Korach, Bamidbar 18:19. Separating Challa from Play Dough (Play-Doh)

Among the entitlements of the Kohanim is the familiar mitzva of Challah.  If you make dough using five pounds or more of flour, you have to separate Challah with a Bracha.  We know that until you separate the Challah, you cannot eat the rest.  But what if you have no intention of consuming the dough in any form at any time? In that case, you don't need to permit the dough, because you're not going to eat it anyway.  Is there still a mitzva to separate the challa in that case?  For example, if you're a kindergarten teacher and you're making play dough for the children.  Play dough is salty wheat dough.  Let's assume it's edible.  Indeed, the children will probably eat some of it, but they also eat dead flies, and in any case, that's not the purpose of the dough.  It is intended to be a plaything.  Do you have to separate challah?


(I hope you realize that I really don't care if you have to be mafrish challa from play-dough.  Echoing Reb Yirmiah's method, I chose it to illustrate the shittos on Hafrashas Challa in a memorable manner.  A less loopy example would be dough that was made to seal pots while they cook, as noted in Shabbas 51b.  I assume they threw it out afterwards.)


In other words, is the mitzva of hafrashas Challah a mattir- a utilitarian means of removing an issur and allowing you to eat the remainder, which, therefore, would only need to be done when you want to eat the remainder, or is it inherently requisite when you have dough, a self standing mitzva irrespective of what you intend to do or not do with the rest of it.   Or, put it this way:  is it dictated only by a desire to generate a specific consequence, or it dictated by current circumstances.  For example: The Rambam says that we don't have mitzva to go and shecht an animal.  But if one desires to eat meat, the mitzva is to be mattir it by means of Shechita.  Rambam 1 Shechita 1:
מצות עשה שישחוט מי שירצה לאכול בשר בהמה חיה ועוף ואחר כך יאכל שנאמר וזבחת מבקרך ומצאנך.   The Kesef Mishna saysמצות עשה שישחוט מי שירצה לאכול וכו'. כתב מי שירצה, לומר שאינה מצוה שחייב האדם לעשותה עכ"פ כמו תפילין וציצית שופר סוכה ולולב.   In fact, for this reason the Raavad in the Minyan Hamitzvos in the Yad holds that Shechita should not be counted among the mitzvos.  Shechita is definitely only a mattir, not an act that is inherently requisite.


Other mitzvos are inherently necessary.  For example, you cannot eat a korban until the blood is placed on the Mizbei'ach.  What if you cannot eat the korban (e.g., chattas ha'of al hasafeik)?  Do you still have to put the blood on the Mizbei'ach?  Of course you do!  The permission to eat the korban that results from doing the mitzva is not the reason you do the mitzva, it is a tangential result.


So what is the story with Hafrashas Challa?  Is it a mitzva in and of itself or only a mattir?


This happens to be a machlokes the Magen Avraham and Reb Akiva Eiger and Rashi (and maybe the Rambam) against the Taz and the Gaon (and maybe the Ramban).  The  Magen Avraham  in OC 8:2 asks why the mishna in Challa allows the bracha on hafrashas challa while seated, when in general brachos should be said while standing.  He answers that this mitzva is only a mattir, like Shechita, so it is not like other mitzvos.  The Gaon there disagrees, as follows: ודברי מג"א שחלה אינה מצוה, דבריו אין להם שחר, והלא אסור לעשות עיסתו קבין כדי להפקיע חיוב חלה כאמור ביו"ד סי' שכ"ד סי"ד ואמרי' בפ"ג דפסחים [מח,ב,] מאי דעתך לחומרא חומרא דאתי לידי קולא, דמפקע ליה מחלה   The Taz in YD 1:17 says clearly that there is a mitzva to be mafrish even if you have no intention of eating the rest and don't need a mattir.  Reb Akiva Eiger there mentions the Magen Avraham and holds like him, against the Taz:  לא מצאתי זה, דבפשוטו הוא רק כשרוצה לאכלו אסור עד שיפריש תרומה, ובמג"א ריש סי' ח' כתב כן לענין חלה ע"ש, וה"נ בתרומה.  Reb Aharon and the Chavatzeles Hasharon (Carlebach, Gilly's brother in law) point out that the passuk in Shlach, Bamidbar 15:19, and a similar passuk by Teruma in Devarim 14:22, use the word "B'achlechem," which seems to support the Magen Avraham.  Also, see Rashi in Gittin 47b: ד"ה מדאורייתא: דביכורים מצוה דרמיא עליה היא ולא טבלי לאסור פירות באכילה וכו'. ולא דמי למעשר וכו' דמעשר טביל ואסר ליה באכילה, ולא מצוה דרמיא עליה היא, אלא אם כן אוכלן או מוכרן דקא משתרשי ליה, clearly like the Magen Avraham.


This issue arises in Chalitza as well.  Is chalitza only necessary as a mattir or is it a mitzva of its own?  What if the Yevama is elderly and there is no chance in the world that she will remarry; is it a mitzva for her to do Chalitza?  This is a machlokes between the Chasam Sofer in his Teshuvos EH II 85 (no, because it's only a mattir) and Reb Moshe in his Dibros in Kiddushin He'arah 113 (yes, because it's a mitzva chiyuvis, from the Gemara in Kiddushin 14a.)  And what about Shiluach Hakan?  Also a machlokes the Chasam Sofer (it's only a mattir) and the Mekubalim (it's a big mitzva.)  What about going to the mikva to remove your tum'ah?  A machlokes Tana'im, whether Tevilla Bizmana Mitzva (see Yoma 8a and Shabbos 121a).


Interestingly, a closely related issue arises regarding Kiddushin:  See Rosh Kesuvos 1:12, who writes:

למה באמת אין מברכין אשר קדשנו במצותיו וצונו לקדש את האשה?  ונ"ל כי ברכה זו אינה ברכה לעשיית המצוה כי פריה ורביה היינו קיום המצוה, ואם לקח פלגש וקיים פו"ר אינו מחוייב לקדש אשה כו' ואף בנושא אשה לשם פו"ר כיון שאפשר לקיים מצות פו"ר בלא קידושין, ולא דמי לשחיטה שאינו מחוייב לשחוט ולאכול, ואפ"ה כשהוא שוחט לאכול מברך, דהתם אי אפשר לו לאכול בלא שחיטה אבל הכא אפשר לקיים פו"ר בלא קידושין כו' .

So, the bottom line is that if you make a lot of play-dough, it's a machlokes achronim whether you have to be mafrish challah.  It will probably feel silly to be mafrish and burn play dough challah even if you're not making a bracha.  You don't have to be Korach to scratch your head at this one.  But you're going to have to come up with a reason the Taz and the Gaon wouldn't require it.

Maybe it's inedible, but we'd have to do an experiment.  You really can't rely on what kids eat.  Any volunteers?

Here's an additional ha'ara in the shitta of the Taz and the Gaon to answer Reb Aharon's raya from באכלכם:  I originally thought that just because Chametz Noksha (חמץ נוקשה ייחדו לישיבה see  חזון איש קט"ז) is not a problem of Baal Yei'ra'eh doesn't mean the same applies to Hilchos Challah- but maybe it does, even according to the Taz.  In fact, perhaps this is what the Taz does with the word "b'achle'chem"- not that you have to want to eat it, because he holds it's not just a utilitarian mitzva, it's a self-standing mitzva.  But B'ach'lechem tells you that if you intend to use it for a non-food purpose, it becomes like chametz noksha and is pattur from Challah.  No intent at all- chayav.  Intent to make tzatzkes- pattur.  

If so, we can say that even according to the Taz/Gaon, intent for a non-food purpose is different than no intent at all, and you would be pattur here.  If you have any thoughts on the matter, let me know. 


NOTE:
When I said that the Rambam and the Ramban can be read to agree with, respectively, the Magen Avraham and the Taz, I was referring to their argument in Sefer Hamitzvos Shoresh 12.  The Rambam says that he doesn't want to count as mitzvos such actions that are only part of a mitzva, like making the utensils of the Mishkan and making the Mishkan as a whole.  The Bahag disagrees.  One of the examples of this disagreement is Matnos Kehuna, in which the Rambam combines the separating and the giving into one mitzva.  The Ramban argues and says that that's only true in some matanos; the ones that render the mixture tevel prior to separation have two separate mitzvos, the separating and the giving.  The ones that do not render the mixture tevel prior to separation have only one mitzva; the separation together with the giving.  The Ramban's example is- Challah.  He brings from the Sifri that there are two separate mitzvos by Teruma, the hafrasha and the nesina.  He also says that if the Rambam were right, it wouldn't make sense to make a bracha on the hafrasha, since that's not the gmar of the mitzva.

The truth is, that the Rambam himself (mitzvos 126) says that the separation of Truma Gedola is a mitzva, and he says the same in his introduction to Trumos in the Yad.  It might be said that the Rambam holds that the purpose of the hafrasha is not to permit the remainder, but to generate matanos that you can give to the Cohen.  The Ramban clearly holds that it is the generating of the permit on the remainder that is the "purpose" of the mitzva of Hafrasha, because if it were to generate matanos, his distinction between matanos that make the rest tevel and matanos that don't.

Parshas Korach: Respect for Gedolei Yisrael

Much of the source material in this post is in Hebrew.  To minimize the possibility of further chillul Hashem, I don't want to translate it, but it is perfectly matched to this week's parsha.

I recently saw a highly respected web log, written by a talmid chacham and kli kodesh, that cited a statement by Rav Steinman as reported in Yediot Achronot.  He also brought someone else's reaction to Rav Steinman's statement.  I was disgusted by the azus panim of the latter, but nu, there are plenty of mouth breathers out there who think they are the Ramchal reincarnated.  I was very taken aback by the former's failure to objurgate that chutzpedikeh screed.  Coincidentally, I saw an article that reinforced Rav Steinman's statement, and a response (click on "Response from a Catholic Theologian") to that article by a Catholic theologian, whose thesis reflects the truth of, lehavdil, Rav Steinman's statement.  I direct you primarily to the first paragraph.  Unfortunately, there are people to whom the measured phrases of a Catholic theologian will mean more than....  The bottom line is that לא תרצח is a chiddush, and לא תנאף is a chiddush, and לא תגנוב is a chiddush.

I need to make this clear; one who remains silent when he hears of disrespect to a great talmid chacham, is complicit, rachmana litzlan, in the sin.  Other, more respectable websites, no doubt are loath to even mention this issue because it is beneath contempt, or because dissemination might add to the Chillul Hashem.  Baruch Hashem, this website doesn't have to worry about respectability, and it is so well matched to this week's parsha that I felt a need to post it.

There may be leadership figures whose status stems primarily from charisma or inheritance, and whose  authority and status is specific to their group of followers, who knowingly and enthusiastically participate in their own deception.  Rav Steinman, on the other hand, is a malach, a living sefer Torah whose middos and tzidkus and chesed are beyond the comprehension of the average human being.  If you have a question about something a man of Rav Steinman's stature said, if something he is quoted as having said troubles you, then either work hard to understand what was said and why it was said and what it means, or just shut the hell up.

article from ynet:

בכנס לקראת שבועות אמר הרב יהודה לייב שטיינמן, ממנהיגי הציבור החרדי-ליטאי, כי העולם נברא למען לומדי התורה: "יש שמונה מיליארדים אנשים בעולם. ומה הם כולם, רוצחים, גנבים אנשים בלי שכל"

הרב אהרון יהודה לייב שטיינמן, ממנהיגי הציבור החרדי-ליטאי, התבטא בחריפות נגד אומות העולם. בדברים שנשא בכנס בבית שמש לקראת חג שבועות - חג מתן תורה - הדגיש הרב את חשיבותה של התורה, ואמר כי העולם נברא עבור הצדיקים שלומדים ומקיימים אותה.

דברי הרב בכנס פורסמו במלואם בעיתון החרדי "יתד נאמן", שם צוטט כאומר על מי שאינם יהודים: "יש שמונה מיליארדים אנשים בעולם. ומה הם כולם, רוצחים, גנבים אנשים בלי שכל. זה הכל נמצא, אבל מי התכלית של העולם, וכי הקדוש-ברוך-הוא ברא את העולם בשביל הרוצחים האלה? בשביל הרשעים האלה?" כסמכות הרוחנית עבור ניצגי הליטאים ויהדות התורה, חזר בהמשך דבריו וטען כנגד העולם: "לגויים אין שום שייכות עם תורה. אומות העולם אין להם שום דבר, לא ביטחון (=אמונה) ולא שום מידה טובה". עסקו בחשיבותה של התורה והשפעתה על חיי היום-יום וחינוך הילדים. הרב הדגיש כי "מי שלא לומד תורה, הוא לא מקיים את המצוות. אם הוא לא לומד תורה זה חורבן, חורבן שלו ושל העולם...

"וזה אנחנו צריכים לשאוף, לראות שכל הילדים, כל הדורות שלנו, להכניס את הבן

ללמוד תורה... כל אחד ואחד שרוצה לראות נחת מהילדים, שיראה שילמדו תורה. אם לא תורה, יהיה עם הארץ וגם נחת לא יהיה ממנו. אפילו אם יהיה לו כסף. וכיז זו התכלית? כסף! האם    לוקחים כסף לקבר? אין דבר כזה, ומה יש כן בקבר - תורה".

מנכ"ל חדו"ש, הרב עו"ד אורי רגב, אמר בתגובה לדברים: "מדהים ומקומם לשמוע את ההתבטאות מלאת השנאה נגד כמעט כל המין האנושי. שוב חושף הרב שטיינמן את העובדה שאגדת המתינות שלו היתה במקרה הטוב מופרכת, ובמקרה הרע מעשה הונאה".

I don't want to reproduce the "Reaction article."

Here is the beginning of the journal article:
J Med Ethics doi:10.1136/medethics-2011-100411

• Law, ethics and medicine

• After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?

1. Alberto Giubilini, 
2. Francesca Minerva

Received 25 November 2011

• Revised 26 January 2012
• Accepted 27 January 2012
• Published Online First 23 February 2012

Abstract

Abortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not have anything to do with the fetus' health. By showing that (1) both fetuses and newborns do not have the same moral status as actual persons, (2) the fact that both are potential persons is morally irrelevant and (3) adoption is not always in the best interest of actual people, the authors argue that what we call ‘after-birth abortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including cases where the newborn is not disabled.

Introduction

Severe abnormalities of the fetus and risks for the physical and/or psychological health of the woman are often cited as valid reasons for abortion. Sometimes the two reasons are connected, such as when a woman claims that a disabled child would represent a risk to her mental health. However, having a child can itself be an unbearable burden for the psychological health of the woman or for her already existing children,1 regardless of the condition of the fetus. This could happen in the case of a woman who loses her partner after she finds out that she is pregnant and therefore feels she will not be able to take care of the possible child by herself.

A serious philosophical problem arises when the same conditions that would have justified abortion become known after birth. In such cases, we need to assess facts in order to decide whether the same arguments that apply to killing a human fetus can also be consistently applied to killing a newborn human.

Such an issue arises, for example, when an abnormality has not been detected during pregnancy or occurs during delivery. Perinatal asphyxia, for instance, may cause severe brain damage and result in severe mental and/or physical impairments comparable with those for which a woman could request an abortion. Moreover, abnormalities are not always, or cannot always be, diagnosed through prenatal screening even if they have a genetic origin. This is more likely to happen when the disease is not hereditary but is the result of genetic mutations occurring in the gametes of a healthy parent. One example is the case of Treacher-Collins syndrome (TCS), a condition that affects 1 in every 10 000 births causing facial deformity and related physiological failures, in particular potentially life-threatening respiratory problems. Usually those affected by TCS are not mentally impaired and they are therefore fully aware of their condition, of being different from other people and of all the problems their pathology entails. Many parents would choose to have an abortion if they find out, through genetic prenatal testing, that their fetus is affected by TCS. However, genetic prenatal tests for TCS are usually taken only if there is a family history of the disease. Sometimes, though, the disease is caused by a gene mutation that intervenes in the gametes of a healthy member of the couple. Moreover, tests for TCS are quite expensive and it takes several weeks to get the result. Considering that it is a very rare pathology, we can understand why women are not usually tested for this disorder.

However, such rare and severe pathologies are not the only ones that are likely to remain undetected until delivery; even more common congenital diseases that women are usually tested for could fail to be detected. An examination of 18 European registries reveals that between 2005 and 2009 only the 64% of Down's syndrome cases were diagnosed through prenatal testing.2 This percentage indicates that, considering only the European areas under examination, about 1700 infants were born with Down's syndrome without parents being aware of it before birth. Once these children are born, there is no choice for the parents but to keep the child, which sometimes is exactly what they would not have done if the disease had been diagnosed before birth.

Abortion and after-birth abortion

Euthanasia in infants has been proposed by philosophers3 for children with severe abnormalities whose lives can be expected to be not worth living and who are experiencing unbearable suffering.

Also medical professionals have recognised the need for guidelines about cases in which death seems to be in the best interest of the child. In The Netherlands, for instance, the Groningen Protocol (2002) allows to actively terminate the life of ‘infants with a hopeless prognosis who experience what parents and medical experts deem to be unbearable suffering’.4

Although it is reasonable to predict that living with a very severe condition is against the best interest of the newborn, it is hard to find definitive arguments to the effect that life with certain pathologies is not worth living, even when those pathologies would constitute acceptable reasons for abortion. It might be maintained that ‘even allowing for the more optimistic assessments of the potential of Down's syndrome children, this potential cannot be said to be equal to that of a normal child’.3 But, in fact, people with Down's syndrome, as well as people affected by many other severe disabilities, are often reported to be happy.5

Nonetheless, to bring up such children might be an unbearable burden on the family and on society as a whole, when the state economically provides for their care. On these grounds, the fact that a fetus has the potential to become a person who will have an (at least) acceptable life is no reason for prohibiting abortion. Therefore, we argue that, when circumstances occur after birth such that they would have justified abortion, what we call after-birth abortion should be permissible.

In spite of the oxymoron in the expression, we propose to call this practice ‘after-birth abortion’, rather than ‘infanticide’, to emphasise that the moral status of the individual killed is comparable with that of a fetus (on which ‘abortions’ in the traditional sense are performed) rather than to that of a child. Therefore, we claim that killing a newborn could be ethically permissible in all the circumstances where abortion would be. Such circumstances include cases where the newborn has the potential to have an (at least) acceptable life, but the well-being of the family is at risk. Accordingly, a second terminological specification is that we call such a practice ‘after-birth abortion’ rather than ‘euthanasia’ because the best interest of the one who dies is not necessarily the primary criterion for the choice, contrary to what happens in the case of euthanasia.

Failing to bring a new person into existence cannot be compared with the wrong caused by procuring the death of an existing person. The reason is that, unlike the case of death of an existing person, failing to bring a new person into existence does not prevent anyone from accomplishing any of her future aims. However, this consideration entails a much stronger idea than the one according to which severely handicapped children should be euthanised. If the death of a newborn is not wrongful to her on the grounds that she cannot have formed any aim that she is prevented from accomplishing, then it should also be permissible to practise an after-birth abortion on a healthy newborn too, given that she has not formed any aim yet.

There are two reasons which, taken together, justify this claim:

1. The moral status of an infant is equivalent to that of a fetus, that is, neither can be considered a ‘person’ in a morally relevant sense.
2. It is not possible to damage a newborn by preventing her from developing the potentiality to become a person in the morally relevant sense.

We are going to justify these two points in the following two sections.

The newborn and the fetus are morally equivalent

The moral status of an infant is equivalent to that of a fetus in the sense that both lack those properties that justify the attribution of a right to life to an individual.

Both a fetus and a newborn certainly are human beings and potential persons, but neither is a ‘person’ in the sense of ‘subject of a moral right to life’. We take ‘person’ to mean an individual who is capable of attributing to her own existence some (at least) basic value such that being deprived of this existence represents a loss to her. This means that many non-human animals and mentally retarded human individuals are persons, but that all the individuals who are not in the condition of attributing any value to their own existence are not persons. Merely being human is not in itself a reason for ascribing someone a right to life. Indeed, many humans are not considered subjects of a right to life: spare embryos where research on embryo stem cells is permitted, fetuses where abortion is permitted, criminals where capital punishment is legal.

and here is the response by Charles C. Camosy , is Assistant Professor of Theology at Fordham University in New York City. 

 Concern for Our Vulnerable Prenatal and Neonatal Children: A Brief Reply to Giubilini and Minerva

Despite the wide public outcry over their article, Giubilini and Minerva’s arguments in defense of infanticide are nothing new. Peter Singer has become one of the best known philosophers in the world in part because of the attention he has received from defending the practice.  Infanticide was such an established part of the culture of ancient Greece and Rome that Christians and Jews became subjects of public mockery for opposing it.  Even today, infanticide is consistently practiced in places where the Judeo-Christian tradition does not serve as a moral foundation, such as China and India.

But the Judeo-Christian tradition’s influence has diminished in the developed West, and as a result it has become more difficult to claim that all members of the species Homo sapiens are persons with an equal right to life. Giubilini and Minerva provide an important example of what follows from the rejection of the sanctity of human life. Even the most ardent defenders of abortion rights cannot deny the science behind the claim a prenatal child is a fellow member of our species, but that—at least to some in our post-Christian world—is not morally significant.  What matters is having the interests and capabilities of persons: rationality, self-awareness, the ability engage in loving relationships, etc. Many already reject the personhood of our prenatal children because they do not have these traits, but Giubilini and Minerva make the fairly obvious point that our neonatal children do not have these traits either. Thus, they claim, if one supports abortion for this reason, one should support infanticide on the same basis.

Korach, Bamidbar 18:8. Counting Resurrected People to a Minyan

This is not only about counting the risen dead for a minyan.  I chose the title because I thought that if it worked for the Chacham Tzvi (#93), it would work for me.

Synopsis:
Hashem promised that Aharon would get Teruma.
Aharon died before we entered Israel and before any Teruma was set aside.
Reb Yochanan uses this as proof of Techiyas Hameisim in the Torah.
Elsewhere, Reb Yochanan state that Mitzvos will be annulled at the time of the resurrection, so from whom will Aharon get Teruma?
A discussion of why mitzvos will be rescinded after the rising of the dead: either because mitzva obligations lapse when a person dies and don't return when he is revived, or because the epoch of the rising of the dead will be free of mitzvos- a ptur on the Gavra or on the Tekufa.
Many are of the opinion that Reb Yochanan never meant that mitzvos will be rescinded, and when he said "B'teilos le'asid lavo" he meant that mitzvos will become kiyumis, or that people will be like malachim, so intensely aware of Hashem's will that the concept of commandment and choice will become meaningless.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Our passuk says 

וַיְדַבֵּר ה אֶל אַהֲרֹן וַאֲנִי הִנֵּה נָתַתִּי לְךָ אֶת מִשְׁמֶרֶת תְּרוּמֹתָי  לְכָל קָדְשֵׁי בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לְךָ נְתַתִּים לְמָשְׁחָה וּלְבָנֶיךָ לְחָק עוֹלָם

Hashem said to Aharon "Here, I have given you guardianship of my Teruma, given to you, to respectfully deal with, and to your children, forever.

The Maharal Diskin brings the Gemara in Chelek that points out that Aharon never saw Teruma in his life; Aharon died before entering Israel, and Teruma only applies to crops grown in Israel.  So how can Hashem tell Aharon that he and his children are granted an entitlement toTeruma?  His children, yes, but Aharon himself never got Teruma!  Reb Yochanan (Sanhedrin 90b) says that this hints to the resurrection of the dead, to Techiyas Hameisim.  Although Aharon died before entering Israel, he himself will receive Teruma after Mashiach comes when the dead are brought back to life.  

Reb Yehoshua Leib Diskin says that he saw in the sefer “Emek Yehoshua” the following question:  Reb Yochanan in Niddah 61b says that mitzvos will be rescinded after Techiyas Hameisim, mitzvos beteilos le’asid lavo.  (He therefore allows burial in shatnez.)   If so, he asks, how can Reb Yochanan in Sanhedrin say that after techiyas hameisim there will once again be Teruma?  If Reb Yochanan himself holds that after Techiyas Hameisim mitzvos will be batteil, then nobody will be chayav to give Teruma to Aharon, and so once again Aharon will get nothing!  He brings that the Emek Yehoshua distinguishes between asei (which will still stand) and lo sa’aseis (which will be bateil), but it is clear that Rav Diskin was not impressed with that teretz.  Rav Diskin answers, that only the people who died and are brought back to life are pattur, but the people that will be living normal lives when Mashiach comes will continue to be chayav in mitzvos, and they will have to give teruma, and so Aharon will get their teruma.

This approach assumes that the ptur from Mitzvos "Le'asid lavo" is is not an epochal ptur on the time of techiyas hameisim, but instead is based on the general rule of ‘lameisim chofshi’, which apparently means that even after they get up they will still be pattur.  But if so, we have a problem with the story in Chelek about R’ Yehuda be Bova who proved that the story of the Atzamos of Yechezkel was not just a dream, because “ani meihem, ve’eilu tefillin shel avi abba,” I am descended from them, and these are my grandfather's tefillin.  So we see that even though they were dead, as soon as they were brought back to life they were chayav in mitzvos again, because otherwise, why would his grandfather wear tefillin.   I suppose you could say the same thing about the Ben Hashunamis and anyone who is brought back to life after being halachicly dead.  That would be really convenient on Shabbos, you wouldn't have to go looking for a goy.

My son said, maybe it means the tefillin they wore when they were alive?  The answer is, of course, that these people were from Shevet Ephraim, who left Mitzrayim before the time of yetziah, and there was not only no chiyuv to wear tefillin, but it would have been impossible to wear tefillin, because there were no parshios to put into them, so obviously it means tefillin they started wearing after they were brought back to life.

The Ritva in Niddah says that although mitzvos will not be obligatory, people will fulfill them out a desire to do Hashem's express will, as a kiyumis.

I later saw that Reb Elchanan in Kovetz Shiurim 2,  #29, klers whether the din of beteilos le’osid lavo is a din in the zman or a din in having been dead, nafkeh mineh for the people who happen to be alive normally at that time. 

At the end of the piece he brings the Ritva in Niddah 61 who asks from Yechezkel’s bones on the shittah that mitzvos beteilos le’osid lavo.  So: 1.  The Ritvah thought of the kashe first, and 2.  obviously the Ritvah held that it was a din in bameisim chofshi, not a din in the zman.  And then he brings the Kashe about Teruma and Aharon, and says the teretz we brought, that it refers to the people who hadn’t died then.

I don't post unless I have a chidush to say.  In this case, much of what we said was said by Reb Elchonon, but I said it before I saw Reb Elchonon.  Anyway, there are things here he doesn't say. 

Finally, there is a piece by the Lubavitcher Rebbe in the Hamaor of Tof Shin Nun Beis that discusses this matter.  He says that the mitzvos will absolutely never be rescinded, but that after Techiyas Hameisim our will and Hashem's will are going to be inseparable, somewhat like that of Malachim, and so the concept of command and duty will be meaningless.

In any case, to address the burning issue of the day: Can you count a resurrected person to a minyan?  It depends on the opinions of the rishonim on how to understand Mitzvos B'teilos L'asid Lavo.  According to some, this means that any person that was once dead is not chayav in mitzvos, and so cannot count toward a minyan.  According to others, the ptur mitzvos is not on just anyone who was once dead.  It is on the time of the general resurrection of the dead.  So the Ben Hashunamis and Elisha's ganav would count toward a minyan.


Here's a Tosfos (BB 74a) which gives a nice overview of all the Gemaros that talk about this.  
Background: the Gemara there is one of Rabbah bar bar Channa's stories in Hasfina.  In this one, he is in the desert and is shown the bodies of those who died during our forty years of wandering before entering Eretz Yisrael.  He cut off the tzitzis on the garments of one of the bodies (because he wanted to use them to prove who was right in the machlokes Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel about how many threads are in the tzitzis,) but he found himself stuck and unable to move.  His guide told him that whoever takes something from these bodies is thus stuck, and when he put it back, he was released.  Tosfos points out that evidently they were buried wearing their Tzitzis.  

פסקי חדא קרנא דתכלתא. 

משמע הכא שיש ציצית למתים 

ויש לדחות שהיו נכנסין מחיים בקבר כדאמר במדרש שכל ערב תשעה באב היו הולכין כשהן חיים לתוך קבריהם והיה בת קול יוצאת ואומרת הבדלו החיים מן המתים 

אבל יש להביא ראיה מפרק התכלת (מנחות דף מא.) דאמר שמואל כלי קופסא חייבין בציצית ומודה שמואל בזקן כשעשאן לכבודו פירוש לתכריכים וההיא שעתא ודאי רמינן להו

וכן יש במדרש למה נסמכה פרשת מקושש לפרשת ציצית לומר לך שהמתים חייבים בציצית

 וקשה דאמרינן בפרק מי שמתו (ברכות דף יח.) רבי חייא ורבי יונתן הוו קא שקלי ואזלי בבית הקברות הוה שדיא תכילתיה דרבי יונתן אקיברא א"ל רבי חייא דלי כנפך שלא יאמרו למחר באין אצלנו ועכשיו מחרפין אותנו ואי יש למתים ציצית מאי מחרפין אותנו דקאמר 

וי"ל דאע"ג דיש להן ציצית מ"מ מחרפין אותם שמראין עצמן שהן חייבים והמתים 
פטורים כדאמר (שבת דף ל.) כיון שמת אדם נעשה חפשי מן המצות 

אבל קשה על המנהג שנוהגים להסיר ציצית מטליתות של מתים 

ואר"ת ששמע מזקני לוטי"ר לפי שציצית עדות הוא שקיים כל התורה דציצית עולה ת"ר וח' חוטין וה' קשרים הרי תרי"ג ועכשיו שאין חשובין כל כך הרי הוא כאילו מעיד עדות שקר 

וה"נ דרשינן במדרש ועשו להם ציצית לדורותם לדור תם 

ואור"י דבימיהם היו כולן מקיימין מצות ציצית לפי שהי' לכולן טליתות של ד' כנפות ולכך היו עושין להן אף במותן אבל עתה שאין לכולן בחייהן אין לעשות במותן אפי' מי שהיה לו בחייו שלא לבייש את מי שאין לו וכענין זה מצינו בפרק בתרא דנדה (דף עא.) בראשונה היו מטבילין כלים ע"ג נשים נדות מתות התחילו חיות מתביישות כו' 

ועוד דאנו סומכין על מסכת שמחות (פי"ב) דאמרינן אבא שאול בן בטנית צוה את בניו קברוהו תחת מרגלותיו של אבא והטילו תכלת מאפיליוני פירוש מטליתו ויש לגרוס התירו מדקאמר מאפיליוני 

ורבינו חיים כהן צדק פירש דאנן קיימא לן כרבי יוחנן דאמר (נדה דף סא:) מצות בטילות לעתיד לבא וההיא דמנחות איירי אליבא דשמואל דאמר אין בטילות ולכך צריך שיהא לו ציצית דעתידין צדיקים שיעמדו בלבושיהם ואם יסירו לו הציצית במותו נמצא שלעתיד יעמוד בלא ציצית והמדרש נמי אתי כשמואל וההיא דלקמן יצתה בת קול ואמרה דביתהו דרבי חנינא בן דוסא עתידה למישדא בה תכלת לצדיקים לעתיד לבא אתיא נמי כשמואל 

ועוד אומר ר"י דהכי פירושו דההיא שעתא ודאי רמינן להו היינו שמשימין בו ציצית ומסלקים אותו מיד להודיע שקיים מצות ציצית לפי שהבגד חדש ולא הושם בו ציצית מעולם צריך להשים בו וכן נוהגים בארץ אשכנז להשים ציצית בטלית של מת שיהא ניכר שקיים מצות ציצית ומיד מסירין

Also: the Rashba in Yevamos says pshat in lameisim chafshi that although one is not allowed to feed a child things that are assur, no such halacha applies to dressing a dead person in Kilayim.  I saw it in the Ritva, but I didn't believe the Rashba really said it: but then I saw it in the Rashba, and it is indeed what he says.


And just because if you're reading this you might be interested: 

Although everyone is familiar with the tshuva in the Chacham Tzvi, few are aware of what his son writes in his Tshuvos Yaavetz II:82, as follows.

בהא דמספקא ליה למר אבא, בספרו (סימן צ"ג), בנוצר ע"י ספר יצירה, אם מצטרף לעשרה. קשיא לי, מאי קמבעיא ליה? אטו מי עדיף מחרש שוטה וקטן, דאינן מצטרפין?! אף על גב דמבני ישראל הן ודאי, וחשובין כשאר אדם מישראל לכל דבר חוץ מן המצות, וההורגן חייב, ואית להו דעתא קלישתא מיהא, וכל שכן הקטן דאתי לכלל דעת, ואפילו הכי לא מצטרף. האי גברא, דלאו בר דעה הוא כלל, צריכא למימר מיהת בכלל חרש הוא?! דהא אשתעי רבי זירא בהדיא, ולא אהדר ליה. הא ודאי גרע מניה. אלא שיש לדקדק: לכאורה נראה שהיה שומע, דהא שדריה לקמיה דרבי זירא. אי הכי, הוי ליה 'חרש השומע ואינו מדבר', שדינו כפקח לכל דבר. אבל אין זה נראה אמת, כי אם היה בו כח השמיעה, היה ראוי גם לכח הדבור בודאי, ולא היה מהנמנע אצלו, אלא מבין ברמיזות וקריצות היה, כמו שמלמדים את הכלב לילך בשליחות להוליך ולהביא מאומה מאדם אחר, כן שלחו לזה והלך. וכתוב בספר חסד לאברהם [לר' אברהם אזולאי], שאין חיותו אלא כחיות הבהמה, ולכן אין בהריגתו שום עברה. אם כן, פשיטא דאינו אלא כבהמה בצורת אדם וכעיגלא תילתא דמיברי להו לרב חנינא ולרב אושעיא. אגב אזכיר כאן מה ששמעתי מפה קדוש, אבי מורי הרב ז"ל, מה שקרה באותו שנוצר ע"י זקנו הגראב"ש [=הגאון ר' אליהו בעל שם] ז"ל, כי אחר שראהו הולך וגדל מאד, נתיירא שלא יחריב העולם. על כן לקח ונתק ממנו השם שהיה דבוק עדיין במצחו, ועל ידי זה נתבטל ושב לעפרו. אבל הזיקו, ועשה בו שריטה בפניו, בעוד שנתעסק בנתיקת השם ממנו בחזקה

On the topic of a minyan of people who have risen from the dead, I'm going to vent a little steam.  I daven at an early minyan on Shabbos.  I understand that the whole early minyan milieu is one of avoiding unnecessary delay.  But when the baalei tefilla sound like the undead and their tefilla sounds like it is completely dead as they mumble the davening in a monotonous drone more quickly than our lips can shape the words, it can be very upsetting.  There are prevailing reasons for my attendance at that minyan; and I am not in a position to rebuke my fellow 'mispallelim.'  I just wish the davening was a little less like an burdensome and flavorless obligation and more like a privilege and joy.

Korach, Bamidbar 17:5. Good Tzara'as, Bad Tzara'as

As always, readers are invited to send me something good they've said.  Three requirements:
1. Originality in whole or in part.

2. Consistency with the style of this website, which means it can be pshat, remez, drush, lomdus, or narishkeit, but I have to like it.

3. That the person who sends it would not be offended by rejection.

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Synopsis:  Although Tzara'as is a spiritual disease, its symptoms symbolize brilliance and superiority.

Rashi in 17:5 says that one who disputes the status of the Kohanim deserves to be stricken with Tzara'as, just as Moshe Rabbeinu's hand was covered with Tzara'as when he doubted the faith of Klal Yisrael in Mitzrayim.

In Sanhedrin 101b, there is a very strange Gemara.

תנו רבנן שלשה ניבטו ולא ראו ואלו הן נבט ואחיתופל ואיצטגניני פרעה נבט ראה אש שיוצאת מאמתו הוא סבר איהו מליך ולא היא ירבעם הוא דנפק מיניה אחיתופל ראה צרעת שזרחה לו על אמתו הוא סבר איהו מלך ולא היא בת שבע בתו הוא דנפקא מינה שלמה איצטגניני פרעה דאמר רבי חמא ברבי חנינא מאי דכתיב (במדבר כ) המה מי מריבה המה שראו איצטגניני פרעה וטעו ראו שמושיען של ישראל במים הוא לוקה אמר (שמות א) כל הבן הילוד היאורה תשליכוהו והן לא ידעו שעל עסקי מי מריבה לוקה

The Gemara says that Achitophel, among others, saw a vision, and the vision had truth to it, but he misunderstood what he saw.  He saw, in a dream, that his male organ developed Tzara'as, and he understood this to mean that he would become king.  He was wrong, though.  Although it did certainly mean that royalty would come from him, it was actually only through his granddaughter, Bas Sheva, (Bas Sheva's father, Eliam, was Achitophel's son,) and his great-grandson, Shlomo, that he was connected to royalty.

This Gemara is very strange.  A normal man that dreamed that his genital organ became diseased with Tzara'as would not wake up convinced that he would be king.  He would wake up

in wide-eyed horror.  It's a nightmare, not a besura tova.  But Achitophel was right!  It was a besura tova!  The dream truly meant that royalty was destined for him, though only through his grandchildren.  What on earth does Tzara'as have to do with gaining royalty?  I saw pshatim in this Gemara, and I'm not bowled over by any of them.  And I'm not interested in Freud's analysis of opposites in his Interpretation of Dreams, and neither were Ravina or Rav Ashi, and neither was Achitophel, thank you.

I believe that our error stems from the assumption that Tzaraas is a stigma, a mark of disgrace and disease.  It may be, however, that Tzaraas, being a bright white mark, is actually a sign of eminence, of superiority.  The word for the brightest of the marks is "Ahz ka'sheleg," a shocking white.  The word "ahz" means brazen; but that's only when applied to a human being.  But when applied to Hashem, it is a praise: Az venora.  A ba'al lashon hara has a superiority complex: he's convinced that only he matters, and that nobody else matters, and he maligns others in order to support his delusion- "I'm better than you because you're worse than me."  The fact that Tzaraas results in expulsion and isolation and tuma is only true where it signifies that the person claimed to be a great man, but he actually is not.  The mark of Tzaraas would then mean that he wrongfully tried to wear the crown of greatness when in fact he is the opposite, that he thinks that he is a great philanthropist but in fact is a stingy and hateful person, or that he's convinced that he is more important than anyone else, while in fact he is no better than others.  In other words, Tzara'as is a gruesome irony: it is an ironic symbol of his delusion.  In the ancient world, it was common to disgrace a condemned political prisoner by placing a symbol of what he attempted to achieve on him- for example, a crude crown.  Tzara'as is a disease and a stigma, but only because it occurs to highlight the disgraceful incongruity of the person's delusional self-image.

If, however, the mark appears on a person who is truly a good and great man, a man who is not a baal lashon hara or stinginess, then on the contrary, it might be a symbol of royalty.  

Let's put it slightly differently: There are two dinim in Tzara'as.  There's the symptom and the disease, the siman and the siba.  The underlying disease is horrible, but the symptom of the disease, the bright white mark, is not.  It's like fever.  Fever itself, unless its above 105 F/40.5 C when it cooks your brains, is not necessarily a bad thing.  The problem is only when the fever indicates that some internal process, an infection or a reaction, is ravaging the body.  While Tzara'as is a disease, that's only in the actual experience of Tzara'as.  But in a dream, the primary symbolism of Tzara'as is a mark of superiority, not an ironic mockery.  If you only see the siman, the symptom, it means something very different.

Achitophel, as we know, was a very great man.  He was among our greatest Talmidei Chachamim, and the Navi says that asking Achitophel for for advice was like asking Hashem Himself.  He believed, and he was correct in his belief, that the Tzaraas that he saw in his dream was a sign that he was destined for royalty.

Similarly, anyone that denies the high status granted to the Kohanim is claiming that he is equally entitled to that high status, that he is as good as they are, as Korach did.  Such a person is marked with Tzara'as- the metaphysical disease that manifests with the appearance of the bright white badge of superiority.

Chaim B. points out that this approach helps us to understand Chazal's statement in Yevamos 47b "קשים גרים לישראל כספחת" converts are as hard for Klal Yisrael as Sapachas, a form of Tzara'as.  The rishonim interpret this statement in diametrically different ways.  On the basis of the Gemara in Sanhedrin 102b, and according to our approach, a sapachas indeed is something that can be interpreted in diametrically different ways; either that some geirim bring cultural traits from before their Geirus, which is bad, or that they outshine us in their brave dedication to the Torah, and shame us by comparison.  This is a perfect analogy to our interpretation of the mark of Tzara'as.

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Korach, Bamidbar 16:1. Achdus I: All You Need is Love, and Other Symptoms of Dementia

Korach incited his followers with the motto "Kol ha'eida kulam kedoshim! Madu'a tisnas'u ahl kehal Hashem?" All the people are holy, and the Shechina dwells within every man equally. What right, Moshe, do you have to create artificial distinctions among the people of God? What right do you have to claim elevated status for yourself and for your relatives?

Rav Kook in his (posthumously printed in 1938 by what seems to be the predecessor of the Mossad HaRav Kook, edited by the Nazir, R’ David Kohen,) Oros Hakodesh, pages 453 and 454, that it is necessary for groups or individuals that have specific talents or roles to be separate in order to allow them to develop their peculiar talent, and that the claim that the mob-movements make that all people must be equal destroys the possibility for the development of spiritual or elevated characteristics: his words— “Sitra achra shari be'chibura ve'siyem be'piruda, ve'sitra dekedusha shari be'piruda ve'siyem be'chibura, ve'sham gufei ikri shalom.” Translation: The 'devil' begins with union and ends with division; holiness begins with division and ends with union, and in that itself is the essence of Shalom. (After years of not knowing the source, Bezalel Naor, an acquaintance from Ner Israel and a renowned scholar of Rav Kook's writings, kindly emailed me that it comes from Zohar II, 95a. This is in the Vilna/Mossad Kook edition. However, it is not used there for the purpose R’ Kook uses it– it just talks about some kind of nochosh and says that “shori b’chiburoh v’siyeim b’pirudoh.”) Applied to the context of Korach: Korach created pirud through what was, ostensibly, a demand for achdus (by saying that everyone is the same and nobody is entitled to a higher position or responsibility) while tzadikim create achdus through pirud, i.e., separation of individuals or groups that have specific talents.

This appears, at first glance, to be a rationalization, or an Orwellian twist of language; but recall the terror that followed the French Revolution (whose motto, "Liberté, égalité, fraternité," "Liberty, Equality, Brotherhood," has been retained by the modern French Republic), and the Maoist Cultural Revolution of 66-76, which persecuted Chinese teachers and intellectuals and “bourgeois values” and enforced Mao’s cult of personality, claiming that the only information necessary was the Red Book and party loyalty, and which had anyone with demonstrated intellectual or cultural achievement sent to re-indoctrination camps and then to manual labor. This quickly turned violent, and the purges that followed resulted in many deaths and economic disruption. Both the French and the Chinese violence asserted a philosophical basis of egalitarianism. On the other hand, the American Revolution also made the fundamental assertion that all men are created equal. The difference is that the evil lies in mandating and enforcing equality, as opposed to the philosophy of encouraging differences; because one man, and thus government as a whole which is only an expression of and for the benefit of men, lacks the authority to control men.

Another observation about Rav Kook's thought: We are constantly deluged with talk about Achdus. Achdus, Achdus, Achdus. Love your fellow Jew, invite him over, have you children play together, respect his way of life. This is baloney. Here's what I think.

Say your daughter goes out with boys to R rated movies, and your neighbor's daughter goes to Beis Yakov, they don't have a TV, and she would blush simply being in the same room as a boy. So, do you think they ought to hang around together? Your daughter would feel she is being belittled and disrespected, your neighbor would not want his daughter influenced by your daughter, and you would both be right. But what, you say, about children young enough to be sexually innocent? Well, would you like your child, in whom you have inculcated literal belief in the words of Chazal, to hear a playmate say that the story of Adam and Noach and the Mabul and the senescent motherhood of Sarah are just made-up stories, fairy tales chas veshalom? So, the kids shouldn't play together. How do you think the families are going to get along if parents keep their kids away from the neighbors? Antipathy is a concomitant of enforced separation.

As far as adults are concerned, let's focus on the facts, not the delusion, and the fact is that the Jews are hopelessly splintered. Does anyone really think that Satmar and Mercaz Harav have much in common? I'm not talking about Neturei Karta. Everyone hates them, and with good reason. Traitors earn hatred, no matter how well-meaning they might be. But Satmar is a functional group with a long history and a heritage of talmidei chachamim. Do members of the two sects/groups/camps have anything to do with each other? Would they feel comfortable walking into the others' shul to daven? And what about the Satmar Dayan in Antwerp who publicly and vociferously railed against a community-wide tehillim gathering for the safety of the soldiers of Tzahal during the Gaza war? And, speaking of the Satmarers, it is not easy to like a group that proclaims that Zionism and the movement to found the State of Israel was the proximate cause of the Holocaust. Did the endless cycle of Inquisitions and pogroms escape their attention?

This is not a new problem. Our history tells us of men who were great scholars and talmidei chachamim whose behavior was horrifying. Think about what the Shvatim wanted to happen to Yosef. Think about Shimi ben Geira and Avner, about other tzadikim gemurim, as the Chassam Sofer says in Parshas Shmos, who murdered Jews because they paskened that this was the halacha, but who, we are told, were wrong. Of course, who are we to judge? We are not even chamorim compared to these great men. Even Korach, compared to us, was a malach. Remember what Menasheh said to Rav Ashi in a dream, as brought in Sanhedrin 102b?

But all that does not matter at all. The point I'm making is this; you can have a great talmid chacham, a great tzadik, even what the Chasam Sofer calls a tzadik gamur. And this person is capable of paskening that someone is chayav misah: he is capable of personally killing a person; and we, the rest of Klal Yisrael, the ones who follow other poskim, hold that they are wrong. That means that there can be a tzadik gamur on one side who holds that we should go out and kill a certain Jew, and other poskim hold that whoever kills that Jew is a Rotzei'ach and is chayav missah. So what you have is a tzadik gamur and talmid chacham who is, by the hashkafos of others, a rotzei'ach. Rotzei'ach is not a morally neutral term. He is a murderer.

So if being a talmid chacham is not proof against being a murderer, what kind of a farce is it to say that Klal Yisrael has to aspire to achdus. This is not an exercise. It is a very good question. When there is nothing in the sincere study of Torah and the honest adherence to our mesorah that prevents the rise of diametrically opposed and absolutely incompatible groups, what do we mean when we say we need achdus? What on earth does achdus mean when the numerous ambiguities of the Torah naturally and inevitably result such radical division that drive us at each others' throats? And these ambiguities do not stem from our failure to adequately study the Torah. The ambiguity is an inherent and intended characteristic of the Torah. See Bava Metzia 88b, where there was an argument between God and the Heavenly Academy regarding a certain halacha, and they decided to bring Rabbah bar Reb Channa to make the decision.

Don't tell me that such extreme polarization is rare. It isn't. It happens all the time and every day.

So what is this constant talk about achdus? Are we so naive that we think it's possible, or, as is more likely, are we just saying it even though we know, in our hearts, that it's impossible? Are we just going through the motions because we think that it's a religious obligation to hahk a tshainik about achdus? I think that when people talk about brotherhood, they mean that a Chaim Berlin family in Flatbush can learn to get along with a Chafetz Chaim family in the Five Towns! Yes, we can do it!


The only difference is that we have THREE National Brotherhood Weeks. See Chagiga 26a, Vayei'asef...chaverim, and the mishnayos there.

At best, we can stay as far away as possible but recognize that the other is nebach entitled to his opinion, criminally stupid as it may be, or level of observance, ridiculously lax/fanatic as it may be. If they need help, offer to help. Greet them with a show of respect, even if you think that their stubborn backwardness is the reason mashiach has not yet come. But social mixing and true respect? Absurd.

As far as I can tell, achdus, to the extent that it is possible at all, is only possible in a secular democracy with strict division between religion and the state. This bifurcation, hopefully, carries over to social interaction. Obviously, this is not a guarantee of peace. Conflict about the form and direction and purpose of government can be as bloody as religious wars, as evidenced by most of the wars of the twentieth century, both hot and cold. But it seems to me that this kind of arrangement holds the most promise, while religion is fundamentally exclusivist and incompatible with compromise and mutual respect.
~

Korach, and The Doors of Gehinom

Synopsis:
There are three doors to Hell: Selfish discontent, silence in the presence of injustice, and the abandonment of community.
UPDATE JULY 2020, COURTESY OF RABBI AVRAHAM BUKSPAN at end.

(My wife spoke this week, and I have to say that I am very proud of the careful thought, energy and focus she brought to the task.)

They say that the road to Hell is paved with good intentions. Well, all you ladies here are full of good intentions. So let's talk about the road to Hell.

Chazal (Eiruvin 19a) say that Gehinom has three entrances; one is in the desert, one on the Sea, and one near Yerushalayim. Unlike Gan Eden, as one of the pirushim in the Ein Yaakov says, which only has one door, Gehinom has three. Three doors, no waiting. Now, Chazal were not writing a tour guide, and there are no visitor’s hours in Gehinom, so it’s not likely that they are really talking about where any actual doors to Gehinnom are.

Rav Yakov MiLisa, the Nesivos, has an interesting pirush in his sefer Nachalas Yakov. He says that there three "entrances" refer to the way people fall into the trap of Gehinom. The first, the Gemara says, is the Midbar, the Desert. The Gemara brings from the story of Korach that at his decisive moment of confrontation with Moshe in the Desert, the floor of the desert opened and he fell into Gehinom. This, the Nesivos explains, means that one who opens his mouth and complains, one who foments discord and argument, is treading on the doorstep of Gehinom. The Gemara in Shabbos 52a says there was a couple that would always get into a fight Friday nights, and Rav Meir took it upon himself to sit with them every Friday night, three weeks in a row, and he saw to it that they learned to avoid their usual arguments. The Gemara says that immediately after the third week, a voice was heard, the voice of the Satan, saying, "Woe to me, Rav Meir has evicted me from my dwelling!" Discontent, pettiness, demands and insisting on what you think you deserve without considering the needs of others, these are all ways of inviting the Satan into your house and earn you a ticket to Gehinom.

The second door is the Yahm, the Sea. The Gemara brings that Yonah prayed from the belly of the fish, and asked God to save him “mibetten She’ol,” from the belly of Gehinom. The Nesivos explains that the "Sea of Yonah" refers to a person who, realizing the danger of confrontation and argument, makes a conscious decision to be silent. This person, realizing how dangerous Machlokes is, says, silence is golden; no matter what, I will not get involved! As the Gemara in Pesachim 93a says, "Silence is precious for the wise, and doubly precious for fools." But when injustice is done, one cannot remain silent. Lo sa'amod ahl dahm rei'echa! Each and every member of the community must raise his voice and oppose injustice. You might not see it, but right there, on the sidelines with you, is another one of the doors to Gehinom.

So, what is one to do? You’re damned if you do, and you’re damned if you don’t. The best idea is to just stay away from the Jewish community. Jews, those contentious and stiff-necked people! Who needs the trouble! And that, of course, is the third door of Gehinom, the door that is outside of Yerushalayim. Yerushalayim is the city of brotherhood, Ir shechubra lah yachdav, the city where we come on the Shalosh Regalim to reinforce our sense of one-ness. One who places himself outside of Yerushalayim abandons his identity, he removes himself from the sense of community. It is that community that stands between us and Gehinom.

Ha’olam hazeh gesher tzar me’od! Life is the edge of a knife; stray just a little, and all will be lost. Every life-choice you make can be a blessing or a curse, and you can’t avoid making these immensely serious life-choices. The only eitzah is to take these things to heart, to ask Hashem for Siyata Dishmaya, to seek advice, and to eliminate, as much as possible, the ego pitfalls and subjectivity that poison the thought process.

(Note: the interpretations of the first two doors are from the Nesivos. That of the third door is my wife's.)




From Rabbi Bukspan:

    In BeZos Ani Botei’ach (pp. 93–94), Rav Shach points out that one can never feel complacent, convincing himself that he is not at the doorstep of Gehinnom. He brings the Gemara, which writes that Gehinnom has three entrances: one in the desert, one in the sea, and one in Jerusalem (Eiruvin 19a). He explains that these three entrances allude to three instances in which the yetzer hara tries to get us to sin.

            The first entrance to Gehinnom that is mentioned in the Gemara is the entrance in the wilderness. A person may think that the yetzer hara is only out to get him when he is part of a crowd, for that is when it can entice him to sin and to arouse his selfish attributes in his interpersonal relationships. However, were he to live as a hermit in the desert, the evil inclination would not rule over him. That is why Chazal came to tell us that one of the entrances to Gehinnom is in the desert.

            Rav Shach then brings the example of Kayin and Hevel. Even though they owned every possession and every piece of real estate in the world, they quarreled and feuded with each other, until they divided the wealth. Yet even then, they were not satisfied and they fought. We see from here that even if a person is alone and has it all, the yetzer hara ambushes him. Thus, the entrance to Gehinnom still looms large even in the desert, as it says in Parashas Korach (Bamidbar 16:33): “And they and all they had descended alive to the pit.”

            Based on the Gemara’s reference to the entrance in the sea, Rav Shach explains that even when a person finds himself in a dangerous situation, with a tempest raging all about him, threatening to capsize his ship, he is still not free from the shackles of the evil inclination. This can be seen from the incident of Yonah HaNavi; even when the sea was raging and everyone on the ship was in danger, he did not yet turn to Hashem. And even after they threw him into the sea and he was in mortal peril in the belly of the dag, the male fish, he did not cry out to Hashem. Only after being spit out by the male fish and subsequently swallowed by a dagah, a female fish, with crowded and extremely uncomfortable conditions, did he cry out to Hashem: “from the belly of the grave” (Yonah 2:3). Even when our lives are threatened, our obstinacy may hold us back, letting us sink into the depths of another entrance to Gehinnom, this one with an address in the sea.

            The third gate is in Yerushalayim, as the pasuk states, “The word of Hashem, Who has fire in Zion and a furnace in Jerusalem” (Yeshayahu 31:9). Even Yerushalayim, the holiest place on earth, offers no assurance of freedom from the yetzer hara, for here, too, he has dominion over us.

            So we see, concludes Rav Shach, that in every place and in every situation, the yetzer hara lurks, waiting to pounce upon us and entice us to sin. We must always be on our guard — against the yetzer hara and his ploys, and against the rationalizations that accompany each sin.

Korach, Bamidbar 16:1. Vayikach Korach. What a Difference a Good Shidduch Makes

I
The Gemara talks about the word ‘vayikach’, and why the story of Korach begins with this word. There are several pshatim in the Medrash and the Gemara.

Harav Dr. Akiva Eisenberg of (Queens) Manchester, NH, once said that the term "vayikach" alludes to the story brought in the Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b-110a. The Gemara brings the passuk in Mishlei 14 “Chachmos nashim bansah beysah, ve'iveles be'yadah tehersenu;" "The wise among the women build their home, and the crooked destroys it with her own hands." The Gemara tells us that Ohn ben Peles’ wife saved him(you’re not going to be the leader anyway, why join the rebellion?), while Korach’s wife goaded her husband into the fight (Moshe did what to you? And you let him get away with it? Are you any kind of man at all?). This, Rabbi Eisenberg explained, is why the Parsha begins with vayikach. Chazal tell us that in the Torah, marriage is always referred to with the term ‘kichah,’ as we know from the limud of kiddushei kesef “kichah kichah”. The wife of Korach agitated and incited him, while the wife of Ohn convinced him to withdraw from the fight with Moshe. It was Korach's "vayikach" that destroyed him, and it was Ohn Ben Peles' "vayikach" that saved him.

Many people are aware of the Gemara in Sanhedrin. But this insight highlights the idea that the very first word of the Parsha of Korach, the introduction to the tragedy, is the "Vayikach". Vayikach Korach ve'Ohn ben Peles-- it was their 'kichah's that sent one to his doom and saved the other from imminent death.

I noticed that the Gemara in Sotah 10b also brings a similar passuk about Avshalom; when he began his rebellion against his father, it says (Shmuel 2 18: ) “Ve’Avsholom lokach vayatzeiv lo matzeiva...”, and the Gemara asks, what did he take, and says various teirutzim, with the same nusach as the Gemarah in Sanhedrin. The same pshat can be applied there; in fact, there the passuk ends by saying that he set up ‘yad Avshalom’ because he didn’t have any children, and he wanted a zikoron for himself, that his wife influenced him to do what he did.

UPDATE 2019
At the Kiddush, I realized two fascinating things. First, that this applies equally well to people who are not married. Every person should have a friend that he respects and whose opinion matters to him -  and the friend should be a true friend, one that encourages when encouragement is needed, and criticizes when criticism is needed. Without that true friend, a person is apt to make mistakes, both of omission and commission, and both mistakes can ruin one's life. 
I then thought about the Mishna is Avos 1:6. 
יהושע בן פרחיה אומר, עשה לך רב, וקנה לך חבר
Do you notice that the expression קנה לך חבר is essentially identical with the concept of Kiddushin learned from the word כי יקח איש אשה? Kicha and Kinyan are synonymous. Chazal are telling us that the Kicha and the Kinyan both enable us to achieve Shleimus!


II
Who suffered the most from the rebellion of Korach? Who was punished most horribly as a result of this event? Was it Korach, who was swallowed up by the earth and buried alive? Was it the 250 supporters, who were burned? No. The most terrible fate was not the one suffered by those who were burned or those who were buried: it was the one suffered by the lone survivor, Ohn ben Peles.  Let me explain why.

Ohn Ben Peles' wife saw through Korach’s demagoguery about all men being equal, and she told Ohn, don’t be silly, don’t listen to that utopian nonsense about everyone being equal, he is going to make himself king, and you will be a follower once again. (Or, as Rabbi Dr. GS said, “you’re a loser no matter what.”) And Ohn says, but what can I do? I'm committed! So she says, leave it to me. She then proceeds to make him drunk, and scares away the Korach people that come to get him. You have to visualize what happened after that. The next day, Ohn is recovering from his bender, he probably still has a headache, and he and his wife are standing there, watching Korach and company confronting Moshe, and then they hear a rumble, a loud and sudden crack! and the earth opens, and Korach and his people fall into Gehinom. Ohn’s wife turns to him and says, “You see what would happen if I let you do what you wanted???” If Ohn Ben Peles would ever dare to disagree with his wife, all she would have to do is say, “You are disagreeing with me?  You also have an opinion?” Or she would just give him a look.

Korach was not the only man to fall, alive, into a Gehinom that day.  (This sounds even better in Yiddish.)

That is, of course, an easy joke, like Mothers in Law jokes. It is more important to reflect on how vital a spouse’s advice on ruchniusdike matters can be. Although the Gemara says that concerning ‘milli d’shmaya’ a husband should make the decisions, if a man is zocheh to have an “isha chachama,” only if he is a fool would he ignore the words of the wise wife Hashem blessed him with. The best example is that of Reb Akiva's wife, Rachel. In the recently published collection of Reb Akiva Eiger's letters, I saw a letter he wrote to his brother in law telling him that he had spent many hours during the night discussing mussar and hashkafa with his wife-- not teaching, discussing. If one is, heaven forbid, cursed with an ‘eishes Korach,’ he needs to act accordingly. But if he is blessed with an “eishes Ohn ben Peles,” he’d better learn to appreciate what he has.