Pharaoh's Impenetrable Heart.

Hashem hardened Pharaoh's heart so that he would not do teshuva and release the Bnei Yisrael.  This is stated several times.  In Shemos see 3:19, ואני ידעתי כי לא יתן אתכם מלך מצרים להלך ולא ביד חזקה, in Va'eira see 7:3 ואני אקשה את לב פרעה, and in Bo, 11:1, כי אני הכבדתי את לבו. From the emphasis and the repeated explanation that it was Hashem's desire to show the world how mighty Egypt would be like a plaything to Hashem, one might think that this was a singularity, a event exclusive to that one place and time.  It is not.  The ability to do Teshuva has been taken away from other people as well and continues to be a possibility.

I don't mean to provide excuses for people that want to fool themselves into thinking they can't do teshuva.  This only happens to highly accomplished resha'im.  If  you're not a world-class achiever in something else, you probably aren't a world-class Rasha either.  To emphasize this, here is something from the Brisker Rov, (quoted by Rav Shlomo Wahrman, author of שארית יוסף and Rosh Yeshiva of Hebrew Academy of Nassau County,) in HaPardes year Year 62 number 1, 1987, to the effect that even an Amaleiki can do teshuva.

 שמעתי מהגרי״ז מבריסק דתשובה מועלת גם לעמלקים דהרי בשמואל א׳ פט״ו כתיב לך והחרמת את החטאים את עמלק

 דמבואר דהוא רק בזמן שחוטאים משא״כ כשעושים תשובה דשוב אי״ז חטאים וכדאמרה ברוריא דביתהו דר״מ בברכות (י.) עה׳׳פ יתמו חטאים מי כתיב חוטאים חטאים כתיב וכוי אלא בעי רחמי עלויהו דלהדרו בתשובה ורשעים עוד אינם.

So no matter how bad you are, unless you are worse than an Amaleiki you certainly can do teshuva.  And let's not forget Gittin 57b, 

נעמן גר תושב היה נבוזראדן גר צדק היה מבני בניו של המן למדו תורה בבני ברק מבני בניו של סיסרא למדו תינוקות בירושלים מבני בניו של סנחריב למדו תורה ברבים מאן אינון שמעיה ואבטליון

But there are people who do lose access to Teshuva.  First, the Rambam:   (6 Teshuva 3)

ואפשר שיחטא אדם חטא גדול או חטאים רבים עד שיתן הדין לפני דיין האמת שיהא הפרעון מזה החוטא על חטאים אלו שעשה ברצונו ומדעתו שמונעין ממנו התשובה ואין מניחין לו רשות לשוב מרשעו כדי שימות ויאבד בחטאו שיעשה. הוא שהקב"ה אמר על ידי ישעיהו השמן לב העם הזה וגו'. וכן הוא אומר ויהיו מלעיבים במלאכי האלהים ובוזים דבריו ומתעתעים בנביאיו עד עלות חמת ה' בעמו עד לאין מרפא. כלומר חטאו ברצונם והרבו לפשוע עד שנתחייבו למנוע מהן התשובה שהיא המרפא. לפיכך כתוב בתורה ואני אחזק את לב פרעה. לפי שחטא מעצמו תחלה והרע לישראל הגרים בארצו שנאמר הבה נתחכמה לו. נתן הדין למנוע התשובה ממנו עד שנפרע ממנו. לפיכך חזק הקב"ה את לבו. ולמה היה שולח לו ביד משה ואומר שלח ועשה תשובה וכבר אמר לו הקב"ה אין אתה משלח שנאמר ואתה ועבדיך ידעתי וגו' ואולם בעבור זאת העמדתיך. כדי להודיע לבאי העולם שבזמן שמונע הקב"ה התשובה לחוטא אינו יכול לשוב אלא ימות ברשעו שעשה בתחילה ברצונו. וכן סיחון לפי עונות שהיו לו נתחייב למונעו מן התשובה שנאמר כי הקשה ה' אלהיך את רוחו ואמץ את לבבו. וכן הכנענים לפי תועבותיהן מנע מהן התשובה עד שעשו מלחמה עם ישראל. שנאמר כי מאת ה' היתה לחזק את לבם לקראת המלחמה עם ישראל למען החרימם. וכן ישראל בימי אליהו לפי שהרבו לפשוע מנע מאותן המרבים לפשוע תשובה שנאמר ואתה הסבות את לבם אחורנית כלומר מנעת מהן התשובה. נמצאת אומר שלא גזר האל על פרעה להרע לישראל. ולא על סיחון לחטוא בארצו. ולא על הכנענים להתעיב. ולא על ישראל לעבוד עכו"ם אלא כולן חטאו מעצמן וכולן נתחייבו למנוע מהן התשובה:

מונעין ממנו התשובה ואין מניחין לו רשות לשוב מרשעו.  That means "they withhold Teshuva from him and do not let him turn away from his wickedness."

Then, Reb Yisrael Salanter:

Reb Yisrael Salanter says that in the case of a regular person, Hashem seeks his Teshuva.  But a person might fall to a point where Hashem no longer seeks his Teshuva, and even if he makes tentative steps towards teshuva he will receive no divine assistance.  Then there is the very worst possible level, where not only does he receive no assistance or encouragement, but even if he manages to push himself to try to do teshuva, Hashem makes it impossible for him to follow through.  Teshuva does not exist in this person's world.  (I'm not sure if that means that he can't do Teshuva, or if it means that even if he does Teshuva Shleimah, it will not be accepted.  After all, from Middas Hadin, Teshuva is impossible. 

Finally, I found it interesting that several Achronim (the Nesivos, Rav Bergman, and several others, with approximately the same approach) use this idea to explain the discussion between Reb Meir and Bruria in Brachos 10a.  Reb Meir held that since they were beyond teshuva, there was no point in their living, and they would be better off dead, to avoid further sins, and the world would be better without them.  Bruria taineh'd that the inability, or the loss of siyata dishmaya to do teshuva is an onesh, and for onshim you can be mispallel.  So she told Reb Meir to daven that their onesh of "no access to Teshuva" should be removed, and then maybe they could be mashpia on them to do teshuva.   Or it could be they were arguing about whether they were on level two or three of Reb Yisrael Salanter's chart.  Neither pshat, I'm sorry to say, clicks in the words of Reb Meir or Bruria.  Also, I find it hard to believe that Reb Meir had any way of knowing that they were already on the madreiga of Ein Maspikin, because then the Tzadikim of Yerushalayim who weren't mochi'ach the resha'im (Shabbos 55a) would have the same excuse.  There are those that want to support this pshat by saying that Reb Meir recognized the syndrome from the fact that all his efforts to be mekareiv them, and their being unaffected by the proximity of such an Adam Gadol, so it must be that they are beyond hope.  Sorry, not convinced.   But it's a nice pshat anyway, because even if it's not a valid interpretation of the conversation between Reb Meir and Bruria, the idea that even a person from whom Teshuva has been taken away has hope, the hope that through Tefilla his access to Teshuva will be restored.

NOTE:  in the comments, Reb Micha Berger presents a formidable argument to the effect that it is incorrect to characterize the Kappara of Teshuva as being l'maala miderech hateva.  Please see there, where I cite  Rabbeinu Bachay and the Shla'h (partially cited in the notes in the Kad Hakemach and more fully in my comment) and Reb Micha's response and citations.
Reb Micha has since posted on this question at his Aish Das website, writing, as always, with serious thought and care.
 On that topic, here's a nice video about the human ability to change.

Shemos 3:14. Momentary Injustice

 כה תאמר לבני ישראל אהיה שלחני אליכם .ויאמר עוד אלקים אל משה כה תאמר אל בני ישראל יקוק אלקי אבתיכם אלקי אברהם אלקי יצחק ואלקי יעקב שלחני אליכם זה שמי לעלם וזה זכרי לדר דר. 

 In his Shaarei Orah II, Rav Bergman explains that the name of Hashem, as it is written, indicates that time doesn't progress for Hashem, only for us.  The Name combines present with future and it cannot be not read in this world:

After bringing the Ramban, Rabbeinu Yitzchak, the Rashbam, and the Baalei Tosfos, he says

הכוונה ברשב"ם ובבעלי התוס' בביאור אשר אהי' שהכוונה באהי' הי' אפשר לומר אלעתיד ולכך נתפרש: אשר אהי', שגם עכשיו בהוה אני במצב של אהי', כי אהי' בהוה זהו עומק פשוטו, וזהו קיצור שם יקו'ק אהי' בהוה וזהו יהי' בהוה

But we perceive events as taking place in sequence.  In our experience, the future and the present are discrete.  We cannot truly understand the divine perspective of simultaneity.  Since it is impossible for humans to understand this, we cannot read the Name as it is written, but rather as we are capable of perceiving it, that of mastery and lordship.  This is what the Gemara (Kiddushin 71a) means when it explains why in our passuk the word that is usually written לעולם is spelled without the vov, לעלם, by which the word "forever" acquires the additional implication of "hidden":

רבי אבינא רמי כתיב (שמות ג) זה שמי וכתיב (שמות ג) זה זכרי אמר הקב"ה לא כשאני נכתב אני נקרא נכתב אני ביו"ד ה"י ונקרא באל"ף דל"ת

 But we have to ask, why davka now?  What was the specific connection of this lesson to that moment in time?    

Furthermore, in the beginning of this passuk Rashi (from Brachos 9b) says that Hashem told Moshe that in the future, there would be many other times of exile and suffering, and that even then Hashem would be with them: 

אהיה אשר אהיה:אהיה עמם בצרה זו אשר אהיה עמם בשעבוד שאר מלכיות. אמר לפניו רבונו של עולם, מה אני מזכיר להם צרה אחרת דיים בצרה זו. אמר לו יפה אמרת, כה תאמר וגו'

Why did Hashem want to tell Moshe about the future galuyos at this moment?  What did that have to do with introducing Himself to Klal Yisrael?

Rav Bergman focuses on the relevance of this lesson to the issue of ידיעה ובחירה and the guilt of the Egyptians for enslaving the Jews.  I want to offer a different interpretation.

I propose that temporary injustice is also unjust, but only if a moment exists as a separate entity.  If the past and the future all exist simultaneously, then all events exist as a combination.  If reality is not temporal, then the concept of temporary is meaningless.  Momentary injustice is unjust, but if moments are not discrete entities, then examining a moment in isolation is an error.

Hashem was telling Moshe Rabbeinu that the harsh servitude of Mitzrayim is- and indeed must be- incomprehensible to Klal Yisrael.  Yes, of course it stemmed from Avraham Avinu's words at the Bris bein habesarim, but it would seem that this was an extreme reaction to the act of an ancestor that lived al pi middas hadin and who had died many years before.  Hashem said you should know that this is not the last time: there will be many such perplexing experiences for Klal Yisrael, and it will only be an awareness that Hashem's justice spans the past and the present and the future that will make it possible for them to comprehend, albeit as a matter of faith.  After all, humans cannot truly understand what it means for all events to exist simultaneously.   But at least if one does accept that postulate, the apparent injustice of an isolated moment loses its significance.  Moments in time are not isolated.  Taken as a whole, combining the cause and the effect and the innumerable intermediate steps, all is crystal clear.

In the comments, great unknown makes the point that such theology is a cold comfort to the suffering.  I agree with him, and I realized that the way it's written, it sounds like the platitudes about omniscience and perfect knowledge and the millennia-long cycle of din v'cheshbon yielding results that our blinkered eyes cannot understand.  That's not what I mean.

What I meant is this: I don't believe that life is an accounting book of debits and credits, where all that matters is whether at the end of the month there is a profit or a loss.  A person that eats something that is extremely bitter is not helped by the fact that he later eats something else that is divinely sweet.  A moment of injustice, a moment when the wicked torture the just and the innocent suffer is an injustice that is neither rectified nor mitigated by some future retribution to the sinner and reward to the saint.    Contemplating the suffering of Mitzrayim, and looking forward to thousands of years of galus, Hashem told Moshe Rabbeinu that from the human perspective, it will have to appear that injustice is taking place.  But at least we were taught that this apparent injustice is an artifact of our narrow experience of time as sequential and ephemeral.  of our perception of each moment as an independent entity.  But the deeper truth is that all the events we perceive as sequential and ephemeral exist simultaneously and irrevocably, and so there is no "moment" of injustice.  The bitter and the sublime are both taking place together, and in the combination of all events, justice and good are absolute.

Shemos 4:10. Moshe's Speech Impediment and Tefilla

At my son's last Sheva Brachos, an old acquaintance of the family who happened to be in town spoke.  This was Rav Shmuel Feivelsohn from Israel, the founder and head of Yeshiva Nachlas Naftoli in Tzfas.  When he was a child during WW II, his parents ran to a town right next to the border with Iran, because at that time Iran was a kingdom and the monarch was allowing Jews to go through Iran to Israel.  Instead of crossing over the Eretz Yisrael, unfortunately, his father died of Typhus and his mother of cancer, and he was taken in by his aunt and uncle, Reb Avrohom (son of Harav Naftoli) Trop and his wife.  Apparently, Reb Chaim Stein was there as well, and he wanted to go back back to Samarkand, where they met up with my parents and the other Bnei Torah.  When my parents got married, his aunt cooked for the wedding in Samarkand and his uncle and aunt were my mother's unterfihrers at their wedding.  (Reb Chaim Stein and his rebbitzen, Frida, were my father's unterfihrers.  That was the deal- whoever got married first would be the unterfirer for the other, and the Steins got married first.)  Rabbi Feivelsohn, who was a young man of around fifteen at the time, danced at my parents' wedding, so having him speak at my youngest son's last sheva brachos was a very moving experience, both for him and for us.  He said two things, and I will write the first.  The second was of a more personal nature in its focus on my father zatza'l.

The Ramban in Shemos 4:10 talks about Moshe's being a chvad peh, having a speech impediment.  The question is, why make such a big issue of Moshe Rabbeinu's defect?  Why didn't Hashem simply cure cure it and finished?  The Ramban has two approaches to this matter.
1.  The Ramban's own pshat.

ועל דרך הפשט יאמר כי אני כבד פה גם מתמול גם משלשום, כי מנעורי הייתי כבד פה, אף כי עתה כי אני זקן. וגם מאז דברך היום אל עבדך, כי לא הסירות כבדות פי בצוותך אותי ללכת אל פרעה לדבר בשמך, ואם כן איך אלך לפניו. 

והנה משה מרוב חפצו שלא ילך לא התפלל לפניו יתברך שיסיר כבדות פיו. אבל טען אחרי שלא הסירות כבדות פי מעת שדברת לי ללכת, אל תצווני שאלך, כי לא יתכן לאדון הכל לשלוח שליח ערל שפתים למלך עמים. והקב"ה כיון שלא התפלל בכך לא רצה לרפאותו, אבל אמר לו אנכי אהיה עם פיך והורתיך אשר תדבר, שיהיו דברי אשר אשים בפיך במלות נכונות שתוכל לבטא בהן יפה:
 Moshe Rabbeinu could very easily have davenned that Hashem should cure him of his problem.  The reason he didn't daven was because being cured would make him perfectly fit for the job of confronting Pharaoh and leading Klal Yisrael, and he didn't want the job.  So he didn't daven, and he said, Ribono shel Olam, I am still an aral sefasayim, and it's inappropriate that You, the Great King, should send a cripple to speak on Your behalf.  Hashem's reaction was that since Moshe didn't daven to be cured, he would not be cured, and Hashem would give Moshe words that he could manage even with his handicap so that he could do his job.

2.   The Medrash.

ובאלה שמות רבה (ג כ) אמרו: אמר לו אם אתה אינך איש דברים אל תחוש, הלא אני בראתי כל פיות שבעולם ואני עשיתי אלם מי שחפצתי וחרש ועור ופקח לראייה ופקח לשמיעה, ואם חפצתי שתהיה איש דברים, היית, אלא לעשות כך אני חפץ. ובעת שתדבר יהיו דבריך נכונים שאני אהיה עם פיך. הדא הוא דכתיב (בפסוק ב): ועתה לך ואנכי אהיה עם פיך. 

ולפי זה נראה בעיני שלא רצה להסיר ממנו כובד הפה בעבור שהיה בו ממעשה הנס שספרו רבותינו בשמו"ר א כו שאירע לו עם פרעה. 

(Based on the Medrash.)  Hashem told Moshe that those people that are handicapped and those that are naturally talented are all as they are because of the specific will of Hashem.  You, Moshe, have this impediment davka because I want you to have it, and I will make it happen that you will speak perfectly despite your handicap.  Why, then, didn't Hashem cure him and make his work easier?  The Ramban suggests that according to the Medrash, pshat is that Hashem didn't want to remove the handicap because it bespoke the miracle during Moshe's infancy when his life was saved by putting a hot coal to his lips.  Even though it was a disfiguring handicap, even though his scarred and immobile lips and tongue gave him constant pain, Hashem didn't want to remove it because they were the result of a miracle that was intended to save Moshe's life.


3.  The Ramban then goes back to his own pshat, different than the Medrash.

והנכון בעיני שאמר ה' למשה מי שם פה לאדם או מי ישום אלם הלא אנכי ה' עושה כל, ובידי לרפאות אותך, ועתה כיון שלא תרצה ברפואתך ולא התפללת לפני על זה, לך אל אשר אני מצווה לך, ואנכי אהיה עם פיך ואצליח שליחותי. גם אפשר שיהיה רמז מויחר אף ה' במשה";שלא רצה לרפאותו ושלחו על כורחו:

 Here the Ramban goes back and states his preference for his own pshat, which I numbered 1.  Hashem said, I can cure you. But since you aren't praying to be cured, I'm not going to.  So go without being cured, and I will make sure that you are successful.  Hashem was angry that Moshe intentionally refrained from davening in order to keep his 4-F.  But it didn't make a difference, because Hashem sent him as he was.

Rabbi Feivelsohn said that it was Reb Chatzkel Levinstein that pointed this Ramban out to him.  It's amazing; Reb Chatzkel said.  According to the Ramban, it was important that Moshe be cured, and Hashem wanted Moshe cured, but since Moshe didn't daven to be cured, Hashem did not cure him.  Amazing!  People think that tefilla is to change Hashem's mind, to convince Him of something, to advocate a point.  Here the Ramban is saying that there are things that a man might have coming to him, there are things that are important that he receive, but if the person will not daven for them, then no matter how important it is that he get them, he won't get them.  That's the way Hashem created the world for his servants.  You might be zocheh to great bracha, but if you don't daven, you're leaving all your brachos on the table.  Everyone wishes the Chasan and Kallah bracha and hatzlacha and the building of a bayis ne'eman, and all the brachos will be mekuyam, but you can never forget that you must be mispallel that your brachos should come into your hands, because without your tefilla nothing will happen.

Rabbi Faivelsohn used the Ramban's wording of the Medrash Rabba to make his main point.  Having suffered and seen others suffering through the privations of Soviet Asia, losing his parents, starving, being half frozen and desperately alone, he now looks back on the wedding he attended as a child, and with the same eyes he sees that couple's youngest grandchild getting married, and all the suffering that he experienced was like the wound on Moshe Rabbeinu's mouth- it was extremely painful, and the pain remains to this day, but now he sees it as all as a mazkeres haneis, as part of the Ribono shel Olam's plan and will, from the world turned upside down in the privations of far-off Samarkand, across seventy years and thousands of miles and unimaginable changes, all the way to the simcha of the Sheva Brachos.

Shemos 2:14. Achein, Noda Hadavar. Leeches and Piranhas

What is it about the internet that brings out our dark side?  I used to think it was the anonymity, the magnified thrill of doing in public what you had been constrained to do in private, the childish desire to open your mouth while chewing to elicit the disgust of the other people at the table.  But now people attach their real names to uncharacteristically intemperate essays, writing things that a moment's reflection ought to have cut off.  It seems that the internet doesn't only allow writers to turn over the rock and reveal the squirming decay and ugliness that decency had hidden.  It seems that the internet actually does damage to the soul.

Let's take the most recent example.  Let's say we have an honorable individual who has founded and directed a rabbinical organization for years.  He has antagonized people on both sides of the Orthodox spectrum, from those who hate him for his unwillingness to bend the rules, to those who hate him for what they consider to be his willingness to bend the rules.  The hatred he has attracted is not unique; Moshe Rabbeinu was accused of fattening himself off of the sweat of the Jews, and Yechezkel Hanavi was accused of having an adulterous affair with a married woman.  This is to be expected.  Every ethnic group has its weaknesses, and devouring our leaders is one of ours.  As related in this week's parsha (2:14.), when Moshe Rabbeinu confronted Dassan and Aviram, 

וַיֹּאמֶר מִי שָׂמְךָ לְאִישׁ שַׂר וְשֹׁפֵט, עָלֵינוּ הַלְהָרְגֵנִי אַתָּה אֹמֵר כַּאֲשֶׁר הָרַגְתָּ אֶת הַמִּצְרִי וַיִּירָא מֹשֶׁה וַיֹּאמַר אָכֵן נוֹדַע הַדָּבָר

'Who made you our prince and judge?' retorted [the other]. 'Do you mean to kill me as you killed the Egyptian?' Moses was frightened. 'The matter has become known,' he said.

Rashi there explains,

Moses was frightened: [To be explained] according to its simple meaning [that Moses was afraid Pharaoh would kill him]. Midrashically, it is interpreted to mean that he was worried because he saw in Israel wicked men [i.e.,] informers. He said, Since this is so, perhaps they [the Israelites] do not deserve to be redeemed [from slavery]. [From Tanchuma, Shemos 10]

Indeed, the matter has become known: [To be interpreted] according to its apparent meaning [that it was known that he had slain the Egyptian]. Its midrashic interpretation, however, is: the matter I was wondering about, [i.e.,] why the Israelites are considered more sinful than all the seventy nations [of the world], to be subjugated with back-breaking labor, has become known to me. Indeed, I see that they deserve it. [From Shemos Rabbah 1:30]

 So, nothing is new as far as how we treat our rabbinic leaders.  Dassan and Aviram were also among the greatest of the Jews, or Pharaoh would have ignored them, and the Jewish people would have ignored them as well.  It must be that they had some achievements and skills that elevated them in peoples' eyes.  And even so, their behavior towards Moshe Rabbeinu was so repugnant that he was moved to despair; "If this is how the Jews behave, no wonder they suffer so much; I wonder if they deserve to ever be redeemed."



Compounding the problem is the Mishna in Pirkei Avos 5:17:  כל מחלוקת שהיא לשם שמים סופה להתקיים

Literally, that means that any dispute that is motivated by a desire to serve Hashem will have positive lasting results.  In my experience, it really means that when people fight in the name of Hashem, they have no moral limitations, and they will never compromise, and the fight will be dirty, and it will never end.  And the parties will never regret it.  "It was le'sheim shamayim!!!!"



I wonder; when accusations were made against this individual, did people say to themselves "this accusation, if it spreads and is taken to be true, will kill this man.  His reputation will be destroyed, his wife will divorce him, his children will hate him, his yeshiva will fall apart, he will end up penniless and despised.  So I had better be more than certain that the accusations are true before openly saying I believe them, and I better not publicize them."  Or, "I will not open my mouth unless the evidence is so compelling that if the accused were my own father, I would believe it."  Or, "Publicizing this is morally indistinguishable from disemboweling him.  Is this something I'm comfortable doing?"

These are rhetorical questions.  I actually am not wondering at all.  What has happened, at least in the case of the guardians of our morals, our righteous fifth column, is that they accepted evidence that would not have been accepted in any court in any civilized country, to say nothing of the extremely strict procedural rules in a Beis Din dealing with capital punishment.  When the government of Iran distributes Photoshopped illustrations of missile launches, when any talented ten year old Goebbels could dice and splice an innocuous telephone conversation into a damning depravity, what evidentiary value do photographs and taped conversations have?  Is it for nothing that the Torah requires live witnesses?  We're not talking about "kabdei'hu ve'chashdei'hu," respect but suspect.  We're talking about making a person into a graf shel re'i.


This is not a case where the accused is a clear and present danger to others, as in the case of child molestation or marital violence.  In those cases, of course, the suspect should immediately be placed where he cannot do any harm.  Our hypothetical suspect presents no danger to anyone.


What if it turns out that the accusations were true, and not part of an orchestrated smear campaign funded by an extremely wealthy nemesis?  Will that justify retroactively the behavior of the lynch mob?  No, it won't.  The question is, was this behavior justified on the basis of the evidence presented.  If the initial evidence was faulty, later proof of guilt will not justify anything that was done before the real proof was presented.


So, I was just wondering.  Assuming this is the fate of Klal Yisrael, and that this kind of blithe willingness to participate in a man's destruction is just another iteration of the behavior Moshe Rabbeinu saw so many years ago, here is the real question. 

Which is better; a piranha or a leech? 

On the one hand, a piranha is a nice looking fish, with glittering silver scales and bright red markings on its belly and ventral fin.  With a little imagination, you can even see a coy smile on its face.  On the other hand, when is smells blood in the water it horribly rips its victims to shreds, leaving nothing behind but striated bones and a faint echo of pain and despair. 

A leech, on the other hand, is an ugly boneless slug of cartilage, lacking even a rudimentary spine, but at least it doesn't rip its victims to pieces, it only sips a bit of their blood.  

It's a tough choice.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Gemilus Chasadim of Gentiles

The Posts on this Website evolve, and the site is, to some extent, participatory.
As I re-read the Post, and as I think about the comments, I will often edit a Post to incorporate, or in response to comments, or so as to anticipate and pre-empt comments. I may also expand or re-write for clarity. So, if you read the comments and find something that doesn't seem to make sense, that may be because I changed the post in response to a comment that exposed an error, a weakness, or an ambiguity.
I very much appreciate your critical reading and thoughtful comments.

This week, the Torah tells us the story of how the daughter of Pharaoh saved Moshe. Apropos of that, I want to point out that we Orthodox Jews tend to develop a parochial, self-congratulatory, hermetically insular resistance to admitting the fact of gentile ba'alei chesed. I think this is embarrasingly juvenile. There are better ways to encourage ethnic and religious pride than to deny middos tovos among the goyim. This morning I had just such an experience, which, though relatively trivial, reminded me about the chesed of Bisya. On another occassion, I bumped someone's rear bumper: there wasn't enough to make real trouble, but there certainly was enough to cause problems if one was so inclined. The fellow whose bumper I hit, a young black man, got out, saw that it was relatively trivial, and said, forget it, let's just be grateful it wasn't worse. Now, it may be that he was was afraid to be late for a meeting with his parole officer; and maybe he had stolen the car. Or it may be that he was just a decent human being, a mentsch. And it may be that Goyim now are, in a sense, like Geirei Toshav, since Torah concepts have been incorporated into Western society. Technically, thay are not Geirei Toshav, since this requires a beis din, and it is a machlokes Rambam and Ra'avad in 14 Isurei Biah whether the concept of Ger Toshav exists now that Yovel is not applicable; but it would be a fine old kulah vis a vis the Rambam in 12 Isurei Biah end of 5.

The Tosfos Yomtov in Avos 3:14 says that Chaviv Adam she'nivra be'tzelem refers to all of mankind. Others, brought there, vigorously debate this universalist perspective, and I certainly can see how one might be uncomfortable applying that term to the sicarii and anthropophagi of the Congo. But when you see it happen, I don't think there's a converse of "havei dan es kol adam lekaf zechus" for gentiles.

I recently got a letter that was intended for an Arabic family that lives down the street. So, one would assume that the issur of "leman sefos harava es hatzmei'a" and/or lo sechanem would apply (see CM 266, and Beis Yosef Tur ChM 249, end of D'H Assur). On the other hand, Tosfos in Avoda Zara 20 says that there is no issur of lo sechanem on neighbors or people who know you, and so we pasken: see YD 151:11, and there is certainly no issur of lo sechaneim when what you do generates a Kiddush Hashem. But then I would have to make sure to re-deliver the letter davka when they are home, and while wearing a big old yarmulkeh. But how would I want my neighbors to behave if an important letter of mine came to their house? Doesn't knowing that some stranger re-delivered their mail encourage them to behave in a more civilized manner in general? What do we do to society if our altruism is limited to our narrow group like the Chasidah, the Of Tamei that is "osah chesed im chavrose'ha," and we refuse to assist others absent some personal benefit? When I need a Shabbas Goy to turn on the heat, or to turn off the alarm system, or whatever, do I need to be ruefully grateful that they don't have the lo sechaneim on us that we have on them?

On the other hand: respect leads to understanding, understanding leads to empathy, and empathy leads to ta'aruvos. the safest thing to do is to take an absolutely rejectionist stance. It is very difficult to categorically deplore someone's religious beliefs while appreciating and respecting his positive traits. "Hatzileini na miyad achi, miyad Eisav" is a very narrow path we have to walk.

Another point: I have been batting this question back and forth for years.
Issue:
Is there a din of lo sechanem when you reciprocate a favor where there is no possiblity of being repaid and there is no Kiddush Hashem.
Of course, as I said from Tosfos and the Mechaber, favors to neighbors are legally viewed as investments. But if there is no possibility of being repaid; if there is no Kiddush Hashem; is the simple concept of hakaras hatov mattir lo sechanem?
Discussion:
Pashtus, I would think it is. It's not chinam! I'm doing it because I want to show my gratitude for a favor he did for me. In a sense, I owe him the reciprocation. It may not be legally enforceable, but it seems to be a moral debt. After all, the chiyuv of Hakaras Hatov is a Meta-Mitzvah: Adam Harishon, when he said "Ha'isha asher nasata imadi," was severely punished for failing to be makir tov.
Application:
Expanding this proposal, let us say that we have a chiyuv of hakaras hatov to the United States, for taking so many Jews in, and for supporting Israel, and for, in general, not only being a medina shel chesed, but also for not killing us. And what is the United States? It is no more than the term we use for the democratic will of its citizens. If so, a concommitant of hakaras hatov to the United States would be a chiyuv hakaras hatov to its citizens!
Conclusion:
So there would be no din of lo sechaneim on any citizen of the United States.

However:
In Gittin, in the sugya of Le'olam Bahem Ta'avodu, according to the Rashba that this is tied to the din of Lo Sechanem, the lashon of the rishonim seems to indicate that mere hakaras hatov is not a mattir. There has to be some legal obligation that you are fulfilling, or the likelihood that the favor will be returned.

Shemos 4:24. The Malach that Attacked Moshe for Delaying Eliezer’s Bris Milah.

Moshe Rabbeinu was attacked by a Malach on his way back to Egypt, and Chazal tell us that this was a punishment for postponing the Bris Milah of his son, Eliezer. Making a bris while traveling would have endangered the child's life, and Moshe decided that the Mitzvah of Milah is countermanded by the need to protect the child's life. (When he reached Egypt, he spent time settling in to the inn, and apparently he should have not done so-- he should have immediately made the Bris, and so the Malach attacked him.) The Mizrachi here asks, what was Moshe Rabbeinu's justification for the delay as he travelled to Egypt in the first place? Although it is true that we learn from the passuk in the Torah "vachai bahem" that piku’ach nefesh is docheh mitzvos, but that only became the halacha after the Torah was given at Har Sinai. Before Matan Torah, the mitzva of milah was mandatory, a chiyuv gamur, from the time of Avraham Avinu, and the mitzvah of vachai bahem was as yet only voluntary, as were the vast majority of the mitzvos prior to Mattan Torah. It was not a chiyuv gamur until mattan Torah! So how could the then-voluntary mitzvah of vachai bahem be docheh the then-mandatory mitzvah of milah?

He answers that Moshe Rabbeinu knew from his own seichel that oneis nefashos is docheh, because it’s better to do one aveira now that will enable kiyum of many mitzvos later (an answer which conflates Shmuel's teretz with the other teretz in the Gemora in Yoma 85b.)


The Gur Aryeh there says he doesn’t know what the Mizrachi is talking about. Vachai bahem is not a din of dechiyah like asei docheh lo sa’aseh. It is a statement of fact that the Torah makes– life transcends mitzvos, and the protection of life is superior to the fulfillment of mitzvos. If life is superior to full-fledged mitzvos that were given on Har Sinai, then kal vachomer life supercedes mitzvos which preceded Matan Torah, including the mitzvah of Milah.


The Taz in his Yad Dovid answers that of course oneis is docheh even without the passuk, because the mitzvos were not given to shorten our lives, but rather for darkei no’am. The chidush of the passuk is that a person who chooses to die rather than transgress the aveira is over on bittul asei of vechai bahem.


So the Mizrachi’s basic assumption was that you need vachai bahem for dechiyah, and therefore Jews before mattan Torah, or goyim bizman hazeh, might not have the petur of dechiya because of oneis. You might wonder, how can it possibly be that there is a aspect of halacha that is more strict for a Ben Noach than it is for a Yisrael. This is not a question, because we find that according to some rishonim, a Ben Noach is chayav for Shogeig-- Rashi Makos 9a and Chinuch #26. Of course, there are those that argue on this-- Lechem Mishneh 10 Melachim 1.

In any case, as far as whether a Ben Noach has a petur for onsim: See Rambam 5 Yesodei Hatorah 1 and 10 Melochim 2, where he says that Bnei Noach absolutely do have a petur of oneis that allows them to be over their aveiros. We don’t need a mitzvah of vachai to patter. In fact, he says that goyim even have a greater petur onsim that Jews do-- for them, the petur dechiya applies to avodah zorah, since they have no mitzvoh of kiddush Hashem.


See the Gilyonos Chazon Ish on Reb Chaim on the Rambam in Rotzei’ach 1:9 d’h veharei; Reb Chaim seems to assume that goyim have no petur dechiya; the Chazon Ish brings the Rambam in Melochim to contradict that assumption.


See R Akiva Eiger in hilchos eiver min hachai who brings a tshuva that klers whether you’re allowed to hand eiver min hachai to a goy who needs it to save his life, because you have a problem of lifnei iver; this teshuva implies that a goy has no hetter of oneis, again contrary to the Rambam.

But the Minchas Chinuch 295, in the first piece and onwards, brings a Hafla’ah with which you can answer both problems– why did Reb Akiva Eiger ignore the Rambam, and why did Reb Chaim ignore the Rambam. The answer, with the Hafla’ah, is that while they have the petur onus when another person threatens them, they don’t necessarily have the petur onus when they choose to be over because they are sick or some other kind of oneis. In the first instance, it is viewed as the other person's act; in the second, it is your act, albeit under duress. See also the first Proshas Drochim in Shemos.

Shemos, 1:15. Shifra and Puah.

The Gemora in Sotah 11b says that Shifrah and Pu'ah were Yocheved and either Miriam or Elisheva. They were given these different names here only to describe the work they did— in their work as midwives, they straightened the bent limbs of newborn children (m'shaperes es havlad) and calmed them by cooing to them (po'oh ehl havlad). Reb Yerucham asks, these women were great nevios; couldn’t they be described with names that are more dignified? It seems like the equivalent of referring to Albert Einstein as “the customs clerk.” He answers that great people don’t do little things. A truly great person invests his actions with greatness. When they did their work as midwives, every move they made was deeply thought-out and appropriately manifestated their spiritual greatness.

This is like what I heard from my father shlita about the Medrash Talpios that “Chanoch tofer manolim hoyo, ve’al kol tefira omar Boruch shem kvod...” Chanoch was a cobbler, and on every stitch he would say Boruch Sheim kvod.... Ovi Mori said, b’derech mussar, that this does not mean that while his hands worked, his mind was far away in the spiritual realms. It means that every stitch he sewed reflected kiddush Hashem. He worked with the highest kavono to make shoes that would benefit their user, that would be water-tight, and would last, and would be worth more than the person would be paying for them. The idea is the same— a gadol will do even the most mundane task with gadlus.

There is an important lesson here. A person that goes to work must remember who he is at every moment. He cannot compartmentalize his life into “ben Torah” and “working man.” He is a ben Torah at all times, and his work, both the way he works and the purpose of his work, should reflect clearly who he is.

I found that Rav Dessler says this too.

 מכתב מאליהו  

חלק א המשא ומתן הטוב, עמוד לד

חלק א קונטרס החסד עמ' 34

בתורה כתוב "ויתהלך חנוך את האלקים", ואמרו חז"ל שהיה תופר מנעלים ועל כל תפירה היה מייחד יחודים לקונו. ושמעתי בשם רבינו ישראל מסלנט זצ"ל שביאר כי אין הכוונה שבשעת תיפרתו היה דבק במחשבות עליונות, שזה אסור על פי הדין, כי איך יפנה דעתו לדבר אחר, בשעה שעוסק במלאכת אחרים, אלא תוכן היחודים ששם על לבו בכל תפירה שתהיה טובה וחזקה, למען יהנו מהמנעלים אשר ינעלם. ככה דבק במדת קונו אשר ייטיב ויהנה לזולתו, וככה ייחד לו יחודים, כי אינו חפץ 

בדבר אחר זולת החפץ לדבק במדות קונו

and

(כרך ראשון קונטרס החסד עמ' 34) כתוב בזה"ל: בתורה כתוב ויתהלך חנוך את האלקים, ואמרו חז"ל "כי חנוך תופר מנעלים היה, ועל כל תפירה ותפירה היה מייחד יחודים לקונו" (עיין מדרש תלפיות ערך חנוך). ושמעתי בשם רבנו ישראל מסלנט זצ"ל שביאר המאמר הזה ביאור נחמד, ויאמר, כי אין הכוונה שבשעת תפירתו היה דבק במחשבות עליונות, שזה אסור על פי הדין, כי איך יפנה את דעתו לדבר אחר בשעה שעוסק במלאכת אחרים אשר שכרוהו? אלא תוכן הייחודים שהיה מייחד הוא, אשר שם על לבו ומחשבתו בכל תפירה ותפירה כי תהיה טובה וחזקה, כי יהיו המנעלים טובים, למען יהנה מהם אשר ינעלם. ככה דבק חנוך במידת קונו אשר ייטיב ויהנה לזולתו, וככה ייחד לו ייחודים, כי לא חפץ חנוך בשום דבר אחר זולת החפץ האחד והשאיפה המיוחדת לידבק במידת קונו וכו'.עיי"ש.

Interestingly, I found this little piece on this Reb Yisrael.

הרב יוסף הלוי שישא

'חנוך תופר מנעלים': צדקת הצדיק

על דברים בשם ר"י סלנטר בספר "מכתב מאליהו"

בספר 'מכתב מאליהו' מאת הגאון רבי א"א דסלר זצ"ל (כרך ראשון קונטרס החסד עמ' 34) כתוב בזה"ל: בתורה כתוב ויתהלך חנוך את האלקים, ואמרו חז"ל "כי חנוך תופר מנעלים היה, ועל כל תפירה ותפירה היה מייחד יחודים לקונו" (עיין מדרש תלפיות ערך חנוך). ושמעתי בשם רבנו ישראל מסלנט זצ"ל שביאר המאמר הזה ביאור נחמד, ויאמר, כי אין הכוונה שבשעת תפירתו היה דבק במחשבות עליונות, שזה אסור על פי הדין, כי איך יפנה את דעתו לדבר אחר בשעה שעוסק במלאכת אחרים אשר שכרוהו? אלא תוכן הייחודים שהיה מייחד הוא, אשר שם על לבו ומחשבתו בכל תפירה ותפירה כי תהיה טובה וחזקה, כי יהיו המנעלים טובים, למען יהנה מהם אשר ינעלם. ככה דבק חנוך במידת קונו אשר ייטיב ויהנה לזולתו, וככה ייחד לו ייחודים, כי לא חפץ חנוך בשום דבר אחר זולת החפץ האחד והשאיפה המיוחדת לידבק במידת קונו וכו'.עיי"ש.

ושמעתי כמה פעמים מאחד מזקני הרבנים זצ"ל שהתפלא מאוד על הביאור הזה, שהרי הביטוי 'מייחד ייחודים' מכוון בדרך כלל לסתרי תורה נעלים וקדושים, ואיך אפשר לסלפו ולהורידו לתפירת מנעלים, למלאכת שוסטער בלעז? ושוב ראיתי שבספר מעשה איש (תולדות החזון איש) כתוב שהחזון איש אמר על זה שאסור לומר כן, ומייחד יחודים הוא כפשוטו.

בכדי לברר הנושא, צריך קודם כל לעיין במקור הדבר. במכתב מאליהו נאמרו הדברים בשם 'מדרש תלפיות' ערך חנוך. מדרש תלפיות איננו מדרש חז"ל כמו מדרש רבה ותנחומא, אלא חובר בידי הרב ר' אליהו הכהן איתמרי זצ"ל מרבני איזמיר לפני כשלוש מאות שנה, מחבר ספר שבט מוסר, והוא ליקוט מאמרי חז"ל זוהר ושאר ספרי הקבלה לפי נושאים. בספר ההוא ציין שהמאמר מקורו בעשרה מאמרות להרמ"ע מפאנו, מאמר אם כל חי (ח"ג סי' כב). וז"ל שם: והוא [חנוך] היה תופר מנעלים בפועל... והיה חנוך באמונתו מכווין בהם לקשור העולמות התחתונים שיהיו תיקונים לרגלי שכינה... ועל כל תפירה ותפירה היה מכוון ואומר ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד וכו' (עיי"ש בפירוש יד יהודה).

וראיתי שבספר קדשי יהושע סי' תכב (חיברו חתנו של הרב דסלר, הרב גלדצלר זצ"ל) כתוב שבפסח תשי"ב היה הרב דסלר אצלו במאנסי, "והקשיתי אז למו"ח דמאמר זה תמוה מכמה אנפין, ולא אאמין שיצא דבר זה מפי קודשו דגאון ישראל מסלנט". ועיי"ש שהאריך למצוא מקורות למאמר הנ"ל. "ועוד הקשיתי למו"ח זצ"ל, ניתי ספר ונחזה, אם הלשון מוכיח דחנוך בעת שהיה תופר מנעלים היה מייחד יחודים ממש, או דכל כוונתו בכל תפירה שתהיה המנעל טובה וחזקה", ואחרי העיון בדברי הרמ"ע מסיק בזה"ל: "הרי מפורש שהכוונה במייחד יחודים דחנוך באמונתו כוון בהם לקשר העולמות התחתונים שיהיו תיקונים לרגלי השכינה, ועל כל תפירה ותפירה היה מכוון ואומר ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו, יש בזה קשר ויחוד כל ההיכלות עליונים. ומפורש בהדיא שהיה מייחד יחודים ממש" וגו'. ואחר אריכות נפלאה לבאר כל העניין הגבוה הזה ממש ממסד עד טפחות הוא כותב: "והשיב לי מו"ח זצ"ל על אתר באנפין נהירין, דודאי אתה צודק דחנוך היה מייחד יחודים עילאין כדכתבו כל המקובלים, ולא חולק הגרי"ס על כל אבות הקבלה, אלא חידושו של הגרי"ס הוא דהייחודים של חנוך בעת שהיה תופר מנעלים של אחרים, הם יחודים של לאו דאונאה ובמצוות עשיית חסד עם זולתו", ועיי"ש פירושו.

וכל הדברים שכותב ומפרש חתנו הגדול של הרב דסלר הם אמת וצדק, אבל רק לפי נוסח הסיפור התמוה הנמצא במכתב אליהו. ובכדי להסיר התלונה מאדמו"ר קדוש ישראל מסלאנט זצללה"ה (כך תיאורו הרב דסלר זצ"ל בכתביו), הנני נותן לפניכם מה שכתוב בקונטרס אחד של זכרונות על קהלת פראנקפורט מאיש אחד יוצאי העיר ההיא, בשם ליאופאלד אופנהיימר. הקונטרס נכתב באנגלית, וז"ל בתרגום ללשה"ק:

ר' ליב ראף, אחד ממייסדי הקהילה הנפרדת, היה לו בית כנסת פרטי בביתו. האיש הזה שהיה עסקן ציבורי היה מזמין רבנים מחוץ לעיר לבוא לבית הכנסת שלו, וביניהם ר' ישראל סלנט ז"ל. הוא ביקש ממנו לתת דרשה שם, אולם ר' ישראל סירב, ונימק את סירובו היות שדרכו בדרוש הוא לדרוש מוסר אל הקהל, אולם מוסר הוא כמו תרופה מדצי"ן, וכאשר הרופא רושם תרופה צריך הוא לדעת מקודם מה שהחולה צריך. ר' ישראל טען שאינו מכיר את הציבור ההוא, ומה שטוב עבור תופר נעליים אינו טוב לתופר בגדים. בחדרו הקטן של תופר נעליים אני מדבר בסגנון אחר ממה שאני מדבר בחדרו הקטן של תופר בגדים. וא"כ מה אתה אומר בשטיב"ל של תופר מנעלים? "חנוך תופר מנעלים היה, שבכל תפירה ותפירה היה מקדש את ה'" (כך הוא הלשון במקור בלשון הקודש). לכן, האם אתה היית מבקש מתופר נעליים שלפני כל תפירה ותפירה שהוא "יורד לטהרה ושיגיד תפלות ותחנונים" (גם זה שם בלשה"ק)? אם כן לא היה גומר אף זוג נעליים אחד בחייו. אלא מה הייתי אומר לו, "חנוך היה אומן נפלא, עד שהעולם אמרו עליו תראו חנוך זה שהוא צדיק גדול וגם הוא תופר נעליים מעולה. זהו הקידוש השם שהיה [חנוך] עושה בכל תפירה". עד כאן תרגום דבריו.

הנה עתה, בצירוף העובדה ההיא עם המקור מאת רמ"ע מפאנו, אפשר להגיד בוודאות שרבי ישראל כל רז לא אנס ליה לגבי חנוך. שכשאמר בלשון מליצה שאינו דורש שירד לטהרה, ר"ל לטבול, ושיגיד תפלות ותחנונים, רמז בזה שידע היטב כל העניין של מייחד יחודים על בוריו, שבלשונו של הרמ"ע נקרא עבודת הקודש שלו תפירת נעליים, ויש בהגדרה הזו סודות גבוהים בסתרי תורה. אולם מי שקורא את לשון הרמ"ע מבלי להעמיק בדבריו יוכל להבין שחנוך היה תופר נעליים פשוטו כמשמעו. ולכן אמר הגרי"ס, שכשהוא מדבר אל שוסטע"ר פשוט בכדי לעודדו במלאכתו, היה אומר לו דברים פשוטים, שחנוך תופר מנעלים אומן טוב היה, ושבכל תפירה ותפירה היה מקדש את השם.

ולפענ"ד לפי נוסח הסיפור הזה שמצאתי, הוכחתי בס"ד שההשגות דמעיקרא אינן כנגד הגרי"ס, אלא כנגד נוסח סיפור שאינו מדוקדק כלל, וצדקת הצדיק במקומה עומדת.

Shemos. Moshe Rabbeinu's Shidduch.

Rabbeinu Bachay asks, why did Moshe want to marry a daughter of a priest of avodah zora, and why specifically Yisro? He explains that Moshe was a hunted man. There was a warrant out for his arrest for the murder of a government official. Moshe Rabbeinu knew that Pharaoh would arrest and imprison him at the first opportunity. Therefore he sought out a ‘kohen’, a priest. The priests, who owned their own property, as it says in the end of the previous parshah, were, to some degree, autonomous, less subject to royal threats and pressure. This made a marriage to a kohen's daughter a wise choice. Among Kohanim, he specifically chose Yisro because Yisro had seven daughters. A man that has seven daughters to marry off will not be too particular about scrutinizing a suitor's credentials or protesting a shidduch because the potential chassan has a tiny little legal problem in his background.

Shemos, 4:24. The snake that almost killed Moshe.

An angel  almost killed Moshe for not making having circumcised his son, Eliezer. I told my shiur that this story is associated with the halacha that milas banav me’akvo mi’la’asos es hapesach— that if a man's son son is uncircumcised, that man may not bring or eat a Korban Pesach: so, if one's son's circumcision is essential to bringing a korban, and the korban merely commemorates and re-enacts Yetzias Mitzrayim, then certainly- kal vachomer- mila is me’akev a person from enacting the original event. When Moshe was on his way to Mitzrayim, to set in motion the events that would lead to Yetzias Mitzrayim, the din of millah became extremely important.

One member of the shiur vehemently disagreed with the whole idea— “this had nothing to do with the korban Pesach, that was much later!”. One of the lomdim in the shiur immediately understood it. I think it’s the kind of thing that either you immediately get it and enjoy it or you absolutely do not, and no amount of explanation will help.

Update:
I have since verified my thesis.  The member that doesn't agree has gone through Shas with me three times, and every time I say this vort, he disagrees in the exact same words.