T'nai Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven

In Parshas Mattos, we learn about the deal Moshe Rabbeinu made with the tribes of Gad and Reuven, where they were given the just-conquered transjordan but only on condition that they don't go home until the rest of the land of Israel was conquered.

From the form of the condition we learn many laws of T'na'im. One of them is "Hein kodem le'lahv," that the condition has to state the positive before the negative. That is, Moshe said "If you join your brethren in their war of conquest, then you will keep this land. If you don't, this land will be taken away and divided equally among all the people of Israel. Yes before no, Positive before negative, "if you join" before "if you don't".

The Taz and the Shach are the two great commentators on Yoreh Dei'ah. Often, they disagree. The Taz wrote an introduction to his work, and in middle of the introduction, he remarks that he has an interesting dvar torah about the laws of T'na'im, which he then writes.

The Shach, in his Nekudos Hakesef, argues on the Taz's introduction. And the Shach's son also argues on the Taz, but for different reasons. And the Gilyon Hamahrsha suggests a far-out-in-left-field answer in response to the Taz.

There are plenty of musmachim that know Yoreh Dei'ah very well that are unaware of this interesting viku'ach; the Shach and the Taz couldn't wait to start arguing, and the Gilyon Maharsha couldn't wait to start making tzushtells.

The Taz:
Brings Tosfos' (Kiddushin 62) kashe: why, by Sotah, does the Kohen say "Im lo shachav" (if you were not unfaithful, then you will be unharmed) first, when there's a rule of hein kodem le'lav? Tosfos answers that Hein, the positive, does not mean active as opposed to passive. It means positive in the sense of desired. Since we would rather that she was innocent, lo shachav is called hein, positive.
The Taz says this cannot be, because the Gemara (Gittin 75), talking about a conditional Get given in anticipation of death (to avoid Yibum problems) asks "how can the condition be stated "if I do not die, it will not be a get, but if I die, it will be a get," since the positive needs to be first? The Gemara answers that a person doesn't begin with puranusa, fearful events, and so he should not begin with "If I die...." But, the Gemara asks, what about the rule of positive/negative? The Gemara answers that the tnai should be stated thus: "If I don't die, then no get, if I die, then yes get, if I don't die, then no get."
So the Taz argues with Tosfos and says that Tosfos' assumption is faulty, and in truth, by Sotah, the real order is "im shachav...im lo shachav". The Taz says that the idea of not beginning with puranus doesn't apply here, because unlike get, where the puranus is a possible future event that we don't want to happen, by sotah we're talking about a possible past event, so beginning with puranus is not a problem. Usually, the Taz does not straight out argue with Tosfos, but here he says that he's sorry to say so, but the truth will out, and he's right.

So the Shach jumps on the Taz and says that the kashe from Get to Sotah is not a kashe. By Sotah and Bnei Gad and Reuven, the purpose of the tnai is to modify the event that is taking place. By BG&BR, the event was the allotment of the land. We modify it by saying that this allotment will take place if you do join your brethren in their war. By Sotah, the event is the trial by Sotah Water, which can have beneficial or deleterious effect, and we modify it by saying that the beneficial effect, that of improving the woman's health, is conditional on her innocence. But by get, there is only one event that is taking place, and that is the giving of a get. The purpose of giving a get is so that the get should be a get. There is no alternative meaning to the act of giving the get. Therefore, one has no choice but to begin with 'If I die." Before even discussing the idea of yes before no and that sort of thing, the fundamental idea of a tnai is the effectuation of the act that is taking place. Here, there is no alternative other than beginning with the circumstances that will effectuate and give meaning to the get-- if I die. So the Gemara says that one should do a triple tnai-- if I don't die, if I die, if I don't die.

The Shach's son, in his Hagahos, says another answer. He says that "Positive" can be either, as Tosfos says, the desired result stated in the positive, or an active instead of passive event. By Sotah, hinaki is a positive/desired. So even though hinaki is if lo shachav, it's still called hein because hinaki, be innocent, is stated in the positive. But by Get, "if I don't die" and "then it will not be a get" are both stated in the negative, and so it cannot be used to begin the tnai.

The Gilyon Mahrsha answers the Taz's question by quoting the Ran in Nedarim 50. The Ran there says that there are times, r'l, when a person, and his friends, should pray that he die instead of live. So, he says, the Taz's assumption that according to Tosfos' rule that hein means desired result "if I die" is an unalloyed negative, is not true. Sometimes, "If I die" is the desired result. The GhM, I think, didn't mean this as a serious teretz; it's just a nice tzushtell.

Mattos, Bamidbar 31:1. Moshe Rabbeinu's Role in the War with Midian.

Reb Meir Simcha asks, why was the war with Midian tied to Moshe? Why couldn’t Hashem just give him the tzivui, and whoever will do it will do it? There is clearly a very important connection between Moshe Rabbeinu and the war with Midian. In fact, Klal Yisrael knew that Moshe would live as long as the war had not yet taken place, and would die after the war ended. Reb Meir Simcha answers that it was important to teach people that personal loyalty cannot stand in the way of doing the will of Hashem. Moshe, fleeing from a death penalty in Mitzrayim, found refuge for many years in Midian, and married the daughter of one of their leaders. Despite this chiyuv hakaras hatov, Moshe led the war against them because Midian had been mechallel Hashem and had attacked Klal Yisrael.

Interestingly, the Lekach Tov points out that Moshe did not personally participate in the war with Midian. Instead, he sent Pinchas to lead the army. He brings that the Tanchuma, and the Medrash here, say that the reason Moshe sent Pinchas was because Moshe owed Midian hakaras hatov, and ‘bira dishasis minei lo sishdi bei Kalah.’ He, who owed a debt of gratitude to Midian, couldn't be the one to wage war on a nation from which he had derived such benefit.

Each of these two pshatim is very nice. However, if you think about it for a second, you will realize that R Meir Simcha’s pshat and the alleged Tanchuma appear to be diametrically opposed and contradictory. Reb Meir Simcha says that the lesson is that in the face of Retzon Hashem and resolving a chillul Hashem, a personal obligation of hakaras hatov means nothing; the Tanchuma says that the lesson is that Moshe Rabbeinu's hakaras hatov interfered with his personally prosecuting the war, that despite Hashem's command to wage war against Midian, Moshe’s hakaras hatov forced him to hand off the actual execution of the war to Pinchas.

It would be easy to say the two approaches, the Tanchuma and the Meshech Chachma— don’t necessarily go together. Ein meishivim ahl hadrush! That may be a good answer if you have a stirah about whether Rivkah was three years old or twelve years old, but it is a very poor answer where contradictory moral lessons are being taught. Secondly, then you would have the Tanchuma’s kashe (why did he hand it off to Pinchas) on Reb Meir Simcha, and Reb Meir Simcha’s kashe (why did Hashem davka want Moshe to be in charge of the war) on the Tanchuma. So we have no choice but to try to resolve the apparent contradiction and to see how they work together.

Perhaps we can say that Hashem wanted davka Moshe to declare and support the war, but Moshe understood that Hashem didn’t mean that he should actively participate, because of his hakaras hatov. Despite declaring and supporting the war, hakaras hatov prevents you from personally taking part.

We find this exact idea expressed in the story of Mitzrayim as well. Moshe was not commanded to actually carry out the makkos of dam and shchin, because of bira de’shasis etc. The makkos that afflicted the water that saved him as an infant, and the sand that hid the killing of the Mitzri, were not done by Moshe. But Aharon did them, and it was Moshe that commanded and directed Aharon to do them. So there, too, we seem to see that hakaras hatov is not a stirah to assailing at arm’s length.

So it seems that the answer is the same as Reish Lakish’s rule (e.g., Nazir 57b) in asei docheh lo sa’aseh; where you have a contradictory mitzvah obligation and lahv prohibition, if you can work them out separately so they don’t conflict, then do so. If not, and the contradiction cannot be resolved, then the obligation takes precedence over the prohibition. Here, too: Of course, the person has a personal chiyuv hakaras hatov. The fact that Hashem has declared that the person has an onesh coming has nothing to do with that chiyuv; the chiyuv onesh does not mean that the person or the object are completely atrocious and ugly. So, Moshe understood, perhaps from his experience in Mitzrayim, that although he was obligated to preside over and direct the war, it would be better, mitzad his hakaras hatov, that he should avoid doing it beyadayim.

Someone pointed out to me that Moshe Rabbeinu had an obligation of hakoras hatov to the royal family in Mitzrayim, and despite that, he personally did many of the makkos. I would say that the benefits Moshe Rabbeinu got from the royal family in Mitzrayim stemmed from the fact that they took him in after he was abandoned as a result of their genocidal decree. It’s sort of like the joke about a patricide pleading for mercy as an orphan. Their care can’t be said to mitigate the murderous intent-- a murderer who shows mercy, and spares one of his possible victims, doesn't deserve a medal.



Having said all this, I have to admit that I find the distinction unsatisfying. It seems like a hair-splitting legalism that disregards the moral basis of hakaras hatov. I assume that hakaras hatov means that you should endeavor to appreciate the favor and to do good for your benefactor. It really doesn 't matter much to the other side whether you're destroying him personally or through an agent. (This idea, that you can express your ambivalence by continuing to love someone while arranging his destruction reminds me. A cleric was once asked how he reconciles the suffering of the innocent with his theology of a loving god, and he answered that "god, in his magisterial capacity, sometimes does things which, in his personal capacity, he abhors." I didn't capitalize god or he because this particular cleric's belief system, and his idea of what god is, is so different from ours that it doesn't deserve a capital letter. In any case, if, as they say, the suffering of the innocent is the "rock of atheism," then I don't think his response would make much of a dent.) I know that ba'alei mussar will answer that hakaras hatov is a middah tova, and the problem here is not the damage to the other side, but instead the damage to your own feeling of hakaras hatov; by appointing an agent, and thereby refraining from doing it yourself, you avoid doing violence to the middah tovah, to your internal emotion of hakaras hatov. This is also how they explain why Moshe was loath to afflict the water and sand of Mitzrayim, although they are utterly insensate. I don't particularly like the pshat there, and I don't particularly like it here, either. Anyway, as I said, I try to write about things that require some thought; in this case, there are wrinkles here that I need to iron out as well.

Chaim Brown, in the comments, says the following.

Why do you need to come up with a pat resolution? I don't see a problem with saying Moshe was charged with declaring war to protest a chilul Hashem, but at the same time was faced with the burden of dealing with his own obligation of hakaras hatov toward his enemy. I think that mix of emotions is more consistant with issues that we face in the real world, where things are seldom black and white, than if you boil it down to one side or the other.

I realized that R Chaim's comment connects this discussion with something I just posted, in 2018, about the conflict between psak and exigency.

Parshas Mattos. The Shvatim and Klal Yisrael: Confederacy, United States, or Centralized Government?

The Parshah begins with the word ‘mattos.’ Matteh refers to a tribe, and the roshei hamattos are the princes of the various tribes. There is another word that refers to a tribe, and that is ‘sheivet.’ Interestingly, a shevet and a matteh both have a simple and literal meaning besides ‘tribe,’ and that is ‘stick’ or ‘staff.’ A few years ago, we were shmuessing during my shiur, and I was wondering if there is a similar developed meaning in English. I don’t think ‘office staff’ is the same, because that just means staff in the sense of a support. A certain young man suggested ‘club.’ He clearly has a bright future in crossword puzzles, but unfortunately he was wrong, because it turns out that 'club' is derived from the Icelandic for a group or a knot, ‘clump,’ such as the knot at the end of a club, so it refers to a group, or a clump, of people.

The terms shevet and matteh are appropriate for tribes, because we are told that each tribe had a banner, which had a unique color and picture and slogan, which was carried on a pole. For example, Reuven's background color was red, Yehuda had a picture of a lion, and Zevulun had a picture of a boat. Even now, it says in Shulchan Aruch that a family that has an unusual interest in the sea is most likely descended from Shevet Zevulun.

One thing is certainly evident, and that is that Hashem did not want Bnei Yisroel to melt into an undifferentiated and homogeneous mass. He wanted the Shvotim to retain a sense of difference and even emphasize their individual character traits and unique identities. He wants us not to mimic others, even fine and religious people, but rather to develop the specialized tradition and character that our own family history reflects. This was encouraged by each sheivet having its own flag and its own position in the encampment and travels. We see many examples of the shvotim having their particular identities.

In last weeks parshah, we learned in the story of the Bnos Tzelofchod that a daughter inherits under certain circumstances. Chazal tell us that when the law that a daughter inherits was introduced, an additional law was given along with it. The other law stated that any woman that stands to inherit land must marry within her tribe, because if she were to marry outside the tribe her property would be controlled and, upon her death, inherited and owned by her husband, and Hashem said there was to be no mixing of ownership at the initial settlement of Eretz Yisroel. In other words, Hashem wanted to ensure that when the land was settled the first time, Reuven territory would be exclusively owned by members of the tribe of Reuven, and Shimon likewise, and so on. The law of marrying within the tribe ensured that there would not be any Efrosi owning land in middle of Reuven. This shows how important it was to establish the independence and separation of the tribes, at least in the initial settlement of the land, which, of course, would establish the character of the settlement.
{I later saw in Bahd Kodesh from R Povarsky in Parshas Mattos that he says and brings from the Gri’z in Beis Habechiroh that the main thing is who was there when it was distributed and settled. Who owned it afterward did not matter. So the Mizbei’ach was considered to be in the cheilek of the Toreiph and the Har Habayis and the southeast edge of the mizbei’ach was in the cheilek of Yehuda even though it later was transferred to all of Klal Yisroel.}

Also, we learn in this week’s parshah about the tribes of Gad and Reuven, who clearly had a great deal more sheep and cows than the other shvotim, which again indicates a difference in their perspective and behavior.

Throughout Tanach we see evidence of the social, political, and economic separation of the shvotim, from the battles against Efraim in Shoftim (Shiboles/Siboles) to the story of Pilegesh B’ Giv’oh. In fact, the shvotim were so independent that for extended times during our history we were a loose confederacy of shvotim, not even a federal union. The Shvotim were essentially sovereign, with very little central civil authority. Even when the monarchy began, the shvotim moved in different directions and had to be dealt with independently, as we see in the conflict between Yehuda/Binyomin and the Aseres Hashvotim.

Now that we see how the shvotim were encouraged to seek their individual identities, we have to wonder why is it that the degolim were introduced only during the second year in the Midbor.

R’ Yakov answers...it is only after they built the Mishkon and learned to participate in the daily avodoh, only after they created the Super-Degel of achdus in bein odom lamokom through the avodoh of the Mishkan, could they be given their degolim. Before that, the degolim-concept would have set off a process of balkanization that would tear the nation apart.

So we see that it is only after achieving achdus in avodoh bein odom lamokom that we can seek our own path in other matters. How is it that we are zocheh to the building of a mishkon or mikdosh that enables us to participate in this avodoh? To answer this question we must hear what R’ Shimon Schwab says in Parshas Emor.

Rav Schwab remarks that in the parsha that discusses the Yamim Tovim, there is a strange interpolation after the description of the Holiday of Shavu'os of the laws of Leket, Shikcha and Pei'ah, which describe the farmer's obligation to leave part of his produce in his field so that the poor can glean it and survive on what was left. Rav Schwab answers that there really is a yomtov between Shvu’os and Rosh Hashonnoh. It is not Labor Day. It is the Yomtov of Leket Shikchoh and Pe’oh. The other yomim tovim commemorate events that already took place, like Yetzias Mitzrayim or the time of kapporoh. This yomtov is a day that is mesugol for a certain event that hadn’t taken place at the time the Torah was given. It is a phantom yomtov. And we call it Tisho Bo’ov. This day is destined to be the day of the Beis Hamikdosh, but the character of the Yomtov depends on our behavior. If we give LS and P properly, if we demonstrate our sense of oneness with the rest of Klal Yisroel, if a farmer who borrowed money and bought seeds and plowed and planted and fertilized and watered lets a poor man into his field to take the gleanings, that means that he sees him as family, and nobody begrudges a family member in need. If you see Klal Yisroel as your family, then the ninth of Ov will be a holiday of the building of the Beis Hamikdosh. In fact, as Rabbi D Oppenheimer added, this is the meaning of the fifteenth of Ov– it is the Yomtov Achron of the seven day holiday of Tisho Bo’ov. If, however, you are mean and stingy and selfish, and don’t give LS and P, then the ninth of Ov will be a day you commemorate disaster, the churbon habayis. One way or another, the ninth of Ov is the day of the Beis Hamikdosh. Whether it is a joyous holiday or a Mo’ed of disaster depends on you– on us.

So we see that in order to be zocheh to a Beis Hamikdosh, we must have a sense of family with the rest of Bnei Yisroel, an achdus in Bein Odom L’ chaveiro. So there is an order to this formula. Achdus Bein Odom L’chaveiro brings us to hashro’as hashchino, which is the binyon habayis. The binyon habayis allows achdus in Bein Odom Lamokom, which enables us to be granted Degolim, which encourage us to develop and celebrate our differences.

But this formula is a one way street. It goes Achdus/Achdus/Shvotim. It does not work backwards. Only after a person or a tzibbur have a firm grasp on the essence of the achdus of chessed and avodoh do they have the luxury of branching out and enhancing their differences. Unfortunately, we find that many people who are lacking the essence of achdus who not only celebrate, but worship their differences. This is only destructive. We must firmly grasp what joins us, and realize that what we share is far more important than what separates us. When we see a fellow Jew that seems very different than us we have to ask ourselves “does that person share our work of chessed and avodas Hashem?” If, and only if, we can honestly say that the other person is so distant from our traditions that he has no concept of what it means to serve his fellow man and to serve G-d, then we might fairly view him as a stranger. If, however, the other person does share those essential and definitive traits, then we have to remember that we are a nation of many Degolim that express very different traits and behaviors and see him as a member of our family.