Toldos, Breishis 25:25. Eisav, Man of Peace

The Baal Haturim points out that Eisav is gematria Shalom.  He says that it is only the mitigating influence of the spiritual component of this gematria that prevents Eisav from utterly destroying the world.

In Parshas Naso, Bamidbar 6:27, in Birkas Kohanim, where it says "וְיָשֵׂם לְךָ שָׁלוֹם," the Baal Haturim also mentions this incongruous gematria, and says a different pshat.  He says that it teaches us to greet every man civilly and with a friendly mien, even one such as Eisav.

I
I found this particularly relevant in light of a recent and recurring event in Yerushalayim, in which some young men from the Jewish community expressed their disdain of certain non-Jewish religious figures in a base and crude fashion.  Ok, this I understand.  The Biryonim and Sikariim that plagued us two thousand years ago had children and grandchildren who carry forward their ugly and self-destructive mesora.  What bothered me was the statement by an American that this behavior is true Kiddush Hashem, that it unambiguously and bravely expresses our repugnance for beliefs that are antithetical to ours.  (See end of the post for a summary of the conversation.)  I assumed that for an non-insular American-raised individual to make such an assertion was surely intended for effect, and he wasn't being serious.  I was wrong.  So if you're not sure who's right in this matter, at least I have the Baal Haturim in my corner.  Unless, of course, he's talking about a Ger Toshav, not an Oveid Avodas Kochavim.

But I am reminded of a story involving Harav Reuven Feinstein.  For years, as Reb Reuven walked to MTJ Shabbos morning, he would pass a distinguished looking bearded gentleman wearing black, and every Shabbos morning he would greet him with a Good Shabbos.  One Shabbos, Rebbitzen Feinstein happened to be walking with Reb Reuven to MTJ, and after he greeted this man, she whispered to him "Reuven!  Why did you say good Shabbos to that man?"  He answered, "why shouldn't I say good Shabbos to him?  I've been saying good Shabbos to him for years."  The Rebbitzen said "Do you think he's a Chosid?  He's not even Jewish!  That's the priest from the Greek Orthodox church!"  Reb Reuven said, "Okay, so what's wrong with saying good Shabbos to a Greek Orthodox priest?  I say good Shabbos to him, he says good Shabbos to me, and everybody's happy."  and he continued to do so each time they met.

Several years later, there was a project the Jewish community wanted done, which ran into opposition from various groups.  At a community hearing, that same Greek Orthodox priest was called upon to state his opinion.  He said he saw nothing wrong with approving the project.  In his experience, he said, the Jewish people on the lower east side were friendly and warm, and if this would strengthen their community, then he was for it.

I am not saying that one ought to be civil because of pragmatic שלח לחמך על פני המים self interest (קהלת רבה יא).  I am saying that with our behavior we either contribute to a civil society or we create the opposite.  We engineer our environment, and we can pollute it with all kinds of effluvia or we can make it beautiful.   I think that there might be a kosher alternative to that fellow's take on the mitzva of Kiddush Hashem.

Summary of the conversation I referred to:

"…they [the holy expectorants] are the very definition of Kiddush Hashem. It's sad that the concept of kiddush and chilul haShem have become so confused nowadays that this question could even be asked. Kiddush Hashem does not mean making nice to the goyim. The Torah tells us explicitly what it means -- raising Hashem's Name and demeaning that of His "rivals" (kiveyachol). We're not told simply to not defile Hashem's altars, etc. Rather we're first told to do so to avoda zara, only then are we told not to do the same to Hashem. Treating "all religions" with respect is by definition chilul haShem, while spitting at avoda zara, and even at its mention, is an ancient minhag Yisrael. The gemara (Megilla 25b) even says that "all mockery is forbidden except that of avoda zara", and proceeds to give some examples of what strikes me as rather puerile humour at the expense of avoda zara. The whole point of Kiddush Hashem is the rejection of relativism; it's a statement that we are not the same.

The difference between us and them is not in any objective measure, but simply that we are right and they are wrong.Not that we believe we are right, but that we are right.Of course they believe that they're right; but they're wrong in that belief. That is what Kiddush Hashem is all about, and the moment you go looking for an objective standard by which to judge both of us equally, a standard that doesn't incorporate the truth of our belief and the falsehood of theirs, then you are being mechalel haShem.
As for worrying about the consequences, that too is the opposite of Kiddush Hashem. Kiddush Hashem by its nature engenders hostility among the idolaters."

[Someone sarcastically responded to the writer that “I am sure that when the media runs such stories the initial reaction of the masses is to say "More glory to Hashem and his Torah"!  The writer answered] "They don't say that when they hear that we refuse to marry them either. If you want their approval then that's the first thing you should drop, because from their point of view that is the most bigoted and fanatical thing about us. Kiddush Hashem means making the world aware that we reject them and their ways. Pretending that we don't is chilul Hashem."

In response to comments that were sent in, below, I want to add two points.  Eretz Yisrael is surrounded by deadly enemies.  Are we going to decide, at this point, that Yoshiyahu (Taanis 22b) was right?  Or do we make concessions to reality and attempt, uncharacteristically, to behave with good manners?  I understand that in Yerushalayim many people develop severe myopia and see only their rebbes and their neighborhood.  But we ought to know better.

Also: that even those that objurgate this kind of behavior should balance their disgust with a thought of the history of the relationship of this particular branch of the church with the Jews and the Jewish state.  I admit, though, that the malefactors we're discussing are probably not standing up to defend the Jewish state.

DGS sent me a shiur from Reb Aharon Soloveichik on the topic of Kiddush Hashem and Chillul Hashem.   It definitely belongs here, and it definitely should not be translated.

והנה הגמרא אומרת שבמקום חילול השם אבידתו היא אסורה. והפרישה בחושן משפט מביא מהרבה ראשונים שזה לא רק שאם יש חילול השם אז אבידתו היא אסורה אלא במקום קידוש השם אבידתו היא אסורה. שיכול להיות מצב שיש חילול השם. חילול השם פירושו שכבר ידוע ומפורסם אצל הגויים על אבידה זו של העכו"ם ויש אפשרות שאם הוא יקח את האבידה לעצמו זה יתפרסם בעתונאות של הגויים שהוא לקח את האבידה לעצמו שהוא לא רצה להחזיר את האבידה לבעלים. זה מקום שיש בו חילול השם. מצב אחר הוא שיהודי מוצא חפץ רב שווי ששייך לעכו"ם והוא יכול לקחת את החפץ לעצמו שהוא יקח את החפץ וישים את זה בכיס שלו בלי שאף אחד יראה וידע מזה. אין בזה אפילו חשש רחוק של חילול השם. 

אבל אם הוא ילך ויפרסם בעיתון שהוא מצא את החפץ כדי לאתר את הבעלים ואז בעיתון יפרסמו שבחור ישיבה החזיר אבידה של חצי מליון דולר אז יהיה קידוש השם גדול. והשאלה נשאלת כשהגמרא אומרת שבמקום חילול השם אבידתו היא אסורה האם הכוונה היא רק למצב הראשון שיש ממש אפשרות של חילול השם שאז אבידתו היא אסורה. אבל במקום שאין חילול השם אלא שיש הזדמנות לקדש שם שמים על ידי החזרת החפץ לבעלים אז יהיה מותר לו לקחת את החפץ לעצמו. או שאפילו אם זה רק שיש הזדמנות לקדש שם שמים אסור לו לקחת את החפץ לעצמו. הפרישה מביא ירושלמי ששמעון בן שטח פעם קנה חמור מעכו"ם ואח"כ הוא מצא יהלומים בתוך החמור אז התלמידים מאד שמחו ואמרו לר' שמעון בן שטח הרי יש לך עכשיו כל כך הרבה יהלומים אז לא יהיו לאף אחד מאתנו דוחק פרנסה לאורך ימים ושנים טובות. ושמעון בן שטח אמר לכו ותמצאו את הישמעאלי העכו"ם הזה ותחזירו לו את כל היהלומים. והם אמרו לו הלא לימדתנו רבינו שאבידת עכו"ם היא מותרת. והוא ענה להם אתם סבורים ששמעון בן שטח ברברי הוא. רוצה שמעון בן שטח לשמוע בריך אלקא דיהודאי יותר מכל הון דעלמא. 

והסמ"ג בספר המצוות כותב שהוא נסע בעולם להרבה מקומות באפריקה ובארץ ישראל למטרה אחת. שאצל היהודים 

בזמנו היו שתי מצוות שלא קיימו. מצוה אחת היה שהיו הרבה יהודים שלא הניחו תפילין. הם קיימו את כל המצוות האחרות אבל הם לא קיימו את המצוה של תפילין. והיו הרבה יהודים שהיו מאד רפים בזה שהם היו מרמים את הגויים. שהיו הרבה יהודים שהרושם שלהם היה שזה בסדר לרמות ולהונות את הגויים. מפני זה הסמ"ג נסע בכל העולם לחנך את היהודים במצוה של תפילין וגם לא לרמות ולהונות את הגויים. והסמ"ג אומר שהוא רוצה בזה לזרז את ביאת הגואל. הסמ"ג אומר שאם אנו נמשיך בהרגל שלנו לרמות ולהונות את הגויים אנו מרחיקים את הגאולה. כדי לזרז את הגאולה אנו צריכים ליזהר לא לרמות את הגויים ואפילו אבידת עכו"ם - והסמ"ג מזכיר את הירושלמי הזה - צריכים להחזיר את האבידה משתי סיבות. זה נכון שאבידת עכו"ם מותרת אפילו לאחר דאתא לידיה. אז אין בזה איסור גזל. אבל יש ענין של שארית ישראל לא יעשו עוולה ולא ידברו כזב. וגם יש ענין של קידוש השם. 

איך הסמ"ג יודע שזה לא דבר יפה ליהודי להחזיק אבידה של עכו"ם לעצמו. איך הסמ"ג יודע את זה? מפני ששמעון בן שטח אמר רוצה שמעון בן שטח לשמוע בריך אלקא דיהודאי מכל הון שבעולם. ואם לא היה שום דבר לא טוב בהחזקת אבידה של עכו"ם אז לא היה בזה איסור של חילול השם ואפילו לא היה בזה מצוה של קידוש השם. מפני שזה הדבר היסודי במצוה של קידוש השם. וזה מאד עצוב לדאבונינו שיותר מדי יהודים חושבים שהמצוה של קידוש השם היא לעשות דבר שיהיה רצוי לגויים. ח"ו. אם זה היה המהות של קידוש השם וחילול השם אז אנו היינו צריכים לוותר ח"ו על כל התורה. שהגויים מאד לא אוהבים כשיהודים מוסרים את נפשם עבור התורה. אז איך זה שהגמרא אומרת שבמקום חילול השם אבידתו היא אסורה? אם זה לא היה דבר אי-מוסרי ליהודי להחזיק לעצמו אבידה של עכו"ם אז לא היה שיך לדבר על חילול השם. למה הגמרא לא אומרת שבמקום חילול השם ריבית עכו"ם היא אסורה? התירוץ הוא שלא איכפת לנו אם הגויים יגידו ביקורת על היהודים על זה שהם לא לוקחים ריבית מיהודים והם כן לוקחים ריבית מגויים. זה לא איכפת לנו. לגויים אין השקפת התורה ולא איכפת לנו מה הם חושבים על זה. חילול השם אין פירושו כשאתה עושה דבר שגוי לא אוהב את הדבר הזה. אולי גוי לא אוהב כשיהודי יש לו זקן ופיאות והוא לובש שטריימיל. יש הרבה גויים כשהם רואים רבי עם שטריימיל הם מאד מתרגזים ומאד מתעצבנים מזה. האם זאת אומרת שזה חילול השם ללבוש שטריימיל ח"ו? זה חילול השם כשיהודי משקר מפני שדבר זה עצמו הוא דבר מכוער. כשיהודי עושה דברים מכוערים זה חילול השם. אבל כשיהודי עושה דבר שהוא מצד עצמו דבר הגון ביותר אז זה בעיה של הגויים אם הגויים לא אוהבים את זה. אז למה הגמרא אומרת שבמקום חילול השם אבידת 

עכו"ם היא אסורה? אז הסמ"ג אומר - זה דבר פשוט וזה מובן מאליו - שאבידת עכו"ם לאחר דאתא לידיה אמנם אין בה איסור גזל. אז הוא לא גזלן. אם מישהו לוקח לעצמו אבידה של ישראל הוא גזלן והוא פסול לעדות מפני שהוא רשע דחמס. אבל אם מישהו לוקח לעצמו אבידה של עכו"ם הוא בודאי לא גזלן. אבל זה בודאי לא תואם לשארית ישראל לא יעשו עולה ולא ידברו כזב כשהוא לוקח  אוצר של עכו"ם שאבד לעכו"ם והוא מחזיק באוצר לעצמו. אז אפילו בלי חילול השם זה לא דבר הגון לעשות. ממילא אם הגוי יודע שלקחתי את האוצר של העכו"ם לעצמי יש בזה איסור של חילול השם. אבל אם זה לא היה דבר מכוער מצד עצמו לא היה בזה איסור של חילול השם רק מפני שהגויים לא אוהבים את זה. כשיהודי לא לוקח ריבית מיהודי והוא כן לוקח ריבית מגוי שום ראשון ושום אחרון לא יגיד שיש בזה איסור של חילול השם. מכיון שמה שאנו עושים הוא תואם לדיני התורה אז אנו בכלל לא שמים לב אם הגויים אומרים ביקורת נגדינו. אז כשהגמרא אומרת שאבידת עכו"ם היא מותרת הפירוש הוא רק שאין איסור גזל, אבל זה כן מתנגש עם שארית ישראל לא יעשו עולה ולא ידברו כזב. ממילא במקום חילול השם אבידת עכו"ם היא אסורה. והדרישה סובר שלא רק במקום חילול השם אבידת עכו"ם היא אסורה. אלא אבידת עכו"ם היא אסורה גם במקום קידוש השם. והראיה שם היא מהירושלמי שאף אחד לא היה מגלה ששמעון בן שטח לקח את האוצר שנמצא בתוך החמור. ובכל זאת שמעון בן שטח דרש שיחזירו את האוצר לעכו"ם שמכר לו את החמור. למה? מפני שזה היה במקום קידוש ה'. אבל הגמרא בב"ק אומרת שבמקום חילול ה' אבידת עכו"ם היא אסורה. 

המשמעות היא שבמקום שאין חילול ה' אז אף שיש הזדמנות לקידוש ה' האבידה היא מותרת. אז הפרישה עושה חילוק בין אבידה אחר דאתא לידיה לאבידה קודם דאתא לידיה. באבידת עכו"ם לאחר דאתא לידיה האבידה היא אסורה לא רק במקום שיש חילול השם שיש אפשרות שגויים ידעו מזה אלא גם אם יש אפשרות להודיע לגויים שיהודי החזיר את האבידה אז אסור לקחת את האבידה. אבל אבידה קודם דאתא לידיה אז יהודי מחוייב להטריח את עצמו להחזיר את האבידה אם יוודע שיהודי ראה את האבידה והוא לא טרח לקחת את האבידה להחזירנה לבעלים. אבל אם זה לא יוודע לגויים אז אף שאם הוא כן יטרח לקחת את האבידה ויחזירנה לבעלים הוא כן יקדש שם שמים שהוא יכריז ואח"כ הוא יחזירנה לגוי ויהיה בזה קידוש השם גדול שהגויים יראו שיהודי טרח להחזיר אבידת לגוי לבעלים, אבל הוא לא מחוייב לעשות את זה. וכשהגמרא אומרת שאם אחד מחזיר אבידה לבעלים עכו"ם עליו הפסוק אומר לא יאבה ה' סלוח לו הפירוש הוא שאם אחד מוצא אבידה של עכו"ם והוא מחזיר את האבידה אז אם הוא מודיע לעכו"ם שהוא הישראל החזיר לו את האבידה אז הוא מקיים בזה מצוה של קידוש השם אף שהוא לא מחוייב לעשות את זה. אבל אם הוא מחזיר את האבידה לעכו"ם באופן כזה שהעכו"ם אפילו לא ידע שיהודי החזיר את האבידה אז עליו הכתוב אומר לא יאבה ה' סלוח לו. שאם ישראל מוצא שור בעיר שרובה עכו"ם והיהודי יודע למי שייך השור והוא מחזיר את השור לרשות הבעלים עכו"ם בלי שהבעלים עכו"ם ידע מי החזיר לו את השור שהוא אפילו לא מודיע לעכו"ם שישראל החזיר לו את השור האבוד שאז העכו"ם כשהוא רואה שהשור הוחזר לו הוא יסבור שעכו"ם החזיר לו את השור שהרי רוב התושבים של העיר הם עובדי כוכבים אז הוא יאמר לעצמו שבודאי עובד כוכבים החזיר לו את השור שהעובדי כוכבים הם כאלו אנשים טובים. אז עליו התכוב אומר לא יאבה ה' סלוח לו. לכן הרמב"ם אומר שאם אחד מחזיר אבידה לעכו"ם זו עבירה מפני שהוא מחזיק יד פושעי עולם. למה הרמב"ם צריך לומר את זה? התירוץ הוא מפני שאם הוא מחזיר את האבידה באופן שהגויים יודעים שהוא החזיר את החפץ לבעלים אז הוא מקיים בזה המצוה של קידוש השם. מתי זה עבירה רק אם הוא החזיר את האבידה באופן שהגויים לא ידעו שיהודי החזיר את החפץ והגויים יחשבו שגוי החזיר את החפץ. אז הוא עושה פעולה של חסד וכל הקרדיט ילך לעובדי כוכבים. זה עבירה גדולה ועליו הכתוב אומר לא יאבה ה' סלוח לו

II

The other way to read the Baal Haturim's observation of the Gematria of Eisav is in the words Tacitus puts into the mouth of a Briton facing the Roman army:

Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus imperium; atque, ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.

They rob, they kill, they plunder, all under the lying name of Roman Empire. They make a desert and call it peace.

I recently saw an article by Louis Menand about George Kennan, who did not at all believe in "morality-based" foreign policy.  The article ends by explaining that Kennan's apparent heartlessness was a necessary result of his realism: as he puts it, "professions of benevolence might be masks for self-interest."

Or, as he quotes from James Adams,

“Power always thinks it has a great soul and vast views beyond the comprehension of the weak; and that it is doing God's service when it is violating all his laws."

One might say the same about the Roman claims to be bringing civilization to the barbarians. One might also say so about certain wealthy philanthropists.

Toldos, Breishis 25:21. Yitzchak's Tefilla & Unintended Consequences. וַיֵּעָתֶר לוֹ ה' וַתַּהַר רִבְקָה אִשְׁתּוֹ.

The Torah makes it clear that the success of Yitzchak's tefilla was an extraordinary event.  When Yitzchak's tefillos were successful, the passuk refers to this as וַיֵּעָתֶר לוֹ ה, and Rashi explains that this means "נתפצר ונתפייס ונתפתה לו."  The tefilla exhorted, appeased, and inveigled Hashem to do as Yitzchak asked.  This seems extreme.  It seems that the tefillos were answered only because they were singularly unrelenting, conciliatory, and convincing.  Why wouldn't Hashem answer Yitzchak as He answers any person that is mispallel?  Clearly, there was some kind of barrier that these particular tefillos had to overcome.  What was that barrier?

In other words: By Moshe Rabbeinu, we find that he davened five hundred sixteen times, and Hashem not only didn't listen, but Hashem told him to stop davening so that the tefillos shouldn't break through.  But that is because there was a shvu'a not to let Moshe enter Eretz Yisrael, so there was an obvious barrier to accepting the tefilla.  But here, where the childlessness was only because הקב"ה מתאוה לתפלתן של צדיקים, either accept it or don't.  Once it was meratzeh, then that should be it.  The words Rashi uses indicate more than just ritzui.  The expressions in Rashi clearly indicate that the success of these tefillos was contrary to some countervailing consideration.

More clearly: if it was just an issue of א"ר יצחק מפני מה היו אבותינו עקורים מפני שהקב"ה מתאוה לתפלתן של צדיקים (Yevamos 64a), then it's just a matter of reaching a certain level or point.  Once that point is reached, then the tefilla ought to be answered.  Here, Rashi doesn't say that the tefilla was answered because it was sufficient.  Rashi says that the tefilla turned the world upside down.  It was  not only a krias yam suf, a revolutionary upheaval, it was a metamorphosis of Hashem's will, kaviyachol. 

The Shai LaTorah vol. I brings that Reb Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld answered this question as follows.  The Chasam Sofer was once asked to be mispallel that a women who was having difficulty in labor have a quick birth.  He said he could not do that.  The Gemara in Kiddushin 72b says that when Reb Akiva died, Rebbi was born; when Rebbi died, Rebbi Yehuda was born; and so on.  Only after his replacement is born does a tzadik die.  "I know," said the Chasam Sofer, "that this child will be a great tzadik that will bring light to the whole world; his birth will make possible the death of the tzadik that he was born to replace.  How can I contribute to the death of that tzadik?"  (See end of post for my comments about this story.)

Here, too, said Reb Yosef Chaim, Eisav's birth led to Avraham's premature death, though for a very different reason:  Avraham Avinu died five years before his time so that he should not see Eisav going letarbus ra'ah (Rashi 25:30.)  If so, the later Eisav is born, the longer Avraham can live; if Eisav were born five years later, Avraham would have lived his whole alloted lifespan.  It was only because Yitzchak prayed so relentlessly and effectively that Hashem listened to the tefillos, even at the cost to Avraham.

Rav Sonnenfeld added that "vayei'aseir lo Hashem" is in Gematria "chamesh shanim."  The Shai LaTorah says that when Reb Aharon Kotler heard this, he said that a Gematria like that can only come from Ru'ach Hakodesh.

So what do we see?  We see that it is possible for a tefilla to be answered even when, unbeknownst to the mispallel, the desired answer is ultimately injurious.  The one who is praying knows nothing about the collateral effect of the answer to his tefilla.  He is only doing what the Torah teaches- when you need something, pray. But if he davens well enough and hard enough and long enough, sometimes the tefilla is answered as he desires, and this sets into motion a cascade of unintended and unexpected and unwanted consequences.  It's like Robert Merton's law of  unintended consequences. a widely quoted admonition that intervention in a complex system always creates unanticipated and often undesirable outcomes.

On the other hand, there is an example of precisely the opposite happening- that because of an inappropriate tefilla, Hashem answers with the opposite of what was asked for.  In Vayeishev, Breishis 37:2,  Rashi says bikeish Yakov leisheiv beshalvah, Yaakov desired to live in peace.  The result of that desire was exactly the opposite, that the trouble of Yosef and the brothers immediately began..  Harav Mordechai Yosef Eisenberg, at his sheva brochos, pointed out that from here we see that a tefilla for something inappropriate can bring the opposite result.  It says bikeish, and, as a result, kofatz.  So we have to be careful about what we daven for, because if  it's something that you shouldn't be asking for, it can elicit the opposite of what you desire.

The difference is that there, what was asked for was wrong.  A tzadik should not seek tranquility.  He is here to overcome and to achieve, not to go on vacation.  Yitchak, on the other hand, was asking for something perfectly legitimate.  He was doing exactly what he should have been doing, and his tefilla was a good tefillah.  So his tefillos were answered, for better or for worse.

Does this sound reasonable to you?  Is that really how tefilla works?  Doesn't the passuk in Mishlei 10:22 say בִּרְכַּת יְהוָה הִיא תַעֲשִׁיר וְלֹא יוֹסִף עֶצֶב עִמָּהּ.?  Not for nothing is this website described as "divrei Torah that require some thought."  In any case, it seems that tefilla is a gamble, which I find very hard to believe.  I'll get back to this later. 

The first time I heard this idea was in a discussion with the Mirrer Rabbi David Zupnik Zatzal.  In Ashrei, we say "Retzon yerei'av ya'aseh, ve'es shavasam yishma veyoshi'eim."  Reb Tzvi Pesach Frank, in the first teshuva in OC (to explain the Bach that says you should say the parsha of Korban Chatas, but don't say the Yehi Ratzon unless you know you actually did an aveira, because if you didn't, it will be chulin ba'azara,) says he saw somewhere that pshat is that Hashem listens to the tefillos of those that fear him; and after the tefilla is answered, after Retzon yerei'av ya'aseh and the wish is granted , and the supplicant realizes that what he got was bad for him, and he now prays "Ribono shel olam, please take away what you gave me!", then Hashem does that, too- ve'es shavasam yishma veyoshi'eim, Hashem listens to their cry and saves them.  (So the pshat in the Bach is that if you say the Yehi Ratzon, and you weren't chayav a korban, then you're in trouble, because the result of your tefilla is "Ke'ilu Hikriv Chatas" whether it's good for you or bad for you, and since you weren't chayav a chatas, you are stuck with chulin ba'azara that you created through your wrongheaded tefilla.)

I found that the Brisker Rov brings the same thing from Reb Chaim in the stencil on Tanach, in Tehillim #145, with a little extra kneitch from Reb Chaim (that there are three dinim.  If the supplicant is a tzadik and can reverse the effect of his tefilla, like Choni Hame'agel who said thanks, that's enough rain, Hashem, then Hashem gives him what he wants.  If he is sort of a tzadik, who deserves an answer, but couldn't reverse the negative effects of the answer, Hashem doesn't answer him at all.  If he's a lower person, Hashem says Fine, have what you want, and see what's going to happen to you.)  Maybe this is where Reb Tzvi Pesach Frank heard it.   But did it really stem from Reb Chaim?

A couple of years later, Rabbi Zupnik found the makor of this idea from long before Reb Chaim.  He showed me that it actually comes from R’ Shlomo Kluger’s pirush on the siddur, יריעות שלמה, found in the R’ Yakov Emden siddur, in the first Ashrei in Shachris.  RS'K says that this is (Taanis 25a) what happened to R’ Chanina Ben Dosa.  He asked to be saved from his crushing poverty, and got the golden leg of a table from his house in Olam Haba.  When he explained to his wife asked what the cost was, she insisted that Reb Chanina be mispallel that the table leg be taken back- ve'es shavasam yishma veyoshi'eim- and, in a doubled miracle, it was taken back to Olam Haba (just like the story (Taanis 23a) of Choni Ha'me'agel.)

Also, there is the Gemara (Sanhedrin 101b and 103b, and Rashi there) that Moshe asked Hashem, how can You allow so many babies to be cemented into the Egyptian walls, and Hashem said, take one of them out.  That one smuggled the Pesel Michah across the Yam suf.  Again, Moshe's tefilla was answered.  He saved that one child, but, as it turned out, at a terrible price.

After some thought, I realized that to say that tefilla is a gamble- that sometimes Hashem grants our wish even when it's bad for us- is just too absurd to accept.  (Maybe Tzadik gozer works that way.  But I just can't see tefilla working like a mechanical vending machine.  If it turns out that I'm wrong, I'm sorry just in case.)  The point of tefilla is to elicit Rachamei Hashem and to be given what's good for us.  We're not ganovim asking Hashem that our break-in be successful (Brachos 63a in the Ein Yaakov).  (When I say I might be wrong, I'm not just being flippant.  It may be that there are two kinds of tefilla- regular tefilla, and insisting in the style of Choni.  Or, it may be that tefilla is just another form of hishtadlus.  Obviously, hishtadlus to get something that's bad for you works, so maybe tefilla can do the same thing.  If this makes sense to you, G-d bless you.  That's why Hashem made chocolate and vanilla.  These ideas don't appeal to me.)  So what's pshat in Reb Chaim and Reb Shlomo Kluger?

Pshat is like we see in Birchas Kohanim: Yevarechecha, and veyishmerecah; Ya'eir, and vichuneka;  Yisa, and ve'yaseim lecha shalom.  Every bracha increases some risk, and every bracha is formulated as (A1) Hashem will give, and (A2). Hashem will guard.  Sometimes, the risk is simply that the bracha will be lost.  Sometimes, the risk is that the bracha will result in Vayishman Yeshurun Vayiv'aht.  Sometimes the risk is the jealousy the bracha engenders.  Sometimes the risk is tza'ar gidul banim.  The point is that when a person gets a bracha, his responsibilities increase as well, and he has to mindful of those responsibilities.  Theoretically, Yitzchak could have raised Eisav in a way that would have kept him from going off.  No doubt it would have been very difficult, but it was possible, as the Medrash says (beginning of Shemos, כיוצא בו (בראשית כה) ויאהב יצחק את עשו, לפיכך יצא לתרבות רעה על אשר לא רידהו) and as Rav Hirsch discusses.  If having a children would actually have been bad for Yitzchak, I don't believe that Hashem would have answered his tefillos.  The yesod of tefilla is Rachamim, to get what is good for you from the Baal Harachamim, not to get what you're asking for.  If a diabetic father begs his son for a jelly doughnut, there's no mitzva of Kibbud Av to give him the doughnut that will put him into shock (Beis Lechem Yehuda YD 240:15)  Does it make sense that such a diabetic's beautiful and sincere tefilla for a jelly doughnut would be answered, or that an addict's prayer for heroin would be answered?  Not to me it doesn't.


Another point: This Rashi, and the idea of tefilla having risks, might seem to be in direct opposition to the story of Chizkiyahu and Yeshayahu and Menashe (Melachim II 20, Brachos 10a bottom of page).  There, Chizkiahu knew that having a child would bring all kinds of tzaros and would undo all the good he had done, so he didn't want to get married.  Yeshayahu told him that the future is none of his business: he had a responsibility to father a child, and he had no right to adjust his behavior on the basis of foreknowledge.  According to that, Yitzchak was right to ask and keep asking, despite the future cost to Avraham Avinu.  Does the story of Chizkiahu contradict the lesson of Yitzchak?  No, it doesn't.  I'll leave it to you to think about.  I'm not Artscroll or the Chidushei Basra.

The moral of the story is that when we are mispallel, we should always have in mind that we only want the thing we pray for if it is ultimately for our good, that we should have siyata dishmaya to properly handle the responsibilities that come with the bracha.   I have a good friend that has decided that the reason he has remained poor is because Hashem knows that he would not handle the nisayon of wealth well.  The thing is, many of us are willing to take the chance:  "Hashem, make me fantastically wealthy, because even though I know it's risky, I'm willing to give the nisayon of wealth a try."  But the truth is, that's not how we should daven.  We should say, Hashem, give me bracha and hatzlacha, but only if it's not "yatza scharo be'hefseido."

After some thought, I decided that there's a simpler approach.  
There are two kinds of tefilla; tachana and insisting.  Tefilla le'ani ki ya'atof is an example of the former.  Choni Hame'agel is an example of the latter.  I think that the former cannot ever be counterproductive.  The latter, however, might be.  You insist?  Well, then, there you go.  Enjoy it.  The only reason I hesitate is because I don't want to say that Yitzchak's tefilla was less than perfect.

    Lehavdil elef havdalos, Oscar Wilde (1854-1900) once said:

"There are only two tragedies in life: one is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting it." 

(As for the story about the Chasam Sofer, I'm not an expert in the Chasam Sofer, but I've read enough of his Torah to have an opinion.  My opinion is that the essence of the story is no doubt true, but I don't believe it was as harsh as it was said over.  I don't believe he said that the woman should suffer yesurei gehenom because he saw something beru'ach hakodesh.  I also don't believe he went around touting his Ruach Hakodesh.  He may have said that the proper tefilla is that she should not have yesurim, but not that the birth should be faster than Hashem intended.)

Toldos, Breishis 25:22. Rivka Didn't Have Any Rabbis at Home To Talk To?

UPDATED NOVEMBER 2020

Rivka had a problem: her experience during pregnancy indicated to her that her child, or children, would be drawn both to Avodas Hashem and to Avoda Zara. Concerned and anxious about what kind of child she was carrying, she sought an explanation.  But, as Rashi points out, it doesn't say that she was mispallel, it says ‘vateileich lidrosh es Hashem', "she went to seek Hashem," which shows that she went somewhere to seek the answer.  Where did she go? 

Rashi says that she went to the Beis Medrash of Sheim, and in the next passuk Rashi brings that Hashem answered her through the nevuah of Sheim. This is in the Medrash Rabbah here 63:6, and 20:6, 45:10, and 48:20, and sort of in the Yerushalmi in Sotah right in the beginning of seventh perek, and the Zohar here on this passuk. Some say to Sheim, some say through a malach.

According to those that say she went to Sheim or Eiver, why did Rivka go to Sheim and Eiver with her problem? Why didn’t she just ask her own husband, Yitzchak? What about Avraham, who lived until Yakov and Eisav were 15 years old?  Was there something about the nature of her question that required that she not go to them, and instead go to Sheim?

(The Ibn Ezra, as usual, solves the problem by disregarding what Chazal say: he says that she did go to Avraham. The Abravanel also says this as an alternative to the various Medrashim.  This is, of course, a valid interpretation of the passuk, but it does nothing to explain what Chazal were thinking.)

The Gur Aryeh (and, I'm told, the Baal Haturim in his pirush) says that she was afraid that the problem she perceived in her child arose from, and reflected, her own flaws, and she was ashamed to go to her husband. .

An acquaintance of mine suggested that the fact that Yitzchok learned in the Beis Medrash of Sheim and Eiver showed that they were the gedolei hador, so they were first people to consult. Another friend vehemently disagreed, saying that there is no question that Yitzchok, and of course Avraham, were far greater than Sheim and Eiver, and the fact that Yitzchak left home to learn there proves nothing.

The Ramban on Breishis 27:4 discusses this tangentially. He asks, when Rivka overheard Yitzchak tell Eisav that he would give him the brachos, she came up with a ruse to subvert Eisav's plan. Why didn’t she simply tell Yitzchak about what she heard from Sheim, that “ve’rav ya'avod tza’ir,” which meant that Eisav would serve Yaakov, and which would mean that the brachos should go to Yaakov? The Ramban answers  "Apparently Rivkah never told him [Yitzchok] about G-d's prophecy to her, "and the older shall serve the younger" (Breishis 25:23), for if she had, how could Isaac go against the word of Hashem? At first, she did not tell him because of her sense of morality and modesty, for "she went to inquire of Ha’elokim" (Breishis 25:22), and she had gone without Isaac's permission; or perhaps she thought, "I need not report a prophecy to a prophet, for he is greater than he who told me," [Sheim, according to the Medrash.] And now she did not want to say to him, "I was told such and such by the Lord before I gave birth," for she reasoned, out of  [Yitzchak's] love for [Eisav], [Yitzchak] would not bless Yakov, but would leave everything in Hashem's hands; and she knew that for this reason [giving Jacob cooked food that tasted like game] Yakov would receive the blessing from his mouth with a full heart and a willing soul.” (Then the Ramban says something vague about hidden intentions of Hashem.)  So: from the Ramban we see several possiblities: 1. that either she didn't want to tell Yitzchak what Shem told her because she went to consult Shem without Yitzchak's permission; or 2. that she figured that if the lesser navi (Shem) knew something, then certainly the greater navi (Yitzchak) knew it as well, (and 3. if he didn't, then there must be a reason Hashem did not want Yitzchak to know about it).

The Chizkuni says this as well-- that Rivka never told Yitzchak what she was told, and that she must have been told to not tell him, or at least was not told to tell him.  This, too, is a post facto validation of her decision to seek the answer outside her home.

I would say, expanding on the Ramban and the Chizkuni, that the three points we elicited from the Ramban are not either/or.  They all are true.  Rivka reasoned that if her husband or father in law knew what was going on, they would have told her.  From their silence she deduced two things: that they didn't know, and that Hashem didn't want them to know.  So she make an independent decision and went elsewhere, thinking that even if Hashem didn't want Yitzchak and Avraham to know, Hashem might tell her.  As it turned out, she was 100% correct.

The Netziv here also deals with the question. He says there are two types of nevuah, two types of nevi'im. One is a navi to whom Hashem speaks; the other is one who sees hidden things through ruach hakodesh, like Shmuel, the "Ro'eh," to whom people would go to find out where their missing donkeys had gone. As is evident from Shmuel, these two types of Nevu'ah are not mutually exclusive; but the Netziv says that Avraham was a type one navi only, while Shem was type 2, and that’s why Rivka went to him.  She needed a see-er, a Ro'eh, an “Adam Gadol she’yad'ah ki hu ro’eh veyodei’ah.”

Rabbi Kenny Nieman said that she went to Sheim because he was the zakein— Sheim lived 600 years, and he was probably around 550 at that time. Rivka's husband and father in law were, comparatively, youngsters.  The distinctive wisdom of a zakein, especially a zakein who was a navi for 400 years, is the greatest possible resource. This teretz reminded me of the dinner for MTJ where they were mechabeid Reb Moshe, and when Reb Yakov Kaminetski spoke, he said that it might seem to be gaivah for him to evaluate Reb Moshe, but there cannot be any doubt that he (Reb Yaakov) is the zakein, and so he had a right to state his opinion of Reb Moshe’s gadlus.

Thank you, Eli, for finding the Medrash Seichel Tov, (authored/compiled by R. Menahem Ben Shlomo, Italy (?), in 1139) that says exactly this:

ותלך.  לבית מדרשו של עבר: לדרוש את ה׳. לבקש רחמים על העובר, ואע׳פ שאברהם קיים, הלכה אצל
זקנים ללמדך שכל המקבל  פני זקן שבדור, כאילו מקבל פני שכינה

Translation: And She Went: To the Beis Medrash of Eiver.  To Seek Hashem:  To pray for mercy for the fetus.  Even though Avraham was alive, she went to the Elder.  This is (stated in the passuk in order) to teach you that anyone that attends the presence of an Elder it is as if he attends the presence of the Shechina.

Reb Berel Povarsky has a very nice discussion about this kashe. He asks this, and many other questions, such as, didn’t she know that her husband had a bad brother, Yishmo’eil, and that there was a process of ‘zikuch’ before the 12 shvatim could be born? Also, Chazal said that Shem showed her Rebbi and Antoninus. How does a good descendant console her for a son who is a rasha? Answer— she knew everything, but wondered, why did the zikuch by Avrohom take place through his pilegesh, Hagar, and now it is taking place through me— lamah zeh anochi— why am I the one that has to bear the bad one. This, of course, was not a question she could ask her husband’s family, because of the concern that the cause was some personal flaw she carried, similar to the Gur Aryeh. The answer that Shem gave her was that Yishma’eil, being the zikuch son, and having been born by the pilegesh, had no redeeming qualities, and is and will always be a pereh adam. (But see above end of Chayei Soroh that Yishmo’eil did tshuvoh before he died, and Eisav never did.) But Eisav needed to have a higher character, and not just be an outlaw, and so you were the one to bear him and to infuse into him these higher qualities. This is why she was shown Rebbi and Antoninus; to show her both the benefit Klal Yisrael will have from him, and also the more refined character a ben Eisav is capable of.

And here is what I think: that she didn’t go to Sheim, but rather to his Beis Medrash. She wanted to ask Hashem herself, or to be mispallel, and to do so required that she go to a makom kadosh, just as Chana went to the Bais Hamikdash when she wanted to ask Hashem for children. And just as Chana was then answered through Eli, the Kohen Gadol who was there at the time, Rivka’s question/tefilla was answered through Sheim, who was a kohen gadol (Nedarim 32b and Targum Yerushalmi Breishis 14:18), or his descendant, Ever, who was in the Beis Medrash at that time. She could have asked her husband or her father in law, but the more appropriate response to a challenge is to attempt to resolve the question yourself, and not to abdicate the opportunity for personal growth by passing off the issue to someone else. Even if Malkitzedek lost the Kehuna for giving a bracha to Avraham before thanking Hashem, it doesn't really matter.  He was the Gadol in a place that was meyuchad for Limud Hatorah and Hashra'as Hashechina.

The word "lidrosh" here means what it means in ישעיהו נה where it says   דרשו ה' בהמצאו  .  The Gemara in Rosh Hashanna 18a says that בהמצאו means either in the setting of a tzibbur, because the Shechina rests on a tzibbur, or during Aseres Yemei Teshuva, when the Shechina makes itself available.  The same בהמצאו  applies to a place of kedusha.  It may be negi'us, but I think my pshat is peshuto shel mikra.

Having said this, it becomes clear that this is what the Medrash Seichel Tov that I brought above means:

לבית מדרשו של עבר: לדרוש את ה׳. לבקש רחמים על העובר

She went to the Beis Medrash of Eiver, not to Eiver himself; and she went to be mevakesh rachamim on the fetus, not to ask Sheim or Eiver any questions.  Precisely like Channah.

What's the lesson here, then?  The lesson is this:  That a person, certainly one who has problems having or raising children, but also anyone that faces a life difficulty, should do as Channah and Rivka did.  Go to the presence of a zakein who is a tzadik and a great talmid chacham, and be mispallel to Hashem for help with your problem. Certainly, seeing a bracha is wise.  As the Gemara in Bava Basra 116a says,

דרש ר' פנחס בר חמא כל שיש לו חולה בתוך ביתו ילך אצל חכם ויבקש עליו רחמים שנא' (משלי טז) חמת מלך מלאכי מות ואיש חכם יכפרנה

But the lesson from this week's parsha is that it is good to find the right place and to be mispallel there yourself.

If someone else has already said this, I don't want to know about it, thank you.  I know that the Ramban says that 'lidrosh' means tefilla, and that the Abravanel argues.  But what I am saying, that Rivka went to a place where there was Hashra'as Hashechina, and connecting it to the story of Chana and how she was answered, and the Gemara in Rosh Hashanna, and the Passuk in Yeshaya, is far more comprehensive than what the Ramban says, especially since unlike the Ramban who is arguing with Rashi, what I'm saying explains Rashi.  So don't tell me that it's mefurash in the Ramban.  It's not mefurash in the Ramban and it's befeirush not like the Ramban.

UPDATE NOVEMBER 2020

This came in a comment. It is a clever and excellent pshat.

YybturnerNovember 26, 2020 at 3:22 PM

I always thought she went to Yeshivas Sheim v'Eiber because when the Medrash says she went past a Beis Medrash it was obviously Shem v'Ever, at that moment. So she went straight in to ask.

UPDATE NOVEMBER 2023

There's so much online... I came across this publication that lists seven answers to this question. I don't vouch for it, but it can't hurt to put it up here. If you have to say a drasha, it's always helpful to have more angles of attack.

הנה רבקה אמנו, יושבת בצילם של אבות וגדולי האומה, אבותינו הק דושים, אברהם ויצחק, ועתה

שרבקה נבוכה בעקבות שהבנים מתרוצצים בקרבה, הולכת לקבול לפני שם ועבר, וצ"ע למה לא שאלה

פי קודשם של יצחק או אברהם, שהיא נמצאת בצילם, ומדוע הניחה את אברהם אבינו שהיתה עמו, והיה נביא גדול, והלכה לירושלים אל שם, והלא אברהם אבינו חי עד שהיו יעקב ועשו בני ט"ו שנה, ויעקב הכין אותו נזיד עדשים להברות אבלותו של אביו על אברהם?

ביאור א'

במדרש שכל טוב מתרץ שאע"פ שאברהם אבינו קיים היה, הלכה אצל זקנים, ללמדך שכל המקבל פני זקן שבדור, כאילו מקבל פני שכינה.

ביאור ב'

בעלי התוס' עה"ת מתרצים שרצתה לדרוש בהן אם מותר לה להפיל העובר מחמת צער הלידה, וידעה כי אברהם ויצחק לא יתירו לה להפיל עוברים מזרעם. ונראה כי הדברים עולים בקנה אחד עם מ"ש במדרש הגדול, דורשי רשומות אומרין אמרה רבקה לפני הקב"ה רבש"ע א"כ עתיד עשו להרוג ולכלות אדירי חכמה שהן עתידין להיות מבניו של יעקב, מי יאמר לפניך על הים זה אלי ואנוהו (שמות ט"ו, ב'), ולמי תאמר על הר סיני אנכי ה' אלהיך (שמות כ', ב'), מיד חגרה מתניה ועמדה בתפילתה. ומבואר שצערה של רבקה לא היה על צער לידה של צער הגוף גרידא, אלא אותו הצער היה על צערם של ישראל בכל הדורות.

ביאור ג'

עוד מתרצים בעלי התוס' עה"ת, כשהיתה רבקה מצטערת מהריונה, בלי ספק אברהם חמיה ויצחק בעלה היו מצטערים בשבילה, ואין הנבואה שורה מתוך עצבות אלא מתוך שמחה. ועוד כי רבקה היתה צנועה והסתירה הדבר מבעלה ומחמיה והלכה אצל שם.

ביאור ד'

עי"ל ע"פ מ"ש בגמ' (ב"ב קטז.), דרש ר' פנחס בר חמא, כל שיש לו חולה בתוך ביתו, ילך אצל חכם ויבקש עליו רחמים, שנא' "חמת מלך מלאכי מות ואיש חכם יכפרנה", וכתב הנמוק"י שם שילך לפני תופס ישיבה, וידוע כי שם ועבר קבעו אז ישיבתם לכל. ועל כן בדוקא הלכה לפני שם ועבר, כי יש מעלה לתופס ישיבה דוקא, וגם מפני שיש לתופס ישיבה את הסגולה לרפא את החולים, מפני שהוא מעמיד תלמידים, וממילא בנוסף למה שישיבו לה דבר, גם יש להם כח מיוחד לרפא את החולה, ואפשר שאחרי שיצאה רבקה מבית שם ועבר ובירכוה, כבר פסק לה צער העיבור ממה שהיו מתרוצצים בקרבה, כי לא מצינו בכתובים שמאז עוד סבלה.

ביאור ה'

עי"ל בס"ד דאדרבה רבקה לא רצתה לצער את יצחק או אברהם ולהפריעם בלימודם, לכן הלכה לפני שם ועבר , שהם קבעו ישיבתם ללמד ולהורות לרבים, והיו מזומנים למי שהיה צריך לדרוש בחכמים. וראיה לדבר, שהרי כשיצחק רצה לתת את הברכות לעשיו, ו גם נאמר לרבקה בנבואה שיעקב יטול הברכות, לא דיברה עם יצחק בדבר להניאו מכוונתו וליתן את הברכות ליעקב בדין, אלא שלא רצתה להפריעו מלימודו ועבודת השי"ת, וכן כל אותו הזמן שעשיו יצא לתרבות רעה, לא סיפרה לו על אודות עשיו שמרמהו כי ציד בפיו, והכל כדי שלא להפריעו בלימודו ולא לצערו. שו"ר שכן תירץ במושב זקנים, שלא רצתה לצער את אברהם. 

ומספרים שכאשר היתה אימו של רבינו הגר"ח מוולאז'ין מתייסרת בצער לידה, עמד על ידה בעלה והיה משוחח בלימוד עם הגאון בעל השאגת אריה, וכאשר החלו לתקוף אותה חבלי לידה, נשכה שפתותיה שלא להשמיע קול זעקה וצווחה, קול צער ויללה, פן עי"כ יסור אליה בעלה, והגאון שאגת אריה יפנה לדרכו, ואז יפסיקו לדבר בלימוד, וכך בעודה מתייסרת וצוותת שפתותיה בתעצומות נפש לרוב יקרתה לתורה, שלא להניא בעלה מעסק התורה, אותה שעה העיר ה' את רוחו של מרן הגר"ח מוואלז'ין זצ"ל שנולד בהריון זה, ועלה ונתעלה ונעשה מרכבה לשכינה בתורתו וביראתו ובהעמדת תלמידים.

ויש עוד מעשה מופלא על מסירות נפשה של אשתו של מרן הגרי"ש אלישיב זצ"ל, שכאשר בנה חלה מאד ונפל למשכב עם יותר מ' 40 מעלות חום, התייראה פן כשישוב בעלה מבהמ"ד, יראה את בנו בחוליו ויגרם לו היסח הדעת בלימוד התורה, על כן הניחה את השולחן בחוץ פתח הבית, כאשר השלחן חוסם את הכניסה לבית, וכסא מונח מבחוץ, ו ערכה עליו את ארוחת הצהרים, וכך לא נודע למרן הרב אלישיב על חוליו של בנו, שבבואו לביתו, התיישב מבחוץ ואכל וחזר לתלמודו.

ביאור ו'

הנה באחת הפעמים שזכיתי לדבר קדם קמיה מרן עט"ר גאון ישראל רבינו עובדיה יוסף זצ"ל (ראה בס' כרם רבנן עמ' ק"פ), סיפרתי שהיה אחד כתב בצוואתו שכל הירושה שלו תחולק ע"פ מה שיפסוק גדול הדור, והיה ספק גדול מיהו גדול הדור, האם הגר"ח מוולוז'ין, או איזה גאון עצום אחר שהיה בזמנו, שהיו שניהם גדולים בתורה, ובהעמדת תלמידים. ופסקו הב"ד שמי שנקרא גדול הדור זה הגר"ח מוולוז'ין, בהיות והוא יצק מים וקיבל את תורתו מרבינו הגר"א, ולכן כיון שהגר"ח היה לו רב, ואילו לגאון השני לא היה רב, אלא הוא מעצמו ישב ולמד, לכן הוא נחשב לגדול הדור. עפ"ז נראה לומר שאע"פ שהיה אברהם קיים,

והגם שהוא היה קברניט הדור (ב"ב צא:) , והיה נביא ה', ואור העולם שניצול מאור כשדים, וכן יצחק היה קיים, וכיון שהיו שם ועבר קיימים, שהם רבותיהם של אברהם ויצחק , לכן הלכה רבקה לפניהם.

ביאור ז'

בספר תורת העובר (עמ' שע"ו), מביא מספר אמרי שפר למהר"י חלאוה זצ"ל שתירץ שרבקה לא הלכה לאברהם, פן יאמר בשלו הצער הגדול הזה עליה, לפי שהתפלל עליה שתהר וע"י תפילתו נתעברה, והעלימה ממנו העניין כדי שלא ישנאנה בראותו שהיא משונה בהריונה משאר הנשים, עכת"ד. והביא עוד בזה מהמהר"ל בגור אריה, שכתב וז"ל: והא דלא שאלה את יצחק או את אברהם י"ל דהיתה רבקה סבורה דשמא בשביל חטא יש לה צער העיבור כ "כ שאמרו רז"ל כי הנשים הצדקניות לא היו בפתקא של חוה כדאיתא בפ"ק דסוטה י"ב, והיתה מתייראת שתתגנה בעיני בעלה או שיאמר אברהם ליצחק שאינה הגונה לו וישא אחרת או יגרשנה, עכ"ל.  

Toldos, Breishis 27:1. Vatich’hena Einov: The Indelible Influence of Exposure to Rish’us.

Yitzchok’s sense of sight deteriorated in his old age. Rashi— because of the smoke from the ketores the wives of Eisav burned for Avoda Zarah. Apparently, the tension and conflict between the holiness of Yitzchak’s eyes and the tumah of the avodah zarah had a deleterious effect on his vision.

The Da’as Zkainim here points out that Rivka’s eyes were not affected because she grew up in the house of Besueil, where she got used to korbanos to Avoda Zarah.

You have to realize that Rivkah left home at the age of three, or, some say, at ten or fourteen. Eisav wasn’t born until around 20 years later, and Eisav didn’t marry till he was 40 (Breishis 26:34). So Rivka was at least 64 years old when the wives of Eisav started to bring korbanos to Avoda Zarah. She had only been with Besueil and Lavan till she was three, and now she was 64, and her eyes weren’t affected by the ketores of Avoda Zara because she was used to it from her youth. Her youth?? Three or four years of exposure as a child that ended sixty years before??  We see the tremendous and indelible effect of growing up in the house of a rasha and being exposed to his rishus. Rivkah was a tzadeikis gemurah, and had been since birth, and had been by Yitzchak for over 60 years, but still, exposure to avodah Zarah didn’t sicken her her as it did Yitzchak. Once a person experiences something bad or wicked, it becomes normal, or a possibility. If one never experienced it, and sees it for the first time later, it makes him sick. Like television— if you watched TV as a child, even if you abhor and avoid it later, watching television will be unpleasant but will not make you chalesh, you won’t have an reflexive physical revulsion. The lewdness and vulgarity might make you cringe, but it won’t nauseate you. And not only does early life experience have an effect, but even prenatal experience does. Eishes Mano’ach was told to avoid whatever was assur to the child she was pregnant with, because it would have affected his kedusha. A parent is held responsible for how well he raises his child, and there are mistakes in raising children that cannot be remedied, certainly not before Mattan Torah (barasi Torah Tavlin), maybe even afterwards. A parent must therefore carefully and seriously think about his child's growth environment.

This “physical aspect of spirituality,” this reflexive abhorrence of vile things, has relevance to the trait of bushah/modesty as well. A person may have an innate bushah. But doing certain things will destroy his boshes ponim, and it will be impossible to ever get it back. So when Rivkah was exposed to the reiyach ketores of Avodah Zarah of Eisov’s wives, she hated it, it was a maras ruach, it caused her emotional grief, but it did not physically damage her.

Now, the natural reaction to this observation is that one suffers from exposure to evil. But think about this: Yitzchak's reaction was blindness. Rivkah didn't lose her sight, nor did she lose her vision: she was able to recognize and deal with the problems that Eisav created. Who was better off? Yitzchak, whose utter and unblemished purity was incorporated to the extent that, faced with evil, his eyes were ruined? Or Rivkah, whose exposure to evil at a young age enabled her to withstand this new exposure, so her vision, and her ability to recognize what was going on and fight it, remained intact?

What would have happened if both Yitzchak and Rivkah were blinded, and they both thought that Eisav was a tzadik? Maybe Eisav would have gotten the brachos, and Yaakov would have remained a destitute and scholarly footnote of history!

And where do you think Rivkah got the idea to switch Yaakov for Eisav? If Rivkah had grown up in a home of unyielding truth and forthrightness, could her plan have even occurred to her? One might reasonably assume that she learned this shrewd strategy as a child in Besueil's home, the same place her brother Lavan learned it, as we see when he applied the family trick against Yaakov by presenting Leah in place of Rachel.

It happens that R’ Hirsch in this week's parsha also says that overprotectiveness can backfire; sometimes a child needs to confront and overcome his netiyos. Some have said that the fallout rate, the incidence of children that reject orthodoxy, is greater in monolithic, insular communities than in mixed communities. (See, for example, http://www.cross-currents.com/archives/2007/10/24/its-not-what-the-neighbours-say ). Children that are raised Orthodox in a community where alternatives are evident acquire the inner strength and confidence to deal with questions. But certainly, a child that is exposed to sexual behavior before he has the mental and emotional stability and strength to deal with such things will have a very hard time overcoming such influences. So you have to decide which is better-- that your child is pure, an 'olah temimah' like Yitzchak, but unprepared to deal with the inevitable encounters we face in our lives, or that he is safe, in other words not as pure, but stronger in facing religious confrontation. They say that sailors used to be the healthiest people in the world, because they were exposed to the most vile and virulent diseases in the many ports they visited, and they survived. On the other hand, one could say that those sailors all had numerous sub-acute illnessness that they would be better off without.

As is often the case in ma'amarei Chazal, and in life itself, there is no bright line between right and wrong, and there are no easy answers. Nonetheless, forewarned is forearmed: one cannot just let things happen by default. Cautious and prudent parents need to face the issue and carefully consider what is right for their children, and to know that there is no perfect answer, and that whatever they decide involves a tradeoff. The best place to start is to have a religious mentor who has seen the reality of life, and to seek his or her advice. Assei lecha Rav, ve'histalek min hasafeik.

Toldos 27:12. The Akeida of Yaakov.

Emes Le’Yakov has a wonderful vort here: We find that each of the avos was faced with tests which required that they do something diametrically opposed to the character trait which they exemplify. This means they had to overcome the middah tova they had worked on their whole life, and even more: they had to do God’s will with alacrity when that will seemed to precisely contradict their understanding of God.

For example, Avrohom’s chesed meant not only that he worked on chesed his whole life, but also that he perceived Hashem as being purely chesed, loving kindness. His tests included the akeida, sending away Yishmo’el, and leaving his old father when God told him “lech lecha.”

IN this week's parshah we find Yaakov's akeida. Yaakov had to tell his father Yitzchok an untruth in order to recieve his blessings. Yakov was the avatar of truth, as it says "titein emes l'Yaakov," and for him, the need to say an untruth was an akeida.

Reb Yaakov asks, where was Yitzchok’s akeida (in the sense of a test which required absolute abandonment of personal wants and personal hashkafa)? He brings the Gemora Shabbos 89b where the avos were told that we, their children, have sinned, and only Yitchok said to God, “Are they my children and not yours?” and offered to bear the sins of Klal Yisroel. This was contrary to Yitzchok’s trait of strength/gevurah, which was to live life al pi middas hadin, by the rules of strict justice. Yaakov sought mercy for his descendants despite his adherence to unmitigated and strict justice.

We can apply this idea to the many times that we are faced with a life-changing test which forces us to reexamine, and possibly abandon lifelong assumptions, and to diametrically change our behavior, and to do what needs to be done with alacrity, dedication and unquestioning faith.

To reinforce this concept, we should remember the Gemora that says that when Reb Akiva was being tortured by the Romans for teaching Torah, as he was dying, he smiled. His student asked him, “Rebbi, how can you smile while you are in such extreme pain?” Reb Akiva answered “My whole life I attested that I would die for the sanctification of God. Now that I have a chance, should I not be pleased that I had the merit to do so?” The words Reb Akiva used are “kol yomai nitzta’arti/all my days I hungered for the opportunity.” There is another Gemora (Yoma 19b) which records the story of a High Priest in the Temple in Jerusalem who belonged to the Tzedukim, and whose beliefs were considered blasphemous by our sages. (At that time, the priesthood had passed from our control to that of the Tzedukim.) He told his father that he intended to perform a certain sacrificial rite in a manner which was anathema to the sages of the Mishna. His father told him, don’t you realize that when they see you, they will stone you to death on the spot? The Gemora records that his answer was phrased exactly as Reb Akiva’s answer— “kol yomai nitzta’arti/all my days I hungered for the opportunity.”, and I am not going to miss the chance to do it now. I believe that the Gemora chose to use a phrase that was identical to that of R' Akivas, who accepted martyrdom with joy. The Gemora is making the point that total dedication and conviction are not the exclusive possession of those who agree with us; that a man can spend his whole life with total conviction of the truth of his cause, and be ready and happy to die for that faith, and be 100% wrong.