The Torah teaches that out of court, give charity, lend money to bad prospects, leave gleanings for the poor. But in court, we cannot favor the poor. If a nasty old scrooge of a rich man claims that a poor man owes him some trivial sum for having made some innocent error, we judge the case by the book and pasken just as we would if the parties were reversed. Rashi here-- You should NOT say "He is poor, and the rich man is duty bound to support him...I should find in favor of the poor man so he will receive his due with self respect."
Outside of court, we are personally and communally obligated to support the poor and downtrodden. But in the courtroom, within the parameters of legal analysis and court judgment, we may never take into consideration who the parties are. In the courtroom, the letter of the law is all that matters. So the rule is as clear as day, right? Wrong #1.
The Bach in CM 12 (4), at the end, arguing on the Beis Yosef and the Rosh, cites the Mordechai and paskens the following:
"And so all Jewish courts are noheig, to force the rich man to do what is proper and right even if the law is not so."
Please go and see the Bach inside. It's fascinating.
This seems to be directly contrary to what we assume to be pshat in our passuk. Even if you say the Bach is talking about pshara (that would be Wrong #2; he's talking about Din Torah,) what difference does that make? They came to a Beis Din for din of some sort, not to be told to give tzedakah. And if you say that the court paskens by the book, but separately forces the rich man to waive his claim, that would be Wrong #3. Look at the Bach inside and his rayah from the Gemara in Ha'umnin.
Talk to dayanim, and they'll tell you that nobody does like the Bach. Talk to people who have lost in a Din Torah, they'll tell you that the Dayanim do exactly the opposite of the Bach. Wrongs #4 and #5. But I'm really not interested in what Batei Din do or don't do. I just want to understand how the Bach understood the passuk in Parshas Kedoshim.
Wednesday, April 29, 2009
Tuesday, April 28, 2009
Asceticism
What do Chazal say about asceticism? Do they encourage or discourage prishus, self-abnegation? The answer, as usual, is, Yes, they do. Chazal say many things on the topic of Prishus that appear contradictory, because they wanted us not to just lean back in our La-Z-Boys and read some half-baked, populist, pre-digested pamphlet about hashkafa, but instead that we spend serious time and effort investigating what underlying ideas inform our Hashkafa.
If you are hoping for a simple, satisfying, and two dimensional pshat that you can say over at a shmorg, I can't help you. Having said that, I offer some thoughts about Prishus, Asceticism in our Mesorah.
Chazal say (Brachos 7b) "gadol shimusha shel Torah yoser mi'limuda," personal association with rabbeim is greater than study." This dictum, while universally applicable, is absolutely fundamental to understanding matters of Hashkafa. Learning hashkafa only from books is certainly problematic, often futile, and occasionally dangerous. My approach is colored by my experience with the Gedolim with whom I have had a personal association sufficiently close as to give me some insight into their hashkafas hachaim. Whether I am transmitting that light faithfully, or polarizing or filtering it, is a question I certainly cannot answer.
http://havolim.blogspot.com/2007/04/kedoshim-vayikra-192-kedoshim-tihyu.html
http://havolim.blogspot.com/2008/05/kedoshim-vayikra-192-kedoshim-tihiyu.html
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If you are hoping for a simple, satisfying, and two dimensional pshat that you can say over at a shmorg, I can't help you. Having said that, I offer some thoughts about Prishus, Asceticism in our Mesorah.
Chazal say (Brachos 7b) "gadol shimusha shel Torah yoser mi'limuda," personal association with rabbeim is greater than study." This dictum, while universally applicable, is absolutely fundamental to understanding matters of Hashkafa. Learning hashkafa only from books is certainly problematic, often futile, and occasionally dangerous. My approach is colored by my experience with the Gedolim with whom I have had a personal association sufficiently close as to give me some insight into their hashkafas hachaim. Whether I am transmitting that light faithfully, or polarizing or filtering it, is a question I certainly cannot answer.
http://havolim.blogspot.com/2007/04/kedoshim-vayikra-192-kedoshim-tihyu.html
http://havolim.blogspot.com/2008/05/kedoshim-vayikra-192-kedoshim-tihiyu.html
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Monday, April 27, 2009
Achrei Mos, Vayikra 16:32. Lecha’hein tachas aviv. Hereditary Entitlement and Meritocracy in Torah Judaism.
(This is a re-post. It has been expanded, and is now one of two articles on nepotism/hereditary entitlement. The other post deals with Moshe Rabbeinu's prayer that his kingship be inherited by his son/s, and Hashem's not granting that request.)
Here, and in Titzaveh, Shemos 29:30, the passuk teaches us that the position of Kehunah Gedolah is inherited from one's father. Obviously, all Kohanim descend from Aharon. But among the Kohanim, the son of the Kohein Gadol inherits his father’s position. Rav Shternbuch, in his Taam Vodaas in Shemos 29, tells the following story. (The italicized portion is from Oizer Alport’s ParshaPotpourri.)
A controversy once broke out when the Rav of a small town in Europe passed away. The leaders of the community wanted to appoint an outsider to take his place, while one of the Rav’s sons argued that he was suited for the position and deserved precedence as the inheritor of his deceased father. The two sides agreed to bring the dispute to the Chofetz Chaim for resolution.
The Chofetz Chaim began by agreeing that Jewish law recognizes that all religious positions, including Rabbinical appointments, are subject to be inherited by the offspring of the deceased. However, the Gemora in Yoma (72b) distinguishes between the son of the Kohen Gadol, who may inherit his father’s purely religious position, and the son of the Kohen Mashuach Milchama (the Kohen who leads the Jews to battle), who may not. Because the latter position is uniquely intended for a man of war and is not purely a religious function, the fact that somebody was suited for the role is irrelevant to his son’s capacity to inherit and fill the position.
The Chofetz Chaim explained that it was once true that the function of the Rav of a community was purely religious in nature – to render legal rulings and to teach the people – and his children were legally entitled to be offered the position before other candidates were considered.
However, he continued, this has unfortunately changed due to the assault of various anti-religious movements on traditional standards and values. As a result, the role of the Rav has been transformed into that of a general leading his troops into a fierce battle, regarding which the Gemora rules that the children are not entitled to automatic precedence in inheriting and filling the position of the deceased!
A thoughtful reading of this story does raise some questions. If the Chofetz Chaim would have said that inherited position is the standard law of the Torah, we could understand that. But it is hard to see the difference between rabbinic religious positions and pastoral positions. Does he mean that religious functions are sinecures, that we don’t care if the man is capable? Doesn’t kehunah gedola, or any religious position, require certain talents or at least aptitude? Why should the Mashu’ach Milchama position be more important in the sense that we really have to get the best suited candidate, that it is a merit-based appointment, while kehunah gedolah is transferred on the basis of familial privilege, of chazakah?(The rule of inherited authority applies to the crown as well. If an heir is qualified, albeit minimally, the crown is his, despite the abundance of far more talented alternatives. Please don't tell me that hereditary succession is peaceful and orderly: I am still looking for a royal succession in Tanach that didn't involve bloodshed, often the killing of the closest relatives in order to gain the position, a minhag that we, the upholders of tradition, have proudly continued in recent years.
Metaphor
On the other hand, it is possible that the rigid and perhaps irrational rule of inherited succession, messy as it turned out to be, is better than a free for all beauty contest, which would be impossible to win decisively and would guarantee a bloody, endless civil war every time a king died. I think that the "best form of government" may be one of the ineluctable, immutable, distinctions among the three Noahide families; we Semites don't do well with Democracy.)
In any case, back to the question on the Chafetz Chaim. Why does inherited rule make more sense in a religious capacity than for the Mashu'ach Milchama? The answer is this:
When the kohen gadol does the avodah, it is not he alone that is standing there doing the avodah. It is him, and his father, and his father’s father, lo, unto the earliest times.
(When I first said this, at the Shabbas table, my wife, Ms. Bor Sid She'einah Me'abeid Tipah, intoned the whole pre-battle speech from a certain re-imagining of Beowulf which she had seen:
"Lo, there do I see my father. Lo, there do I see my mother, and my sisters, and my brothers. Lo, there do I see the line of my people, stretching back to the beginning. They call to me; they bid me to take my place among them, in Valhalla, where the brave may live...forever." I mention this because it is an excellent portrayal of the strength that might be accessible to one who sees himself as a link in an ancient chain.)
click here
In spiritual matters, when you stand before Hashem, you stand at the center of a great cloud of the past and the future. So of course, we want a man whose ancestors and descendants are all kohanim gedolim.
By the Mashu’ach Milchama, on the other hand, while of course we need an individual who is a tzadik, more importantly we need a man that can inspire the soldiers to courage and bravery. We don’t give a hoot about his father. (So my wife’s sonorous declamation was, in a sense, inapposite: there, he was summoning up and embracing his brave heritage and fate, while my whole point here is that zechus avos is more important in a religious function than it is in a mashuach milchomo. But it’s a great way to communicate an emotional understanding of the idea that the Kohen Gadol doesn’t go in alone.)
In the interest of scholarship not being eclipsed by showmanship, there are several things that need to be added.
We cited a Chofetz Chaim above regarding Rabbonus being hereditary. In fact, this is a very contested issue. Just as an indicator of how difficult the practical halacha is, in the Kol Kisvei Chafetz Chaim there is a letter from him about a din torah he was involved in: after Reb Naftoli Trop died, his position as Magid Shiur was given to the CC's son in law, and the Trops were not happy. In settlement, the yeshiva gave one position to a Trop, and a monetary settlement to a Trop son in law.
The various medroshim and the Rambam, (such as the Sifra in Shmini on the sons of Aharon, and the Sifra in Tzaz, Vayikra 6, and the Sifri in Devorim 17:20, who all say that Kehuna Gedola and Malchus and Srarah are inherited, and the Medrash in Koheles that says that while Kehuna and Malchus are inherited, Rabbonus is not, since the Keser Torah is available freely to anyone and is not restricted in any way by rights of inheritance, and the Rambam in Klei Hamikdash that says that Malchus, Kehuna Gedolah, and other minuyim are inherited, but only if the heir is worthy of the position "either in Chachma or in Yir'as Shamayim,",) are not nearly as interesting as the more recent poskim.
The more recent poskim that discuss this all basically 'agree' that Malchus and Kehuna Gedola are inherited. They all agree that 'Purely Torah' positions, like saying the Beis Medrash shiur, are not. The issue seems mostly to be which category does Rabbanus or being a Rosh Yeshiva go into-- malchus/serara, or Torah. If Malchus, then they are inherited. If Torah, they are not.
So, the Rama in YD 245 says there is yerusha in Rabbanus. (The Magen Avraham in OC 53 brings the Teshuvos Harashba that the position of Chazzan is inherited. I know an otherwise sane man, whose father was a Chazan, and who thinks he has a beautiful voice, and who, when he davens for the amud, is memareik a lot of aveiros in his listening audience, not through dveikus, but through yesurim.)
But: the Aruch Hashulchan there in YD 245 says there is absolutely no preference given to the son of a Rov. And the Chasam Sofer says the same thing in Teshuvos OC 12.
On the other hand, the Chasam Sofer in the very next teshuva seems to qualify the strong statements in the above cited teshuva. And (no kidding) the Chasidishe perspective, even the Avnei Nezer and the Maharsham, is that Rabbonus is primarily Malchus and is inherited.
An interesting and very fiercely litigated issue arises where the position comprises both Torah and Serara. Torah is not subject to Yerusha; but along with the Torah position comes Serara- power and money. Arguments will arise as to which is the primary function, the Torah or the Serara. This would be less of an issue with Roshei Yeshiva than it is with Rebbes. But lets assume that the two functions are or could be independent. Does the latter follow the former? Or perhaps an argument could be made that upon the death of the holder of the position, the two aspects should be divided, with the Serara going to a heir and the Torah position going to the person with the greatest aptitude. And, of course, there is the usual fight about where the position is definitely inheritable, and the holder of the position didn't write a Tzava'a, but clearly expressed his preference for someone who is not first in line in the law of yerusha. Do we apply the strict law of yerusha, where we don't care about unwritten wishes, or do we say that in communal matters, where theoretically the needs of the community should have given some weight, the statements should be given the force of law?
Here, and in Titzaveh, Shemos 29:30, the passuk teaches us that the position of Kehunah Gedolah is inherited from one's father. Obviously, all Kohanim descend from Aharon. But among the Kohanim, the son of the Kohein Gadol inherits his father’s position. Rav Shternbuch, in his Taam Vodaas in Shemos 29, tells the following story. (The italicized portion is from Oizer Alport’s ParshaPotpourri.)
A controversy once broke out when the Rav of a small town in Europe passed away. The leaders of the community wanted to appoint an outsider to take his place, while one of the Rav’s sons argued that he was suited for the position and deserved precedence as the inheritor of his deceased father. The two sides agreed to bring the dispute to the Chofetz Chaim for resolution.
The Chofetz Chaim began by agreeing that Jewish law recognizes that all religious positions, including Rabbinical appointments, are subject to be inherited by the offspring of the deceased. However, the Gemora in Yoma (72b) distinguishes between the son of the Kohen Gadol, who may inherit his father’s purely religious position, and the son of the Kohen Mashuach Milchama (the Kohen who leads the Jews to battle), who may not. Because the latter position is uniquely intended for a man of war and is not purely a religious function, the fact that somebody was suited for the role is irrelevant to his son’s capacity to inherit and fill the position.
The Chofetz Chaim explained that it was once true that the function of the Rav of a community was purely religious in nature – to render legal rulings and to teach the people – and his children were legally entitled to be offered the position before other candidates were considered.
However, he continued, this has unfortunately changed due to the assault of various anti-religious movements on traditional standards and values. As a result, the role of the Rav has been transformed into that of a general leading his troops into a fierce battle, regarding which the Gemora rules that the children are not entitled to automatic precedence in inheriting and filling the position of the deceased!
A thoughtful reading of this story does raise some questions. If the Chofetz Chaim would have said that inherited position is the standard law of the Torah, we could understand that. But it is hard to see the difference between rabbinic religious positions and pastoral positions. Does he mean that religious functions are sinecures, that we don’t care if the man is capable? Doesn’t kehunah gedola, or any religious position, require certain talents or at least aptitude? Why should the Mashu’ach Milchama position be more important in the sense that we really have to get the best suited candidate, that it is a merit-based appointment, while kehunah gedolah is transferred on the basis of familial privilege, of chazakah?(The rule of inherited authority applies to the crown as well. If an heir is qualified, albeit minimally, the crown is his, despite the abundance of far more talented alternatives. Please don't tell me that hereditary succession is peaceful and orderly: I am still looking for a royal succession in Tanach that didn't involve bloodshed, often the killing of the closest relatives in order to gain the position, a minhag that we, the upholders of tradition, have proudly continued in recent years.
Metaphor
On the other hand, it is possible that the rigid and perhaps irrational rule of inherited succession, messy as it turned out to be, is better than a free for all beauty contest, which would be impossible to win decisively and would guarantee a bloody, endless civil war every time a king died. I think that the "best form of government" may be one of the ineluctable, immutable, distinctions among the three Noahide families; we Semites don't do well with Democracy.)
In any case, back to the question on the Chafetz Chaim. Why does inherited rule make more sense in a religious capacity than for the Mashu'ach Milchama? The answer is this:
When the kohen gadol does the avodah, it is not he alone that is standing there doing the avodah. It is him, and his father, and his father’s father, lo, unto the earliest times.
(When I first said this, at the Shabbas table, my wife, Ms. Bor Sid She'einah Me'abeid Tipah, intoned the whole pre-battle speech from a certain re-imagining of Beowulf which she had seen:
"Lo, there do I see my father. Lo, there do I see my mother, and my sisters, and my brothers. Lo, there do I see the line of my people, stretching back to the beginning. They call to me; they bid me to take my place among them, in Valhalla, where the brave may live...forever." I mention this because it is an excellent portrayal of the strength that might be accessible to one who sees himself as a link in an ancient chain.)
click hereIn spiritual matters, when you stand before Hashem, you stand at the center of a great cloud of the past and the future. So of course, we want a man whose ancestors and descendants are all kohanim gedolim.
By the Mashu’ach Milchama, on the other hand, while of course we need an individual who is a tzadik, more importantly we need a man that can inspire the soldiers to courage and bravery. We don’t give a hoot about his father. (So my wife’s sonorous declamation was, in a sense, inapposite: there, he was summoning up and embracing his brave heritage and fate, while my whole point here is that zechus avos is more important in a religious function than it is in a mashuach milchomo. But it’s a great way to communicate an emotional understanding of the idea that the Kohen Gadol doesn’t go in alone.)
In the interest of scholarship not being eclipsed by showmanship, there are several things that need to be added.
We cited a Chofetz Chaim above regarding Rabbonus being hereditary. In fact, this is a very contested issue. Just as an indicator of how difficult the practical halacha is, in the Kol Kisvei Chafetz Chaim there is a letter from him about a din torah he was involved in: after Reb Naftoli Trop died, his position as Magid Shiur was given to the CC's son in law, and the Trops were not happy. In settlement, the yeshiva gave one position to a Trop, and a monetary settlement to a Trop son in law.
The various medroshim and the Rambam, (such as the Sifra in Shmini on the sons of Aharon, and the Sifra in Tzaz, Vayikra 6, and the Sifri in Devorim 17:20, who all say that Kehuna Gedola and Malchus and Srarah are inherited, and the Medrash in Koheles that says that while Kehuna and Malchus are inherited, Rabbonus is not, since the Keser Torah is available freely to anyone and is not restricted in any way by rights of inheritance, and the Rambam in Klei Hamikdash that says that Malchus, Kehuna Gedolah, and other minuyim are inherited, but only if the heir is worthy of the position "either in Chachma or in Yir'as Shamayim,",) are not nearly as interesting as the more recent poskim.
The more recent poskim that discuss this all basically 'agree' that Malchus and Kehuna Gedola are inherited. They all agree that 'Purely Torah' positions, like saying the Beis Medrash shiur, are not. The issue seems mostly to be which category does Rabbanus or being a Rosh Yeshiva go into-- malchus/serara, or Torah. If Malchus, then they are inherited. If Torah, they are not.
So, the Rama in YD 245 says there is yerusha in Rabbanus. (The Magen Avraham in OC 53 brings the Teshuvos Harashba that the position of Chazzan is inherited. I know an otherwise sane man, whose father was a Chazan, and who thinks he has a beautiful voice, and who, when he davens for the amud, is memareik a lot of aveiros in his listening audience, not through dveikus, but through yesurim.)
But: the Aruch Hashulchan there in YD 245 says there is absolutely no preference given to the son of a Rov. And the Chasam Sofer says the same thing in Teshuvos OC 12.
On the other hand, the Chasam Sofer in the very next teshuva seems to qualify the strong statements in the above cited teshuva. And (no kidding) the Chasidishe perspective, even the Avnei Nezer and the Maharsham, is that Rabbonus is primarily Malchus and is inherited.
An interesting and very fiercely litigated issue arises where the position comprises both Torah and Serara. Torah is not subject to Yerusha; but along with the Torah position comes Serara- power and money. Arguments will arise as to which is the primary function, the Torah or the Serara. This would be less of an issue with Roshei Yeshiva than it is with Rebbes. But lets assume that the two functions are or could be independent. Does the latter follow the former? Or perhaps an argument could be made that upon the death of the holder of the position, the two aspects should be divided, with the Serara going to a heir and the Torah position going to the person with the greatest aptitude. And, of course, there is the usual fight about where the position is definitely inheritable, and the holder of the position didn't write a Tzava'a, but clearly expressed his preference for someone who is not first in line in the law of yerusha. Do we apply the strict law of yerusha, where we don't care about unwritten wishes, or do we say that in communal matters, where theoretically the needs of the community should have given some weight, the statements should be given the force of law?
Sunday, April 19, 2009
Tazria, Vayikra 13:3. A Kohen Must See the Tzara'as.
The Torah says that if a nega appears, only a kohen may pasken whether it is Tzara'as. If he is not a Talmid Chacham, he has to take a lamden with him to tell him what to pasken. But the Kohen has to examine the nega'im, and, ultimately, he has to pasken.
Rabbi Dr. Gary Schreiber pointed out that the avoda of the miluim, the process by which the Kohanim were inaugurated, has similarities to the tahara process of the metzora. If you carefully compare the two, you will find that they have avodos in common which are rarely found elsewhere. He said an excellent, and, I think, new, pshat that explains both connections of Kehuna to Tzara'as.
A kohen is subject to the temptation of gaavah, because of his entitlements (the twenty four Matnos Kehuna) and his kedusha (which enables him to do the avodah and requires him to be tahor). Also, Kohanim are aware of everyone’s sins, because whoever brings a korban chatas has to be misvadeh; furthermore, when someone brings a chatas, he has to clearly explain to the Beis Din of the Kohanim why he is bringing it, so they can be sure that the Korban Chatas is indeed required and that it is not chulin ba'azara. So he might say lashon hora. This is a dangerous position to be in: you are born with superior kedusha, Klal Yisrael has to sweat to wrest a living from the earth while you sit at home and get your food-- grain, fruit and meat-- delivered tied with a bow, and you are privy to all their embarrasing failures and sins. It would not be surprising if Kohanim viewed the rest of Klal Yisrael as if they were a bunch of donkeys. This natural tendency to ga'avah and lashon hara can bring Tzara'as.
So the Torah says that the kohanim must personally look at nega’im. They need to see what the result of gaavah and lashon hara are. This constant visual reinforcement will help them control their yetzer hora. Very few oncologists smoke, and many dermatologists obssesively avoid exposure to sunlight, because day after day they see the deadly results of irresponsible and self destructive behavior; so, too, Kohanim are obligated to closely examine the nega'im of Tzara'as, and this will remind them to eschew the traits that bring Tzara'as - Ga'avah and Lashon Hara.
And this explains why the Avodas HaMilu'im recalls Taharas Metzora. The foundation ritual of Kehuna mirrors the taharas metzora process, so that every kohen will read this parsha and remember that the superior status he was granted brought with it a concomitant danger, and that every day he must be on guard against the temptations of ga'avah and lashon hara. Indeed, this concept is found in the Bracha the Kohanim give Klal Yisrael: Yevarechacha Hashem Veyishmerecha: every blessing brings along a heightened risk and the need for shemira. Kohanim, too, are blessed with many things, and these blessings create the need for greater shemira.
(Dr. Schreiber's words:
"...the similarity between the avoda of the taharas hametzora and the miluim of the kohanim which requires blood placed on the the bohanos of each of them. The kohen will hopefully carry the initial impression with him through his years of avodah and refrain from the failings that lead to one becoming a metzora.")
Update 2017: R Avrohom Bukspan sent a comment that connects a Medrash on this inyan. Vayikra Rabba 15.
רבי בשם רבי חמא בר חנינא:
צער גדול היה לו למשה בדבר, כך הוא כבודו של אהרן אחי להיות רואה את הנגעים?!
אמר ליה הקב"ה: לא נהנה (אותו) מהם כ"ד מתנות?
מתלא אמר: דאכיל בהדי קורא ילקה בהדי קילא, (= האוכל מן הקור לוקה מן הקורה).
There are too many pshatim on the words דאכיל בהדי קורא so we won't go into that, but, as I responded to Reb Avrohom,
Very interesting pshat in the Medrash. Pashtus, it means that if a person shares his blessings with you, you can't turn your back on him when he's suffering and say it has nothing to do with you, you have to share his pain as well. But the way you're connecting it to this pshat, it's Chazal's way of describing what Gaavah is all about- that when it comes to taking, you think you're entitled, so that when the man needs sympathy, you don't feel any obligation to him. "I took because I deserve, and it's an honor for him to give me. I owe nothing to him!" So the Torah says, no. It was a gift, and you should be makir tov to the extent that his pain is your pain.
Update 2021:
Just to outline the similarities between Taharas Metzora and Chinuch Kohanim and Leviim. Chinuch Leviim is in Behaaloscha, and Kohanim is in Tzav.
1. Taglachas:
Metzora, (ויקרא יד, ט)
וְהָיָה בַיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי יְגַלַּח אֶת כׇּל שְׂעָרוֹ אֶת רֹאשׁוֹ וְאֶת זְקָנוֹ וְאֵת גַּבֹּת עֵינָיו וְאֶת־כׇּל־שְׂעָרוֹ יְגַלֵּחַ
Leviim וְהֶעֱבִירוּ תַעַר עַל כָּל בְּשָׂרָם" (במדבר ח, ז)
2. Kibus:
Metzora וְכִבֶּס אֶת בְּגָדָיו" (ויקרא יד, ט)
Leviim וְכִבְּסוּ בִגְדֵיהֶם וְהִטֶּהָרוּ" (במדבר שם)
3. Tevilla.
4. Tenufa, by Metzora on his living Korban, by the Leviim on them personally.
5. Dam and Shemen on the persons:
Metzora וְלָקַח הַכֹּהֵן מִדַּם הָאָשָׁם וְנָתַן הַכֹּהֵן עַל תְּנוּךְ אֹזֶן... וכו" (ויקרא יד, יד, י'ז)
וּמִיֶּ֨תֶר הַשֶּׁ֜מֶן אֲשֶׁ֣ר עַל־כַּפּ֗וֹ יִתֵּ֤ן הַכֹּהֵן֙ עַל־תְּנ֞וּךְ אֹ֤זֶן הַמִּטַּהֵר֙ הַיְמָנִ֔ית וְעַל־בֹּ֤הֶן יָדוֹ֙ הַיְמָנִ֔ית וְעַל־בֹּ֥הֶן רַגְל֖וֹ הַיְמָנִ֑ית עַ֖ל דַּ֥ם הָאָשָֽׁם׃
Kohanim, (ויקרא ח, כד-ל)וישחט ויקח משה מדמו ויתן על־תנוך אזן־אהרן הימנית ועל־בהן ידו הימנית ועל־בהן רגלו הימנית
ויקרב את־בני אהרן ויתן משה מן־הדם על־תנוך אזנם הימנית ועל־בהן ידם הימנית ועל־בהן רגלם הימנית
Shemen, by the Kohanim, ויקח משה משמן המשחה ומן־הדם אשר על־המזבח ויז על־אהרן על־בגדיו ועל־בניו ועל־בגדי בניו אתו ויקדש את־אהרן את־בגדיו ואת־בניו ואת־בגדי בניו אתו
UPDATE 2022.
I just saw an email from R Zweig's yeshiva in Miami. He says that the lesson of davka these three limbs is that a kohen, elevated to Keser Kehuna, holier than every other Jew, needs to be reminded that his is a position of service, not self-aggrandizement. So you put the dam on his hand, leg and ear - The kohen is charged with the work of doing for others, and going to others, and listening to others. The same lesson is taught the Metzora, who needs to change from self centered to sympathetic.
His words:
In this week’s parsha, we find Hashem giving Moshe instructions for the official installation of Aharon and his sons as kohanim – the priestly class of Bnei Yisroel. Moshe then gathers all of Bnei Yisroel to watch as he follows a step-by-step process for initiating Aharon and his sons as the kohanim.
Aside from the steps that might be expected in the process of elevating their status – immersion in a mikveh, dressing them in priestly vestments, applying and sprinkling the special anointing oil to all the vessels in the Mishkan and to Aharon and his sons as well, etc. – we find a very unusual ritual.
Several sacrifices were offered: a bull was brought as a sin offering, a ram was brought as a burnt offering, and a second ram was brought as a peace offering (see 8:22 and Rashi ad loc). Moshe then applied the blood of the peace offering to Aharon’s and his sons’ right ear lobes, right thumbs, and right big toes.
This ritual is only performed in one other place in the Torah: by the purification of a person who has been struck by tzora’as – commonly (and incorrectly) translated as leprosy.
hat is the meaning of this enigmatic ritual and what is the relationship between initiating the kohanim and cleansing one who has recovered from tzora’as?
Aharon and his sons were being elevated to a new status over the rest of the Jewish people. They were now receiving forevermore one of the three crowns that Hashem gifted to this world; they were receiving the crown of kehuna. Without proper perspective, being crowned can be a dangerous affair as it can easily lead one to harbor false notions of self-importance. A person can actually begin to believe that he is receiving this honor because there is something intrinsically great about himself.
The unique ritual of placing the blood on the ear lobe, thumb, and big toe is intended to address this issue. The unifying connection between all of these parts of the body is that the ears, fingers, and toes represent the person’s extremities. When a person gets cold, the first parts that are affected are the extremities – namely the ears, fingers, and toes – because they are the furthest from the core of the body. Yet, when a person is asked to point to himself, he always points to his core. Thus, by emphasizing the extremities, this ritual demonstrates that the position is not about them personally, it’s about what they can do for others.
The message they receive is that while being anointed a kohen is an honor, it is more significantly a great and awesome responsibility. The Talmud has a dispute about whether the kohanim are agents of the people to Hashem or agents of Hashem to the people, but everyone agrees that they are merely agents. In other words, they are facilitators not principals. This is the message conveyed by placing the blood on the extremities.
This is also true of a person who has been struck by tzora’as. This punishment comes as a consequence of speaking loshon hora. The core motivating force of one who speaks loshon hora is the desire to elevate oneself by putting others down. While every sin contains an element of self-centered behavior, loshon hora is the sin of focusing on the perceived importance of oneself and trying to elevate the opinions of others regarding one’s own self-importance. This is why a person needs a kohen to declare them unclean and the process of purification is the same as the kohen’s initiation. The message they are supposed to receive and internalize is that they need to focus less on themselves and their own importance.
ADDITIONAL UPDATE 2022
Dr. R' Hertzka Grinblatt offered another very good explanation for the commonality among Metzora and Kohen and Levi. He said that all three need to be kovei'a themselves in a machaneh.
The Metzora needs to be allowed into Machane Yisrael; the Levi into Machane Levi'ah; the Kohen into Machane Shechina.
This is a case of תן לחכם ויחכם עוד, and also an application of די לחכימה ברמיזה. Because you can cavil that the Metzora was already muttar to enter the machane after the Shtei Tziporim; and the Levi? He doesn't need any hetter to go into the Har HaBayis. But the point is still excellent. There are three machanos. Each of the three is the place of the parts of Klal Yisrael. For all three of these people, it is part of the process that is KOVEI'A them into their machane position. Again, I can explain it for you, I can not understand it for you.
Monday, April 6, 2009
Learning Torah in Place of Bringing Korban Pesach
In Parshas Tzav, the Chasam Sofer has Torah for Shabbos Hagadol. One of the pieces he writes is as follows.
Zos Hatorah la'olah lamincha velachatas....
Then he talks about the people who were tamei at the time the second Korban Pesach was brought, in the year after they left Mitzrayim. He says that when the people came to Moshe, and complained "We are tamei. Why should we be excluded from this great mitzvah of the Korban Pesach?" Moshe answered "Wait and I will see what God answers." He explains that Moshe's immediate response to the questioners was to apply the Gemara in Menachos: Don't worry about not being able to bring the Korban Pesach-- just sit and learn the parsha of the korban, and it will be as if you brought it. But they answered that this is not good enough, because the Korban Pesach is brought en masse, it is brought, as the Gemara says, Bich'nufya. This Kenufya cannot, they said, be achieved by learning the parsha of the Korban. Moshe Rabbeinu saw the justice of their argument, and asked Hashem what the answer was.
So we had two big problems with this Chasam Sofer.
Problem 1. If, as Moshe Rabbeinu said, 'learning' is like 'bringing', what kind of problem did they have that they would not be bichnuf'ya. Just as Reuven bringing his private korban at the same time as Shimon does creates knufya, so, too, Levi the Tamei learning the parsha while Klal Yisrael was bringing actual korbanos should join them together and give the temei'im the ma'ala of kenufya! I bring, you learn, we're all bringing the korbanos together!
So, you will answer that learning the parsha of a korban only creates a "virtual korban" insofar as intrinsic aspects of the korban are concerned, and kenufya is extrinsic. (Or, one is a din in the cheftza, and one is a din in the gavra.) In other words, kenufya is not a din in the korban itself, it is a circumstantial din, and learning only replicates dinim in the Cheftza of the korban, not in circumstances of the gavra who is bringing it. But that is not a good answer. It is a no good answer. Because eating the korban pesach is also essential to being mekayeim the halacha of Korban Pesach; or at least, it is essential that at the time of shechita, you are fit to eat the Korban. If learning counts for "ability to eat," then learning should count for rubbing elbows also.
Problem 2. So what did Hashem answer? No problem: you can bring a Pesach Sheini. What good is that answer according to the Chasam Sofer? The whole problem was that they were missing the knufya aspect, and the Pesach Sheini is certainly not bich'nufya! As far as a Pesach "not bichnuf'ya", they could have been mekayem that at the time of the first Pesach!
My middle Brisker answered this question by saying the kenufya is only a din in the first Pesach, and one who brings it without kenuf'ya is bringing an imperfect Korban Pesach. But there is no din of Kenufya by the Pesach Sheini. That, then, would be a perfect Korban Pesach even without Kenufya.
This is a fine answer. It is simple, straigthforward, and directly resolves the question. But I still think the Chasam Sofer is tzarich iyun. The Brisker Mehalach to answer the Chasam Sofer makes Pesach Sheini like winning the gold at the Senior Olympics; you got a perfect score, but only because the bar was lowered.
Zos Hatorah la'olah lamincha velachatas....
אמר ריש לקיש מאי דכתיב (ויקרא ז) זאת התורה לעולה למנחה ולחטאת ולאשם כל העוסק בתורה כאילו הקריב עולה מנחה חטאת ואשם אמר רבא האי לעולה למנחה עולה ומנחה מיבעי ליה אלא אמר רבא כל העוסק בתורה אינו צריך לא עולה ולא חטאת ולא מנחה ולא אשם
The Gemara in the end of Menachos brings that Rava learns from this passuk that "one who learns Torah does not need the korbanos." Rava bases this on the word "La'olah," seeing the introductory article "la'" as a negative, as it is interpreted in the context of Nedarim-- 'la' as 'lo', meaning 'not.' Reish Lakish, on the other hand, learns it to mean that "one who learns Torah, it is as if he brought these korbanos." To explain the difference between these shittos, the Chasam Sofer notes that in the beginning of Tzav, each Korban is introduced with the words "zos toras ha...(whatever korban is being discussed)." Here, it does not say "la" anything. He explains that if one learns the parsha of the korban in order to understand how to bring it, then the learning, while meritorious, cannot be better than the actual bringing. This is what Reish Lakish is referring to. If, on the other hand, one learns because he loves the Torah and wants to see what God intended, such a learning elevates him above korbanos and he does need korbanos at all. Mamzer talmid chacham is greater than Kohen Gadol am ha'aretz.Then he talks about the people who were tamei at the time the second Korban Pesach was brought, in the year after they left Mitzrayim. He says that when the people came to Moshe, and complained "We are tamei. Why should we be excluded from this great mitzvah of the Korban Pesach?" Moshe answered "Wait and I will see what God answers." He explains that Moshe's immediate response to the questioners was to apply the Gemara in Menachos: Don't worry about not being able to bring the Korban Pesach-- just sit and learn the parsha of the korban, and it will be as if you brought it. But they answered that this is not good enough, because the Korban Pesach is brought en masse, it is brought, as the Gemara says, Bich'nufya. This Kenufya cannot, they said, be achieved by learning the parsha of the Korban. Moshe Rabbeinu saw the justice of their argument, and asked Hashem what the answer was.
So we had two big problems with this Chasam Sofer.
Problem 1. If, as Moshe Rabbeinu said, 'learning' is like 'bringing', what kind of problem did they have that they would not be bichnuf'ya. Just as Reuven bringing his private korban at the same time as Shimon does creates knufya, so, too, Levi the Tamei learning the parsha while Klal Yisrael was bringing actual korbanos should join them together and give the temei'im the ma'ala of kenufya! I bring, you learn, we're all bringing the korbanos together!
So, you will answer that learning the parsha of a korban only creates a "virtual korban" insofar as intrinsic aspects of the korban are concerned, and kenufya is extrinsic. (Or, one is a din in the cheftza, and one is a din in the gavra.) In other words, kenufya is not a din in the korban itself, it is a circumstantial din, and learning only replicates dinim in the Cheftza of the korban, not in circumstances of the gavra who is bringing it. But that is not a good answer. It is a no good answer. Because eating the korban pesach is also essential to being mekayeim the halacha of Korban Pesach; or at least, it is essential that at the time of shechita, you are fit to eat the Korban. If learning counts for "ability to eat," then learning should count for rubbing elbows also.
Problem 2. So what did Hashem answer? No problem: you can bring a Pesach Sheini. What good is that answer according to the Chasam Sofer? The whole problem was that they were missing the knufya aspect, and the Pesach Sheini is certainly not bich'nufya! As far as a Pesach "not bichnuf'ya", they could have been mekayem that at the time of the first Pesach!
My middle Brisker answered this question by saying the kenufya is only a din in the first Pesach, and one who brings it without kenuf'ya is bringing an imperfect Korban Pesach. But there is no din of Kenufya by the Pesach Sheini. That, then, would be a perfect Korban Pesach even without Kenufya.
This is a fine answer. It is simple, straigthforward, and directly resolves the question. But I still think the Chasam Sofer is tzarich iyun. The Brisker Mehalach to answer the Chasam Sofer makes Pesach Sheini like winning the gold at the Senior Olympics; you got a perfect score, but only because the bar was lowered.
Wednesday, April 1, 2009
Torah on Parshas Tzav, and Gebrokt
A little note about Gebrokts. To soak matza is called to brok, and soaked matza is Gebrokt, or Gebrokst, or Gebrokts. (Some European Jews do not eat Matza that has contacted water after baking, for fear that the matza contains some flour that was not properly kneaded and remained intact and might now, upon contact with water, rise. No Matza balls, no Matza Brei, and so on.) I've read that this is a german word for broken, used here because people crumble their matza and put it into soup. I find this an unlikely etymology for this grotesque little word, non-linguist that I am. In Hebrew, it's called Shru'yah: if you're want to use Yiddish for soaked matza, you would call it Geveikt, which means soaked, not Gebrokt. Also, what is it with the tz at the end of the word? If anything, it should be Gebrokt, not Gebrokts.
I would say, in the spirit of "mai apotikei, poh te'hei ka'i," that it is related to the Minchas Chavitin in Parshas Tzav. The Minchas Chavitin, (which is brought by the Kohen Gadol every day and by every kohen hediot on the first day he does avodah) is an unusual Korban Mincha, in that it is baked, and boiled, and fried, and then crumbled. The word the Torah uses for boiled is "murbeches," and "tufinei pittim" means baked and crumbled. So I suggest that gebrokts is related to "murbeches" and to "tufinei pittim," and ended up accomodating both both the German/Yiddish literal meaning of crumbled and the associated meaning of cooked, or soaked, in water, from the Hebrew of Murbeches. It is murbrokt. It probably started out as "Murbeckts," or "Murbekst," and over time turned into Gebrokts. This is not unlikely. After all, Hamantashen started out as poppy-seed-filled Mohn Tashen and devolved into prune-filled Hamantashen.
I speak, however, as an outsider. I do eat gebrokt on Pesach, and I would eat quinoa and peanuts, too, if I could A., find them with a good hechsher, and B., get my wife to make something with quinoa on Pesach with the horde of maniacal einiklach underfoot and swinging on the doors who want things they recognize. And if anyone would make a kosher le'pesach mass-market honey beer with hops, you really would need a kittel to tone down the seder.
Earlier posts on Parshas Tzav:
Sitting Shiva before the Petirah, and Celebrating Lives Well Lived.
http://havolim.blogspot.com/2008/03/tzav-vayikra-1133-umipesach-ohel-moed.html
Torah Incorporated--Embodying the Torah
http://havolim.blogspot.com/2007/03/tzav-vayikro-656-fire-on-mizeiach.html
I would say, in the spirit of "mai apotikei, poh te'hei ka'i," that it is related to the Minchas Chavitin in Parshas Tzav. The Minchas Chavitin, (which is brought by the Kohen Gadol every day and by every kohen hediot on the first day he does avodah) is an unusual Korban Mincha, in that it is baked, and boiled, and fried, and then crumbled. The word the Torah uses for boiled is "murbeches," and "tufinei pittim" means baked and crumbled. So I suggest that gebrokts is related to "murbeches" and to "tufinei pittim," and ended up accomodating both both the German/Yiddish literal meaning of crumbled and the associated meaning of cooked, or soaked, in water, from the Hebrew of Murbeches. It is murbrokt. It probably started out as "Murbeckts," or "Murbekst," and over time turned into Gebrokts. This is not unlikely. After all, Hamantashen started out as poppy-seed-filled Mohn Tashen and devolved into prune-filled Hamantashen.
I speak, however, as an outsider. I do eat gebrokt on Pesach, and I would eat quinoa and peanuts, too, if I could A., find them with a good hechsher, and B., get my wife to make something with quinoa on Pesach with the horde of maniacal einiklach underfoot and swinging on the doors who want things they recognize. And if anyone would make a kosher le'pesach mass-market honey beer with hops, you really would need a kittel to tone down the seder.
Earlier posts on Parshas Tzav:
Sitting Shiva before the Petirah, and Celebrating Lives Well Lived.
http://havolim.blogspot.com/2008/03/tzav-vayikra-1133-umipesach-ohel-moed.html
Torah Incorporated--Embodying the Torah
http://havolim.blogspot.com/2007/03/tzav-vayikro-656-fire-on-mizeiach.html
Monday, March 30, 2009
Fancy Kittels, Mixed Messages, and the Tides of Symbolism
UPDATED MARCH 2010/NISSAN '70 and APRIL 2019/NISSAN '79;
In an earlier post, which discussed Hiddur Mitzvah and conspicuous virtue, I wrote the following:
The expensively tailored frilly, lacy, kittel -- a garment that is supposed to remind us of the fragility of life and its inevitable end, a garment that symbolizes simplicity, humility, and the rejection of materialism -- is evidence of either obliviousness or insanity, and deserves a post of its own. And some pictures.
1. Don't tell me about the enormously expensive white cloak worn by the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur, the Pilusin. That is entirely different: the wearing of that garment is an intrinsic part of his Temple service, and the garment is inherently holy. Also, you don't bury him in them; on the contrary. The garment is buried after Yom Kippur and never used again.
2. Please don't tell me about Rebbes that have silk-and-silver-trimmed, fur-collared Kittels. If there are, I don't want to know about it.
3. If your wife or your father in law bought your kittel for you, then it's not your fault. It just means they love you.
HOWEVER: Lakewood Guy mentioned that his wife wants to buy him a fancy kittel for the seder. When he pointed out the incongruity of a fancy kittel, she said that he can use the fancy one for the seder, and his simple Yom Kippur kittel for his funeral le'achar mei'ah ve'esrim shanim tovim ve'aruchim. It would seem that she is making a valid point, and that the symbolism of the kittel is not at all the same on those two occassions. On Yom Kippur, it symbolizes purity from sin and reminds us of the day of death. For Yom Kippur, then, the kittel should be unadorned. At the Seder, it symbolizes Cheirus, freedom, and there is no reason to not make it beautiful. Under the chuppah, well, whether it symbolizes yom hamissah depends on who you're marrying, and whether it symbolizes purity depends on why you're marrying her.
HOWEVER II: Unfortunately, the Taz in OC 472 SK 3 says that the reason we wear a kittel at the Seder is so that our simcha doesn't get out of hand, especially after drinking four cups of wine. We wear the kittel to temper our joy by reminding ourselves of the day of our death. The Taz was a Litvak. Anyway, I haven't found anyone that disagrees with the Taz. And he means it le'halacha, because he applies the reasoning to pasken that an Aveil may wear a kittel during the first year seder. See Hilchos Yom Kippur, OC 610:4, Rama: we wear the kittel on Yom Kippur for two reasons: to symbolize angelic purity, and to remind ourselves that every passing second brings us closer to the abyss. There, too, the Taz says that the first reason would preclude an Aveil from wearing the kittel, while the second would allow it, and he follows the second reason. So: I would like to agree with LakewoodGuy's wife. The Taz, on the other hand, says she's wrong. For the sake of a healthy marriage, I would say that our wives really don't need to know about the Taz; I know my wife would find the Taz surprising. So just be quiet and let her buy you a fancy kittel for the seder.
Brief review of the teshuva: Can an aveil wear a kittel on Yom Kippur and Pesach. Answer-- there are two reasons we wear a kittel; one is joy and grandeur, Simcha and chashivus, that we are like malachei hashareis, the holy angels, and the other is to emphasize the somberness of remembering the yom hamisa and our shrouds. However, he says, the latter symbolism is utterly lost on the people of our time, and nobody gives a thought to the sobering idea of wearing the garment we will be buried in. Therefore, by default, the dominant semiotic is the former, that of simcha, and this is inappropriate for an aveil, and therefore he should not wear the kittel.
What I found interesting was his statement that the "malach" symbol applies to Pesach as well as Yom Kippur, when neither the Taz nor the Magen Avraham say that. The Taz only says "dual yom misah and malach" on Yom Kippur, but on Pesach says only yom misah. The Magen Avraham, who discourages an aveil from wearing the kittel on Pesach, does not say so because it is a symbol of chashivus and simcha, which he would if he held like Reb Moshe. Instead, he says that an aveil should not wear a kittel on Pesach because "belav hachi libo nichna," that even without the kittel his heart is humbled. If he held like Reb Moshe, he would have said that the reason for an aveil to not wear it is because of the malach/simcha/chashivus component. But no matter. Reb Moshe says it, and finished. I also found it in Rabbi Felder's sefer on Aveilus, Mourning and Remembrance, which is based on Reb Moshe's psakim.
Secondly, I found the Aruch Hashulchan in 610:2, in Hilchos Yom Kippur, that says a very similar thing. He brings the Taz about the dual symbolism, and says that, and I translate, "the main reason is because it is white and clean and a garment of honor. An additional reason is because the minhag is to use it to bury the dead, and so when wearing it, one remembers the day of death and this will help for teshuva. So an aveil should not wear it because he should not beautify himself during his aveilus." Hence, the Aruch Hashulchan is saying that the main purpose of the kittel is as a garment of honor. (I don't know if this is exactly like Reb Moshe; it seems to me that Reb Moshe, while agreeing to this in regard to current reality, would disagree as to which is the primary original meaning.)
The most remarkable thing in Reb Moshe's teshuva is his saying that the somber aspect of the kittel is, today, irrelevant, because people simply do not see it that way. Since people now see it more as a garment of honor and beauty, then that is what it means le'halachah, and it is therefore inappropriate for an aveil in the first year.
So, where do we stand? There are four interesting ideas that arise from our discussion.
1. The kittel communicates two completely different messages: the sobering reminder of how short and fleeting our lives are, and a joyous image of angelic beauty and grandeur. This one garment is intended to elicit two diametrically opposed emotions. (Rabbis: I highly recommend this topic for a drasah that discusses how the two are not, really, contradictory at all. While most relevant to Sukkos, when we beautifully decorate a dwelling that is inherently flimsy and temporary, it has relevance to the Seder as well, of course.)
2. Reb Moshe (regarding what the kittel means to the people of our time), and the Aruch Hashulchan (as a general matter), both say that the currently halachically dominant symbolism of the kittel is the second one, that of angelic beauty and grandeur, at least insofar as aveilim are concerned.
3. Therefore; according to the Aruch Hashulchan, there's nothing very wrong with a fancy kittel. It would, however, vitiate the second meaning of the kittel, and while he says the first meaning is the primary reason, that does not mean that the second reason does not exist at all. It is secondary, but still extant. The appropriate thing, then, would be to wear a kittel that can communicate both meanings. According to Reb Moshe, while a kittel really carries a somber message, it is inappropriate for Aveilim because it is perceived as a joyous garment. For the rules of the behavior of an aveilus, perception is more important than reality, because aveilus is kibbud and honor of the niftar, and honor is, by definition, subjective. So according to Reb Moshe, one might say that a fancy kittel is appropriate, or one might say that it is inappropriate, since inherently, the message is, at least partly, the reminder of yom hamissah, even if nobody knows or cares about that symbol.
But: I still say that there is no justification for totally tossing out the universally agreed meaning of the kittel as a mazkeres yom hamissah. The reasonable thing would be to wear a beged that comfortably comprises both symbolic meanings, a tabula rasa. AND THAT MEANS A SIMPLE, ELEGANT KITTEL!
4. I can be wrong too. “Certainty is not the test of certitude. We have been cocksure of many things that were not so.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
I would never read the Taz like Reb Moshe does, and the Magen Avraham almost certainly says like me, but my opinion against Reb Moshe's is a sneeze in a hurricane, and his teshuva and the Aruch Hashulchan can certainly be read as justifying fancy kittels. The Aruch Hashulchan doesn't mean that, and neither does Reb Moshe. But they can be read that way. So fancy kittels are not absurd; they are just wrong.
I still say that if your kittel is bespoke, it bespeaking about you.
Postscripts:
Perhaps the lesson of the kittel is this:
There is a minhag for married men to wear a kittel.
The reason for the minhag is unclear, and ranges all over the map.
BUT THERE IS NO MINHAG TO KNOW WHAT THE KITTEL MEANS. Most people think nothing at all, or, according to Reb Moshe, they are oblivious of its original intention. It's almost as if the minhag is to not know what it means.
So; Wear the kittel, and YOU CAN DECIDE WHAT IT MEANS TO YOU! (see, e.g., my discussion about breaking a plate at a tna'im here.)
You're a free agent. I've listed the Taz, the Magen Avraham, the Maharal, the Aruch Hashulchan, the Netziv, the Kli Yakar and Rav JB. And Reb Leibaleh Eiger and the Bnei Yissaschar. You have a nice and far ranging list of reasons for the kittel, or you can make one up, if you like.
Or, all the themes work together. Gilu bire'ada, enjoying the opportunities to do mitzvos and simply having pleasure from the gift of a beautiful Olam Hazeh that we enjoy and use for avodas Hashem, all the while remembering that we must temper our enjoyment with the unblinking awareness of our responsibilities and the limited time we have to acheive them. This is the same idea with korbanos: enjoy achilas kodshim, but remember that you are eating mishulchan gavo'ah, and that the experience should be viewed as a means of spiritual growth. It is through this human simcha shel mitzvah, a physical experience that ties our bodies to our cheilek elo'ah mima'al, that hashra'as hashechina comes.
~
In the spirit of even-handedness, here's a picture of the trim on a nice kittel, available for around $180+ at Greenfield Judaica. Better lean ALL the way over when you're drinking the arba kosos, because you don't want to get this one stained. (Update: there are much more expensive kittels available now.)
IMPORTANT UPDATE:
I recently was thinking about this, and I realized that the entire discussion is based on a fundamental and pervasive error, and everything I wrote above about the contradictory interpretations of the Kittel is wrong. I realized this just last week, when I brought up this issue at my Shabbos morning Kiddush, asking "What, exactly, is the reason we wear a Kittel at the Seder?" One of the guests, Reb Yitzchak Resnick, responded "Because it is symbolic." His words were, of course, the introduction of an discussion. But I realized that his one sentence statement is more correct than anything I had heard on the topic. His sentence was not the beginning of a discussion: it was the entire discussion. A Kittel is symbolic; it is inherently laden, or charged, with significance. It is white, it is simple, it is unusual. That is the root of the idea of a kittel. It elicits a feeling. How that set of qualities is applied varies. It has come to be used for bigdei meisim; it has come to be used to symbolize angels. It has come to symbolize separation and distinction. BUT ALL THESE THINGS ARE OUTGROWTHS OF THE INHERENTLY SYMBOLIC NATURE OF THIS GARMENT. They are not inherent explanations of why we wear the kittel at the seder: they are merely applications of the symbolic nature of this unusual garment. The real purpose of the Kittel is to elicit and stimulate a reaction and a response.
So, the answer is, we wear the kittel because it is symbolic. It is unusual; it is white; it is simple; it is clean. What specific association to the seder does the kittel have? There is no definitive answer to that question. The 'electric charge' of the kittel, the unusual quality of the kittel, the stimulus to our seder experience, is all that matters. No specific association was intended, and a multitude of interpretations are all equally valid. To a great extent, the seder experience is based on questions, and the stimulus to thought is more important than any particular answer; the kittel, too, is a question. In our tradition, every question ought to produce at least seventy answers. So, what meaning should we read into the kittel at the seder? Gilu Bir'ada is probably the best way to put it, if only because Gilu Bir'ada, by its very nature, covers the whole spectrum. But the main thing is, let your imagination fly.
I finally understand what Rav Yosef Ber Soloveichik meant in saying that " the Kittel is just another shinui." He meant exactly what we are saying here. The Kittel is a symbolic begged. What that symbol comprises changes with every generation.
ANOTHER IMPORTANT UPDATE:
I am grateful to the yungermahn at my son's kollel who directed our attention to this Matteh Ephrayim/Elef consiLamatteh in tof reish yud , The Matteh Ephraim strongly defends the minhag they used to have to use a kittel with silver around the neck. I find it very, very hard to understand, but considering that Reb Ephraim Zalman Margoliyos was recognized as a gadol in the generation of Reb Akiva Eiger,the Ketzos and the Nesivos, Reb Mordechai Bennet and the Chasam Sofer, and that he joined the Chasam Sofer in the war against the haskala, it is obvious that if there's a problem of seichel hayashar here, it is mine. This is especially true in light of his explanation of the minhag and in light of the fact that he was a fantastic gevir who made his fortune in the diamond business.
ANOTHER IMPORTANT UPDATE:
I mentioned above the sefer Mah Yakar which is hard to find online. R Yehuda Halpert kindly sent in a photo of his copy.
In an earlier post, which discussed Hiddur Mitzvah and conspicuous virtue, I wrote the following:
The expensively tailored frilly, lacy, kittel -- a garment that is supposed to remind us of the fragility of life and its inevitable end, a garment that symbolizes simplicity, humility, and the rejection of materialism -- is evidence of either obliviousness or insanity, and deserves a post of its own. And some pictures.
1. Don't tell me about the enormously expensive white cloak worn by the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur, the Pilusin. That is entirely different: the wearing of that garment is an intrinsic part of his Temple service, and the garment is inherently holy. Also, you don't bury him in them; on the contrary. The garment is buried after Yom Kippur and never used again.
2. Please don't tell me about Rebbes that have silk-and-silver-trimmed, fur-collared Kittels. If there are, I don't want to know about it.
3. If your wife or your father in law bought your kittel for you, then it's not your fault. It just means they love you.
HOWEVER: Lakewood Guy mentioned that his wife wants to buy him a fancy kittel for the seder. When he pointed out the incongruity of a fancy kittel, she said that he can use the fancy one for the seder, and his simple Yom Kippur kittel for his funeral le'achar mei'ah ve'esrim shanim tovim ve'aruchim. It would seem that she is making a valid point, and that the symbolism of the kittel is not at all the same on those two occassions. On Yom Kippur, it symbolizes purity from sin and reminds us of the day of death. For Yom Kippur, then, the kittel should be unadorned. At the Seder, it symbolizes Cheirus, freedom, and there is no reason to not make it beautiful. Under the chuppah, well, whether it symbolizes yom hamissah depends on who you're marrying, and whether it symbolizes purity depends on why you're marrying her.
HOWEVER II: Unfortunately, the Taz in OC 472 SK 3 says that the reason we wear a kittel at the Seder is so that our simcha doesn't get out of hand, especially after drinking four cups of wine. We wear the kittel to temper our joy by reminding ourselves of the day of our death. The Taz was a Litvak. Anyway, I haven't found anyone that disagrees with the Taz. And he means it le'halacha, because he applies the reasoning to pasken that an Aveil may wear a kittel during the first year seder. See Hilchos Yom Kippur, OC 610:4, Rama: we wear the kittel on Yom Kippur for two reasons: to symbolize angelic purity, and to remind ourselves that every passing second brings us closer to the abyss. There, too, the Taz says that the first reason would preclude an Aveil from wearing the kittel, while the second would allow it, and he follows the second reason. So: I would like to agree with LakewoodGuy's wife. The Taz, on the other hand, says she's wrong. For the sake of a healthy marriage, I would say that our wives really don't need to know about the Taz; I know my wife would find the Taz surprising. So just be quiet and let her buy you a fancy kittel for the seder.
After I wrote this, LkwdGuy directed me to the Igros Moshe in Yoreh Deah 4 61:7, where he writes one thing I found surprising, and one thing I found remarkable.
Brief review of the teshuva: Can an aveil wear a kittel on Yom Kippur and Pesach. Answer-- there are two reasons we wear a kittel; one is joy and grandeur, Simcha and chashivus, that we are like malachei hashareis, the holy angels, and the other is to emphasize the somberness of remembering the yom hamisa and our shrouds. However, he says, the latter symbolism is utterly lost on the people of our time, and nobody gives a thought to the sobering idea of wearing the garment we will be buried in. Therefore, by default, the dominant semiotic is the former, that of simcha, and this is inappropriate for an aveil, and therefore he should not wear the kittel.
What I found interesting was his statement that the "malach" symbol applies to Pesach as well as Yom Kippur, when neither the Taz nor the Magen Avraham say that. The Taz only says "dual yom misah and malach" on Yom Kippur, but on Pesach says only yom misah. The Magen Avraham, who discourages an aveil from wearing the kittel on Pesach, does not say so because it is a symbol of chashivus and simcha, which he would if he held like Reb Moshe. Instead, he says that an aveil should not wear a kittel on Pesach because "belav hachi libo nichna," that even without the kittel his heart is humbled. If he held like Reb Moshe, he would have said that the reason for an aveil to not wear it is because of the malach/simcha/chashivus component. But no matter. Reb Moshe says it, and finished. I also found it in Rabbi Felder's sefer on Aveilus, Mourning and Remembrance, which is based on Reb Moshe's psakim.
Secondly, I found the Aruch Hashulchan in 610:2, in Hilchos Yom Kippur, that says a very similar thing. He brings the Taz about the dual symbolism, and says that, and I translate, "the main reason is because it is white and clean and a garment of honor. An additional reason is because the minhag is to use it to bury the dead, and so when wearing it, one remembers the day of death and this will help for teshuva. So an aveil should not wear it because he should not beautify himself during his aveilus." Hence, the Aruch Hashulchan is saying that the main purpose of the kittel is as a garment of honor. (I don't know if this is exactly like Reb Moshe; it seems to me that Reb Moshe, while agreeing to this in regard to current reality, would disagree as to which is the primary original meaning.)
The most remarkable thing in Reb Moshe's teshuva is his saying that the somber aspect of the kittel is, today, irrelevant, because people simply do not see it that way. Since people now see it more as a garment of honor and beauty, then that is what it means le'halachah, and it is therefore inappropriate for an aveil in the first year.
So, where do we stand? There are four interesting ideas that arise from our discussion.
1. The kittel communicates two completely different messages: the sobering reminder of how short and fleeting our lives are, and a joyous image of angelic beauty and grandeur. This one garment is intended to elicit two diametrically opposed emotions. (Rabbis: I highly recommend this topic for a drasah that discusses how the two are not, really, contradictory at all. While most relevant to Sukkos, when we beautifully decorate a dwelling that is inherently flimsy and temporary, it has relevance to the Seder as well, of course.)
2. Reb Moshe (regarding what the kittel means to the people of our time), and the Aruch Hashulchan (as a general matter), both say that the currently halachically dominant symbolism of the kittel is the second one, that of angelic beauty and grandeur, at least insofar as aveilim are concerned.
3. Therefore; according to the Aruch Hashulchan, there's nothing very wrong with a fancy kittel. It would, however, vitiate the second meaning of the kittel, and while he says the first meaning is the primary reason, that does not mean that the second reason does not exist at all. It is secondary, but still extant. The appropriate thing, then, would be to wear a kittel that can communicate both meanings. According to Reb Moshe, while a kittel really carries a somber message, it is inappropriate for Aveilim because it is perceived as a joyous garment. For the rules of the behavior of an aveilus, perception is more important than reality, because aveilus is kibbud and honor of the niftar, and honor is, by definition, subjective. So according to Reb Moshe, one might say that a fancy kittel is appropriate, or one might say that it is inappropriate, since inherently, the message is, at least partly, the reminder of yom hamissah, even if nobody knows or cares about that symbol.
But: I still say that there is no justification for totally tossing out the universally agreed meaning of the kittel as a mazkeres yom hamissah. The reasonable thing would be to wear a beged that comfortably comprises both symbolic meanings, a tabula rasa. AND THAT MEANS A SIMPLE, ELEGANT KITTEL!
4. I can be wrong too. “Certainty is not the test of certitude. We have been cocksure of many things that were not so.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
I would never read the Taz like Reb Moshe does, and the Magen Avraham almost certainly says like me, but my opinion against Reb Moshe's is a sneeze in a hurricane, and his teshuva and the Aruch Hashulchan can certainly be read as justifying fancy kittels. The Aruch Hashulchan doesn't mean that, and neither does Reb Moshe. But they can be read that way. So fancy kittels are not absurd; they are just wrong.
I still say that if your kittel is bespoke, it bespeaking about you.
Postscripts:
- The Maharal says that the Kittel is a celebratory expression of the joy and purity created by the Seder. See Maharal page 41, where he talks about the color white being unadulterated and pure, and how this alludes to the geula which stemmed from the olam elyon without any isarusa d'le'eila or any olam hamurkav, whatever that means.
- The Netziv in his Hagada, as told to me by Chaim B., says that you wear a Kittel whenever you eat korbanos, and so we wear it while we reenact achilas Korban Pesach. I haven't taken down the hagados yet, so I haven't seen it inside, but I assume the Netziv is referring to the interesting Rambam in 10 Klei Hamikdash, the very last halacha in Hilchos Klei Hamikdash, which I bring in the comments along with something from the Lubavitcher Rebbe.
- The Malbim in his Hagada says from Reb Yechiel Heller that it comes from the Mechilta "Metzuyanim sham," because in Shabbos 145b it says that the Talmidei Chachamim in Bavel were metzuyanim in their clothing and Nedarim 20b, where it says that talmidei Chachamim are metzuyanim in their clothing like the malachei hashareis, and by malachim it says "levush habadim," and that means white. Apparently, he means that the Jews in Mitzrayim wore white clothing.
- The Sifsei Chachamim in Megilla 31a says it's a remez to techiyas hameisim, a reminder of the resurrection, which will take place during Nissan.
- Rav Yosef Ber Soloveichik said that the Kittel is just another shinui. (I didn't see this inside, either, but if he said this, I think it's just not fair. As I've written elsewhere, when Chazal say that we do things at the seder just for shinui, they were not telling us the whole story. See http://havolim.blogspot.com/2007/03/shtei-pamim-dipping-at-seder-two.html)
- A Talmid, in the comments, says that Reb Leibaleh Eiger said that it symbolizes the levanim worn by a niddah, a zav, or a zavah, who is beginning the process of tahara, and we, too, are beginning the seven weeks of preparation for Matan Torah. I really, really have issues with this 'pshat,' and I would guess that even he didn't mean it seriously. But I'm doing a list, so who cares. POSTSCRIPT: I saw a Chasam Sofer (his peirush on Mah Nishtana) that gives meaning to this pshat. The Chasam Sofer says that the Seuda and the Matzos are not like a Korban Todah, which commemorates the past. If it were, it would include Chametz. It is instead like a Korban Milu'im, or the Korban of the Nazir, which only has Matza. He explains that the purpose of the Seder is to make us realize not what happened in the past but rather what opportunities we are given for the greatest spiritual accomplishments. It is not a focus on the past, it is a focus on opportunities for the future. If so, it certainly makes sense that the Kittel would be the begged worn by a person who is beginning a new process, who takes the first step in a progress towards Mattan Torah.
- Bnei Yissaschar says that it recalls the fact Lo shinu malbusham, that wearing distinctive clothing in Mitzrayim helped us maintain our identity and contributed to the Geula. This is like the Malbim.
- Here's a creative one, quoted from the Peirush on the Hagadah called Mah Yakar, (Reb Yehuda Halpert tells us that Mah Yakar is a commentary on הגדה של פסח כלי יקר by רב יהושע חיים ; גריססגאטט who compiled all of the commentsof the Kli Yakar in other places and put them into a hagadah, and then he compiled his own commentary on the Kli Yakar comments.called Mah Yakar.) The Galus Mitzrayim was set into motion by the envy engendered by Yosef's Kesones Pasim. We wear a white, simple garment that first of all is by its simplicity and lack of color exactly the opposite of the Kesones Pasim, and also is considered the symbol of the fungible garment, as seen in the Mishna in Taanis, where the women would wear klei lavan so that they were all dressed the same. This idea stems from Rashi in Breishis where he translates ksones pasim with the word Karpas, like chur karpas ut'cheiles, and then Rabbeinu Manoach on the Rambam 8 Chametz U'Matza 2 who makes the connection between the Karpas and the Ksones Pasim. From there it's a short step to saying that the kittel is like an anti-kesones-pasim.
- That's it. I know of other explanations for the kittel, but I just can't bring myself to say over all the silly and irresponsible explanations I've seen and heard.
Perhaps the lesson of the kittel is this:
There is a minhag for married men to wear a kittel.
The reason for the minhag is unclear, and ranges all over the map.
BUT THERE IS NO MINHAG TO KNOW WHAT THE KITTEL MEANS. Most people think nothing at all, or, according to Reb Moshe, they are oblivious of its original intention. It's almost as if the minhag is to not know what it means.
So; Wear the kittel, and YOU CAN DECIDE WHAT IT MEANS TO YOU! (see, e.g., my discussion about breaking a plate at a tna'im here.)
You're a free agent. I've listed the Taz, the Magen Avraham, the Maharal, the Aruch Hashulchan, the Netziv, the Kli Yakar and Rav JB. And Reb Leibaleh Eiger and the Bnei Yissaschar. You have a nice and far ranging list of reasons for the kittel, or you can make one up, if you like.
Or, all the themes work together. Gilu bire'ada, enjoying the opportunities to do mitzvos and simply having pleasure from the gift of a beautiful Olam Hazeh that we enjoy and use for avodas Hashem, all the while remembering that we must temper our enjoyment with the unblinking awareness of our responsibilities and the limited time we have to acheive them. This is the same idea with korbanos: enjoy achilas kodshim, but remember that you are eating mishulchan gavo'ah, and that the experience should be viewed as a means of spiritual growth. It is through this human simcha shel mitzvah, a physical experience that ties our bodies to our cheilek elo'ah mima'al, that hashra'as hashechina comes.
~
In the spirit of even-handedness, here's a picture of the trim on a nice kittel, available for around $180+ at Greenfield Judaica. Better lean ALL the way over when you're drinking the arba kosos, because you don't want to get this one stained. (Update: there are much more expensive kittels available now.)
IMPORTANT UPDATE:
I recently was thinking about this, and I realized that the entire discussion is based on a fundamental and pervasive error, and everything I wrote above about the contradictory interpretations of the Kittel is wrong. I realized this just last week, when I brought up this issue at my Shabbos morning Kiddush, asking "What, exactly, is the reason we wear a Kittel at the Seder?" One of the guests, Reb Yitzchak Resnick, responded "Because it is symbolic." His words were, of course, the introduction of an discussion. But I realized that his one sentence statement is more correct than anything I had heard on the topic. His sentence was not the beginning of a discussion: it was the entire discussion. A Kittel is symbolic; it is inherently laden, or charged, with significance. It is white, it is simple, it is unusual. That is the root of the idea of a kittel. It elicits a feeling. How that set of qualities is applied varies. It has come to be used for bigdei meisim; it has come to be used to symbolize angels. It has come to symbolize separation and distinction. BUT ALL THESE THINGS ARE OUTGROWTHS OF THE INHERENTLY SYMBOLIC NATURE OF THIS GARMENT. They are not inherent explanations of why we wear the kittel at the seder: they are merely applications of the symbolic nature of this unusual garment. The real purpose of the Kittel is to elicit and stimulate a reaction and a response.
So, the answer is, we wear the kittel because it is symbolic. It is unusual; it is white; it is simple; it is clean. What specific association to the seder does the kittel have? There is no definitive answer to that question. The 'electric charge' of the kittel, the unusual quality of the kittel, the stimulus to our seder experience, is all that matters. No specific association was intended, and a multitude of interpretations are all equally valid. To a great extent, the seder experience is based on questions, and the stimulus to thought is more important than any particular answer; the kittel, too, is a question. In our tradition, every question ought to produce at least seventy answers. So, what meaning should we read into the kittel at the seder? Gilu Bir'ada is probably the best way to put it, if only because Gilu Bir'ada, by its very nature, covers the whole spectrum. But the main thing is, let your imagination fly.
I finally understand what Rav Yosef Ber Soloveichik meant in saying that " the Kittel is just another shinui." He meant exactly what we are saying here. The Kittel is a symbolic begged. What that symbol comprises changes with every generation.
ANOTHER IMPORTANT UPDATE:
I am grateful to the yungermahn at my son's kollel who directed our attention to this Matteh Ephrayim/Elef consiLamatteh in tof reish yud , The Matteh Ephraim strongly defends the minhag they used to have to use a kittel with silver around the neck. I find it very, very hard to understand, but considering that Reb Ephraim Zalman Margoliyos was recognized as a gadol in the generation of Reb Akiva Eiger,the Ketzos and the Nesivos, Reb Mordechai Bennet and the Chasam Sofer, and that he joined the Chasam Sofer in the war against the haskala, it is obvious that if there's a problem of seichel hayashar here, it is mine. This is especially true in light of his explanation of the minhag and in light of the fact that he was a fantastic gevir who made his fortune in the diamond business.
ANOTHER IMPORTANT UPDATE:
I mentioned above the sefer Mah Yakar which is hard to find online. R Yehuda Halpert kindly sent in a photo of his copy.
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