Fancy Kittels, Mixed Messages, and the Tides of Symbolism

UPDATED MARCH 2010/NISSAN '70 and APRIL 2019/NISSAN '79;

In an earlier post, which discussed Hiddur Mitzvah and conspicuous virtue, I wrote the following:



The expensively tailored frilly, lacy, kittel -- a garment that is supposed to remind us of the fragility of life and its inevitable end, a garment that symbolizes simplicity, humility, and the rejection of materialism -- is evidence of either obliviousness or insanity, and deserves a post of its own. And  some pictures.

1. Don't tell me about the enormously expensive white cloak worn by the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur, the Pilusin. That is entirely different: the wearing of that garment is an intrinsic part of his Temple service, and the garment is inherently holy.  Also, you don't bury him in them; on the contrary.  The garment is buried after Yom Kippur and never used again.

2. Please don't tell me about Rebbes that have silk-and-silver-trimmed, fur-collared Kittels. If there are, I don't want to know about it.

3. If your wife or your father in law bought your kittel for you, then it's not your fault. It just means they love you.

HOWEVER: Lakewood Guy mentioned that his wife wants to buy him a fancy kittel for the seder.  When he pointed out the incongruity of a fancy kittel, she said that he can use the fancy one for the seder, and his simple Yom Kippur kittel for his funeral le'achar mei'ah ve'esrim shanim tovim ve'aruchim. It would seem that she is making a valid point, and that the symbolism of the kittel is not at all the same on those two occassions. On Yom Kippur, it symbolizes purity from sin and reminds us of the day of death.  For Yom Kippur, then, the kittel should be unadorned. At the Seder, it  symbolizes Cheirus, freedom, and there is no reason to not make it beautiful. Under the chuppah, well, whether it symbolizes yom hamissah depends on who you're marrying, and whether it symbolizes purity depends on why you're marrying her.

HOWEVER II: Unfortunately, the Taz in OC 472 SK 3 says that the reason we wear a kittel at the Seder is so that our simcha doesn't get out of hand, especially after drinking four cups of wine. We wear the kittel to temper our joy by reminding ourselves of the day of our death. The Taz was a Litvak. Anyway, I haven't found anyone that disagrees with the Taz. And he means it le'halacha, because he applies the reasoning to pasken that an Aveil may wear a kittel during the first year seder.  See Hilchos Yom Kippur, OC 610:4, Rama: we wear the kittel on Yom Kippur for two reasons: to symbolize angelic purity, and to remind ourselves that every passing second brings us closer to the abyss. There, too, the Taz says that the first reason would preclude an Aveil from wearing the kittel, while the second would allow it, and he follows the second reason.  So: I would like to agree with LakewoodGuy's wife. The Taz, on the other hand, says she's wrong. For the sake of a healthy marriage, I would say that our wives really don't need to know about the Taz; I know my wife would find the Taz surprising. So just be quiet and let her buy you a fancy kittel for the seder.

After I wrote this, LkwdGuy directed me to the Igros Moshe in Yoreh Deah 4 61:7, where he writes one thing I found surprising, and one thing I found remarkable.
Brief review of the teshuva: Can an aveil wear a kittel on Yom Kippur and Pesach. Answer-- there are two reasons we wear a kittel; one is joy and grandeur, Simcha and chashivus, that we are like malachei hashareis, the holy angels, and the other is to emphasize the somberness of remembering the yom hamisa and our shrouds. However, he says, the latter symbolism is utterly lost on the people of our time, and nobody gives a thought to the sobering idea of wearing the garment we will be buried in. Therefore, by default, the dominant semiotic is the former, that of simcha, and this is inappropriate for an aveil, and therefore he should not wear the kittel.

What I found interesting was his statement that the "malach" symbol applies to Pesach as well as Yom Kippur, when neither the Taz nor the Magen Avraham say that. The Taz only says "dual yom misah and malach" on Yom Kippur, but on Pesach says only yom misah. The Magen Avraham, who discourages an aveil from wearing the kittel on Pesach, does not say so because it is a symbol of chashivus and simcha, which he would if he held like Reb Moshe. Instead, he says that an aveil should not wear a kittel on Pesach because "belav hachi libo nichna," that even without the kittel his heart is humbled. If he held like Reb Moshe, he would have said that the reason for an aveil to not wear it is because of the malach/simcha/chashivus component. But no matter. Reb Moshe says it, and finished. I also found it in Rabbi Felder's sefer on Aveilus, Mourning and Remembrance, which is based on Reb Moshe's psakim.

Secondly, I found the Aruch Hashulchan in 610:2, in Hilchos Yom Kippur, that says a very similar thing. He brings the Taz about the dual symbolism, and says that, and I translate, "the main reason is because it is white and clean and a garment of honor. An additional reason is because the minhag is to use it to bury the dead, and so when wearing it, one remembers the day of death and this will help for teshuva. So an aveil should not wear it because he should not beautify himself during his aveilus." Hence, the Aruch Hashulchan is saying that the main purpose of the kittel is as a garment of honor. (I don't know if this is exactly like Reb Moshe; it seems to me that Reb Moshe, while agreeing to this in regard to current reality, would disagree as to which is the primary original meaning.)

The most remarkable thing in Reb Moshe's teshuva is his saying that the somber aspect of the kittel is, today, irrelevant, because people simply do not see it that way. Since people now see it more as a garment of honor and beauty, then that is what it means le'halachah, and it is therefore inappropriate for an aveil in the first year.

So, where do we stand? There are four interesting ideas that arise from our discussion.

1. The kittel communicates two completely different messages: the sobering reminder of how short and fleeting our lives are, and a joyous image of angelic beauty and grandeur. This one garment is intended to elicit two diametrically opposed emotions. (Rabbis: I highly recommend this topic for a drasah that discusses how the two are not, really, contradictory at all. While most relevant to Sukkos, when we beautifully decorate a dwelling that is inherently flimsy and temporary, it has relevance to the Seder as well, of course.)

2. Reb Moshe (regarding what the kittel means to the people of our time), and the Aruch Hashulchan (as a general matter), both say that the currently halachically dominant symbolism of the kittel is the second one, that of angelic beauty and grandeur, at least insofar as aveilim are concerned.

3. Therefore; according to the Aruch Hashulchan, there's nothing very wrong with a fancy kittel. It would, however, vitiate the second meaning of the kittel, and while he says the first meaning is the primary reason, that does not mean that the second reason does not exist at all. It is secondary, but still extant. The appropriate thing, then, would be to wear a kittel that can communicate both meanings. According to Reb Moshe, while a kittel really carries a somber message, it is inappropriate for Aveilim because it is perceived as a joyous garment. For the rules of the behavior of an aveilus, perception is more important than reality, because aveilus is kibbud and honor of the niftar, and honor is, by definition, subjective. So according to Reb Moshe, one might say that a fancy kittel is appropriate, or one might say that it is inappropriate, since inherently, the message is, at least partly, the reminder of yom hamissah, even if nobody knows or cares about that symbol.

But: I still say that there is no justification for totally tossing out the universally agreed meaning of the kittel as a mazkeres yom hamissah. The reasonable thing would be to wear a beged that comfortably comprises both symbolic meanings, a tabula rasa.  AND THAT MEANS A SIMPLE, ELEGANT KITTEL! 

4. I can be wrong too. “Certainty is not the test of certitude. We have been cocksure of many things that were not so.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
I would never read the Taz like Reb Moshe does, and the Magen Avraham almost certainly says like me, but my opinion against Reb Moshe's is a sneeze in a hurricane, and his teshuva and the Aruch Hashulchan can certainly be read as justifying fancy kittels. The Aruch Hashulchan doesn't mean that, and neither does Reb Moshe. But they can be read that way. So fancy kittels are not absurd; they are just wrong.

I still say that if your kittel is bespoke, it bespeaking about you.

Postscripts:

• The Maharal says that the Kittel is a celebratory expression of the joy and purity created by the Seder.  See Maharal page 41, where he talks about the color white being unadulterated and pure, and how this alludes to the geula which stemmed from the olam elyon without any isarusa d'le'eila or any olam hamurkav, whatever that means.
• The Netziv in his Hagada, as told to me by Chaim B., says that you wear a Kittel whenever you eat korbanos, and so we wear it while we reenact achilas Korban Pesach. I haven't taken down the hagados yet, so I haven't seen it inside, but I assume the Netziv is referring to the interesting Rambam in 10 Klei Hamikdash, the very last halacha in Hilchos Klei Hamikdash, which I bring in the comments along with something from the Lubavitcher Rebbe.
• The Malbim in his Hagada says from Reb Yechiel Heller that it comes from the Mechilta "Metzuyanim sham," because in Shabbos 145b it says that the Talmidei Chachamim in Bavel were metzuyanim in their clothing and Nedarim 20b, where it says that talmidei Chachamim are metzuyanim in their clothing like the malachei hashareis, and by malachim it says "levush habadim," and that means white.  Apparently, he means that the Jews in Mitzrayim wore white clothing.
• The Sifsei Chachamim in Megilla 31a says it's a remez to techiyas hameisim, a reminder of the resurrection, which will take place during Nissan.
• Rav Yosef Ber Soloveichik said that the Kittel is just another shinui. (I didn't see this inside, either, but if he said this, I think it's just not fair. As I've written elsewhere, when Chazal say that we do things at the seder just for shinui, they were not telling us the whole story. See http://havolim.blogspot.com/2007/03/shtei-pamim-dipping-at-seder-two.html)
• A Talmid, in the comments, says that Reb Leibaleh Eiger said that it symbolizes the levanim worn by a niddah, a zav, or a zavah, who is beginning the process of tahara, and we, too, are beginning the seven weeks of preparation for Matan Torah. I really, really have issues with this 'pshat,' and I would guess that even he didn't mean it seriously. But I'm doing a list, so who cares.  POSTSCRIPT: I saw a Chasam Sofer (his peirush on Mah Nishtana) that gives meaning to this pshat. The Chasam Sofer says that the Seuda and the Matzos are not like a Korban Todah, which commemorates the past. If it were, it would include Chametz. It is instead like a Korban Milu'im, or the Korban of the Nazir, which only has Matza. He explains that the purpose of the Seder is to make us realize not what happened in the past but rather what opportunities we are given for the greatest spiritual accomplishments. It is not a focus on the past, it is a focus on opportunities for the future. If so, it certainly makes sense that the Kittel would be the begged worn by a person who is beginning a new process, who takes the first step in a progress towards Mattan Torah.
• Bnei Yissaschar says that it recalls the fact Lo shinu malbusham, that wearing distinctive clothing in Mitzrayim helped us maintain our identity and contributed to the Geula.  This is like the Malbim.
• Here's a creative one, quoted from the Peirush on the Hagadah called Mah Yakar, (Reb Yehuda Halpert tells us that Mah Yakar is a commentary on הגדה של פסח כלי יקר by רב יהושע חיים ; גריססגאטט who compiled all of the commentsof the Kli Yakar in other places and put them into a hagadah, and then he compiled his own commentary on the Kli Yakar comments.called Mah Yakar.)    The Galus Mitzrayim was set into motion  by the envy engendered by Yosef's Kesones Pasim.  We wear a white, simple garment that first of all is by its simplicity and lack of color exactly the opposite of the Kesones Pasim, and also is considered the symbol of the fungible garment, as seen in the Mishna in Taanis, where the women would wear klei lavan so that they were all dressed the same.  This idea stems from Rashi in Breishis where he translates ksones pasim with the word Karpas, like chur karpas ut'cheiles, and then Rabbeinu Manoach on the Rambam 8 Chametz U'Matza 2 who makes the connection between the Karpas and the Ksones Pasim. From there it's a short step to saying that the kittel is like an anti-kesones-pasim.
• That's it. I know of other explanations for the kittel, but I just can't bring myself to say over all the silly and irresponsible explanations I've seen and heard.

There comes a point when you find out so much that you don't know more, you end up knowing nothing. Why was the minhag of wearing a kittel started? Ah! I know! We wear the Kittel to make you happy; to keep you sober; because its beautiful; because its simple; to remind us of how we ate korbanos; to wear a garment that is so odd that the children will wonder why you're wearing it, to wear a garment that is immediately obvious as being Jewish....
Perhaps the lesson of the kittel is this:

There is a minhag for married men to wear a kittel.

The reason for the minhag is unclear, and ranges all over the map.

BUT THERE IS NO MINHAG TO KNOW WHAT THE KITTEL MEANS. Most people think nothing at all, or, according to Reb Moshe, they are oblivious of its original intention. It's almost as if the minhag is to not know what it means.

So; Wear the kittel, and YOU CAN DECIDE WHAT IT MEANS TO YOU!  (see, e.g., my discussion about breaking a plate at a tna'im here.)

You're a free agent. I've listed the Taz, the Magen Avraham, the Maharal, the Aruch Hashulchan, the Netziv, the Kli Yakar and Rav JB. And Reb Leibaleh Eiger and the Bnei Yissaschar. You have a nice and far ranging list of reasons for the kittel, or you can make one up, if you like.
Or, all the themes work together. Gilu bire'ada, enjoying the opportunities to do mitzvos and simply having pleasure from the gift of a beautiful Olam Hazeh that we enjoy and use for avodas Hashem, all the while remembering that we must temper our enjoyment with the unblinking awareness of our responsibilities and the limited time we have to acheive them. This is the same idea with korbanos: enjoy achilas kodshim, but remember that you are eating mishulchan gavo'ah, and that the experience should be viewed as a means of spiritual growth. It is through this human simcha shel mitzvah, a physical experience that ties our bodies to our cheilek elo'ah mima'al, that hashra'as hashechina comes.
~
In the spirit of even-handedness, here's a picture of the trim on a nice kittel, available for around $180+ at Greenfield Judaica. Better lean ALL the way over when you're drinking the arba kosos, because you don't want to get this one stained.  (Update: there are much more expensive kittels available now.)



IMPORTANT UPDATE:
I recently was thinking about this, and I realized that the entire discussion is based on a fundamental and pervasive error, and everything I wrote above about the contradictory interpretations of the Kittel is wrong.  I realized this just last week, when I brought up this issue at my Shabbos morning Kiddush, asking "What, exactly, is the reason we wear a Kittel at the Seder?"  One of the guests, Reb Yitzchak Resnick, responded "Because it is symbolic."  His words were, of course, the introduction of an discussion.  But I realized that his one sentence statement is more correct than anything I had heard on the topic.  His sentence was not the beginning of a discussion: it was the entire discussion.  A Kittel is symbolic; it is inherently laden, or charged, with significance.  It is white, it is simple, it is unusual.  That is the root of the idea of a kittel.  It elicits a feeling.  How that set of qualities is applied varies.  It has come to be used for bigdei meisim; it has come to be used to symbolize angels.  It has come to symbolize separation and distinction.  BUT ALL THESE THINGS ARE OUTGROWTHS OF THE INHERENTLY SYMBOLIC NATURE OF THIS GARMENT.  They are not inherent explanations of why we wear the kittel at the seder: they are merely applications of the symbolic nature of this unusual garment. The real purpose of the Kittel is to elicit and stimulate a reaction and a response.

So, the answer is, we wear the kittel because it is symbolic.  It is unusual; it is white; it is simple; it is clean.  What specific association to the seder does the kittel have?  There is no definitive answer to that question.     The 'electric charge' of the kittel, the unusual quality of the kittel, the stimulus to our seder experience, is all that matters.  No specific association was intended, and a multitude of interpretations are all equally valid.  To a great extent, the seder experience is based on questions, and the stimulus to thought is more important than any particular answer; the kittel, too, is a question.  In our tradition, every question ought to produce at least seventy answers.  So, what meaning should we read into the kittel at the seder?  Gilu Bir'ada is probably the best way to put it, if only because Gilu Bir'ada, by its very nature, covers the whole spectrum.  But the main thing is, let your imagination fly.

I finally understand what Rav Yosef Ber Soloveichik meant in saying that " the Kittel is just another shinui." He meant exactly what we are saying here. The Kittel is a symbolic begged. What that symbol comprises changes with every generation. 

ANOTHER IMPORTANT UPDATE:
I am grateful to the yungermahn at my son's kollel who directed our attention to this Matteh Ephrayim/Elef consiLamatteh in tof reish yud , The Matteh Ephraim strongly defends the minhag they used to have to use a kittel with silver around the neck.  I find it very, very hard to understand, but considering that Reb Ephraim Zalman Margoliyos was recognized as a gadol in the generation of Reb Akiva Eiger,the Ketzos and the Nesivos, Reb Mordechai Bennet and the Chasam Sofer, and that he joined the Chasam Sofer in the war against the haskala, it is obvious that if there's a problem of seichel hayashar here, it is mine.  This is especially true in light of his explanation of the minhag and in light of the fact that he was a fantastic gevir who made his fortune in the diamond business.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT UPDATE:
I mentioned above the sefer Mah Yakar which is hard to find online. R Yehuda Halpert kindly sent in a photo of his copy.

Vayikra 1:2. Adam ki yakriv. Conspicuous Virtue (Virtue Signaling)

Rashi brings from Beitzah 20 "Adam ki yakriv," that your korbanos should be like the korbanos of Adam Harishon; just as the korbanos of Adam Harishon could not possibly have been stolen, since the entire world was his, you too may bring korbanos only if they are yours.

Dr. Zvi Krinsky said an interesting pshat in the tzushtell to the korbanos of Adam Harishon. Some people do mitzvos in a special or flamboyant way because they want to impress others; they are very makpid on hidur mitzvah when other people can see what they're doing. When they buy a lulav and esrog, or a Megillah, they are very particular about hidur, but when they buy tzitzis, they don’t spend the time or money to be makpid in hiddur. Some people only daven a long shmoneh esrei when there are people watching. (Two points— spending more for hiddur to show off, and doing mitzvos in a showy way to make people think you are a kadosh. Dr. Krinsky was talking about yuhara; I added hiddur mitzvah.) We should learn from the korbanos of Adam to be mehadeir mitzvos not to impress people— there were no people for Adam to impress— but rather because of our love and respect for the mitzvah itself, or as a way of becoming kadosh. Do the mitzvah le'sheim mitzvah, not le'sheim showing off, or showing how holy you are.

I do not think it is that simple. First of all, Reb Yehuda/Rav's rule (Pesachim 50b) of the rule of Le'olam ya'asok adam bemitzvos afilu shelo lishma.... should apply to hiddur no less than to other mitzvos. But I would argue that this kind of hiddur is not just a bedi'eved, a "mitoch shelo lishma" din, but it might actually be inherently praiseworthy.

The Gemora in Shabbos 133b, Sukah 11b, and Nazir 2b, says "hisna’eh lefanav bemitzvos," which literally means ‘beautify yourself before Him with mitzvos’. This seems to focus on the "beautify yourself with..." aspect more than the "beautify the mitzvah" aspect. The renowned dikduk expert, Rabbi Dr. Avremi Isenberg says that the use of ‘hispa’eil’ (a reflexive construction) doesn't prove anything, because the His'pa'eil form is sometimes used for Pi'eil, just as "ke’ilu hiskabalti" means nothing other than ‘ke’ilu kibalti. However, the difference is that with Hiskabalti, it means "I view myself as if I had received the money." Here, that logic does not apply, and it seems to intend the literal reading of "beautify yourself." Also, the Gemara in Yoma 70a and Sottah 41b says

אח"כ כל אחד ואחד מביא ספר תורה מביתו וקורא בו כדי להראות חזותו לרבים

which means that they brought their sifrei Torah to show other people their beauty, unmistakably indicating that ‘hisna’eh’ is meant literally-- that Chazal encourage us to take pride in how we do mitzvos, to show off how beautiful our tashmishei mitzvah are.

The first instinct, of course, is to see such behavior as vanity or Mechzi keyuhara (which, in this context, would be like "lekanteir, see Tosfos Pesachim 50b). But perhaps there’s nothing wrong with preening or being showy by beautifying a mitzvah that you are doing. Mechzi keyuhara is, of course, a terrible thing. But perhaps that’s only where you are sanctimonious, where you act in a misleading way to fool people into thinking you’re on a higher madreigah than you actually are, because people will emulate you in your other foolish behavior, or because if you later do something bad it will be a chillul Hashem, or, in the case of lekanteir, because you enjoy disparaging others. But showing off how much you spend on a mitzvah, and that your esrog is the nicest one in shul, is not necessarily so bad— it’s not a lie, and it may even foster the other people’s chavivus mitzvos-- it is constructive rivalry. Kin'as sofrim tarbeh chachma, and kin'as gvirim tarbeh ke'vod shamayim.

My son, Moshe, said that the person is only showing off with it because it is something he cares about. If he was indifferent to the mitzvah, he wouldn’t think it worth showing off with; he would spend his money on things that he wants to be identified with more, and just get by with a minimal cheftzah shel mitzvah. While showing off with your cheftzah shel mitzvah may not be a refined middah tovah, it is a middah tovah anyway, and the benefits far outweigh the detriment. Anyway, think of it like jewelry— "mitzva jewelry". It may be that the main purpose of jewelry and fashion is to show off to other people, and this vanity is easy to catergorize as ignoble; but the reality is that people do wear jewelry, and this is considered normal behavior. So why shouldn’t our tashmishei mitzvah be our jewelry? This is somewhat similar to making feasts, which appeal to our desire for good food, for seudos mitzvah. The same way that the satisfaction of our desire for rich and plentiful food, when used lesheim mitzvah, is good, so too satisfaction of the desire to stand out and be envied can be used le’sheim mitzvah.

The first person to comment on this idea said that my suggestion is panglossian and naive. He said that it is more likely that such people are not demonstrating their love for mitzvos. Rather, he sourly said, they simply take note of the things the members of their peer group desire and attribute significance to, and they acquire these things and do them in a showy way so as to demonstrate their superiority and gain the respect of those people, but they themselves really have no interest in the inherent significance of the mitzvah.

I agree that he makes a valid theoretical point. In response, I make a modification will accomodate both our opinions. That is: the exclusively public hiddur phenomenon may be a one step "Capture the Flag" process or a two step "Rolls Royce" process. "One step" is, as he said, that the mitzvah object is an arbitrary symbol of dominance and superiority, just as the Flag in the game of Capture-the-Flag is an arbitrary symbol of victory with absolutely no intrinsic value. It's just a shmatteh. "Two step" would be that the mitzvah is inherently significant, and everyone would enjoy doing it in the best and most beautiful way. On the other hand, the time, effort and expense are impediments to seeking out and buying the best esrog, for example. But since a shining beautiful esrog will elicit everyone's admiration, people are willing to spend more time and money to buy the best one possible. The example would be buying a Rolls Royce. Everyone says that a Rolls is a very stable, powerful, and luxurious car. It is definitely not a shmatteh. But who is crazy enough to spend half a million dollars for it and then worry about birds and gravel? And imagine what the kids in carpool are going to do to it. But it turns necks and elicits awe, and it symbolizes success and power, and so people are willing to spend the money.

So, my friends, you'll have to decide for yourself. In theory, both possibilities are valid: Those people who spend fortunes for mitzvos that others will see, might be playing Capture the Flag, or they might be driving a Rolls Royce.

I heard from Reb Moshe something that, I think, addresses this issue. There was a time when people would have fistfights about aliyos, and sitting on the Mizrach wall was something people would dream about and fight for for years. Now, we are all so much more civilized, and we don't mind not getting shlishi and we sit wherever we sit. Reb Moshe said that this is not because we are more mature. It is because the kavod of the aliyos and the seat in shul mean less to us. We have plenty of ways of finding satisfaction and honor at work and at home and on the golf course, so we just don't care about kavod Beis Haknesses. It's not that we are more understanding, it's that the Shul and Krias Hatorah mean less to us.

I think that something I heard from Reb Yerucham is a very good tzushtell to this topic. Harav Dovid Zupnik Zatzal once told me that he heard in the Mir from Reb Yerucham that Kin'as sofrim is good when you wish the other person would know more and you would still know more than he does, and it's bad when you would be perfectly happy if he knew less, as long as you knew more than him. The first person is motivated only by a desire to establish dominance. The second is motivated by the desire to excell in Torah, both in Gadlus beTorah and in dominance over the field.

The Wall Street Journal had a De Gustibus column on March 23, 2007, by Joseph Rago. He talked about Veblen’s 1899 "Theory of the Leisure Class," in which he introduced the idea of conspicuous consumption, defined as "specialized consumption of goods as an evidence of pecuniary strength." This is, of course, specific to the "expenditure of superfluities." The author of the column updated Veblen’s essay to extend to "conspicuous virtue." People buy more expensive things that are free trade, renewable, cage free, and live strong bracelets, partly, and allegedly, because they want to support the causes these things represent, but to a great degree because they want to proclaim their virtue. (He suggests that this trend has become popular partly because of guilty consciences about consumerism and materialism. That was certainly true in '07, but with the current recession, this fashion has attenuated.)

This is a very nice way of describing the ‘hisna’eh’ attitude: conspicuous virtue, where the motive is partly the underlying mitzvah, but also to proclaim your virtue. In any case, the idea I said above is still true: there is a mixed motivation, but in the final analysis it stems from pride in ability to fulfil the mitzvah– I can be a better eved Hashem than you can be. Jewelry is an example of conspicuous consumption; a nice esrog, a few black Brisker Matzos, silver and vermeil tefillin boxes, are mitzvah jewelry, conspicuous virtue.

The expensively tailored frilly, lacey, kittel, a garment that is supposed to remind us of the fragility of life and its inevitable end, a garment that symbolizes simplicity, humility, and the rejection of gashmius, is evidence of either insanity or obliviousness, and deserves a post of its own. And some pictures.

1. Don't tell me about the bigdei lavan of the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur, the Pilusin, that cost a fortune. It's not a tzusthell; a Kohen Gadol's levisha of his begadim is a ma'aseh avodah in itself, and so it is a cheftzah shel mitzvah. Also, you don't bury him in them.

2. Please don't tell me about Rebbes that have silk-and-silver-trimmed, fur-collared Kittels. If there are, I don't want to know about it.

3. If your wife or your shver bought your kittel for you, then it's not your fault. It just means they love you.

HOWEVER: Lakewood Guy mentioned that his wife wants to buy him a fancy kittel for the seder, and said that he can use a simple one for Yom Kippur and at his levayah le'achar mei'ah ve'esrim shanim tovim ve'aruchim. It would seem that she is making a valid point, and that the symbolism of the kittel is not at all the same on those two occassions. On Yom Kippur, it symbolizes purity from sin and reminds us of the Yom Hamissah. For Yom Kippur, then, the kittel should be unadorned. At the Seder, it symbolizes Cheirus, and there is no reason to not make it beautiful. Under the chuppah, well, whether it symbolizes yom hamissah depends on who you're marrying, and whether it symbolizes purity depends on why you're marrying her.

HOWEVER II: Unfortunately, the Taz in OC 472 SK 3 says that the reason we wear a kittel at the Seder is so that our simcha doesn't get out of hand. We wear the kittel to temper our joy by reminding ourselves of the day of our death. The Taz was a Litvak. Anyway, I haven't found anyone that disagrees with the Taz. And he means it le'halacha, because he applies the reasoning to pasken that an Aveil may wear a kittel during the first year seder.

In Hilchos Yom Kippur, OC 610:4 in the Rama, he says that we wear the kittel on Yom Kippur for two reasons: to symbolize angelic purity, and to remind ourselves that every passing second brings us closer to the abyss. There, too, the Taz says that the first reason would preclude an Aveil from wearing the kittel, while the second would allow it, and he follows the second reason.

So: I would like to agree with LakewoodGuy's wife. The Taz, on the other hand, says she's wrong. For the sake of a healthy marriage, I would say that our wives really don't need to know about the Taz; I know mine would blow a gasket (what does that mean??? Too much simcha? Simcha is the mitzvas hayom!!! We've been working for a month to be marbeh simcha!!! What's wrong with simcha???? Who is this Taz????) So just be quiet and let her buy you a fancy kittel for the seder.

IMPORTANT UPDATE:
First of all, I have another post on this issue, a follow up to this discussion.  Second, I have to put in a mareh makom someone sent me that addresses this issue, whether I like it or not:  The Matteh Ephraim/Elef Lamatteh in 610.

Note: the paragraph that was here earlier, which discussed the differences between paskening for mamonus and paskening for kodshim, is in the shop for repair. We can't tell you when it will be ready. Maybe after Pesach.

Shemos 35:26. The Women Who Wove for the Mishkan

I don't have much time this week, so I am putting this in just for your reading enjoyment.

On the blog http://divreichaim.blogspot.com/2009/03/donation-of-women-to-mishkan.html
Reb Chaim B., who is also too busy to write as often as he would like, wrote:

Too much work, too little time to write...
The Torah tells us that the women also donated to the Mishkan, expertly weaving while the wool was still attached to the sheep (35:26). Yet, we know the halacha that a women's handiwork actually belongs to her husband. Isn't it husbands and not wives who deserve the credit from the pasuk?

I saw an answer quoted in the name of R' Chaim Volozhiner's mother (and yes, it is because of who said it that I am writing this). The reason a husband is entitled to keep his wife's handiwork is because he provides her with mezonos, food and support. ( ed.- Ma'aseh Yadayim is in exchange for Mezonos.) Since in the desert the women did not need their husband's support, as the man fell equally for women as well as men, this takanah of ma'aseh yadayim belonging to the husband did not apply! (ed.-In the comments, it was pointed out that even before matan Torah the dinim of kesuva, and most likely the appurtenant reciprocal duties, were observed.)

"Rebbetzin Volozhiner" may get creativity points for her answer, but my wife prefers pshat to derash and when I mentioned this question on Shabbos she immediatly pointed out that who says the women who donated were married -- maybe they were the single girls and the whole kashe doesn't get off the ground.

In the comments, I wrote
I assume that your Isha Chashuva means the single girls that were past katnus and na'arus and still not married-- the old maids, so to speak. Because before that, their ma'aseh yadayim belongs to their fathers mide'oraysa.
And now, we see how our holy Toireh is merumaz at in our daily language-- http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=spinster

Vayakhel, Shemos 36:28. Li'me’kutze’os Hamishkan. Love, Lions, and Corners

It has been said that cultures for whom certain things or concepts are particularly important will develop many separate words to describe relatively minor variations in these things or concepts. For example, instead of using one noun with a variety of adjectives, different nouns are created. This is known as Focal Vocabulary . The famous example, though I'm told that linguists dispute its truth, is that Eskimos have a many different words for snow. If that's your entire landscape, of course you will, over time, develop words whose meanings incorporate the various states of snow, such as hard, granular, soft, slippery, loose, slushy, etc. I assume that skiers have the same arsenal of nouns. In Hebrew, it's Sheleg, period.

In Hebrew, how many words are there for lion? Five: Ari, Kfir, Layish, Shachal, and Gur refer only to lions, which, evidently, are symbolically powerful in our culture. In English, there is only one-- Lion. How do you say you like or love? You like your neighbor? Ani oheiv oso. You love your wife? Ani oheiv osah. You like pizza? Ani oheiv pizza.

Having said this, let's look at the parsha. How many ways are there to say "Corner" in Hebrew? Pinah, or keren. But in this parsha, it appears in an unparalleled panoply of iterations.
36:28– by the krashim, Me’kutze’os.
37:3– by the Aron, Pa’amosav.  (By the way, the Ibn Ezra apparently got fed up with all these synonyms, so he translates "Pa'amosav" as feet.  According to him, the Aron Kodesh had feet, and didn't sit directly on the ground.  His raya is from "Mah yafu pa'amayich ba'ne'alim."  Of course, this is contradicted in the Gemara in the beginning of Sukkah, but do you think he cares?  Tosfos in Yoma says it had not four, but eight rings, four for the badim that actually carried it, and four for the decorative badim.)
37:13– by the Shulchan, HaPei’os.
38:2– by the Mizbach ha’olah, Pinosav.
(Karnos, of course, appear on the Mizbechos, but they really look like Karnayim, so I'll leave those out.)

So, if you want to talk about fighting, use Latin (bellum, pugna, macto, litis, certo). For love, Greek (agape, eros, storge, philia, thelema). For lions in corners, Hebrew is your language of choice.  (You might be interested in looking into the field called Phonaesthetics.)
(This actually is like the Yerushalmi in Megilla 1:9. The Yerushalmi there says "four languages are proper for the world to use;

א"ר יונתן דבית גוברין ד' לשונות נאים שישתמש בהן העולם ואלו הן לעז לזמר רומי לקרב סורסיי לאילייא עברי לדיבור

Greek for song, Latin for war, Aramaic for elegy, and Hebrew for speech." The meforshim there learn לקרב means "to draw near, or convince," but I think it means "for war." There's no reason to think the list changes from nouns to verbs, and stam their pshat is tzarich iyun.)

What’s pshat? Why so many ways of referring to corners? After Parshas Teruma and Tetzaveh, where we were endlessly boxed, (Mishbetzos on the Choshen and the Eifod and the Kesones Tashbeitz), suddenly we are cornered.

Rabbi Yitzchok Resnik PhD (abd) said that these parshiyos, which describe the fabrication of the Mishkan and its contents, speak to craftsmen in their specialized language. Every craft, every profession, has its own lexicon, its own patois or jargon. For example, "A stretcher and a joint" has an entirely different meaning to a bricklayer and to a paramedic. Perhaps these are terms that are used variously by cabinetmakers, by goldsmiths, and by carpenters, and they express differences in how they are crafted or how they are used.

I said, just for homiletic aerobics, that intersections can have many different meanings. When two things that are moving in different directions meet, they might be unaffected by the meeting, they might simply end where they meet, or they might change completely, they might attain a new identity. A corner is the intersection of two sides, and maybe these different words express the various outcomes of intersection.


Previous postings on Vayakhel and Pekudei, every one of which is lots better than the above:

The Latent Holiness of Human Love

The Wisdom of Mussar and Seichel: This is not an Oxymoron.

Knitting our Brows about Why King David Couldn't Build the Beis Hamikdash

The Hidden Prophecy of the Destruction, and Rebuilding, of the Batei Mikdash

Ki Sisa, Shemos 34:6. The Thirteen Middos and The Alshich's Key to Tefilla

Only speaking from how I personally feel about this discussion, and in light of the superficial and easily distracted nature of most internet reading, please allow me to suggest that you print and read it.

Rosh Hashannah 17b–

אמר רב יהודה ברית כרותה לי"ג מדות שאינן חוזרות ריקם שנאמר (שמות לד) הנה אנכי כורת ברית

Amar R Yehudah: Bris krusah le’yud gimmel middos she'einan chozros reikan. A covenant is sealed on the Thirteen Middos that they do not return empty-handed. Rashi– they never go unanswered when they are recited in the tefillah of a tainis.

The Alshich in Shlach 14:17-20 says that the question has been asked that this Chazal contradicts our experience; plenty of times we say it over and over, and it doesn't do a thing! (An interesting question! Most teachers would react to a question like this with a frask in punim--"Who are you going to trust, you sheigetz, Chazal or your lying eyes???? A more confident didact would respond with the usual "Sometimes ‘No’ is the best answer", or "They can’t overcome a gzeira that was finalized with a shevu’ah", or that "The effect of the tefilla is hidden or pending".)

The Alshich brings an answer from the Livnas Sapir: The recital of the Thirteen Middos is only effective when the person who says them fulfills the Gemara in Shabbos 121 "mah hu rachum v’channun...," just as He is merciful, you too be merciful, just as He is long tempered, etc., that the person emulates the traits of God that are enumerated in the Thirteen Middos.

Obviously, this makes the Gemara's promise less exciting.  The one consolation is offered by the Pri Megadim in his sefer "Sefer HaMagid" Volume III Drush 7 at the end, where he says that if the Middos require "being," the members of the tzibbur are viewed as one- one might contribute "Rachum," another "Chanun," etc., because it's very unlikely that one person will have all the Middos.

Another way of putting the Alshich’s (Livnas Sapir) teretz is "It is not enough to say the yud gimmel middos. You have to be the yud gimmel middos."

Imagine a father who is an achzar with his children, who says with great kavana "Oy, Avinu, Ha'av Harachaman, racheim aleinu!" He's a father, and he has no rachmanus on his children! Or, someone who is mean and heartless, who is davenning "ki eil melech chanun verachum atta" with real kavana and dveikus. How do you think the Ribbono Shel Olam should respond to such people? What good are such tefillos? If, on the other hand, you think, as you daven, that this is a middah that one should emulate and express in one’s life, and you determine to do so, then the tefilla would certainly mean a great deal more. The great chiddush of the Alshich is that this is true even regarding the Bris of the 13 Middos.

Even farther: the Tzror HaMor in Ki Sisa (34:9) says

אבל אם הם אכזרים ועושי רשעה, כל שכן שבהזכרת י"ג מדות הם נתפסין. וזהו 'וחנותי את אשר אחון' (שמות לג, יט) - מי

שראוי לחון ולרחם עליו

that if a person is cruel and wicked, and he recites the Middos praising Hashem's kindness and piety, this will bring down punishment upon him even worse than had he not said them.

Now that the Alshich applies this concept even to the Middos, it opens a whole new perspective on what tefillah means. Everyone knows there is a mitzva of Tefilla. Everyone knows there is a mitzva of emulating Hashem's middos: (Shabbas 133b:

אבא שאול אומר ואנוהו הוי דומה לו מה הוא חנון ורחום אף אתה היה חנון ורחום

Zeh Eili ve'anveihu-- Abba Shaul omeir; mah Hu rachum vechanun.... Rashi-- Ve'anveihu-- ani ve'Hu. ani veHu. hevei domeh Lo; velashon ve'anveihu, Ani vehu, and Sotah 14a:

ואמר רבי חמא ברבי חנינא מאי דכתיב (דברים יג) אחרי ה' אלהיכם תלכו וכי אפשר לו לאדם להלך אחר שכינה והלא כבר נאמר (דברים ד) כי ה' אלהיך אש אוכלה הוא אלא להלך אחר מדותיו של הקב"ה מה הוא מלביש ערומים דכתיב (בראשית ג) ויעש ה' אלהים לאדם ולאשתו כתנות עור וילבישם אף אתה הלבש ערומים הקב"ה ביקר חולים דכתיב (בראשית יח) וירא אליו ה' באלוני ממרא אף אתה בקר חולים הקב"ה ניחם אבלים דכתיב (בראשית כה) ויהי אחרי מות אברהם ויברך אלהים את יצחק בנו אף אתה נחם אבלים הקב"ה קבר מתים דכתיב (דברים לד) ויקבר אותו בגיא אף אתה קבור מתים

Acharei Hashem Elokeichem teileichu....le'haleich achar midosav shel HKB"H. The din of "Ve'halachta Bidrachav" is codified in the Rambam Sefer Hamitzvos 8 and the Chinuch 611.) The chiddush here is that these two dinim are mutually dependent; one without the other is ineffective and incomplete. The independent mitzvah of vehlachta bidrachav has a separate application: it is also the necessary prerequisite for the tefilla of the Yud Gimmel Middos. You have to do the Middos, and you have to stand like a shliach tzibbur and ask for them from Hashem.

Tefilla without incorporating into yourself what you hope to elicit from Hashem is not Tefilla at all. Tefilla is not an arm's length entreaty that, if heard and fulfilled, enables you to passively observe as your prayers are answered. Tefilla is part of a process that includes dveikus or inspired zimra and tehilla or bitachon, that enables you to become a fitting vessel for the achievement of Hashem's will. The answer to successful Tefilla is the opportunity to participate in the result. By becoming God-like, you can become a fitting conduit that allows the will of God to flow, through you, to this world. Energy can't flow through 'nothing.' There's got to be a medium that is hospitable to the energy to allow it to move. The medium is you.  The least you need to do is to be a conductor, not an insulator.

We find the same concept in Nedarim 40a--

כל שאין מבקר חולה אין מבקש עליו רחמים לא שיחיה ולא שימות

one who has not been mevaker choleh, his prayers on behalf of the sick are totally ignored. Bikkur Cholim without tefilla, good, but not good enough. Tefilla without bikkur cholim? A waste of time. You want to invoke Hashem's mercy on the sick through your prayers? Don't bother to daven unless you yourself have been mevakeir choleh. But tefilla after you were mevakeir choleh? Ah, that's something special.

This pshat is supported by the Gemara in Rosh Hashanna 17b. There, the Gemara says that Hashem was mis'atef with a tallis like a shli'ach tzibur, and said the 13 Middos, and told Moshe "Im ya'asu banai lefanai kaseder hazeh Ani mochel lahem." The word "Ya'asu" implies action, even though the context is speech, tefillah by a shli'ach tzibur. But according to the above, the two concepts are congruous: the bris of the 13 Middos involves tefilla, speech, which reflects or generates action, the act of emulating Hashem.

A Commenter pointed out that the Alshich learned in Reb Yosef Karo's yeshiva, and he had a fellow talmid named Reb Moshe Cordevero, who wrote the Tomer Devora. The entire theme of the Tomer Devora is a discussion of the obligation, and how, to emulate Hashem's 13 Middos. He ends the first chapter by saying "Just as a man behaves below, so he will merit to open himself "Middah Elyonah Mil'e'maalah." Exactly as he behaves, "kach mashpi'ach mi'le'maalah," and he causes that Middah to shine in the world." With that in mind, it seems evident that this theme, as quoted by the Alshich from the Livnas Hasapir, was, among RYK's talmidim, an important and very carefully considered hashkafas hachaim.

This approach reminds me of the Nefesh Hachaim’s idea of "Hashem Tzilchah, " (see Nefesh Hachaim 1:7 DH V’zeh she’omar Dovid Hamelech Hashem Tzilchoh and the next paragraph, and 1:9 DH Omnom ho’inyon, and the Hagoho there who says the Anaf Yosef’s vort about Tapu’ach which I bring here, which R Chaim Volozhener also says klor in his pirush on Shir Hashirim 2:3) and what I wrote in Devarim Eikev 10:17:

Ha’eil hagadol hagibor vehanorah. Yoma 69— the Anshei Knesses Hagdolah were called that because ‘hecheziru atara liyoshna’. Yirmiah took off ‘nora’, and Daniel took off ‘gibor’. But they said that aderabba— his gevura is his arichus appaiyim to the resha’im, and his morah is what keeps us in existence interspersed among the nations. The idea here is that we cannot describe the actual character of Hashem, but instead only describe the characteristics that we think underlie what we observe to be his actions in our world. This is what is stated in ‘anim zemiros’, that ‘Himshilucho velo kefi yeshcha, vayashvucha lefi ma’asecha.’ What we say about Hashem is, first of all, only a mashal, and second of all, only what we perceive through His behavior. The Rambam says "Kol hato’arim she’anu omrim al Hashem Yisbarach ein hakavana al to’arim atzmi’im chas veshalom rak al to’arei hape’ulos."
An example of this: the Gemora in Shabbos 88a says, "Amar R’ Chamma bar Chanina, ‘ketapuach be’atzei hayaar...’, lama nimsh’lu Yisrael l’Tapuach?" etc. Rabbeinu Tam asks there, that in that passuk, it is not Klal Yisroel being compared to a Tapuach, but rather Hashem? The Anaf Yosef in the Ein Yakov brings down the Nefesh Hachaim that answers that if Klal Yisroel perceived and compared Hashem to ‘tapuach’, this is definitely because Klal Yisroel are comparable and the behavior is similar to ‘tapuach’, because "kederech she’anachnu misro’im lefonov yisborach, kach hu yisborach shemo bo lei’ra’os el ha’olamos al zeh ha’hadraga vehashiur mamash." From this vort you see that not only does Hashem appear in a fashion that reflects our behavior, but that what we call His semblance is just one of the ways that He communicates with us through His behavior.

Back to the Alshich.

The Panim Yafos (written by the Ba’al Hafla’ah) disagrees with the Alshich, because how can we possibly emulate "Hashem Hashem", which is also part of the thirteen middos. So he holds that it has nothing to do with the Gemara in Shabbos, and the guarantee applies to simple recital, to saying it alone.

See the Rosh at the end of the first perek of Rosh Hashannah, where he brings two shittos, the Geonim and Rabbeinu Tam, about the first two sheimos in the Middos and whether both or only one is a Middah, and the Korban Neshanel there in #10 who brings the Arizal and the Sefer Chassidim. The Arizal in Shaar Hakavonos Drush "Vayaavor" 3 holds the Middos begin with "Keil." But the Sefer Chassidim (250) holds it begins with "Rachum." If the Alshich/Livnas Sapir hold like the Sefer Chasidim, the Hafla'ah's question would not begin.

Furthermore, the in the Ramak's Tomer Devora, he describes how to emulate, or reflect, the Middos of, for example, Malchus. Obviously, then, the Hafla'ah's kashe would not be shver.

~

Reb Chaim B. pointed out to me that the Bnei Yisaschar says that the machlokes between the Alshich and the Hafla'ah was something that Esther Hamalka thought about, and she decided that the Bris was for Amira alone, based on the midda of "Eil," as the Hafla'ah says. See comments for the Mareh Makom and discussion.

~

Reb David Guttmann pointed out a fascinating thing:

The Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim is very similar to the Alshich, and yet very, very different. The Rambam also agrees that mere tefilla is inadequate. What, says the Rambam, makes the recitation of the Middos effective? Understanding what they mean! This is what the Rambam says in the Moreh 1:54, when he discusses what it was the Moshe sought from Hashem, and what Hashem taught him about the Middos: (Kafach translation)

הודעני נא את דרכיך ואדעך וכו' ,
והתבונן במה שנכלל בלשון זה מן המופלאות, אמרו 'הודעני נא את דרכיך ואדעך', מלמד על היותו יתעלה נודע בתאריו, שאם ידע הדרכים ידעהו. ואמרו 'למען אמצא חן בעיניך', מלמד כי מי שידע את ה', הוא אשר ימצא חן בעיניו. לא מי שצם והתפלל בלבד , אלא כל מי שידעו הוא הרצוי המקורב, ומי שסכל ידיעתו, הוא הזעום המרוחק. ולפי ערך הידיעה והסכלות יהיה הרצון והזעם והקרבה והריחוק.

"Not one who only fasts and prays, but instead one who knows Him, he is the desired one who is drawn near. The senseless one is distanced and draws anger. Exactly proportionate to one’s wisdom or foolishness is one’s closeness or separation."

~

So, the Alshich says, talk is cheap; mere tefilla is not enough. You have to live the Middos. The Rambam says, mere tefilla is not enough. You have to understand, to know, the Middos. The Panim Yafos says "amira," and maybe he really means simple recital. More likely he would agree with the Rambam, that it requires at least an awareness and understanding of the Middos.

~

Now please don't go telling me that they agree, because you can't live them unless you understand them, and once you know them, you will live them. That may be true, but it is irrelevant. The Rambam and the Alshich are saying totally different things, Period.

~

And don't go looking at the Tomer Dvorah for help in determining how the Tzefas people defined the Middos, because he only works with the passuk of "mi keil komocho," which alludes to the Middos. He very carefully does not mention even once exactly which words in the passuk in Ki Sisa the Middos comprise.

Also, note that after the chet hameraglim, Moshe used an incomplete set of the middos, and see the meforshim there, including the Ramban.

~

I’ve used the Alshich to explain the din in Yoreh Dei'ah 265 about Sande’ka’us being like bringing ketores, and Rabbeinu Peretz’s shittah that one should not be sandek for more than one of a person’s children, because the Gemara says that bringing the Ketores made the Kohen wealthy, and in order to distribute the segula as widely as possible, no Kohen was allowed to be maktir the Ketores twice. Since Sande'ka'us is like bringing Ketores, he says, one should not be a sandek twice for children from one family. The Gaon says not to worry about it, because he hasn't seen anyone becoming rich from being a sandek. I said that can answer the Gaon's kashe the same way the Alshich answered his kashe: It's not enough to be the sandek or to be maktir the ketores-- you have to become the ketores. It's a great line, and it has the smell of a truth, but it's hard to know what exactly it means. Maybe having a good smell, i.e., a good reputation. Maybe it means being m’kareiv avaryanim, like the chelb’nah, as the Rambam stresses in 8 Tefilla 1. The connection to Bris Millah is that there is one thing that distinguishes us from Gentiles, and also engenders within us a great kedusha, and that is the Bris Millah, the sign of the covenant with God. One must be aware of the potential for kedusha it represents, and also that every single Jew, every Mahul, is part of the Covenant; Kol Yisrael yeish lahem cheilek; and so our sense of arvus, our loyalties and empathies, should actively extend to every Ben Bris, of all stripes, from Meretz to Neturei Karta to normal people like me... and you. Distasteful as it can be, we are all Guf Echad and we all have the potential to add something important to Klal Yisrael. But it certainly doesn’t mean the mere ma'aseh kof of haktarah/sandeka'us.

~

By the way: I said in the beginning that the Alshich's question is surprising, and that if a student asked it, we would be disturbed at his apparent lack of faith. The truth is that the Alshich wouldn't have written the kashe in the sefer unless he had a teretz that he thought adequately answered it, as the Ra'avad says in Deios on Yedi'ah Ube'chira.

Rav Moshe Alshich (1508 - 1593, Tzfas), known as the Alshich Hakadosh, was a student of Rav Yoseph Caro in Tzefas. Among the Alshich's students was Rav Chaim Vital. The Livnas Hasapir is, as you can tell from the name, a Kabbalah Sefer, from, I'm told, the twelve hundreds.

~

Purim: A Guest Post from Reb Anonymous Drush Guy

Here is something a commenter sent. I think it is very nice, and I hope you enjoy it.
Yasher Koach!

Who was the true hero of this miracle? The Megilla seems to indicate that the victory was won only by the combination of Mordechai and Esther. In what sense is that so? And why is Mordechai Hatzadik the only individual in Tanach whose lineage from both his mother's and father's side is mentioned?

Why was Esther such an essential figure? What was her specific contribution? For this we must understand that the battle is fought as much on a spiritual battleground as it is on a physical one. We can now rephrase the question: What gave Esther her spiritual domination over the power of Amalek?

Perhaps this is the answer.
The power of Amalek comes from Eisav. Eisav had one spiritual power above his brother Yakov– his almost perfect respect for his father. Esther was an orphan, raised without a mother or father. This, ironically, means that Esther was not weakened by an imperfect Kibud Av Ve’em. Even though Eisav's respect of parents was of greater than his Brother Yakov's, Esther was not at a disadvantage, as she never failed in any duty to her parents. Now: it may be true that she didn't have any imperfection in her mitzvas Kibbud, but oneis lav ke'mahn de'avid, being prevented from doing an act is not the same as having done it. But that is not the case here: Not only was she not weakened by imperfect Kibbud Av Ve'eim, one can assume that she wished, with all her heart, that she had parents she could honor, and Chazal tell us that Hashem deems one who wants to do a mitzvah but is unable to fulfill it as if that person has fulfilled the mitzvah. In theory, each of us wants to do proper Kibbud Av Ve'eim, but in real life, the Yeitzer Hora gets in the way. Esther, on the other hand, had only the pure desire to do the perfect Kibbud Av Ve'eim. So in a sense, her Kibbud Av was not only unflawed, it could be viewed as perfectly done.

Step two brings us to the second element– Mordechai. The original question has yet to be addressed: why the double lineage? Let us once again return to Eisav. His strong point was his profound respect and concern for his parents--except in one situation. This perfect son sent his own son Elifaz to kill Yakov. Where was his concern for his parents’ suffering here? Didn’t he care that the death of Yakov would be a terrible blow for Yitchak and Rivka? So perhaps we have found the fatal flaw in the merit of Amalek! But, unfortunately, we lost our advantage, because the Shvatim sold Yosef and told their father Yakov that Yosef had been killed. So it seems that once again, we are at a disadvantage. But–at the selling of Yosef, were all the brothers involved? No we have one individual that was untainted by this blemish, and that is Binyamin, who was not involved in the sale in any way, neither in the sale nor by instigating the sale by bearing tales to Yakov, as Yosef did.. The perfect pawn in our game of spiritual chess, he was not involved as he was not born and can not be held responsible.


If so, you might ask, Mordechai should only need a lineage to Binyamin. Why was the Yehuda lineage important too? Because there is another valid complaint against Klal Yisrael– our treatment of a certain Princess Timna, Amalek’s grandmother. Timna, a gentile, so much so wanted to be connected to Avraham's family, but she was rejected when she came to convert. In desperation for some connection, she went and became a concubine to Elifaz and said "better to be a maidservant amongst the children of Avraham (as Elifaz was his Grandchild) than a Princess among the other nations" Here again it seems we have a problem in our treatment of people trying to join Klal Yisroel. And that flaw is countered by the Yehuda linage. Shevet Yehuda is the model of behavior for accepting of Geirim! Yehuda married a Canaanite Giyores named Shua and then another Giyores named Tamar. Than later, his descendant Boaz married Rus, another convert. We have come full circle, and now we can see how both Mordechai and Esther, and Mordechai lineage from both Yehuda and Binyamin, were essential to the victory over Amalek.

Homer Bshem Omro Mevi Es Hageulah
דברי מהרי''א

UPDATE 2021

Rabbi Avraham Bukspan, the man of remarkable bekiyus, told me that as long as we were being sensitive to מביא גאולה לעולם, I should know that this vort is to be found, step by step, in the Yaaros Devash from Reb Yonasan Eibschutz (drush 2 vol 2 page 25.) That being the case, we will assume that the "מהרי"א" that was cited was not meant (as is most often the case) to refer to Rav Yehuda Assad, the successor of the Chasam Sofer, but rather to Rav Yonasan Eibshutz.

A Story from Old Lithuania

This is a true story. My father zatzal knew the people involved. Make of it what you want.

There was a Rov in the small town of Pompian, known in Lithuanian as Pumpenai (http://www.maplandia.com/lithuania/panevezys/pasvalio/pumpenai/), and he was called the Pompianer Rov. He had only one daughter, an intellectually gifted young woman, and it was a very small town, with little to do or with whom to do it, and so, he learned with her. She was a diligent and talented student, and she developed into a talmidah chachamah by Lithuanian standards, which means a great deal indeed.

The time came, as it does, for shidduchim. When shidduch time comes, people realize that, like it or not, they can't always do just as they please, because shidduchim, by their very nature, involve "other people," and inevitably, they will be judged by other people's standards. Bachurim knew that this Rov was a great talmid chacham, and they heard that the daughter was also a melumedes, and so shidduchim were proposed, discussed and presented. Bachurim would come in to the Rov, and he would talk in learning with them, and as often as not, the bachur would say something, and the girl would interject and say "es iz nit emes! Shteit fahrkehrt...." or, "stahm ge'dreit ah kop," or some other frank and forthright assessment of the young man's scholarly attainments.

Many suitors did not find this endearing. As time passed, her reputation among the Bnei Torah in the Yeshivos ensured that fewer and fewer prospects were willing to step into the line of fire.

Eventually, she and her father had to accept the realities of the situation, and she married the only man that wasn't intimidated by her gadlus batorah-- a Karpuln macher, a man who made lasts for cobblers. He was a total am ha'aretz, (although that, too, was by Lithuanian standards, and in America, maybe he would be the Rabbi of a shul or say a daf yomi shiur,) and when bachurim would come into their home to talk to his wife in learning, he didn't understand a thing that was being said, but he was proud that his wife was so respected and sought after, and he would sit on the side and smile.

The end.

Some facts have been changed just in case someone from the family survived and would be offended by the story. For example, there actually were two daughters, but only one learned with the father. Also, Pompian was not really that small, it was just not far from Ponevezh, so all the action was out of town.