Vayikro 5:7. The Korban Oleh V’yoreid.

This is about korbanos. If kodashim makes your eyes glaze over, go read something like The Little Medrash Says, or this.

There is a category of korbanos called Oleh V’Yoreid, literally, ascending and descending. This means that a sliding scale is applied to people who have to bring these korbanos, according to their ability to pay. If one can afford it, he must bring a regular chatos, which is a female sheep or goat. If he cannot afford that, he brings two doves, one brought as a chatas and one as an olah. If he cannot even afford that, he brings a minchas chotei, just a couple of pounds of flour.

It is important to know that 'Oleh' does not mean that the sheep is a korbon Olah. It is most often a korban chattas, not an Olah. It is called 'Oleh v'Yoreid' because the expense of the korbon rises and falls according to the means of the one who brings it.

If you have a hard time remembering who brings an oleh v’yoreid, here’s a mnemonic: Shvatim.
Shmi’as Kol (someone who falsely swore that he didn’t know any testimony when called to be a witness)
Bitui (shvu’as Bitui, for breaking an oath to do or not do something,)
Tum’as Mikdosh veKodoshov (contact with hekdesh while in a state of tum’ah)
Yoledes (the chilbirth korbon. Also for a zov or a zovoh.)
Metzorah (one of the korbonos of a metzora upon becoming tahor.)

For an exhaustive list of mnemonics that can help remember Torah topics, I have compiled this.

The Gemara in Chullin 22 learns from a passuk that you can’t buy an Olas Ha’of from maiser sheni money. Tosfos asks, there is already a limud in the Sifri that tells us that you can’t use maiser sheni money to buy an olas nedovo, because it’s all burned, and there is no achila. The same logic should preclude the use of maiser sheni money to buy an olas ho’of, making this new drosho unnecessary.

Also, the Gemora has a drasha that you can’t be makriv ofos at night. The Gemara asks, we already knew this from the old drasha of ‘beyom tzavoso,’ that almost no avodah can be done at night. So the Gemara answers, that would be good for the chatas ha’of, but we still need the drasha for the olas ha’of. Reb Meir Simcha asks, why wouldn’t we know it for the olah just as we know it for the chatas? Why would we think an olah is any different than other korbanos?

He brings the Ibn Ezra that asks, “if the korban ohf replaces the chatas beheima, why do we need two, one a chatas and one an olah?” The Ibn Ezra answers that a chattas has achilas mizbeiach (eimurim that are burned), and achilas adam (the parts that are eaten by the Kohanim), but chatas ohf only has achilas adam, since none of the chatas ha'of is burned on the mizbei'ach. So you need a chatas ha’of to replace the achilas adam aspect of the chatas beheimah, and an olas ha’of to replace the achilas mizbei’ach of the chatas beheimoh. It is only when you have chatos and olas ha’ohf that you replace the chatas beheima.

With the Ibn Ezra he answers the kashes on the Gemora: since the Olas ha’ohf comes to replace the achilas mizbei’ach of the chatos beheima, and burning eimurim is allowed at night, we might think the olas ha’ohf is also kosher at night. Also, since the chatas and olas ha’ohf are really two parts of the same thing, maybe we can use maiser sheini money to buy the pair of birds, since you can use maiser sheini money to buy a chatos, which is partially eaten..
Kamashma lon, that the olas ha’ohf is considered a regular korbon bifnei atzmo.

The magi’ah in the chidushim there brings that Reb Meir Simcha later saw that the ‘laila’ kashe was asked to the Rashba, and the Rashbo only says that it’s shver, but tries to be meyasheiv with a alternate girsa there.

More interesting, in the hakdama to the sefer Mekor Baruch (also brought by the magi’ah,) he writes that Reb Meir Simcha told someone that the night after he thought of this, the Rashba came to him in a dream and told him that his teretz was much better than what he, the Rashba, had written.

If you have gotten this far, I have another interesting story about a dream.

When Horav Leib Bakst (I verified this story with his son) was a young man in Shanghai, he was stricken with severe appendicitis, and he was bein hachayim ubein hameisim.  He had a dream that he was in front of the beis din shel ma’aloh, and the Mashgiach, R’ Yeruchem, was on the Beis Din. They were arguing about who is more chashuv, malachim or people. Some said that people are more chashuv, because Malachim can only do one thing, but people can do many things at one time. They then asked him, what does he say, does this mean that people are better than malachim? He said he did not want to answer. They told him that he had no choice, and he had to answer. So he told them that this did not prove that people are better, because pshat that a Malach can do only one thing is that when he does his shlichus, he does it with his entire being, with all his kochos. But when people do more than one thing at a time, it is because they are not doing the things they are doing 100%, they are not being done perfectly. Even for people, if they need to do something perfectly, they can only do one thing at a time. R’ Yeruchem said that what he said was good, and the Beis Din paskened that he will live. And then he woke up. When the Mirrer oilom wanted to make a shinui hasheim, he refused, saying that Beis Din had already paskened that he will live, and he will live, and there is no reason to make a shinui hasheim. They say that his life reflected that idea, of focus and dedication to achievement by bringing all his power to doing one thing perfectly. He used to say, “A person can only do one thing at a time, if he does it the way it needs to be done.” The same thing applies to the times that we should be focused on achieving kedusha, like, for example, when we come to shul, or whenever we steal some time from our daily activities to say tehillim or to learn, we have to focus on it to the exclusion of all other things, including society news, sports, the latest in Jewish cuisine, whatever we plan to do afterwards, or whatever we would rather be doing, or whatever.

Pekudei, Shemos 38:21. Pekudei Hamishkon Mishkan Ho’eidus.

Rabbeinu Bachya here says that these three words, Hamishkon Mishkan Ho'eidus, are a remez to the time the Mishkon, the Bayis Rishon, and the Bayis Sheini stood. The gematriya of the third word, Ho’eidus (choseir) is 479; the Mishkon stood for 480 years, but the first year was only half the year. The gematria of the second word, Mishkan, is 410, which is exactly the number of years the first Beis Hamikdosh in Yerushalayim stood. And the gematria of the first word, Hamishkon, is 415; the Bayis Sheini stood 420 years, so he adds the kollel— the number of letters in the word. In sum:
Hamishkon = 415, the years the Bayis Sheini stood (w/kollel).
Mishkan = 410, the years the Bayis Rishon stood.
Ho'eidus = 479, the years the Mishkon stood.

(in the Midbar for 39 years, at Gilgal for 14 years, Shilo for 369 years, 13 in Nov and Givon 44.)

(This gematria is amazingly on point, except for the need to resort to the kollel. Perhaps the Bayis Sheini lost its kedushah five years before it was destroyed, and was no more than a dead, soul-less edifice under the control of the various splinter cults that arose at that time. As the Gemora in Megilla regarding the parties made by Belshatzar and Achashveirosh indicates, nevu'ah calendars are not printed in advance, and numbers and dates can be interpretated in various ways.)

The Satmarer Rov in Vayo’el Moshe asks, why are they in reverse order? Why does the last word refer to the first of the three, the Mishkon, and the first word refer to the last, the Bayis Sheini? Although I bring the Satmarer Rov's teretz below, I would be happy to hear a more straightforward explanation for the order reversal. Write a comment or send me mail at Eliezere@aol.com

Back to the Satmarer Rov's teretz: After asking why the Botei Mikdosh are referred to in reverse order, he also asks the following questions: Why does this remez belong specifically here? Also, why is there no description of the specific use of the gold in the Mishkon, while the silver and copper’s uses are described in minute detail? He answers that the gold was a kappora on the Eigel. The Gemora says that although Beis Din is authorized to attach a person’s property to ensure that he fulfil his korbon obligations, we do not do so for korbonos that are for kapporo– ein memashk’nin al hachato’os. This is because a person that stands to gain kapporoh from a serious sin gives be’ayin yofeh, he is happy to take advantage of this opportunity, and he will give as soon and as much as he can. Here, the nation felt the same way about the gold they gave for a kapporo on the eigel, and they didn’t demand itemization. But the other nedovos were given as a favor to the mishkon, and because the people gave it not for a kappora, but as a donation, they gave it with some degree of reservation. When people give without complete love and enthusiasm, underlying character flaws assert themselves, and thus began their distrust of Moshe. This distrust is an example of sinas chinom, which ultimately caused the churbon Bayis Sheini. So it is proper that immediately after the word ‘pekudei’, which refers to the audit that was made necessary because of the spirit of distrustfulness and suspicion, the possuk alludes to the Bayis Sheini, the third of the mishkonos.


I wonder what predictive value Rabbeinu Bachya’s vort has. Can we find a remez to the third and eternal Beis Hamikdosh, sheyiboneh bimheiro b'yomeinu? Or perhaps it would be impossible to find a numerical reference to the Bayis Shlishi because it will stand forever? But maybe it will only stand until the end of the sixth millenium, so it is limited in time? But if we could find a remez to its years, we could simply subtract that number from six thousand nine hundred ninety nine to find the date it will be built.

Te'tzaveh, Shemos 28:30. The Urim Ve’tumim.

Ho’Urim ve’es HaTumim Vehoyu al Leiv Aharon. The Urim Vetumim were on the heart of Aharon. This phrase, “ahl leiv Aharon,” does not merely describe the placement of the Urim Vetumim. As we will explain, it describes the condition necessary for the Urim Vetumim to function.

The Yalkut here: R’ Shimon Ben Yochai says, the heart that rejoiced when Moshe was elevated to greatness will wear the Urim Vetumim. Rav Chaim Shmuelevitz here in the ma’amar “Sheves Achim Gam Yochad” says that this means that a heart that feels such empathy for others is fit to wear the Urim Vetumim. To understand the messages that come through it, one has to have complete sensitivity and sympathy for Klal Yisroel.

The Choshen only serves to amplify and augment that intrinsic empathy, which enables the wearer to correctly understand its messages. He connects this to the story in Brochos 31b with Eli Hakohen. When Eli told Chana that she was a drunk— shikora— she answered “lo adoni...” And the Gemora there explains “lo odon atto bedovor zeh, giliso be’atzmecho she’ein ruach hakodesh shoreh olecho sheteida she’eini schuras yoyin.” You are not a master in this matter, you have revealed that the divine spirit is not resting on you, for then you would know that I am not drunk, but rather I am overwhelmed with emotion and I am praying with total concentration. The pshat is that if Eli did not have the necessary sympathy to discern that she acted as she did because she was davening with great kavono because of her emotional desolation, he could not correctly interpret the message of the Urim Vetumim. He thought it said "shikora," drunk, when it actually said "kesarah," like Sarah, who also prayed to have a child.

The lesson is that you need the “leiv Aharon” in order for the Urim V’tumim to work. I once heard a nice story about empathy from my father shlitah. The Baal Shem Tov once said that he learned ahavas Yisroel from a drunken peasant. Two drunken peasants were staggering through the street, holding on to each other, saying "John, you are my best friend!" "Ivan, you are my best friend!" Suddently, John pushes Ivan away and kicks him. Ivan, shocked, said, "John, why did you kick me? I am your best friend!" And John said, "I was sick last week, why didn’t you visit me!" Ivan answered, "But John, my best friend, how was I supposed to know you were sick? I didn’t know you were sick, I don’t see you every day!" John yelled at him, "You call yourself my friend? Why didn’t it hurt you when I was sick?"

On the topic of empathy: see the Radvaz in the Rambam Aveilus 14:1. The Rambam talks about the mitzvos of gmilus chasodim, and the Radvaz says that the mitzvah to be mesamei’ach choson vekallah is tied to the five kollos of matan Torah (Brochos 6b), and then he brings the Gemora in Shabbos 31 from Hillel that “desoni loch lechavroch lo sa’avid.” The Radvaz means to explain the connection between the mitzvah of being mesamei’ach choson vekallah and the kabolas hatorah— that desoni means that you have to feel the other person’s feelings as if they are your own. Since desoni is such an essential part of the Torah, as Hillel said, a person that really feels the ‘sharing of the joy of another person’ and who, by sharing the joy of the choson and kallah increases their simcha, is zocheh to Torah.

My son’s Sheva Brochos recently took place during a terrible snow storm. People were stuck on highways all over, cars were in ditches, and walking five inches outside was challenging, to say nothing of driving. Despite all this, most people that were invited did come to the Sheva Brochos. I was very moved by this unambiguous demonstration of caring and love, and the first thing I spoke about was the mitzvoh of Birkas Hagomeil. The Gemora in Brochos 44 says that if a friend sees you and says a birkas hagomeil on your recent recovery or redemption, and you say omein, you are no longer obligated to make your own birkas hagomeil. The gemora asks, but you need a minyon? And answers, yes, there has to be a minyon there. And the gemora asks, but you need sheim umalchus? And answers, yes, he used sheim umalchus. This is brought in Orach Chaim 219:4. The Ramoh adds a very interesting thing. He says that the friend’s brocho is not l’vatoloh, even though we don’t find that people have to make such brochos on their friends’ nissim, since it is a birchas shevach v’hodo’oh “ahl tovas chaveiro she’somei’ach boh.” The Mishneh Bruroh in 18 brings the Taz that explains that with the words "she’somei’ach boh” the Ramoh limits the relevance of this halochoh to a relative or friend who is truly happy about the recovery or salvation of the person; if, however, he is not truly joyful in his heart, and he only made the brochoh for appearances sake, for the sake of being social (mipnei hasholom), then it is a brochoh l’vatoloh, and he had better not use the sheim umalchus. The Taz makes us face an obvious but unpleasant fact. It is not natural for us to rejoice in our friends’ successes. Nobody questions our sympathy and commiseration for a friend’s loss, but that is a feeling that is relatively easy to achieve. Who knows? Maybe, deep down, we think, better him than me, and are relieved at our escape, maybe it’s a little schadenfreude. But whatever it is, the fact remains that it’s easier to sympathize with a friend’s misfortune than to rejoice at his success or recovery or redemption. The initial and natural emotion upon seeing a friend’s success is envy. It sounds sick, but that’s the fact. R’ Mottel Pagremansky is quoted as saying that to sympathize, you need to be a mentsch, but to be happy with another’s success, you have to be a maloch.

Think about how this plays out in our daily lives. We all know of families that know each other, and who each have a daughter in shidduchim. One girl goes out with a boy, and immediately the other family resents it. We heard about him first! How did they get him and we didn’t! They must have paid someone off! Instead of thinking, Boruch Hashem, it should be with hatzlochoh, we will find what is bashert for us, they think they have been cheated.

But this is not what the Torah wants. For us, the foundation of the whole Torah is “veohavto l’rei’acho komocho.” Besides the issur of coveting a neighbor’s property, the Torah says we must rejoice in his successes as if they were our own.

Some readers will say to themselves that this is a ridiculous and naive idea, and that no human being can feel this way. We would be lucky if we feel that close to our immediate relatives. But to feel this way towards anyone but your spouse or your children is unnatural and abnormal. They are probably right. But we are obligated to overcome this natural feeling and become Torah people, not just natural people. This is the trait that Aharon represented, towards which we should aspire, and which we should all work to achieve.

Trumah, Shemos 25:18. A Socratic Dvar Torah about the Kruvim

Here are four questions. These are not questions that misdirect or require knowledge of obscure facts. Any student of the Chumash will, with a little thought, find the answers to these questions. This process will help you realize something fundamental about the character and nature of the Kruvim.

1. Everyone is familiar with the Kruvim that stood atop the Aron Kodesh in the Mishkan. People who are ma’avir sedra also know of the Kruvim that were woven into the inside layer of the cover of the Mishkan. But where else in the Torah are Kruvim mentioned?

2. In what sense are the other Kruvim diametrically opposed to the Kruvim mentioned here?

3. In what sense is the purpose of the other Kruvim identical with that of the Kruvim mentioned here?

4. How do you understand the striking differences and similarities of the character and task of the Kruvim of the Mishkon and the other Kruvim?

UPDATE:
When I posted this, I posted only the questions and left the thinking to the reader. As it happened, one reader, an anonymous baal machshava, nailed the answers. Please see the comments for his answers to these questions. I still don't get why he/she would not use their name. Bishlema me, I need to latitude to post whatever I want without consequence. But I still don't get why a commenter would do that, and I am still consumed with curiosity as to who that anonymous was.

Terumah, Shemos 25:31. Miksha tei’aseh hamenorah. Lending Force to Energy

Rashi here brings the Tanchuma that says that Moshe had a very hard time understanding how to make the Menorah (as Rashi also says in passuk 40). So Hashem told him to throw the gold he had been working on into the fire, and a perfect menorah came out. The Maharal asks, why then did Hashem have to show him the tavnis hamenorah shel eish, as Rashi says in 40, and command him to make it? It was obviously impossible for Moshe to fulfill that commandment! The Maharal (Gur Aryeh) answers that Moshe did attempt to make it, and as part of the crafting process put it into the fire, and only then did it come out perfected. But Moshe did make it, at least the initial imperfect stages.

The mussar haskeil is that we cannot be expected to do everything that Hashem requires from us. We are expected to have bitachon in Hashem, and trust that if He presents us with what seems to be an insurmountable challenge, we do have the potential to overcome it, and we must plan and work to the limits of our ability. When we reach the limit of our ability, having given all our kochos, we will have Siyata Dishmaya to reach our goal.
This is the pshat in the Mishnah in Pirkei Avos (2:16) that says “Lo alecha hamelacha ligmor, ve’ein atta ben chorin libateil heimenu.” And it is similar to the idea that Moshe set aside the arei miklot in the eiver hayarden even though he knew they would not be effectuated until after his death.

And now to the most important point. It is crucial to realize the similarity and the stark contrast between what happened here and what happened to Aharon at the maiseh ha’egel. (See Sfas Emes here.) There, too, Aharon threw the gold into the fire, and there, too, something came out. The point is, (and this also answers the Maharal’s kashe,) that preparation, kavana, having a goal in mind, transforms the maiseh, the act, completely. Moshe’s act, while physically identical with Aharon’s maiseh, was completely different in ruchnius. Moshe threw the gold into the fire after giving all his strength in the attempt to understand what the menorah was, and realizing that after giving all he had, he needed siyata dishmaya to achieve his goal. Aharon threw it in with no kavana at all, expecting that nothing would come of it. So when when Micha threw in the plate with the Shem Hashem on it (Shemos 32:4), the result was something Aharon never could have anticipated.

Gold is inert, neutral, and unchanging. But it conducts energy very well, and when combined with power and energy, the combination creates a potent, living force. Throwing gold into a fire creates a conduit for inchoate energy, and this can have more than one result— what comes out might be an avodah zarah that spreads death and darkness through the world, or it might be a menorah that channels the kedusha of the Shechina and brings life and light to the whole world.

Mishpatim, Shemos 23:3. The Majority Rules, but not always.

The possuk here says אחרי רבים להטות, which teaches that the opinion of the majority is to be followed. There is an interesting set of shittos about the extent of this halacha. See Minchas Usher here.

A. What if the mi’ut is smarter than the rov?
Obviously, the difficulty in assessing relative chochmo, and the multiplicity of types of chochmo, make this difficult to apply with any confidence in the real world, but here are the shittos.

1. Hagohos Ashri Avodoh Zoroh 1:3 holds that chochmoh never outweighs the supremecy of the rov.
2. The Ramban Sanhedrin 32a holds that in a Beis Din, Rov supercedes chochmoh, but in a non-beis din context, you can do whatever you want. In other words, Rov is no longer determinative, but neither is the mi’ut chachomim determinative.
3. The chinuch in 78 says that Rov is only dispositive against a mi’ut chochom in Sanhedrin, but not in any smaller Beis Din.
4. Rav Hai Gaon brought in the Ramban is unclear. He might hold that you always go after chochmoh, even in Sanhedrin Hagodol.

B. What about community matters?

1. Some hold that all community matters can be decided by a simple majority, which is binding on the minority. Rosh Tshuvos Klal 6 Simon 5, Tshovus Rashbo 1:781, and Yam Shel Shlomo Chulin 1:end of 51.
2. The Mordechai in BK 179 and BB 480 holds that majority cannot obligate the minority to do anything ever, but he brings that the Ram holds that the selectmen, the Tuvei Ho’ir, have the ability to bind their communities even to the extent of hefker, while the Rashbo limits that power to gedolei hador mamosh.
3. The Maharshdam in AC 37 and CM 421 says that community matters are decided by the chachemi ho’ir, and community money matters by its money men, the rich and influential, (who are assumed to be the most responsible and sophisticated when it comes to such things).
4. See beginning of four perek of Maseches Megilla. The Gemora distinguishes between the limited powers of the Tovei Ho'ir acting alone and the broader powers of the Tovei Ho'ir acting pursuant to a referendum.

Mishpatim, Shemos 23:1. Lo sisa sheima shov - Ex Parte Communications and First Impressions.

Rashi here brings that this pasuk is the source of the the issur for a dayan to hear from a litigant when the other party is not present. Ralbag– the result of this communication, unchallenged by the opposite party, will be to create in the dayan’s mind the impression that his version is true, and the other side will have the burden of proof. Lawyers are familiar with this as the prohibition of “ex parte communication.” In fact, several lawyers I know have gotten into trouble for precisely this behavior.

The Dayan knows that everyone is lying, or hiding the truth, or, at best, is biased, and there are two sides, but the first version he hears makes an impression.  Once the impression is made, the other side will have the burden of overcoming the first impression. The same is true with everything we hear or learn, it makes an impression, and it’s hard to change- kivan d'al, al. As the Alter of Kelm said, the only "negius" that is impossible to eliminate completely is that of "muskol rishon" - first impression. This is because it is protected by both atzlus and gaivah, mental laziness and pride - two obstacles, each of which is formidable in its own right. (Last sentence not quoted from the Alter.)

The words are similar to those at Har Sinai– Lo sisa es sheim Hashem Elokecha lashav and Lo sisa sheima shav. Sisa and Shov both mean to carry in vain. Here, the vanity is that it becomes a barrier to other information.  The Torah is telling us “don’t let what you know be an impediment for what you still need to learn.”

As an introduction, I would like to tell a few stories about how hard it is to admit error, or to change your mind after a first impression.

There was once an apikorus who lay dying. Suddenly, he called out that they should summon the Rov, because he wanted to do tshuva. His students, gathered around his bed, were shocked. Professor, you have been an apikores your whole life, you made your reputation as an apikores– you’re a kofer b’ikker! What do you mean you want to do tshuva! He answered, “Adderabba! The Gemora says resho’im afilu ahl pischo shel gehenom einom chozrim bitesuva– Dos iz eich falsh.” (On the contrary! The Gemora says that the wicked refuse to repent even when they stand at the gates of Hell, and I say that this, too, is false.)

Chanania ben Azor, claimed to be a prophet and contradicted Yirmiahu’s dire prophecies by saying everything would be fine, and then Yirmiahu told him he would die before the end of the year for his false nevu’ah. As he lay dying before Rosh Hashonnoh he told his family to delay his burial till after the new year began so his death wouldn’t show he was wrong.

In arguments between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel, we almost always pasken like Beis Hillel, because Beis Hillel considered the opinion of Beis Shammai before making a final halachic decision, while Beis Shammai ignored the opinions of Beis Hillel. In fact, the Mishneh in Eidios says that Hillel and Shammai themselves only argued without coming to an agreement in 3 places; in all of those three cases, who do we pasken like? We pasken neither like Beis Hillel nor like Beis Shammai. This is because the fact that they couldn’t ultimately agree indicated that neither was right, because they always did consider the other side’s opinion. If either had been right, the other side would have seen that, and would have retracted their view. The lesson of Shammai and Hillel, which was given over to the students of Hillel but not to those of Shammai, is that Conviction does not have to create mental paralysis.

This is true for everyone, not only true among jurists and intellectuals: People who daven for Amud, you will notice that they often pronounce the first three brochos differently than the rest. This is because they changed schools or got a different sort of rebbi. Think about how strange that is! They pronounce the first three brochos differently than other parts of davenning, because of the specific style of the teacher they had in first grade! That’s how they were taught, that’s the way it is. They are stuck forever, like a bug in amber.

In hashkofo also; most people have what they were taught when they were in grade school. This might be good pedagogically for ten year olds, but this is not so nice for adults. Most people only open their minds when they are traumatized. There is a joke in my family about a relative of ours– he has a mind like a steel trap. Once an idea wanders into his head, it snaps shut and you need a crowbar to open it.

I respect Dr. Anthony Flew. An atheist since age 15, professor of philosophy at Oxford, at age 81 decided that the big bang and the extreme complexity of self-reproducing life indicates intelligent design. (Or, as he later watered it down, “would be confirmatory to a faith in a creator.”)

I saw a reference to a paper published in 2005 by a man named Lewandowsky in Psychological Science. He says that “People build mental models. By the time they receive a retraction, the original misinformation has already become an integral part of that mental model, or world view, and disregarding it would leave the world view a shambles. People continue to rely on misinformation even if they demonstrably remember and understand subsequent retraction.” (Quoted in Wall Street Journal of February 4 2005 in a column by Sharon Begley.)

An excellent example of a very similar concept is the story involving Rebbitzen Sheila Feinstein. She asked someone to get her husband, HoRav Reuven Feinstein, from the dais at some event, and the person said that he knew that R’ Reuven and his brother R’ Dovid were on the dais, but how will he know which is which? The Rebitzen said that R’ Reuven has the black beard and R’ Dovid has the brown beard. The man came back a few minutes later and said, sorry, Rebbitzen, they both have grey beards! The Shviger simply didn’t realize it. She still thought of them as they were years ago, and her mental image trumped the reality.


The lesson is, we need to keep an open mind. Don’t suffer from arrested spiritual development. Ask questions, don’t stop until you find an answer that satisfies you. But even when you are satisfied, don’t be self-satisfied or smug, because the Torah warns us to keep an open mind, lo siso sheima shov. Take that Koheles off the shelf and see if Shlomo Hamelech has anything to say to you.


(See on this topic R Chaim Shmuelevitz page 198. I later found out that Malcolm Gladwell wrote a book, “Blink,” on exactly this topic. I don't think he brings down the Rashi or R' Chaim Shmuelevitz.)