appurtenant, not coequal.

TBC

(just to get this Yetzer Hara out of the way, I need to mention that in Yeshivos, they say pshat in Reb Akiva's  chiddush of לרבות תלמידי חכמים is that even a Talmid Chacham needs to be a Yarei Shamayim. The idea is that a talmid chacham should not rely on his gadlus batorah and think he is safe from the yetzer hara. He, too, must remember to work on his yiras shamayim.)

Friday, August 5, 2011

Devarim 1:6. Fixing a Mistake in a Bracha


To say Hashem's name in vain is a sin.  Making an unneeded or incorrect bracha is also considered enunciating Hashem's name in vain.  This is reason enough for us to avoid making brachos by rote or while distracted, because you're asking for trouble- we so often wake up in middle of a bracha and realize we've made a mistake.  Here's an example:  the halacha is that if you had already davenned e.g. mincha, and started shmoneh esrei again without remembering that you had davenned already, you are making a bracha le'vatala, and you stop in middle of a bracha.  (Thank you, Tzvee, for reminding me to put the cite in.  OC 107:4.)  This happened to me more than once after saying my shiur, when my mind was not really on the davening, and I only realized it when I got to Atta chonein l'adam daas.  I think it was a kind of ironic answer to my prayer-  "You're asking for Da'as?  OK, here's some Da'as.  You already davenned mincha today, chochom."

(The Darkei Moshe in Hilchos Tzitzis discusses why the bracha we make on a talis kattan is "al mitzvas," which is a rare nusach for a bracha.  He says that many people wear a tallis kattan that is smaller than the minimum size, so the bracha might be a bracha le'vatala.  To avoid this problem, he says, we use the nusach "al mitzvas," because then it can function as a general bracha of praise, a birkas shevach on the fact that Hashem gave us this mitzvah.  If we would say La'asos tzitzis, or lilvosh beged metzuyetzet, it would be an unequivocal birkas hamitzvos, and absent kiyum mitzva, it would be le'vatalah.)

But, sometimes  you can save yourself from the sin by converting what you said into something useful.  If you realized your mistake after you said  ברוך אתה ה, you can finish off your sentence with the words למדני חוקיך, because in Tehillim (119:12) there is a passuk that says  ברוך אתה ה' למדני חוקיך, so you've done a fine thing- you said a passuk in Tehillim.  This is the advice of the Mechaber in OC 206:6, where he says:
נטל בידו פרי לאוכלו ובירך עליו ונפל מידו ונאבד או נמאס צריך לחזור ולברך אף על פי שהיה מאותו מין לפניו יותר כשבירך על הראשון.  וצריך לומר ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד על שהוציא שם שמים לבטלה ואם אמר כשנפל ברוך אתה ה' ולא אמר אלהינו יסיים ויאמר למדני חוקיך שיהא נראה כקורא פסוק ואין כאן מוציא שם שמים לבטלה אבל העומד על אמת המים מברך ושותה אף על פי שהמים ששותה לא היו לפניו כשבירך מפני שלכך נתכוין תחילה.

The Noda B'Yehuda, in his Tzlach (Brachos 39a, here,) adds another save.  He says that if you began your incorrect bracha, and realized the problem after you began the word Elokeinu, but you haven't said the whole word and only said "Elokei,"  you can convert your bad bracha into the passuk in Divrei Hayamim I 29:10, where it says ויברך דויד את ה לעיני כל הקהל ויאמר דויד ברוך אתה ה אלוקי ישראל אבינו מעולם ועד עולם.  Since, however, you will have begun in middle of the passuk by saying only ברוך אתה ה אלוקי ישראל אבינו מעולם ועד-עולם, you should still says Baruch Sheim, as required by the Mechaber in OC 206:6 in cases of Shem Shamayim Levatala.

Recently, some people (e.g., חבצלת השרון מהרב מרדכי קרליבך on this week's parsha) have suggested a further save.  If a person has already said Baruch Atta Hashem Elokeinu, what can he do?  He should say our passuk, ה אלקינו דבר אלינו בחרב לאמר רב לכם שבת בהר הזה, because then, we can ignore the Baruch Atta, and the words Hashem Elokeinu will be the beginning of our passuk.
It could be that this is simply a case where nobody thought of this before.  Indeed, he says that he brought the suggestion to Harav Eliashiv and Harav Kanievsky and they approved of the idea.
On the other hand, one might argue that this suggestion is flawed, because in a bracha, the Sheim Hashem is an Object, while in our passuk, it is the Subject.  (In the sentence "Bless You, Hashem," the word "you" is the Object of the sentence.  In "Hashem told us...," the word "Hashem" is the Subject.)  Does this matter?  Sometimes words might be intended either as subject or an object, such as in the five pesukim listed in Yoma 52a ( שאת משוקדים מחר ארור וקם).   But in those cases, they are either one or the other.  There are, though, some cases where Chazal darshen that a word as inherently intended to be both object and subject, as in the hava amina in Menachos 19 in Reb Shimon (and as the Sfas Emes suggests in Yoma as well).  But here, if  you change the Sheim from object to subject,  you are attempting to change the essential meaning of the Sheim, and that cannot be done.

great unknown, in the comments, brings the Gemara in Brachos 12a, 
פשיטא היכא דקא נקיט כסא דחמרא בידיה וקסבר דשכרא הוא ופתח ומברך אדעתא דשכרא וסיים בדחמרא יצא דאי נמי אם אמר שהכל נהיה בדברו יצא דהא תנן על כולם אם אמר שהכל נהיה בדברו יצא אלא היכא דקא נקיט כסא דשכרא בידיה וקסבר דחמרא הוא פתח ובריך אדעתא דחמרא וסיים בדשכרא מאי בתר עיקר ברכה אזלינן או בתר חתימה אזלינן ת"ש שחרית פתח ביוצר אור וסיים במעריב ערבים לא יצא פתח במעריב ערבים וסיים ביוצר אור יצא ערבית פתח במעריב ערבים וסיים ביוצר אור לא יצא פתח ביוצר אור וסיים במעריב ערבים יצא כללו של דבר הכל הולך אחר החתום שאני התם דקאמר ברוך יוצר המאורות הניחא לרב דאמר כל ברכה שאין בה הזכרת השם אינה ברכה שפיר אלא לר' יוחנן דאמר כל ברכה שאין בה מלכות אינה ברכה מאי איכא למימר אלא כיון דאמר רבה בר עולא כדי להזכיר מדת יום בלילה ומדת לילה ביום כי קאמר ברכה ומלכות מעיקרא אתרוייהו קאמר ת"ש מסיפא כללו של דבר הכל הולך אחר החתום כללו של דבר לאתויי מאי לאו לאתויי הא דאמרן לא לאתויי נהמא ותמרי ה"ד אילימא דאכל נהמא וקסבר דתמרי אכל ופתח אדעתא דתמרי וסיים בדנהמא היינו בעיין לא צריכא כגון דאכל תמרי וקסבר נהמא אכל ופתח בדנהמא וסיים בדתמרי [יצא] דאפילו סיים בדנהמא נמי יצא מאי טעמא דתמרי נמי מיזן זייני:
which discusses whether a person who thinks he has a glass of wine, and says Baruch Atta Hashem, and realizes it is beer, and finishes with Shehakol, whether this person fulfills his chiyuv bracha.  The Gemara does not state a conclusion.
In OC 209, MB SK 6, he says that although by brachos that are miderabanan we rely on the kula, and you are yotzei, by brachos that are de'oraysa we are machmir and require that he repeat the bracha, because, apparently, we lean toward the opinion that the kavana while he says the Sheim Umalchus is the main part of the bracha, and kavana for one purpose cannot be recharacterized.  

So, the bottom line is, that the reason the Mechaber's idea and the Tzlach's idea work, is because the switched ending is consistent with the idea of bracha in general- lamdeini chukecha, or Dovid Hamelech's bracha of Hashem.  But here, forget about the minor change from Object to Subject.  We're trying to change it from Bracha to recitation of history.  That kind of change doesn't work even toch kdei dibbur.

Yasher koach, great unknown.  However, as great unknown points out in his comment, although the tzushtell to the Gemara is excellent, once you bring in the Mishna Berura who says you can't even repurpose a bracha de'oraysa once you've said the sheim umalchus, then we have a problem with the advice about Lamdeini Chukecha!  Because if  you can't change the kavana of the Sheim from Hagafen to Shehakol, you certainly can't change it from Shehakol to Lamdeini Chukecha..

Wednesday, August 3, 2011

Devarim, Shabbos Chazon. Guest Post by Rabbi Pinches Friedman, the Shvilei Pinches

Rabbi Pinches Friedman
Parshas Devorim - Shabbos Chazon 5771
Translation by Dr. Baruch Fox

(Formatting changes resulted in some missing spaces, but it's easy enough to read.  Please see my end  note.)

This upcoming Shabbos, on which we read parshas Devorim, is referred to as “Shabbos Chazon.” This name derives from the fact that the haftarah designated for this special Shabbos is taken from the words ofthe prophet Yeshayah, who prophesied about the destruction of the Beis HaMikdosh (Yeshayah 1, 1): ”חזון— ישעיהו בן אמוץ אשר חזה על יהודה ועל ירושלים”the vision of Yeshayahu the son of Amotz, whichhe saw concerning Yehudah and Yerushalayim. This parsha and this haftarah are always read, without exception, on the Shabbos before Tisha B’Av — or on the actual Shabbos of Tisha B’Av, in which case the fast is postponed to the following day, Sunday.

It is a well-known fact that the parshas we read on Shabbos, were arranged specifically by Ezra HaSofer to conform to an annual cycle (Megillah 31:). It is worthwhile, therefore, to investigate why Ezra HaSofer saw fit to institute the recitation of parshas Devorim on the Shabbos before Tisha B’Av.

Addressing this issue, the Levush (O.C. 428, 4) cites the words of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch(ibid.): " תשעה באב קודם ]פרשת[ ואתחנן “ — TishaB’Av precedes parshas Voeschanan; then he adds: “כדי שיקראו פרשת דברים שמתחלת תוכחותיו של משה קודם ט’ באב, כדי להפטיר בה בחזון שהיא תוכחת על חורבן”— so that Moshe’s rebuke of the people, which begins in parshas Devorim, will be read before Tisha B’Av along with the haftarah of “Chazon,” which is a rebuke concerning the destruction of the Temple.In other words, we wish to connect these two rebukes— Moshe’s rebuke of Yisroel before his death with the prophet Yeshayah’s rebuke of Yisroel concerning the destruction of the Temple. Since we read Yeshayah’s rebuke on the Shabbos before Tisha B’Av, it was arranged that parshas Devorim would coincide with thereading of this haftarah.איכה אשא לבדי” “ Is a Rectification for“איכה ישבה בדד”  Let us begin our journey by following the Levush’s  lead. What is the deeper connection between MosheRabeinu’s rebuke in parshas Devorim and Yeshayah’s rebuke concerning the destruction of the Temple?

Let us refer to the following Midrash (Eichah Rabbah; Intro.”אילו זכיתם הייתם קוראים בתורה איכה אשא לבדי,:( 11ועכשיו שלא זכיתם הרי אתם קוראים )איכה א א( איכהישבה בדד" — had you been meritorious, you would have recited from the Torah, “How can I carry alone?”;now that you were not meritorious, you are required to recite, “How is it that she sits alone?”The following requires explanation: (a) clearly, both rebukes employ the term ” איכה “; nevertheless, why would the recitation of ” איכה אשא לבדי “--“How can I carry alone?” preclude the necessity of reciting “איכהישבה בדד” --“How is it that she sits alone?” (b)Today, in our times, although we recite from the Torah:איכה אשא לבדי” “--“How can I carry alone?”, due to our multitudinous sins, we still mourn the destruction of the Temple, on the night of Tisha B’Av, by reciting:איכה ישבה בדד” “--“How is it that she sits alone?”To clarify our sages’ riddle and deeper message, let us examine the following words of rebuke uttered by Moshe,in our parsha:, ”איכה אשא לבדי טרחכם ומשאכם וריבכםהבו לכם אנשים חכמים ונבונים וידועים לשבטיכם ואשימםבראשיכם” — how can I alone carry your trouble, your burden, and your quarrels? Provide for yourselves distinguished men, who are wise, understanding, and well known to your tribes, and I shall appoint themas your heads. Rashi comments: ”ואשמם, חסר יו”ד לומר שאשמותיהם של ישראל תלויות בראשי דייניהם, שהיהלהם למחות ולכוון אותם לדרך הישרה” — the word ואשמם" “ is written without the letter “yod” (changing the meaning of the word from “I will appoint” to “their guilt”) to teach us that the sins of Yisroel hang on the heads of their judges; for they should have protested and directed them to the proper path. Why, according to Rashi’s insight, did Moshe Rabeinu emphasize this point here — that the judges bore responsibility forthe people’s sins?

First, let us recall what we have learned in the Gemoreh (Yoma 9:):, ”מקדש ראשון מפני מה חרב מפני שלשה דברים שהיו בו עבודה זרה וגלוי עריות ושפיכות דמים... אבל מקדש שני שהיו עוסקין בתורה ומצוות וגמילות חסדים מפני מה חרב, מפני שהיתה בו שנאת חנם, ללמדך ששקולה שנאת חנם כנגד שלש עבירות עבודה זרה גלוי עריות ושפיכות דמים” — the first Beis HaMikdosh was destroyed because of the commission of the three cardinal sins — idol-worship, immorality and murder. During the period of the second Beis HaMikdosh, however, the people engaged in Torah study, the performance of mitzvot and acts of kindness. It was destroyed because of baseless hatred,“sinas chinam” — this teaches us that “sinas chinam”carries as much weight as the three cardinal sins. The Gemoreh proceeds to prove, from a possuk in Yechezkel(1, 27), that even during the period of the first Beis HaMikdosh, “sinas chinam” already existed among the leaders of Yisroel.“Sinas chinam” among the Leaders of Yisroel Led to “Sinas chinam” among the People of Yisroel We must note the alarming commentary of the Kli Yoker on our parsha (Devorim 1, 1). He states that the baseless hatred that existed among the leaders of Yisroel during the period of the first Beis HaMikdosh led to the baseless hatred that developed among the Parshas Devorim 5771 | 2people of Yisroel during the period of the second Beis HaMikdosh. Here are his sacred words:“ובט’ באב היה מעשה המרגלים, בו ביום נולדה מדת שנאת חנם בישראל, כמו שכתוב )דברים א כז ( ותאמרו בשנאת ה' אותנו הוציאנו וגו', פירש רש"י ]והוא היה אוהב אתכם אבל אתם שונאים אותו, משל הדיוט אומר [מה דבלבך על רחמך מה דבלביה עליך. כי המה סברו מאחר שכל אחד מהם שונא את חבירו, כך מסתמא שונא אותם גם הקב"ה... ותהר צרה זו ותלד מדה רעה זו אשר החריבה בית ראשון ושני, כי בבית ראשון היה שנאת חנם בין נשיאי ישראל, ובבית שני פשתה הנגע בין כל ישראל כדאיתא ביומא".The incident with the spies, the “meraglim,” occurred on Tisha B’Av. That very day, the negative characteristic of “sinas chinam” emerged amongst the people of Yisroel.They accused Hashem of hating them (Devorim 1, 27),although He truly loved them. This was an indication that they hated each other and, therefore, assumed that HKB”H hated them, as well. This incident gave birth to the negative characteristic that caused the destruction of the two Temples. During the period of the first Beis HaMikdosh, “sinas chinam” existed among the leaders of Yisroel; during the period of the second Beis HaMikdosh, this defect spread among the people themselves — as stated in the Gemoreh in Yoma.

Additionally, in light of the fact that the first Beis HaMikdosh was destroyed because the people were guilty of committing the three cardinal sins, where were their leaders? Why didn’t they take steps to prevent the people from committing these transgressions? The answer, sadly enough, is that there was a lack of unity among the leaders of Yisroel.

Due to their quarreling amongst themselves, they were incapable of presenting a united front and no longer represented a positive influence on the people.Furthermore, as we learned from the Gemoreh: ”ללמדך ששקולה שנאת חנם כנגד שלש עבירות עבודה זרה גלוי עריות ושפיכות דמים” — “sinas chinam” carries the same weight and gravity as the three cardinal sins.Consequently, the “sinas chinam” that prevailed among the leaders of Yisroel was just as serious a transgression as the three cardinal sins. Seeing as they were not free of guilt, and their offense was just as great, they were incapable of steering the people away from the sins of idolatry, immorality and murder.

As we discussed at length in our essay on parshas Masei,citing the Sefas Emes (5659), this is the reason thatHKB”H arranged for Aharon HaKohen to depart from this world on Rosh Chodesh Av — the commencement of the nine days on which we mourn the loss of the Beis HaMikdosh, which was destroyed because of “sinaschinam.” It is HKB”H’s wish that Aharon will influence usfrom above to follow in his ways and to love our fellow Jew. As we learned in the Mishnah (Ovos 1, 12), the disciples of Aharon were characterized as: ”אוהב שלום ורודף שלום, אוהב את הבריות ומקרבן לתורה” — loving peace, pursuing peace, loving all creatures and bringing them nearer to Torah.Moshe Rabeinu the Future Redeemer Yearned to Hasten the Redemption.

Let us now introduce an idea from the Megaleh Amukos(20). Moshe Rabeinu wanted to enter Eretz Yisroel so that he could build the Beis HaMikdosh. HKB”H told him that that was not possible; for, if he were to build theBeis HaMikdosh, it would be impossible for our enemies to conquer it or destroy it. The Gemoreh (Soteh 9.)explains that our enemies never captured the Mishkan,because it was the result of Moshe’s handiwork. Thisis evident from what we have learned: “משנבנה מקדש ראשון נגנז אהל מועד קרשיו קרסיו ובריחיו ועמודיו ואדניו” — once the first Beis HaMikdosh was built, the Ohel Moed (the Mishkan) was stored, including all of its structural components.The Midrash explains (Eichah Rabbah 4, 14) that in the process of the destruction of the Temple,HKB”H visited his wrath on the wood and stones of the structure rather than on Yisroel. This is implied inHKB”H’s response to Moshe: ” רב לך “ — you are on toohigh a level and your handiwork is beyond the realm and capacity of Yisroel’s enemies to conquer. Therefore,Moshe’s request to cross the Yarden and build the Beis HaMikdosh was denied; so that HKB”H would not be Parshas Devorim 5771 | 3forced to visit his wrath, chas v’shalom, on the people of Yisroel. This is what we learned from the Megaleh Amukos.

In fact, Moshe Rabeinu also knew that Yisroel’senemies had no power or control over his handiwork. Yet,according to the Megaleh Amukos (252), he prayed to enter Eretz Yisroel and build the Beis HaMikdosh in the hope of realizing the final and complete redemption —hageulah hasheleimah. As the Zohar hakadosh teaches us (Bereishit 25:), Moshe Rabeinu, himself, is destined to be the Melech HaMashiach. This is alluded to in the possuk (Bereishit 49, 10): “לא יסור שבט מיהודה, דא משיח בן דוד, ומחוקק מבין רגליו, דא משיח בן יוסף,עד כי יבא שיל”ה דא מש”ה” The possuk states thatthe royal scepter will not depart from the tribe ofYehudah — this is an allusion to Moshiach ben David;next it states that a lawgiver will not depart from his descendants — this is an allusion to Mashiach benYosef; until the arrival of Shiloh — this is an allusion to Moshe; the numerical value of שיל”ה is the same as the numerical value of the name מש”ה — both equal 345.Moshe’s entreaty to enter the land in order to build a Beis HaMikdosh that would endure forever is now easy to comprehend. For, at the time of the future redemption, HKB”H will slaughter the yetzer hara and exterminate it from the world, once and for all. In that event, there will be no need for HKB”H to pour out his wrath upon the wood and stones of the Temple’sstructure. Nonetheless, HKB”H informed Moshe that Yisroel were not yet worthy and the time for the future redemption had not yet arrived.Additionally, let us recall the words of the Tikunei Zohar (69, 112.): ”ואתפשטותיה דמשה בכל דרא ודראובכל צדיק וצדיק” — in other words, there is an extension of Moshe Rabeinu’s neshamah in every generation andin every tzaddik.

The Megaleh Amukos on Voeschanan(45) finds an allusion to this phenomenon in Moshe’sproclamation to Yisroel (Devorim 3, 26): “ויתעבר ה’ בי למענכם” — the word ” ויתעבר “ derives from the word“ibur,” which is a form of reincarnation. Thus, Moshe is telling the people that due to their transgressions and unworthiness, he will have to reincarnate in every generation and into every tzaddik--instead of bringing in the redemption himself, during his lifetime.“How Will I Be Able to Bear the Burden Alone”after My Brother Aharon’s Decease. We can now begin to comprehend, to some small degree, Moshe Rabeinu’s heartfelt outpouring and open rebuke of Yisroel: “איכה אשא לבדי טרחכם ומשאכם וריבכם” — how can I bear your trouble and your burden and your quarrels alone? In other words, so long as my brother Aharon — the ultimate peacemaker —was alive, he assisted me by promoting peace between the members of Yisroel.Now, however, that Aharon has passed away onHor HaHar, I have been left alone; how am I to bear this burden alone? I am not capable of eradicating the “sinas chinam” and resolving the disputes alone.Notwithstanding, I will not abandon you, but rather:“הבו לכם אנשים חכמים ונבונים וידועים לשבטיכם”— appoint for yourselves wise, capable men, i.e. the tzaddikim and leaders of each and every generation;ואשימם בראשיכם” “ — and I will reincarnate into them.Through them, I will teach you the ways of Hashem and how to overcome the nasty attribute of “sinas chinam,”senseless hatred.By means of his faculty of divine inspiration —“ruach hakodesh” — Moshe foresaw the causes ofthe destruction of the two Temples. He realized that“sinas chinam” would prevail among the leaders of Yisroel during the period of the first Beis HaMikdosh;outwardly, they acted friendly toward one another,but, in reality, they did not hesitate to stab each other in the back. This “sinas chinam” among the leaders of Yisroel led to the prevalence of “sinas chinam”among the people of Yisroel during the period of the Parshas Devorim 5771 | 4second Beis HaMikdosh.

Therefore, Moshe cried out from the depths of his being: ” “ואשימם בראשיכם— the blame for the people’s tragic failure, their baseless hatred, lies with the leaders; the leaders failed to guide the masses properly due to their own shortcomings in this matter.We can now shed light on the meaning of the Midrash: ”אילו זכיתם הייתם קוראים בתורה איכה אשא לבדי” — had you been meritorious, it would have sufficed for you to recite from the Torah the possuk relatingMoshe’s rebuke of the people concerning quarrels and“sinas chinam”; had you taken the message to heart,by putting aside your differences and learning to love and appreciate one another, the Beis HaMikdosh would not have been destroyed. ” ועכשיו שלא זכיתם “ — now,however, that you were not meritorious and did not heedMoshe’s words of rebuke: “הרי אתם קוראים איכה ישבהבדד” — you are forced to recite the lamentations of Eichah, in the aftermath of the destruction of the Beis HaMikdosh due to baseless hatred, “sinas chinam.”

Alas, we can also understand why parshas Devorimis always read on the Shabbos before Tisha B’Av.This parsha contains Moshe’s Rabeinu’s rebuke ofYisroel:” — ”איכה אשא לבדי טרחכם משאכם וריבכם how will I carry alone your trouble, your burden and your quarrels? Reading and hearing this rebuke, is intended to convey the lesson of the Midrash. Had we heeded Moshe’s words of rebuke: ” ,“איכה אשא לבדיwe would not have to recite on Tisha B’Av: “איכה ישבה בדד” . In the final analysis, we must comprehend the tragic consequences of “sinas chinam” and be motivated to perform teshuvah fully to eradicate “sinas chinam”from our midst. In this merit, we will realize the final and complete redemption and will no longer need to recite the lamentation of: איכה ישבה בדד .

NOTE:
I posted this because Dr. Fox is a good friend, a yarei shamayim who is both highly intelligent and very well educated, and I am certain that it is valuable and deeply meaningful.  I personally cannot express an opinion about it, because it is of a area of Torah that I never learned and for which I have not yet developed any understanding or patience or appreciation.  If you have comments, they will have to be discussed among yourselves without my participation.