Ki Seitzei. Osek B'Mitzvah, Tzedaka during Davening

The rule of Oseik B'Mitzvah is that while engaged in one mitzvah, you are pattur from other mitzvos. 

Did you know that the din of עוסק במצוה is relevant to Parshas Ki Seitzei? The Tzitz Eliezer (19:41:14) says that the reason our parsha says that a newlywed should not join the army is because being home and forging a unbreakable relationship with his wife is part of the mitzvah of marriage. On the basis of עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה, therefore, he is exempted from military service that would take him away from home. The same is true regarding one who built a new house or planted an orchard - because establishing these things is under the rubric of settling Eretz Yisrael.  He notes that the Netziv, the Aruch HaShulchan, and others clearly say the opposite, but he holds what he holds. 

יד) ונראה פשוט דיסוד הפטור של נשא אשה או בנה בית או חילל כרמו דהוא מתורת דין של העוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה ובכאן התורה פטרתו משום כך ביציאה והתרחקות שתגרום לו אי הקיום 

ומפני כך מוציא הרמב"ם בה' מלכים שם בה' י"ר מן הכלל בזה את הבונה בית או נטע כרם בחו"ל ופוסק שאינו חוזר עליהם והיינו מכיון דבחו"ל ליכא מצוה בחינוך בית או חילול כרם 

ומקור דברי הרמב"ם בזה הוא מהירושלמי בסוטה בפ"ח ה"ד דאיתא יכול הבונה בית בחו"ל יהא חוזר ת"ל ולא חנכו את שמצוה לחנכו [שהדירה בא"י מצוה ק״ע] יצא זה שאינו מצוה לחנכו. ועוד איתא שם בהלכה ה' יכול הנוטע כרם בחו"ל יהא חוזר ת"ל ולא חללו את שמצוה לחללו יצא זה שאין מצוה להללו יעו"ש בשירי קרבן בה"ד. 

הרי כנז' ושהפטור מפני עסיקה במצוה ויעוין גם במג"א או"ח סימן תקס"ח סק"ה במ"ש דחנוכת הבית בא"י הוי סעודת מצוה אבל לא בחו"ל ע"ש ועיין גם בב"מ ד' ק"א ע"ש 

ועפי"ז מתיישבת בפשיטות הקושיא שראיתי בספר מעיל שמואל [פלורינטין] בחידושיו על הרמב"ם שבסוה"ס שכותב להקשות שלא ידע למה לא כתב הרמב"ם בהי"ד שם נמי נושא אשה ור"ל שיזכיר בהלכה זו גם נושא אשה שאינו חוזר עליה אם נשא בחו"ל ונשאר בקושיא 

אבל לפי לא אבל לפי האמור לא קשיא כלל והיינו מפני שמקור דברי הרמב"ם הוא מהירושלמי ושמה ג"כ לא נזכר מנשא אשה ומפני שבאשה באמת כן חוזר עליה גם אם נשא אותה בחו"ל דהא כל הטעם שבבנה בית ונטע כרם בחו"ל דאינו חוזר הוא מפני דבחו"ל אין בהן מצוה וכדכתיב מפורש גם בירושלמי אבל משא"כ בנשא אשה דבודאי איכא מצוה גם בנשא בחו"ל דאיננה תלויה בארץ אלא היא חובת הגוף א"כ גם בנשא בחו"ל חוזר ולכן במתכוון לא הזכיר הרמב"ם בהי"ד גם נשא אשה מפני דנשא אשה שאני ובאמת חוזר עליה אפילו בנשא בחו"ל

This ends the direct connection to our parsha, such as it is. 

Now the question of the moment: We are all familiar with פרוטה דרב יוסף. Oseik patters even tzedaka. What about davening? If one is davening, does the rule of עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה apply to the meshulachim, or the gabbaim, that ask for tzedaka?

Giving Tzedaka before davening is wonderful, as the Mechaber says in OC 92:10, טוב ליתן צדקה קודם  תפלה. Giving Tzedaka during Vayevareich David is fine, a common hanhaga following the lead of the Ari zal. It's just pesukei d'zimra. But what about during davening proper?

1. The Rama (OC 38:8, אֲבָל אִם יָכוֹל לַעֲשׂוֹת שְׁתֵּיהֶן כְּאַחַת בְּלֹא טֹרַח, יַעֲשֶׂה שְׁתֵּיהֶן,) paskens like the Ran, that osek only patters when doing the second would require some degree of tircha - interfereing with or at least interrupting the first. (Tosfos bk 57b says Oseik applies only where there is serious tircha, the Ran Sukkah Rif 11a says any tircha at all.)  Therefore, the question is not relevant to most people, for one of two reasons.
       A. For one group of people, it will not interfere with tefilla because they have no kavana anyway.
       B. For another group, it will not interfere with tefilla because they will be able to retain their clear focus on tefilla even while giving the tzedaka.
But it does matter to those people in Group C.
       C. People who generally have kavana in davening, and for whom giving tzedaka will diminish or interrupt their kavana.

My categorization is not sophistry, it's true.  Group A needs no citation - most of us are Group A. But I found Groups B and C in Rav Binyamin Zilber's peirush on Rabbeinu Yona's Sefer HaYira, his Mekor HaYirah. Rav Zilber is in Group B, and lehavdil bein chaim l'chaim Reb Chaim Kanievsky is in Group C.

In Siman 75, Rabbeinu Yona says 

עה. ואל ירמוז בעיניו ויקרוץ בשפתיו וימלול ברגליו ויורה באצבעותיו, כי תועבת ה׳ כל עושה אלה

Rav Zilber, in his peirush, says 

 מיהו לדבר מצור. לכ״ע מותר בפרשה שניה,.... לפיכך מותר ליתן פרוטה לעני בפרשה שניה. 

Rav Zilber is saying that since it is not assur to gesture during the second parsha of Krias Shema, that it's not considered a zilzul or a hefsek, so it is also muttar to give tzedaka at that point.
In the back of the sefer he brings that Reb Chaim Kanievsky wrote a letter to him saying that even given that it's muttar as far as dinei hefsek are concerned, the rule of Oseik would patter.

אות ע״ה מותר ליתן פרוטה לעני בפרשה שני'. ומ״מ נראה דפטור משום עוסק במצוה. 

Rav Zilber responded with the Rama that oseik only patters if it's a disturbance, and this is not a disturbance, certainly if the person prepares coins for the ani to take while you're davening..

אות עה. לענין נתינת צדקה בפרשת שני׳ של ק״ש נראה דאינו פטור משום עוסק במצוה — ע״פ מה שפסק הג״ה בסי׳ ל״ח ראם יכול לעשות שתיהן כאחת בלא טורח יעשה שתיהן. ובנתינת צדקה  לעני באמצע ק״ש מיקרי דאפשר לעשות שתיהן אם יכין לזה לפני התפלה.

Reb Chaim wrote back that giving during davenning shters kavana, and even leaving coins and having people take them shters kavana.

ולאחר חליפת מכתבים עם הרה״ג שליט״א הנ״ל.....כתב לי בזה״ל: ומלבד זה אין דברי מעכת״ר שליט״א מיושבים אצלי שאין חייב להכין לפני התפלה מעות שמא יבא עני ומי יודע אם יבא ואיך ישמרם כל התפלה ואין ספק שיפריע •הכונה, ובאמצע התפלה בודאי יצטרך להפסיק. והו״ל אין יכול לקיים שניהם עכ״ד. 

ובמכתב אחר כתב לי וז׳׳ לומ״מ אינו נוגע כ׳׳ז לנ״ד ]אם יש חיוב באפשר לקיים שתיהן[ דא״א לקיים שניהם כמש״כ וכן שמעתי בהדיא מאדם גדול בעל הוראה שפסק כן למעשה שאין חיוב לתת כאמצע התפלה. ומקודם כתב לי בזה״ל בענין צדקה באמצע התפלה: וכי אני כתבתי שאין בזה משום מדת חסידות אני רק כתבתי שע״פ דין אין שום חיוב להכין קודם שבא העני מספק וכו' וגם -אני יודע בעצמי שאם אני מכין לפני התפלה זה מפריע לי בכוונת התפלה עכ״ד. 

So Rav Zilber ended up by saying that he doesn't get why it would shter anyone's kavana. It doesn't shter his, he says. Just stop for a moment, give the tzedka, and go back to davening, or certainly it should be fine to just leave coins on your table and let people take them.

והנה מי שמרגיש שזה מפריע לו לכוונת התפלה בוודאי אין בזה גם משום מילי דחסידות ולפעמים נקרא -גם הדיוט. אבל ראיתי לרבנן קשישאי שמדקדקים להכין על העמוד פרוטות לעניים וע״ז בודאי נוכל להמליץ שאין כ להטבעים שוים, ובל לבבות דורש ד׳. אבל מצד המציאות קשה להבין למה זה יפריע שהרי יכול להפסיק איזה שניות אפילו אם אינו מכין פרוטות לפני התפלה, ול״ד למה שהזהרו האחרונים שהגבאים לא ילכו לקבץ צדקה בזמן קריאת התורה. 

2. So we have Rav Chaim Kanievsky that says that osek does patter. However, as brought in Derech Emunah and Ishei Yisrael, he holds that one may give if one so desires, despite the Ritva. 

דרך אמונה (מתנות עניים פרק י ציון ההלכה ס”ק צו) וקובץ שערי הוראה (קובץ ב’ עמ’ קמא)

3. However, some poskim strongly discourage it: Rav ShZ Auerbach, brought in Halichos Shlomo I:7:4 says that it should be discouraged, and Rav Chaim Falagi in Tzedala LeChaim (6:4) says it is wrong to collect during davening because it damages kavana, and the Meiam Loez says the same thing (Parshas Vayigash page 785)

4. There are those that want to be mattir based on the shitah of the Nesivos that Oseik only applies to a chiyuvis, not a kiyumis, and tefilla might be derabanan, but only kiyumis on the deoraysa level. I don't like this approach. It may be kiyumis and derabanan in the abstract, but the concept of tefilla, and the din of tefilla, is a regular chiyuvis. Once you're davening, you're being mekayeim a chiyuv deoraysa.

5. Rabbi Krasner, in his Nachlas Shimon on Rus (I:1:nn38) brings the Sdei Chemed (V:Ayin:45) that brings from the Tshuvos Sheim Aryeh that a mitzva bein adam lamakom does not patter bein adam lechaveiro; so tefilla, lechoyra, would not patter tzedaka. 
Unfortunately, and as creative as that opinion is, nobody agrees with him, and it's hard to justify the shittah.

6. Let's say you're pattur. The Peirush on the Rambam, Michtam l'David, written by Rav David Hassan, a talmid of the Or HaChaim, says (at the end of Hilchos Sanhedrin,)  that davka when you're pattur, that's when you ought to give.

וע״פ האמור בענין יאמר נא כוונת הפ׳ כה אמר ה׳ שמרו משפט ועשו צדקה כי קרובה ישועתי וכו׳ והוא דכבר כתבנו דאם עוסק במצוה פטור מליתן לעני צדקה בא הכתוב ליתן בו מצוה ולהזהיר האדם דאע”פ כן יעשה צדקה אפי’ בשעה שהוא פטור ממנה והוא אומרו שמרו משפט ועשו צדקה פי’ לפי [ש]בשעה שאתם עוסקים במשפט נמצא שאתם עוסקים במצוה אף על פי כן יעשו צדקה ולזה לא אמר שמרו משפט וצדקה אלא ועשו צדקה שם רמז דס”ד שלא לעשות ויהיב טעמא כי ע”י זה קרובה ישועתי לבא כאומרם ז”ל ולזה צריכין לעשות לפנים משורת הדין דאה”נ דאין אתם חייבין אבל אינכם מקרבין הגאולה ובהכי לא תקשה מה טעםהוצרך לומר הטעם כי קרובה דבלאו הכי איכא מקום פטור

That reminds me of what Reb Aryeh Levin said. He used to visit people that were imprisoned by the British. Someone asked him who he saw that day, and when he named the prisoner, the person said "Oy, you visited that sheigitz? He's a rasha gamur, and the Rambam says on such a person that אסור לרחם עליו!!!" Reb Aryeh Levin answered, "Oy, אסור לרחם עליו?  Such a rachmanus, to be in a madreiga of אסור לרחם עליו. He certainly needs visitors."

7. I think that it's worth considering the confluence of tefilla and tzedaka. As Rav Binyamin Zilber ends by saying, more or less, if you're standing there asking the Ribono shel Olam to do you a favor, and a poor man comes over asking for a favor, and you ignore him, the smart money is not going to be on your getting  a favorable response from Hashem. So simply out of self interest, and to enhance your own tefilla, you might want to give the prutah to the ani. And, as RJ commented, we ought to keep in mind Avraham Avinu's behavior when Orchim appeared. (There are differences, such as the immediate need by orchim, but the idea is still valid.)

ובלא כל הנ״ל נראה דאין זו הפסק בתפלה שהרי נתינת צדקה הוי הכנה לתפלה כמו שאמרו ז״ל (ב״ב י׳) יהיב פרוטה לעני והדר מצלי שנאמר ואני בצדק אחזה פניך. וכיון שזה עצה לראות פני ד׳ כלומר שהלב מתקרב יותר אל ד׳ א״כ פשוט הוא רכל נתינה ונתינה משפיע על הלב. והאחרונים מביאים בשם האריז״ל ליתן צדקה בשעה שאומרים ואתה מושל בכל ולא חששו לא משום עוסק במצוה )דגם פסוקי דזמרד, הוי מצוד,( ולא משום ביטול כוונת התפלה. 

Ki Seitzei, Devarim 23:4. Little Things. They Were Unsympathetic. Also, They Hired Someone to Murder You.

Rav Mordechai Rogov (a Mirrer) in his Ateres Mordechai talks about the strange juxtaposition in the criticism of Amon and Moav- that they didn't come out to greet you with bread and water, and that they hired Bilaam to curse you, in the hope that you would all die.  This is like saying that they lack refinement, and they are monsters. Some answer by saying that if they would defend themselves by saying that they were poor, and they couldn't afford to give you anything, and they were afraid you would descend upon them and impoverish them, then how did they manage to find the enormous amounts of money they offered Bilaam to curse you?  

Harav Rogov simply answers that the foundation of murder is indifference.

This reminds me of something written by Agamben.  Harav Rogow doesn't need support from Agamben, but Rav Rogow was famously brief and expressed his deep thoughts with disarming simplicity, so it's interesting to see the idea elaborated in modern language.  I took the following from Wikipedia.  The basic idea is that the first and essential step taken by a society before countenancing or even encouraging murder is removing the victim’s identity as an equal, as a citizen, and someone like yourself.  

Homo sacer (Latin for "the sacred man") is an obscure figure of Roman law: a person who is banned, may be killed by anybody, but may not be sacrificed in a religious ritual. The person is excluded from all civil rights, while his/her life is deemed "holy" in a negative sense.
  
Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben used this concept for his book Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Agamben describes the homo sacer as an individual who exists in the law as an exile. There is, he thinks, a paradox: It is only because of the law that society can recognize the individual as homo sacer, and so the law that mandates the exclusion is also what gives the individual an identity.
 Agamben holds that life exists in two capacities. One is natural biological life (Greek: Zoë) and the other is political life (Greek: bios). This zoeis related by Agamben himself to Hannah Arendt's description of the refugee's "naked life" in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). The effect of homo sacer is, he says, a schism of one's biological and political lives. As "bare life", the homo sacer finds himself submitted to the sovereign's state of exception, and, though he has biological life, it has no political significance.
 Agamben says that the states of homo sacer, political refugees, those persecuted in the Holocaust, and the "enemy combatants" imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay and other sites are similar. As support for this, he mentions that the Jews were stripped of their citizenship before they were placed in concentration camps.
 Thus, Agamben argues, "the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man prove to be completely unprotected at the very moment it is no longer possible to characterize them as rights of the citizens of a state", following in this Hannah Arendt's reasoning concerning the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which tied human rights to civil rights. Although human rights were conceived of as the ground for civil rights, the privation of those civil rights (as, for example, in the case of stateless people or refugees) made them comparable to "savages", many of whom were exterminated, as Arendt showed, during the New Imperialism period. Arendt's thought is that respect of human rights depends on the guarantee of civil rights, and not the other way around, as argued by the liberal natural rights philosophers.

Along the same lines, from George Bernard Shaw,  "The worst sin towards our fellow creatures is not to hate them, but to be indifferent to them: That's the essence of inhumanity."

To me, the most interesting thing about this is the insight we gain into “ve’ahavta le’rei’acha kamocha.”  Kamocha is not a shiur, it’s essential to the idea of respect of another human being.  If you take away the kamocha, you might come to stripping him of his identity as a fellow human being, you might eventually be indifferent to his right to life.  Amon and Moav didn’t see you as human; if they had, they would have offered you something to eat and drink.  Once they ‘otherified’ you, it was an easy step to cursing and attacking you.

Elie Wiesel said this in a powerful way.  He was quoted in the US News & World Report (27 October 1986) as having said

The opposite of love is not hate, it's indifference. The opposite of beauty is not ugliness, it's indifference. The opposite of faith is not heresy, it's indifference. And the opposite of life is not death, but indifference between life and death.

Update Ellul ayin vov/September 2016
I saw that Reb Yaakov (a Slabodker) here in 21:23, in his Emes L'Yaakov, talks about the Torah's apparent double warning not to leave an executed criminal's body hanging- לא תלין נבלתו על העץ וגו' ולא תטמא את אדמתך.  He shows that the words   ולא תטמא את אדמתך are another way of saying that leaving the body hanging will result in more murders committed. Why? Because the natural sense that human beings have a divine element, and have infinite value, will be depreciated upon seeing the disgraced body- not only the disgraced body, but the fact that it was disgraced by other people. So here, too, in sequential parshios in Ki Seitzei, we see that you don't prevent homicide by telling people that (as Reb Yomtov Ehrlich puts it!) killing people is not nice.  You have to start far, far before that- you have to teach people to be respectful and to see the divine in their fellow human beings.

כ"א כ"ג לא תלין נבלתו על העץ וגו' כי קללת אלקים תלוי ולא תטמא את אדמתך פירש"י וז"ל כי קללת אלקים תלוי זלזולו של מלך שאדם עשוי בדמות דיוקנו כו' כל הרואה אותו אומר המלך הוא תלוי וכו' 

והנה עיין ברמב"ן שהעלה דטעם דולא תטמא את אדמתך הוא לאו מיוחד לארץ ישראל והיינו דהמלין את התלוי עובר בארץ ישראל בלאו נוסף של טומאת הארץ והרי הוא עובר בשני לאוין ועשה ובחוץ לארץ כלאו ועשה ועיי"ש 

ולפענ"ד ביאור הענין הוא עפ"י דברי רש"י הנ"ל דהתליה הוא ביזוי לצלם אלקים דהרי כשמתבזה צלם אלקים זה גורם לשפיכות דמים וכמש"כ בפרשת נח ט' פ"ה ואך את  דמכם לנפשתיכם אדרש גו' כי בצלם אלקים עשה את האדם והיינו שהאזהרה לשפיכות דמים היא משום שהאדם עשוי בצלם אלקים וא"כ כשמבזה את הצלם הרי הוא מרבה שפיכות דמים ושפיכות דמים גורם לטומאת הארץ וכדכתיב לעיל בפרשת מסעי ל"ה פל"ג ולארץ לא יכפר לדם אשר שפך בה כי אם בדם שפכו ולא תטמא את הארץ אשר אתם ישבים בה וגו' וכן איתא ביומא דף פ"ה ע"א ושפיכות דמים מטמא את הארץ וגורם לשכינה שתסתלק מישראל והביא רש"י פסוק דה בפרשת מסעי ולכן כארץ ישראל ישנו טעם נוסף של ולא תטמא את אדמתך דהבזיון לצלם אלקים כהכרח יגרום הוספה בטומאת הארץ ודו"ק היטב 

In light of these two observations about homicide, and the Rashi about Ben Soreir uMoreh, the Parsha is teaching us the aleph beis of Mussar: Seemingly minor ethical debasement, left unaddressed, can lead to the most brutal and bestial behavior. A pegam in middos can lead to the worst aveiros if left uncorrected.

(The Rashi in 21:11-

וְרָאִיתָ בַּשִּׁבְיָה אֵשֶׁת יְפַת תֹּאַר וְחָשַׁקְתָּ בָהּ וְלָקַחְתָּ לְךָ לְאִשָּׁה:

and you see among the captives a beautiful woman and you desire her, you may take [her] for yourself as a wife.

ולקחת לך לאשה: לא דברה תורה אלא כנגד יצר הרע. שאם אין הקב"ה מתירה ישאנה באיסור. אבל אם נשאה, סופו להיות שונאה, שנאמר אחריו (פסוק טו) כי תהיין לאיש וגו' וסופו להוליד ממנה בן סורר ומורה, לכך נסמכו פרשיות הללו:

[and you desire her,] you may take [her] for yourself as a wife: [Not that you are commanded to take this woman as a wife,] but Scripture [in permitting this marriage] is speaking only against the evil inclination [, which drives him to desire her]. For if the Holy One, blessed is He, would not permit her to him, he would take her illicitly. [The Torah teaches us, however, that] if he marries her, he will ultimately come to despise her, as it says after this, “If a man has [two wives-one beloved and the other despised]” (verse 15); [moreover] he will ultimately father through her a wayward and rebellious son (see verse 18). For this reason, these passages are juxtaposed. — [Tanchuma 1]  )

Update Ellul pei gimmel: 

I just saw the following from R Yitzchok Epstein in his Ichud b'Chiddud

A third מהלך we heard is as follows. The  גמרא in Sanhedrin 103b:

תניא רבי נתן אומר מגרב לשילה ג' מילין והיה עשן המערכה ועשן פסל מיכה מתערבין זה בזה בקשו מלאכי השרת לדוחפו אמר להן הקב"ה הניחו לו שפתו מצויה לעוברי דרכים

So we see that even for the חטא of avodah Zarah, Hashem is מאריך אף  as long as you’re being  אורחים מכניס & doing חסד!

In the end, after בלעם came to curse the Yidden, he gave them the עצה to be מכשיל the Yidden with עריות. Says the פסוק, if the מואבים would have offered the Yidden food & drink, יתכן that even with the עבירה they did, 'ד would have been אף מאריך & let them join the ranks of כלל ישראל !So that is why both are mentioned.

Ki Seitzei: Irony

Chazal tell us that an object that kills a man must be buried. It should be buried near its victim, but the essential point is that the item must be buried. 

For example, Sanhedrin 45b

אחת אבן שנסקל בה ואחת עץ שנתלה עליו ואחד סייף שנהרג בו ואחד סודר שנחנק בו כולן נקברין עמו 

(Regarding individuals executed by the Sanhedrin.) "All - the boulder with which he was stoned, the gallows on which he was hanged, the sword with which he was killed, the strip of cloth with which he was choked - all of them are to be buried with him."
Rashi

כולם נקברים עמו - מקבור תקברנו יתירא נפקא לן לקמן בפירקא (דף מו:):

(It's not as clear on 46b, so I brought it from 45b.


Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein, in the Teshuvos in back of his sefer on Bamidbar, talks about a person who purchased a gun that had been used to kill a Jew, and the question was whether it must be buried.  He says that the halacha we are discussing here would apply only to the bullet, but not to the gun, and therefore the gun does not have to be buried.

(I haven't gone through the sugya recently, but I don't understand why, if this is true, the Gemara would say that the gallows require kevura, since it was not the instrument of his death.  The court never executes anyone on the gallows.  Only after the person was executed by other means was his body hanged for a moment.  Evidently, it's enough that the gallows was part of his death sentence, even if not used to cause his death; if the gallows has to be buried, how much more so should a gun be buried!)

But that is not the focus of this post.  What I found interesting was the contrast between Rav Zilberstein's psak and something I saw on Quora.  Quora is a website where people pose questions, others propose answers, and the answers are ranked by popular vote- what they call up-votes.

The question posed was

Which individual gun been used to claim the most human lives? What is its story?

The most "up-voted" answer, with seventy two thousand views, was offered by one Samuel Lim.

Oh boy, Ive been waiting for this one. I have a weapon with a not so illustrious history of service. The one-and-only...

Number 19074 Model 10 Browning FN

Images courtesy of: Browning FN Model 1910: The first shots of WWI

I can't even begin to do you justice by describing the kill count of this little peashooter, but suffice it to say that it is responsible for EVERY MILITARY CASUALTY OF THE 20th CENTURY PAST 1914.
Yup. A bit sensationalist of me? No, this was the firearm that Gavrilo Princip used to gun down the Austrian Archduke, starting the chain of events that culminated not only in the Great War, but also the Second World War. Who knows how the 20th century would have played out if this gun had jammed? We will never know.

So on the one hand you have Harav Zilberstein, saying that the din that the instrument of a man's death must be buried is limited to the bullet, and does not apply to the gun. On the other hand, you have Mr. Lim's observation that the weapon responsible for more deaths than any other weapon was this pistol. It's sort of ironic, in that the lamdan focuses on the naked physical fact, while Mr. Lim sees a deeper truth. How do you like that illustration of the difference between people-logic and Halacha-logic.


I am not, chalila, criticizing R Zilberstein's psak. We define "cause" contextually. In Bava Kamma, this point is hammered in countless times in the sugyos of Gramma and Garmin and the difference between liability in a court here on Earth and liability in a Heavenly court. Another example- when the daughters of Yisro told their father that Ish Mitzri, an Egyptian man, saved us from the other shepherds, it has been said that this was true. Moshe was not an Egyptian, but he was on the run from the Egyptian police for having killed the Egyptian man who attacked a Jew, so ultimately, it was the Egyptian that set in motion the chain of events that brought Moshe to Yisro.  But perhaps Mr. Lim's response should help us to realize that even if the din of  קבור תקברנו technically does not apply to a gun, the horrors it set in motion make it so repugnant as to be unworthy of continued existence.

If this were to be on a Parsha, it belongs in Ki Seitzei, Devarim 21:23, on  כי קבר תקברנו.

Here's the relevant part of Rav Zilberstein's teshuva.

תשובה קנ"ז

נאמר בקול מבשר ח"א סי' ﬠ"ח שחבל תליה שהנאצים ימש"ו תלו עליו יהודים קדושים הי"ד, אסור בהנאה וחייב קבורה ןזאת ﬠפ"י השאילת יﬠב"ץ ח"ב סימן קנ"ח שכתב לענין השאלה שהביא בלה"פ ליו"ד סי" ח' שאיש אחד קנה סייף מאת התליין הממונה להרוג מחויבי מיתה וﬠשה ממנו סכין של שחיטה. וכתב היּﬠב"ץ שיש לחוש בזה משום איסורי הנאה שכך בהרוגי בי"ד שנו חכמים סייף שנהרג בו נקבר ﬠמן ביחוד אם דן בו ישראל ואﬠ"ג דשלא כדין הרגו פשיטא דיש לחוש. ﬠ"כ.

.....

ובע"ז ס"ב: כתב רשי'י בד"'ה כולם נקברין ﬠמו דהע והאבן והסייף והסודר אסורים בהנאה וזאת כוונת היﬠב"ץ. ואף שהלכה זו נאמרה בהרוגי בי"ד מ"מ כיון שמפורש בסנהדרין מ"ו: ולא זו בלבד אמרו אלא כל המלין מתו ﬠובר בלא תעשה ובגמ' שם דריש ליה מרבוי דלאו דוקא בהרוגי בי"ד אלא גם כל שאר מתים יש בהם מ"ע ול"ת דלא תלין יﬠוי"ש

........

ובנוגע לאקדח, לא הוא הורג כי אם הכדור שיש בו אבק שריפה והברזל הוא ההורג והאקדח רק מצית את האבק, ודופק עליו, ומפﬠילו, אבל הוא ﬠצמו אינו משמש כלי מות, ולכן אין חיוב לקוברו

There's also a line attributed to Reb Yehuda HaChasid to this effect-

סכין או חרב שנהרג בו יהודי אסור ליהנות ממנו כי סכנה גדולה הוא לכל בני ביתו ולכל אשר יהנו ממנו, אך יקברוהו עם הנהרג.

And finally, it is important to know that although Rashi says this is a drasha, the Rambam (15 Sanhedrin 9) says that this halacha of burying the gallows is only to prevent his memory from being shamed.  It is a chesed for the man that was killed, not a drasha from a passuk.  If so, the rule only applies where keeping the object might result in disgrace for the person who was killed with it. Obviously, the Yaavetz held like Rashi.

Shema Koleinu

This was inspired by something Reb Chaim B wrote, and much of it is a restatement of his words.  Most of what's not Reb Chaim's is my wife's, Malkie's.  

-   Boswell   -

In דברים כא,יח, in the parsha of בן סורר ומורה it says איננו שמע בקול אביו ובקול אמו.  What terrible crime is he guilty of that is described as איננו שמע בקלנו?  What is the added word koleinu, when it could say eileinu?  

In Parshas Breishis, Hashem chastises Adam Harishon for the sin of the Etz Hadaas, saying (Breishis 3:17) כי שמעת לקול אשתך. What is added with the word לקול?  The Or Hachaim says 

שקבל דברי אשתו ולא בדק אחריה ונמשך לו מזה שאכל מן העץ. ודקדק לומר לקול, לרמוז שלא בחן בדבריה, אלא להברת דבריה, שאמרה לו קח ואכול אכל, והיה לו לשאול מאיזה עץ לקחה. 

According to the Or Hachaim, "Kol" is different than dibbur or amira, kol is what he calls the havara.  I translate that to mean the tone, or we might say "the voice" as opposed to "the words."  By Chava, the problem was that Adam listened to her enticing voice without carefully thinking about what she was saying.  

Applying this to our question by בן סורר ומורה, we see that the problem is not just that he doesn't listen to what they tell him, it is that he is indifferent to what they want to impart as parents.  He has disassociated himself from them to the point that he is indifferent to the mesorah and the way of life and the beliefs that a child would naturally absorb from his parents.

Yirmiahu (9:11) says 

 מי האיש החכם ויבן את זאת ואשר דבר פי  ה' אליו ויגדה; על מה אבדה הארץ, נצתה כמדבר מבלי עבר. ויאמר ה' על עזבם את תורתי אשר נתתי לפניהם ולא שמעו בקולי ולא הלכו בה. וילכו אחרי שררות לבם ואחרי הבעלים אשר למדום אבותם

The Gemara in Nedarim 81a and BM 85a-b explains what it was that the people did not understand.  Evidently, although there was reshaim, the people as a whole did the Mitzvos and learned Torah.  Why would the majority be punished for the sins of the minority?  The zechus of the rabbim should have protected them!  Nobody could understand what was happening, until the Ribono shel Olam explained it, על עזבם את תורתי אשר נתתי לפניהם ולא שמעו בקולי ולא הלכו בה.  But that can't be taken literally, because if they had abandoned the Torah, the question would not have been so hard to answer.  The Gemara explains that they didn't make a bracha before learning Torah.  The Ran explains that they didn't learn Torah out of a desire to understand the thoughts of the Ribono shel Olam, they only learned in order to pasken the halacha.   According to the Ran's pshat, they considered learning Torah to have value only as a hechsher, and you don't make a bracha on a hechsher mitzva.  But it is still hard to understand, it this is such a terrible  aveira that their Torah and Mitzvos lost the ability to be meigin? Would not their high level of learning, the מאור שבה, have eventually brought them back to where they should have been?
With the Or Hachaim we can explain it.  There is the letter of the law and the spirit of the law.  If a person only follows the technical halacha but does not allow the meaning and spirit of the mitzvos to come into his heart and mind, his mitzvos mean very little.  Not only do his mitzvos mean little, but it is a terrible sin to be an expert in the letter of the law, and yet remain resolutely tone deaf to the moral and ethical aspect, to know the Dibros but not pay attention to the Kol.    When such people do mitzvos, it is the act of a vassal that has no choice but to do as his master demands.  This is not the loving relationship of an eved Hashem.  It is inevitable that such Shemiras HaMitzvos will ultimately degenerate into behavior that is completely inconsistent with the Torah.  Such a people will twist the Torah and the Mitzvos into something unrecognizable.

Now that we have said this pshat in this Gemara, we will recognize that this is what Reb Yochanan means in his statement in Bava Metzia 30b.

אשר יעשון זו לפנים משורת הדין, דאמר ר' יוחנן לא חרבה ירושלים אלא על שדנו בה דין תורה. אלא דיני דמגיזתא לדיינו? אלא אימא שהעמידו דיניהם על דין תורה ולא עבדו לפנים משורת הדין

Steve Dubey pointed out that the early Reform movement recognized the great importance of the "Kol Hashem." They believed that this is the true essence of Judaism, and actual mitzvos don't matter.  All that matters, they said, is the spirit of the law, the refinement and social responsibility and tikkun olam.  Unfortunately, as it turned out, if you're not anchored by the taryag, then you will float away into something that has nothing to do with the Ribono shel Olam.  As the Chinuch says, without mitzvos maasiyos, philosophy is a will o' the wisp, and neither does it last nor does it have any deep effect. (Mitzva 16.   ועתה בני, אם בינה - שמעה זאת והטה אוזנך ושמע, אלמדך להועיל בתורה ובמצוות: דע, כי האדם נפעל כפי פעולותיו, ולבו וכל מחשבותיו תמיד אחר מעשיו שהוא עוסק בהם, אם טוב ואם רע)

Doing the mitzvos without hearing the kol, and claiming to hear the kol without doing the mitzvos, both violate the heart of the Torah and contradict the purpose of Klal Yisrael.  That's what the passuk in Yirmiah means.  על עזבם את תורתי אשר נתתי לפניהם ולא שמעו בקולי ולא הלכו בה.  If you do the mitzvos without hearing the kol, you're not really doing the mitzvos at all.  That's what caused the Churban.

When my wife spoke this past Shabbos, she connected this to Sarah's shema bekolah,  Rashi says that (Breishis 21:12) Avraham Avinu was mortified to hear what Sarah Imeinu said about sending Yishmael and Hagar away.  Indeed, her words were terrible.  But when you understand what lies behind them, you will follow them, because you will discern the Ruach Hakodesh behind her words.  Similarly, when Yitzchak said about his masked son "hakol kol yaakov,"  Rashi says it means with derech eretz and patience.

(When my Rosh Yeshiva and Rebbi, Rav Rudderman, was elderly and sick, he had to be hospitalized, and he lay in bed, speaking to no one, and refusing to eat.  Rabbi Neuberger called my father in Chicago, and asked him to fly in to Baltimore to see if he could somehow bring Rav Rudderman out of his terrible decline.  My father came in, and as soon as he walked into the room, Rav Rudderman sat up in bed and greeted him, and he took something to eat, and they spoke animatedly.  My father told him that he had been told that Rav Rudderman had not spoken to anyone for days, and they were very worried, and my father said he didn't understand, Rav Rudderman had plenty of talmidim gedolei Torah that he could talk to in learning.  Why didn't he talk to anyone but my father?  Rav Rudderman answered, it was true, he indeed had many talmidim he could talk to, but not one of them talked in the nusach of Slabodka.  Only my father could talk to him in the nusach of Slabodka.  And that unique kol, only that kol, made the difference between Rav Rudderman lying in bed so depressed that they feared for his life, and being animated and excited.)

If you truly have a connection to the Ribono shel Olam, then you don't merely follow His commandments, you try to discern what kind of person He wants you to become.  You realize that there are a myriad of things that distinguish an eved Hashem, and you will desire to incorporate as much of them into your life as possible.

This Kol of the Ribono shel Olam is not just His words, it is that which cannot be expressed in words.  In fact, sometimes, there is no sound at all....  
Eliahu had a vision in the cave, described in Shmuel 1:19.

ט ויבוא-שם אל-המערה, וילן שם; והנה דבר ה', אליו, ויאמר לו, מה-לך פה אלייהו.  י ויאמר קנוא קינאתי לה' אלוהי צבאות, כי-עזבו בריתך בני ישראל--את-מזבחותיך הרסו, ואת-נביאיך הרגו בחרב; ואיוותר אני לבדי, ויבקשו את-נפשי לקחתה.  יא ויאמר, צא ועמדת בהר לפני ה', והנה ה' עובר ורוח גדולה וחזק מפרק הרים ומשבר סלעים לפני ה', לא ברוח ה'; ואחר הרוח רעש, לא ברעש ה'.  יב ואחר הרעש אש, לא באש ה'; ואחר האש, קול דממה דקה.  יג ויהי כשמוע אלייהו, וילט פניו באדרתו, וייצא, ויעמוד פתח המערה; והנה אליו, קול, ויאמר, מה-לך פה אלייהו.  יד ויאמר קנוא קינאתי לה' אלוהי צבאות, כי-עזבו בריתך בני ישראל--את-מזבחותיך הרסו, ואת-נביאיך הרגו בחרב; ואיוותר אני לבדי, ויבקשו את-נפשי לקחתה.  טו ויאמר ה' אליו, לך שוב לדרכך מדברה דמשק; ובאת, ומשחת את-חזאל למלך--על-ארם.  טז ואת יהוא בן-נמשי, תמשח למלך על-ישראל; ואת-אלישע בן-שפט מאביל מחולה, תמשח לנביא תחתיך.

What does that mean,  ואחר האש, קול דממה דקה?  If its silent, it's not a kol.  The answer is that sometimes, silence speaks loudest. The Ribono shel Olam said to Eliahu, the time for Kanaus is over.  Now is the time to influence Klal Yisrael in a softer manner, not harshly but instead with a קול דממה דקה.  But Eliahu responded, again,  קנוא קינאתי , this is the only way I know to teach Klal Yisrael.  So Hashem said, the time has come for you to appoint a successor that knows how to talk to Klal Yisrael today.

When we say Selichos, we say, שמע קולנו ה' אלוהינו, חוס ורחם עלינו.  Ribono shel Olam, please listen to our Kol, listen to our tefillos, look how we supplicate and beg you.  What do you think the Ribono shel Olam answers?  Hashem answers, Shma bekoli.  Do the mitzvos, but don't just do them min hasafa velachutz.  Listen to My Kol.  Do the mitzvos and understand what kind of human beings I expect the mitzvos to make you, both din and lifnim mishuras hadin.   When you are שומע בקולי, then אשמע בקולכם.



Note:
Rav Avraham ben HaGra's pshat in the difference between Kol and Dibbur in his periush on Tefilla appears to be identical with the Ohr HaChaim, and he uses it to explain Shema Koleinu, as we did. Thank you to Harav Shmuel Yeshaya Keller from Telshe, Chicago, for the excellent mareh makom.  

שמע קולנו פי' שיש הבדל בין דבור לקול דיבור הוא להטעים את כונתו וקול הוא קול דברים היוצאים מרצון האדם בלא טעם כאשר בא הצווי אל אברהם כל אשר תאמר אליך שרה שמע בקולה גם שלא ישרו בעיניך וכן אמר עקב אשר שמע אברהם בקולי ולא הרהר אחרי וכן וידר ישראל נדר לה' ויאמר אם נתן תתן את העם הזה בידי  והחרמתי את עריהם וישמע ה' בקול ישראל ויתן את הכנעני בידם ואמר בקול ישראל כי נדר הזה לא היה לו טעם לדעת המקום ברוך הוא ולא היה חפץ בזה כי מעל ישראל בחרם אצל יריחו אף על פי כן שמע בקולם וכן וידום השמש וירח עמד עד יקום גוי אויביו הלא היא כתובה על ספר הישר וגו' ולא היה כיום ההוא לפניו ולאחריו לשמוע ה' בקול איש כי ה' נלחם לישראל ורז"ל דרשו על ספר הישר זה ספר בראשית שנזכרו בו מעשי אבות ומה ענינו לכאן ולפי דרכנו יתכן שלא היה ביום ההוא לשמוע ה' בקול איש מעולם האזין תפלת ישראל שהיה לצורך וכאן היה רק קול דברים עד יקום גוי אויביו הלא ה' נלחם לישראל למה ישנה טבע מערכות שמים בחנם להעמיד השמש בחצי השמים הרבה שלוחים למקום להשמידם אבל היה לשלם זכות אבותינו שהיו שומעים לחוקי אלהים אשר לא השיגו טעמיהן ועשו בלבב שלם כן שילם ה' לבניהם וזהו טעם הלא היא כתובה על ספר הישר טעם זה מעשי האבות שהיו עושין רצון המקום בלי טעם כן שילם ה' לבניהם וזהו שאנו מתפללים שמע קולנו גם שאין זכות עשה עמנו בזכות אבותינו 

Ki Seitzei, Devarim 25:1, Lo Yilbash and Men's Hair Dye. לא ילבש גבר שמלת אשה

The Mechaber (YD 182:6) says that it is assur for a man to dye his hair.

אסור לאיש ללקט אפילו שער אחד לבן מתוך השחורות, משום "לא ילבש גבר", וכן אסור לאיש לצבוע (שערות לבנות שיהיו) (ב"י) שחורות, אפילו שערה אחת

However, if a man is afraid that his white hair makes him look old and it will jeopardize his job, Reb Moshe (YD I:82 and YD II:61) and Reb Moshe Mordechai Epstein (Teshuvos 24) say that it is muttar for him to dye his hair.  He is not motivated by an effeminate desire to be beautiful, he just wants to keep his job and earn a living.  This can also be found in the Sefer Chasidim (siman 379,) where a man was advised by his friends to dye his hair to improve his shidduch prospects.  It is apparent that Reb Yehuda HaChasid's only concern was the duplicity, not the halacha of Lo Yilbash.

אמרו לאחד: אישה פלונית יפה במקום פלוני, היא חפצה בך. שמע לעצתנו, ולך שמה ותצבע שעריך בשחור, ותהיה סבורה שאינך זקן, והיא תאמר מה שבלבה. אמר להם: חלילה לי להטעות אותה אלא תראה שאני זקן

Similarly, see Tosfos Nazir 59a DH Mabul and Tshuvos HaRashba brought in Beis Yosef 182 that כל שאינו עושה משום נוי שרי.  I assume that a toupe is subject to the same analysis, and I know one yarei shamayim, who wears a toupe for business reasons.  He does not wear it when he's not in a work environment.  Because this man asks Rav Shmuel Kaminetsky before doing anything questionable, I assume he does this pursuant to a psak halacha.

The question is, what would the halacha be today, when many men dye their hair for appearance' sake. Would the issur no longer apply?  Would it be muttar to dye your hair just for appearance' sake? (See article in the Los Angeles Times that discusses the two motivations we mentioned and cites statistics on the growing trend of men dying their hair.)  It appears obvious that the halacha would change as social behaviors change.  Almost everyone relies on this when they look at the mirror or wear deodorant or cologne, leaving aside the question of whether this reliance is applied too broadly.  We know that in biblical times, many men wore earrings.  Now, it probably would be assur for a man to wear earrings.  Does this apply to dying hair?

On the one hand, the teshuvos we cited are not proof of hetter, because they were addressing cases where the person was motivated only by a need to achieve a specific goal of parnassah or shidduch, while we are talking about a behavior motivated by what the Gemara considers a feminine obsession with appearance and a desire to disguise one's age and maintain an illusion of youth.  On the other hand, it is no longer something associated only with women.  

This might be a machlokes between the Mechaber and the Rema in YD 182:6.  

In some places, men would absolutely not shave the hair under their arms.  In other places, men would commonly do so.  The Mechaber says, quoting the Rambam (12 AZ 9), 

המעביר שער בית השחי ובית הערוה אפילו במספרים כעין תער היו מכין אותו מכת מרדות בד"א במקום שאין מעבירין אותו אלא נשים כדי שלא יתקן עצמו תיקון נשים אבל במקום שמעבירין אותו גם האנשים אם העביר אין מכין אותו

The Gaon there (182:1-3) says that according to this shittah, even in a place where both men and women shave their bodies, it is assur for a Jewish man to do so, but only lechatchila, and so there would be no malkos.

On the other hand, the Rema says

ואפילו לכתחילה שרי (ר"ן פ"ב דעבודת כוכבים) רק החברים נמנעים בכ"מ (שם ובב"י בשם נ"י

that it is muttar lechatchila, and that only Bnei Torah refrain from doing so.
The Rambam's issur lechatchila, it seems, stems from the fact that Chazal decided that such behavior is not al pi din gender specific, and is not really assur, but it is still a feminine type of behavior and should be avoided by Bnei Torah. 

This machlokes might apply, or might eventually apply, to the question of men dying their hair.

It is possible, however, that the comparison to the issue of shaving the body is imperfect.  In that case, the motivation for men to do it is the discomfort of sweat accumulating on the hair, not to be pretty.  If the men in that area did it for beauty's sake, it is possible that everyone would prohibit it.  However, I have not found any poskim that focus on this distinction, so I am not willing to propound it as a matter of practical halacha.

• Assuming that we would pasken like the Rama, a number of questions remain.  If the numbers cited include homosexual men, the statistics would be meaningless, because it is davka those men the Torah warns us not to be like, so their habits could not possibly be the basis of a hetter.  On the contrary- the fact that they do this would be the basis of additional issur.  
• If the numbers include men that in Orthodox Jewish society would be viewed as effeminate, would that render the numbers irrelevant?  Perhaps not.  Not too long ago, only low women dyed their hair or wore very high heels or red clothing.  Behaviors mostly specific to prostitutes slowly percolated "upwards," and now are not seen as pritzus at all.  In other words, irrespective of the origin of the behavior, once it becomes common it loses its previous connotation.
• Assuming the numbers are legitimate and have halachic validity, at what point does it become "not a feminine practice?"  One could argue that this would be true even at a low number, so long as it is not immediately viewed as feminine.  On the other hand, one might say that for the halacha to change would require a higher percentage.  
• Another question is, and assuming that prevalence is determinative, would we judge each city separately?  Each country?

The Prisha in 182 touches on this, but does not resolve the question.

 אבל במקום שמעבירין השער האנשים. נראה דרצונו לומר אנשים נכרים לטון דנהוג נהוג ולמדינן ממנהג הנכרים גס יש לומר דעל ישראל קאמר דהיכי דהנהיגו כן כולם יחד אין מוחין בידם

Reb Akiva Eiger brings down this Prisha and also brings a Teshuva of the Perach Shoshan,   פרח שושן כלל ו׳ ס״ב which can be found here, with the relevant paragraph being the last one in the teshuva on the next page.  As far as I can tell, the Perach Shoshan just brings down the Prisha, so it seems that Reb Akiva Eiger brings it only to show that the question remains unresolved.

Rabbi Tzvi Hersh Haber of LA posted on this topic here.  In his comments on our post he quotes a local rabbi to the effect that "Rav Elyashiv told him with regards to tzniyus, things that are tzibbur dependent are dependent on the tzibbur that is מקפיד בדברים אלו."

Here's a cartoon from the New Yorker that encapsulates the problem I am dealing with.  It is available for purchase in Premium Giclee Print from Conde Naste for $139.

All things considered, there is adequate justification for the men that are meikil. Even if it were problematic, מוטב שיהיו שוגגין ואל יהיו מזידין would very likely apply.  Certainly, this is less of a problem than those men that shave all the hair off of their heads as smooth as a cue ball, as we discussed elsewhere.

☞UPDATE:
Thank you LkwdGuy for sending a mareh makom to Rav Mordechai Tendler's Mesores Moshe, pg. 248, quoting Reb Moshe that if it is common for men to dye their hair then there is no issur lo yilbash, similar to looking in a mirror.
As I respond in the comments, we cannot pasken from the Mesores Moshe as easily as we can from the Igros.  Reb Moshe was extremely meticulous when he wrote a teshuva he intended to be mefarseim, weighing every word, while oral discussions, and even oral psakim, might have been oriented toward the individual with whom he was talking, or intended to make a point in the interpretation of a sugya, and not intended as a psak for the generations.  Still, it does show that Reb Moshe held that the svara is valid.  The problem remains that in our time, as I illustrated with the cartoon, the increasing frequency of men dying their hair might not be determinative.  A large part of that group might be men whose gender identity is not masculine, and so they might not count.

Ki Seitzei, Devarim 22:7. Shiluach Hakan. Dense Fog.

Besides the spinning compass needle of whether Shiluach Hakan is a mattir for someone that needs birds or eggs, or a precious opportunity to be seized, (despite the Minchas Elazar 3:43, the Chasam Sofer's shitta is still a shittah) Shiluach Hakan generates widely disparate ideas in hashkafa as well.

The Gemora in Brochos 33b and the Mishneh in Megilla 25a say “האומר: "על קן צפור יגיעו רחמיך", ו"על טוב יזכר שמך", משתקין אותו..”  One who says ""To the nest of a bird does Your compassion reach! On the good shall Your Name be mentioned!" must be silenced.  The Gemora says two reasons; because the Mitzvos are nothing more than Gzeiros- God's decrees, and because he elicits Kina- jealousy from those that are not thus favored.

The Ramban here says that the reason for the Mitzvah is not because of the birds, but to inculcate middas rachamim in us.  

The Maharal in Tiferes Yisroel 6 argues and says that it still doesn’t explain why birds and not another creature was chosen to demonstrate this middah, so while it shtims with “gzeiros”, it’s still not like “kin’a.” 

The Rambam in Moreh 3:48 says that the reason is because Hashem is a rachamon, and we should learn from this sensitivity to a creature’s grief that we should be much more careful with people.  He then says, what about the Gemora in Brochos?  And he answers that that Gemora is only going according to Reb Yehuda in Bova Metzia 115a that “ein dorshin taima dikro”, but we hold like Reb Shimon that dorshin.  

(Harav Shimon Krasner (author of the acclaimed Nachalas Shimon on Tanach)  pointed out that the Rambam does not mention R’ Yehuda or R’ Shimon, he simply says that the Gemorah is according to those that hold that “ein ta’am lemitzvos;”  which SK says refers to the people who hold that mitzvos are for discipline and have no underlying reason at all.  However, as is evident in the Maharal and others, they learn like me.)  The Maharal also goes to town on this, and says that he cannot believe that the Mishna in Brochos, about which no tanna says a word, is only according to one shittah, and especially a shitta that we don’t hold of. 

The Magiah in the Maharal (Yad Mordechai, R’ Chaim Pardes,) brings that the Rambam really paskens like R’ Yehuda in Malveh veLoveh 3:1, but that the Lechem Mishneh there explains that he really holds like R’ Shimon.  Also, Tosfos in Sota 14a d’h Kedei Leyag’a says that R’ Yehuda only argues on R’ Shimon where the ta’am will result in a nafkeh minna lehalacha.  But where there’s no nafkeh minna, everyone darshens.  (This does not explain the Rambam in the Moreh, because obviously the Gemora in Brochos doesn’t want to darshen even here, and the Rambam says that whether you darshen is tolui in the machlokes R’Y and R’S.)  Anyway, the Maharitz Chiyos there says that the Tosfos in Sotah is the shitta of the Rambam and explains why the Rambam often gives reasons for mitzvos.  Tosfos in Megilla 25a brings a piyut from the Kallir which seems to say that it is because of rachamim, but the Maharsha says that the piyut is no raya, but then brings from a Targum Yonasan in Vayikra 22:28 that oso ve’es bno is rachamim.  Also, the Maharsha in Brochos also says that the meshaskin is only because he’s doing it in tefilla, which is matil kin’a, but the mitzvah can be because of rachamim, just like tzedaka. 

And, adding to the fogginess, the Rambam in Tefilla 9:7 and the pirush hamishne in Brochos and Megilla brings the din of meshaskin and the reason of ‘gzeiros’. 

Also, remember the Rashba in Teshuvos 4:253 (with some prefatory words of kovod to the Rambam,) that it is best to just ignore all the reasons the Rambam gives for mitzvos, because “yeish kushyos gedolos kim’at bekulan,” and only Hashem knows His reasons.

And of course, in contrast with what the Gemorah and the rishonim are mashma (that this is a mitzvah that shows rachamim), is the Zohar that says that Shiluach haKan causes grief to the mother bird, and it is me’oreir rachamim by the Ribono Shel Olam, who says, if this bird is so grief stricken at being separated from its young, how much more so am I saddened by the siluk Shechina from my children, Klal Yisroel.

There is also the Gaon in his pirush on Mishlei, 30:17, where he says that all the mitzvos of Hashem are Rachamim, and the reason meshaskin is because this particular mitzvah has an element of achzorius in it, by chasing away the mother.

Doctor Meir Zahtz suggested that a “ki yikorei” of achzorius done by a Ben Yisroel causes a revulsion and generates a reaction of rachamim.  This is like a weakened virus is injected to elicit an immune reaction which will protect the patient from more serious infection.  Here, a little achzorius elicits a flood of rachamim.

Ki Seitzei. Piety in the Service of Iniquity The Concept of To'eiva- תועבה- in Parshas Ki Seitzei.

Thank you to my dear brother in law, HaravYosef Asher Weiss.

Five times in this Parsha the Torah uses the term To'eiva, an abomination.  These are:
משקלות False Weights and Measures
כלי גבר Wearing the clothing of the other gender in order to secretly pass among them
אתנן זונה Bringing a Korban of an animal given in payment for prohibited sexual relations.
מכיר כלב Bringing as a Korban an animal received in exchange for a dog.
מחזיר גרושתו משנשאת Remarrying a woman you had divorced who had been married in the interim.

Reb Moshe says that the תועבה aspect of false weights and measures and  wearing the clothing of the other gender refers to these things done as a precursor to sin.  The case of the false weights is not that he actually used them, but he just has them in the house, and he has no intention of using them.  (Chinuch 602, רמבם  ז גניבה ג-   כל מי שמשהה בביתו או בחנותו מדה חסרה או משקל חסר עובר בלא תעשה שנאמר לא יהיה לך בכיסך וגו'. ואפילו לעשות המדה עביט של מימי רגלים אסור.)  He doesn't even have a particularly big yetzer hara to use them.  On the contrary!  He will keep these false weights in his house to revile them, as the Rambam says, or, by not using them, he will be rewarded for resisting and overcoming his Yetzer Hara.  It's a Big Mitzvah!  But that is exactly what a to'eiva is- to put yourself into a position where sinning will be easier, to put yourself into a position such that later, when a moment of weakness and desire comes along, the means of doing the sin will be at hand.  The case of Kli Gever means that he just enjoys wearing women's clothing or hanging around with women, but he has no intention of sinning.  He tells himself that he will tantalize himself by the availability of sin and refrain, and he will be rewarded by the Ribono shel Olam-another Big Mitzvah!  But inevitably the moment will come that he will have a yetzer hara, and because he has all the appurtenances and experience, sinning will be as easy as falling off a log.  If you sin because you were seized by a yetzer hara, it's bad enough.  Here, you didn't even have the yetzer hara.  At that time, at the moment when you don't have a particular Yetzer Hara, what you ought to be doing is creating a home that is safe from temptation.  So why are you exactly the opposite?  Why are setting things up for that moment of weakness so that the sin will be easier?  That is a to'eiva.

The to'eiva of the third and fourth are that the person wants to buy a clean conscience by doing a mitzvah.  This is obvious in the case of an Esnan Zona.  In the case of Mechir Kelev, you can either say like Reb Meir Simcha, that the essential issur hearkened back to the time that certain dogs were kept for the purpose of bestiality, or because in many places, having a dog meant that you didn't want poor people to bother you asking for money.  Having done these ugly things, you feel bad.  You tell yourself, I feel dirty, I feel ashamed.  I need to cleanse myself, to heal my soul!  What you ought to be doing is Teshuva, making yourself a better person.  Instead, you bring the animal as a korban.  It's a Big Mitzvah!  All you're doing is buying a clean conscience.  As someone once said, "Whenever I get the urge to exercise, I lie down until the feeling passes."   This person doesn't just lie down; he lies down and eats donuts until the feeling passes.  This perversion of a good impulse to do teshuva into a superficial sop to the Ribono shel Olam, this selfish delusion that you are a holy man while you remain a sheigitz, is a to'eiva.

The fifth, machzir gerushaso, is a person that likes the idea of spouse swapping.  He wouldn't chalila transgress the issur of eishes ish!  The very thought sickens him.  But lemaisah has this tremendous desire for his neighbor's wife, as his neighbor does for his.  So they divorce their wives, switch exes, and later they take them back.  It's a Big Mitzvah!  I am not like those rotten bums that have affairs with an Eishes Ish.  Oh  no, I am avoiding that terrible issur by finding a way to make it muttar!  This person ought to be cauterizing his animalistic desires, but instead, he uses his knowledge of the Torah as a servant to his rotten desires.   You know that what you want is disgusting, and you know that you would never do the issur.  So why are you not addressing your yetzer hara??? Why, instead, are you looking for a way to kasher it???  That is a To'eiva.

All the To'eivos in the parsha involve people who twisting the ideas and the values of the Torah to convince themselves that everything they are doing is a fulfillment of the Torah, and by doing this, they blind themselves to their Rish'us.  These people tell themselves they are showing discipline by avoiding sins, they are doing good things, they are fulfilling the dinim of the Torah.  They find frummeh ways to telling themselves זכיתי לבי טהרתי מחטאתי.

The To'eiva is the abuse of Torah concepts in the furtherance of Rish'us.  These people are perverting the pious impulse that every Jewish heart experiences by using it to quiet their conscience and fuel their Yetzer Hara.  It would be better to follow Eliahu Hanavi's advice:  אם ה' האלוהים לכו אחריו ואם הבעל לכו אחריו.

These To'eivos form a progression.

First, a person tells himself "I have no interest in sinning."   But he brings the yetzer hara into his house, and sets himself up for the time when he will sin.
Second, a person sins, but instead of facing his failure and doing a proper teshuva, he brings the proceeds of his sin as a Korban, and thinks that this will cleanse him.  This doesn't cleanse him, it makes him dirtier.  This is That is a To'eiva.
Third, a person says "Oh, I would never do that terrible sin!  But I have a tremendous desire for my neighbor's wife.  What shall I do???"   The answer at this point is, you realize that what you want is horrible, you know that you're a chazer for even thinking about it.  So take a cold shower, eat some chasteberries, and stay away from your neighbor's wife.  Don't talk to her on the phone, don't accidentally go shopping when she's likely to be out shopping, and don't invite them to the house on Shabbos.  But he has a better answer, "I and my neighbor will divorce our wives, switch partners, and then take them back."  That is a To'eiva.

Speaking of To'eivos fueled by degenerate piety, A B C D E F G

Ki Seitzei, Devarim 25:13-16. When the Ends Justify the Means

I've learned that lengthy posts need to be outlined and summarized for the readers' convenience.

Outline and Summary:

I.  Sometimes, only telling a lie will prevent the triumph of falsehood-לטעון שקר להוציא דין לאמיתו.  Would such a thing be muttar?

II.  Answer- 
         a.  Maybe.  
         b.  Maybe not.

I hope that was helpful.

Thank you to my Yetzer Hara, who helps me to do my best thinking in learning during davening.  I owe this much-improved version to his assistance.  

When the Torah prohibits something, there are usually exceptions to the prohibition, circumstances under which some good outweighs the bad, or where some need is greater than the prohibition.  We have rules of עשה דוחה לא תעשה,פקוח נפש, and עבירה לשמה, such as the case of Ya'el.  On the other hand, some issurim are (almost, but not quite,) absolutely forbidden, such as Avoda Zarah, Gilui Arayos, and Shfichas Damim.  Similarly, there is a rule of אסור להציל עצמו בממון חבירו, that it is "prohibited" to save oneself by stealing from another person, which a very few Rishonim seem to understand to mean actual prohibition.  (The vast majority of Rishonim understand it to mean that if a man steals to save a life he remains liable to repay what he took.)

In light of the above, it's interesting to see some baalei machshava writing that "In Judaism, the ends do not justify the means."  For example, you have the Sfas Emes in Shoftim quoting R' SB of Pshsch to the effect that צדק צדק תרדוף teaches us that להיות רדיפת הצדק בצדק לא בשקר, that only kosher means should be used in pursuit of important goals.  This is often quoted, e.g., here, where he says שהמטרה לא תכשיר את האמצעים, אף שהמטרה הוא צדק הרדיפה לצדק היינו האמצעים להמטרה, צריכה ג״כ להיות עם צדק .  As we have seen, the Torah certainly does tell us that the ends justify the means, with very few exceptions.  Of course, the quoted thought was not referring to cases of Dechiya- of extreme necessity, or superior value.  But one must realize that we certainly do weigh costs and benefits in the Torah, even regarding serious issurim- within the parameters of Dechiya.  Once the concept is validated in the case of Issurim, the application regarding other values is certainly situational.  Their words should be taken more as a mussar derhehr, a reminder that we have to carefully weigh the public and personal costs when, under the burden of the needs of the klal, we might be tempted to bend our principles le'sheim shamayim.

As human beings, Faith in the Ribono shel Olam is our paramount goal.  But when it comes to emulating the Ribono shel Olam, Truth is the fundamental value.  The Seal of the Ribono shel Olam is Emess- דאמר רבי חנינא חותמו של הקב"ה אמת (Shabbos 55a.)  The Torah, which begins and ends with Emess, repeatedly and explicitly prohibits falsehood.  We are told מדבר שקר תרחק and אבן שלמה וצדק יהיה לך and ולא תכחשו ולא תשקרו איש בעמיתו.  

There is a lower level of "relatively minor" falsehood, regarding personal matters that have no bearing on others, regarding which the Gemara (BK 24b) says one may prevaricate in the interest of humility, modesty, and gratitude to a host.  Let us call this category "Immaterial falsehoods."  Perhaps the passuk in Mishlei (12:22) תועבת ה' שפתי שקר, or even Chazal's words (Sotah 42b)  ....ארבע כתות אינן מקבלות פני השכינה... כת שקרנים would apply to him.  But I think that's only for a person for whom truth loses its value, a person that makes a habit of lying, such that the passuk in Yirmiah (9:4) למדו לשונם דבר שקר העוה נלאו would apply to him.  I don't think the passuk of מדבר שקר תרחק or אבן שלמה וצדק יהיה לך would apply there.  (This is discussed at length in רי"פ פערלא ספר המצוות לרס"ג ח"א מ"ע כ"ב)  Here, we are talking about "Material falsehoods:" matters where there is an expectation of truth and serious consequences- where your words directly affect another.  According to those shittos that the issur de'oraysa only applies in the presence of Beis Din (Rav Perlow's hachra'a in the רס"ג,) then this discussion will refer to falsehoods in the presence of Beis Din.

What kinds of Dechiya would apply regarding the laws of honesty and truth, to the halachos of ישרות and  צדק?  Of course, the usual rules of Dechiya would apply.  But we're not talking about the legalistic formula of Dechiya.  We're discussing cases where telling the truth would allow falsehood to triumph, and lying would bring about justice.  

The question is as follows.  We know that a false oath is an absolute issur; the circumstances are irrelevant.  Even if the false oath is taken to prevent a cheater and a liar from robbing you, it is absolutely forbidden to swear falsely.  It is like any issur in the Torah, and to avoid an issur one must spend or lose all his money, as the Rama says (YD 157:1- ואם יוכל להציל עצמו בכל אשר לו צריך ליתן הכל ולא יעבור לא תעשה. [ר"ן פרק לולב הגזול ורשב"א וראב"ד וריב"ש])  Are the general laws of honesty and truthfulness and rectitude in weights and measures like taking an oath?  Or are they concept-commandments to create a world of truth and honesty, to bring about a just result? 

If the law of honesty is like other issurim in the Torah, even though one would be allowed to transgress the law where the rules of Dechiya applied, there is no Dechiya to save yourself from being cheated or to prevent someone else from winning through falsehood.  If, on the other hand, the laws of honesty are intended to generate justice and fairness, then they would only apply where the consequence of truth is truth and the consequence of falsehood is falsehood.  Where lying would prevent falsehood and truth would allow falsehood to win, then you are reflecting Hashem's Emess davka by not telling the truth, and there would be no law requiring honesty.  If only a lie will prevent a cheater and a liar from brazenly robbing you, from cheating you out of what is yours, then telling the truth would contribute to a false world, and it would a good thing to lie.

In other words, is the issur of Sheker a din in the ma'aseh, or is it a din in the Totza'ah.  Is it a proscribed act, like eating Chazer and Shvu'as Sheker, or is it a means of achieving a world of truth, a world in which honesty wins at the end of the day and justice is established.

(I have to let you know that the newly elected Rav HaRashi of the Ashkenazim, Rabbi David Lau, has an article on this topic in his sefer Maskil L'David Siman 47.  He says many nice things there, and I say many nice things here, and between his article and mine, one can get a nice hekef in the sugya, not chalila to equate myself with him, of course.)

In cases of business relationships, we have the Gemara (BB123a) that tells us the story behind the arrangement between Yaakov and Rachel,

אמר לה מינסבת לי אמרה ליה אין מיהו אבא רמאה הוא ולא יכלת ליה אמר לה מאי רמאותיה אמרה ליה אית לי אחתא דקשישא מינאי ולא מנסבא לי מקמה אמר לה אחיו אני ברמאות [א"ל] ומי שרי להו לסגויי ברמאותא אין עם נבר תתבר ועם עקש תתפל

using the passuk in  II Shmuel 22:26-7,  

עם חסיד תתחסד עם גבור תמים תתמם עם נבר תתבר ועם עקש תתפל.

Rachel asked Yaakov, how are you going to live here, with my father?  He'll cheat you out of everything!  Yaakov answered that he is Lavan's equal in trickery.  Rachel asked, is it permitted for a righteous person to act with trickery?  Yaakov answered "Yes.  With honest people, be honest.  With crooks, be devious."

On the other hand, we do have a Gemara (Shvuos 31a) that seems to prohibit misdirection even where it is the only way to prevent a liar from stealing your money.

מנין לתלמיד שאמר לו רבו יודע אתה בי שאם נותנין לי מאה מנה איני מבדה מנה יש לי אצל פלוני ואין לי עליו אלא עד אחד מנין שלא יצטרף עמו תלמוד לומר מדבר שקר תרחק האי מדבר שקר תרחק נפקא הא ודאי שקורי קא משקר ורחמנא אמר לא תענה ברעך עד שקר אלא כגון דאמר ליה ודאי חד סהדא אית לי ותא אתה קום התם ולא תימא ולא מידי דהא לא מפקת מפומך שקרא אפי' הכי אסור משום שנאמר מדבר שקר תרחק מנין לנושה בחבירו מנה שלא יאמר אטעננו במאתים כדי שיודה לי במנה ויתחייב לי שבועה ואגלגל עליו שבועה ממקום אחר תלמוד לומר מדבר שקר תרחק 

Someone's Rebbi asks him to do him a favor: someone owes him money, and the person is a known liar and won't pay it unless he's forced to.  Unfortunately, only one witness is available, and one witness will only force the borrower to swear, and he'll swear falsely.  So the Rebbi asks this talmid, do me a favor, when the witness is sworn in, stand near him, so that borrower will think you're waiting to be sworn in too, and he'll give up and pay me.  It is assur to do this, under the rule of מדבר שקר תרחק- it's not honest.  Even though it's his Rebbi, and he knows the Rebbi is telling the truth, it doesn't matter.  Rashi there says that the strategy is שיהא סבור בעל דין שאתה בא להעיד ויודה אמת, that the ingrate lying borrower should tell the truth, because he thinks he will be caught in his lie.  No, you can't do it.  This is subterfuge, you're tricking someone, and the Torah says not just to not lie, the Torah says  תרחק, keep dishonesty far away from yourself.

In our parsha, the Torah prohibits owning false weights and measures.

Devarim 25:13-16

לא יהיה לך בכיסך אבן ואבן גדולה וקטנה  לא יהיה לך בביתך איפה ואיפה גדולה וקטנה   אבן שלמה וצדק יהיה לך איפה שלמה וצדק יהיה לך למען יאריכו ימיך על האדמה אשר יהוה אלהיך נתן לך   כי תועבת ה' אלקיך כל עשה אלה כל עשה עול

You shall not keep in your money-bag two different weights, one large and one small.

You shall not keep in your house two different ephah measures, one large and one small.
You shall have a full and honest weight, [and] a full and honest ephah measure, in order that your days will be prolonged on the land which the Lord, your God, gives you.
 For whoever does these things, whoever perpetrates such injustice, is an abomination to the Lord, your God.

The Malbim in Mishlei 20:10, on the passuk  אבן ואבן איפה ואיפה תועבת יהוה גם שניהם, says the following.

"אבן ואבן איפה ואיפה". שיצוייר דבר שהוא רע לפי הנגלה ואינו רע לפי הנצפן, כמו אם יש להקונה אבן ואבן לשקול המעות, במשקל גדול ובמשקל קטן, ויש להמוכר איפה ואיפה למדוד כן לפי ערך זה את הפירות שמוכר שאם מוכר במדה קטנה משלם לו המעות במשקל הקטן, הגם שבזה יוכל לומר זכיתי לבי, אחר שנותן לפי הצדק, בכ"ז לא יוכל לאמר טהרתי מחטאתי לפי הנגלה, כי "תועבת ה' גם שניהם", אף שימצאו שניהם זה לעומת זה האבן מול האיפה, כי התורה הזהירה בכלל שלא ימצא בכיסך אבן ואבן בשום אופן ובשום הצטדקות:

This means that when the Torah prohibits having false weights and measures, this is even where you have them to defend yourself against crooked businessmen.  You keep a false money weight so that when someone tries to sell you with his false volume measure, you will pay him using your false money-weight, so that you end up paying for what you got.  Sounds reasonable, no?  The Malbim says that this is exactly what the Passuk in Mishlei is prohibiting.

Similarly, you have Rav Huna in Brachos (5b).

רב הונא תקיפו ליה ארבע מאה דני דחמרא על לגביה רב יהודה אחוה דרב סלא חסידא ורבנן ואמרי לה רב אדא בר אהבה ורבנן ואמרו ליה לעיין מר במיליה אמר להו ומי חשידנא בעינייכו אמרו ליה מי חשיד קב"ה דעביד דינא בלא דינא אמר להו אי איכא מאן דשמיע עלי מלתא לימא אמרו ליה הכי שמיע לן דלא יהיב מר שבישא לאריסיה אמר להו מי קא שביק לי מידי מיניה הא קא גניב ליה כוליה אמרו ליה היינו דאמרי אינשי בתר גנבא גנוב וטעמא טעים

Rashi:

תקיפו. החמיצו: ליעיין מר במיליה. יפשפש במעשיו: אי איכא דשמיע עלי מילתא לימא. אם יש בכם ששמע עלי דבר שאני צריך לחזור בי יודיעני:שבישא. חלקו בזמורות הגפן שחותכין מהן בשעת הזמיר ותנן (בב"מ דף קג.)כשם שחולקין ביין כך חולקין בזמורות ובקנים. שריגים מתרגמינן שבשין (בראשית מ) : מי שביק לי מידי מיניה. וכי אינו חשוד בעיניכם שהוא גונב לי הרבה יותר מחלקו: בתר גנבא גנוב כו'. הגונב מן הגנב אף הוא טועם טעם גנבה

Four hundred barrels of Rav Huna's wine went sour.  His friends came to him, and one suggested that he look into his business behavior to see if there was some infraction of ethics that may have brought about this loss.  Rav Huna was offended- do you think I am less than honest in my business?  The other answered him, do you think things happen for no reason?  Rav Huna said, if anyone has heard any thing critical of me, let me know.  They told him yes, we heard that you don't allow your sharecropper to take a part of the side-growths.  He said to them, do you not know that my sharecropper is a terrible thief, and he steals everything he ought to be giving me?  They said to him, that doesn't excuse you for cheating him.  People say that one who steals from a thief tastes the flavor of theft.

Perhaps you will say that the story with Rav Huna was only for great Talmidei Chachamim, who should not sully themselves with even the faintest whiff of dishonesty.  After all, we have a rule that עביד איניש דינא לנפשיה (CM 4:1), that one may take the law into his own hands and seize his property from a thief.  (True, some say this is only true where you see the object he stole from you in his hands.  But many poskim hold it is allows you to take anything of his you can get your hands on.)

  יכול אדם לעשות דין לעצמו אם רואה שלו ביד אחר שגזלו יכול לקחתו מידו, ואם האחר עומד כנגדו יכול להכותו. 

If one is allowed to take the law into his own hands and seize the property of one who had stolen from him, and he doesn't have to involve the courts, and if he resists, you can take it by force, even if you need to physically attack the ganav, then it ought to be muttar to trick him out of his property.  (This is not uncommon.  I once bought some things from Home Depot, and realized later that the clerk, who I think was drunk or high, had charged me for three sheets of plywood and other lumber more than I bought, totaling around sixty dollars, and I didn't realize it until I was in the car.  I should have paid attention, but I didn't.  I couldn't go back to customer service, because no reasonable person would believe me.  On the other hand, there were some pumps there, just under sixty dollars, that I needed, and they would be easy to walk off with.  I won't tell you what I did, but with the perspective of time, I have come to realize that the risk, however slight, of being caught and causing a chillul hashem, should have rendered the question moot.)

But the Rambam, (based on Shvu'os 31a) as explained in the Shach in CM 75 SK 1 seems to apply Rav Huna's issur to everyone.  

ט  אסור לאדם לטעון טענת שקר, כדי לעוות הדין או כדי לעכבו.  כיצד:  היה נושה בחברו מנה--לא יטעננו במאתיים, כדי שיודה  במנה ויתחייב שבועה.  היה נושה בו מנה, וטענו מאתיים--לא יאמר אכפור בכול בבית דין ואודה לו במנה ביני לבינו, כדי שלא אתחייב לו שבועה.

י היו שלושה נושין מנה מנה באחד, וכפר בהן--לא יהיה אחד תובע, ושניים מעידים, וכשיוציאו ממנו, יחלוקו.  ועל דברים אלו וכיוצא בהן, הזהיר הכתוב ואמר "מדבר שקר, תרחק" (שמות כ"ג,ז').

There are people that say pshat in the Rambam that with the words לטעון טענת שקר, כדי לעוות הדין או כדי לעכבו he is limiting the issur to cases where some injustice will result.  Those people should be ashamed of themselves, because this is is a very bad pshat in the Rambam, as is evident from the Rambam's examples.  In any case, when the Shach says this halacha, he adds a few words:

 התובע את חבירו כו'. אסור לטעון שקר כדי לעוות הדין או כדי לעכבו אע"פ שהוא זכאי, כגון מי שהיה נושה בחבירו מנה, לא יטעננו מאתים כדי שיודה במנה ויתחייב שבועה ויגלגל עליו ממקום אחר. היה נושה מנה וטענו מאתים, לא יאמר אכפור הכל בב"ד ואודה לו במנה בינו לביני כדי שלא אתחייב לו שבועת התורה. היו שלשה נושים מנה באחד וכפר בהן, לא יהיה אחד תובע ושנים מעידים, וכשיוציאו ממנו יחלקו. היה טוענו מנה ע"פ עד אחד וכפר בו, לא יאמר לאחד בוא אני ואתה ונעידנו ונוציא גזילה מתחת ידו. כל זה מתבאר מהש"ס פרק שבועת העדות [דף ל"א ע"א] והתוספתא דשבועות פרק ה' [ה"ב] ורמב"ם סוף הלכות טוען ונטען וסמ"ג עשין ק"ז.

You see that the Shach adds the words כדי לעוות הדין או כדי לעכבו אע"פ שהוא זכאי.  He's learning that the Rambam's לעוות means to manipulate, not to pervert.

And there's the Rashba, which is unambiguous.

Rashba 3 81, 

"שאלת: הא דאמור רבנן בפרק המניח את הכד מאה פנדי בפנדא למחיה, ואפילו למאן דאמר לא עביד איניש דינא לנפשיה, במקום דאיכא פסידא עביד, ולרב נחמן דאמר אפילו במקום דליכא פסידא, יש בכלל זה שיוכל לטעון שקר להוציא דין לאמיתו, כי ההוא דפרק חזקת דלחיש לרב נחמן ואמר ליה אין שטרא זייפא הוא" וכו' "על כן שואל אני אם מותר לטעון שקר לאפוקי זוזי, כי היכי דשרי ליה למימחי חבריה אע"ג דעבר על לא יוסיף פן יוסיף. 

"תשובה: חס ליה לזרעיה דאברהם דלימא שיקרא ואפילו במקום פסידא, דכתיב שארית ישראל לא יעשו עולה ולא ידברו כזב" וכו' (כאן מביא את הראיה שהביאו כבר משבועות ל"א על ג' שהפקידו אצל אחד). 

"אלא שכל מקום שיש מיגו, אנו מאמינין שהאמת כמו שטוען שאלו בא לשקר היה לו לטעון טענה אחרת בשקר שהיה נאמן בה 

וההוא דפרק חזקת הבתים, לא אמרו שיהא מותר לו לעשות ולטעון כן, אלא כל שטען מאמינין אותו משום מגו למר כדאית ליה ולמר כדאית ליה, ותדע לך דאי מהתם נימא דשרי נמי למיעבד שטרא זייפא כי התם וחס לנו לומר כן, אלא ודאי שנוי השקר ואהוב האמת ואין תמורתו כלי פז 

On the other hand, you have the Sma/Prisha, who says that one may lie, at least outside of a Beis Din, when his lie will protect an innocent man (oneself, for example,) from being robbed.

Sma in CM 369 SK 10

ועיין פרישה (ס"ק ח') שם כתבתי דנראה שבמקום שהמוכסים מאמינים להסוחרים במה שאומרים לפניהם שאין להם סחורה אלא כך וכך, אזי מותר לשנות להגיד לפניהם באופן שלא יפסידו. דהיינו דרך משל אם יש להם מ' אמות בגד, ומן הדין אין להם ליתן מהם מכס אלא ל' גדולים, וכשידוע להמוכסן שיש מ' אמות יכריחו ליתן לו מהם מ' גדולים, מותר להם לשנות ולומר להמוכס שאין להם אלא ל' אמות ולא יתנו לו אלא ל' גדולים וכל כיו"ב, ומשום הכי דקדק המחבר וכתב ז"ל, אסור להבריח ממנו דבר הקצוב כו', הא המותר מותר להבריח.

And there's a very interesting expression in the Ramban (BB 32b).  The case there is that A took B to court for a debt, and he produced a Shtar to support his claim.  B said "It's forged!"  A whispered to the judge "Yes, it's forged, but I forged it because I had a true shtar that I lost, and now this man is trying to get out of paying me what he owes."  The Ramban there calls A a fool for admitting it to the judge. "הרי זה טיפש והפסיד".   It seems to me that the Ramban thinks he would have been smarter to just be quiet and let the court mistakenly rely on his forged shtar- which was forged in the pursuit of justice.  This is not a strong proof, but it's interesting.

Finally, to bring this back to the passuk in our parsha about having legal weights and measures, and the Malbim, I want to point out that Reb Moshe (in my translated English Dorash Moshe) asks, why does it say תואבה by  כלי גבר and by  אבן ואבן?    He answers, that a person who has false weights in his house, even though he is absolutely convinced that he will never use them, is doing a to’eiva.  He is making doing an aveira easier.  Bishlema if he is faced with a strong yetzer hora, he has a teretz.  But here, he doesn’t even have any obvious yetzer hora.  Why, then, is he keeping these weights in his house?  Because he is indifferent.  He doesn’t see that the opportunity to do an aveira is a terrible and threatening thing.  This indifference is a to’eiva.  Similarly, a person might think that if he brings himself to the brink of an aveira, and then controls himself, he is being a tzadik.  So he might wear bigdei isha, and when the opportunity to sin comes, he tells himself, he will be poreish.  This, says Reb Moshe, is also a תואבה.  Only a fool or a rasha will do this.  I think that this is also what the Malbim meant, because he ends with the words  כי התורה הזהירה בכלל שלא ימצא בכיסך אבן ואבן בשום אופן ובשום הצטדקות.  This means that they are not necessarily taking sides in the issue discussed by the poskim that I brought above.