Vayikra 1:2. Adam ki yakriv. Conspicuous Virtue (Virtue Signaling)

Rashi brings from Beitzah 20 "Adam ki yakriv," that your korbanos should be like the korbanos of Adam Harishon; just as the korbanos of Adam Harishon could not possibly have been stolen, since the entire world was his, you too may bring korbanos only if they are yours.

Dr. Zvi Krinsky said an interesting pshat in the tzushtell to the korbanos of Adam Harishon. Some people do mitzvos in a special or flamboyant way because they want to impress others; they are very makpid on hidur mitzvah when other people can see what they're doing. When they buy a lulav and esrog, or a Megillah, they are very particular about hidur, but when they buy tzitzis, they don’t spend the time or money to be makpid in hiddur. Some people only daven a long shmoneh esrei when there are people watching. (Two points— spending more for hiddur to show off, and doing mitzvos in a showy way to make people think you are a kadosh. Dr. Krinsky was talking about yuhara; I added hiddur mitzvah.) We should learn from the korbanos of Adam to be mehadeir mitzvos not to impress people— there were no people for Adam to impress— but rather because of our love and respect for the mitzvah itself, or as a way of becoming kadosh. Do the mitzvah le'sheim mitzvah, not le'sheim showing off, or showing how holy you are.

I do not think it is that simple. First of all, Reb Yehuda/Rav's rule (Pesachim 50b) of the rule of Le'olam ya'asok adam bemitzvos afilu shelo lishma.... should apply to hiddur no less than to other mitzvos. But I would argue that this kind of hiddur is not just a bedi'eved, a "mitoch shelo lishma" din, but it might actually be inherently praiseworthy.

The Gemora in Shabbos 133b, Sukah 11b, and Nazir 2b, says "hisna’eh lefanav bemitzvos," which literally means ‘beautify yourself before Him with mitzvos’. This seems to focus on the "beautify yourself with..." aspect more than the "beautify the mitzvah" aspect. The renowned dikduk expert, Rabbi Dr. Avremi Isenberg says that the use of ‘hispa’eil’ (a reflexive construction) doesn't prove anything, because the His'pa'eil form is sometimes used for Pi'eil, just as "ke’ilu hiskabalti" means nothing other than ‘ke’ilu kibalti. However, the difference is that with Hiskabalti, it means "I view myself as if I had received the money." Here, that logic does not apply, and it seems to intend the literal reading of "beautify yourself." Also, the Gemara in Yoma 70a and Sottah 41b says

אח"כ כל אחד ואחד מביא ספר תורה מביתו וקורא בו כדי להראות חזותו לרבים

which means that they brought their sifrei Torah to show other people their beauty, unmistakably indicating that ‘hisna’eh’ is meant literally-- that Chazal encourage us to take pride in how we do mitzvos, to show off how beautiful our tashmishei mitzvah are.

The first instinct, of course, is to see such behavior as vanity or Mechzi keyuhara (which, in this context, would be like "lekanteir, see Tosfos Pesachim 50b). But perhaps there’s nothing wrong with preening or being showy by beautifying a mitzvah that you are doing. Mechzi keyuhara is, of course, a terrible thing. But perhaps that’s only where you are sanctimonious, where you act in a misleading way to fool people into thinking you’re on a higher madreigah than you actually are, because people will emulate you in your other foolish behavior, or because if you later do something bad it will be a chillul Hashem, or, in the case of lekanteir, because you enjoy disparaging others. But showing off how much you spend on a mitzvah, and that your esrog is the nicest one in shul, is not necessarily so bad— it’s not a lie, and it may even foster the other people’s chavivus mitzvos-- it is constructive rivalry. Kin'as sofrim tarbeh chachma, and kin'as gvirim tarbeh ke'vod shamayim.

My son, Moshe, said that the person is only showing off with it because it is something he cares about. If he was indifferent to the mitzvah, he wouldn’t think it worth showing off with; he would spend his money on things that he wants to be identified with more, and just get by with a minimal cheftzah shel mitzvah. While showing off with your cheftzah shel mitzvah may not be a refined middah tovah, it is a middah tovah anyway, and the benefits far outweigh the detriment. Anyway, think of it like jewelry— "mitzva jewelry". It may be that the main purpose of jewelry and fashion is to show off to other people, and this vanity is easy to catergorize as ignoble; but the reality is that people do wear jewelry, and this is considered normal behavior. So why shouldn’t our tashmishei mitzvah be our jewelry? This is somewhat similar to making feasts, which appeal to our desire for good food, for seudos mitzvah. The same way that the satisfaction of our desire for rich and plentiful food, when used lesheim mitzvah, is good, so too satisfaction of the desire to stand out and be envied can be used le’sheim mitzvah.

The first person to comment on this idea said that my suggestion is panglossian and naive. He said that it is more likely that such people are not demonstrating their love for mitzvos. Rather, he sourly said, they simply take note of the things the members of their peer group desire and attribute significance to, and they acquire these things and do them in a showy way so as to demonstrate their superiority and gain the respect of those people, but they themselves really have no interest in the inherent significance of the mitzvah.

I agree that he makes a valid theoretical point. In response, I make a modification will accomodate both our opinions. That is: the exclusively public hiddur phenomenon may be a one step "Capture the Flag" process or a two step "Rolls Royce" process. "One step" is, as he said, that the mitzvah object is an arbitrary symbol of dominance and superiority, just as the Flag in the game of Capture-the-Flag is an arbitrary symbol of victory with absolutely no intrinsic value. It's just a shmatteh. "Two step" would be that the mitzvah is inherently significant, and everyone would enjoy doing it in the best and most beautiful way. On the other hand, the time, effort and expense are impediments to seeking out and buying the best esrog, for example. But since a shining beautiful esrog will elicit everyone's admiration, people are willing to spend more time and money to buy the best one possible. The example would be buying a Rolls Royce. Everyone says that a Rolls is a very stable, powerful, and luxurious car. It is definitely not a shmatteh. But who is crazy enough to spend half a million dollars for it and then worry about birds and gravel? And imagine what the kids in carpool are going to do to it. But it turns necks and elicits awe, and it symbolizes success and power, and so people are willing to spend the money.

So, my friends, you'll have to decide for yourself. In theory, both possibilities are valid: Those people who spend fortunes for mitzvos that others will see, might be playing Capture the Flag, or they might be driving a Rolls Royce.

I heard from Reb Moshe something that, I think, addresses this issue. There was a time when people would have fistfights about aliyos, and sitting on the Mizrach wall was something people would dream about and fight for for years. Now, we are all so much more civilized, and we don't mind not getting shlishi and we sit wherever we sit. Reb Moshe said that this is not because we are more mature. It is because the kavod of the aliyos and the seat in shul mean less to us. We have plenty of ways of finding satisfaction and honor at work and at home and on the golf course, so we just don't care about kavod Beis Haknesses. It's not that we are more understanding, it's that the Shul and Krias Hatorah mean less to us.

I think that something I heard from Reb Yerucham is a very good tzushtell to this topic. Harav Dovid Zupnik Zatzal once told me that he heard in the Mir from Reb Yerucham that Kin'as sofrim is good when you wish the other person would know more and you would still know more than he does, and it's bad when you would be perfectly happy if he knew less, as long as you knew more than him. The first person is motivated only by a desire to establish dominance. The second is motivated by the desire to excell in Torah, both in Gadlus beTorah and in dominance over the field.

The Wall Street Journal had a De Gustibus column on March 23, 2007, by Joseph Rago. He talked about Veblen’s 1899 "Theory of the Leisure Class," in which he introduced the idea of conspicuous consumption, defined as "specialized consumption of goods as an evidence of pecuniary strength." This is, of course, specific to the "expenditure of superfluities." The author of the column updated Veblen’s essay to extend to "conspicuous virtue." People buy more expensive things that are free trade, renewable, cage free, and live strong bracelets, partly, and allegedly, because they want to support the causes these things represent, but to a great degree because they want to proclaim their virtue. (He suggests that this trend has become popular partly because of guilty consciences about consumerism and materialism. That was certainly true in '07, but with the current recession, this fashion has attenuated.)

This is a very nice way of describing the ‘hisna’eh’ attitude: conspicuous virtue, where the motive is partly the underlying mitzvah, but also to proclaim your virtue. In any case, the idea I said above is still true: there is a mixed motivation, but in the final analysis it stems from pride in ability to fulfil the mitzvah– I can be a better eved Hashem than you can be. Jewelry is an example of conspicuous consumption; a nice esrog, a few black Brisker Matzos, silver and vermeil tefillin boxes, are mitzvah jewelry, conspicuous virtue.

The expensively tailored frilly, lacey, kittel, a garment that is supposed to remind us of the fragility of life and its inevitable end, a garment that symbolizes simplicity, humility, and the rejection of gashmius, is evidence of either insanity or obliviousness, and deserves a post of its own. And some pictures.

1. Don't tell me about the bigdei lavan of the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur, the Pilusin, that cost a fortune. It's not a tzusthell; a Kohen Gadol's levisha of his begadim is a ma'aseh avodah in itself, and so it is a cheftzah shel mitzvah. Also, you don't bury him in them.

2. Please don't tell me about Rebbes that have silk-and-silver-trimmed, fur-collared Kittels. If there are, I don't want to know about it.

3. If your wife or your shver bought your kittel for you, then it's not your fault. It just means they love you.

HOWEVER: Lakewood Guy mentioned that his wife wants to buy him a fancy kittel for the seder, and said that he can use a simple one for Yom Kippur and at his levayah le'achar mei'ah ve'esrim shanim tovim ve'aruchim. It would seem that she is making a valid point, and that the symbolism of the kittel is not at all the same on those two occassions. On Yom Kippur, it symbolizes purity from sin and reminds us of the Yom Hamissah. For Yom Kippur, then, the kittel should be unadorned. At the Seder, it symbolizes Cheirus, and there is no reason to not make it beautiful. Under the chuppah, well, whether it symbolizes yom hamissah depends on who you're marrying, and whether it symbolizes purity depends on why you're marrying her.

HOWEVER II: Unfortunately, the Taz in OC 472 SK 3 says that the reason we wear a kittel at the Seder is so that our simcha doesn't get out of hand. We wear the kittel to temper our joy by reminding ourselves of the day of our death. The Taz was a Litvak. Anyway, I haven't found anyone that disagrees with the Taz. And he means it le'halacha, because he applies the reasoning to pasken that an Aveil may wear a kittel during the first year seder.

In Hilchos Yom Kippur, OC 610:4 in the Rama, he says that we wear the kittel on Yom Kippur for two reasons: to symbolize angelic purity, and to remind ourselves that every passing second brings us closer to the abyss. There, too, the Taz says that the first reason would preclude an Aveil from wearing the kittel, while the second would allow it, and he follows the second reason.

So: I would like to agree with LakewoodGuy's wife. The Taz, on the other hand, says she's wrong. For the sake of a healthy marriage, I would say that our wives really don't need to know about the Taz; I know mine would blow a gasket (what does that mean??? Too much simcha? Simcha is the mitzvas hayom!!! We've been working for a month to be marbeh simcha!!! What's wrong with simcha???? Who is this Taz????) So just be quiet and let her buy you a fancy kittel for the seder.

IMPORTANT UPDATE:
First of all, I have another post on this issue, a follow up to this discussion.  Second, I have to put in a mareh makom someone sent me that addresses this issue, whether I like it or not:  The Matteh Ephraim/Elef Lamatteh in 610.

Note: the paragraph that was here earlier, which discussed the differences between paskening for mamonus and paskening for kodshim, is in the shop for repair. We can't tell you when it will be ready. Maybe after Pesach.

Shemos 35:26. The Women Who Wove for the Mishkan

I don't have much time this week, so I am putting this in just for your reading enjoyment.

On the blog http://divreichaim.blogspot.com/2009/03/donation-of-women-to-mishkan.html
Reb Chaim B., who is also too busy to write as often as he would like, wrote:

Too much work, too little time to write...
The Torah tells us that the women also donated to the Mishkan, expertly weaving while the wool was still attached to the sheep (35:26). Yet, we know the halacha that a women's handiwork actually belongs to her husband. Isn't it husbands and not wives who deserve the credit from the pasuk?

I saw an answer quoted in the name of R' Chaim Volozhiner's mother (and yes, it is because of who said it that I am writing this). The reason a husband is entitled to keep his wife's handiwork is because he provides her with mezonos, food and support. ( ed.- Ma'aseh Yadayim is in exchange for Mezonos.) Since in the desert the women did not need their husband's support, as the man fell equally for women as well as men, this takanah of ma'aseh yadayim belonging to the husband did not apply! (ed.-In the comments, it was pointed out that even before matan Torah the dinim of kesuva, and most likely the appurtenant reciprocal duties, were observed.)

"Rebbetzin Volozhiner" may get creativity points for her answer, but my wife prefers pshat to derash and when I mentioned this question on Shabbos she immediatly pointed out that who says the women who donated were married -- maybe they were the single girls and the whole kashe doesn't get off the ground.

In the comments, I wrote
I assume that your Isha Chashuva means the single girls that were past katnus and na'arus and still not married-- the old maids, so to speak. Because before that, their ma'aseh yadayim belongs to their fathers mide'oraysa.
And now, we see how our holy Toireh is merumaz at in our daily language-- http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=spinster

Vayakhel, Shemos 36:28. Li'me’kutze’os Hamishkan. Love, Lions, and Corners

It has been said that cultures for whom certain things or concepts are particularly important will develop many separate words to describe relatively minor variations in these things or concepts. For example, instead of using one noun with a variety of adjectives, different nouns are created. This is known as Focal Vocabulary . The famous example, though I'm told that linguists dispute its truth, is that Eskimos have a many different words for snow. If that's your entire landscape, of course you will, over time, develop words whose meanings incorporate the various states of snow, such as hard, granular, soft, slippery, loose, slushy, etc. I assume that skiers have the same arsenal of nouns. In Hebrew, it's Sheleg, period.

In Hebrew, how many words are there for lion? Five: Ari, Kfir, Layish, Shachal, and Gur refer only to lions, which, evidently, are symbolically powerful in our culture. In English, there is only one-- Lion. How do you say you like or love? You like your neighbor? Ani oheiv oso. You love your wife? Ani oheiv osah. You like pizza? Ani oheiv pizza.

Having said this, let's look at the parsha. How many ways are there to say "Corner" in Hebrew? Pinah, or keren. But in this parsha, it appears in an unparalleled panoply of iterations.
36:28– by the krashim, Me’kutze’os.
37:3– by the Aron, Pa’amosav.  (By the way, the Ibn Ezra apparently got fed up with all these synonyms, so he translates "Pa'amosav" as feet.  According to him, the Aron Kodesh had feet, and didn't sit directly on the ground.  His raya is from "Mah yafu pa'amayich ba'ne'alim."  Of course, this is contradicted in the Gemara in the beginning of Sukkah, but do you think he cares?  Tosfos in Yoma says it had not four, but eight rings, four for the badim that actually carried it, and four for the decorative badim.)
37:13– by the Shulchan, HaPei’os.
38:2– by the Mizbach ha’olah, Pinosav.
(Karnos, of course, appear on the Mizbechos, but they really look like Karnayim, so I'll leave those out.)

So, if you want to talk about fighting, use Latin (bellum, pugna, macto, litis, certo). For love, Greek (agape, eros, storge, philia, thelema). For lions in corners, Hebrew is your language of choice.  (You might be interested in looking into the field called Phonaesthetics.)
(This actually is like the Yerushalmi in Megilla 1:9. The Yerushalmi there says "four languages are proper for the world to use;

א"ר יונתן דבית גוברין ד' לשונות נאים שישתמש בהן העולם ואלו הן לעז לזמר רומי לקרב סורסיי לאילייא עברי לדיבור

Greek for song, Latin for war, Aramaic for elegy, and Hebrew for speech." The meforshim there learn לקרב means "to draw near, or convince," but I think it means "for war." There's no reason to think the list changes from nouns to verbs, and stam their pshat is tzarich iyun.)

What’s pshat? Why so many ways of referring to corners? After Parshas Teruma and Tetzaveh, where we were endlessly boxed, (Mishbetzos on the Choshen and the Eifod and the Kesones Tashbeitz), suddenly we are cornered.

Rabbi Yitzchok Resnik PhD (abd) said that these parshiyos, which describe the fabrication of the Mishkan and its contents, speak to craftsmen in their specialized language. Every craft, every profession, has its own lexicon, its own patois or jargon. For example, "A stretcher and a joint" has an entirely different meaning to a bricklayer and to a paramedic. Perhaps these are terms that are used variously by cabinetmakers, by goldsmiths, and by carpenters, and they express differences in how they are crafted or how they are used.

I said, just for homiletic aerobics, that intersections can have many different meanings. When two things that are moving in different directions meet, they might be unaffected by the meeting, they might simply end where they meet, or they might change completely, they might attain a new identity. A corner is the intersection of two sides, and maybe these different words express the various outcomes of intersection.


Previous postings on Vayakhel and Pekudei, every one of which is lots better than the above:

The Latent Holiness of Human Love

The Wisdom of Mussar and Seichel: This is not an Oxymoron.

Knitting our Brows about Why King David Couldn't Build the Beis Hamikdash

The Hidden Prophecy of the Destruction, and Rebuilding, of the Batei Mikdash

Ki Sisa, Shemos 34:6. The Thirteen Middos and The Alshich's Key to Tefilla

Only speaking from how I personally feel about this discussion, and in light of the superficial and easily distracted nature of most internet reading, please allow me to suggest that you print and read it.

Rosh Hashannah 17b–

אמר רב יהודה ברית כרותה לי"ג מדות שאינן חוזרות ריקם שנאמר (שמות לד) הנה אנכי כורת ברית

Amar R Yehudah: Bris krusah le’yud gimmel middos she'einan chozros reikan. A covenant is sealed on the Thirteen Middos that they do not return empty-handed. Rashi– they never go unanswered when they are recited in the tefillah of a tainis.

The Alshich in Shlach 14:17-20 says that the question has been asked that this Chazal contradicts our experience; plenty of times we say it over and over, and it doesn't do a thing! (An interesting question! Most teachers would react to a question like this with a frask in punim--"Who are you going to trust, you sheigetz, Chazal or your lying eyes???? A more confident didact would respond with the usual "Sometimes ‘No’ is the best answer", or "They can’t overcome a gzeira that was finalized with a shevu’ah", or that "The effect of the tefilla is hidden or pending".)

The Alshich brings an answer from the Livnas Sapir: The recital of the Thirteen Middos is only effective when the person who says them fulfills the Gemara in Shabbos 121 "mah hu rachum v’channun...," just as He is merciful, you too be merciful, just as He is long tempered, etc., that the person emulates the traits of God that are enumerated in the Thirteen Middos.

Obviously, this makes the Gemara's promise less exciting.  The one consolation is offered by the Pri Megadim in his sefer "Sefer HaMagid" Volume III Drush 7 at the end, where he says that if the Middos require "being," the members of the tzibbur are viewed as one- one might contribute "Rachum," another "Chanun," etc., because it's very unlikely that one person will have all the Middos.

Another way of putting the Alshich’s (Livnas Sapir) teretz is "It is not enough to say the yud gimmel middos. You have to be the yud gimmel middos."

Imagine a father who is an achzar with his children, who says with great kavana "Oy, Avinu, Ha'av Harachaman, racheim aleinu!" He's a father, and he has no rachmanus on his children! Or, someone who is mean and heartless, who is davenning "ki eil melech chanun verachum atta" with real kavana and dveikus. How do you think the Ribbono Shel Olam should respond to such people? What good are such tefillos? If, on the other hand, you think, as you daven, that this is a middah that one should emulate and express in one’s life, and you determine to do so, then the tefilla would certainly mean a great deal more. The great chiddush of the Alshich is that this is true even regarding the Bris of the 13 Middos.

Even farther: the Tzror HaMor in Ki Sisa (34:9) says

אבל אם הם אכזרים ועושי רשעה, כל שכן שבהזכרת י"ג מדות הם נתפסין. וזהו 'וחנותי את אשר אחון' (שמות לג, יט) - מי

שראוי לחון ולרחם עליו

that if a person is cruel and wicked, and he recites the Middos praising Hashem's kindness and piety, this will bring down punishment upon him even worse than had he not said them.

Now that the Alshich applies this concept even to the Middos, it opens a whole new perspective on what tefillah means. Everyone knows there is a mitzva of Tefilla. Everyone knows there is a mitzva of emulating Hashem's middos: (Shabbas 133b:

אבא שאול אומר ואנוהו הוי דומה לו מה הוא חנון ורחום אף אתה היה חנון ורחום

Zeh Eili ve'anveihu-- Abba Shaul omeir; mah Hu rachum vechanun.... Rashi-- Ve'anveihu-- ani ve'Hu. ani veHu. hevei domeh Lo; velashon ve'anveihu, Ani vehu, and Sotah 14a:

ואמר רבי חמא ברבי חנינא מאי דכתיב (דברים יג) אחרי ה' אלהיכם תלכו וכי אפשר לו לאדם להלך אחר שכינה והלא כבר נאמר (דברים ד) כי ה' אלהיך אש אוכלה הוא אלא להלך אחר מדותיו של הקב"ה מה הוא מלביש ערומים דכתיב (בראשית ג) ויעש ה' אלהים לאדם ולאשתו כתנות עור וילבישם אף אתה הלבש ערומים הקב"ה ביקר חולים דכתיב (בראשית יח) וירא אליו ה' באלוני ממרא אף אתה בקר חולים הקב"ה ניחם אבלים דכתיב (בראשית כה) ויהי אחרי מות אברהם ויברך אלהים את יצחק בנו אף אתה נחם אבלים הקב"ה קבר מתים דכתיב (דברים לד) ויקבר אותו בגיא אף אתה קבור מתים

Acharei Hashem Elokeichem teileichu....le'haleich achar midosav shel HKB"H. The din of "Ve'halachta Bidrachav" is codified in the Rambam Sefer Hamitzvos 8 and the Chinuch 611.) The chiddush here is that these two dinim are mutually dependent; one without the other is ineffective and incomplete. The independent mitzvah of vehlachta bidrachav has a separate application: it is also the necessary prerequisite for the tefilla of the Yud Gimmel Middos. You have to do the Middos, and you have to stand like a shliach tzibbur and ask for them from Hashem.

Tefilla without incorporating into yourself what you hope to elicit from Hashem is not Tefilla at all. Tefilla is not an arm's length entreaty that, if heard and fulfilled, enables you to passively observe as your prayers are answered. Tefilla is part of a process that includes dveikus or inspired zimra and tehilla or bitachon, that enables you to become a fitting vessel for the achievement of Hashem's will. The answer to successful Tefilla is the opportunity to participate in the result. By becoming God-like, you can become a fitting conduit that allows the will of God to flow, through you, to this world. Energy can't flow through 'nothing.' There's got to be a medium that is hospitable to the energy to allow it to move. The medium is you.  The least you need to do is to be a conductor, not an insulator.

We find the same concept in Nedarim 40a--

כל שאין מבקר חולה אין מבקש עליו רחמים לא שיחיה ולא שימות

one who has not been mevaker choleh, his prayers on behalf of the sick are totally ignored. Bikkur Cholim without tefilla, good, but not good enough. Tefilla without bikkur cholim? A waste of time. You want to invoke Hashem's mercy on the sick through your prayers? Don't bother to daven unless you yourself have been mevakeir choleh. But tefilla after you were mevakeir choleh? Ah, that's something special.

This pshat is supported by the Gemara in Rosh Hashanna 17b. There, the Gemara says that Hashem was mis'atef with a tallis like a shli'ach tzibur, and said the 13 Middos, and told Moshe "Im ya'asu banai lefanai kaseder hazeh Ani mochel lahem." The word "Ya'asu" implies action, even though the context is speech, tefillah by a shli'ach tzibur. But according to the above, the two concepts are congruous: the bris of the 13 Middos involves tefilla, speech, which reflects or generates action, the act of emulating Hashem.

A Commenter pointed out that the Alshich learned in Reb Yosef Karo's yeshiva, and he had a fellow talmid named Reb Moshe Cordevero, who wrote the Tomer Devora. The entire theme of the Tomer Devora is a discussion of the obligation, and how, to emulate Hashem's 13 Middos. He ends the first chapter by saying "Just as a man behaves below, so he will merit to open himself "Middah Elyonah Mil'e'maalah." Exactly as he behaves, "kach mashpi'ach mi'le'maalah," and he causes that Middah to shine in the world." With that in mind, it seems evident that this theme, as quoted by the Alshich from the Livnas Hasapir, was, among RYK's talmidim, an important and very carefully considered hashkafas hachaim.

This approach reminds me of the Nefesh Hachaim’s idea of "Hashem Tzilchah, " (see Nefesh Hachaim 1:7 DH V’zeh she’omar Dovid Hamelech Hashem Tzilchoh and the next paragraph, and 1:9 DH Omnom ho’inyon, and the Hagoho there who says the Anaf Yosef’s vort about Tapu’ach which I bring here, which R Chaim Volozhener also says klor in his pirush on Shir Hashirim 2:3) and what I wrote in Devarim Eikev 10:17:

Ha’eil hagadol hagibor vehanorah. Yoma 69— the Anshei Knesses Hagdolah were called that because ‘hecheziru atara liyoshna’. Yirmiah took off ‘nora’, and Daniel took off ‘gibor’. But they said that aderabba— his gevura is his arichus appaiyim to the resha’im, and his morah is what keeps us in existence interspersed among the nations. The idea here is that we cannot describe the actual character of Hashem, but instead only describe the characteristics that we think underlie what we observe to be his actions in our world. This is what is stated in ‘anim zemiros’, that ‘Himshilucho velo kefi yeshcha, vayashvucha lefi ma’asecha.’ What we say about Hashem is, first of all, only a mashal, and second of all, only what we perceive through His behavior. The Rambam says "Kol hato’arim she’anu omrim al Hashem Yisbarach ein hakavana al to’arim atzmi’im chas veshalom rak al to’arei hape’ulos."
An example of this: the Gemora in Shabbos 88a says, "Amar R’ Chamma bar Chanina, ‘ketapuach be’atzei hayaar...’, lama nimsh’lu Yisrael l’Tapuach?" etc. Rabbeinu Tam asks there, that in that passuk, it is not Klal Yisroel being compared to a Tapuach, but rather Hashem? The Anaf Yosef in the Ein Yakov brings down the Nefesh Hachaim that answers that if Klal Yisroel perceived and compared Hashem to ‘tapuach’, this is definitely because Klal Yisroel are comparable and the behavior is similar to ‘tapuach’, because "kederech she’anachnu misro’im lefonov yisborach, kach hu yisborach shemo bo lei’ra’os el ha’olamos al zeh ha’hadraga vehashiur mamash." From this vort you see that not only does Hashem appear in a fashion that reflects our behavior, but that what we call His semblance is just one of the ways that He communicates with us through His behavior.

Back to the Alshich.

The Panim Yafos (written by the Ba’al Hafla’ah) disagrees with the Alshich, because how can we possibly emulate "Hashem Hashem", which is also part of the thirteen middos. So he holds that it has nothing to do with the Gemara in Shabbos, and the guarantee applies to simple recital, to saying it alone.

See the Rosh at the end of the first perek of Rosh Hashannah, where he brings two shittos, the Geonim and Rabbeinu Tam, about the first two sheimos in the Middos and whether both or only one is a Middah, and the Korban Neshanel there in #10 who brings the Arizal and the Sefer Chassidim. The Arizal in Shaar Hakavonos Drush "Vayaavor" 3 holds the Middos begin with "Keil." But the Sefer Chassidim (250) holds it begins with "Rachum." If the Alshich/Livnas Sapir hold like the Sefer Chasidim, the Hafla'ah's question would not begin.

Furthermore, the in the Ramak's Tomer Devora, he describes how to emulate, or reflect, the Middos of, for example, Malchus. Obviously, then, the Hafla'ah's kashe would not be shver.

~

Reb Chaim B. pointed out to me that the Bnei Yisaschar says that the machlokes between the Alshich and the Hafla'ah was something that Esther Hamalka thought about, and she decided that the Bris was for Amira alone, based on the midda of "Eil," as the Hafla'ah says. See comments for the Mareh Makom and discussion.

~

Reb David Guttmann pointed out a fascinating thing:

The Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim is very similar to the Alshich, and yet very, very different. The Rambam also agrees that mere tefilla is inadequate. What, says the Rambam, makes the recitation of the Middos effective? Understanding what they mean! This is what the Rambam says in the Moreh 1:54, when he discusses what it was the Moshe sought from Hashem, and what Hashem taught him about the Middos: (Kafach translation)

הודעני נא את דרכיך ואדעך וכו' ,
והתבונן במה שנכלל בלשון זה מן המופלאות, אמרו 'הודעני נא את דרכיך ואדעך', מלמד על היותו יתעלה נודע בתאריו, שאם ידע הדרכים ידעהו. ואמרו 'למען אמצא חן בעיניך', מלמד כי מי שידע את ה', הוא אשר ימצא חן בעיניו. לא מי שצם והתפלל בלבד , אלא כל מי שידעו הוא הרצוי המקורב, ומי שסכל ידיעתו, הוא הזעום המרוחק. ולפי ערך הידיעה והסכלות יהיה הרצון והזעם והקרבה והריחוק.

"Not one who only fasts and prays, but instead one who knows Him, he is the desired one who is drawn near. The senseless one is distanced and draws anger. Exactly proportionate to one’s wisdom or foolishness is one’s closeness or separation."

~

So, the Alshich says, talk is cheap; mere tefilla is not enough. You have to live the Middos. The Rambam says, mere tefilla is not enough. You have to understand, to know, the Middos. The Panim Yafos says "amira," and maybe he really means simple recital. More likely he would agree with the Rambam, that it requires at least an awareness and understanding of the Middos.

~

Now please don't go telling me that they agree, because you can't live them unless you understand them, and once you know them, you will live them. That may be true, but it is irrelevant. The Rambam and the Alshich are saying totally different things, Period.

~

And don't go looking at the Tomer Dvorah for help in determining how the Tzefas people defined the Middos, because he only works with the passuk of "mi keil komocho," which alludes to the Middos. He very carefully does not mention even once exactly which words in the passuk in Ki Sisa the Middos comprise.

Also, note that after the chet hameraglim, Moshe used an incomplete set of the middos, and see the meforshim there, including the Ramban.

~

I’ve used the Alshich to explain the din in Yoreh Dei'ah 265 about Sande’ka’us being like bringing ketores, and Rabbeinu Peretz’s shittah that one should not be sandek for more than one of a person’s children, because the Gemara says that bringing the Ketores made the Kohen wealthy, and in order to distribute the segula as widely as possible, no Kohen was allowed to be maktir the Ketores twice. Since Sande'ka'us is like bringing Ketores, he says, one should not be a sandek twice for children from one family. The Gaon says not to worry about it, because he hasn't seen anyone becoming rich from being a sandek. I said that can answer the Gaon's kashe the same way the Alshich answered his kashe: It's not enough to be the sandek or to be maktir the ketores-- you have to become the ketores. It's a great line, and it has the smell of a truth, but it's hard to know what exactly it means. Maybe having a good smell, i.e., a good reputation. Maybe it means being m’kareiv avaryanim, like the chelb’nah, as the Rambam stresses in 8 Tefilla 1. The connection to Bris Millah is that there is one thing that distinguishes us from Gentiles, and also engenders within us a great kedusha, and that is the Bris Millah, the sign of the covenant with God. One must be aware of the potential for kedusha it represents, and also that every single Jew, every Mahul, is part of the Covenant; Kol Yisrael yeish lahem cheilek; and so our sense of arvus, our loyalties and empathies, should actively extend to every Ben Bris, of all stripes, from Meretz to Neturei Karta to normal people like me... and you. Distasteful as it can be, we are all Guf Echad and we all have the potential to add something important to Klal Yisrael. But it certainly doesn’t mean the mere ma'aseh kof of haktarah/sandeka'us.

~

By the way: I said in the beginning that the Alshich's question is surprising, and that if a student asked it, we would be disturbed at his apparent lack of faith. The truth is that the Alshich wouldn't have written the kashe in the sefer unless he had a teretz that he thought adequately answered it, as the Ra'avad says in Deios on Yedi'ah Ube'chira.

Rav Moshe Alshich (1508 - 1593, Tzfas), known as the Alshich Hakadosh, was a student of Rav Yoseph Caro in Tzefas. Among the Alshich's students was Rav Chaim Vital. The Livnas Hasapir is, as you can tell from the name, a Kabbalah Sefer, from, I'm told, the twelve hundreds.

~

Purim: A Guest Post from Reb Anonymous Drush Guy

Here is something a commenter sent. I think it is very nice, and I hope you enjoy it.
Yasher Koach!

Who was the true hero of this miracle? The Megilla seems to indicate that the victory was won only by the combination of Mordechai and Esther. In what sense is that so? And why is Mordechai Hatzadik the only individual in Tanach whose lineage from both his mother's and father's side is mentioned?

Why was Esther such an essential figure? What was her specific contribution? For this we must understand that the battle is fought as much on a spiritual battleground as it is on a physical one. We can now rephrase the question: What gave Esther her spiritual domination over the power of Amalek?

Perhaps this is the answer.
The power of Amalek comes from Eisav. Eisav had one spiritual power above his brother Yakov– his almost perfect respect for his father. Esther was an orphan, raised without a mother or father. This, ironically, means that Esther was not weakened by an imperfect Kibud Av Ve’em. Even though Eisav's respect of parents was of greater than his Brother Yakov's, Esther was not at a disadvantage, as she never failed in any duty to her parents. Now: it may be true that she didn't have any imperfection in her mitzvas Kibbud, but oneis lav ke'mahn de'avid, being prevented from doing an act is not the same as having done it. But that is not the case here: Not only was she not weakened by imperfect Kibbud Av Ve'eim, one can assume that she wished, with all her heart, that she had parents she could honor, and Chazal tell us that Hashem deems one who wants to do a mitzvah but is unable to fulfill it as if that person has fulfilled the mitzvah. In theory, each of us wants to do proper Kibbud Av Ve'eim, but in real life, the Yeitzer Hora gets in the way. Esther, on the other hand, had only the pure desire to do the perfect Kibbud Av Ve'eim. So in a sense, her Kibbud Av was not only unflawed, it could be viewed as perfectly done.

Step two brings us to the second element– Mordechai. The original question has yet to be addressed: why the double lineage? Let us once again return to Eisav. His strong point was his profound respect and concern for his parents--except in one situation. This perfect son sent his own son Elifaz to kill Yakov. Where was his concern for his parents’ suffering here? Didn’t he care that the death of Yakov would be a terrible blow for Yitchak and Rivka? So perhaps we have found the fatal flaw in the merit of Amalek! But, unfortunately, we lost our advantage, because the Shvatim sold Yosef and told their father Yakov that Yosef had been killed. So it seems that once again, we are at a disadvantage. But–at the selling of Yosef, were all the brothers involved? No we have one individual that was untainted by this blemish, and that is Binyamin, who was not involved in the sale in any way, neither in the sale nor by instigating the sale by bearing tales to Yakov, as Yosef did.. The perfect pawn in our game of spiritual chess, he was not involved as he was not born and can not be held responsible.


If so, you might ask, Mordechai should only need a lineage to Binyamin. Why was the Yehuda lineage important too? Because there is another valid complaint against Klal Yisrael– our treatment of a certain Princess Timna, Amalek’s grandmother. Timna, a gentile, so much so wanted to be connected to Avraham's family, but she was rejected when she came to convert. In desperation for some connection, she went and became a concubine to Elifaz and said "better to be a maidservant amongst the children of Avraham (as Elifaz was his Grandchild) than a Princess among the other nations" Here again it seems we have a problem in our treatment of people trying to join Klal Yisroel. And that flaw is countered by the Yehuda linage. Shevet Yehuda is the model of behavior for accepting of Geirim! Yehuda married a Canaanite Giyores named Shua and then another Giyores named Tamar. Than later, his descendant Boaz married Rus, another convert. We have come full circle, and now we can see how both Mordechai and Esther, and Mordechai lineage from both Yehuda and Binyamin, were essential to the victory over Amalek.

Homer Bshem Omro Mevi Es Hageulah
דברי מהרי''א

UPDATE 2021

Rabbi Avraham Bukspan, the man of remarkable bekiyus, told me that as long as we were being sensitive to מביא גאולה לעולם, I should know that this vort is to be found, step by step, in the Yaaros Devash from Reb Yonasan Eibschutz (drush 2 vol 2 page 25.) That being the case, we will assume that the "מהרי"א" that was cited was not meant (as is most often the case) to refer to Rav Yehuda Assad, the successor of the Chasam Sofer, but rather to Rav Yonasan Eibshutz.

A Story from Old Lithuania

This is a true story. My father zatzal knew the people involved. Make of it what you want.

There was a Rov in the small town of Pompian, known in Lithuanian as Pumpenai (http://www.maplandia.com/lithuania/panevezys/pasvalio/pumpenai/), and he was called the Pompianer Rov. He had only one daughter, an intellectually gifted young woman, and it was a very small town, with little to do or with whom to do it, and so, he learned with her. She was a diligent and talented student, and she developed into a talmidah chachamah by Lithuanian standards, which means a great deal indeed.

The time came, as it does, for shidduchim. When shidduch time comes, people realize that, like it or not, they can't always do just as they please, because shidduchim, by their very nature, involve "other people," and inevitably, they will be judged by other people's standards. Bachurim knew that this Rov was a great talmid chacham, and they heard that the daughter was also a melumedes, and so shidduchim were proposed, discussed and presented. Bachurim would come in to the Rov, and he would talk in learning with them, and as often as not, the bachur would say something, and the girl would interject and say "es iz nit emes! Shteit fahrkehrt...." or, "stahm ge'dreit ah kop," or some other frank and forthright assessment of the young man's scholarly attainments.

Many suitors did not find this endearing. As time passed, her reputation among the Bnei Torah in the Yeshivos ensured that fewer and fewer prospects were willing to step into the line of fire.

Eventually, she and her father had to accept the realities of the situation, and she married the only man that wasn't intimidated by her gadlus batorah-- a Karpuln macher, a man who made lasts for cobblers. He was a total am ha'aretz, (although that, too, was by Lithuanian standards, and in America, maybe he would be the Rabbi of a shul or say a daf yomi shiur,) and when bachurim would come into their home to talk to his wife in learning, he didn't understand a thing that was being said, but he was proud that his wife was so respected and sought after, and he would sit on the side and smile.

The end.

Some facts have been changed just in case someone from the family survived and would be offended by the story. For example, there actually were two daughters, but only one learned with the father. Also, Pompian was not really that small, it was just not far from Ponevezh, so all the action was out of town.

Tetzaveh, Shemos 28:30. The Urim VeTumim, Halacha, and Another Ancient Minhag Explained

Rashi Yoma 73b- the Urim VeTumim was the written name of Hashem, placed within the folds of the Choshen, by means of which the Choshen was enlivened with divine knowledge. The Ramban says that the Kohen Gadol would concentrate on the "Urim" names of Hashem, and letters would light up on the Choshen, but he would not yet understand what the letters signified. He would then concentrate on the "Tumim" names, and this would inspire him with the understanding of how to combine the letters and what they meant. Rashi in Yoma understands it differently; that Urim means the letters lit up and made a statement that the Kohen Gadol immediately should understand, and Tumim means that the message thereby received was Tamim- immutable and permanent. But everyone agrees that the Choshen was a line of communication with Hashem, and the statements of the Choshen/Urim VeTumim were a message from Hashem.

Targum Yonasan in passuk 15 says that the Choshen would reveal dinim that were concealed from the Poskim, the judges. In passuk 30, too, he says that the Kohen Gadol would seek Hashem's teaching through the Choshen.

With this, we understand the passuk in Malachi 2:7-- "ki sifsie Kohen...vetorah yevakshu mipihu ki malach Hashem...hu." The Baal Haturim in passuk 15 says that Eifod is gematria malach; the Medrash in 38:3 says that hte kavod rendered to Aharon was that he was dressed "kimalachei hashareis." The malach in the passuk in Malachi is the Kohen Gadol, whose bigdei kehunah, the Choshen, enabled him to answer hitherto unanswerable questions.

So that's the Targum Yonasan. But does everyone agree? Of course not.

There is a stirah in Rashi's shittah itself. Rashi in Eiruvin 45a says "midi de'isur ve'hetter lo mesha'ali be'urim vetumim," matters of isur and hetter were not asked of the Urim VeTumim. But Rashi in Eiruvin 63a says "she'haya asid Yehoshua li'hyos tzarich lish'ol devar halacha mei'Eliezer." The implication is that the questions to Eliezer would be answered by the Urim VeTumim, contrary to Rashi on 45a.

Similarly, the Brisker Rov in Temura 16a: In the Gemara about the three thousand halachos that were forgotten in the days of mourning for Moshe Rabbeinu's death, the Gemara says that the people told Pinchas "She'al!", "Ask". The Griz says pshat that it is impossible to say that the "ask" meant to ask for the forgotten halachos by means of nevu'ah, because no navi can ask Hashem questions except Moshe Rabbeinu, who said "Imdu vi'eshma'a mah yetzaveh Hashem." Nevi'im don't ask, they passively hear what Hashem chooses to impart. Instead, the "She'ahl" meant that he should ask through the Urim VeTumim, and Pinchas answered that he could not do that, because "Lo Bashamayim Hie." That works well with the second Rashi in Eiruvin, and not so well with the first, and not at all with the Targum Yonasan.

The Maharit'z Chiyus discusses this issue to some extent in his pirush on Ta'anis 4a, and he also has a sefer, Toras Hanevi'im, in which he discusses all these sources except for the Targum Yonasan, as well as how Asniel ben Knaz was able to re-create the forgotten halachos; he brings from Rashi in Ta'anis (ibid) that Asniel used Ru'ach Hakodesh, and he brings from the Yefei To'ar in Chayei Sara that Ruach Hakodesh is okay, while Nevuah is not, and he argues both misvara and from a Gemara in Yoma.

The Mechilta here in 22:7 says

 ונקרב בעל הבית . שומע אני לשאול באורים ותומים. תלמוד לומר אשר ירשיעון אלהים. לא אמרתי אלא אלהים שהם מרשיעין.

Similarly, the Chasam Sofer in the last teshuva in OC says that Ruach Hakodesh is only a factor in the sense that it evokes iyun and siyata dishmaya, not as evidence of the truth of a shita.

Even a halacha taught in a dream is a problem that has been widely discussed.
The Chida in his שו"ת יוסף אומץ פב says that if the Mechaber had seen the שאלות ותשובות מן השמים from Rav Yakov of Marvege, יעקב, ממרויש, he would have paskened that women make a bracha on Zman Grama.
נראה ודאי דאילו מרן ז"ל שלטו מאור עיניו הקדושים בתשובות רבינו יעקב ממרוי"ש, דמשמיא מיהב יהבי כח לברך לנשים, ודאי כך היה פוסק ומנהיג
These words have occasioned a degree of surprise, considering BM  59b by Tanur Achna'i.  Indeed, the Shibalei Haleket 157, the Noda Biyehuda YD II 30, and the Shach YD 333:sk25 and 336:sk2 all say that dreams are of no weight in psak.  But all this is not a kashe on the Chida, because he's talking about the Mechaber, who does pasken on that basis, as we see in OC 651:9, where he paskens on the basis of a dream of the Rikanti that we must hold the arba minim together during the naanu'im.

As for the Targum Yonasan, unfortunately, textual issues and questions of authorship have limited its citational authority. And the second Rashi in Eiruvin might mean that Eliezer simply was a bigger talmid chacham, or remembered certain things that Yehoshua forgot. In any case, the only clear raya we have is the first Rashi in Eiruvin, which stated that the Urim VeTumim could not answer halachic questions, and the Griz's assumption that this is what the Gemara in Temura means as well. Thus, the only questions one could ask the Urim VeTumim were matters of fact or safety or success. If the question revolved on issues of halacha, the Urim Vetumim could not be consulted.

The Ketzos in his introduction has a very worthwhile and interesting discussion of this concept. Harav Dovid Goldberg in his sefer on Chumash also discusses the Targum Yonasan and the tzushtell to Sifsei Kohen.

So this is another example of that remarkable rule, Lo Bashamayim Hee. Even thought the Kohen Gadol had access to the perfect truth of divine knowledge, he was not allowed to ask for halachic guidance. The Torah is a Matanah from Hashem, and now it is ours. It's ours to interpret, and guard, and live, and it is we who are to make of it what we can.

Reb Moshe and the Chazon Ish both have said something that, to me, is somewhat similar. They said that Rishonim that have been unearthed in Genizos and libraries have no halachic standing, and can only be used to support a svara said independently. Even if we know for a fact that the same Rashba we rely on in Bava Kamma wrote a pirush on, let's say, Maseches Bechoros, we would not rely on it lehalacha. To have standing in halacha, the sefer has to have gone through the crucible of Klal Yisrael's history. This, too, follows the idea that Klal Yisrael, the nation, its historical experience, and its gedolim, form the reality of the Torah, and nothing can be superimposed on that reality, not historic analysis, not newly discovered evidence of what the Tanaim or Amora'im meant, not Nevi'im with their Nevu'ah, not the Beis Din Shel Ma'alah itself. Emes Mei'Eretz Titzmach.

Life is so strange. Sometimes, we stand in awe, as we realize that we have been exposed to one of those marvelous and mysterious coincidences! Now that we've brought down the interesting limitation on the use of the Urim VeTumim, we begin to understand one of life's great mysteries.
Of all the four parts of Shulchan Aruch, which is the part that people pay least attention to? Which part is so little adhered to that it is like a Sadeh lo avar bah Ish? Well, certainly people honor the laws of Orach Chaim. We are all meticulous in regard to tefilla, chametz, tefillin, and so on. Yoreh Deah? Of course. We would never eat treif or be over on Taharas Hamishpacha. Even HaEzer? Very much so; except for maybe yichud and some harchakos, we are, in general, very careful with these dinim of kiddushin, gittin, Isurei Kehunah, and so on. But what about Dinei Mamonos? Meh. Are we so makpid on Be'yomo titein scharo? Are we meticulous about paying halva'os bizmanam and lo sihyeh lo kenosheh? How about Ani hame'hapeich becharara and Hasagas Gevul? In business, are we as honest as the day is long? Yes, we are. December 21st. But why is this so? Why do so few people take what it says in Choshen Mishpat seriously? Now you know why! Because "Ma'aseh Avos Siman LeBanim!" The original Choshen Mishpat of the Kohen Gadol was not meant to be used for Halacha le'maaseh either! Minhag Yisrael, for millenia, has been that you're not supposed to look at the Choshen Mishpat for shailos in Halacha.

On a serious note: There is a sefer written by Rabbi Yitzchak Sender (author of The Commentator's series) called Machazeh Elyon, about all aspects of Nevu'ah. His very last piece in the sefer deals with this issue, and he shtells tzu many excellent mekoros, such as Mantzepach, where the gemara asks, how could the Anshei KH introduce them, if Lo bashamayim hee, and the Gemara answers "shakchum vechazru veyasdum," and Rashi says ahl yedei ruach hakodesh. He has a very interesting mehalach in the difference between ein navi and lo bashamayim, and cases where neither might apply. It's really worth getting the sefer.